Baugh 1 Matthew Baugh Professor Alicia Bolton ENG 101 21 November 2013 One Small Issue Aboard the

ISS One Giant Problem for the Space Program Space travel, and specifically what can go wrong, can captivate us as a people. We are fascinated by the amazing leaps in technology the space program represents, and our children hold it as an exciting promise of the future, both on this world and elsewhere. But why should we ordinary people here on Earth be concerned with what happens to astronauts in outer space, and their assigned duties and communications with ground controllers? Shouldnt we trust that the people behind these missions have done their jobs and have everything under control? One might think that because the scope and importance of space missions is so great, that engineers, scientists and crews on the ground would never allow anything to go awry. It would seem; however, this has not been the case. As revealed in Steven Caseys Picture Window, things did go wrong aboard the International Space Station (ISS) in January of 2004. A potentially disastrous air leak occurred in a high-tech window in the Destiny Module of the spacecraft, threatening the lives of the two astronauts aboard by slowly depleting their survivable air supply and necessitating a total shutdown of the entire multi-billion dollar space station. A curved metal hose called a vacuum jumper designed to remove air from between the two panes of glass in the window, was inadvertently and repeatedly, used as a handle for support by numerous astronauts for months as they floated by the window and attempted to steady themselves for views out the window in the weightlessness of space. The barely discernible air leak was discovered by American astronaut, Michael Foale, one of the two aboard the space station at the time (the other was Russian cosmonaut Alexander Kaleri), just in time to avoid sealing off and abandoning the space station. The root causes of this problem were multifold and complex, yet key contributing factors were long-

Baugh 2 standing faulty practices of NASA mission control, and limitations that can lead to human error in space. Mistakes made by both mission controllers on the ground and astronauts aboard the space station led directly to the air leak. Had these mistakes been addressed and corrected in time, the serious threat to the International Space Station; its future, and the astronauts on board, could easily have been prevented. Some would argue that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (or NASA for short), in all its accomplished glory, is beyond reproach in its attention to detail and preemptive capabilities. After all, look at the history making successes of the first moon landing and subsequent perfect missions of Apollo. Even with the unforeseen misfortune and aborting of Apollo 13, in all seven missions twenty one men went into space to go to the moon and returned safely to Earth (Duggins 21). Perhaps, NASA shouldnt have rested on its laurels. Failures since Apollo have been severe. Fourteen astronauts in total were killed in the destruction of the space shuttles Challenger and Columbia in 1986 and 2003 (Duggins 2). In the Challenger disaster, it was NASAs organizational culture that was ultimately to blame for the explosion of the shuttle and the deaths of its seven crew members (Davis). Impatience to proceed as scheduled, go-fever and a desire to save face caused NASA ground controllers to overlook a potentially serious weather condition and its consequences at the launch pad in Florida that fateful day in January of 1986. Engineers of Morton-Thiokol, the contractor assigned to the design of the solid rocket boosters (SRB) for Challenger, expressed serious concerns about the low temperatures on launch day. This concern, and the urgency to be heard by those in command, is reflected in a 2007 article by Chris Bergin: Thiokols Bob Ebeling wrote the infamous Help! memo in October 1985, informing everyone within his capabilities of the growing concerns about low temperature launches relating to the seals on the SRBs. We didnt think we were getting anyones

Baugh 3 attention and we thought by using the subject Help! would get them (Thiokol top level management) to read at least the first sentence of the memo, said Ebeling. (Bergin) In describing the behind the scenes worries on the morning of the launch, Bergin continues to quote Ebeling: A manager came by my room and asked me if I was concerned about an 18 degree launch, recalled Ebeling. I said What? because were only qualified to 40 degrees. I said what business does anyone even have thinking about 18 degrees, were in no mans land, were in a big grey area. (Bergin) As we all know, Challenger was allowed to launch in the face of those warnings and exploded less than two minutes after liftoff as a result of the SRB seal failure. Its crew of seven was killed and Americas space efforts suffered an extended interruption. The decision to continue ahead with the launch of Challenger, in spite of clear warnings about the danger, shows the mistake of needless haste and carelessness on the part of NASA. This demonstrates how an attitude of impatience and desire to accomplish pre-scheduled tasks without fail overrode the sensibility of taking more time to ensure that every element of the spacecraft was functioning safely and properly. Another stark example of NASAs flawed organizational attitude can be seen in its earliest days. The formation of NASA, and the development of its organizational culture, is deeply rooted in Americas race for space supremacy with the Soviet Union (Duggins 226). University of St. Andrews, Scotland Modern History Professor Gerard J. De Groot, describes the overbearing desire of the United States to achieve dominance in space. When he began writing about the American space (lunar) program, he discovered there were many heroic individuals. He also found a gang of cynics, manipulators, demagogues, tyrants, and even a few criminals (De Groot xi). In encapsulating his study, he goes on to say, I discovered scheming politicians who amassed enormous power by playing on the public fascination for space and the fear of what the Russians might do there. Quite a few people got rich from

Baugh 4 the [earlier days of the space program+; some got very rich indeed (De Groot xi). This attitude of exploitation and greed might answer questions about how people involved in the planning of space missions could overlook issues involving safety by placing more importance on things like financial and political gain instead. It could have been this kind of misuse of funding and violation of trust that played a part in the bypassing or ignorance of safety measures, which could have prevented the events in Picture Window from happening. De Groot also makes a statement that, historically, seems to have echoed through the managerial halls of NASA, and which offers a good explanation of the organizations attitude of impatience. When describing the mindset during the preparatory years of the Apollo program, he relates, At the back of everyones mind was [President+ Kennedys arbitrary deadline of landing on the moon by the end of the decade, which meant that the entire program proceeded at a pace faster than prudence dictated (De Groot 206). In an interesting twist, it seems the Russians have had a somewhat better track record in space safety. Perhaps this is because they have not been so obsessed with supremacy or haste, and more concerned with safety and successful missions instead. Their Soyuz spacecraft remained in use as the only regular transport of astronauts, from both the US and Russia, to and from the ISS after the United States space shuttle fleet was grounded after the Columbia disaster in February of 2003. In fact, Soyuz remains the only regular and reliable transport to this day (Duggins 27). Because of the grounding of the space shuttle fleet, another major causative factor in the ISS incident of 2004 is highlighted. Casey states in his essay, that NASA did indeed recognize, during some stage of the planning process, the possibility of astronauts hazardously using the vacuum hose as a handle, even though it was not designed for that purpose. A handhold rack unit was built specifically to mount over the window in the Destiny Module, which indicates NASA had considered the danger, yet it was never delivered to the space station due to grounding of the space shuttle (85). This provokes

Baugh 5 several lingering questions. Was the optical perfection of the window so important that mission engineers overlooked the potential danger of using the vacuum hose as a support handle? Why did astronauts use this vacuum hose as a support handle when it wasnt designed for such a purpose, and why was this use not reported to anyone as a major concern in time to stop a problem from happening? And finally, why didnt NASA advise and/ or train the astronauts to not use the vacuum hose as a support handle, when they were aware of the potential danger it could present? In moving on with the importance of the space shuttle to the ISS, the book Final Countdown, by Pat Duggins, tells us about the ending of the space shuttle program and gives a glimpse of what will come in the aftermath of that ending. The space shuttle was vital to the birth, construction and resupplying of the International Space Station. It was Americas first and only method of travelling back and forth into space at the time assembly of the space station began in 1998. It was the grounding of the space shuttle fleet, due to the Columbia disaster in 2003, which prevented the substitute handhold unit from reaching the International Space Station. Duggins spells out the importance of the space shuttles role: Before the Columbia disaster, the space shuttle had become indispensable in the effort to build the International Space Station. Interest in the program revived, after years of unexciting launches on routine-seeming errands, as NASA struggled to find a specific mission to give the shuttle focus. Now its indispensability proved to have a double edge. All of the spacecraft were grounded following this second disaster, and that left the space station in a serious bind. The United States was without a way to fly to orbit, which meant construction on [the International Space Station] would come to a halt. (180) Although this reference makes a point about why the space station was not supplied with a substitute handle system, it does not explain why the engineers on the ground didnt inform the crews

Baugh 6 about the potential dangers of using the existing window appendages. It also doesnt explain why the astronauts used the vacuum hose as a support or why they didnt report any concerns about doing so to ground controllers. Could there be a valid reason why someone given the chance to live and work in space would disregard, or overlook, something of such importance? To help answer this question, lets focus our attention on the crews in space aboard the space station. Spending long hours and days in the isolation of outer space, and having to deal with changes of weightlessness upon the human body, can take a tremendous toll on everyday functioning and normal activities. The film Living in Space is an educational history about major milestones in space travel. The film examines the effects of going into space on the human body and mind. It also talks about the consequences of spending extended time periods outside of the protective environment in which humans and other life forms evolved, and what can be learned and gained from those that have experienced these voyages. In the film, we are told about what scientists have discovered from extended human trials in space, examples *of what people experience+ include radiation sickness, damaging effects on the immune system, the blood, muscle and bones in microgravity, and the psychological stress of extended weightlessness (Living in Space, The Mir Space Station). Additionally, the film touches upon the International Space Station and its importance as a permanent multi-national docking station in low earth orbit, and as a unique laboratory for the development of new technologies for human kind. Professor of Physics Robert Pepin says in the film, thebenefit to thecomputer industry of being able to grow large defect-free crystals [in space] is really quite enormous (Living in Space, The International Space Station). In explaining the effects of weightlessness upon the body and mind, as well as showing the demands of performing important experiments, the film shows the difficulties that can be caused by these effects on people sent into space. Compromised human capabilities can easily lead to human error.

Baugh 7 Furthermore, time constraints can also cause stress that can lead to human error. In the NASA website article written by Jessica Nimon, the pressing time schedules imposed on the astronauts aboard the space station are discussed. Introducing Flight Engineer Don Pettit and describing his activities, the article further sheds light on how being in space affects human beings and can make important tasks challenging. It particularly talks about how demanding schedules can help create these challenges. Quoting Pettit himself, the article says, "When humans venture into a harsh wilderness, the fraction of time on task shrinks You are lucky to log six hours of mission tasking and six hours of sleep. The rest of the time is spent simply trying to stay alive (Nimon). He states that workdays in space are normally 12 hours long, and that there is no such thing as free time, only off duty time. It is possible the same kind of time constraints and reactions to the harsh environment of outer space that Pettit experienced affected the astronauts who used the Destiny Modules vacuum hose as a handle for support. Stress caused by the tough environment and time schedule could have clouded judgment to the point where the dangers of their actions were not realized or reported as a concern. But again, why is the International Space Station, and what happens there, so vitally important to us on Earth? To put into perspective the magnitude of how discoveries in space aboard the space station can improve life on Earth, and how the pressure to achieve these discoveries might affect the abilities of astronauts performing experiments, one must understand the expectations placed on the astronauts. Much investment in space research has been made by governments and industry. The astronauts, no doubt, are very aware of the high hopes, faith and trust placed in them. This can only add to their level of stress, which in turn, increases the chances for mistakes to be made. The article Use It Or Lose It (author not named) talks about how the International Space Station has finally brought substantial returns on investment, and how it is making significant progress in new technologies. The article makes its most important point by stating how the space station has evolved into something different than its predecessors: space station utilization is largely directed toward

Baugh 8 improving life on Earth, unlike the scientific goals of Apollo and today's deep-space exploration work (Use It Or Lose It). The article covers the recent American Astronautical Society's second annual ISS Research and Development Conference, which was held in Denver in July of 2013. Several noteworthy scientists and physicians were in attendance and gave speeches about the amazing leaps forward in their respective fields research aboard the space station has given them. Nobel laureate Samuel Ting gave a presentation on how a space station particle physics survey could answer questions about the Big Bang. Another speaker, physician Garnette Sutherland, amazed the audience with his presentation about robotics developed from the space station performing brain surgeries better than the most skilled surgeon. Don Pettit, the International Space Station astronaut who previously fascinated school children with televised experiments performed in space, was also in attendance. What happens aboard the space station should concern anybody with a stake in the future, and hopes for better technologies in fields like computers and healthcare. The discoveries made there will most likely affect life on Earth in major ways well into the future. One would think potential disasters in outer space aboard spacecraft would be a major concern for any country involved in the space program. Countries have invested billions of dollars and have staked their brightest scientific minds on the successes of each launch into space. The responsibility of guaranteeing successful space missions, and assuring the safe return home of astronauts, should be a constant thought on the minds of everyone involved in the International Space Station. Safety and success in space exploration go hand-in-hand, since one cannot be achieved without the other. If those sent into space cannot return safely to Earth, and a mission must be scrapped due to mechanical or structural failure, then billions of dollars and the hopes of all nations involved are lost, and the point of the mission is for naught. Therefore, safety should be the most important objective in planning a venture beyond the confines of Earth.

Baugh 9 Adequate time should be taken, and all available mental focus should be put into action, to asses and correct any suspicious circumstance or abnormality whatsoever, regardless of the time or resources it might detract from preset mission timelines or work schedules. One would think this is especially true of the United States because it has led the world in some of most historic milestones of the space age. However, as Steven Casey reveals, human mistakes that can lead to catastrophic failure aboard the International Space Station are a real possibility, and can be attributed to countries like the United States. This, of course, represents a huge problem. If mistakes such as the ones that caused the leak in the Destiny Modules window cannot be prevented in the future, then serious doubt exists for successful future endeavors in space.

Baugh 10 Works Cited Casey, Steven. Picture Window. The Atomic Chef: And Other True Tales of Design, Technology and Human Error. New York: Aegean Publishing, 2006. 78-85. Print. Bergin, Chris. Remembering the Mistakes of Challenger. NasaSpaceflight.com. NASA Space Flight, 28 Jan. 2007. Web. 16 Nov. 2013. Davis, Phillip M. A look back at the Challenger disaster. Design News 57.13 (1996): 154. Business Source Premier. Web. 17 Nov. 2013. De Groot, Gerard J. Dark Side of the Moon : The Magnificent Madness of the American Lunar Quest. New York University Press, 2006. eBook Collection (EBSCO host). Web. 2 Nov. 2013. Duggins, Pat. Final Countdown: NASA and the End of the Space Shuttle Program. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007. Print. Living in Space. Films Media Group, 2006. Films On Demand. Web. 4 Nov. 2013. <http://storm.hgtc.edu:2048/login?url= http://digital.films.com/ PortalPlaylists.aspx?aid=3503&xtid=34747&loid=76136> Nimon, Jessica. Time in Space, A Space in Time. NASA. International Space Station Program Science Office. NASA's Johnson Space Center, 2012. Web. 4 Nov. 2013. "Use It Or Lose It." Aviation Week & Space Technology 175.26 (2013): 1. Business Source Premier. Web. 4 Nov. 2013.

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