Section I. GENERAL TACTICAL DOCTRINES.

Source: U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar !"# O$$icially released $rom restricted status by t%e U.S. &rmy 'enter For Military History. 1. BASIC DOCTRINES. &n outstandin( c%aracteristic o$ t%e German nation is it s $ondness $or e)eryt%in( connected *it% militarism. +%is is based not only on traditional sentiment but also on lon(,ran(e and intense education t%at (lori$ies t%e military spirit. +%is (i)es t%e German military leaders t%e essential $oundation $or a((ressi)e military operations. +%e Germans belie)e t%at only t%e o$$ensi)e can ac%ie)e success on t%e $ield- particularly *%en combined *it% t%e element o$ surprise. German military literature- $or t%e past century- %as emp%asi.ed t%e need $or a((ressi)eness in all military operations. +%e Germans %a)e been t%orou(%ly a*are o$ t%e psyc%olo(ical component in *ar$are and %a)e de)eloped systematic terrori.ation to a %i(% de(ree. &t t%e same time t%ey %a)e placed considerable reliance on no)el and sensational *eapons suc% as t%e mass use o$ armor- t%e robot bomb- and t%e super,%ea)y tank. +%eir principal *eaknesses in t%is re(ard %a)e been t%eir $ailure to inte(rate t%ese ne* tec%ni/ues *it% establis%ed arms and tactics , German $ield artillery- $or e0ample- did not maintain pace *it% German armor , and t%eir de)otion to automatic *eapons at t%e e0pense o$ accuracy. & %i(%ly trained o$$icer corps and a t%orou(%ly disciplined army are t%e necessary elements to implement t%is a((ressi)e p%ilosop%y. German tactical doctrines stress t%e responsibility and t%e initiati)e o$ subordinates. +%e belie$ o$ $ormer years t%at t%e German army *as in$le0ible and lackin( in initiati)e %as been completely destroyed in t%is *ar- in *%ic% a((ressi)e and darin( leaders%ip %as been responsible $or many bold decisions. 1et- *%ile t%e Germans %a)e many e0cellent tacticians- t%ey tend to repeat t%e same type o$ maneu)ers- a $act *%ic% %as been $ully e0ploited by &llied commanders. +%e German speciali.ation in particular types o$ *ar$are suc% as mountain- desert- *inter- or t%e attack on $orti$ied positions- s%o*ed t%orou(% preparation and in(enuity. &t t%e same time- t%e Germans %ad been /uite *illin( to learn $rom t%eir opponents and on numerous occasions %a)e copied &llied tactics and *eapons. 2. RECENT TACTICAL TRENDS From t%e time *%en t%e German &rmy *as $orced on t%e de$ensi)e by t%e &llied armies- German tactical doctrines %a)e under(one modi$ications suc% as renunciation (e0cept in unstated instances# o$ air support- and t%e substitution o$ linear de$ense $or elastic o$$ensi)e de$ense. +%e primary (oal o$ Germany today is to (ain time and to ac%ie)e )ictory in a political sense- since t%e Germans are no lon(er capable o$ a military )ictory. O$ necessity t%eir military operations no* supplement t%is e$$ort and %a)e become a lar(e,scale delayin( action. 3. EXERCISE OF COMMAND

+%e U.S. and German doctrines applied in e0ercise o$ t%e command are )irtually identical. +%e Germans stress t%e necessity o$ t%e sta$$ in assistin( t%e commander to e)aluate t%e situation and in preparin( and disseminatin( orders to t%e lo*er units. +%ey emp%asi.e t%at t%e commander s%ould be *ell $or*ard *it% %is units not only $or t%e purpose o$ $acilitatin( communication- but also because %is presence %as a salutary e$$ect on t%e troops.

Section II. RECONNAISSANCE

Source: U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar !"# O$$icially released $rom restricted status by t%e U.S. &rmy 'enter For Military History. a: PURPOSE. +%e purpose o$ reconnaissance and t%ey types o$ units employed to obtain in$ormation are similar in t%e U.S. and t%e German &rmies. German tactical principles o$ reconnaissance- %o*e)er- di)er(e some*%at $rom t%ose o$ t%e U.S. +%e Germans stress a((ressi)eness- attempt to obtain superiority in t%e area to be reconnoitered- and stri)e $or continuous obser)ation o$ t%e enemy. +%ey belie)e in employin( reconnaissance units in $orce as a rule. +%ey e0pect and are prepared to $i(%t to obtain t%e desired in$ormation. O$ten t%ey assi(n supplementary tasks to t%eir reconnaissance units- suc% as sabota(e be%ind enemy lines- %arassment- or counter, reconnaissance. . TEC!NI"UE. Only enou(% reconnaissance troops are sent on a mission to assure superiority in t%e area to be reconnoitered. 2eser)es are kept on %and to be committed *%en t%e reconnaissance must be intensi$ied- *%en t%e ori(inal $orce meets stron( enemy opposition- or *%en t%e direction and area to be reconnoitered are c%an(ed. +%e Germans encoura(e a((ressi)e action a(ainst enemy security $orces. W%en t%eir reconnaissance units meet superior $orces- t%ey $i(%t a delayin( action *%ile ot%er units attempt to $lank t%e enemy. c. CLASSIFICATION. 2econnaissance is classi$ied by t%e Germans as operational- tactical- and battle reconnaissance , correspondin( to t%e U.S. distant- close- and battle reconnaissance. 2. OPERATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE #O$e%ati&e A'()*a%'n+, Operational reconnaissance- penetratin( o)er a lar(e area in (reat dept%- pro)ides t%e basis $or strate(ic plannin( and action. +%is type o$ reconnaissance is intended to determine t%e location and acti)ities o$ enemy $orces- particularly localities o$ rail concentrations- $or*ard or rear*ard displacements o$ personnel- loadin( or unloadin( areas o$ army elements- t%e construction o$ $ield or permanent $orti$ications- and %ostile air $orce concentrations. 3denti$ication o$ lar(e enemy motori.ed elements- especially on an open $lank- is important. Operational reconnaissance is carried out by t%e &ir Force and by motori.ed units. &erial p%oto(rap%y units operate at altitudes o$ 45-"66 to 75-"66 $eet. Since missions assi(ned to operational air reconnaissance are (enerally limited to t%e

obser)ation o$ important roads and railroads- reconnaissance sectors and areas normally are not assi(ned. +%e motori.ed units employed $or operational reconnaissance %a)e only directions and ob8ecti)es assi(ned. 3. TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE #Ta)ti-c.e A'()*a%'n+, a. PURPOSE +actical reconnaissance- carried out in t%e area be%ind t%e operational reconnaissance- pro)ides t%e basis $or t%e commitment o$ troops. 3ts mission embraces identi$ication o$ t%e enemy s or(ani.ationdisposition- stren(t%- and antiaircra$t de$ense9 determination o$ t%e enemy s rein$orcement capabilities9 and terrain reconnaissance o$ ad)ance sectors. &ir Force reconnaissance units and motori.ed and mounted reconnaissance battalions are employed $or tactical reconnaissance. +%eir direction and radius o$ employment are based upon t%e results o$ t%e operational reconnaissance. . AIR RECONNAISSANCE. +actical air reconnaissance is normally made $rom altitudes o$ 5-"66 to 45-666 $eet. &s a rule- air reconnaissance units are assi(ned speci$ic reconnaissance areas- t%e boundaries o$ *%ic% normally do not coincide *it% sectors assi(ned to (round units. 2econnaissance planes (enerally are employed sin(ly. c. GROUND RECONNAISSANCE. Sectors o$ responsibility are assi(ned to (round tactical reconnaissance battalions. 3n order to make t%em independent or to $acilitate t%eir c%an(e o$ direction- battalions may be assi(ned only reconnaissance ob8ecti)es. 3n suc% instances- boundary lines separate ad8acent units. +%e Germans a)oid usin( main roads as boundary lines- de$inin( t%e sectors in suc% a *ay t%at main roads $all *it%in t%e reconnaissance sectors. +%e *idt% o$ a sector is determined by t%e situation- t%e type and stren(t% o$ t%e reconnaissance battalion- t%e road net- and t%e terrain. 3n (eneral- t%e *idt% o$ a sector assi(ned to a motori.ed reconnaissance battalion does not e0ceed :6 miles. /. ORDERS FOR TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE. Orders issued to a reconnaissance battalion or it s patrols normally contain- in addition to t%e mission- t%e $ollo*in(: (4# ;ine o$ departure (7# 3n$ormation concernin( ad8acent reconnaissance units (:# Sector boundaries or direction o$ operation. (!# Ob8ecti)es. ("# <%ase lines. (5# 3nstructions $or transmission o$ reports. (=# ;ocation o$ immediate ob8ecti)es *%ose attainment is to be reported. (># 3nstructions re(ardin( air,(round liaison. (?# +ime o$ departure- route- and ob8ecti)e o$ t%e main $orce.

e. TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE PROCEDURES. W%en a motori.ed reconnaissance column e0pects contact *it% t%e enemy- it ad)ances by leaps and bounds. +%e len(t% o$ bounds depends on t%e co)er t%e terrain o$$ers as *ell as on t%e road net. &s t%e distance $rom t%e enemy decreases- t%e bounds are s%ortened. +%e Germans utili.e roads as lon( as possible and usually use di$$erent routes $or t%e ad)ance and t%e return. +%e reconnaissance battalion commander normally sends out patrols *%ic% ad)ance by bounds. +%eir distance in $ront o$ t%e battalion depends on t%e situation- t%e terrain- and t%e ran(e o$ t%e si(nal e/uipment- but as a rule t%ey are not more t%an an %our s tra)elin( distance (about 7" miles# a%ead o$ t%e battalion. +%e battalion ser)es as t%e reser)e $or t%e patrols and as an ad)ance messa(e center (Meldekop$#- collectin( t%e messa(es and relayin( t%em to t%e rear. &rmored reconnaissance cars- armored %al$,tracks- or motorcycles compose t%e motori.ed reconnaissance patrols- *%ose e0act composition depends on t%eir mission and on t%e situation. Motorcycles are used to $ill in (aps and inter)als- t%ereby t%ickenin( t%e reconnaissance net. W%en t%e pro0imity o$ t%e enemy does not permit pro$itable employment o$ t%e motori.ed reconnaissance battalion- it is *it%dra*n and t%e motori.ed elements o$ t%e di)isional reconnaissance battalion take o)er. Di)isional reconnaissance battalions seldom operate more t%an one day s marc% (4> miles# in $ront o$ t%e di)ision- co)erin( an area appro0imately 5 miles *ide. 0. BATTLE RECONNAISSANCE. #Ge(ec.t-a'()*a%'n+, a. GENERAL @attle reconnaissance as a rule is be(un *%en t%e opposin( $orces be(in to deploy. &ll troops participatin( in battle carry out battle reconnaissance t%rou(% patrols- artillery obser)ation postsobser)ation battalions- and air reconnaissance units. +%e in$ormation obtained on t%e or(ani.ation and stren(t% o$ t%e enemy pro)ides t%e basis $or t%e conduct o$ t%e battle. . ARMORED CAR PATROLS. +%e <an.er di)ision dispatc%es armored reconnaissance units e/uipped *it% armored )e%icles and numerous automatic *eapons. +%e armored reconnaissance unit is $ast and %as a *ide radius o$ action. &rmored car patrols normally are composed o$ t%ree armored reconnaissance cars- one o$ *%ic% is e/uipped *it% radio. &n artillery obser)er o$ten accompanies t%e patrol so t%at in an emer(ency $ire can be brou(%t do*n /uickly. +%is type o$ patrol usually is or(ani.ed $or missions lastin( one to t*o days. +asks are de$ined clearly- and not%in( is allo*ed to inter$ere *it% t%e patrolAs main ob8ecti)e. 3$ enemy $orces are met- action is a)oided unless t%e $orce is so *eak t%at it can be destroyed *it%out di)ertin( t%e patrol $rom it s main task. 3$ enemy action is anticipated- t%e patrol is rein$orced *it% sel$,propelled (uns and occasionally *it% tanks. Bn(ineers and motorcyclists are o$ten attac%ed to t%e patrol to deal *it% road blocks and demolitionAs. W%ile scoutin( a *oods- a $a)orite German ruse is to dri)e t%e leadin( car to*ards it s ed(e- %alt brie$ly to obser)e- and t%en dri)e o$$ rapidly- %opin( to dra* enemy $ire t%at *ill disclose t%e

enemy positions. &t road blocks- t%e leadin( car opens $ire. 3$ $ire is not returned- men dismount and (o $or*ard to attac% to* ropes to t%e road block. 3$ necessary- t%e patrol dismounts and proceeds *it% mac%ine (uns to reconnoiter on $oot. & patrol is ne)er split up- but in open country distances bet*een cars may be as muc% as 766 to :66 yards. c. OBSER1ATION BATTALION AND AIR RECONNAISSANCE. +%e German obser)ation battalion locates enemy artillery and %ea)y *eapons positions by sound and $las% ran(in( and e)aluated aerial p%oto(rap%s. +%e &ir Force assists in battalion reconnaissance by obser)in( t%e distribution o$ t%e enemy s $orces- %is artillery- bi)ouac and mo)ements- reser)es- tank assemblies- and any ot%er special occurrences be%ind t%e $ront. 3n (eneral- air battle reconnaissance is e0ecuted under 5-666 $eet. /. BATTLE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS #S$a.t%'$$en, +%e Germans send out reconnaissance patrols consistin( o$ a noncommissioned o$$icer and t%ree or $our men- to (et suc% in$ormation as t%e location o$ enemy positions and mine$ields. +%ey (enerally a)oid contact and retreat *%en $ired on. e. COMBAT PATROLS #Ge(ec.t--$a.t%'$$en o% St%o--t%'$$en, +%ese consist o$ at least one noncommissioned o$$icer and ei(%t men- but are usually stron(er. &s a rule- t%e combat patrol is commanded by a ser(eant *%o %as under %im 4" to 76 men- or(ani.ed in t*o e/ual sections- eac% commanded by a section leader. +%ese are raidin( patrols- and t%eir mission o$ten includes brin(in( back prisoners o$ *ar. Since &llied air supremacy %as neutrali.ed German air reconnaissance to a (reat e0tent- t%e Germans %a)e placed increased importance on prisoners o$ *ar- especially o$$icers- as a source o$ in$ormation on enemy stren(t%- dispositions- and intentions. 'ombat or ot%er types o$ patrols are o$ten sent out to test t%e stren(t% o$ enemy outposts. 3$ an outpost pro)es to be *eakly %eld- t%e patrol attacks- occupies t%e position- and remains t%ere until relie)ed by troops $rom t%e rear. 3$ t%e patrol is stron(ly (arrisoned- t%e patrol attempts to return *it% a prisoner o$ *ar. (. SPECIAL PATROLS #S$a.t%'$$en 2it e-on/e%en A'(+a en, +%ese )ary in stren(t% in accordance *it% t%eir special mission. Special patrols are sent to carry out suc% tasks as demolitions- en(a(in( o$ enemy patrols t%at %a)e penetrated German positions- and ambus%in( enemy supply columns. +. MISCELLANEOUS RECONNAISSANCE. Bn(ineer patrols are employed to reconnoiter approac%es to $orti$ied areas- de$iles- or ri)ers.

&rtillery patrols- usually consistin( o$ an o$$icer and a $e* mounted men- reconnoiter routes o$ approac%- obser)ation posts- and $irin( positions. .. TERRAIN RECONNAISSANCE. #Ge*an/ee%)'n/'n+, +%e Germans place (reat emp%asis on terrain reconnaissance- reali.in( t%e in$luence terrain %as upon t%e conduct o$ operations. Most o$ t%eir usual reconnaissance missions include terrain reconnaissance tasks. +errain may be so important at times as to re/uire reconnaissance by special units. Ground and air reconnaissance units (i)e special attention to t%e road net , its densitycondition- road blocks- mines- and demolition , as *ell to t%e terrain itsel$- particularly tank country.

i. E"UIPMENT AND SUPPORT. +%e Germans e/uip t%eir (round battle,reconnaissance patrols *it% mac%ine pistols and one or t*o li(%t mac%ine (uns t%at are used to co)er t%e patrol s approac% or *it%dra*al. Bn(ineers o$ten are attac%ed to (uide a patrol t%rou(% German mine$ields and to clear a *ay t%rou(% enemy *ire or mines. &rtillery support is (i)en in t%e $orm o$ %arassin( $ire put do*n 8ust be$ore t%e patrol reac%es its ob8ecti)e. Sometimes t%e artillery $ires into ad8acent sectors to mislead t%e enemy as to t%e actual area to be reconnoitered. 3n ot%er instances- artillery and mortars t%at %a)e re(istered durin( t%e pre)ious day s%ell durin( t%e ni(%t t%e area to be reconnoitered. &s soon as t%e barra(e is li$ted- t%e patrol ad)ances under co)er o$ mac%ine,(un $ire $rom $lankin( positions.

SECTION III. MARC!ES

Source: U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar !"# O$$icially released $rom restricted status by t%e U.S. &rmy 'enter For Military History. 1. GENERAL +%e $ormations and t%e or(ani.ations o$ t%e marc% column in day or ni(%t ad)ances are t%e same in t%e German &rmy as in t%e U.S. &rmy and are (o)erned by t%e same principles. $or a smoot% $unctionin( o$ t%e marc% t%e Germans stress: systematic trainin( and practice9 attention to p%ysical *el$are9 care o$ )e%icles and e/uipment9 pre)ious reconnaissance o$ routes9 *arnin( orders9 and t%e issue o$ detailed marc% orders. 2. ORGANI3ATION AND CONTROL OF T!E MARC! COLUMN 3n order to secure t%e marc% column a(ainst enemy attacks- t%e Germans di)ide t%e column in t%e same manner as U.S. doctrine prescribes- namely into &d)ance Guard (Cor%ut#- Main @ody (Gros#and 2ear Guard (Dac%%ut#. German e/ui)alents $or t%e U.S. terms are: &DC&D'B GU&2D Spit.e , <oint Spit.enkompanie , &d)ance <arty

Cortrupp , Support Haupttrupp , 2eser)e 2B&2 GU&2D Dac%spit.e , 2ear <oint Dac%spit.enkompanie , 2ear <arty Dac%trupp , Support Haupttrupp , 2eser)e +%e issue o$ orders $or marc% and tra$$ic control is t%e responsibility o$ t%e %i(%er command. Mo)ement by road o$ $ormations $rom battalion stren(t% up*ard is carried out in t%e Eone o$ t%e 3nterior at t%e orders o$ t%e &rmy Hi(% 'ommand (OFH# or a %ead/uarters actin( on t%e orders o$ t%e &rmy Hi(% 'ommand. 3n t%e +%eater o$ War suc% mo)ements are controlled by &rmy Head/uarters- *%ic% issues orders in accordance *it% instructions $rom &rmy Hi(% 'ommand or t%e &rmy Group. Mo)ements in t%e areas o$ military commanders o$ line,o$,communication areas are controlled by orders o$ t%e commanders o$ suc% areas. Orders $or mo)ement are issued to t%e $ormations o$ $i(%tin( troops by t%e operations (roup o$ %ead/uarters9 t%ose to supply ser)ices and units in t%e line,o$,communication area emanate $rom t%e supply and administrati)e (roup. +%e Germans set up a *ell or(ani.ed tra$$ic control ser)ice *%ic% is under t%e orders o$ t%e operations (roup. &ll tra$$ic control ser)ices usually *ear oran(e,red brassards- *%ile t%e members o$ t%e military police are distin(uis%ed by metal (or(ets. +%e Germans allot to eac% $ront,line di)ision its o*n road or sector o$ ad)ance- usually marked by ad)ance parties. General Head/uarters or any ot%er troops directed simultaneously on t%e same roads- are subordinated to t%e di)ision $or t%e duration o$ t%e mo)e. &ll,*eat%er roads usually are allotted to motori.ed or armored di)isions- *%ile subsidiary roads are assi(ned to in$antry di)isions.

3. CONDUCT OF T!E MARC!. W%en a German in$antry di)ision ad)ances alon( se)eral routes- an in$antry element normally $orms t%e %ead o$ eac% main body. +%e commander o$ t%e main body usually marc%es at or near t%e %ead o$ t%e main body. +%e motori.ed elements o$ t%e di)ision- unless employed on reconnaissance or security missions- are or(ani.ed into one or more motor ec%elons *%ic% $ollo* t%e marc% column by bounds- or mo)e in a column alon( a separate road. @e$ore t%e marc% be(ins- t%e di)ision si(nal battalion lays a trunk telep%one line as $ar $or*ard as t%e situation permits and e0tends t%is line *%ile t%e marc% proceeds. +%e leadin( si(nal unit usually marc%es *it% t%e support o$ t%e ad)ance (uard and establis%es telep%one stations at important points. 3n a marc% alon( se)eral roads t%e trunk line normally is laid alon( t%e route o$ t%e di)ision commander and %is sta$$. 3n addition to t%e construction o$ t%e trunk line- t%e Germans stress radio communications to t%e rear and $lanks- as *ell as t%e use o$ messen(ers mounted on %orses- bicycles- or motorcycles. 0. SECURIT4 OF MARC! COLUMNS. &s a rule- t%e Germans allot motori.ed units $or t%e protection o$ t%e $lanks and rear o$ marc%

columns. Ho*e)er- a smaller unit- suc% as a battalion- may ad)ance *it%out security detac%ments. +%e Germans are )ery muc% concerned about antiaircra$t protecti)e measures and o$ten marc% in open columns (Flie(ermarsc%tie$e#9 an ad)ance in deployed $ormation (Flie(ermarsc%breite# is seldom practical. &ntiaircra$t de$ense is concentrated at important terrain $eatures- suc% as brid(escrossroads- and de$iles. @ecause o$ &llied air supremacy t%e Germans no* instruct t%eir troops to conduct mo)ements and t%e transport o$ supplies only at ni(%t- and *it%out li(%ts. +%ey also order t%eir troops to lea)e burned out )e%icles standin( on t%e road to attract $res% attacks by enemy aircra$t.

SECTION I1. OFFENSI1E

Source: U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar !"# O$$icially released $rom restricted status by t%e U.S. &rmy 'enter For Military History. 1. GENERAL +%e $undamental principle o$ German o$$ensi)e doctrine is to encircle and destroy t%e enemy. +%e ob8ecti)e o$ t%e combined arms in attack is to brin( t%e armored $orces and t%e in$antry into decisi)e action a(ainst t%e enemy *it% su$$icient $ire po*er and s%ock. Superiority in $orce and $ire po*er- t%e employment o$ armored $orces- as *ell as t%e surprise element- play a (reat part in t%e o$$ensi)e. 'oordination bet*een t%e combined arms under a stron( uni$ied command is- t%e Germans emp%asi.e- an absolute re/uisite to t%e success o$ t%ese s%ock tactics. +%is %as become more and more true as t%e &llies %a)e de)eloped e$$ecti)e antitank *eapons and %a)e adopted deeper de$enses- limitin( t%e sel$,su$$iciency o$ German tanks. +o counter t%ese measures- t%e Germans %a)e increased t%e mobility and armor protection o$ t%eir motor,borne in$antry- and %a)e mounted a lar(e proportion o$ bot% t%eir direct and indirect %ea)y support *eapons on sel$, propelled carria(es. 3n attemptin( t%orou(%ly to paraly.e t%e de$ender up to t%e moment o$ t%e tank,in$antry assault- t%e Germans reali.e t%at e)en t%e most $ormidable $orces are ne)er su$$icient $or o)er*%elmin( superiority on t%e entire $ront. +%ey t%ere$ore select a point o$ main e$$ort (Sc%*erpunkt# $or a breakt%rou(%- allottin( narro* sectors o$ attack (Ge$ec%tsstrei$en# to t%e troops committed at t%e decisi)e locality. +%ere t%ey also mass t%e bulk o$ t%eir %ea)y *eapons and reser)es. +%e ot%er sectors o$ t%e $ront are en(a(ed by *eaker- di)ersionary $orces. 3n selectin( t%e point o$ main e$$ortt%e Germans consider *eaknesses in t%e enemy s de$ensi)e position9 suitability o$ t%e terrainespecially $or tanks and $or cooperation o$ all arms9 approac% routes9 and possibilities $or supportin( $ire- especially artillery. &lt%ou(% t%e Germans select a point o$ main e$$ort in all attacks- t%ey usually also make plans $or s%i$tin( t%eir main e$$ort i$ t%ey meet une0pected success else*%ere. +o allo* suc% s%i$ts- su$$icient reser)es and a stron(- uni$ied command are or(ani.ed. &n attack alon( a narro* $ront- accordin( to German doctrine- must %a)e su$$icient $orces at it s disposal to *iden t%e penetration *%ile maintainin( its impetus- and to protect t%e $lanks o$ t%e penetration. Once t%e attack is launc%ed- it must dri)e strai(%t to its ob8ecti)e- re(ardless o$ opposition. 2. T4PES OF ATTAC5 a. FLAN5 ATTAC5 #F*an)enan+%i((, +%e Germans consider t%at t%e most e$$ecti)e attack is a(ainst t%e enemy s $lank. +%e $lank attack de)elops eit%er $rom t%e approac% marc% , sometimes t%rou(% a turnin( mo)ement , or $rom $lank marc%es. 3t attempts to surprise t%e enemy and permit %im no time $or countermeasures. Since mobility and t%e deception o$ t%e enemy at ot%er positions are re/uired- t%e $lank attack is most success$ully mounted $rom a distance9 t%e troop mo)ements necessary $or t%e maneu)er can be e0ecuted in close pro0imity to t%e enemy only *it% unusually $a)orable terrain or at ni(%t. &ttacks are launc%ed on bot% $lanks only *%en t%e Germans consider t%eir $orces clearly superior.

. EN1ELOPMENT #U2(a--'n+-an+%i((, +%e en)elopment is a combination $lank,and,$rontal attack especially $a)ored by t%e Germans. +%e en)elopment may be directed on eit%er or bot% t%e enemy s $lanks- and is accompanied by a simultaneous $rontal attack to $i0 t%e enemy s $orces. +%e deeper t%e en)elopment (oes into t%e enemy s $lanks- t%e (reater t%e dan(er o$ bein( en)eloped onesel$. +%e Germans t%ere$ore emp%asi.e t%e necessity o$ stron( reser)es and or(ani.ation o$ t%e en)elopin( $orces in dept%. Success o$ t%e en)elopment depends on t%e e0tent to *%ic% t%e enemy is able to dispose %is $orces in t%e t%reatened direction. c. ENCIRCLEMENT #Ein)%ei-'n+,. &n encirclement- t%e Germans t%ink- is a particularly decisi)e $orm o$ attack- but usually more di$$icult to e0ecute t%an a $lank attack or an en)elopment. 3n an encirclement- t%e enemy is not attacked at all in $ront- or is attacked in $ront only by li(%t $orces- *%ile t%e main attackin( $orce passes entirely around %im- *it% t%e ob8ecti)e o$ maneu)erin( %im out o$ position. +%is re/uires e0treme mobility and deception. /. FRONTAL ATTAC5 #F%onta*an+%i((,. +%e Germans consider t%e $rontal attack t%e most di$$icult o$ e0ecution. 3t strikes t%e enemy at %is stron(est point- and t%ere$ore re/uires superiority o$ men and materiel. & $rontal attack s%ould be made only at a point *%ere t%e in$antry can break t%rou(% into $a)orable terrain in t%e dept% o$ t%e enemy position. +%e $ronta(e o$ t%e attack s%ould be *ider t%an t%e actual area (Sc%*erpunkt# c%osen $or penetration- in order to tie do*n t%e enemy on t%e $lanks o$ t%e breakt%rou(%. &de/uate reser)es must be %eld ready to counter t%e employment o$ t%e enemy s reser)es. e. 6ING ATTAC5 #F*'+e*an+%i((, &n attack directed at one or bot% o$ t%e enemy s *in(s %as- t%e Germans teac%- a better c%ance o$ success t%an a central $rontal attack- since only a part o$ t%e enemy s *eapons are $aced- and only one $lank o$ t%e attackin( $orce or $orces is e0posed to enemy $ire. @endin( back one *in( may (i)e an opportunity $or a $lank attack- or $or a sin(le or double en)elopment. (. PENETRATION #Ein %'c., AND BREA5T!ROUG! #D'%c. %'c., +%ese are not separate $orms o$ attack- but rat%er t%e e0ploitation o$ a success$ul attack on t%e enemy s $ront- *in(- or $lank. +%e penetration destroys t%e continuity o$ t%e %ostile $ront. +%e broader t%e penetration- t%e deeper can t%e penetration *ed(e be dri)en. Stron( reser)es t%ro* back enemy counterattacks a(ainst t%e $lanks o$ t%e penetration German units are trained to e0ploit a penetration to t%e ma0imum so t%at it may de)elop into a complete breakt%rou(% be$ore %ostile countermeasures can be launc%ed on an e$$ecti)e scale. +%e deeper t%e attacker penetrates- t%e more e$$ecti)ely can %e en)elop and $rustrate t%e attempts o$ t%e enemy to close %is $ront a(ain by *it%dra*al to t%e rear. +%e attackin( $orces attempt to reduce indi)idual enemy positions by encirclin( and isolatin( t%em. +%e Germans do not consider a breakt%rou(% success$ul until t%ey o)ercome t%e enemy s artillery positions- *%ic% usually is t%e special task o$ tanks. 2eser)e units roll up t%e enemy s $ront $rom t%e ne*ly created $lanks. +%e Germans o$ten re$er to t%is maneu)er

as "Feil und Fessel". 3. ORGANI3ATION OF T!E ATTAC5 a. ATTAC5 ORDER. +%e attack order (&n(ri$$sbe$e%l# (enerally contains t%e ob8ecti)e o$ t%e attack- t%e disposition o$ t%e in$antry- unit sectors and boundaries- disposition and support missions o$ t%e artillery- location o$ reser)es- and t%e time o$ attack. +%e order is not dra*n up in accordance *it% any stereotyped $orm- but as a rule $ollo*s t%is pattern: (4# Bstimate o$ t%e situation (disposition o$ %ostile and $riendly troops# (7# Mission. (:# &ssembly areas $or t%e $or*ard companies9 ob8ecti)e9 sector boundaries9 orders $or t%e continuation o$ combat reconnaissance. (!# 3nstructions $or t%e preparation o$ t%e %ea)y,*eapons $ire support- especially $or massed $ire. ("# Orders to t%e artillery $or $ire preparation and coordination. (5# &ssembly areas $or t%e reser)es. (=# +ime o$ attack. (># 3nstructions $or rear ser)ices (medial ser)ice and supplies#. (?# ;ocation o$ command posts. (46# Miscellaneous.

. SECTORS OF ATTAC5. +%e *idt% o$ a sector assi(ned to an in$antry unit in t%e attack depends on t%e unit s mission and battle stren(t%- on terrain conditions- on t%e a)ailable $ire support o$ all arms- and on t%e probable stren(t% o$ enemy resistance. Dormally t%e sector assi(ned to a platoon is bet*een 45" and 776 yards. & company attack sector is about ::6 to ""6 yards. & battalion sector is about !!6 to 4-466 yards- *%ile a di)ision sector may be !-!66 yards to "-"66 yards. +%ese sectors also pro)ide t%e boundaries $or t%e ot%er arms- especially $or t%e artillery in support o$ t%e in$antry- alt%ou(% t%e artillery may utili.e $a)orable obser)ation positions in nei(%borin( sectors. +%is also applies to t%e %ea)y in$antry *eapons. For lar(e units t%e sectors are determined $rom t%e map9 $or smaller units- $rom t%e terrain. +%ese sectors e0tend as deep into enemy territory as t%e plan o$ battle may re/uire. &s t%e situation de)elops- c%an(es are $re/uently made. 3mportant points al*ays lie *it%in units sectors- unless t%ey are to be attacked by se)eral units. +%e Germans do not consider it necessary to occupy t%e *%ole *idt% o$ t%e sector *it% troops. Open $lanks ordinarily are not bounded. c. FIRE PLAN. Fire superiority is ac%ie)ed t%rou(% coordination o$ t%e in$antry and artillery *eapons. +%e basis o$ t%e $ire plan (Feuerplan# is t%e re(ulation o$ t%e commitment o$ all *eapons. +%e $ire plan includes t%e $ollo*in(: (4# &ssi(nment o$ combat missions. (7# Distribution o$ obser)ation sectors and $ields o$ $ire $or t%e in$antry and t%e artillery.

(:# &n estimate o$ capabilities o$ t%e artillery $or e$$ecti)e e0ecution o$ t%e combat mission. (!# Orders $or t%e commencement o$ $ire and $ire sc%edules. ("# Orders $or t%e preparation $or massed $ire. (5# 3nstructions $or ammunition supply. +%e Germans stress t%e coordination o$ $lat and %i(% tra8ectory *eapons so t%at all dead spaces are co)ered by $ire. ;ack o$ si(nal e/uipment %o*e)er- o$ten %inders t%e application o$ t%is principle. 0. CONDUCT OF T!E ATTAC5 a. GENERAL. Most o$ t%e German successes in t%e present *ar %a)e been ac%ie)ed *it% armored $ormations. 1ears o$ secret trainin( and e/uippin( *ere de)oted to t%e de)elopment o$ t%e <an.er di)ision. +%e ori(inal German blit.krie( tactics *ere based on t%e belie$ in t%e irresistible po*er o$ tank $ormations operatin( independently *it% t%e support o$ di)e, bombers. 'onsiderable modi$ications %a)e taken place in t%is t%eory o)er t%e past $e* years. &t t%e present time- t%e o$$ensi)e tactics o$ t%e Germans are less spectacularly bold t%an t%ey *ere in 4?:?- but t%e $undamental t%eory be%ind t%em %as c%an(ed remarkably little- t%ou(% in t%eir armored tactics t%ey stress more tank,in$antry coordination since unlimited air support is no lon(er at t%eir command. +%e main *ei(%t o$ all ma8or German attacks since 4?:? *as borne by t%e <an.er di)ision. W%ere in$antry di)isions %a)e been employed- t%ey *ere limited to local attacks on a comparati)ely minor scale- or to moppin( up in rear o$ t%e <an.er di)isions. +%e Germans ne)er en)isa(ed a $ull,scale attack by in$antry $ormations on $i0ed de$enses. German tactics %a)e been to out$lank or encircle t%e main area o$ t%e enemy de$enses *it% tank $ormations and to %a)e t%e in$antry roll up t%e de$enses $rom t%e rear- or to break $rontally t%rou(% t%e enemy de$enses *it% massed tanks and de)elop t%e $amous "Feil und Fessel" maneu)er. +%e Germans learned at %ea)y cost t%e $utility o$ c%ar(in( a %ostile antitank de$ense *it% tank concentrations and o$ en(a(in( in tank,)ersus,tank combat *it%out %a)in( superiority in ran(e and armament. +%ey %a)e learned t%at lar(e $ormations o$ tanks cannot ac%ie)e a breakt%rou(%opposed by an e$$ecti)e screen o$ antitank (uns- *it%out t%e assistance o$ ot%er arms. +%ere$ore attention %as to be (i)en to t%e combined tactics o$ tanks and <an.er Grenadiers- t%e mec%ani.ed or motori.ed in$antry *%o accompany t%e tanks. Great emp%asis in German o$$ensi)e t%eory is laid on t%e role o$ t%e artillery- but in practice t%e artillery,support role %as de)ol)ed to an e)er,increasin( de(ree on t%e tanks and assault (uns. De)ert%eless- t%e principle t%at t%e supportin( $ire s%ould be concentrated on a narro* $ronta(e *%ere t%e tanks and in$antry are most likely to ac%ie)e a breakt%rou(% %as been retained. +%e $act t%at part o$ t%e enemy resistance is likely to remain undisclosed until t%e attack %as already be(un %as caused t%e Germans permanently to decentrali.e a portion o$ t%e $ield artillery. +%is tendency %as led to t%e emer(ence and continual de)elopment o$ t%e assault (uns- *%ose main $unction is t%e close support o$ in$antry and tanks in t%e attack. +%eir armor and mobility allo* t%em to operate muc% $art%er $or*ard t%an t%e $ield artillery. +%e tendency to detac% $ield artillery battalions $rom t%eir $ield artillery re(iment remains stron(. 3n $act- t%is tendency is so pre)alent t%at a concentration o$ massed artillery precedin( an attack seldom is ac%ie)ed- necessitatin(- as it does- a (reat de(ree o$ centrali.ed control. +%e Germans

%o*e)er- replace t%e massed artillery $ire to a lar(e e0tent *it% t%e $ire o$ multi, barreled mortars and rocket pro8ectors- t%ou(% t%ese latter %a)e not t%e accuracy o$ t%e $ormer. +%e Germans make a clear distinction bet*een an attack made $rom mo)ement and an attack $rom a prepared position- *%ic% is t%e more common o$ t%e t*o. : ATTAC5 B4 MEC!ANI3ED AND MOTORI3ED FORCES. #1, T!E ATTAC5 3n armored,$orce operations- t%e Germans stress t%e need $or t%e concentrated employment- at t%e decisi)e place and time- o$ t%e entire combined command o$ tanks and ot%er arms- less necessary reser)es. +%e tanks constitute t%e strikin( $orce o$ suc% a command and normally ad)ance as t%e $irst ec%elon o$ t%e attack. +%eir primary mission is to break t%rou(% and attack t%e enemy artilleryrat%er t%an to seek out and destroy enemy tanks- *%ic% can be more e$$ecti)ely en(a(ed by antitank units. +%e mission o$ t%e ot%er arms is to assist t%e tanks in t%eir ad)ance- and particularly to eliminated antitank *eapons. +%e smallest combat unit in suc% a $orce o$ combined arms is t%e commune. +%e basic $ormation $or t%e tank platoon- company- and battalion are $ile- double $ile- *ed(e- and blunt *ed(e. +%e type o$ $ormation used $or a speci$ic task depends to a lar(e e0tent on terrain conditions and t%e stren(t% o$ enemy opposition. & German tank platoon normally consists o$ one command tank and t*o tank s/uads o$ t*o tanks eac%. +%e tank re(iment normally attacks in *a)es- in eit%er o$ t%e $ollo*in( manners: +%e tank re(iment is ec%elon in dept%- one tank battalion $ollo*in( t%e ot%er. +%e re(imental commander s location is bet*een t%e t*o battalions. +%is $ormation %as t%e ad)anta(es o$ a su$$iciently *ide $ront (about 4466 yards#- and close contact by t%e company commander o$ %is units in t%e conduct o$ t%e attack. W%en t*o tank battalions are attackin(- one be%ind t%e ot%er- it takes t%em about %al$ an %our to pass t%eir o*n in$antry. W%en t%e t*o,battalions,abreast $ormation is employed- it is almost essential t%at anot%er tank re(iment $orm t%e $ollo*in( *a)e. +%is $ormation usually %as t%e disad)anta(e o$ bein( too *ide. +%e re(imental commander cannot obser)e %is units- and %e %as no units o$ %is o*n be%ind %im *%ic% %e can commit in a decisi)e moment. +%e attack normally proceeds in t%ree *a)es. +%e $irst *a)e t%rusts to t%e enemy s antitank de$ense and artillery positions. +%e second *a)e pro)ides co)erin( $ire $or t%e $irst *a)e- and t%en attacks t%e enemy s in$antry positions- preceded- accompanied- or $ollo*ed by part o$ t%e <an.er Grenadiers- *%o dismount as close as possible to t%e point *%ere t%ey must en(a(e t%e enemy. +%e ob8ecti)es o$ t%e second *a)e are t%e remainin( antitank positions- positions o$ %ea)y in$antry,support *eapons- and mac%ine,(un emplacements *%ic% %old up t%e ad)ance o$ t%e in$antry. +%e t%ird *a)e- accompanied by t%e remainder o$ t%e <an.er Grenadiers- mops up. +%ese t%ree *a)es no* o$ten are telescoped into t*o- t%e $irst *a)e speedin( t%rou(% t%e enemy s positions as $ar as %is (un positions- t%e second crus%in( t%e enemy s $or*ard positions in detail and moppin( up t%e opposition no dealt *it% by t%e $irst *a)e or *%ic% %as re)i)ed since t%e $irst *a)e passed t%rou(%.

& typical attack $ormation o$ t%is type mi(%t be di)ided up amon( t%e <an.er di)ision s units as $ollo*s: t%e $irst *a)e- on a $ronta(e o$ about 7-666 to :-666 yards- mi(%t consist o$ one tank battalion- t*o companies $or*ard- supported on t%e $lanks by elements o$ t%e assault (un battalion. 'lose to t%e rear o$ t%e $irst *a)e usually $ollo* one or t*o <an.er Grenadier companies in armored %al$,tracks. &bout 4"6 yards to t%e rear o$ t%e $irst *a)e mo)es t%e second *a)e- $ormed o$ t%e second tank battalion in t%e same $ormation- closely $ollo*ed by t%e remainder o$ t%e armored <an.er Grenadiers- *%o are in turn $ollo*ed at some distance by t%e motori.ed <an.er Grenadiers. +%e $lanks are protected by antitank (uns *%ic% normally operate by platoons- mo)in( by bounds. +%e artillery $or*ard obser)er tra)els in %is armored )e%icles *it% t%e $irst *a)e- *%ile t%e artillery commander o$ t%e supportin( artillery units usually tra)els *it% t%e tank commander. &ssault (uns normally also accompany t%e second *a)e. +%e tanks %elp eac% ot%er $or*ard by $ire and mo)ement- medium or %ea)y tanks takin( up %ull, do*n $irin( positions and (i)in( co)erin( $ire *%ile t%e $aster tanks ad)ance to t%e ne0t commandin( $eature. +%en t%e latter (i)e co)erin( $ire to t%e $ormer mo)in( $or*ard to t%eir ne0t bound. Once t%e $irst *a)e %as reac%ed t%e rear o$ t%e enemy s $or*ard de$enses- it pus%es strai(%t on to attack t%e enemy s artillery. &s soon as t%ese positions %a)e been neutrali.ed- t%e tanks re$orm beyond t%e artillery positions and eit%er prepare to e0ploit t%e attack or $orm an all,round de$ensi)e position on suitable (round. +%e tank commander- as t%e leader o$ t%e stron(est unit- is in most cases in command o$ t%e combat team- and all t%e ot%er participatin( arms (<an.er Grenadiers- artillery- en(ineers- and antitank units# are placed under %im. +%e Germans reali.e t%at a stron( and uni$ied command is an essential $eature o$ any military operation. For certain missions- %o*e)er- tank units are attac%ed to anot%er arm- in *%ic% case t%e tank commander is consulted be$ore t%e $inal plans $or t%e operations are made. #2, INFANTR47TAN5 COOPERATION W%en t%e enemy %as *ell prepared positions *it% natural or constructed tank obstacles- t%e German in$antry attacks be$ore t%e tanks and clears t%e *ay. +%e ob8ecti)e o$ t%e in$antry is to penetrate into t%e enemy position and destroy enemy antitank *eapons to t%e limit o$ it s stren(t% and t%e $ire po*er o$ it s o*n support *eapons- au(mented by additional support and co)erin( $ire $rom t%e tanks and sel$,propelled *eapons sited in t%eir rear. Only a$ter t%e destruction o$ t%e enemy antitank de$ense can t%e tanks be employed on t%e battle line to t%e $ullest ad)anta(e. W%en t%e tank obstacles in $ront o$ t%e enemy position are already destroyed- and no additional tank obstacles are to be e0pected in t%e dept% o$ t%e enemy s main de$ensi)e position- t%e in$antry breaks t%rou(% simultaneously *it% t%e tank unit. +%e in$antry attack is conducted in t%e same manner as it *ould be *it%out t%e cooperation o$ tanks. Hea)y in$antry *eapons are kept in readiness to $ire at possible ne*ly disco)ered antitank positions. O$ particular importance is protection o$ t%e open $lanks by ec%elonin( t%e $lank units and employin( %ea)y *eapons at t%e $lanks. 3n most cases- t%e in$antry $ollo*s t%e tanks closely- takin( ad)anta(e o$ t%e $ire po*er and paraly.in( e$$ects o$ t%e tanks upon t%e enemy s de$ense. +%e Germans normally transport t%e in$antry to t%e line o$ departure on tanks or troop,carryin( )e%icles in order to protect t%e in$antry

and to increase it s speed. +%e in$antry lea)es t%e )e%icles at t%e last possible moment- and (oes into action mainly *it% li(%t automatic *eapons. +%e tanks ad)ance by bounds $rom co)er to co)er- reconnoiterin( t%e terrain a%ead and pro)idin( protecti)e $ire $or t%e dismounted <an.er Grenadiers. +%e tanks do not slo* t%eir ad)ance to enable t%e in$antry to keep continuous pace *it% t%em- but ad)ance alone and *ait under co)er until t%e in$antry catc%es up *it% t%e ad)ance. +errain t%at does not o$$er su$$icient co)er is crossed *it% t%e (reatest possible speed. +%e in$antry attacks in small $ormations also by bounds under t%e $ire co)er o$ it s o*n %ea)y *eapons and o$ t%e tanks- stayin( a*ay $rom indi)idual tanks because t%ey dra* t%e stron(est enemy $ire. W%en a tank company attacks *it% in$antry- t%ere are normally t*o platoons on t%e line- one platoon back- and t%e $ourt% platoon in reser)e. +%e inter)al bet*een tanks is usually 466,476 yards. +%e tank s mac%ine (uns usually en(a(e in$antry tar(ets at 4666 yards ran(e and under- *%ile t%e tank (uns en(a(e tar(ets at 7-666 to 7-"66 yards. +%e coordination bet*een tanks and <an.er Grenadiers mo)in( into combat on armored %al$,tracks is similar to t%e tec%ni/ue employed in a purely armored $ormation- since t%e armored %al$,tracks are not only troop,carryin( )e%icles but also combat )e%icles. W%en t%e terrain is $a)orable $or tank *ar$are- t%e <an.er Grenadiers in t%eir armored %al$,tracks $ollo* immediately *it% t%e second *a)e- a$ter t%e $irst tank *a)e %as o)errun t%e opponent s position. & deep and narro* $ormation is employed. &$ter t%e penetration- t%e main mission o$ t%e <an.er Grenadiers is to o)ercome t%e enemy positions *%ic% sur)i)ed t%e $irst *a)e. 3n attackin( enemy pillbo0es- t%e Germans use combat (roups consistin( o$ tanks- in$antry- and en(ineers- assisted by artillery. +%e normal composition o$ a combat (roup attackin( one bunker is one platoon o$ tanks and one platoon o$ in$antry rein$orced by one s/uad o$ en(ineers. @e$ore t%e combat (roup is committed a(ainst t%e enemy pillbo0- artillery $ires %i(% e0plosi)es and smoke s%ells at t%e nei(%borin( pillbo0es to isolate t%em- s%ells t%e terrain bet*een pillbo0es- and conducts counterbattery $ire. Under t%e protection $o$ t%is $ire- t%e combat (roup ad)ances close to t%e pillbo0 *%ile ot%er in$antry units attack t%e enemy in t%e terrain bet*een t%e pillbo0es. One tank s/uad co)ers t%e ad)ances o$ t%e ot%er tank s/uads and t%e in$antry platoon by direct $ire a(ainst t%e pillbo0- particularly a(ainst t%e obser)ation and *eapons openin(s. +%e $irst tank s/uad %alts under co)er *%ene)er possible and co)ers t%e ad)ance o$ t%e second tank s/uad. W%en t%e combat (roup reac%es a barbed *ire obstacle surroundin( t%e pillbo0- t%e t*o tank s/uads %a)e di$$erent missions. One tank s/uad remains in $ront o$ t%e pillbo0- and it s tanks are dri)en into a position $rom *%ic% t%ey can o)erlook t%e terrain- and *atc% out $or antitank (uns and mac%ine, (un emplacements- *%ile t%e ot%er tank s/uad (t%e pillbo0 tank s/uad# rolls across t%e obstacle to enable t%e in$antry and en(ineers to (et close to t%e pillbo0. +%e pillbo0 tank s/uad t%en $ires on t%e pillbo0 at close ran(e. +%e in$antry s/uad mean*%ile takes t%e surroundin( terrain and co)ers t%e en(ineers *%o blast t%e entrance o$ t%e pillbo0 *it% +D+. #3, ARTILLER47TAN5 COOPERATION &rtillery support is o$ decisi)e importance $or t%e preparation and t%e success$ul conduct o$ a tank attack. & uni$ied command $or t%e entire artillery controls t%e artillery $ire as lon( as t%e in$antry and tank units are $i(%tin( on t%e same line. W%en t%e tanks break t%rou(% t%e enemy $or*ard de$ense lines- t%e sel$,propelled artillery or any ot%er artillery battalion desi(nated $or t%e support o$

t%e tank unit is placed under t%e command o$ t%e tank unit commander. +%e Germans belie)e t%at t%e artillery $ire must not c%eck t%e momentum o$ t%e attack. 'onse/uently t%e %ea)iest $ire must $all *ell a%ead o$ t%e tanks or outside t%eir sector. +%e mission o$ t%e artillery preparation be$ore t%e attack is to destroy- or at least neutrali.e- t%e opponent s antitank de$ense in t%e area bet*een t%e line o$ contact and t%e re(imental reser)e line. 'ontinuous counterbattery $ire pre)ents t%e enemy $rom s%ellin( t%e tank assembly area and $rom breakin( up t%e preparation o$ t%e tank attack. +%e artillery %as t%e $ollo*in( missions be$ore t%e tank attack: 'ounterbattery $ire on enemy artillery located in positions *%ic% command t%e (round o)er *%ic% t%e tank attack is to be made. 'oncentrations on enemy tanks in assembly areas. Harassin( $ire on all areas in *%ic% t%e antitank units are located or suspected. Fire is %ea)iest on areas in *%ic% tanks cannot operate but $rom *%ic% t%ey can be en(a(ed e$$ecti)ely. &d8ustin( $ire *it% %i(% e0plosi)es on probably enemy obser)ation posts commandin( t%e sector to be attacked. +%ese obser)ation posts are blinded *it% smoke as soon as t%e attack be(ins. B0perience %as tau(%t t%e Germans t%at t%e $lanks o$ a tank attack are )ulnerable. +%ere$ore t%ey assi(n to t%e artillery and t%e rocket pro8ector units t%e task o$ protectin( $lanks by barra(es usin( %i(% e0plosi)es and smoke s%ells. +%e artillery %as t%e $ollo*in( missions durin( t%e tank attack: 'ounterbattery $ire. @lindin( enemy obser)ation posts. &s t%e attack pro(resses- en(a(in( successi)e lines o$ antitank de$ense- especially areas to t%e rear and $lanks o$ t%e sector attacked. Screenin( t%e $lanks o$ t%e attack *it% smoke and neutrali.in( t%e enemy s in$antry and rear areas. Delayin( t%e mo)ement and deployment o$ enemy reser)es-- particularly tanks. +%e Germans stress t%at t%is *ide )ariety o$ tasks must not lead to t%e *%olesale dispersal o$ e$$ort. +%e main task o$ t%e artillery is at all times t%e destruction o$ t%e enemy s antitank *eapons- tanksand artillery. ;iaison bet*een artillery and tanks durin( t%e attack is establis%ed by t%e commandin( o$$icers and t%e artillery liaison (roup- *%ic% normally mo)es *it% t%e $irst *a)e. &rtillery $or*ard obser)ers- i$ possible in armored obser)ation posts- ride *it% t%e most $or*ard elements. & German $ield e0pedient is $or t%e tank unit to take alon( a $or*ard obser)er in one o$ it s tanks. 3t o$ten %appens t%at t%e tankman %imsel$ %as to take o)er t%e obser)ation o$ t%e artillery. He %imsel$ can re/uest $ire and s%i$t concentrations *%en t%e situation re/uires suc% c%an(es.

SECTION I1. OFFENSI1E 7 Pa%t II

Source: U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar !"# O$$icially released $rom restricted status by t%e U.S. &rmy 'enter For Military History. c. T!E INFANTR4 DI1ISION IN T!E ATTAC5. #1, Gene%a* $%inci$*e- (o% e2$*o82ent. German teac%in( en)isa(es in$antry di)isions bein( employed to make a penetration in t%e enemy de$ensi)e positions t%rou(% *%ic% armored and mec%ani.ed $ormations can pass. Durin( t%e course o$ t%is *ar- %o*e)er- no ma8or attack %as been carried out by in$antry di)isions *it%out t%e support o$ <an.er di)isions. 3n $act- more ma8or attacks %a)e been carried out by <an.er Di)isions *it% only a minimum o$ ordinary in$antry elements. 3n$antry di)isions %a)e been employed almost entirely in a role o$ consolidation- $ollo*in( up t%e armored and mec%ani.ed $ormations- systematically eliminatin( centers o$ resistance by,passed by t%e latter- or e0ploitin( t%e latter s success by moppin( up demorali.ed enemy de$enses to t%e $lanks o$ t%e armored breakt%rou(% , in s%ortconsolidatin( and %oldin( t%e (round *on by t%e mec%ani.ed $ormations. 3n )ie* o$ t%e unspectacular role allotted to t%e in$antry di)ision it is di$$icult to (i)e in$ormation about ot%er t%an minor in$antry tactics- suc% as attacks on a small scale. #2, PREPARATION FOR T!E ATTAC5 +%e met%od o$ $ormin( up $or an in$antry assault on a prepared position is similar to t%at employed by t%e <an.er di)ision. W%ile t%e in$antry is in assembly positions- t%e artillery makes all preparations $or t%e support o$ t%e attack. 3t dra*s out %ostile artillery $ire and e0ecutes counterbattery $ire a(ainst kno*n enemy batteries. ;ar(e troop concentrations and especially important tar(ets are taken under $ire at (reat ran(es. 3n order not to betray t%eir $ull stren(t% and intentions- t%e Germans *it%%old a portion o$ t%eir batteries $rom t%ese missions. +%ey also try to decei)e t%e enemy as to t%eir intentions by co)erin( ot%er sectors simultaneously *it% $ire. W%en possible- preparation $or an attack is a)oided durin( t%e day in order to pre)ent &llied obser)ation. Occasionally- to obtain a success by surprise- t%e Germans launc% attacks *it%out artillery preparation. Surprise attacks are also launc%ed under co)er o$ darkness or $o(. +%e Germans normally occupy t%eir line o$ departure by means o$ in$iltration in order to a)oid losses. +%eir orders direct *%at actions %a)e to be taken *%en companies run into enemy de$enses9 *%en enemy $ire is opened $rom t%e $lank9 *%en an enemy counterattack is launc%ed9 *%en ob8ecti)es are reac%ed9 *%en companies appear to be (ettin( dispersed9 *%en part o$ a company pus%es too $ar a%ead o$ nei(%borin( units or is %eld up. +%e %ea)y mac%ine (uns o$ t%e rear*ard company and some o$ t%e mortars and %ea)y mortars are assi(ned to deal *it% enemy $lankin( $ire. +%e commander o$ t%e %ea)y company is normally at t%e battalion %ead/uarters- $rom *%ic% %e can control t%e $ire o$ t%e in$antry %ea)y support *eapons. #3, DEPLO4MENT

a, FIRST STAGE. +%e Germans carry out deployment in t*o sta(es. +%ey call t%e $irst sta(e Bnt$altun( or "s%akin( out"- *%ic% is e/ui)alent to t%e deployment o$ a marc% column accordin( to U.S. procedure. 3n t%e $irst sta(e- an in$antry re(iment normally deploys do*n to battalions- alt%ou(% t%e procedure may (o do*n to companies i$ a %i(% state o$ preparedness is necessary. Features o$ t%e $irst sta(e o$ deployment are as $ollo*s: 'ompanies retain t%eir combat )e%icles until t%eir *eapons and e/uipment arri)e at t%e o$$,carrier position- *%ic% is located as $ar $or*ard as t%e situation permits. +%e Germans o$ten place only one company $or*ard- t%e main stren(t% o$ t%e battalion bein( kept under control o$ t%e battalion commander as lon( as possible so t%at %e may deploy it in t%e most ad)anta(eous direction $or t%e attack. 3$ t%e condition o$ t%e terrain and t%e enemy $ire cause a c%an(e in inter)als bet*een units- t%e normal inter)als are resumed as soon as possible. Support *eapons are used to co)er t%e "s%akin( out" p%ase o$ deployment and t%e subse/uent ad)ance- t%e *eapons bein( kept *it%in t%e marc% column bet*een companies or be%ind t%e battalion. &$ter t%e $irst sta(e o$ deployment %as been carried out- t%e leadin( elements o$ t%e battalion may be ordered to sei.e important tactical $eatures. W%en deployin( by ni(%t or in *oods- a care$ul reconnaissance is made- routes are marked- and stron( protection is placed $or*ard. 3nter)als bet*een units are s%orter. &$ter t%e $irst sta(e o$ deployment %as been completed- t%e battalion commander marc%es *it% t%e leadin( elements and normally *ill send reconnaissance patrols a%ead or reconnoiter t%e enemy position %imsel$. +%e commanders o$ support *eapons accompany %im- reconnoiterin( $or $irin( positions. # , SECOND STAGE. +%e second sta(e- called Bnt*icklun( (de)elopment#- is deployment in detail- *%ic% is t%e $inal action o$ t%e company e0tendin( itsel$ do*n to platoons and s/uads. Features o$ t%e second sta(e o$ deployment are as $ollo*s: +%e companies deploy in dept% as soon as t%ey come in ran(e o$ artillery $ire. &n ad)ance in columns o$ $iles is considered desirable because it a$$ords a small tar(et and t%e company is easier to control- but be$ore adoptin( t%is $ormation t%e dan(er o$ en$ilade $ire is *ei(%ed. 3$ enemy $ire and di$$icult terrain necessitate $urt%er deployment- t%e companies disperse in dept% by sections. 2eser)es and support *eapons also adopt open $ormations- but t%ey remain $ar enou(% be%ind to a)oid comin( under t%e $ire directed at t%eir leadin( elements. W%en t%e ri$le companies are deployed- t%ey e0ploit all possible co)er as t%ey ad)ance- employin( column,o$,$ile $ormations *it% irre(ular distances. +%e leadin( elements are not e0tended until t%ey are to en(a(e in a $ire $i(%t. +%e elements t%at $ollo* continue ad)ancin( in $ile.

3n determinin( *%en to deploy- t%e Germans take into consideration additional p%ysical strain placed on men *%en t%ey marc% cross country. #0, TEC!NI"UE OF ATTAC5. +%e in$antry attack on prepared positions is made in t%e same se/uence as t%at o$ t%e <an.er di)ision- namely penetration- breakt%rou(%- e0ploitation by t%e reser)es. 3n t%e in$antry attack%o*e)er- t%e $irst p%ase is a series o$ local attacks by so,called assault detac%ments (Stosstrupps# *it% t%e aim o$ o)ercomin( key points in t%e enemy de$enses- so t%at *ed(es into t%e enemy s $or*ard positions can be establis%ed $rom *%ic% t%e attack can be dri)en $or*ard into t%e dept% o$ t%e enemy position- or rollin( up t%e positions on eit%er $lank o$ t%e *ed(e. &ssault detac%ments normally are composed o$ in$antry *it% en(ineers attac%ed. & typical assault detac%ment consists o$ t%e $ollo*in(: one o$$icer9 obstacle clearin( party- consistin( o$ t*o to si0 men $or eac% lane to be cleared- e/uipped *it% small arms- *ire,cutters- and ban(alore torpedoes and ot%er e0plosi)es9 embrasure,blasin( party consistin( o$ t%ree or $our men e/uipped *it% (renades and demolition or pole c%ar(es. +%is party may also include- t%ou(% it may *ork independently- a $lame,t%ro*er party- consistin( normally o$ t*o men9 co)erin( parties- normally t*o or t%ree parties o$ )aryin( si.e $rom t%ree men *it% one li(%t mac%ine (un to $ull platoons9 smoke party consistin( o$ t*o or t%ree men e/uipped *it% smoke candles or (renades9 supply partycarryin( reser)es o$ e/uipment and ammunition- t%eir stren(t% dependin( on t%e si.e o$ t%e assault detac%ment. &ttacks most o$ten are made at da*n- and are preceded normally by %ea)y artillery preparation- one purpose o$ *%ic% is to make s%ell %oles *%ic% a$$ord co)er $or t%e ad)ancin( assault detac%ments as t%ey mo)e $or*ard. W%en t%e latter reac% t%e *ire obstacles surroundin( t%e enemy positionCery si(nals are $ired- callin( $or a)ailable artillery $ire to be brou(%t on t%e position to seal it o$$ $rom $lankin( positions. 3$- by reason o$ pro0imity o$ t%e assault detac%ment to t%e artillery s dan(er .one- t%e $ormer cannot be protected by co)erin( $ire- t%e smoke party may lay a smoke screen. +%e obstacle clearin( party t%en cuts one or more lanes t%rou(% t%e *ire- usin( *ire,cutters or ban(alore torpedoes. +%e embrasure,blastin( party passes t%rou(% and attacks t%e embrasures. Flame t%ro*ers- i$ employed are not intended by t%emsel)es to cause t%e surrender o$ t%e position- but to co)er t%e ad)ance o$ t%e embrasure,blasin( party *it% it s e0plosi)e c%ar(es *%ic% are considered t%e decisi)e *eapon. &ntitank (uns may be used to (i)e close support to t%e embrasure,blastin( party- bein( man%andled $rom co)er to co)er. +%ey *ill attack t%e embrasure *it% armor,piercin( ammunition- and also (i)e protection a(ainst possible tank,supported counterattacks. 3t is probable t%at se)eral suc% operations *ill be in pro(ress on any one sector at any one time be$ore an attack- in t%e $irst place to probe $or *eak spots- and in t%e second place to keep t%e enemy in uncertainty as to t%e $inal point o$ main e$$ort o$ t%e attack. German $eint attacks %a)e o$ten been deli)ered in suc% stren(t% or *it% suc% )iolence as to be indistin(uis%able $rom t%e main attack. Once a *ed(e %as been $irmly establis%ed in t%e enemy positions- t%e second p%ase o$ t%e attack be(ins. +roops so $ar %eld in t%eir assembly area- or slo*ly makin( %ead*ay under co)er o$ t%e artillery $ire supportin( t%e $irst p%ase o$ t%e attack- ad)ance to cut t%e enemy position in t*o and to roll up t%e positions $lankin( t%e *ed(e. @ecause t%e Germans anticipate enemy de$enses or(ani.ed in dept%- and because t%ese are unlikely

to be $ully disclosed until a$ter t%e be(innin( o$ t%e attack- t%ey do not make detailed plans $or close,support co)erin( $ire- *%ic% *ould be %ard to *ork out in ad)ance- but tend to decentrali.e t%eir support *eapons and artillery $or t%e second p%ase o$ t%e assault- in *%ic% rein$orced battalions- companies- or platoons $i(%t t%eir o*n *ay $or*ard- independently o$ t%eir $lankin( units- until t%ey %a)e (ained t%eir $inal ob8ecti)e. &ttack on li(%tly de$ended positions is more similar to t%e conduct o$ t%e attack by t%e <an.er di)ision. +%e $irst p%ase is likely to be a deployed attack on a t*o,re(iment $ront- t%e t%ird re(iment in reser)e. +%e Germans belie)e t%at in t%e ad)ance e0tended $ormation o$ units is ad)anta(eous because it $orces t%e enemy to scatter %is $ire. +o counteract t%e o)er*%elmin( &llied superiority in artillery and planes *%ic% $re/uently knock out t%e attack be$ore it is under *ay- t%e Germans %a)e been kno*n to use t%e $ollo*in( met%od: Small (roups o$ less t%an platoon si.e in$iltrate mainly at ni(%t o)er a period o$ t%ree to $our days into t%e %ostile battle position or at least *ell be%ind t%e ad)anced positions. Durin( t%e day t%e in$iltrated (roups conceal t%emsel)es- but i$ cau(%t pass t%emsel)es o$$ as ordinary patrols to a)oid raisin( suspicion. W%en t%e actual attack is launc%ed t%ese units try to (i)e t%e impression t%at t%e de$ender is surrounded and o$ten cause (reat con$usion. W%en t%e Germans (o o)er $rom t%e attack to t%e de$ense- e)en i$ only temporarily- t%ey concentrate t%e supportin( *eapons around t%e commander o$ t%e unit t%at is to be supported- so t%at %e can control t%e $ire plan. #9, INFANTR47ASSAULT GUN COORDINATION +%e assault (uns are or(ani.ed in assault (un battalions and are under t%e control o$ t%e di)ision commander. +%e Germans re(ard t%eir sel$,propelled assault (uns as t%e decisi)e *eapons to be employed particularly at t%e point o$ main e$$ort. 3n cooperation *it% in$antry t%ey $acilitate t%e penetration and breakt%rou(%. +%ese *eapons- t%e Germans belie)e- complement artillery $ire by t%eir ability to $ollo* t%e in$antry ri(%t up to an ob8ecti)e. +%eir use $or small actions be$ore an attack is $orbiddenso as not to betray t%eir presence. Surprise is sou(%t by brin(in( t%em into position by ni(%t and camou$la(in( t%eir assembly area. Used primarily to neutrali.e enemy support *eapons at close ran(es o)er open si(%ts- assault (uns are pre$erably employed in concentrations9 to employ t%em sin(ly or in comparati)ely small number is $ro*ned upon by t%e Germans. German assault (uns ad)ance *it% or 8ust be%ind t%e in$antry9 t%ey ne)er (o a%ead o$ t%e in$antry. W%en an ob8ecti)e is reac%ed- t%e assault (uns do not remain *it% t%e in$antry *%ile t%e position is bein( consolidated but retire about 4-666 yards to a*ait $urt%er assi(nment. 3n close combat t%e assault (uns are rat%er %elpless and t%ere$ore it is t%e task o$ t%e in$antry to keep t%e enemy a*ay $rom t%e assault (uns. De*ly,or(ani.ed assault (un escort batteries %a)e t%e same task. #:, ARTILLER4 +%e Germans employ t%eir $ield artillery in (eneral support (&ll(emeine Unterstut.un(#- in t%e

same manner as t%e U.S. &rmy. +%e Germans consider t%e battalion as t%e $irin( unit. Splittin( up an artillery battalion into batteries and placin( batteries under an in$antry battalion is t%e e0ception 8usti$ied only *%en t%e in$antry battalion %as an independent mission ($or e0ample- $lank protection# or *%en t%e terrain does not permit uni$ied $ire control by artillery battalion commanders. Sin(le commitment o$ (uns is a(ainst German tactical doctrine. Carious recent reports- %o*e)er- describe de)iations $rom t%e prescribed practice. Dormally t%e Germans do not employ sin(le $ield artillery pieces $or direct $ire- as- $or instance- t%e 2ussians do. @ut muc% use is made o$ ro)in( (uns (&rbeits(esc%ut.#- and o$ (uns $irin( $rom alternate positions to make identi$ication more di$$icult. Standin( German orders call $or t%e preparation o$ alternate $irin( positions- *%ic%- %o*e)er- are used no* only in cases o$ )ery %ea)y counterbattery $ire- as t%e (asoline s%orta(e keeps all mo)ements to a minimum. +%e Germans o$ten desi(nate t%e number t*o piece as t%e ro)in( (un- and unlike t%e ot%er pieces- it normally is not du( in. 3t $re/uently c%an(es it s position- *%ic% is about 7"6 to :66 yards $rom t%e rest o$ t%e battery. +%e German artillery o$ten en(a(es a tar(et $rom a lateral position. +%is deception- particularly identi$ied *it% lon(er ran(e *eapons- is e0tended by employin( anot%er (un- o$ten o$ li(%ter caliber- in a care$ully coordinated attack on t%e same tar(et. Flas% simulators also increase t%e di$$iculty o$ )isual location o$ acti)e (uns. +%e $irst step to obtain in$antry,artillery coordination is taken in t%e attack order and is assured by direct contact bet*een t%e commanders- artillery liaison units (&rtillerie)ebindun(skommando#and direct contact bet*een artillery obser)ers and in$antry units. +%e Germans also employ $or*ard obser)ers (Cor(esc%obene @eobac%ter#- *%o %a)e t%e same task as t%eir U.S. counterpart. +%e si(nal e/uipment necessary $or communication bet*een units- liaison units- and obser)ers is only partly or(anic. +%e Germans keep most o$ t%e si(nal e/uipment centrali.ed in t%e di)ision si(nal battalion- *%ic% allots e/uipment as needed to t%e )arious units. 3n t%e attack t%e (reater part o$ t%e artillery supports t%e main e$$ort. +%e remainder o$ t%e artillery is assi(ned t%e mission o$ $lank protection a(ainst possible enemy counterattacks. #;, MEETING ENGAGEMENT. #Be+e+n'n+-+e(ec.t, 3n t%e meetin( en(a(ement t%e Germans belie)e t%at t%e ad)anta(e lies *it% t%e side *%ic% succeeds $irst in makin( e$$ecti)e preparation $or t%e attack and t%ereby depri)es t%e enemy o$ %is $reedom o$ action. W%en bot% ad)ersaries attack immediately $rom marc% columns- t%e decisi)e $actors are t%e initiati)e o$ t%e 8unior o$$icers and t%e e$$iciency o$ t%e troops. +%e senior commander /uickly coordinates t%e $unctions o$ t%e )arious o$$icers- *%ile t%e ad)ance (uard secures $or %im $reedom o$ action and t%e opportunity $or a speedy deployment o$ %is troops. #<, PURSUIT. U.S. and German tactical doctrines on pursuit are )ery muc% alike. <ursuit be(ins *%en t%e enemy is no lon(er able to maintain %is position and abandons t%e combat area *it% t%e bulk o$ %is $orces. +%e ob8ect o$ t%e pursuit is t%e complete anni%ilation o$ t%e retreatin( or routed enemy. B$$ecti)e

pursuit re/uires (reat initiati)e $rom commanders o$ all ec%elons o$ command- *%o must not %esitate to start pursuit immediately- e)en *%en t%eir troops are e0%austed. +%e enemy must be (i)en no time to pause to reor(ani.e %is $orces and reconstitute %is de$ense. +%e pursuit is conducted on a broad $ront by means o$ $ire and mo)ement. W%en makin( $or distant ob8ecti)es e)ery e$$ort is made to (et around t%e enemy s $lanks and e$$ect a surprise attack in %is rear. Ho*e)er- care must be taken t%at enemy attack on one s o*n $lank does not cause de$lection $rom t%e ori(inal direction. Fast,mo)in( troops are used in t%e pursuit. +%ese troops o$ten are or(ani.ed into pursuit or ad)ance sections. +%e in$antry scatters t%e enemy and by,passes resistin( enemy Stron(point- lea)in( t%eir destruction to units $ollo*in( in t%e rear. <art o$ t%e artillery places concentrations at t%e a)enues o$ retreat- *%ile t%e remainder displaces $or*ard in ec%elon- pro)idin( continuous support $or t%e units in $ront. +%e Germans emp%asi.e t%at a pursuit *it%out t%e necessary artillery support may lead to disaster. &ssault (uns tra)el *ell $or*ard *it% t%e rapidly ad)ancin( in$antry- t%eir comparati)ely %ea)y armament enablin( t%em to crus% /uickly and decisi)ely any enemy $orces attemptin( to make a stand. 'ombat a)iation bombs routes o$ retreat and stra$es t%e %ostile $orces in direct support o$ t%e (round attack. 'ombat en(ineers repair dama(ed roads- $acilitatin( t%e continuous $lo* o$ supply and troops. <ursuit a$ter a success$ul breakt%rou(%- is re(arded by t%e Germans as an ideal mission $or t%e <an.er di)ision. <an.er Grenadiers in armored %al$,tracks or in unarmored )e%icles and tanks supplement eac% ot%er in pursuin( t%e enemy. Durin( t%e ad)ance on roads- t%e tanks $orm t%e point. Ho*e)er- t%rou(% *ooded areas or lar(er )illa(es t%e <an.er Grenadiers take o)er t%e point. +anks and <an.er Grenadiers stay close to(et%er so t%at eit%er- accordin( to t%e situation- can be committed as soon as enemy resistance is encountered. +anks are normally not used in units o$ less t%an company stren(t%.

SECTION 1. DEFENSI1E 7 Pa%t II

Source: U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar !"# O$$icially released $rom restricted status by t%e U.S. &rmy 'enter For Military History. 0. DEFENSE OF TO6NS. +%e Germans re(ard to*ns and )illa(es as e0cellent stron(points- particularly i$ t%e buildin(s are o$ masonry. +o*ns also are re(arded as e0cellent antitank positions because o$ t%e considerable in$antry,artillery e$$ort necessary to neutrali.e t%em. 3n de$endin( a to*n or )illa(e- t%e Germans locate t%eir main line o$ resistance *ell *it%in t%e built,up portion9 t%e ed(es o$ t%e to*n- *%ic% pro)ide easy tar(ets $or artillery $ire- are belie)ed to be too )ulnerable. +%e main line o$ resistance is laid out irre(ularly in order to de)elop $lankin( $ire- and e)ery e$$ort is made to conceal its location until t%e last possible moment. Minor stron(points are maintained $or*ard o$ t%e line in order to break up attacks and pro)ide additional $lankin( $ire. 'ul,de,sacs are or(ani.ed and attempts made to trap attackin( $orces in t%em $or destruction by counter, attackin( mobile reser)es. +%ese reser)es are kept in readiness *it%in t%e to*n itsel$- but ot%er reser)e $orces are %eld outside t%e to*n to pre)ent %ostile $lankin( maneu)ers. @ot% occupied and unoccupied buildin(s are booby,trapped in or(ani.in( t%e de$ended positions. Bntrances to buildin(s are blocked and all *indo*s are opened so as not to disclose t%ose $rom *%ic% $ire is maintained. 2ooms are darkened- and passa(es are cut in t%e *alls bet*een buildin(s. +o a)oid detection- t%e Germans $ire $rom t%e middle o$ t%e rooms- and $re/uently c%an(e t%eir positions- *%ile communication is maintained t%rou(% cellars and o)er roo$s. Mac%ine (uns are sited lo*- usually in basements- to pro)ide better (ra.in( $ire. '%imneys and cornices are used as co)er $or men on roo$s9 tiles may be remo)ed to pro)ide loop%oles. Searc%li(%ts are mounted to illuminate $ields o$ $ire9 in t%eir absence )e%icle %eadli(%ts may be used as substitutes. W%en %ouses collapse- t%e de$ense is carried on $rom cellars- and rubble %eaps o$ destroyed areas are or(ani.ed into stron(points. +anks are considered to be ine$$ecti)e *it%in a de$ended to*n- alt%ou(% t%e Germans %a)e used t%em in static- du(,in positions at cross,roads and s/uares. &s a result o$ t%eir e0periences on t%e Bastern Front- t%e Germans belie)e sin(le tanks are too )ulnerable to Moloto) cocktails- ma(netic mines- and e0plosi)e c%ar(es. W%en t%e Germans t%emsel)es use t%ese antitank *eapons- t%ey employ t%em $rom $o0%oles du( outside t%e perimeter o$ t%e to*n. B$$orts are made to destroy enemy tanks immobili.ed by antitank action- eit%er *it%in or outside t%e to*n in order to pre)ent t%eir reco)ery or use as artillery obser)ation posts and mac%ine,(un nests. &ntipersonnel mines are interspersed in antitank mine$ields because t%e attackin( in$antry are considered t%e c%ie$ menace. &ssault (uns may pro)ide direct de$ensi)e support $ire i$ attackin( $orces break t%rou(% and disor(ani.e t%e German position. +o secure t%e added protection a$$orded by masonry *alls- t%e Germans may locate assault (uns or tanks *it%in buildin(s and use t%em a(ainst %ostile armored )e%icles and in$antry. 'ounterattacks- supported by assault (uns or tanks- *ill not be *it%%eld until t%e situation %as become desperate9 indeed surprise counterattacks may be launc%ed at any time. For t%e de$ense o$ )illa(e stron(points special battle commandants (Famp$kommandanten# are appointed. +%e battle commandant is usually t%e senior o$$icer and t%e tactical commander o$ all military $orces- emer(ency units- and ci)il or(ani.ations in %is area. He %as t%e disciplinary po*er o$ a re(imental commander.

3n t%e case o$ $airly small )illa(es- consolidation o$ t%e place itsel$ is usually deemed su$$icient. For lar(er localities an outer de$ense system is constructed in addition to t%e inner de$enses. +%e inner de$ense system consists o$ a number o$ concentric positions *%ic% are broken do*n into perimeter positions- intermediate positions- and t%e inner rin( position. +%e inner de$ense system is di)ided into sectors- eac% $ormin( a stron(point system in itsel$- *it% t%e stron(points protected by all,around antitank and in$antry obstacles and connected *it% eac% ot%er by trenc%es. +%e perimeter rin( position is t%e most important part o$ t%e inner de$enses and consists o$ one or more continuous trenc% systems- eac% *it% a deep main battle .one. +%e $or*ard ed(e o$ten is beyond t%e outskirts o$ t%e )illa(e- unless t%is creates un$a)orable conditions $or t%e antitank de$ense- in *%ic% case it is *it%in t%e )illa(e itsel$. &rtillery and %ea)y support *eapons are employed as *%ole units in support o$ t%e perimeter rin( position- alt%ou(% sin(le (uns may be detac%ed $or t%e de$ense o$ stron(points and roads. +%e nearer t%e $i(%tin( approac%es t%e inner rin(- t%e more likely it *ill be t%at t%e Germans *ill split up t%e support *eapons units $or close cooperation *it% in$antry assault (roups. +%e outer de$ense system like*ise consists o$ a number o$ concentric positions- appro0imately !,5 miles apart- so as to $orce t%e enemy artillery to displace to en(a(e eac% one. For de$ense o$ lar(er to*ns t%e Germans or(ani.e t%e outside rin( about 47 4G7 to 4> 4G7 miles beyond t%e outskirts *%ene)er $easible. @eyond t%is outside de$ense rin(- about 7-766 yards $or*ard- are t%e ad)anced positions- *it% co)erin( units still $urt%er $or*ard on main roads and rail*ays. <atrols o$ all types- includin( motori.ed and cyclist patrols- (i)e early *arnin( o$ t%e enemy s approac% and keep %im under continuous obser)ation. Don,military outposts- suc% as police sentries- party o$$icials- and local $armers also are used $or t%ese duties. Sector boundaries $or companies and battalions are de$ined $rom t%e outside de$ense rin( to t%e center o$ t%e to*n or )illa(e. Usually t%e do not coincide *it% )ital main roads- *%ic% al*ays are de$ended by entire companies or battalions. B)ery stron(point- de$ense block (combined ad8acent buildin(s#- and sector %as local reser)es9 mobile reser)es- consistin( o$ combat (roups comprised o$ in$antry- tanks- assault and sel$,propelled (uns- are employed $or counterattacks o$ a lar(er scale. 3n addition to re(ular military units t%e Germans employ emer(ency units- or(ani.ed $rom personnel o$ &rmy- Da)y- and &ir Force in to*n de$ense. @esides t%ese re(ularly or(ani.ed emer(ency units- impro)ised emer(ency units are $ormed $rom stra((lers- remnants o$ $ormationsand units in process or reor(ani.ation. Utili.ation o$ emer(ency units is only temporary. +%eir main tasks- o$ local nature- are protection o$ %ead/uarters- supply points- air$ields- etc.- and (arrison ser)ice in $orti$ications. 9. DOCTRINE OF 6EST6ALL S4STEM +%e Germans consider economy o$ $orce t%e $undamental principle in plannin( .ones o$ permanent $orti$ications. +%ey ori(inally built t%e West*all as a protecti)e barrier alon( t%e Frenc% $rontier to permit commitment o$ ma0imum $orces o$$ensi)ely in t%e Bast. +%us- in 4?:?- t%ey *ere able to %old in t%e West *it% appro0imately 76 di)isions- *%ile employin( !6 to "6 di)isions a(ainst <oland. W%en West*all construction ceased in 4?!6- German strate(y in t%e West *as o$$ensi)een)isionin( an in)asion o$ France by a *ide en)elopment- *it% t%e bulk o$ t%e German $orces in t%e

Dort%- *%ere t%e West*all de$enses *ere relati)ely *eak. +%e pi)ot o$ maneu)er *as sout% o$ t%e Moselle 2i)er- *%ere t%e West*all de$enses *ere stron(est. +%e Germans ne)er %a)e discarded t%e principle t%at o$$ensi)e action is t%e best protection. W%en t%eir armies *ere $orced back to t%e West*all in 4?!!- t%ey used t%is de$ensi)e system as a base $or o$$ensi)e operations in selected areas- as in t%e Saar and t%e Bi$el. &d)anta(e also *as taken o$ t%is protected .one $or t%e $ree lateral mo)ement o$ troops9 s%elters *ere utili.ed $or t%e co)er and concealment o$ reser)e $orces- *eapons- and supplies. German West*all tactics are based on a stubborn de$ense o$ indi)idual $orti$ications- local counterattacks a(ainst areas o$ penetration- and counterattack by (eneral mobile reser)es a(ainst areas o$ deep penetration. German troops are not permitted to de)elop a static,de$ense comple0 *%ic% mi(%t $oster t%e idea t%at a position once surrounded is lost. @unker (arrisons are tau(%t to continue resistance e)en t%ou(% surrounded- because t%eir perse)erance impedes t%e attackers ad)ance and $acilitates counterattacks. +roops are trained in t%e principle t%at t%e decision is usually ac%ie)ed by t%e in$antry in t%e open bet*een bunkers. Or(anic %ea)y in$antry *eapons and artillery are t%e backbone o$ German de$ense in t%e West*all- 8ust as in mobile *ar$are. 2eser)es %abitually are le$t under co)er until t%e time $or counter, attack arri)es. Surprise is al*ays attempted. For e0ample- bunkers and %ea)y *eapons $re/uently are sited on re)erse slopes- not only $or concealment and protection in de$ilade- but also to open $ire suddenly upon t%e un*ary attacker crossin( t%e crest or mo)in( around t%e nose o$ a %ill. +%e attacker penetratin( t%e West*all de$ense system must be prepared to cope *it% une0pected resistance $larin( up in %is rear areas- surprise by accurate $lankin( and en$ilade $ire at s%ort and medium ran(es- sudden counterattacks by $orces not kno*n to be in t%e areas- and counterattacks in increasin( stren(t% as t%e penetration pro(resses. German doctrine prescribes t%at t%e intact portion o$ t%e de$enses must continue t%e battlere(ardless o$ t%e situation at t%e penetrated area- until t%e appropriate command orders a read8ustment o$ t%e line. <enetrations normally are dealt *it% as $ollo*s: by mobile reser)es *%ic% seal t%em o$$ $rontally9 by counterattack or countero$$ensi)e $rom protected $lanks to t%reaten t%e rear areas o$ t%e penetratin( $orce9 or by bot%- as in t%e &ac%en area. &t any rate- t%e Germans *ill attempt to destroy t%e penetration be$ore t%e attacker %as reor(ani.ed and consolidated %is (ains. Here a(ain t%e principle o$ economy o$ $orce is (enerally $ollo*ed. German troops may be taken $rom stron(ly protected and little t%reatened areas in order to concentrate on ade/uate counterattackin( or countero$$ensi)e $orce. Hence- t%e attacker s%ould %a)e su$$icient stren(t% to *ard o$$ stron( countermeasures and at t%e same time e0ploit t%e ad)anta(es (ained by a penetration.

Section 1I. RETROGRADE MO1EMENTS

Source: U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar !"# O$$icially released $rom restricted status by t%e U.S. &rmy 'enter For Military History. 1. 6IT!DRA6AL FROM ACTION #A %ec.en /e- Ge(ec.t-,

a. GENERAL +%e Germans break o$$ an en(a(ement $or one or more o$ t%e $ollo*in( reasons: *%en it %as ser)ed its purpose9 *%en conditions re/uire t%e employment o$ t%e troops- or part o$ t%em on anot%er $ront9 *%en a continuation o$ t%e battle (i)es no promise o$ success9 or *%en de$eat is imminent. W%en an attack e0%austs itsel$ *it%out attainin( its ob8ecti)e- t%e Germans assume t%e de$ensi)e as t%e $irst step in *it%dra*in( $rom action. 3$ t%e de$ense must be continued in a rear*ard positiont%e breakin( o$ contact- t%e retirement- and t%e resumption o$ t%e de$ense are care$ully planned be$ore%and. <ositions in t%e rear are prepared $or t%e reception o$ t%e troops- particularly i$ t%ey %a)e en(a(ed in %ea)y $i(%tin(. +%e retirement is made in con8unction *it% t%at o$ ad8acent unitsand stress is placed on maintainin( t%e co%esi)eness o$ t%e retirin( $orces. @y maintainin( t%e usual $ire o$ all arms- t%e Germans try to decei)e t%eir enemy as lon( as possible as to t%e continued occupation in $orce o$ t%eir ori(inal position. 3n )ie* o$ t%e se)ere losses in$licted by &llied planes and armored $orces on German troops durin( dayli(%t disen(a(ements- t%e Germans try to a*ait darkness be$ore *it%dra*in( $rom action. &t ni(%t t%ey break o$$ combat on a *ide $ront and mo)e back alon( routes as nearly perpendicular as possible to terrain $eatures suitable $or $i(%tin( delayin( actions. W%en t%e situation $orces t%em to *it%dra* durin( dayli(%t- t%e do so by unit sectors- coordinatin( t%e mo)ements o$ ad8acent units. 2. RETREAT #R'c)='+, a. GENERAL. 2etreat is a $orced retirement *%ic% is ordered by t%e Germans only *%en all possibilities $or success are e0%austed. +%e ob8ecti)e is to place enou(% distance bet*een $riendly and %ostile $orces to enable t%e $ormer to conduct an orderly *it%dra*al and to occupy ne* positions in t%e rear. . CO1ERING FORCES. +%e Germans usually or(ani.e co)erin( $orces $rom troops in closest contact *it% t%e enemy , eit%er *%ole tactical units or elements $rom se)eral. +%ese $orces attempt to make t%e enemy belie)e t%at t%e position is still $ully occupied. Bn(ineers prepare additional obstacles- mine$ieldsand booby traps $or*ard o$ and *it%in t%e positions to be %eld. & portion o$ t%e artillery and %ea)y in$antry *eapons support t%e co)erin( $orces. +%ey maintain as lon( as possible t%eir $ormer $ire acti)ity to decei)e t%e enemy- e)en *%en $ul$illment o$ t%eir mission means t%e loss o$ indi)idual (uns. +%e sector assi(ned to a co)erin( $orce is usually too *ide to be under e$$ecti)e control o$ a sin(le commander- but t%e actions o$ t%e )arious commanders are closely coordinated. Orders speci$y *%et%er t%e co)erin( $orces are to remain in contact *it% t%e %ostile $orces until t%ey be(in to ad)ance- or to $ollo* t%e main body a$ter a speci$ied inter)al. c. REAR GUARD #Nac..'t, 4. &s t%e distance $rom t%e enemy increases- t%e retirin( troops $orm marc% columns. W%ere possible- a di)ision s retirement takes place alon( t*o parallel routes. +%e $res%est troops a)ailable are used as rear (uards. Since t%e rear (uard cannot e0pect support $rom t%e retreatin( main body- it must be relati)ely stron(. 3t is composed o$ in$antry units. Generally t%e di)isional $ield artillery

retires *it% t%e main body- none bein( assi(ned to t%e rear (uard. Sel$,propelled and %ea)y in$antry,support (uns- and e)en %o*it.ers- are $re/uently attac%ed to t%e rear (uard. +anks also may be assi(ned. & typical rear (uard $or eac% route in a di)ision retirement is one in$antry battalion to *%ic% are attac%ed elements o$ t%e reconnaissance unit- to protect t%e $lanks- and o$ t%e en(ineer unit to prepare demolitions. 7. +%e rear (uard in$antry battalion normally employs only one o$ its ri$le companies on acti)e rear (uard tasks. +%e t%ree ri$le companies per$orm t%is $unction in turn as lon( as t%eir stren(t% remains appro0imately e)en. 3$ t%e terrain demands it- t*o companies are employed at a time. +*o or more antitank (uns and %al$ o$ t%e sel$,propelled or %ea)y in$antry (uns allotted to t%e $ull rear (uard support t%e rearmost ri$le company or companies. W%en pressure becomes too stron(- t%e sin(le ri$le company is *it%dra*n t%rou(% t%e t*o remainin( ri$le companies *%ic% are supported by t%e remainder o$ t%e attac%ed *eapons. Cariations o$ t%is leap$ro((in( pro(ress are repeated until darkness- *%en a (eneral disen(a(ement takes place and t%e ori(inal $ormation is resumed. :. 2ear (uards *it%dra* by bounds to selected but not prepared positions. +%e e0tent to *%ic% positions e)entually can be prepared depends on t%e pro0imity o$ t%e pursuin( $orces- t%e len(t% o$ time eac% particular position is likely to be %eld- and t%e decision o$ t%e indi)idual company and platoon commanders. Durin( eac% sta(e o$ t%e retreat- t%e commander o$ t%e rear company can order a *it%dra*al to t%e main rear (uard position- but *it%dra*al $rom eac% main rear (uard position is ordered by t%e commander o$ t%e main body. Fre/uently t%e speed o$ *it%dra*al is based on a time,distance sc%edule. Durin( t%e *it%dra*al $rom a certain to*n- rear (uards *ere instructed to retire not more t%an :-666 yards a day. !. B0perience %as s%o*n t%at in certain types o$ country a rein$orced rear (uard company (enerally can %old up )ery superior $orces on a $ront as *ide as t%ree miles. 3n one instance o$ a *it%dra*al $rom a de$ensi)e position alon( a ri)er line- a German <an.er di)ision- *%ic% %ad one <an.er Grenadier battalion and attac%ed elements as its rear (uard- *as co)ered by one ri$le company rein$orced by a company o$ tanks- $our in$antry (uns (includin( t*o sel$,propelled#- and a battery o$ medium %o*it.ers. +%e tanks *ere mainly used to co)er t%e *it%dra*al o$ t%e ri$le elements. On anot%er occasion a similar rear party %ad a number o$ %ea)y mortars attac%ed. +%ese co)ered t%e in$antry *it%dra*al *it% t%e %elp o$ $our tanks *%ic% also carried t%e mortars back to t%e ne0t bound. ". <articularly suited $or rear (uard tasks- because o$ its armor and %i(% $ire po*er- is t%e armored reconnaissance battalion o$ t%e <an.er di)ision. W%en employin( t%e armored reconnaissance battalion in terrain t%at a$$ords co)er- t%e Germans site *ell camou$la(ed- armored %al$,tracks in *ooded areas- $lat re)erse slopes- or %i(% (rain $ields- and open $ire *it% all *eapons at )ery close ran(e. +%e armored %al$,tracks t%en penetrate into t%e con$used enemy and- a$ter repulsin( %imretreat to pre)iously or(ani.ed alternate positions. 3. DELA4ING ACTION. a. BASIC PRINCIPLES. +%e Germans make a distinction bet*een "delayin( en(a(ements" (Hin%altendes Ge$ec%t# and "delayin( action" (Hin%altender Widerstand#. & delayin( en(a(ement is primarily t%e (eneral plan o$ t%e %i(%er commander $or %oldin( back t%e enemy. Delayin( actions are t%e measures taken by lo*er units to carry out t%e %i(%er commander s plan. +%e purpose o$ delayin( actions is to enable t%e main German $orce to disen(a(e itsel$ $rom battle-

retire in order- and establis% a ne* de$ensi)e position. Delayin( actions t%ere$ore seek to decei)e t%e enemy as to German stren(t%- dispositions- and intentions9 to pre)ent t%e enemy $rom committin( t%e main German $orces9 and to pre)ent close pursuit o$ t%e main $orces by t%e enemy. +%ese measures are accomplis%ed by rear (uards- special battle (roups- and stron(points- all o$ *%ic% are c%aracteri.ed by %i(% automatic $ire po*er- mobility- and economy in numerical stren(t%. Delayin( actions are or(ani.ed not in a main de$ensi)e belt- but on lines o$ resistance (Widerstandslinien#. +%e distance bet*een suc% lines is (reat enou(% to pre)ent t%e enemy $rom en(a(in( t*o o$ t%em $rom t%e same artillery position. He is compelled to displace and mo)e up %is artillery to en(a(e eac% line. +%ese lines o$ resistance are normally establis%ed alon( $or*ard slopes to $acilitate disen(a(ement and *it%dra*al under co)er. +%e delayin( actions are $ou(%t $or*ard o$ t%e lines o$ resistance *it% mobile $orces. Furt%ermore- battle outposts are or(ani.ed $or*ard o$ eac% line. +%e main delayin( *eapons are mac%ine (uns- mortars- and sel$,propelled *eapons. +anks are used in small (roups. Maintenance o$ contact is a most conspicuous principle in t%e German s conduct o$ a *it%dra*al and delayin( action. +%e si.e- composition- direction- and intention o$ t%e attackin( enemy $orce are obser)ed at all times. . CONDUCT OF T!E DELA4ING ACTION. Durin( a delayin( action- *ide sectors are co)ered by artillery units *idely deployed , (uns are sited by sections i$ necessary , and by *idely distributed in$antry,support *eapons. +%e de$ense is t%en $urt%er or(ani.ed by establis%in( stron(points manned by small (roups. +%e positions $rom *%ic% delayin( actions are $ou(%t are c%aracteri.ed by )ery sli(%t dept%. &s a (eneral rule- a unit is responsible $or double t%e $ront normally allocated in de$ensi)e $i(%tin(. & company sector is 5"6 to 4-:66 yards9 a battalion sector 4-="6 to !-!66 yards9 a re(imental sector !-!66 to 5-566 yards9 and a di)ision sector 4:-666 to 77-666 yards. 3n lea)in( a line o$ resistance- German co)erin( $orces attempt to disen(a(e by ni(%t. 3$ t%at is not possible- t%eir actions are (o)erned by t%e $ollo*in( principle: t%e enemy is not allo*ed to come closer to t%em t%an t%ey are $rom t%eir ne0t line o$ resistance. +%e troops must be able to reac% t%e ne* position be$ore t%e enemy reac%es t%e old one- or t%eir losses *ill be e0cessi)e. +%e troops t%ere$ore do not retire in t%e $ace o$ enemy patrols , e)ery e$$ort is made to destroy suc% patrols , but only *%en t%e enemy mounts an attack. 3$ it can be ascertained t%at t%e enemy is preparin( $or a massed attack- t%e Germans make a timely *it%dra*al to a)oid e0posin( t%e troops to enemy artillery concentrations. &d)ance elements employ smoke to enable t%em to make a (eta*ay in a critical situation. 2i$lemen co)er t%e disen(a(ement o$ %ea)y *eapons- *%ic% mo)e back by bounds. B)ery opportunity is taken to make limited counterattacks in order to in$lict casualties on an enemy *%o ad)ances recklessly. Fire is opened at e0treme ran(es on an enemy ad)ancin( $or a ma8or attack. Bnemy reconnaissance $orces are allo*ed to approac%- %o*e)er- and t%en an e$$ort is made to destroy t%em. 'ounterattacks on a lar(e scale are a)oided- e0cept *%en t%e enemy t%reatens to penetrate t%e line o$ resistance. W%en t%at occurs- t%e Germans counterattack *it% t%e main $orces o$ t%e rear (uard

and seek to restore t%e situation in order t%at t%e pro(ram o$ sta(ed *it%dra*al may be continued. ;ocal counterattacks are made $or t%e protection or retention o$ some $eature essential to t%e sa$e conduct o$ t%e main *it%dra*al- or to (ain time $or t%e preparation o$ t%e line o$ resistance or p%ase line. +%e area bet*een t%e lines o$ resistance is called t%e intermediate area (E*isc%en$eld#. B0plicit orders are (i)en as to *%et%er t%e intermediate area is to be co)ered in one bound or is to be $ou(%t o)er. +%e latter necessity arises especially *%en t%e ne0t line o$ resistance %as not been $ully prepared and time must be (ained. Detac%ments must reac% t%e line o$ resistance early enou(% to insure t%at all t%e main positions are occupied in time. +%e supply o$ ammunition is care$ully or(ani.ed. & (reat deal o$ ammunition is re/uired $or delayin( actions because a $e* *eapons on a broad $ront must do as muc% as or e)en more t%an t%e normal number o$ (uns in a de$ensi)e position. W%en ammunition is scarce- t%e Germans speci$ydo*n to sections i$ necessary- t%e /uantity o$ ammunition t%at may be used at eac% position. B)ery commander maintains a supply o$ ammunition $or emer(encies. +%e Germans stress t%e importance o$ decei)in( t%e enemy by e)ery means. &rtillery and %ea)y *eapons are mo)ed continually to (i)e an impression o$ (reater stren(t%. Dummy positions and camou$la(e are also *idely used. So t%at isolated (roups may be ade/uately directed- si(nal communication recei)es special attention. 3n delayin( actions in mountainous terrain- t%e Germans make (reater use o$ t%eir reconnaissance and en(ineer units t%an o$ any ot%er component. 2econnaissance units are almost continuously in contact *it% ad)ance and $lankin( enemy elements- and participate in most rear,(uard and battle, (roup en(a(ements. c. STRONGPOINTS IN DELA4ING ACTION. +%e Germans co)er t%e rear (uard s resistance or p%ase lines by a system o$ stron(points or de$ended localities. Hust as it is a $unction o$ t%e rear (uards to pre)ent a pursuin( $orce $rom makin( contact *it% t%e main body *%ile it is on t%e mo)e- so it is t%e $unction o$ stron(points to pre)ent t%e penetration o$ resistance or p%ase lines until t%e main body %as *it%dra*n to its ne0t position. 3n mannin( stron(points- t%e Germans s%o* t%e same economy o$ $orce t%ey s%o* in $ormin( rear (uards. +ypical $ire po*er o$ a stron(point in close country is one or t*o sel$,propelled (uns- t*o %ea)y mortars- and up to si0 mac%ine (uns. 3n open country- one sel$,propelled (un is normally employed- supplemented by t%ree tanks and a small party o$ in$antry *it% mortars and mac%ine (uns in armored %al$,tracks. Stron(points (enerally are or(ani.ed on t%e %ed(e%o( principle. <ro)ision is made $or all,around $ire- but t%e stron(points are not necessarily mutually sel$,supportin(. +%ey are normally located on commandin( $eatures- and sometimes on t%e $or*ard ed(es o$ )illa(es or %amlets i$ t%ese dominate road or terrain bottlenecks. 3n $lat country- %o*e)er- )illa(es usually are not occupied e0cept by snipers- but positions are occupied in t%e rear o$ t%e )illa(es to en(a(e enemy )an(uards debouc%in( $rom t%em. Weapons are not du( in- and positions are $re/uently c%an(ed. 'ounterbattery $ire t%ereby is rendered )ery di$$icult as t%ere are no prepared positions to be spotted $rom t%e air. +%e Germans t%us $orce t%eir enemy to launc% a $ull,scale attack supported by artillery

to dislod(e t%e (arrison o$ t%e stron(point- *%ic% normally *it%dra*s 8ust be$ore t%e attack can materiali.e. &pproac%es to stron(points *%ic% cannot be co)ered by $ire are $re/uently mined. B0tensi)e mine$ields are $re/uently laid at t%e %eads o$ re,entrants in %illy terrain. /. BATTLE GROUPS IN DELA4ING ACTION. @attle (roups are normally or(ani.ed $or t%e e0ecution o$ some speci$ic task in t%e *it%dra*al- suc% as a local counterattack or t%e de$ense o$ some particular $eature *%ose retention is necessary $or t%e security o$ t%e main *it%dra*al. @attle (roups- *%ic% t%e Germans employ $or o$$ensi)e and de$ensi)e as *ell as delayin( missions)ary in si.e $rom a company or t*o- *it% attac%ed close support *eapons- to a re(iment or se)eral battalions rein$orced *it% tanks- artillery- antiaircra$t- en(ineer- and reconnaissance elements. 3n all cases t%e Germans seek to make t%em as sel$,su$$icient as possible in combat. 3n actual practice%o*e)er- t%e composition o$ German battle (roups appears o$ten to %a)e been dictated less by t%e t%eory o$ *%at units s%ould be put to(et%er to $orm a sel$,su$$icient combat $orce- t%an by t%e demands o$ an emer(ency situation *%ic% commanders %a)e been $orced to meet *it% t%e insu$$icient and normally disassociated units at t%eir disposal. German battle (roups may be or(ani.ed $or s%ort- lon(- or c%an(in( missions. +%ey are usually kno*n by t%e name o$ t%eir commander. e. DEMOLITION AND OBSTACLES. +o pre)ent t%e pursuin( enemy columns $rom approac%in( close enou(% to en(a(e e)en t%eir rear (uard elements- t%e Germans continually employ demolitions and obstacles o$ all kinds. +%e t%orou(%ness *it% *%ic% en(ineer operations %a)e been carried out %as increased steadily t%rou(%out t%e *ar. 'ul)erts and brid(es are completely destroyed. 2oads and all natural detours are mined- cratered- or blocked by $elled trees9 in streets and )illa(es- streets are blocked by t%e *recka(e o$ buildin(s. Certical rail obstacles are placed to obstruct main routes9 mines o$ten are laid $or :6 yards around t%e ed(e o$ t%e obstacle. Wooden bo0 mines are used to a lar(e e0tent as demolition c%ar(es- and aerial bombs and artillery s%ells are sometimes similarly employed. Fre/uently rear parties are committed to a delayin( en(a(ement in order to co)er t%e preparation o$ demolitions immediately be%ind t%em. Durin( static periods in t%e (eneral *it%dra*al- *%en t%e Germans occupy t%eir line o$ resistance or p%ase line- en(ineer units prepare demolitions in t%e rear. &$ter t%e *it%dra*al- t%ese demolitions are co)ered by sniper $ire- mac%ine (uns and sel$,propelled *eapons as lon( as possible.

SECTION 1II. MINEFIELDS

Source: U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar !"# O$$icially released $rom restricted status by t%e U.S. &rmy 'enter For Military History. 1. GENERAL +%e Germans make e0tensi)e use o$ mines *%ic% t%ey consider a most e$$ecti)e de$ensi)e *eapon.

Mine$ields are utili.ed c%ie$ly to co)er de$ensi)e actions and retreats- alt%ou(% limited use is made o$ t%em in o$$ensi)e actions $or $lank protection. 3n a static situation t%e Germans re(ard mine$ields as an element o$ t%e $ront line position- laid out accordin( to an o)er,all mine plan de)eloped in close con8unction *it% t%at $or t%e $ields o$ $ire o$ all *eapons. Wit%in recent mont%s- standard German doctrine $or mine$ield location %as been modi$ied. 3nstead o$ layin( dense mine$ields in $ront o$ t%e main line o$ resistance- dispersed mines are laid t%ere- *%ile t%e mine$ields proper are sited *it%in t%e main battle position. 2. SUR1E4ING OF MINEFIELDS +%e Germans consider it necessary to sur)ey t%e location o$ mine$ields and indi)idual mines *it%in t%e mine$ields. German en(ineers are instructed to c%oose re$erence points (Festpunkte or F<# $or mine$ields *%ic% easily can be identi$ied. &t a (rade crossin(- at t%e intersection o$ t*o impro)ed roads- at t%e ed(e o$ a )illa(e- or some suc% $a)orable location- t%is can be done *it%out any di$$iculty. 3n some instances %o*e)er- t%e Germans are $orced to use "(uide *ire" and au0iliary $i0ed points (Cermessun(spunkte or C<#. & type o$ au0iliary $i0ed point t%at %as pro)ed practicable is t%e center o$ an e/uilateral trian(le *it% sides 4" to 7" $eet lon(. +%e corner points and t%e $i0ed point itsel$ may be stakes- rails- or concrete or steel (irders about : $eet in len(t% connected *it% barbed *ire. Suc% a $i0ed point can be reestablis%ed easily because e)en %ea)y s%ellin( *ill rarely destroy more t%an one or t*o stakes. & mine$ield is limited by t%e $our corner points &4- &7- &:- &!. +%e corner points are marked clock*ise- &4 and &7 $ormin( t%e base line on t%e German side. +%e sur)ey o$ t%e $ield re$ers to one or bot% points o$ t%e base line. &u0iliary $i0ed points- called "mine stakes" (Minenp$a%le#- are used i$ necessary. Fi0ed points may be re$erence points $ound on t%e map or au0iliary $i0ed points establis%ed by t%e troops. Distances are measured in meters9 a.imut% readin(s are taken on t%e German issue compass , di)ided in 5-!66 mils like t%e U.S. compass but read counterclock*ise- and marked *it% t%e letters FE (Fompass.a%l#. +%e ne*,type compass called "marc% compass" %as clock*ise (raduation and is indicated *it% t%e letters MFE. +%e Germans use t%e ma(netic a.imut% and al*ays proceed in t%eir sur)ey $rom t%e $riendly to*ard t%e enemy side. +%e Germans belie)e t%at it is ad)anta(eous to lay a continuous c%ain o$ re$erence points 566 to ?66 $eet apart- t%rou(% a di)ision sector. +%is c%ain can be used to determine t%e location o$ ditc%estrenc%es- obstacles- and pillbo0es- as *ell as mine$ields. 3ndi)idual points are desi(nated *it% 2oman numerals- startin( on t%e ri(%t $lank o$ t%e di)ision sector. 3. LA4ING OF MINEFIELDS a. PATTERNS +o assure t%e (reatest possible e$$ect- mine$ields are normally laid out in de$inite patterns. +%e Germans make an e0ception to t%is practice- %o*e)er- in sectors *%ere t%ey do not intend to undertake o$$ensi)e actions. +%ere t%ey disperse t%e mines irre(ularly in t%e areas bet*een de$ensi)e positions. +%e main belts o$ a ma8or antitank mine$ield laid in a uni$orm pattern normally consist o$ antitank mines *it% a sprinklin( o$ antipersonnel mines in t%e $or*ard ed(e o$ t%e $ield. @ot% types may be $itted *it% anti,li$tin( de)ices- and some o$ t%e antipersonnel mines %a)e trip *ires attac%ed. 3n some instances- t%ese mines are placed in t%e inter)als bet*een t%e dia(onal *ires o$ a double, apron $ence- *it% trip *ires $astened to t%e dia(onals.

& number o$ antitank mines are laid in t%e $or*ard ed(e o$ antipersonnel mine$ields to pre)ent armored )e%icles $rom detonatin( t%e main belt o$ antipersonnel mines. +%e $or*ard ed(es o$ mine$ields o$ all types o$ten are so*n *it% e0plosi)e c%ar(es placed in *ooden bo0es $itted *it% pressure $uses. +%ese act as bot% antitank and antipersonnel mines and discoura(e t%e use o$ detectors to locate t%e mines. For*ard o$ most re(ular $ields- and particularly in $ront o$ lanes- mines may be $ound *idely spaced or scattered at random in unmarked (roups. Mines also are laid in spaces runnin( out at ri(%t an(les $rom t%e $or*ard ed(e o$ t%e mine$ield to dama(e )e%icles mo)in( alon( t%e $ield in searc% o$ lanes. &ll pressure,type antitank and antipersonnel mines are laid in lines. For measurin( distances and spaces- t%e troops use a mine,measurin( *ire (Minenmessdra%t# *%ic% t%ey t%emsel)es make $rom old telep%one *ire. +%e mine,measurin( *ire is 7! meters (about 7" yards# lon(- and e)ery meter (: $eet : inc%es# is marked *it% a piece o$ *ood. +%e rin(s on t%e ends are about $i)e inc%es in diameter. +%e measurin( *ire- in addition to measurin( t%e distance bet*een $i0ed points- ser)es to lay out ri(%t an(les by stakin( out a trian(le o$ 5- >- and 46 meters respecti)ely. Spaces bet*een mines are determined by re$erence to t%e marks on *ire9 t%e $our rin(s on one end are used to o$$set t%e ro*s. +%e density o$ a mine$ield depends upon t%e inter)al bet*een mines and t%e number o$ ro*s. +%e table abo)e represents t%e density. Mine lanes are le$t open $or patrols- and passa(e lanes $or assault troops. For permanent patrols ne* lanes are made $rom time to time- and t%e old ones closed. & mine,$ree sa$ety strip is pro)ided on t%e Germans side. +%e Germans normally lay mine belts in indi)idual sections >6 by 46" $eet. +%e sections usually are sta((ered- and- $or e0tensi)e mine belts- t%ey are combined in units o$ t%ree or $our to $orm $or*ard or re)erse arro*%eads- or ec%elons. Mine$ields arran(ed in ec%elon are sur)eyed by usin( corner posts on t%e %ostile side o$ intermediate mine$ields as sur)ey points. +%e Germans emp%asi.e t%at mine$ields must be co)ered by $ire- alt%ou(% durin( a %asty retreat t%ey o$ten do not tend to $ollo* t%is principle. 3t is common $or a re(ular mine$ield to %a)e a listenin( post *it% t*o men at t%e rear*ard ed(e9 about =6 or >6 yards $art%er to t%e rear t%ere usually is a co)erin( party o$ $our or $i)e men armed *it% one or t*o li(%t mac%ine (uns. W%en t%e Germans are in %asty *it%dra*al- t%ey usually lay a lar(e number o$ small nuisance mine$ields. +%ese $ields contain many di$$erent types o$ mines- *%ic% o$ten are unmarked and s%o* e)ery e)idence o$ %urried layin(. +%e conse/uent lack o$ pattern uni$ormity makes t%eir detection and clearance a laborious and dan(erous task. +%ou(% no consistency is noted in layout and types o$ mines in suc% $ields- t%e Germans s%o* certain pre$erences in t%eir c%oice o$ sites $or t%em. . LOCATION 3n (eneral- mines are laid eit%er close to- or on- roads9 on air$ields and rail*ays9 and alon( tele(rap% routes. Sur$aced portions o$ roads are usually a)oided by t%e %asty mine layer- but k%aki,painted +, Mines sometimes are placed on t%e sur$ace at dips in t%e road- in t%e %ope t%at dri)ers *ill be unable to c%eck t%eir )e%icles in time to a)oid t%em. +%e Germans also place mines alon( t%e s%oulders o$ t%e road opposite narro* places *%ere dri)ers %a)e to detour to pass- and at t%e entrances to de$iles *%ere t%ey %a)e to pull o$$ t%e road to *ait $or )e%icles mo)in( in t%e opposite direction. Ot%er places usually so*n *it% antitank mines are turnouts- s%arp bends- t%e unsur$aced

islands sometimes $ound at crossroads- berms- and *ell *orn *%eel ruts. c. CONCEALMENT +%e Germans- *it% (reat in(enuity- attempt to make t%eir mines di$$icult to detect. +%ey bury t%em as muc% as 7! inc%es belo* t%e sur$ace *%ere t%ey e0plode only a$ter passa(e o$ a number o$ )e%icles %as compacted t%e eart% co)er su$$iciently to operate t%e $u.e. +%ey put e0plosi)es in *ooden bo0es to pre)ent t%e e$$ecti)e operation o$ ordinary mine detectors- and mark tire prints in t%e eart% on top o$ t%e mine by dra*in( a detac%ed a0le and *%eels o)er it. +%e Germans also s%o* considerable in(enuity in sitin( random antipersonnel mines on t%e line o$ t%e %ostile ad)ance. 2oad demolitions are plenti$ully so*n *it% S,Mines and kilometer posts at points *%ere )e%icular dri)ers %a)e to dismount to read directions are similarly treated. S,Mines also are placed in ditc%es- o$ten close to t%e trip *ire pe( o$ anot%er mine. Duisance $ields on lines o$ communication (enerally are closely spaced- occasionally so closely as to cause sympat%etic detonation. +%is is particularly possible *%en mines are laid *it% t%eir pressure plates almost $lus% *it% t%e sur$ace o$ t%e (round and only li(%tly co)ered *it% eart%. German dummy mine$ields take )arious $orms. 3n some cases a trip *ire is laid to (i)e t%e appearance o$ a mine$ield perimeter *ire- *it% t%e usual lanes- and t%e (round is disturbed at re(ular inter)als. Scrap metal- o$ten dispersed *it% real mines- is placed in s%allo* %oles to cause a reaction in t%e mine detector. Dummy mines o$ten are *ired in and connected *it% booby traps.

Section 1III. SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Source: U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar !"# O$$icially released $rom restricted status by t%e U.S. &rmy 'enter For Military History. 1. TO6N AND STREET FIG!TING 3n attackin( a to*n or )illa(e- t%e Germans employ $lankin( and encirclin( tactics. +%ey attempt to cut o$$ *ater- electricity- (as- and ot%er utilities. W%ile carryin( out t%e $lankin( maneu)er- t%ey pin do*n t%e de$enders *it% %ea)y artillery $ire and aerial bombardment. W%en it is necessary to make a direct assault- t%e Germans concentrate all a)ailable %ea)y *eapons- includin( artillery and air units- on one tar(et. +%ey $a)or as tar(ets $or t%eir massed $ire t%e $or*ard ed(es o$ t%e communityespecially detac%ed (roups o$ buildin(s and isolated %ouses. Durin( t%e $ire concentration t%e in$antry assembles and attacks t%e ob8ecti)e immediately upon termination o$ artillery $ire. +anks and assault (uns accompany t%e in$antry in s*eepin( a*ay barricades- blastin( passa(es t%rou(% *alls- and crus%in( *ire obstacles. Guns and mortars are used a(ainst concealed positions- and antitank (uns co)er side streets a(ainst possible $lankin( operations. Mac%ine (uns en(a(e snipers on roo$s. +%e immediate ob8ecti)e o$ t%e Germans is to di)ide t%e area occupied by t%e enemy. +%ese areas are t%en isolated into as many smaller areas as possible- in order to deny t%e enemy $reedom o$ mo)ement. &not%er $orm o$ attack employed by t%e Germans is to dri)e t%rou(% a community and establis%

(ood positions beyond t%e to*n to block t%e retreat o$ t%e de$ender. +%en t%ey try to anni%ilate t%e enemy *it%in t%e community. +%e assaultin( troops are di)ided into a number o$ columns and make a series o$ coordinated parallel attacks. &ttacks $rom opposite directions and con$lictin( an(les are a)oided- since t%ey lead to con$usion and to $irin( on $riendly troops. +%e columns are sub,di)ided into assault and mop,up (roups. &ssault detac%ments o$ en(ineers- e/uipped *it% demolition e/uipment- $lame t%ro*ersand (renades- accompany t%e in$antry. W%ere possible- t%e Germans blast %oles t%rou(% t%e *alls o$ ro*s o$ buildin(s alon( t%e route o$ ad)ance in order to pro)ide t%e in$antry *it% co)ered approac%es. +%ese passa(es a$$ord protection $or brin(in( up supplies and e)acuatin( casualties. Houses are cleared o$ de$enders by small,arms $ire. Streets are a)oided as muc% as possible by t%e Germans *%o in$iltrate simultaneously t%rou(% back yards and o)er roo$s. +%ey attempt to $urt%er t%e ad)ance by sei.in( %i(% buildin(s *%ic% o$$er dominatin( positions and *ide $ields o$ $ire. W%en compelled to ad)ance t%rou(% streets- t%e Germans mo)e in t*o $iles- one on eac% side o$ t%e t%orou(%$are. +%e le$t side is pre$erred as it is more ad)anta(eous $or $irin( ri(%t %anded $rom door*ays. 'onsideration is (i)en to t%e problem o$ $i(%tin( a(ainst de$enders or(ani.ed not only in dept% but in %ei(%t. 'onse/uently t%e men recei)e speci$ic assi(nments to *atc% t%e rooms- t%e )arious $loors o$ buildin(s- and cellar *indo*s. Side streets are immediately blocked- and at ni(%t searc%li(%ts are kept ready to illuminate roo$s. &s soon as a buildin( is occupied- t%e Germans or(ani.e it into a stron(point. Windo*s and ot%er openin(s are con)erted into loop%oles and embrasures. 'ellars and attics are occupied $irst in or(ani.in( $or de$ense. B)en buildin(s *%ic% %a)e been completely destroyed are kept under constant obser)ation to pre)ent t%eir reoccupation by t%e enemy. From occupied buildin(s t%e Germans deli)er continuous mac%ine,(un and ri$le $ire *it% t%e ob8ect o$ denyin( t%e enemy t%e opportunity to occupy alternate positions. Under(round corridors and se*ers- *%ic% pro)ide e0cellent co)er $or de$enders- are attacked *it% determination. W%en immediate clearance or smokin(,out is not possible- t%e entrances are barricaded- blocked- or (uarded. &*are t%at t%eir tanks and assault (uns are )ulnerable to attacks by tank,%untin( units- t%e Germans assi(n in$antry to protect t%em. @arricades and obstacles are cleared by in$antry and en(ineers. &ll able,bodied ci)ilians- re(ardless o$ dan(er- are summoned to clear t%e streets o$ debris. W%en a section o$ a to*n is occupied- t%e Germans close up all side streets leadin( $rom t%e occupied area- block all e0its o$ %ouses- and t%en be(in a %ouse to %ouse searc% *it% details assi(ned to special tasks- suc% as moppin( up roo$s- attics- basements- courtyards- and staircases. 2. ATTAC5 ON FORTIFIED POSITIONS +%e Germans reali.e t%e di$$iculty o$ attackin( a stron(ly $orti$ied enemy position and prepare suc% an attack *ell in ad)ance o$ t%e actual operation. @e$ore attackin( a lar(e and intricately $orti$ied position co)erin( a lar(e area , a classic e0ample *as t%e assault on t%e @el(ian Fortress Bben Bmael , t%e Germans attempt to secure- in addition to in$ormation obtained t%rou(% normal reconnaissance- its e0act plan by t%e employment o$ a(ents and $i$t% columnists. W%en time permits- t%ey construct a duplicate o$ t%e $orti$ication on similar terrain *ell in t%e interior o$ German- as t%ey did *it% Bben Bmael. 3n buildin( suc% installations $or intensi)e re%earsal trainin(

o$ specially, or(ani.ed combat teams- t%e Germans spare neit%er labor nor e0pense. +%ese special combat teams usually consist o$ combat en(ineers- rein$orced by in$antry- antitank- and c%emical *ar$are units. +%e attack on t%e $ortress usually is preceded by an intensi)e di)e,bomber bombardment and lon(, ran(e %ea)y,artillery $ire. +%e purpose o$ t%ese bombardments is to destroy obstacles and mine$ields- and to create bomb craters *%ic% not only pro)ide co)er $or t%e assaultin( troops but also may be con)erted into $irin( positions. O$ten paratroopers land in close pro0imity to t%e $orti$ication 8ust prior to t%e assault- immediately establis%in( radio communications *it% t%e combat,team %ead/uarters. +%e climatic p%ase o$ t%e operation is t%e assault. 3ts primary ob8ecti)e is to (et t%e en(ineers $or*ard to certain selected *orks. durin( t%e approac%- and until t%e en(ineers reac% t%e $orti$ications- t%e artillery deli)ers $ire o$ ma0imum intensity. &ntitank (uns lay direct $ire a(ainst t%e embrasures- and c%emical *ar$are units employ smoke to blind $orts and ad8acent supportin( *orks. +%e in$antry co)ers t%e embrasures *it% ri$le and mac%ine,(un $ire and remains in readiness to mo)e $or*ard and consolidate any success t%e en(ineers may (ain. Bn(ineers cra*l $or*ardutili.in( s%ell %oles $or co)er. +%ey are e/uipped *it% %and (renades- blocks o$ +D+- and submac%ine (uns. Some (roups use ban(alore torpedoes- some pole c%ar(es- *%ile still ot%ers are armed *it% %ea)y $lame t%ro*ers. Wit% +D+ and pole c%ar(es- t%ey attempt to demolis% systematically t%e *eaker *orks suc% as embrasures- ports- turrets- 8oints- and doors. 3. COMBAT IN 6OODS W%en attackin( into *oods- t%e Germans usually di)ide t%e area into company sectors. +%e Germans stress constant reconnaissance to disco)er t%e most *eakly manned enemy position. +%is reconnaissance is carried out- e)en t%ou(% company stren(t% becomes temporarily reduced. 2econnaissance patrols usually mo)e clock*ise $rom t%eir ori(inal position. +%e company commander re)ie*s t%e reconnaissance reports in detail *it% %is platoon and section leaders. +%e company usually deploys in *ed(e $ormation *%en ad)ancin(. 3n order to ac%ie)e surprise- t%e Germans o$ten lea)e t%e roads and ad)ance cross,country. &s soon as t%e point o$ t%e *ed(e o$ t%e company is in si(%t o$ t%e enemy- t%e Germans creep $or*ard to close,combat ran(e- al*ays keepin( contact *it% ad8acent and supportin( units. +%e company t%en storms t%e enemy s position- usin( t%e (reatest possible number o$ %and (renadespole c%ar(es- and close, combat *eapons. +%e ad)ance elements attempt to break into t%e %ostile position as deeply as possible- t%e body o$ t%e *ed(e *idenin( t%e penetration on bot% sides. +%e company commander t%en decides *%et%er to roll up t%e enemy position on t%e more important $lank or to %old t%e (round until rein$orcements arri)e be$ore continuin( t%e attack. Bac% platoon details at least one obser)er- armed *it% an automatic *eapon to neutrali.e enemy treetop snipers. +%e Germans belie)e t%at bursts o$ $ire- rat%er t%an sin(le s%ots- are necessary to deal e$$ecti)ely *it% suc% snipers. +%e Germans consider $i(%tin( in *ooded areas as t%e primary task o$ ri$lemen and mac%ine (unners- since t%e employment o$ %ea)y,support *eapons o$ten is impossible. +%e Germans occasionally dismount %ea)y mac%ine (uns and use t%em as li(%t caliber mac%ine (uns. &ntitank (uns o$ small caliber and li(%t in$antry %o*it.ers sometimes are brou(%t $or*ard manually- and *%en indirect $ire is not possible t%ey en(a(e tar(ets directly. ;i(%t mortars are employed indi)idually. From Finnis% troops- t%e Germans learned a success$ul met%od o$ usin( mortars in

*oods. +%e mortar obser)ers- accompanied by a telep%one operator- mo)e *it% t%e ad)ance element. +%e line back to t%e mortar cre* is e0actly 766 yards lon(. One man is detailed to see t%at t%e line does not (et %un( on t%e *ay and as $ar as possible runs in a strai(%t line. W%en t%e ad)ance element contacts t%e enemy- t%e obser)er 8ud(es t%e distance $rom %imsel$ to t%e tar(et and adds t%e 766 yards to t%e mortar ran(e. @racketin( o$ $ire $or ad8ustment is considered too dan(erous because o$ t%e close pro0imity o$ $riend and $oe. W%en t%e Germans lea)e a *oods or %a)e to cross a lar(e clearin( *it%in t%e *ooded area- t%e troops *ork t%emsel)es close to t%e ed(e o$ t%e *oods. +%en all t%e men lea)e t%e *oods simultaneously- rus%in( at least 466 yards be$ore seekin( co)er. 0. COMBAT IN MOUNTAINS a. GENERAL +%e German principles o$ combat in mountain areas correspond in (eneral to t%ose employed on le)el terrain. +%e peculiarities o$ mountain terrain- suc% as limited routes- e0treme *eat%er conditions- and di$$icult communications- necessitate additional considerations in t%e tactics employed. +%e (reatest di$$erences occur in t%e %i(%er mountains- *%ere t%e Germans utili.e specially trained mountain troops- *%ic% include t%e reno*ned +yrolean and @a)arian mountaineers. +%e Germans emp%asi.e t%at all operations *ill be o$ lon(er duration in mountainous country t%an in lo*lands- and t%ere$ore make proper allo*ance $or t%e $actors o$ time and space. For e)ery ::6 yards o$ ascent or ""6 yards o$ descent t%ey add 4 %our to t%e time estimate $or co)erin( a (i)en distance on t%e map. Mo)ements- command- and supply in mountain areas represent sources o$ di$$iculty- accordin( to t%e Germans. . TACTICAL C!ARACTERISTICS OF MOUNTAIN 6ARFARE +%e Germans di)ide t%eir units into numerous marc%in( (roups- *%ic% normally consist o$ a rein$orced in$antry company- an artillery battery- and an en(ineer platoon. 3n t%is manner t%e Germans counteract t%e dan(er o$ ambus%- since eac% (roup is able to $i(%t independently. +%e Germans locate t%eir en(ineer units *ell $or*ard *it% t%e ad)ance (uard so t%at t%ey may assist in road repairs. +%e Germans reali.e t%at small enemy $orces can retard t%e ad)ance o$ a *%ole column and t%ere$ore t%ey %a)e sin(le (uns sited *ell $or*ard. +%ey also or(ani.e stationary and mobile patrols $or $lank protection. +%e skill and leaders%ip o$ 8unior commanders are se)erely tested in mountain *ar$are- as $orces (enerally are split into small (roups- t%e e$$icient command o$ *%ic% re/uires a %i(% standard o$ trainin( and discipline. 'olumns o$ten are separated by lar(e areas and impassable country- and since lateral communication is o$ten )ery di$$icult- command o$ deployed units becomes muc% more complicated t%an o)er le)el terrain. Dormally supplies are or(ani.ed in t*o ec%elons- t%e mountain and )alley ec%elon. +%e Germans make e0tensi)e use o$ %i(%,tra8ectory *eapons in mountain $i(%tin(- alt%ou(% antitank (uns and %ea)y mac%ine (uns are used $or co)erin( road blocks. +%e e$$ecti)eness o$ t%e mountain artillery depends on care$ully selected obser)ation posts *%ic% are in communication *it% t%e sin(le (un positions.

2adio is t%e primary means o$ communication- since t%e layin( o$ telep%one *ire is not considered $easible. c. MOUNTAIN TACTICS &ttacks across mountains are made to protect t%e $lanks o$ t%e main attack- to *ork around t%e enemy rear- or to pro)ide $lankin( $ire $or t%e main attack. +%e Germans attempt to sei.e commandin( %ei(%ts and mountain passes. +%e Germans select t%eir assembly areas as close to t%e enemy as possible to make possible a s%ort assault. Supportin( *eapons are attac%ed to companies- and *%ere $easible- to platoons. 3n de$ense- t%e Germans or(ani.e t%eir ad)ance positions on t%e $or*ard slope- *%ile t%e main battle position *it% %ea)y, support *eapons is located on t%e re)erse slope. +%e (reater part o$ a unit o$ten is %eld in reser)e. +%is necessitates t%e or(ani.ation o$ relati)ely narro* sectors- *%ic%%o*e)er- results in an or(ani.ation o$ (round $a)orable $or counterattacks. 0. 6INTER 6ARFARE Many o$ t%e tec%ni/ues o$ German *inter *ar$are *ere de)eloped $rom t%ose o$ t%e mountain troops- *%ic% *ere adapted easily to conditions o$ e0treme cold. Ski patrols are t%e c%ie$ means o$ reconnaissance in sno*,co)ered terrain. &s a rule- t%e stren(t% o$ t%e patrol is a s/uad- rein$orced by in$antry soldiers trained as en(ineers- artillery obser)ers- and a communication detac%ment. 3n addition to normal reconnaissance missions- patrols obtain in$ormation as to t%e dept% o$ t%e sno*- load capacity o$ ice sur$aces- and dan(er o$ a)alanc%es. +%ese ski patrols normally bla.e trails by markin( trees or rocks and by erectin( poles or $la(s. Stakes are used to indicate t%e e0tremities o$ roads. Under *inter conditions- German units keep support *eapons and artillery *ell $or*ard *%ile on t%e marc%. +%eir antitank *eapons are distributed t%rou(%out t%e entire column. Ski troops are or(ani.ed to (uard t%e $lanks. Slei(%s are added $or t%e support o$ *eapons and supplies. +%e Germans assi(n to trail units t%e task o$ cuttin( tracks $or t%e $ormations t%at $ollo*. +%e stren(t% o$ t%e trail unit o$ a company is one or t*o s/uads9 t%at o$ a battalion up to t*o platoons. 3n di$$icult terrain t%eir stren(t% may be doubled. +rail units are di)ided into a number o$ trail detac%ments consistin( o$ si0 to ten men- ec%eloned be%ind t%e $irst o$ t%e trail units. +%e marc% $ormation o$ ski troops is (enerally sin(le $ile9 usually parallel trails are used to reduce t%e len(t% o$ t%e column. 3n *inter *ar$are- attacks *it% limited ob8ecti)es are t%e rule. +%e Germans attempt *%ere)er possible to combine $rontal and $lank attacks under conditions o$ e0treme cold and sno*. +%ey employ support *eapons as $ar $or*ard as practicable. &ttacks o$ten are made by ski troops9 because o$ t%e di$$iculty o$ transportin( artillery- ski troops $re/uently %a)e to dispense *it% artillery support. For t%is reason t%e Germans consider it all t%e more necessary to concentrate %ea)y and li(%t in$antry *eapons at points o$ main e$$ort and to coordinate %i(% and $lat tra8ectory *eapons. W%en pack %o*it.ers are a)ailable- t%ey can be dismantled and brou(%t $or*ard on sled(es. &ssault (uns can e$$ecti)ely support ski troops in sno* under 45 inc%es deep. +%ey eit%er accompany t%e attack as $ar as road conditions allo* or mo)e into positions at e$$ecti)e ran(e- not

e0ceedin( :-"66 yards- on specially cleared pat%s a*ay $rom roads. +%ey occupy t%eir positions 8ust be$ore t%e attack. &s a rule attac%ed assault (uns are employed in platoon and company stren(t%9 sin(le commitment is a)oided. +ank units are attac%ed only in e0ceptional circumstances. Or(ani.ation o$ a de$ensi)e position in deep sno* or on $ro.en (round takes considerable time- $or it is necessary to mo)e *eapons into position- lay out $oot pat%s and roads- and build stron( outposts and stron(points *it% all,around de$ense. 'amou$la(e is particularly stressed under suc% conditions. Since normal units used as reser)es in deep sno* %a)e only limited mobility- t%e Germans employ ski troops $or reser)es *%ere)er possible. +%ese ski units are used $or immediate counterattacks *%ic% are directed- *%ere possible- a(ainst t%e $lank o$ t%e attackin( enemy. +%e Germans also use t%e ski troops as raidin( parties to %arass t%e enemy s $ront and rear. :. PARTISAN 6ARFARE Dote: &s t%is $ile concerns itsel$ only *it% German tactics t%e ma8ority o$ t%is section *%ic% deals *it% &llied partisan acti)ities %as been omitted. +%is includes sections "a" t%rou(% "e". (. GERMAN PREPARATION FOR PARTISAN 6ARFARE @eyond doubt- t%e Germans prepared and are still preparin( $anatical members o$ t%e Dational Socialist <arty- SS- and armed $orces $or partisan acti)ities as t%e territory occupied by t%e &llies increases. One o$ Heinric% Himmler s main duties as commander,in,c%ie$ o$ t%e Home &rmy is super)isin( t%e establis%ment o$ partisan or(ani.ations and stay,be%ind a(ents in areas about to be occupied by t%e &llies. +%e Germans %a)e built up lar(e stores o$ ammunition and suppliesparticularly in t%e mountainous areas o$ t%e country- and %a)e establis%ed at )arious localities trainin( centers $or $uture German SS <artisans. Women are included in t%is trainin( pro(ram. &s to t%e met%ods *%ic% t%e Germans are most likely to employ- no de$inite in$ormation can be re)ealed at t%is time. Ho*e)er- it is recommended t%at a study o$ t%e &llied partisan combat met%ods be made to obtain an appro0imate conception o$ possible German partisan acti)ities. ;. ANTI7AIRBORNE OPERATIONS +%e Germans consider t%e use o$ mines and *ire obstacles particularly e$$ecti)e a(ainst enemy airborne operations. +%ey block landin( $ields and areas *%ere landin(s mi(%t be made *it% S, mines- stakes- ditc%es- piled eart%- stone- and *ood- nondescript )e%icles *it%out *%eels- and ot%er barricades. +%ey also construct mine$ields and dummy mine$ields. For t%e protection o$ important installations a(ainst airborne attack- t%e Germans or(ani.e an all, around de$ense- (i)in( particular attention to co)erin( a)enues o$ approac% *it% mac%ine (uns. Obser)ation posts are set up on %i(% points- suc% as c%urc% to*ers and terrain $eatures to (i)e early *arnin( o$ %ostile landin(s. Suc% posts are located also in rear areas- and are especially important in t%inly populated localities- since *ire communications are particular tar(ets o$ enemy airborne troops. Special si(ns by c%urc% bells- drums- or bu(les are arran(ed $or alarmin( t%e German mobile reser)es units. +%ese units- specially or(ani.ed $or t%e task o$ counteractin( enemy airborne in)asions and partisan acti)ities usually consist o$ motori.ed troops *it% mac%ine (uns and antitank (uns mounted on t%eir )e%icles. &lt%ou(% t%e Germans consider it an error to delay in committin( t%ese units- t%ey stress t%at care s%ould be used to a)oid enemy decepti)e maneu)ers suc% as t%e droppin( o$ dummy parac%utists. +%e Germans usually *it%%old ri$le $ire until descendin( parac%utists are at close ran(e- usin(

mac%ine,(un $ire at (reater distance. +%ey belie)e t%at $ire is more e$$ecti)e immediately upon t%e landin( o$ t%e %ostile $orce- be$ore a consolidation o$ position %as been made. Bnemy transport planes are considered particularly (ood tar(ets since t%ey must reduce speed 8ust prior to t%e 8ump o$ t%e troops. +%e Germans appreciate t%e importance o$ immediate action a(ainst airborne troops and *%en no alternati)e is possible t%ey *ill commit in$erior $orces to combat t%e %ostile aerial in)asion- %opin( to delay t%e attack until reser)es can be brou(%t up.