S/ES 200331910

United States Department^of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 31, 2003

(SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED When Separated from Attachments) v

MEMORANDUM FOR DANIEL MARCUS

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES

SUBJECT: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United

States Request for Information

Attached is the supplementary information regarding U.S. visa

policy requested by the 9/11 Commission members in a November 21
interview with the Assistant Secretary of Consular Affairs, Maura
Harty. It consists of classified and "Sensitive but Unclassified"
responses to nine questions posed by the Commission.
Under Executive Order 12958, the Department of State may not
disseminate classified information outside the Executive Branch
except under conditions that ensure that the information will be
given protection equivalent to that afforded to such information
within the Executive Branch. We ask that only appropriately
cleared members of staff be granted access to the material and that
it be protected by applying standards at least as stringent as E.O.
12958 on the handling of classified information.
Please note.that the attached material contains information
that is protected from disclosure under Section 222 (f) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1202(f), and, in
accordance with that law, may only be used for the "formulation,
amendment, administration, or enforcement of the immigration,
nationality, or other laws of the United States."
Further, most of the information is considered "Sensitive but
Unclassified." Although this material is not classified in and of
itself, its designation as "Sensitive but Unclassified* requires
special handling. Therefore, we have also request that the
Commission protect this information from unauthorized disclosure.

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 - CONEXDENTIAL
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We hope this information is useful to you. As always, please

do not hesitate to contact us if you have further questions.

Karl Hofmann
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Supplementary Information.

-CONFIDENT I-AL
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FOLLOW-UP TO A/S HARTY'S MEETING ON 11/21

9/11 COMMISSION

Question 1.

Chronology of SAO changes after 9/11

Answer:

Chronology of SAO Changes post 9/11:

11/10/01: A 20 calendar-day hold was instituted on all NIVs for

applicants from what became the Condor countries. This was an
interim measure done by the State Department at the request of
DOJ. The data from the pending visa applications was supplied to
the FBI on a disc on a regular basis. The hold applied to all
males between the ages of 16 and 45.

01/26/02: Visas Condor was established pursuant to interagency

agreement. The criteria and the list of.countries are
classified. Posts could issue if they received no response from
the Department within 30 calendar days. Condor cases were
initially reviewed by the FBI and the CIA.

07/20/02 The 30-day clock system for Condor cases was ended
and posts had to wait for a response from the Department in each
case before proceeding. The CIA, having already provided State
with all names of suspected terrorists from its databases,
dropped out of the Condor program shortly thereafter.

10/18/02 Per agreement with the FBI, the 20 day hold, which had
been effectively superseded by the Condor procedure, was
formally terminated.

10/02/03 The Condor criteria were changed and more narrowly

focused, per interagency agreement.

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Question 2:

Chart on all SAO types, showing how they worked before 9/11 and
how they work now:

Answer:

Before 09/11/2001 After 09/11/2001

SAO Category FBI CIA NP FBI CIA NP
Bear: For Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
diplomats Specific 10 day Specific 10 day
from certain reply review, reply review,
countries no no
specific specific
reply reply
required required
Donkey: For Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
applicants 15 day 15 day specific 15 day
with a CLASS review review reply review,
hit or who no no required no
are from a specific specific specific
country that reply reply reply
has a special required required required
processing
requirement
Eagle: For Yes, Yes No Yes Yes No
certain 15 day 15 day Specific Review
categories of review, review reply after
applicants, no no required issuance
mostly specific specific
immigrants, reply reply
from China, required required
Cuba, Iran,
Russia and
Vietnam
Mantis: For Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
applicants 15 day 15 day 15 day Specific 15 day 15 day
who seek to review, review, review, reply review, review,
enter the no no no required no no
U.S. to specific specific specific specific specific
engage in reply reply reply reply reply
activities required required required required required
which may
involve the
transfer of
sensitive
technology

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Merlin N/A N/A N/A Yes Yes No

(Did not Specific 45 day
exist) : For reply review,
refugees with required no
CLASS hits, specific
Cuban reply
parolees and required
family
members of
asylees
Condor (Did N/A N/A N/A Yes No No
not exist) : Specific
For certain reply
applicants required
from
particular
countries

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Question 3:

What is the current number of people on FBI hold (total, and

number still pending after more than 90 days)?

Answer:

As of November 24, 2003, the number of cases on hold was 12,914,

Also on November 24, 2003, the number of cases on hold for more
than 90 days was 3,080.

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Question 4.

Description of how we are currently using information from the

Passport Analysis Project. How do results get into our system?
How do Consular Officers learn what CIA knows about bogus
entry/exit stamps?

Answer:

See confidential submission as attachment.

The Bureau of Consular Affairs' Office of Fraud .Prevention

Programs (FPP) receives information from a variety of sources
including post reporting, other agencies and foreign
governments. FPP sends Intelligence Alerts to all posts
informing them about document fraud and lost or stolen
passports. All FPP alerts, and alerts provided by the
Department of Homeland Security's Forensic Document Laboratory,
are then placed on the CA/FPP intranet web site. In addition,
the web site also has copies of cachets, emblems, seals and
stamps used by terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and by
Middle Eastern and North African countries.

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 Jflff^^TPEJi i ±£^u

ADDENDUM TO QUESTION NO. A

Question 4: Description of how we are currently using

information from the Passport Analysis Project. How do
results get into our system? How do consular officers
learn what CIA knows about bogus entry/exit stamps?

Tttj

9/11 Classified Information

Classified by A/S Harty

Reason: E.O. 12958 Section 1.4
Declassify 12/5/2013
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Question 5:

Please provide copies of our MOU's with the DHS and/or Secret
Service Forensic Document Labs, and of DSfs MOU with the Secret
Service:

Answer:

CA does not have MOUs with either forensic document lab but
works closely and cooperatively with both. For example we
consulted on the design of the new Lincoln visa with both labs.
DS also has informed us that it has no formal MOU with either
lab.

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Question 6:

List visa accomplishments since September 11, 2001.

Answer:

The Department of State has made significant changes to the

visa process and entry screening requirements since September
11, 2001, to protect the U.S. national security. The steps
outlined below are some of our more important efforts to improve
the security of U.S. borders, which also include our ongoing
participation in interagency efforts to implement the provisions
of the USA PATRIOT Act, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Entry Reform Act, the Homeland Security Act, and the National
Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS).

Improvements Made in Visa Processing

, 9
Application Processing . + U^y'- "T^

• Greatly increased the percentage of nonimmigrant applicants

interviewed worldwide and set a written standard on interviews
to achieve consistency around the world. On August 1, 2003,
new regulations were implemented which limit waiver of
personal appearance for nonimmigrant visa applicants to only a
few categories of exceptions, including diplomats, children,
and the elderly.
• In coordination with the Departments of Justice and Homeland
Security, added more interagency security checks for counter-
terrorism purposes for certain groups of visa applicants from
certain countries.
• Provided access to the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) to
DHS inspectors at ports of entry. The CCD provides detailed
information on all visas issued, including photographs of
nonimmigrant visa applicants. (The CCD had earlier been made
available to consular officers worldwide in May 2001.)
• Expanded intranet resources for consular adjudicators to
assist them in reading and verifying entry/exit cachets in
Arabic or Persian script.
• Coordinated with the Department of Justice in the removal of
Argentina (February 2002) and Uruguay (April 2003) from the
Visa Waiver Program and imposition of limitations on Belgium's
participation (May 2003).

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• In March 2003, centralized the flow of fiancee visa petitions

from BCIS to the National Visa Center (NVC) in New Hampshire.
NVC compiles FBI and security advisory checks before sending
the files to overseas posts.
• Developed Internet site that allows applicants to complete NIV
application on-line. Resultant application form includes a 2-
D bar code enabling quick scanning of data into the NIV
system. Forms are available in both English and Spanish, with
additional languages in development.

Namechecks

• As of June 2002, incorporated approximately eight million

records from the FBI's National Crime Information Center
(NCIC) into our Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS)
namecheck database. This more than doubled the records on
file. (This was authorized by the USA Patriot Act.)
• Eliminated the periodic purge program for lookout records that
fitted a certain predefined profile. As of mid-November, the
CLASS database contained approximately 16 million prime
records, and an additional 7.5 million alias records.
• Integrated into CLASS a threefold increase in namecheck
records from the intelligence community (through TIPOFF, a
clearinghouse for sensitive intelligence and watchlist
entries).
• Instituted automated cross-checking of new derogatory
information concerning terrorists or suspected terrorists
(including TIPOFF entries) against records of previously
issued visas in order to revoke existing valid visas in the
hands of those who may be a threat.
• In May 2003, implemented the Alternate Processing Center (APC)
for the CLASS namecheck system. Located in the Kentucky
Consular Center, several hundred miles from Washington, DC,
the APC provides additional namecheck production resources and
load sharing capability with the primary computer complex in
the Washington area. APC also improves CLASS survivability.
• Effective February 2002, discontinued the use of a CD-ROM
based back-up namecheck system. Since then consular officers
have been required to conduct a CLASS check which provides
real-time lookout information prior to issuance of any visa.
• Implemented the Hispanic algorithm in all Western Hemisphere
posts; additional posts are gradually being phased in.
• Joined with DOJ and others in establishing a new Terrorist
Screening Center (TSC) that will integrate watchlists,
including TIPOFF. Visa applicants will be checked against TSC
data.

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Enhanced Data Collection

• Began worldwide deployment of biometric NIV software, with

Brussels, our first pilot post, going live with fingerprint
collection on September 22, 2003. As of November 24, we have
28 posts collecting fingerprints in addition to all the
Mexican posts. All visa posts will have this capability by
October 26, 2004.
• Included 25 additional data elements in the automated
nonimmigrant visa processing system beginning in September
2002. These fields are viewable worldwide through the
Consular Consolidated Database. This data includes
information on the U.S. sponsors and U.S. destination of the
visa applicant.
• Created two new forms for nonimmigrant visa applicants: the
DS-157 (November 2001), required of all men aged 16 to 45 from
every country in the world; and the DS-158 (July 2002),
required of all applicants for student visas. The DS-157 is
used to identify applicants who require a security advisory
opinion from Washington agencies.
• In the spring of 2002, provided all posts with software and
scanners to allow scanning of supporting evidence in serious
refusals. This evidence is thus available in its electronic
format to all consular operations and DHS port of entry
inspection offices. This is part of the effort to replace
paper files with image-storage and retrieval and to improve
the access to information by consular officers making
adjudication decisions.
• In April 2002, began requiring photo-capture for refused
nonimmigrant visa applicants.
• Revised photo standards for nonimmigrant applicants to improve
the quality of data for facial recognition and other purposes.
• Included several additional data elements in the automated
immigrant visa processing system to support datasharing with
the Social Security Administration.

Expanded Information Sharing

• Created a new staff office, VO/I, in the Visa Office in August

2002 to coordinate information management and liaison
activities. We expect this office to continue to grow and to
play a key role in interagency discussions.
• The Border Biometric Program office in the Visa Office has
been reorganized as the Office of Border and International
Programs to allow for expanded efforts at information sharing

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and coordination with like-minded nations and multilateral

organizations.
In the fall of 2001, began storing serious refusal files for
posts at risk (or with space problems) at the Kentucky
Consular Center (KCC). KCC has begun scanning old files,
making these files available to all CCD users. This process
will be expanded to include serious refusal files from all
posts worldwide, thereby making them available to all posts
worldwide and to domestic offices.
Implemented technology support in the visa lookout system to
support DHS's National Security Entry Exit Registration System
(NSEERS).
Successfully launched the Interim Student and Exchange
Authentication System (ISEAS) (September 2002), which provided
electronic verification of the acceptance of foreign students
and exchange visitors who apply to enter the United States on
student (WF," "M") and exchange visitor ("3") visas. ISEAS
was created to satisfy the mandates of Section 501(c) of the
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 and
remained active until February 2003 when DHS's Student and
Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) was implemented.
Worked with DHS on the implementation of the SEVIS student
tracking system. All student visas are now verified and
registered in SEVIS. Over one million records from SEVIS have
been downloaded to CA' s Consular Consolidated Database where
the information is available for the electronic verification,
adjudication, and reporting of student and exchange visitor
visas.

Internal Controls
Removed direct Foreign Service National access to detailed
namecheck information in consular automated systems.
Reviewed the visa referral system and reminded post/consular
managers of the controls needed. The referral form was
revised and its use was made mandatory worldwide. The form
now requires written certification by the referring officer
that the visa applicant is personally known to the referring
officer and does not pose a threat to the United States.
In July 2002, installed new management tools to monitor user
accounts on consular automated systems.
Mandated a special worldwide review of management controls in
September 2002 and again in August 2003. This is now being
made a required annual report from all consular sections.

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Implemented a system of Consular Management Assistance Teams

to visit posts to review management controls and procedures.
The first such visits were made in February 2003.
Began the process of formalizing and disseminating Standard
Operating Procedures for visa processing, including the
creation of online processing manuals to better index
operating instructions.

Fraud Prevention Efforts

In March 2002, pilot tested the new, tamper-resistant Lincoln

nonimmigrant visa foil with worldwide deployment completed in
September 2003.
Developed a more secure way of canceling machine-readable
visas to deter malefactors from ""washing" the cancellation
stamp from the visa. The system was made available to posts in
March of 2003.
In April 2003, established a Vulnerability Assessment Unit
(VAU) staffed by personnel from Consular Affairs and
Diplomatic Security. VAU personnel employ data-mining and
other techniques to identify baseline trends and patterns and
detect variations that could indicate possible malfeasance.
The unit analyzes data anomalies and makes recommendations for
action. The unit also participates in State Department
training efforts to ensure consular employees are well
informed about issues related to malfeasance.
In August 2003, established a fraud prevention unit at the
National Visa Center in Portsmouth, New Hampshire (NVC). The
unit focuses initially on data validation/fraud screening for
employment-based cases using automated search tools. After
experience has been gained at NVC, we will expand the program
to the Kentucky Consular Center (KCC).
Based on success with the Diversity Visa lottery (DV) program,
anti-fraud efforts using Facial Recognition technology have
been expanded on a test basis to thirteen NIV applicant pools,
with a focus on countering both visa fraud and terrorism.
Created an e-form for easy reporting of lost/stolen/missing
visaed passports, with automatic forwarding to DHS.
Continue to update our database of foreign lost and stolen
passports. We currently have over 680,000 entries of blank
and individually issued lost and stolen passports in the
database.

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Training

• In March 2002, initiated an Advanced Namechecking Techniques

course at the Foreign Service Institute. Hundreds of consular
officers have now received this training.
• Lengthened the Basic Consular Course, also known as ConGen,
from 26 to 31 days. This change is the result of the added
emphasis that we are giving to visa security, counter-
terrorism awareness and interviewing techniques. Among the
new modules is a two-day interviewing "mini-course" that will
focus students on ways to identify lying/deception by
applicants. The new curriculum also includes a half- day
program on counter-terrorism at the CIA Headquarters in
Langley. The new, longer ConGen training schedule began
October 17, 2003.
• Increased training for Ambassadors, Deputy Chiefs of Mission
and Principal Officers on their supervisory role in the visa
function.
• Incorporated CIA module on terrorist travel patterns into the
basic consular course, which was expanded in October 2003.

Security Improvements

• Proposed elimination of crew list visas and establishment of a

requirement that seamen obtain individual visas. (Crew list
visas do not allow for the same verification of identity and
bona fides as do individual applications.) A proposed
regulation was published for public comment in December 2002;
the final rule is in the final stages of interagency
clearance.
• In February 2003, eliminated the waiver of the visa
requirement for permanent residents of Canada and Bermuda.
• In March 2002, amended regulations to close a loophole and
limit the ability of persons with expired visas to reenter the
U.S. from contiguous territory (i.e. Mexico, Canada, the
Caribbean). The change removed from the automatic
revalidation provision those persons who apply for a new visa
and are refused in Canada or Mexico and all nationals of
countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism regardless
of whether they apply for a visa.
• Supported implementation of the Aviation Security Bill.
• Started discussions with Mexico and Canada about greater
cooperation on immigration, security, and visa issues.
• Approved an Entry-Exit Project Charter (now called VUS- VISIT"
(United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology program), drafted jointly with INS, Customs, and

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DOT, which sets the parameters for an automated system to

record the arrivals, departures, and stay activities of
individuals coming to and leaving the U.S. Continue to work
closely with DHS on development of US-VISIT.
Deployed on-line electronic registration for the Diversity
visa program. Registration for the DV-2005 "lottery" is
conducted exclusively through a dedicated web site. This will
enable us better to identify duplicate entries, including,
through extensive use of facial recognition technology, those
submitted under fraudulent identities.

FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS TO THE VISA PROCESS AND TIMETABLES

The Department continues to implement requirements set

forth in the USA PATRIOT Act, the Enhanced Border Security and
Visa Entry Reform Act, and the Homeland Security Act. Major
initiatives not outlined above that are currently planned or in
the early stages of implementation include:

Application Processing

• Explore possible development of "rules-based process" software

as a tool to highlight relevant information for consular
officers to facilitate visa adjudication.
• Revamp the visa processing sections of the Foreign Affairs
Manuals, including a complete reexamination of all existing
guidance to overseas posts. Existing standard operating
procedures are being redrafted and reissued, and new standard
operating procedures (SOPs) are being developed.
• Re-engineering the interagency visa clearance process to allow
stronger accountability and quicker processing.

Namechecks

Improve capacity of CLASS to handle additional information

such as Interpol and deportation lookout information, the
Hispanic algorithm, and lost and stolen passport data.
Develop and implement an algorithm to improve performance on
namechecking of Asian names. This algorithm will be piloted
in FY 2004, with worldwide rollout projected for FY 2005.
Continue to pursue with the FBI additional data pertaining to
NCIC lookouts to reduce "false positive" hits.
Upgrade the central namecheck processing facility to increase
computer power and provide system scalability.

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Enhanced Data Collection

The Border Security Act requires that U.S. visas use biometric
identifiers by October 26, 2004. The Department began phased
implementation of biometric (fingerprint) collection in
September 2003, with the first post Mgoing live" on September
22, 2003. We anticipate that all posts will be collecting
biometrics by October 2004.
The Department will work with countries that are eligible for
the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) and with ICAO to meet the
requirement that those countries incorporate biometric
identifiers in their passports by October 2004, as required by
the Border Security Act.

Expanded Information Sharing

Continue to expand datashare opportunities with federal

agencies, maximizing the value of consular data to the USG
while developing procedures to ensure proper use of this
information.
Make consular data available via the interagency OSIS (Open
Sources Information System) network. Work with agencies
concerned with Border Security (DHS, FBI, etc.) to develop an
MOU that will allow this access.
Continue working on a number of programs with Canada and
Mexico as part of our U.S.-Canada Smart Border Action Plan (30
point plan) and U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership (22 point
plan). As concerns the movement of people, we are working on
agreements that would allow us to share Advance Passenger
Information/Passenger Name Records for airline passengers
entering the U.S., Canada, or Mexico. We are also working
with both these countries (NEXUS with Canada and SENTRI with
Mexico) to expand frequent travelers programs to allow faster
crossings for bona fide travelers.

Internal Controls

Restrict further the access of Foreign Service National

employees to namecheck information.
Provide additional guidance to the field on supervisory
officer review of visa issuances and refusals.
Maintain a robust schedule of visits by consular management
assistance teams to posts to review management controls and
procedures.

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Provide written guidance to chiefs of mission and their

deputies to assist them in their oversight of consular
sections.

Fraud Prevention Programs

Review facial recognition results from initial test deployment

at visa posts to determine how it may benefit screening in the
operational environment.
Introduce new, tamper-resistant and machine-readable immigrant
visa foil. This new machine-readable immigrant visa process
will include digitized photo and fingerprints.

Security Improvements

Deploy worldwide in 2004 the re-engineered interagency visa

clearance process, which expands the use of automation and
shared data to facilitate the clearance process.
Eliminate crew-list visas and require all seamen to obtain
individual visas.

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Question 7:

How do we know officers on the line are seeing the right

intelligence information? Who is giving us information on
trends?

Answer:

Consular section chiefs are key members of posts' mandatory

Terrorist Lookout Committees (also known as "'Visas Viper
Committees"). Comprised of representatives from intelligence,
law enforcement and security agencies at post, the committees
meet monthly to discuss and evaluate information about possible
terrorists and terrorist organizations. Committees focus on
local developments and implications of worldwide trends. The
results of the meetings are shared with visa officers at post
and a monthly report is sent to the Department. Consular
section chiefs are also included in regular Law Enforcement
Agency meetings, at posts that have such agencies. While these
meetings cover broader topics than those of the Terrorist
Lookout Committees, terrorism is typically on the agenda.

The Department has also stressed the importance of information

sharing by all agencies at post in the process of orientation
for new consular officers. A message to the field reminding
Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Mission to ensure proper sharing of
information with visa officers is currently in preparation.

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Question 8: (Part A - Post Training)

Please provide an explanation of the antifraud program,

including fraud prevention managers' responsibilities at post,
plus anti-fraud training. (FPP)

Answer:

Mission

CA/FPP performs a vital role in enhancing U.S. border security

and fraud prevention in the application for U.S. travel
documents. We accomplish this through training, information
sharing and operational support programs for the domestic
Passport Agencies and. Consular Sections abroad.

By enhancing the ability of our passport and visa adjudicators

to make quality decisions, we promote the travel of legitimate
visitors while deterring the entrance of those who would seek
our harm. Two teams, the Information Team and the Training
Team, share responsibility for building the skills of our
consular adjudicators and managers.

CA/FPP works very closely with each component of CA, as well as

with DS and, of course, DHS, particularly the Forensic Document
Lab. We also maintain liaison with organizations such as
NAPHSIS (National Association for Public Health Statistics and
Information Systems) and AAMVA (American Association of Motor
Vehicle Administrators).

Information Team

The staff of the information team produces a number of

publications, including the Intelligence Alerts, which share
data on missing/lost/stolen blank travel documents with our
consular sections, DS, DHS and many other government offices.
The information team also produces a bi-monthly update, the
Fraud Digest, which discusses fraud trends and fraud prevention
management strategies. In addition, the staff sends out an e-
weekly to the Fraud Prevention Managers (FPMs) at the passport
agencies and other interested addressees with reports from the
media on fraud trends. The team maintains a library of travel
documents, both genuine and fraudulent, for training and
forensic purposes. It also has country files in hard copy and
country summaries on-line. The team maintains FPP's award-

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winning intranet website, which provides extensive management

tools and information to FPMs in consular sections abroad.

Training Team

The training staff conducts the fraud segment of FSI's ConGen

Rosslyn and Advanced Consular Course. It also conducts two
annual workshops for overseas FPMs, and two to three workshops
for consular FSNs with fraud prevention duties. When time and
resources permit, we conduct fraud detection training at the
passport agencies. The team also assists DS with its new-agent,
ARSO and FSNI visa and passport fraud training. The training
team has produced five Self-Instructional guides for use by
consular and DS staff with fraud prevention responsibilities.

Document Security

FPP has fielded a secure ink for canceling visas. We have

tested various inks through the Secret Service laboratory, and
have settled on a supplier. We have also designed a self-inking
stamp for posts' convenience.

FPP has been instrumental in the design of the Lincoln visa, a

more secure, tamper-resistant nonimmigrant visa foil that has
now been deployed worldwide. We have also worked to design a
similar foil for use as an immigrant visa. This new machine
readable immigrant visa will be deployed in 2004.

VAU

FPP recently worked with Diplomatic Security to establish a

Vulnerability Assessment Unit (VAU), which is staffed by
personnel from Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security. VAU
personnel employ data-mining and other techniques to identify
baseline trends and patterns and detect variations that could
indicate possible malfeasance. The unit analyzes data anomalies
and makes recommendations for action. The unit also
participates in State Department training efforts to ensure
consular employees are well informed about issues related to
malfeasance.

FRAUD PREVENTION UNITS OVERSEAS

The role of Fraud Prevention Units (FPU) overseas is to identify

and prevent fraud within the context of statutory consular

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•operations. When absolutely necessary and possible, Fraud

Prevention Managers (FPMs) and or Fraud Prevention Assistants
(FPAs) should use investigations to develop factual information
to aid officers in deciding difficult cases. Priority is given
to'citizenship and immigrant visa cases. Non-immigrant visa
cases involving alien trafficking, terrorism and drug smuggling
are also of primary importance.

It is crucial for FPMs and FPAs to establish a dialogue with the

Regional Security Office and DHS officers, as well as -other
appropriate offices in the mission. The data that they can bring
to such colleagues will often provide a critical piece to an
intelligence puzzle or an investigation in progress. U.S. border
security today absolutely depends upon such interagency
cooperation. Their feedback, in turn, can enhance line officers'
decisions and help them recognize fraud indicators. Liaison
with other foreign missions and host country authorities may
also be fruitful, when such contacts are trustworthy and
information is shared discreetly.

The FPU conducts fraud prevention training for new adjudicators

as well as ongoing training/briefings for consular officers and
FSNs on post-specific fraud issues such as frequently
encountered fakes, the reliability of official documents and
regional issues that affect fraud encountered in adjudications.
In addition, when appropriate, the FPU provides
training/briefings for foreign government and transportation
officials on subjects such as ""familiarization with the new
Lincoln Visa" or "changes in USG requirements for visa
issuance."

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Question # 8 (Part B - U.S. Passport Fraud Prevention)

[Note: this question is rephrased to include information on U.S.

passport fraud prevention measures.]

With reference to the U.S. passport program, please provide an

explanation of the antifraud program, including fraud prevention
measures and managers' responsibilities at domestic passport
agencies, plus anti-fraud training.

Answer:

The Domestic Passport Fraud Prevention Program

Fraud detection is an integral part of maintaining the integrity

of the US passport. Every passport agency has an anti-fraud
unit that is headed by a GS-13 Fraud Prevention Manager.

Fraud Prevention Managers are constantly training Passport

Specialists, who review every passport application. Possible
fraud cases are referred to the anti-fraud unit for review. If
the Fraud Prevention Manager determines that an investigation is
warranted, the case is transferred to Diplomatic Security for
appropriate action.

Passport Specialists recently received formal training to help

them identify possible terrorists who are applying for a U.S.
passport. If a passport application contains this type of
information, it is referred to Diplomatic Security for
appropriate handling.

In October 1999, Passport Services officially assumed several

fraud functions that were previously performed by. CA/FPP.
CA/PPT/PAS is responsible for providing day-to-day support to
all of the Passport Services Fraud Prevention Managers.
However, CA/PPT/PAS continues to work with CA/FPP to assure that
the Fraud Program runs smoothly and effectively.

CA/PPT/PAS maintains and analyzes the passport agencies' monthly

Fraud Prevention Managers reports.

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Summary of Current Anti-Fraud Measures

There are three systems tools that aid us in combating passport

fraud both here and overseas.

• Consular Lost and Stolen Passport Program (CLASP)

In January 2002, the Department of State implemented the

Consular Lost and Stolen Passport (CLASP) system, which allows
both domestic and overseas U.S. citizens to report the loss,
theft or recovery of their U.S. passport by telephone, letter,
Internet or submission of a DS-64 "Statement Regarding Lost or
Stolen Passport."

The CLASP Unit, located in Washington, B.C., enters data

received from the public into the CLASP database. The sixteen
domestic passport agencies as well as over 230 overseas posts
can also enter data into CLASP. In addition to the passport
number, the full name and date and place of birth of the owner
of the record is collected and stored in the database and made
available on screen, along with comments. This is to allow for
replacement of a U.S. passport to the traveler- and prevent the
legitimate traveler from being detained upon re-entry into the
U.S. Travelers receiving replacement passports are instructed
that the old passport book is "invalid" and should not be used
should it be located or returned to them.

Entries made into CLASP are automatically transmitted to

the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS). The
modified data transmitted to TECS is retrievable by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal law
enforcement agencies with access to TECS. If DHS has questions
regarding CLASP entries appearing in TECS, they can contact the
CLASP Unit for assistance. On a daily basis, we instruct DHS
officers at Points of Entry to confiscate U.S. passport books
that are reported in CLASP as lost or stolen. These books are
returned to the CLASP Unit for destruction. The DHS officer
also informs the traveler to contact the CLASP Unit in writing
to resolve the issue.

The CLASP database currently has over 232,000 reported lost

or stolen passport entries.

• Passport Lookout Tracking System (PLOTS)

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The Passport Lookout Tracking System (PLOTS) is an online,

inter-active database that provides scanned images of passport
lookout cases to users throughout the Consular Affairs (CA)
Bureau in real-time. Since coming on line in December 2001,
PLOTS has significantly enhanced passport security. There are
over 140,000 cases in PLOTS.

PLOTS will be electronically linked to the Department of

State's Diplomatic Security Bureau (DS) case management system.
Diplomatic Security is, among other things, responsible for
conducting passport fraud criminal investigations. The two
systems will provide each other with case updates as they occur.

• Passport Records Imaging System Management (PRISM)

In the spring of 1999, Passport Services began digitally

scanning all applications for U.S. passports issued both
domestically and abroad. This program, PRISM, enables domestic
passport agencies and overseas posts to electronically retrieve
a high-definition digitized color-image of the original passport
application (including photograph) onto the requester's desktop
computer. This makes verifying citizenship and identity fast,
easy, and accurate.

PRISM is a highly effective tool for ensuring the integrity

of the U.S. passport. Because a clear, detailed photograph of
the bearer as well as other pertinent information can be quickly
retrieved and verified, photo-substitution and other frauds can
be significantly reduced. Used in cooperation with U.S. law
enforcement agencies, PRISM plays a major and increasingly
important role in maintaining border control, homeland security
and the integrity of the U.S. passport.

Passport Services is also engaged in a project to scan into

the PRISM database passport records from 1994 through 1999 that
have been previously microfilmed. As a result of this effort,
applications associated with valid U.S. passports will be
accessible through the PRISM database by Spring 2004. This will
facilitate virtually instantaneous visual verification of the
identity of the bearer of a U.S. passport worldwide.

Question 9:

When available, results of the Bearing Point study of border

crossings, in connection with the Western Hemisphere passport
requirement.

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Answer

At this time, Passport Services does not have the final

report from Bearing Point on the potential demand for passports
if a Western Hemisphere travel document requirement were
imposed. We expect the report around mid-December.

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Draft:
Question 1, 2, 3: VO/L/C:Pdoherty x31264
Question 4: CA/VO/I:Msardinas//CA/FPP:Jburt-Lynn
Question 5: CA/VO/IrMSardinas
Question 7: VO/F/P: MerzDW/3-1175
Question 6: CA/VO: SAEdson/MRegan (3-1155/3-1160)
Question 8: CA/FPP: JBLynn x
Question 8: CA/PPT (PPT fraud):Jpenn X32443
Queston 9: CA/PPT:JPennx32443

Cleared: CA: JJacobs

CA/VO: CBarry - ok
CA/VO/I: MSardinas - ok
CA/VO/L: JGorsky - ok
CA/EX/CSD: LTFarris ok
CA/VO/P: ERamo tows ki ok
CA/EX: LWollemborg ok
CA/VO:PMurphy - ok
CA/VO/BIP:PFitzgerald - ok
CA/P: WStaeben -
CA/FPP: FTurley - ok
FSI: SMaloney - ok
CA/PPT:Judy Penn -ok
CA/PPT:Florence Fultz Acting - ok
L/CA:MMcLeod ok
L/LM:JBorek ok

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