I. 1. Difference between a modal institution and an institution subject to a resolutory condition. Art. 882.

The statement of the object of the institution, or the application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed by him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention. That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation. (797a) A modal institution or institucion sub modo is one where the testator states the following: 1) the object of the institution, or 2) the purpose of the application of the property left by the testator, or 3) the charge imposed by the creator upon the heir. The statement of these matters shall not be considered as a condition unless it appears that such was the testators intention. (Art. 882). Art. 884. Conditions imposed by the testator upon the heirs shall be governed by the rules established for conditional obligations in all matters not provided for by this Section. (791a) An institution subject to a resolutory condition is a conditional testamentary disposition wherein the right to inheritance terminates upon the happening of a resolutory condition one, which has for its object, when accomplished, the revocation of the principal obligation. ANG HIRAP NITO!!! 2. Difference between fideicommisary substitution and legacy of a usufruct. Art. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further, that the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at the time of the death of the testator. (781a) Art. 869. A provision whereby the testator leaves to a person the whole or part of the inheritance, and to another the usufruct, shall be valid. If he gives the usufruct to various persons, not simultaneously, but successively, the provisions of Article 863 shall apply. (787a) In the legacy of usufruct, if the owner of the legal title or the naked owner predeceases the testator and the usufruct is alive upon the testators death, the usufructuary will enjoy the usufruct of the property until his death. Upon the death of the usufructuary, the property will revert to the estate of the testator to be distributed to the testators legal heirs. The usufructuarys heirs will get nothing. In the case of a fideicommisary substitution, if the fidei predeceases the testator, the fiduciary will get the title of the property if he is alive upon the testators death under art. 868. Thus, in a legacy of usufruct, the usufructuary can never acquire legal title over the property because the testator intended for him to enjoy only the usufruct of the property during his lifetime. While in FS, the F may acquire legal title over the property if the F predeceases the testator. Also, there is no substitution in Legacy of Usufruct but there can be Subsitution in FS. 3. Difference between reserve maxima and reserve minima. Reserva maxima holds that the reserve should apply to the property that has been gratuitously acquired from some other ascendant, brother or sister, that can be included within the legitime of the reservista, or of the estate. Reserva minima holds that all property passing to the reservista must be considered as passing partly by operation of law and partly by will of the descendant, and therefore, of the properties acquired gratuitously by the descendant from another ascendant, or brother or sister, should be reservable, and the other half should be free.

The reserve maxima is more in consonance with the original objective of reserve troncal, because it subjects to the reservation the largest amount possible. The reserva minimum, on the other hand, is based on general principles of law and is more equitable. Tolentino believes that reserve minima is more in line with the philosophy of the present Civil Code of socialization of property. 4. Difference between preterition and ineffective disinheritance. Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation. (814a) Art. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is not proved, or which is not one of those set forth in this Code, shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited; but the devises and legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will not impair the legitime. (851a) The deprivation of a compulsory heir of his legitime by the testator may be express or tacit. The express method is disinheritance; the tacit, by preterition. a. Disinheritance, being express, is always voluntary; preterition may also be voluntary, but the presumption of law is that it is voluntary. b. In disinheritance, there is some legal cause; in preterition, the law presumes that there has been merely an oversight or mistake on the part of the testator. c. In case of a valid disinheritance, the compulsory heir is totally excluded from the inheritance; and if the inheritance is not lawfully made, the compulsory heir is merely restored to his legitime. But in case of preterition in the direct line, the omitted heir gets 5. Difference between republication of a will and revival of a will. Art. 835. The testator cannot republish, without reproducing in a subsequent will, the dispositions contained in a previous one which is void as to its form. (n) Art. 836. The execution of a codicil referring to a previous will has the effect of republishing the will as modified by the codicil. (n) Art. 837. If after making a will, the testator makes a second will expressly revoking the first, the revocation of the second will does not revive the first will, which can be revived only by another will or codicil. (739a) Republication is the process of giving validity to a will which is useless or has become useless because it was void OR because it had been revoked. A will, which is void, if one wants to make it valid, should do the process of republication. Under the law, republication is accomplished in two ways: (1) re-execution and (2) reference by codicil. In re-execution, the testator has to execute his will by complying with all the formalities for making a valid will. Reference by a codicil (Art. 836) is akin to incorporation of a document. The second will simply states that the first will is incorporated or republished. Revival is the process of restoring the operation of a previously revoked will by operation of law. In revival, the validity of the will revoked is restored not by act of testator but by the act of law. 6. Discuss the rule and rationale of competency of interested witnesses. (4 interested witnesses; one legatee-heir waived) Art. 823. If a person attests the execution of a will, to whom or to whose spouse, or parent, or child, a devise or legacy is given by such will, such devise or legacy shall, so far only as concerns such person, or spouse, or parent, or child of such person, or any one claiming under such person or spouse, or parent, or child, be void, unless there are three other competent witnesses to such will. However, such person so attesting shall be admitted as a witness as if such devise or legacy had not been made or given. (n)

[Answer: No, the legatee or devisee, or his spouse, parent child, or any person claiming under them cannot receive the legacy or devise granted in a will to which the legatee or devisee is an attesting witness.] This article does not disqualify a devisee or legatee, or the spouse, parent or child of such devisee or legatee, from becoming a witness to the will. If he is credible, and not disqualified under Art. 821, he is a competent witness but the devise or legacy in his favor, or in favor of his spouse, parent or child, will be void. This article, therefore, does not refer to disqualification to be a witness, but to the disqualification to inherit. The reason behind Art. 823 is that the devisee/ legatee is interested in the validity of the will since it will make him receive something. Therefore, his testimony will not be credible. The disqualification of a witness to inherit extends to the spouse, parent, child or anyone claiming thereunder. This is to prevent the circumvention of the law. The will itself is valid but the legacy or devise is avoided.

II. Situational [Notarial will] [Will is not valid] Main question: Is the will valid? Sub-question1: What are the formalities which must be observed in the execution of a will? Sub-question 2: Was there substantial compliance as to the signing of the wills? Sub-question 3: Is the testator required to sign the notarial acknowledgment? Sub-question 4: Does Cagro v. Cagro apply? [Answer: The will is not valid.] The formalities which must be observed in the execution of a will is enumerated in art. 805 of the Civil Code. Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. (n) As regards the fourth page of the will where the will was ended by the testator, the law is clear in requiring the testator and the witnesses to sign at the end of the will. The end of the will is not its physical end, or the point in space that is farthest from the beginning of the will. The testator must sign at the logical end of the will, or that point in space where the testamentary dispositions ended. In the case at bar, the testator should therefore sign at the end of the fourth page. However, the law is silent as to where the witnesses must sign. The Supreme Court in the case of Taboada v. Rosal decided this, where the witnesses signed all pages on the left margin, not the last page at the end of the will. On the page which contains last disposition, only testator signed but not the witnesses. The Court upheld the validity of the will, ratiocinating that the witnesses signatures in the margin served the purpose of the signature to identify the will later on and prevent substitution of the page. All purposes were served by the marginal signature affixed by the witnesses. Art. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence,

defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805. (n) The fifth page of the will no longer contains the testamentary dispositions of the testator and should therefore be not included as one of the pages of the will that must be signed by the testator and the witnesses on the left margin. Also, the fact that the testators signature does not appear at the bottom of the page is immaterial to the wills validity sicne the testator is not requied to sign the notarial acknowledgement nor the attestation clause as held in Abangan v. Abangan. What is fatal to the validity of the will is the fact that the witnesses signed only at the bottom of the page, or below the notarial acknowledgment rather than below the attestation clause. III. 1. Discuss and criticize the doctrine in Kalaw v. Relova In Kalaw v. Relova, Gregorio Kalaw, claiming to be the sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad Kalaw, filed a petition for the probate of her holographic fill. The holographic will, as first written, named Rosa Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir. She opposed the probate alleging that the holographic will contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix. As required by Art. 814 of the CC. (put in art. 814 here). Rosas position was that the holographic will, as first written, should be given effect and probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder. Trial court denied petition to probate the holographic will. The SC held that ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. The SC also held that the cancellation revokes the entire will and that Art. 830 (3) governs. It provides that the revocation or cancellation does not require authentication. The writing of a new name is an alteration which is governed by Art. 814 (validation by full signature). Hence, no one inherits as there is no heir instituted. The argument against the policy of the SC in this case is to the effect that the Court failed to distinguish in applying the provisions of Art. 814 and Art. 830 (3). In holographic wills, even an erasure will amount to a revocation which must be governed by Art. 814 (especially applicable to holographic wills) and not Art. 830. Since Art. 814 is a specific provision and Art. 830 is a general one being applicable to both notarial and holographic wills. Art. 814 should control over 830. Art. 814 should have been applied in this case. In reconciling Art. 814 and 830, it appears that not all cancellations amount to revocation. If applied to Relova, when we have (a) alterations that amount to revocation, we apply Art. 830; (b) if we have alterations that are short of revocation, we apply 814. Art. 814 speaks of dispositions written below the testators signature on the will. These are considered independent of the will itself. Hence, they must be signed and dated by the testator. It its not dated and signed, the disposition is void, without affe cting the validity of the others or the will itself. However, if there are insertions, cancellations, erasures or alterations in a holographic will, a signature will be sufficient. If there are changes that were not signed, they are

considered as not made, but the will is not invalidated.

2.

Discuss the presumption in Gago v. Mamuyac Francisco Gago petitioned for the probation of the decedents 1918 will. It was denied on the ground that there was another will executed in 1919. Again, Francisco petitioned for the probation of the 1919 will, which was denied on the ground that the said will was revoked in 1920. The SC affirmed such denial, saying that the law does not require proof of revocation, since it is difficult to prove. The presumption is that where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it. In a proceeding to probate a will the burden of proof is upon the proponent to establish not only its execution but also its existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the contestant to show that it has been revoked. Copies of wills should be admitted by the courts with great caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony that a will was executed in duplicate and each copy was executed with all the formalities and requirements of the law, then the duplicate may be admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the original has been lost and was not cancelled or destroyed by the testator. 3. Discuss the presumption in Abangan v. Abangan In Abangan v. Abangan, there is a presumption that the testator is presumed to know the dialect/ language of the place where he habitually resided during his lifetime. In the said case, the Court held that the circumstance appearing in the will itself that same was executed in the city of Cebu and in the dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which this will is written. That presumption however is merely disputable. He who alleges that despite long years in a certain place, he never learned the dialect, has to prove it. 4. Discuss the footnote in Gan v. Yap. In Gan v. Yap, the Court held reached the conclusion that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The footnote stated that Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court. In Rodelas v. Aranza, the Court held that a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. The photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court. However, the pronounced ruling is a dangerous rule since forgery cannot be detected from a photostatic or serox copy. If advanced techniques to detect forgery on these pieces are discovered, then it may be allowed. IV. [Rules on Intestacy] Facts in the exam 1. Dr. Lopez had three children. 2. One of them is Roberto. 3. Roberto and Marilyn are husband and wife. 4. They have three children. 5. Dr. Lopez and Roberto did not leave a will and died intestate. Questions:

Who will inherit from Dr. Lopez? When can there be representation? May Marilyn, as Robertos spouse, claim for herself? Can Marilyn, as guardian of the children, claim for her children? How much will the children get? There is a life insurance policy in favor of Dr. Lopezs children (children are beneficiaries). Can Marilyn inherit his husbands shares? Sec. 3 (kk) of Rule 131 That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time. V. [Review Institution of heirs and Substitution] 1. Elmo has no surviving descendant, ascendant or spouse. 2. Elmo instituted his friends Alfonso, Benito, and Carlos. 3. Felisa was named as a substitute for the three friends. 4. Carlos predeceased Elmo. 5. Gino, Carlos son, wants to represent Carlos. 6. Felisa wants to claim Carlos share. Questions: 1. May Elmo dispose of his entire estate freely? 2. Can Elmo institute the three? 3. Discuss the possible shares of the three instituted heirs. 4. Is the substitution clause valid? 5. What will be the shares of Alfonso, Benito, and Carlos? 6. When Carlos died, what happens to his share? 7. May Gino represent Carlos in his shares? 8. As a substitute, can Felisa claim Carlos share? What kind of substitution is thi s? Assuming that Elmo has no compulsory heirs, Elmo may dispose of his entire estate freely. 842 of the Civil Code states that One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose of by will all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed. The substitution clause (Art. 859) is valid. Art. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish, or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance. A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall comprise the three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided. (774) The rule on institution of heirs will apply. The shares of Alfonso, Benito, and Carlos shall be governed by Art. 846. Heirs instituted without designation of shares shall inherit in equal parts. (765). They shall inherit in equal parts. When Carlos predeceased Elmo, BUT despite Carlos death, Elmo did not bother to cha nge his will, Gino will not get his fathers share because there is no representation in testamentary succession. Assuming that Alfonso and Benito are alive, Carlos share will go to Alfonso and Benito because there is accretion among those designated as heirs in the will. Alfonso and Benito will get Carlos portion in equal shares. Inasmuch as Felisa was substituted for three heirs, then the three should die ahead, be incapacitated, or repudiate in order for Felisa to be a substitute. The property will go to the co-heirs if accretion is proper. However, since Elmo did not specify that substitution may take place for any or all of the several heirs, substitution was ineffective and Felisa cannot claim the share of Carlos. VI. [Review forms governing wills] Facts: 1. Dr. Fuentes has an illegitimate son named Jay. 2. Dr. Fuentes executed a holographic will in the Philippines.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

3.

Dr. Fuentes is a national of a country that does not recognize holographic wills. His country also does not recognize the law on legitimes. (Leonides v. Cayetano)

Questions: 1. Is the holographic will valid, with regard to its formalities? 2. Can Jay validly insist on being given his legitime? Yes, the holographic will may be admitted for probate in the Philippines. The fact that the laws of country where Dr. Fuentes is a national does not recognize holographic wills is immaterial. According to Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a) Assuming that the holographic will complied with Art. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (678, 688a) and other relevant provisions of Philippine law, the will, as to its form is valid. Furthermore, according to Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes. (n). Art. 816 allows an alien executing a will in a foreign country other than his own, to follow the formalities prescribed by Philippine law. Jay cannot validly insist on his legitime. Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited Jay, it was sufficiently established that at the time of Dr. Fuente s death, a citizen of a foreign country, he was able to execute a holographic will in accordance with Philippine law. Therefore, applying the doctrine in Cayetano v. Leonidas, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide: Art. 16 par. (2). xxx xxx xxx However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. the law which governs Dr. Fuentes will, as regards its intrinsic validity, is the national law of the decedent. The law of Dr. Fuentes country does not provide for legitimes. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. Furthermore, as held in Bellis v. Bellis, It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail

over general ones.

VII. [Rules on Fideicommisary substitution see Andrews samplex] 1. If the first heir or the fiduciary died before the testator, but the second heir or the fideicommisary survived the testator, the law is not clear as to whom the property will go. But following the intent of the testator for the property to be transmitted to the fideicommisary after it is held by the fiduciary, then the property should go to the second heir. 2. The first heir shall inherit the property. The law provides that rights, properties, obligations pass only upon the death of the testator. In fideicommisary, it is required that the second heir be alive at the time of the testators death. Since the second heir predeceased the testator, no right/ property are transmitted to him. The first heir will inherit. 3. a. The heirs of the secondary heir will inherit. The law provides that property is transmitted upon the death of the testator. In the case at bar, since the testator died before the second heir, the property is transmitted to the second heir, because the law provides that in a fideicommisary substitution, the property is transmitted to the second heir upon the death of the testator.

b. Yes. The only requirements in a fideicommisary substitution with respect to the two heirs is that the substitute must only be one degree from the fiduciary and that they are both alive at the time of the death of the testator. The illegitimate child of the fiduciary is one degree away from him. Article 992 of the civil Code, which provides that An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. Article 992, however, only applies in intestate succession. In the case of fideicommisary substitution, what is involved is testamentary succession. c. The one degree controversy is one of the restrictions that the testator should observe in making a fideicommisary substitution. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted." In Palacios v. Ramirez, the Court held that what is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows: Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, substitution, or transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly adopted this construction. From this point of view, there can be only one tranmission or substitution, and the substitute need not be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman, however, construe the word "degree" as generation, and the present Code has obviously followed this interpretation, by providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree "from the heir originally instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and be one generation from the first heir. From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary In Sir DLCs opinion, he was not sure if this was clearly expressed in Palacios v Ramirez. Based on report of Code commission, one degree should be read to mean one degree of transfer, one of the entailment of property within a group or family. It is one of the devises/institutions in the Old Civil Code that entail a property within a group or property. According to the CC framers, one of the reforms introduced by CC is the abolition of CC which entail property for a long period of time. If this were the cornerstone, it should have been one degree of transfer and not relationship.

VIII. Facts: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Ignacio died. Ignacios father has a brother, named Felix. Ignacio has three brothers, Telesforo, Escolastico, and Jacobina. Ignacio was the decedent and he died without issue. Escolastico has one son. Jacobino has a child and a grandchild. Ignacio made a will, disinheriting Telesforo, without stating its cause.

Questions: 1. Who will inherit by intestate succession? 2. Was the disinheritance effective? (please insert relevant codal provisions) Only Escolastiko, his nephew, will inherit by intestate succession. In this case, his surviving relatives are his nephew, uncle, and youngest brother. It is a rule on intestate succession that collateral relatives like the unlce, can only inherit, in the absence of the legitimate children and descendants, legitimate parents and ascendants, illegitimate children, illegitimate parents, surviving spouse, and brothers, sisters, nephews, and nieces. Since Ignacios brother and nephew are still alve, the uncle Felix cannot inherit by intestate succession. The rule as regards brothers and nephews is that they will inherit concurrently in the intestate succession. However, the brother Telesforo cannot inherit because of the express will by Ignacio. The fact that Ignacios will did not state the cause for disinheriting his brother is not fatal to the validity of said provision. Article 919 provides the grounds for disinheriting children and descendants; Art. 920 for disinheriting ascendants; and Art. 921 for spouse. The disinheritance of a brother does not fit any of these provisions. Telesforo is not a compulsory heir. Therefore, the testator need not state the cause for his brothers disinheritance. Assuming that the disinheritance was done in a valid will, the disinheritance is effective against Telesforo. IX. (see samplex B) X. (see samplex B)