REQUISITESOFJUDICIALREVIEW 1. Actual case or controversy a. ripeness b. mootness 2. Proper party 3.

Question must be raised at the earliest possible time 4. Constitutional Question Must Be the Very Lis Mota of the Case a. Actual case or controversy a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial determination.

CASES An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy t h a t i s a p p r o p r i a t e o r r i p e f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n , n o t c o n j e c t u r a l o r anticipatory. It cannot be disputed that there is yet no actual case or controversy involving all or any of the private respondents on one hand, and all or any of the petitioners on the other, with respect to rights or obligations under R.A. No. 8050. (Board of Optometry vs. Colet,GR 122241, July 30, 1996) The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well -delineated. They are: (1) there m u s t b e a n a c t u a l c a s e o r c o n t r o v e r s y ; ( 2 ) t h e q u e s t i o n o f constitutionality must be raised by t h e p r o p e r p a r t y ; ( 3 ) t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l q u e s t i o n m u s t b e r a i s e d a t t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Petitioners have far from co mplied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events,i . e . , t h a t M a y o r B i n a y w i l l r u n a g a i n i n t h i s c o m i n g m a y o r a l t y elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same post in the 1998 elections. C o n s i d e r i n g t h a t t h e s e c o n t i n g e n c i e s m a y o r m a y n o t h a p p e n , petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction (Mariano vs.COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211) In actions involving constitutional issues, the firmly settled rule is that a constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by the courts unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry are met: ( 1 ) t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a n a c t u a l c a s e o r c o n t r o v e r s y ; ( 2 ) t h e p a r t y r a i s i n g t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e m u s t h a v e a personal and substantial interest in the resolution thereof;( 3 ) t h e c o n t r o v e r s y m u s t b e r a i s e d a t t h e e a r l i e s t r e a s o n a b l e opportunity; and( 4 ) t h a t t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e m u s t , b e indispensable for the final determination of the controversy. 3A p p r a i s i n g t h e p r e s e n t p r o c e e d i n g i n t e r m s o f t h e f o r e g o i n g requirements, the Solicitor General urges that the petition at bar does not present a justiciable controversy for having been filed prematurely:" . . . p e t i t i o n e r s , w h o c l a i m t o b e p e r f o r m i n g a r t i s t s , h a d n o t previously applied with the Secretary of Labor for exemption from the coverage of the Circular in line with the afore quoted provision. Said provision connotes that the prohibition is not at all permanent or absolute. It admits of exception . . . But to repeat, there is no allegation in the petition that petitioners had previously sought exemption from the Secretary of Labor, from the coverage of the Circular, before filing the instant petition. Obviously, the petition must fail for prematurity." The Court agrees with the Solicitor General(Fernandez vs. Torres, 215SCRA 489) .A n a c t u a l c a s e o r c o n t r o v e r s y m e a n s a n e x i s t i n g c a s e o r c o n t r o v e r s y t h a t i s a p p r o p r i a t e or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to a n a d v i s o r y o p i n i o n . T h e p o w e r d o e s n o t e x t e n d t o hypothetical questions since any attempt at abstraction could only l e a d t o d i a l e c t i c s a n d b a r r e n l e g a l q u e s t i o n s a n d t o s t e r i l e conclusions unrelated to actualities. Legal standing orlocus standihas been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged,alleging more than a generalized grievance. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues u p o n w h i c h t h e c o u r t d e p e n d s f o r i l l u m i n a t i o n o f d i f f i c u l t constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in a n y o f h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s b y t h e o p e r a t i o n o f s t a t u t e o r ordinance, he has no standing ( L a B u g a l B ' l a a , T r i b a l A s s n . v s . D E N R Secretary, GR 127882, Jan. 27, 2004) .In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no do ubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not o n l y t h e r i g h t b u t i n f a c t t h e d u t y o f t h e j u d i c i a r y t o s e t t l e t h e dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide." The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters raised in the petition is clearly set o u t i n t h e 1 9 8 7 C o n s t i t u t i o n w h i c h e m p h a s i z e s t h e j u d i c i a l department's duty and power to strike down grave abuse of d i s c r e t i o n o n t h e p a r t o f a n y b r a n c h o r i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y o f government including Congress. As the Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it inappropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government. As the petition alleges grave a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n a n d a s t h e r e i s n o o t h e r p l a i n , s p e e d y o r a d e q u a t e r e m e d y i n t h e o r d i n a r y c o u r s e o f l a w , w e h a v e n o hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be given due course and the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule6 5 o f t h e R u l e s o f C o u r t . I n d e e d , c e r t i o r a r i , p r o h i b i t i o n a n d mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. On this, we have no equivocation. We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the m e r i t s o f t r a d e l i b e r a l i z a t i o n a s a p o l i c y e s p o u s e d b y s a i d international body. Neither will it rule on t h e p r o p r i e t y o f t h e government's economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional d uty "to determine w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e r e h a d b e e n a g r a v e a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes (Tanada, et. al.vs. Angara, et. al., GR 118295, May 2, 1997)

1.RIPENESS CASES Issue: Did Lyons's injunction against the use of police chokeholds m e e t t h e t h r e s h o l d r e q u i r e m e n t s i m p o s e d b y A r t i c l e I I I o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n ? T h e C o u r t h e l d t h a t f e d e r a l c o u r t s w e r e w i t h o u t jurisdiction to entertain Lyons' claim for injunctive relief. The fact that Lyons had been choked once did nothing to establish "a real a n d i m m e d i a t e t h r e a t t h a t h e w o u l d a g a i n b e s t o p p e d . . b y a n officer who would illegally choke him into unconsciousness. " The Court held that in order to establish an actual controversy, Lyons would have to show either 1) that all Los Angeles police officers always choked citizens with whom they had encounters, or 2) that the City ordered or authorized officers to act in such a manner. Lyons was thus limited to suing the police and the city for individual damages. Lyons case is not ripe because of the speculative nature of his c l a i m . P r e d i c t i o n s o f f u t u r e b e h a v i o r a r e b e y o n d t h e c o u r t s functions. The rule is that, ripeness arises when an actual case has ripened or matured into a controversy worthy of adjudication.(City of Los Angeles vs. Lyons, 449 US 934) 2 MOOTNESS A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts d e c l i n e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r s u c h c a s e o r d i s m i s s i t o n g r o u n d o f mootness. The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present p etitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police o f f i c e r s , a c c o r d i n g t o p e t i t i o n e r s , c o m m i t t e d i l l e g a l a c t s i n implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it i m p o s e s n o d u t i e s , i t a f f o r d s n o p r o t e c t i o n ; i t i s i n l e g a l contemplation, inoperative. The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; s e c o n d , t h e e x c e p t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r o f t h e s i t u a t i o n a n d t h e paramount public interest is involved; t h i r d , w h e n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e r a i s e d r e q u i r e s f o r m u l a t i o n o f controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review (David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR 171396, May 03, 2006) .After being denied admission to a state -operated law school, petitioner brought this suit on behalf of himself alone for injunctive r e l i e f , c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e s c h o o l ' s a d m i s s i o n s p o l i c y r a c i a l l y discriminated against him in violation of the Equal Protection Clause o f t h e F o u r t e e n t h A m e n d m e n t . T h e C o u r t h e l d t h a t b e c a u s e petitioner will complete law school at the end of the term for which he has registered regardless of any decision this Court might reach on the merits, the Court cannot, consistently with the limitations of Art. III of the Constitution, consider the substantive constitutional issues, and the case is moot. (a) Mootness here does not depend upon a "voluntary cessation" of t h e s c h o o l ' s a d m i s s i o n s p r a c t i c e s b u t u p o n t h e s i m p l e f a c t t h a t petitioner is in his final term, and the school's fixed policy to permit him to complete the term. (b) The case presents no question that is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," since petitioner will never again have to go through the school's admissions process, and since it does not follow that the issue petitioner raises will in the future evade review merely because t h i s c a s e d i d n o t r e a c h t h e C o u r t u n t i l t h e e v e o f p e t i t i o n e r ' s graduation(DeFunis vs. Odegaard, 416 US 312, 40 L.Ed. 343) 2. P r o p e r P a r t y Constitutional question must be raised by the proper party one who has sustained or in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. 2.1.Conventional Standing ---CASES The court was tasked to determine if the rules of standing should be considered part of the 'case or controversy' clause of Article III of the Constitution or, apart from that, if the court can hear cases on" generalized grievances" or in the interest of third parties where none of the complainants have standing. The court found that as none of the plaintiffs could demonstrate any injury actually done to them by the defendants, the plaintiffs were third parties to the issue and had no standing to sue. The plaintiff's descriptions of their own m e a g e r f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n s a n d s u b s e q u e n t i n a b i l i t y t o l i v e i n P e n f i e l d w e r e f o u n d b y t h e C o u r t t o b e t h e c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e economics and housing market of the area rather than any wrongdoing by the defendants(Warth vs. Seldin, 422 US 490, 45 L.Ed.2d, 343) 2.2Representative Standing 2.3 Jus Tertii Standing CASES The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether a statute that denies the sale of beer to individuals of the same ag e b a s e d o n t h e i r g e n d e r v i o l a t e s t h e E q u a l P r o t e c t i o n C l a u s e . Additionally, the Supreme Court examined jus tertii (third party rights), in this case the vendor of the 3.2% beer. The Court held that t h e g e n d e r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s m a d e b y t h e O k l a h o m a s t a t u t e w e r e unconstitutional because the statistics relied on by the state were insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the statute and the benefits intended to stem from it. Furthermore, the Court found that analysis of the Equal Protection Clause in this case had not been changed. As to third party rights, the court, expanding on the doctrine of standing, held that the vendors of 3.2% beer will be economically affected due to the restrictive nature of the sales to m a l e s b e t w e e n 1 8 a n d 2 0 . T o h a v e s t a n d i n g , o n e m u s t s h o w a "nexus" of the injury to themselves and the constitutional violation of the statute. In this case, the statute only directly affects plaintiff Craig. Only indirectly does it affect the vendor, Whitener, the third party. The Supreme Court explains that Whitener and other vendors have standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to their market or function"(Craig vs Boren, 429 US 190,50 L.Ed.2d. 343) 2.4Trancedental Importance to the public CASES Respondents claimed that petitioners had no legal standing to initiate the instant action. Petitioners, however, countered that the a c t i o n w a s f i l e d b y t h e m i n t h e i r c a p a c i t y a s S e n a t o r s a n d a s taxpayers. The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow t a x p a y e r s t o q u e s t i o n c o n t r a c t s e n t e r e d i n t o b y t h e n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t o r g o v e r n m e n t - o w n e d o r c o n t r o l l e d c o r p o r a t i o n s allegedly in contravention of the law and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are

involved. For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action(Tatad vs. Garcia, 243 SCRA 436) .On the locus standi of the petitioners, the Court resolved the issue in their favor. A party's standing before the Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside i n v i e w o f t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d . I n t h e l a n d m a r k Emergency Powers Cases, the Court brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.(Avelino vs. Cuenco,G.R. No. L-2821)." Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not devoid of discretion as to whether o r n o t i t s h o u l d b e e n t e r t a i n e d , " o r t h a t i t " e n j o y s a n o p e n discretion to entertain the same or not (Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, 232SCRA 110) .Issue: Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file t h e i n s t a n t p e t i t i o n . T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t r u l e d i n t h e n e g a t i v e . Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because som e cases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured b y t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e l a w o r b y o f f i c i a l a c t i o n t a k e n , b u t b y concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized i n t e r e s t t h e y h a v e f o r b r i n g i n g t h i s s u i t . A n d t h e y d o n o t h a v e present substantial interest in the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA)as would entitle them to bring this suit(Kilosabayan vs. Morato, 246 SCRA540) .It is insisted that this Court has in the past accorded standing to taxpayers and concerned citizens in cases involving "paramount p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . " T a x p a y e r s , v o t e r s , c o n c e r n e d c i t i z e n s a n d legislators have indeed been allowed to sue but then only ( 1 ) i n c a s e s i n v o l v i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s a n d (2) under certain conditions. Petitioners do not meet these requirements on standing. Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of i l l e g a l d i s b u r s e m e n t o f p u b l i c f u n d s , o r w h e r e a t a x m e a s u r e i s assailed as unconstitutional. Vote rs are allowed to question the validity of election laws because of their obvious interest in the v a l i d i t y o f s u c h l a w s . C o n c e r n e d c i t i z e n s c a n b r i n g s u i t s i f t h e constitutional question they raise is of "transcendental importance "w h i c h m u s t b e s e t t l e d e a r l y . L e g i s l a t o r s a r e a l l o w e d t o s u e t o question the validity of any official action which they claim in fringes their prerogatives qua legislators. Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these various litigants have. Petitioners assert a n i n t e r e s t a s t a x p a y e r s , b u t t h e y d o n o t m e e t t h e s t a n d i n g requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,95SCRA392,403(1980),towit:While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys,No where in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is"being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power ", or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC , or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from w a s t i n g p u b l i c f u n d s t h r o u g h t h e e n f o r c e m e n t o f a n i n v a l i d o r unconstitutional law.Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se, is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or nota taxpayer's suit should be entertained. Petitioners' suit does not fall under any of these categories of taxpayers' suits (Kilosbayan vs.Morato (Recon), GR 118910, Nov. 16, 1995) 2.5 Standing members of the CONGRESS CASES Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excessof the authority vested on the President by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domainof the Legislature arises. It is true that the Constitution provides amechanism for overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy,however, is available only when the presidential veto is based onpolicy or political considerations but not when the veto is claimed tobe ultra vires. In the latter case, it becomes the duty of the Court todraw the dividing line where the exercise of executive power endsand the bounds of legislative jurisdiction begin (Philconsa vs. Enriquez,235 SCRA 506) .PETRON questions theocus standi of petitioners to file the action(Rollo pp. 479-484). Petitioners however, countered that they filedthe action in their capacity as members of Congress.In Philippine Constitution Association v Hon. Salvador Enriquez G.R.No. 113105, August 19, 1994, we held that the members of Congressh a v e t h e l e g a l s t a n d i n g t o q u e s t i o n t h e v a l i d i t y o f a c t s o f t h e Executive which injures them in their person or the institution of Congress to which they belong. In the latter case, the acts cause d e r i v a t i v e b u t n o n e t h e l e s s s u b s t a n t i a l i n j u r y w h i c h c a n b e questioned by members of Congress (Kennedy v. James, 412 F.Supp. 35 3 [1976]). In the absence of a claim that the contract in question violated the rights of petitioners or impermissibly intrudedinto the domain of the Legislature, petitioners have no legal standingt o i n s t i t u t e t h e i n s t a n t a c t i o n i n t h e i r c a p a c i t y a s m e m b e r s o f Congress.H o w e v e r , p e t i t i o n e r s c a n b r i n g t h e action in their capacity as t a x p a y e r s u n d e r t h e d o c t r i n e l a i d d o w n i n Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona 232 SCRA 110 (1994). Under said ruling, taxpayers mayq u e s t i o n c o n t r a c t s e n t e r e d i n t o b y t h e n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t o r g o v e r n m e n t - o w n e d o r c o n t r o l l e d c o r p o r a t i o n s a l l e g e d t o b e i n contravention of the law. As long as the ruling in Kilosbayanon locusstandiis not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and upholdthe legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the presentaction (Bagatsing vs. Committee on Privatization, GR 112399, July 14, 1995) 2.6Standing of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines CASES The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case."Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal andsubstantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained orwill sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that isbeing challenged. The term "interest" means a material interest, aninterest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mereinterest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Theg i s t o f t h e q u e s t i o n o f s t a n d i n g i s w h e t h e r a p a r t y a l l e g e s s u c h personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure thatconcrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues u p o n wh i c h t h e c o u r t d e p e n d s f o r i l l u m i n a t i o n o f d i f f i c u l t constitutional questions. In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchorsits standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law andt h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . A p a r t f r o m t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n , h o w e v e r , t h e I B P a s s e r t s n o o t h e r b a s i s i n s u p p o r t o f i t s l o c u s s t a n d i T h e m e r e invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule o f l a w a n d nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe itwith standing in this case. This is too general an interest which isshared by other groups and the whole citizenry.Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Courthas the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfyt h e r e q u i r e m e n t o f l e g a l s t a n d i n g w h e n p a r a m o u n t i n t e r e s t i s involved. In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitudeon the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able tocraft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public,the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. 18 In thiscase, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advancedconstitutional issues which de serve the attention of this Court inv i e w o f t h e i r s e r i o u s n e s s , n o v e l t y a n d w e i g h t a s p r e c e d e n t s . Moreover, because peace and order

are under constant threat andl a w l e s s violence occurs in increasing tempo, u n d o u b t e d l y a g g r a v a t e d b y t h e M i n d a n a o i n s u r g e n c y p r o b l e m , t h e l e g a l controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. Itwill stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later(IBP vs Zamora, GR 141284, Aug. 15, 2000) 2.7 Standing of the Government to question its laws CASES Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the SolicitorGeneral and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in presentcase. The Court held that the People of the Philippines, representedby the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule isthat the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have ap e r s o n a l a n d s u b s t a n t i a l i n t e r e s t i n t h e case such that he hass u s t a i n e d , o r w i l l s u s t a i n e d , d i r e c t i n j u r y a s a r e s u l t o f i t s enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violatesthe constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name thepresent action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it seta s i d e . O f g r e a t e r i m p o r t t h a n t h e d a m a g e c a u s e d b y t h e i l l e g a l expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon thefundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence,the wellsettled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56) 2.8 Taxpayers Suits Two (2) requisites of Taxpayers suits: 1 . P u b l i c f u n d s a r e d i s b u r s e d b y a p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n o r instrumentality, and 2 . A l a w i s v i o l a t e d o r s o m e i r r e g u l a r i t y i s c o m m i t t e d a n d t h a t t h e petitioner is directly affected by the alleged ultravires act. CASES In the case before us, petitioners failed to show, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining a n y d i r e c t i n j u r y a s a r e s u l t o f t h e e n f o r c e m e n t o f t h e V F A . A s taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On this point, it bears stressing that a taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of the issues raised in the petitions, this Court, in- the exercise of its sound discretion, brushes aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions, as we have d o n e i n t h e e a r l y E m e r g e n c y P o w e r s C a s e s , 2 0 w h e r e w e h a d occasion to rule:". . . ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the o b j e c t i o n t h a t t h e y w e r e n o t p r o p e r p a r t i e s a n d r u l e d t h a t ' transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure (Bayan vs. Zamora, GR 138570, Oct. 10,2000) Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR). In other words, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any "injury" in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached u p o n t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ' s p o w e r s t o c r e a t e a p u b l i c o f f i c e a n d t o propose amendments to the Charter b y f o r m i n g t h e P C C R . A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in a l l e g e d c o n t r a v e n t i o n o f t h e l a w o r t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . T h u s , a taxpayer's action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power (Gonzales vs. Narvasa, GR140835, Aug. 14, 2000) Questionmustberaisedattheearliestpossibleopportunity.General Rule: must be raised in the pleadings. Exceptions: a . c r i m i n a l c a s e s a t a n y o f the court b p c a d v

t i m e

a t

t h e

d i s c r e t i o n

. c i v i l c a s e s a t a n y s t a g e o f t h e r o c e e d i n g s i f necessary for the determination of the case itself; . e v e r y c a s e ( e x c e p t w h e r e t h e r e i s e s t o p p e l ) t any stage if it involves the jurisdiction of the court. . C o n s t i t u t i o n a l q u e s t i o n m u s t t h e e r y "lis mota" of the case

lis mota a controversy begun. Determination of constitutionality of the statute must be necessary to a final determination of the case(People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56).Therefore, the following must be avoided: Political questions; Advisory opinions; Moot and academic issues; No standing. 4. DOCTRINE OF PURPOSEFUL HESITATIONCASES In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned a c t i s u s u a l l y t h e h a n d i w o r k o f t h e l e g i s l a t i v e o r t h e e x e c u t i v e departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its discussion. I t i s a l s o e m p h a s i z e d t h a t e v e r y c o u r t , i n c l u d i n g t h i s C o u r t , i s charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a l a w u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , o n t h e t h e o r y t h a t t h e m e a s u r e w a s f i r s t carefully studied by the executive and the legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental l a w b e f o r e i t w a s f i n a l l y a p p r o v e d . T o

doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the c l e a r e s t s h o w i n g t h a t t h e r e w a s i n d e e d a n i n f r a c t i o n o f t h e Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by therequired majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of theduty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down (Drilon vs. Lim, GR 112497, Aug. 04, 1994) 5.EFFECTSOFDECLARATIONOFUNCONSTITUTIONALITY The law is either: 1.void if on its face it does not enjoy any presumption of validitybecause it is patently offensive to the Constitution. It produces noeffect creates no office and imposes no duty. (Igot v. Comelec, 95SCRA392).2. voidable i f o n i t s f a c e i t e n j o y s t h e p r e s u m p t i o n o f constitutionality. The law becomes inoperative only upon the judicial declaration of its invalidity; the declaration produces noretroactive effect (Serrano de Agbayani v PNB, 38 SCRA 429). Doctrine of Operative Fact Realizes that in declaring a law or rule null and void, undue harshnessand resulting unfairness must be avoided. CASES The strict view considers a legislative enactment which is declaredunconstitutional as being, for all legal intents and purp oses, a totalnullity, and it is deemed as if had never existed. Here, of course, werefer to the law itself being per se repugnant to the Constitution. It isnot always the case, however, that a law is constitutionally faulty per se . Thus, it may well be valid in its general import, but invalid ini t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o c e r t a i n f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n s . T o e x e m p l i f y , a n otherwise valid law may be held unconstitutional only insofar as it isallowed to operate retrospectively such as, in pertinent cases, whenit vitiates contractually vested rights. A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may not necessarily obliterate all the effectsand consequences of a void act occurring prior to such a declaration. Thus, in our decisions on the moratorium laws we have beenconstrained to recognize the Interim effects of said laws prior to theirdeclaration of unconstitutionality, but there we have likewise beenunable to simply ignore strong considerations of equity and fair play.So also, even as a practical matter, a situation that may aptly be described as fait accompli may no longer be open for further inquiry let alone to be unsettled by a subsequent declaration of nullity of agoverning statute (Republic vs. CA, GR 79732, Nov. 8, 1993) 6 . R E L A T I V E C O N S T I T U T I O N A L I T Y CASES The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , s i n c e t h e s t a t u t e m a y b e constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another.A s t a t u t e v a l i d a t o n e t i m e m a y b e c o m e v o i d a t a n o t h e r t i m e because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though a f f i r m e d b y a f o r m e r a d j u d i c a t i o n , i s o p e n t o i n q u i r y a n d investigation in the light of changed conditions (Central Bank EmployeeAssn, Inc. vs. BSP, GR 148208, Dec. 15, 2004)

Board of Optometry vs. Angel B. Colet G.R. No. 122241, July 30, 1996 Prayer of the Petitioners: The petitioners seek to annul and set aside the order rendered by herein public respondent Judge Angel B. Colet, who granted the writ of preliminary injunction restraining, enjoining, and prohibiting the herein petitioners in enforcing and implementing the Revised Optometry Law or any regulations or Code of Ethics issued thereunder. Prayer of Respondents: Herein private respondents prayed that the writ of preliminary injunction be made permanent. Facts: Congress enacted R.A. No. 8050, entitled An Act Regulating the Practice of Optometry Education, Integrating Optometrists, an d for Other Purposes," otherwise known as the Revised Optometry Law of 1995. Herein private respondents filed with a petition for declaratory relief and for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. They cited the following as grounds for their petition: 1. that there was derogation in the legislative process and vitiation of legislative consent; 2. that RA No. 8050 violates the due process clause of the Constitution; 3. that RA No. 8050 violates the principle against undue delegation of legislative power; and 4. that it is violation of the guaranty of freedom of speech and press. Meanwhile, upon examination of the petition, it was found out that the body of the petition gave no details as to the juridical personality and addresses of the alleged herein associations OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP, except for Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. The petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74770, merely listed the names of the alleged presidents as well as their profession and home addresses. As to herein petitioners, they filed an opposition to the application for preliminary injunction and alleged that: 1. respondents do not possess the requisite right as would entitle them to the relief they sought; 2. respondents have no legal existence or capacity to file the case; 3. that the implementation of the questioned law carries no injurious effect; and 4. that herein respondents failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the questioned law. The Regional Trial Court granted the writ of preliminary injunction. The court was inclined to find prima facie, that petitioners have legal rights affected by the Revised Optometry Law, and that in its operation, said Law is likely to inflict serious and irreparable injury to such legal rights. Thus, herein petitioners filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. Issue: Whether or not herein private respondents have legal existence or capacity (locus standi) to question the constitutionality of RA No. 8050. Ruling: Only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action, and every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Under Article 44 of the Civil Code, an association is considered a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members. There is serious doubt as to the existence of private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP. For one, the body of the petition in Civil Case No. 9574770 makes no mention of these associations nor states their addresses. Further, nowhere is it claimed therein that they are juridical entities. These run counter to Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which provides that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party must be averred. Second, not even in the sworn statements of the alleged presidents representing the "associations," which were offered in evidence in support of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, were such

"associations" mentioned or named. Finally, in their Comment on the instant petition, the private respondents chose to remain silent on the issue of the juridical personality of their "associations." For having failed to show that they are juridical entities, private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP must then be deemed to be devoid of legal personality to bring an action, such as herein questioned petition. Therefore, since OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP were not shown to be juridical entities, they cannot, for obvious reasons, be deemed real parties in interest. Thus, petitioners prayer is granted. The questioned ord er rendered by the Regional Trial Court granting the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and the writ of preliminary injunction are hereby annulled and set aside. Principle: An association can only be considered as a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members MARIANOvs.COMELEC(242SCRA211) FACTS:1 . T w o petitions assailing certain provisions of RA No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City) as unconstitutional.2.GR No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief,and assailing the statuteas unconstitutional on the following grounds:a.Section 2 did n o t p r o p e r l y i d e n t i f y t h e l a n d a r e a or territorial jurisdiction of Makati bymetes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , i n r e l a t i o n t o S e c t i o n s 7 a n d 4 5 0 o f t h e Local Government Code.b.Section 51 attempts to alter or restart thethree -consecutive term l imit for local electiveofficials, in violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 7,A r t i c l e V I o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . c . S e c t i o n 5 2 : i . I n c r e a s e d t h e l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t o f M a k a t i o n l y b y s p e c i a l law (the Charter) violates the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to bepassed by Congress withint h r e e y e a r s f o l l o w i n g the return of every censusii.The increase in legislative district was not expressed in the billt i t l e i i i . T h e addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h S e c t i o n 5 ( 3 ) , A r t i c l e V I o f t h e Constitution the population of Makati is 450,0003.GR No. 118627 involves a petition which assails Section 52 asunconstitutional on the samegrounds as aforestated.I S U E : ALSE 2013:ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODUCO,IBARRA,LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA9H E L D Y : es. Petitions dismissed. R A T O I : a. The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local government unit cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. The existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2)the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events (i.e. Mayor Binay will run again, etc.)Petitioners merely posed a hypothetical issue. Petitioners (residents of Taguig) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what the Congress did in enacting RA No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makatis legislative district. The policy of the Court favors a liberal construction of the one title one subject rule so as not to impede legislation. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject. D: Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than 250,000 shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. Although Makati has a population of 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since ithas met the minimum populationrequirement of 250,000

Warth v. Seldin Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiffs claimed that a local zoning ordinance excluded persons of low and moderate income from living in a certain community. Defendants responded by claiming that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A plaintiff must generally allege a specific case or controversy between herself and the defendant in order to have standing. Facts. The Plaintiffs were various organizations and individuals residing in Rochester, New York (Rochester). The Plaintiffs brought suit against the town of Penfield, New York (Penfield) and members of Penfields Zoning, Planning, and Town Boards (Defendants). Plaintiffs contended that Penfields zoning ordinance effectively excluded persons of low and moderate income from living in the town, in contravention of constitutional and statutory rights. The lower federal courts held that none of the Plaintiffs had s tanding. Issue. Have the Plaintiffs established that a case or controversy exists between themselves and the Defendants within the meaning of Article III of the United States Constitution (Constitution), in order to have standing? Held. Yes. Judgment affirmed. In order for a federal court to have jurisdiction, the plaintiff himself must have suffered some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively legal action. Additionally, standing will generally not be found when: a generalized grievance is shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens a plaintiff attempts to claim relief on the legal rights of third parties. Congress may create standing for individuals through statutes who would otherwise lack standing, so long as the plaintiff alleges a distinct and

palpable injury to himself. In the present case, the Plaintiffs claimed the enforcement of zoning ordinances against third parties had the effect of precluding the construction of housing suitable to their needs. For standing, a plaintiff must allege that the challenged practices affect him specifically and that court intervention would personally benefit the plaintiff. In order for an organization to have standing, it must claim that all or any one of its members are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action. Plaintiffs in this case fail to do so. Dissent. The Plaintiffs have submitted a sufficient pleading to avoid a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The majority s opinion is based instead on the merits of the claim Discussion. The purpose of the standing requirement is to prevent the courts from being forced to adjudicate abstract questions of wide public significance, which could better be determined in other forums. Craig v. Boren Brief Fact Summary. Oklahoma State maintained different drinking ages between men and women for the consumption of 3.2% alcohol beer. The Appellant, Craig (Appellant), now alleges that this difference violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Synopsis of Rule of Law. Gender-based classifications must satisfy intermediate scrutiny requirements to pass constitutional muster. Facts. The State of Oklahoma prohibited the sale of nonintoxicating 3.2% alcohol beer to men under the age of 21 and women under the age of 18. Suit was brought against the State, alleging the law violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Issue. Does the Oklahoma statute violate the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution? Held. Yes. Appeals Court ruling reversed and remanded. Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) argues that case precedent dictates that an intermediate level of scrutiny should be applied in analyzing the statute. Specifically, the gender-based classification must serve an important government objective and be substantially related to the achievement of such objective. The District Court unequivocally found that the objective to be served by the statute is increased traffic safety. J. Brennan is not persuaded by the Appellees, Craig and others (Appellees), statistics that the statute closely serves the stated objective. As such, it is not constitutional. Dissent. Justice William Rehnquist (J. Rehnquist) dissents on two levels. He believes that rational basis analysis is the appropriate level of scrutiny for gender-based classification. Furthermore, he believes that the intermediate scrutiny applied by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) is so diaphanous and elastic as to encourage judicial prejudice. Discussion. Craig v. Boren establishes intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate level of review for gender-based classification. Intermediate scrutiny is distinguished from strict scrutiny at both the objective and means levels. Important government objectives (intermediate) v. compelling government objectives (strict) and substantially related (intermediate) v. narrowly tailored (strict).

THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 122241. July 30, 1996] BOARD OF OPTOMETRY, represented by its Chairman, DR. PRIMITIVA Y. PEREZ-SISON, PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, represented by its Commissioner, HERMOGENES P. POBRE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, represented by its Secretary, DR. HILARION M. RAMIRO, BUREAU OF FOODS AND DRUGS, represented by its Director, DR. QUINTIN L. KINTANAR, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, represented by its Secretary, SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ, JR., and BUREAU OF HIGHER EDUCATION, represented by its Director, MONA D. VALISNO, petitioners, vs. HON. ANGEL B. COLET, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 29, ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC., represented by its President and Chairman of the Board, MIGUEL P. ACEBEDO, OPTOMETRY PRACTITIONERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (OPAP), represented by its President, DR. MIRIAM F. LLAVE, CENEVIS OPTOMETRIST ASSOCIATION (COA), represented by its President, DR. ROBERTO RODIS, JR., ASSOCIATION OF CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM OPTOMETRIST (ACMO), represented by its President, DR. CYRIL CORALES, SOUTHERN MINDANAO OPTOMETRIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILS., INC. (SMOAP), represented by its President, DR. ELMER VILLAROSA, and REPUBLICA A. PANOL, No. 9 Gen. Malvar St., Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City, respondents. DECISION DAVIDE, JR., J.: Petitioners seek to annul and set aside for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion the order of 25 August 1995 issued by public respondent Judge Angel V. Colet in Civil Case No. 95-74770 which granted a writ of preliminary injunction restraining, enjoining, and prohibiting the petitioners herein from undertaking in any form or manner, the enforcement or implementation of the Revised Optometry La w [R.A. No. 8050] or any regulations or Code of Ethics issued thereunder. The background facts are not disputed. R.A. No. 8050,i[1] entitled An Act Regulating the Practice of Optometry Education, Integrating Optometrists, and for Other Purposes, otherwise known as the Revised Optometry Law of 1995, was a consolidation of House Bill (HB) No. 14100ii[2] and Senate Bill (SB) No. 1998,iii[3] which were respectively approved by both Houses and, thereafter, reconciled by the Bicameral Conference Committee.iv[4] The Reconciled Billv[5] was then separately ratified by both the Senate and the House of Representativesvi[6] and approved into law by the President on 7 June 1995. On 31 July 1995, the private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a petition for declaratory relief and for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order.vii[7] As grounds for their petition, the private respondents alleged that: 1. There were surreptitious and unauthorized insertion and addition of provisions in the Reconciled Bill which were made without the knowledge and conformity of the Senate panel, thereby derogating the orderly procedure essential to the legislative process and vitiating legislative consent; 2. R.A. No. 8050 derogates and violates the fundamental right of every Filipino to reasonable safeguards against deprivation of life, liberty and property without due process of law in that it authorizes optometrists to engage in acts of practice within the zone of medical practice through permitted use in certain kinds of diagnostic pharmaceutical agents thereby exposing and subjecting those who avail of the services of optometrists to definite hazards which would inflict upon them impairment of vision, resultant blindness, or possible loss of life; 3. R.A. No. 8050 derogates and violates the principle against undue delegation of legislative power when it provides for a penalty of imprisonment for a maximum of eight years and a fine not exceeding P40,000.00 upon any person found violating any rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to said law; 4. R.A. No. 8050 suppresses truthful advertising concerning optical goods and services in violation of the guaranty of freedom of speech and press; and 5. R.A. No. 8050 employs vague ambiguous terms in defining prohibitions and restrictions, hence, it falls within the ambit of void-forvagueness doctrine which safeguards the guaranty of due process of law. They then prayed that after due notice and hearing, an order be issued granting a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining, restraining, restricting, and forbidding the respondents therein (herein petitioners), their agents, officers, and employees from performing or undertaking any act in implementation or enforcement of R.A. No. 8050, or any of its provisions, or its Code of Ethics, during the pendency of the case, until further orders of the court; and that after trial on the merits, judgment be rendered: (a) declaring R.A. No. 8050 and its Code of Ethics null and void due to constitutional violations and transgressions; (b) granting a writ of prohibition against all the respondents therein enjoining and restraining them from enforcing or implementing R.A. No. 8050 or its Code of Ethics in whole or in part; and (c) making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction. An examination of the petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74770 in Branch 29 of the RTC of Manila, disclosed that among the petitioners included in the caption of the petition were Acebedo Optical Co., Inc.; Optometry Practitioner Association of the Philippines (OPAP); Cenevis Optometrist Association (COA); Association of Christian-Muslim Optometrist (ACMO); and Southern Mindanao Optometrist Association of the Philippines (SMOAP) each allegedly represented by its president. The body of the petition, however, gave no details as to the juridical personality and addresses of these alleged associations, save for Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. It merely listed the names of the alleged presidents as well as their profession and home addresses. As likewise disclosed in the petitioners Complianceviii[8] filed with the trial court on 18 August 1995, the names of Miguel Acebedo, representing Acebedo Optical Co., Inc.; Miriam F. Llave, representing the OPAP; and Republica A. Panol, another petitioner in Civil Case No. 95-74770, did not appear in the registration books of the Board of Optometry to be authorized optometry practitioners in the Philippines, as evidenced by certifications issued by the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC). Private respondents COA and ACMO were neither registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as evidenced by the certifications issued by the latter. On 1 August 1995, the trial court, per respondent Judge Angel V. Colet, issued a Temporary Restraining Orderix[9] enjoining the respondents from enforcing or implementing R.A. No. 8050 or its Code of Ethics, until further orders of the court; directing that summons, with a copy of the petition and of the temporary restraining order, be served immediately; and setting the application for a writ of preliminary injunction for hearing on 15 August 1995. On 11 August 1995, the petitioners herein, as respondents below, filed an Oppositionx[10] to the application for preliminary injunction and alleged that: (1) No proper ground exists to warrant the issuance of a writ as (a) petitioners therein do not possess the requisite right as would entitle them to the relief demanded; (b) petitioners have unquestionably not shown their legal existence or capacity to file the case, much less their authority to file it in a representative capacity; and (c) petitioners have misled the court into believing that an act is being done in the implementation of R.A. No. 8050 tending to make the judgment ineffectual;

(2) The implementation of R.A. No. 8050 carries no injurious effect; and (3) Petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of R.A. No. 8050. At the hearing of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the parties indicated their intention to present witnesses in support of their respective positions. Nevertheless, the trial court, finding such procedure not [to be] conducive to the summary procedure appropriate to the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, merely directed the parties to submit their other arguments in writing with supp orting evidence, after which the application for a writ of preliminary injunction would be deemed submitted for resolution.xi[11] The parties complied therewith. On 25 August 1995, the trial court issued the challenged order,xii[12] the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court grants the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for until further orders of the Court, respondents and their officials, agents and employees, are restrained, enjoined, and prohibited from undertaking in any form or manner, the enforcement or implementation of the Revised Optometry Law [R.A. 8050] or any regulation or Code of Ethics issued thereunder. Let the writ issue upon filing with this Court a bond in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND [P100,000.00] PESOS in favor of respondents, conditioned upon payment of damages sustained by respondents in case the writ is later adjudged to have been improvidently or improperly issued. We quote its ratiocinations to support the above disposition: Viewing the petition as a whole, which is duly verified, particularly the constitutional infirmities alleged by the petitioners, and the supporting exhibits, the court is inclined to find prima facie, that petitioners have legal rights affected by the Revised Optometry Law, and that in its operation, said Law is likely to inflict serious and irreparable injury to such legal rights. There is clear public right that laws enacted for the governance of citizens should be the product of the untrammeled will of the peoples representatives in Congress. Petitioners contend and have adduced at least sufficient evidence to support this order that, in the Revised Optometry Law, approved by the two Houses of Congress, there is a showing that at least one major paragraph imposing penalties on corporate officers, was surreptitiously smuggled into the measure, because the clear tenor and the content of the provision (Sec. 33) as agreed upo n in the Bicameral Conference Committee, duly reflected in its Minutes (Exhs. S and T) did not in clude such paragraph. The fraud upon the legislative process thus practiced through surreptitious and insidious tampering, manifestly contravenes and violates said public right, which violation petitioners as members of the Philippine body politic, have the status and standing to vindicate by the present petition for extraordinary legal remedies. (See the rulings in Tanada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, particularly pp. 36-37, citing Severino v. Governor-General, Phil. 366, 378). Similarly, there is likewise a public right that the laws enacted for the public good should in truth and in fact promote the public good. Such public right would be negated and violated if, as petitioners allege, the Revised Optometry Law which is intended to provide our people with better opportunities and better facilities for better vision, institutes a practice which in its actual operation, exposes persons availing of optometric services to serious risk of impairment of vision, possible loss of sight and even possible loss of life, through administration by optometrists of DPAs. If this be true, the law under question violates that public right, because it permits inflicting of serious injury upon our people using services of optometrists. After examining the different exhibits submitted by petitioners, in which trained experts in our government agencies themselves attest to the dire consequences that persons on whom DPAs are used may suffer, the Court finds prima facie basis for danger of irreparable injury to public health, which the Court should forestall in the exercise of prudence by a preliminary writ of injunction, pending full inquiry and thorough determination after trial. Apart from the public rights, which petitioners are entitled to assert in this action, there are also private individual rights of petitioners which the Revised Optometry Law tends to injure, and which would be injured irreparably with the actual operation of said law. Hardest hit in this regard are the optometrists, whose vested right to continue in the practice is virtually bludgeoned by the Revised Optometrist Law, as virtually admitted by respondents in their Opposition. On the one hand, the revised concept of the practice of optometry [Sec. 4] mandates as standard, the use of DPAs in optometric examination. For this reason, said Law authorizes virtual suspension of the licenses of the present crop of optometrists, until after they shall have re-trained and qualified to use DPAs [Sec. 31]. In case such optometrists insist on practicing without the mandatory training, their practice could be viewed as substandard if they would avoid use of DPAs [Sec. 4]. Alternatively, if they use DPAs before they are qualified through mandatory training, they could incur criminal liability [Secs. 32 and 33]. In either case, their use of DPAs without or after qualifying training, would expose them to malpractice suits from persons who might have sustained injury through the use of D PAs. Again, they might not have the option of refraining from the use of DPAs, since they could face an ethics charge for substandard practice in not using DPAs in their practice. Finally, even petitioner Acebedo Co. would suffer injury in its operations because its activities, based on the affidavits submitted as exhibits, would surely touch the boundaries of conduct prohibited and penalized in the Revised Optometry Law. For one thing, its right to continue in employment, the optometrists working in its optical shop clinics [including affiant petitioners] might be injured through a criminal charge that such employment constitutes a prohibited indirect practice of optometry within the strictures of Section 5 in relation to Sec. 32. Or its advertising of optical goods and wares, which is its right under the general law and the Constitution, could be charged as an offense under Section 32 and subjected to penalty under Section 33. These restraints, which could seriously prejudice existing legal rights, entitle the petitioner corporation to the extraordinary remedy of declaratory relief, and to preliminary injunction pending the holding of a trial on the merits. The Court understands that petitioner could have adduced more evidence than what appears especially on the matter of the jeopardy to public health as a result of changes of optometric practice introduced by the Revised Optometry Law. But as the Court understands it, preponderance is not required for evidentiary support for the grant of preliminary injunction. As the rule stands, a sampling of relevant evidence is enough, so as to give the Court a justification for the issuance of the writ [See Olalio v. Hizon, 196 SCRA 665; Syndicated Media Access vs. CA, 219 SCRA 794]. Jurisprudence likewise supports the grant of preliminary writs of injunction, to maintain the status quo, in suits questioning the constitutionality of laws with demonstrable prejudice of legal rights [J.M. & Co. v. CA, 3 SCRA 696]. On the basis of the main petition, which is for declaratory relief directed at the nullification of R.A. 8050 on constitutional grounds, and for a writ of prohibition, likewise premised on the nullity of said law due to constitutional infirmities, the Court finds that the whole or part of the relief which petitioners are seeking and to which prima facie they are entitled, consists in restraining the enforcement or implementation of the law. The Court likewise concludes, on its finding that both public rights would be prejudiced by the operation of R.A. 8050, that its enforcement pendente would inflict substantial injustice to petitioners.xiii[13] On 1 September 1995, respondent Judge Colet issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,xiv[14] the dispositive portion of which reads: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned that, until further orders, you, the said defendants, and all your attorneys, representatives, agents, and any other person assisting you refrain from enforcing and/or implementing R.A. No. 8050 or its Code of Ethics. The petitioners then filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and alleged that: I RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND/OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE LOCUS STANDI TO FILE THE PETITION A QUO.

II RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND/OR ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DECREEING THAT PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY/INVALIDITY OF R.A. 8050 EXISTS WHICH WARRANT THE ENJOINMENT OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION. III RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND/OR ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PRELIMINARILY ENJOINING R.A. 8050 ON MERE ALLEGATIONS BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THAT THE SAME WOULD BRING INJURIOUS EFFECTS TO THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC. IV RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND/OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. As we see it, the assigned errors quoted above may be reduced to two key issues, viz.: (1) The locus standi of the private respondents to question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8050; and (2) The absence of a valid cause of action for either declaratory relief or prohibition. The petitioners maintain that for a party to have locus standi to question the validity of a statute, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement.xv[15] In this light, the private respondents do not have the requisite personal and substantial interest to assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8050 for, per the certifications of the SEC, private respondents COA and ACMO are not registered associations; and two of the alleged presidents of the respondent associations are not duly registered optometrists as certified to by the PRC. Finally, the petitioners aver, the private respondents did not allege in their petition in Civil Case No. 95-74770, and in their Rejoinder to the Opposition therein, their capacity to bring suit as required by Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. Refuting this charge, the private respondents claim in their Comment on the petition that they have, as held by the trial court, locus standi under the rule of Public Right pursuant to Tanada vs. Tuvera,xvi[16] citing Severino vs. Governor General;xvii[17] moreover, as also found by the trial court, their rights as optometrists or optical companies would be adversely affected by the assailed law. They further claim that they seek to protect their Constitutional rights to property and freedom of expression from enforcement of the provisions of the challenged law, which bar truthful advertisements and impose vague and unreasonable conditions for the continued practice of their profession. Insofar as private respondents Acebedo Optical Co., Inc., and Panol are concerned, the said law would likewise adversely affect the conduct of their business of maintaining optical shops and expose them to threats of criminal prosecution. Finally, they contend that they also seek, as taxpayers and citizens, under the concept of Public Right, to bar the enforcement of the law because it endangers the publics health, a danger clearly seen from the oppositio ns to the law filed before both houses of Congress. I Only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action, and every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.xviii[18] Under Article 44 of the Civil Code, an association is considered a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members. There is serious doubt as to the existence of private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP. For one, the body of the petition in Civil Case No. 95-74770 makes no mention of these associations nor states their addresses. Further, nowhere is it claimed therein that they are juridical entities. These run counter to Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which provides that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party must be averred. Second, not even in the sworn statementsxix[19] of the alleged presidents representing the associations, which were offered in evidence in support of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, were such associations mentioned or named. Finally, in their Comment on the instant petition, the private respondents chose to remai n silent on the issue of the juridical personality of their associations. For having failed to show that they are juridical entities, private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP must then be deemed to be devoid of legal personality to bring an action, such as Civil Case No. 95-74770. A real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court is a party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.xx[20] In the case at bench, since OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP were not shown to be juridical entities, they cannot, for obvious reasons, be deemed real parties in interest. Moreover, since the names of private respondents Miguel Acebedo, Miriam F. Llave, and Republica A. Panol do not appear in the registration books of the Board of Optometry as authorized optometry practitioners in the Philippines,xxi[21] they do not have the requisite personal and substantial interest in the case. Even further, although private respondents Roberto Rodis, Jr., Cyril Corales, and Elmer Villarosa claim to be practicing optometrists, the petition in Civil Case No. 95-74770 is bereft of any allegation to make them real parties in interest to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8050. As an attempt in extremis, the private respondents now assert in their comment that the petition for declaratory relief, prohibition, and injunction was filed in their capacity as taxpayers and citizens, under the concept of Public Right, to bar the enforcement of the law beca use it endangers public health.xxii[22] They thus suggest that their petition is in the nature of a taxpayers class suit. As a class suit, Civil Case No. 95-74770 must fail. Not only did the private respondents fail to allege this in their petition, they likewise failed to allege the existence and prove the requisites of a class suit, viz., the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons, and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.xxiii[23] Courts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is the exception to the requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. For while no difficulty may arise if the decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the decision were otherwise as those who were deemed impleaded by their self-appointed representatives would certainly claim denial of due process.xxiv[24] Neither may the private respondents be allowed at this late stage to seek refuge under the doctrine allowing taxpayers suits . While they claimed their petition in Civil Case No. 95-74770 was a taxpayers suit, and although this Court, in a catena of cases, has shown liberality in granting locus standi to taxpayers in taxpayers suits,xxv[25] the private respondents have not adequately shown that this liberality must be extended to them. Their plea of injury or damage is nothing but a sweeping generalization. II Civil Case No. 95-74770 must fail for yet another reason. As a special civil action for declaratory relief,xxvi[26] its requisites are: (1) the existence of a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue invoked is ripe for judicial determination.xxvii[27] On this score, we find no difficulty holding that at least the first and fourth requisites are wanting.

Then there is the unbending rule in constitutional law that courts will not assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question unless the following requisites are first satisfied: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination; (2) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the resolution of the case.xxviii[28] An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory.xxix[29] It cannot be disputed that there is yet no actual case or controversy involving all or any of the private respondents on one hand, and all or any of the petitioners on the other, with respect to rights or obligations under R.A. No. 8050. This is plain because Civil Case No. 9574770 is for declaratory relief. Then, too, as adverted to earlier, the private respondents have not sufficiently established their locus standi to question the validity of R.A. No. 8050. The conclusion then is inevitable that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the implementation of R.A. No. 8050, as well as of the Code of Ethics promulgated thereunder, if one has been issued. Even if there was before him a case involving the law, prudence dictated that the respondent Judge should not have issued the writ with undue haste, bearing in mind our decision, penned by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, in Drilon vs. Lim,xxx[30] where we stated: We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, even as the accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charge with violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation of a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its discussion. It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act be struck down. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged order of 25 August 1995 of respondent Judge Angel V. Colet in Civil Case No. 95-74770 granting the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued on 1 September 1995 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The respondent Judge is further DIRECTED to DISMISS Civil Case No. 95-74770. Costs against private respondents Acebedo Optical Co., Inc., Republica A. Panol, and the alleged presidents of Optometry Pr actitioner Association of the Philippines, Cenevis Optometrist Association, Association of Christian-Muslim Optometrists, Southern Mindanao Optometrist Association of the Philippines. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995 JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents. G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995 JOHN R. OSMEA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents. PUNO, J.: At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati." 1 G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds: 1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code; 2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. 3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:

(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census; (b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and (c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated. We find no merit in the petitions. I Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus: Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila. The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining local government units. (Emphasis supplied) In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code which require that the area of a local government unit should be made by metes and bounds with technical descriptions. 2 The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality." The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. 3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary disputes. 4 We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General in this regard, viz.: Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by meted and bounds, with technical descriptions" was made in order to provide a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served. Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the other way around. This could not be the intendment of the law. Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument of government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar. II Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states: Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate

existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati. They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution which provide: Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay. We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. 5 Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction. III Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides: Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmarias and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district. (emphasis supplied) They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment 6 cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the bill 7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. 8 In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution 9 clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty. Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. 14 Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject." WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 102940 November 6, 1992 ADELPHA FERNANDEZ, MARISSA DOMINGO, EUNICE OFRECIA, ROSELYN MENDOZA, ARLENE CABALLERO, ALMIRA MIRANDA, and MARY CHRISTINE VALENTON, petitioners, vs. HON. RUBEN TORRES, SECRETARY OF LABOR and EMPLOYMENT and JOSE SARMIENTO, ADMINISTRATOR, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, respondents. RESOLUTION FELICIANO, J.: Petitioners Adelpha Fernandez, Marissa Domingo, Eunice Ofrecia, Roselyn Mendoza, Arlene Caballero, Almira Miranda and Mary Christine Valenton seek certiorari and prohibition to prohibit and restrain the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment ("DOLE") and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration ("POEA") from enforcing and implementing Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 dated 20 November 1991 entitled "Prescribing Additional Requirements, Conditions and Procedures for the Deployment of Performing Artists." Item No. 1 of the assailed DOLE Circular provides as follows: 1. No Filipino entertainer shall be deployed outside the Philippines except for legitimate performing artists consisting of musicians, singers and members of dance troupes. In all cases, the performing artists must have a track record of legitimate and reputable performance in the Philippines for at least one year. In no case shall the performing artists be below 23 years old. The Secretary of Labor and Employment may, for justifiable reasons, exempt performing artists from coverage hereof. The promulgation of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 was preceded by public agitation (as reflected in the print media) for a total ban on deployment of Filipino entertainers abroad, in response to the growing number of documented reports and complaints from entertainers and their relatives about the exploitative working conditions, harassment, forcible detention, physical injuries, rape and even death suffered by female performing artists and entertainers abroad. Because a comprehensive prohibition of such deployment would visit obviously adverse economic consequences upon the entertainment industry, the First National Tripartite Conference for the Protection of Overseas Entertainers, attended by representatives from the Government and from the management and labor sectors of the entertainment community, was held last 18 November 1991. The Conference was convened to evaluate a Government proposal for a complete interdiction of overseas deployment of Philippine entertainers and performing artists. During this Conference, some of the problems facing Filipino entertainers (in particular, women entertainers) abroad were discussed openly: vulnerability to operations of organized crime syndicate abroad; subjection to white slavery; harsh and substandard working conditions; vulnerability to sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancies, and so forth. 1 At the end of the Conference, the consensus among the management and labor representatives which emerged was that Government should adopt a policy of selective (rather than comprehensive) prohibition of deployment abroad of Philippine entertainers, to avoid the adverse effects which complete prohibition would impose on the country's manpower export program. The labor representative recommended that the minimum age for performing artists seeking overseas deployment be raised from eighteen (18) years to twenty-three (23) years. 2 In the present proceeding, petitioners allege themselves to be "qualified performing artists, mostly singers and dancers," of ages eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years. Through counsel, they challenge the constitutional validity of Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 and their arguments may be condensed in the following manner: (1) that Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 is violative of the equal of the protection clause and the due process clause of the Constitution, and the state policy on protection of labor because Item No. 1 is arbitrary, oppressive and discriminatory against performing artists of ages eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) who would otherwise be qualified for overseas employment; and (2) that Item No. 1 of the mentioned DOLE Circular was promulgated by public respondent DOLE Secretary and POEA Administrator without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. In actions involving constitutional issues, the firmly settled rule is that a constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by the courts unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry are met: (1) the existence of an actual case or controversy; (2) the party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal and substantial interest in the resolution thereof; (3) the controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity; and (4) that the resolution of the constitutional issue must be indispensable for the final determination of the controversy. 3 Appraising the present proceeding in terms of the foregoing requirements, the Solicitor General urges that the Petition at bar does not present a justiciable controversy for having been filed prematurely: . . . petitioners, who claim to be performing artists, had not previously applied with the Secretary of Labor for exemption from the coverage of the Circular in line with the aforequoted provision. Said provision connotes that the prohibition is not at all permanent or absolute. It admits of exception. . . . But to repeat, there is no allegation in the petition that petitioners had previously sought exemption from the Secretary of Labor, from the coverage of the Circular, before filing the instant petition. Obviously, the petition must fail for prematurity. 4 The Court agrees with the Solicitor General. We note in the first place, that Item No. 1 of the challenged DOLE Circular does not establish an absolute and comprehensive prohibition of deployment abroad of entertainers below twenty-three (23) years of age. Item No. 1 itself provides that "the Secretary of Labor and Employment may, for justifiable reasons, exempt from performing artists from coverage hereof." The discretionary authority here asserted by the DOLE Secretary does not purport to be unlimited and arbitrary in nature. To the contrary, fairly explicit and precisely drawn grounds for exempting particular performing artists from the coverage of Item No. 1 are set out in a set of "Administrative Guidelines Implementing Department Circular No. 01-91." 5 In the second place, petitioners have failed to allege or have refrained from alleging, that they had previously applied to public respondent officials for exemption from the minimum age restriction imposed by Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 01-91. Necessarily, therefore, petitioners also do not allege that public respondent officials have arbitrarily denied their applications for exemption from the minimum age requirement or from any other requirement establishment by Item No. 1. Neither have petitioners alleged that public respondents have continually threatened to deny all and sundry applications for exemption, so as to create a reasonable expectation that their applications would be immediately and arbitrarily denied, should they in fact file them. Petitioners do assert that the exemption clause of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 is "practically useless and [constitutes] empty verbiage." They have not, however, attempted to support this assertion.

The Court is not compelled to indulge in speculation that public respondent would deny any and all applications for exemption from coverage of DOLE Circular No. 01-91. Two (2) important presumptions are here applicable. The first is that administrative orders and regulations are entitled to the presumption of constitutionality. 6 The second is that official duty has been or will be regularly performed. 7 In Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education. 8 the petitioner universities and colleges challenged a regulation requiring all private educational institutions to secure a permit to operate from the Department of Education. The Court dismissed the Petition for being premature, after finding that the petitioners had in fact in their possession permits to operate and that the petition was filed for speculative or academic purposes upon the supposition that the petitioning institutions might be denied such permits, or have their permits withdrawn, at some future time. The Court held: Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy. (Cf. Com. ex rel Watkins vs. Winchester Waterworks (Ky.) 197 S.W. 2d. 771.) An action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and positive relief. (Salonga vs. Warner Barnes, L2245, January 1951). Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however intellectually solid the problem may be. This is specially true where the issues "reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion. (Rice vs. Sioux City, U.S. Sup. Ct. Adv. Rep., May 23, 1955, Law Ed., Vol. 99, p. 511). 9 (Emphasis supplied). To engage in judicial review, under the facts and circumstances here obtained, in advance of official efforts to apply the provisions of the challenged circular, upon the supposition that petitioners' legal rights in the premises might be denied by public respondent officials, is too close to rendering an advisory opinion in a hypothetical case an undertaking clearly beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. 10 We consider, therefore, that petitioners have failed to show the first requisite of a judicial inquiry, i.e., the existance of actual case or controversy. This failure renders unnecessary consideration of the other requisites of constitutional litigation. ACCORDINGLY, for lack of a justiciable controversy, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. Costs against petitioners. Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur. Narvasa, C.J. and Medialdea, J., are on leave.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 113375 May 5, 1994 KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAADA, and REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners, vs. TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Office of the President; RENATO CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Executive Secretary and Chairman of the Presidential review Committee on the Lotto, Office of the President; PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE; and PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents. Jovito R. Salonga, Fernando Santiago, Emilio C. Capulong, Jr. and Felipe L. Gozon for petitioners. Renato L. Cayetano and Eleazar B. Reyes for PGMC. Gamaliel G. Bongco, Oscar Karaan and Jedideoh Sincero for intervenors. DAVIDE, JR., J.: This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the "Contract of Lease" executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the on- line lottery system, also known as "lotto." Petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated (KILOSBAYAN) avers that it is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal. The rest of the petitioners, except Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Taada and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as members of the Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens. Senators Webb and Taada and Representative Arroyo are suing in their capacities as members of Congress and as taxpayers and concerned citizens of the Philippines. The pleadings of the parties disclose the factual antecedents which triggered off the filing of this petition. Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it the authority to hold and conduct "charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities," the PCSO decided to establish an on- line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, "a multinational company and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia," long "engaged in, among others, successful lottery operations in Asia, running both Lotto and Digit games, thru its subsidiary, Sports Toto Malaysia," with its "affiliate, the International Totalizator Systems, Inc., . . . an American public company engaged in the international sale or provision of computer systems, softwares, terminals, training and other technical services to the gaming industry," "became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO." As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through its individual nominees) organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which "was intended to be the medium through which the technical and management services required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO." 1 Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease Contract of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO. 2 Relevant provisions of the RFP are the following: 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY xxx xxx xxx

1.2. PCSO is seeking a suitable contractor which shall build, at its own expense, all the facilities ('Facilities') needed to operate and maintain a nationwide on-line lottery system. PCSO shall lease the Facilities for a fixed percentage ofquarterly gross receipts. All receipts from ticket sales shall be turned over directly to PCSO. All capital, operating expenses and expansion expenses and risks shall be for the exclusive account of the Lessor. xxx xxx xxx 1.4. The lease shall be for a period not exceeding fifteen (15) years. 1.5. The Lessor is expected to submit a comprehensive nationwide lottery development plan ("Development Plan") which will include the game, the marketing of the games, and the logistics to introduce the games to all the cities and municipalities of the country within five (5) years. xxx xxx xxx 1.7. The Lessor shall be selected based on its technical expertise, hardware and software capability, maintenance support, and financial resources. The Development Plan shall have a substantial bearing on the choice of the Lessor. The Lessor shall be a domestic corporation, with at least sixty percent (60%) of its shares owned by Filipino shareholders. xxx xxx xxx The Office of the President, the National Disaster Control Coordinating Council, the Philippine National Police, and the National Bureau of Investigation shall be authorized to use the nationwide telecommunications system of the Facilities Free of Charge. 1.8. Upon expiration of the lease, the Facilities shall be owned by PCSO without any additional consideration. 3 xxx xxx xxx 2.2. OBJECTIVES The objectives of PCSO in leasing the Facilities from a private entity are as follows: xxx xxx xxx 2.2.2. Enable PCSO to operate a nationwide on-line Lottery system at no expense or risk to the government. xxx xxx xxx 2.4. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LESSOR xxx xxx xxx 2.4.2. THE LESSOR The Proponent is expected to furnish and maintain the Facilities, including the personnel needed to operate the computers, the communications network and sales offices under a build-lease basis. The printing of tickets shall be undertaken under the supervision and control of PCSO. The Facilities shall enable PCSO to computerize the entire gaming system. The Proponent is expected to formulate and design consumer-oriented Master Games Plan suited to the marketplace, especially geared to Filipino gaming habits and preferences. In addition, the Master Games Plan is expected to include a Product Plan for each game and explain how each will be introduced into the market. This will be an integral part of the Development Plan which PCSO will require from the Proponent. xxx xxx xxx The Proponent is expected to provide upgrades to modernize the entire gaming system over the life ofthe lease contract. The Proponent is expected to provide technology transfer to PCSO technical personnel. 4 7. GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR PROPONENTS xxx xxx xxx Finally, the Proponent must be able to stand the acid test of proving that it is an entity able to take on the role of responsible maintainer of the on-line lottery system, and able to achieve PSCO's goal of formalizing an on-line lottery system to achieve its mandated objective. 5 xxx xxx xxx 16. DEFINITION OF TERMS Facilities: All capital equipment, computers, terminals, software, nationwide telecommunication network, ticket sales offices, furnishings, and fixtures; printing costs; cost of salaries and wages; advertising and promotion expenses; maintenance costs; expansion and replacement costs; security and insurance, and all other related expenses needed to operate nationwide on-line lottery system. 6 Considering the above citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that the Berjaya Group "undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40%," by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors. On 15 August 1993, PGMC submitted its bid to the PCSO. 7 The bids were evaluated by the Special Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards Committee (SPBAC) for the on-line lottery and its Bid Report was thereafter submitted to the Office of the President. 8 The submission was preceded by complaints by the Committee's Chairperson, Dr. Mita Pardo de Tavera. 9 On 21 October 1993, the Office of the President announced that it had given the respondent PGMC the go-signal to operate the country's on-line lottery system and that the corresponding implementing contract would be submitted not later than 8 November 1993 "for final clearance and approval by the Chief Executive." 10 This announcement was published in the Manila Standard, Philippine Daily Inquirer, and the Manila Times on 29 October 1993. 11 On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to Presidential Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing the setting up to the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. 12 At the meeting of the Committee on Games and Amusements of the Senate on 12 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN reiterated its vigorous opposition to the on-line lottery on account of its immorality and illegality. 13 On 19 November 1993, the media reported that despite the opposition, "Malacaang will push through with the operation of an on-line lottery system nationwide" and that it is actually the respondent PCSO which will operate the lottery while the winning corporate bidders are merely "lessors." 14 On 1 December 1993, KILOSBAYAN requested copies of all documents pertaining to the lottery award from Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr. In his answer of 17 December 1993, the Executive Secretary informed KILOSBAYAN that the requested documents would be duly transmitted before the end of the month. 15. However, on that same date, an agreement denominated as "Contract of Lease" was finally executed by respondent PCSO and respondent PGMC. 16 The President, per the press statement issued by the Office of the President, approved it on 20 December 1993. 17 In view of their materiality and relevance, we quote the following salient provisions of the Contract of Lease:

1. DEFINITIONS The following words and terms shall have the following respective meanings: 1.1 Rental Fee Amount to be paid by PCSO to the LESSOR as compensation for the fulfillment of the obligations of the LESSOR under this Contract, including, but not limited to the lease of the Facilities. xxx xxx xxx 1.3 Facilities All capital equipment, computers, terminals, software (including source codes for the On-Line Lottery application software for the terminals, telecommunications and central systems), technology, intellectual property rights, telecommunications network, and furnishings and fixtures. 1.4 Maintenance and Other Costs All costs and expenses relating to printing, manpower, salaries and wages, advertising and promotion, maintenance, expansion and replacement, security and insurance, and all other related expenses needed to operate an On-Line Lottery System, which shall be for the account of the LESSOR. All expenses relating to the setting-up, operation and maintenance of ticket sales offices of dealers and retailers shall be borne by PCSO's dealers and retailers. 1.5 Development Plan The detailed plan of all games, the marketing thereof, number of players, value of winnings and the logistics required to introduce the games, including the Master Games Plan as approved by PCSO, attached hereto as Annex "A", modified as necessary by the provisions of this Contract. xxx xxx xxx 1.8 Escrow Deposit The proposal deposit in the sum of Three Hundred Million Pesos (P300,000,000.00) submitted by the LESSOR to PCSO pursuant to the requirements of the Request for Proposals. 2. SUBJECT MATTER OF THE LEASE The LESSOR shall build, furnish and maintain at its own expense and risk the Facilities for the On-Line Lottery System of PCSO in the Territory on an exclusive basis. The LESSOR shall bear all Maintenance and Other Costs as defined herein. xxx xxx xxx 3. RENTAL FEE For and in consideration of the performance by the LESSOR of its obligations herein, PCSO shall pay LESSOR a fixed Rental Fee equal to four point nine percent (4.9%) of gross receipts from ticket sales, payable net of taxes required by law to be withheld, on a semi-monthly basis. Goodwill, franchise and similar fees shall belong to PCSO. 4. LEASE PERIOD The period of the lease shall commence ninety (90) days from the date of effectivity of this Contract and shall run for a period of eight (8) years thereafter, unless sooner terminated in accordance with this Contract. 5. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF PCSO AS OPERATOR OF THE ON-LINE LOTTERY SYSTEM PCSO shall be the sole and individual operator of the On-Line Lottery System. Consequently: 5.1 PCSO shall have sole responsibility to decide whether to implement, fully or partially, the Master Games Plan of the LESSOR. PCSO shall have the sole responsibility to determine the time for introducing new games to the market. The Master Games Plan included in Annex "A" hereof is hereby approved by PCSO. 5.2 PCSO shall have control over revenues and receipts of whatever nature from the On-Line Lottery System. After paying the Rental Fee to the LESSOR, PCSO shall have exclusive responsibility to determine the Revenue Allocation Plan; Provided, that the same shall be consistent with the requirement of R.A. No. 1169, as amended, which fixes a prize fund of fifty five percent (55%) on the average. 5.3 PCSO shall have exclusive control over the printing of tickets, including but not limited to the design, text, and contents thereof. 5.4 PCSO shall have sole responsibility over the appointment of dealers or retailers throughout the country. PCSO shall appoint the dealers and retailers in a timely manner with due regard to the implementation timetable of the On-Line Lottery System. Nothing herein shall preclude the LESSOR from recommending dealers or retailers for appointment by PCSO, which shall act on said recommendation within forty-eight (48) hours. 5.5 PCSO shall designate the necessary personnel to monitor and audit the daily performance of the On-Line Lottery System. For this purpose, PCSO designees shall be given, free of charge, suitable and adequate space, furniture and fixtures, in all offices of the LESSOR, including but not limited to its headquarters, alternate site, regional and area offices. 5.6 PCSO shall have the responsibility to resolve, and exclusive jurisdiction over, all matters involving the operation of the OnLine Lottery System not otherwise provided in this Contract. 5.7 PCSO shall promulgate procedural and coordinating rules governing all activities relating to the On-Line Lottery System. 5.8 PCSO will be responsible for the payment of prize monies, commissions to agents and dealers, and taxes and levies (if any) chargeable to the operator of the On-Line Lottery System. The LESSOR will bear all other Maintenance and Other Costs, except as provided in Section 1.4. 5.9 PCSO shall assist the LESSOR in the following: 5.9.1 Work permits for the LESSOR's staff; 5.9.2 Approvals for importation of the Facilities; 5.9.3 Approvals and consents for the On-Line Lottery System; and 5.9.4 Business and premises licenses for all offices of the LESSOR and licenses for the telecommunications network. 5.10 In the event that PCSO shall pre-terminate this Contract or suspend the operation of the On-Line Lottery System, in breach of this Contract and through no fault of the LESSOR, PCSO shall promptly, and in any event not later than sixty (60) days, reimburse the LESSOR the amount of its total investment cost associated with the On-Line Lottery System, including but not limited to the cost of the Facilities, and further compensate the LESSOR for loss of expected net profit after tax, computed over the unexpired term of the lease. 6. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LESSOR The LESSOR is one of not more than three (3) lessors of similar facilities for the nationwide On-Line Lottery System of PCSO. It is understood that the rights of the LESSOR are primarily those of a lessor of the Facilities, and consequently, all rights involving the business aspects of the use of the Facilities are within the jurisdiction of PCSO. During the term of the lease, the LESSOR shall.

6.1 Maintain and preserve its corporate existence, rights and privileges, and conduct its business in an orderly, efficient, and customary manner. 6.2 Maintain insurance coverage with insurers acceptable to PCSO on all Facilities. 6.3 Comply with all laws, statues, rules and regulations, orders and directives, obligations and duties by which it is legally bound. 6.4 Duly pay and discharge all taxes, assessments and government charges now and hereafter imposed of whatever nature that may be legally levied upon it. 6.5 Keep all the Facilities in fail safe condition and, if necessary, upgrade, replace and improve the Facilities from time to time as new technology develops, in order to make the On-Line Lottery System more cost-effective and/or competitive, and as may be required by PCSO shall not impose such requirements unreasonably nor arbitrarily. 6.6 Provide PCSO with management terminals which will allow real-time monitoring of the On-Line Lottery System. 6.7 Upon effectivity of this Contract, commence the training of PCSO and other local personnel and the transfer of technology and expertise, such that at the end of the term of this Contract, PCSO will be able to effectively take-over the Facilities and efficiently operate the On-Line Lottery System. 6.8 Undertake a positive advertising and promotions campaign for both institutional and product lines without engaging in negative advertising against other lessors. 6.9 Bear all expenses and risks relating to the Facilities including, but not limited to, Maintenance and Other Costs and: xxx xxx xxx 6.10 Bear all risks if the revenues from ticket sales, on an annualized basis, are insufficient to pay the entire prize money. 6.11 Be, and is hereby, authorized to collect and retain for its own account, a security deposit from dealers and retailers, in an amount determined with the approval of PCSO, in respect of equipment supplied by the LESSOR. PCSO's approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. xxx xxx xxx 6.12 Comply with procedural and coordinating rules issued by PCSO. 7. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES The LESSOR represents and warrants that: 7.1 The LESSOR is corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, at least sixty percent (60%) of the outstanding capital stock of which is owned by Filipino shareholders. The minimum required Filipino equity participation shall not be impaired through voluntary or involuntary transfer, disposition, or sale of shares of stock by the present stockholders. 7.2 The LESSOR and its Affiliates have the full corporate and legal power and authority to own and operate their properties and to carry on their business in the place where such properties are now or may be conducted. . . . 7.3 The LESSOR has or has access to all the financing and funding requirements to promptly and effectively carry out the terms of this Contract. . . . 7.4 The LESSOR has or has access to all the managerial and technical expertise to promptly and effectively carry out the terms of this Contract. . . . xxx xxx xxx 10. TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK The LESSOR shall establish a telecommunications network that will connect all municipalities and cities in the Territory in accordance with, at the LESSOR's option, either of the LESSOR's proposals (or a combinations of both such proposals) attached hereto as Annex "B," and under the following PCSO schedule: xxx xxx xxx PCSO may, at its option, require the LESSOR to establish the telecommunications network in accordance with the above Timetable in provinces where the LESSOR has not yet installed terminals. Provided, that such provinces have existing nodes. Once a municipality or city is serviced by land lines of a licensed public telephone company, and such lines are connected to Metro Manila, then the obligation of the LESSOR to connect such municipality or city through a telecommunications network shall cease with respect to such municipality or city. The voice facility will cover the four offices of the Office of the President, National Disaster Control Coordinating Council, Philippine National Police and the National Bureau of Investigation, and each city and municipality in the Territory except Metro Manila, and those cities and municipalities which have easy telephone access from these four offices. Voice calls from the four offices shall be transmitted via radio or VSAT to the remote municipalities which will be connected to this voice facility through wired network or by radio. The facility shall be designed to handle four private conversations at any one time. xxx xxx xxx 13. STOCK DISPERSAL PLAN Within two (2) years from the effectivity of this Contract, the LESSOR shall cause itself to be listed in the local stock exchange and offer at least twenty five percent (25%) of its equity to the public. 14. NON-COMPETITION The LESSOR shall not, directly or indirectly, undertake any activity or business in competition with or adverse to the On-Line Lottery System of PCSO unless it obtains the latter's prior written consent thereto. 15. HOLD HARMLESS CLAUSE 15.1 The LESSOR shall at all times protect and defend, at its cost and expense, PCSO from and against any and all liabilities and claims for damages and/or suits for or by reason of any deaths of, or any injury or injuries to any person or persons, or damages to property of any kind whatsoever, caused by the LESSOR, its subcontractors, its authorized agents or employees, from any cause or causes whatsoever. 15.2 The LESSOR hereby covenants and agrees to indemnify and hold PCSO harmless from all liabilities, charges, expenses (including reasonable counsel fees) and costs on account of or by reason of any such death or deaths, injury or injuries, liabilities, claims, suits or losses caused by the LESSOR's fault or negligence. 15.3 The LESSOR shall at all times protect and defend, at its own cost and expense, its title to the facilities and PCSO's interest therein from and against any and all claims for the duration of the Contract until transfer to PCSO of ownership of the serviceable Facilities.

16. SECURITY 16.1 To ensure faithful compliance by the LESSOR with the terms of the Contract, the LESSOR shall secure a Performance Bond from a reputable insurance company or companies acceptable to PCSO. 16.2 The Performance Bond shall be in the initial amount of Three Hundred Million Pesos (P300,000,000.00), to its U.S. dollar equivalent, and shall be renewed to cover the duration of the Contract. However, the Performance Bond shall be reduced proportionately to the percentage of unencumbered terminals installed; Provided, that the Performance Bond shall in no case be less than One Hundred Fifty Million Pesos (P150,000,000.00). 16.3 The LESSOR may at its option maintain its Escrow Deposit as the Performance Bond. . . . 17. PENALTIES 17.1 Except as may be provided in Section 17.2, should the LESSOR fail to take remedial measures within seven (7) days, and rectify the breach within thirty (30) days, from written notice by PCSO of any wilfull or grossly negligent violation of the material terms and conditions of this Contract, all unencumbered Facilities shall automatically become the property of PCSO without consideration and without need for further notice or demand by PCSO. The Performance Bond shall likewise be forfeited in favor of PCSO. 17.2 Should the LESSOR fail to comply with the terms of the Timetables provided in Section 9 and 10, it shall be subject to an initial Penalty of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), per city or municipality per every month of delay; Provided, that the Penalty shall increase, every ninety (90) days, by the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) per city or municipality per month, whilst shall failure to comply persists. The penalty shall be deducted by PCSO from the rental fee. xxx xxx xxx 20. OWNERSHIP OF THE FACILITIES After expiration of the term of the lease as provided in Section 4, the Facilities directly required for the On-Line Lottery System mentioned in Section 1.3 shall automatically belong in full ownership to PCSO without any further consideration other than the Rental Fees already paid during the effectivity of the lease. 21. TERMINATION OF THE LEASE PCSO may terminate this Contract for any breach of the material provisions of this Contract, including the following: 21.1 The LESSOR is insolvent or bankrupt or unable to pay its debts, stops or suspends or threatens to stop or suspend payment of all or a material part of its debts, or proposes or makes a general assignment or an arrangement or compositions with or for the benefit of its creditors; or 21.2 An order is made or an effective resolution passed for the winding up or dissolution of the LESSOR or when it ceases or threatens to cease to carry on all or a material part of its operations or business; or 21.3 Any material statement, representation or warranty made or furnished by the LESSOR proved to be materially false or misleading; said termination to take effect upon receipt of written notice of termination by the LESSOR and failure to take remedial action within seven (7) days and cure or remedy the same within thirty (30) days from notice. Any suspension, cancellation or termination of this Contract shall not relieve the LESSOR of any liability that may have already accrued hereunder. xxx xxx xxx Considering the denial by the Office of the President of its protest and the statement of Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that "only a court injunction can stop Malacaang," and the imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease in February 1994, KILOSBAYAN, with its copetitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition. In support of the petition, the petitioners claim that: . . . X X THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH RESPONDENTS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND/OR ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, AND THE PCSO GRAVELY ABUSE[D] THEIR DISCRETION AND/OR FUNCTIONS TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION AND/OR AUTHORITY IN RESPECTIVELY: (A) APPROVING THE AWARD OF THE CONTRACT TO, AND (B) ENTERING INTO THE SO-CALLED "CONTRACT OF LEASE" WITH, RESPONDENT PGMC FOR THE INSTALLATION, ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF THE ON-LINE LOTTERY AND TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS REQUIRED AND/OR AUTHORIZED UNDER THE SAID CONTRACT, CONSIDERING THAT: a) Under Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO, the PCSO is prohibited from holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity"; b) Under Act No. 3846 and established jurisprudence, a Congressional franchise is required before any person may be allowed to establish and operate said telecommunications system; c) Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, a less than 60% Filipino-owned and/or controlled corporation, like the PGMC, is disqualified from operating a public service, like the said telecommunications system; and d) Respondent PGMC is not authorized by its charter and under the Foreign Investment Act (R.A. No. 7042) to install, establish and operate the on-line lotto and telecommunications systems. 18 Petitioners submit that the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the on-line lottery system in "collaboration" or "association" with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic." Even granting arguendo that a lease of facilities is not within the contemplation of "collaboration" or "association," an analysis, however, of the Contract of Lease clearly shows that there is a "collaboration, association, or joint venture between respondents PCSO and PGMC in the holding of the On-Line Lottery System," and that there are terms and conditions of the Contract "showing that respondent PGMC is the actual lotto operator and not respondent PCSO." 19 The petitioners also point out that paragraph 10 of the Contract of Lease requires or authorizes PGMC to establish a telecommunications network that will connect all the municipalities and cities in the territory. However, PGMC cannot do that because it has no franchise from Congress to construct, install, establish, or operate the network pursuant to Section 1 of Act No. 3846, as amended. Moreover, PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or controlled corporation and cannot, therefore, be granted a franchise for that purpose because of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore,

since "the subscribed foreign capital" of the PGMC "comes to about 75%, as shown by paragraph EIGHT of its Articles of Incorporation," it cannot lawfully enter into the contract in question because all forms of gambling and lottery is one of them are included in the so-called foreign investments negative list under the Foreign Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) where only up to 40% foreign capital is allowed. 20 Finally, the petitioners insist that the Articles of Incorporation of PGMC do not authorize it to establish and operate an on-line lottery and telecommunications systems. 21 Accordingly, the petitioners pray that we issue a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction commanding the respondents or any person acting in their places or upon their instructions to cease and desist from implementing the challenged Contract of Lease and, after hearing the merits of the petition, that we render judgment declaring the Contract of Lease void and without effect and making the injunction permanent. 22 We required the respondents to comment on the petition. In its Comment filed on 1 March 1994, private respondent PGMC asserts that "(1) [it] is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work, (i.e., the building and maintenance of a lottery system to be used by PCSO in the operation of its lottery franchise); and (2) as such independent contractor, PGMC is not a co-operator of the lottery franchise with PCSO, nor is PCSO sharing its franchise, 'in collaboration, association or joint venture' with PGMC as such statutory limitation is viewed from the context, intent, and spirit of Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa 42." It further claims that as an independent contractor for a piece of work, it is neither engaged in "gambling" nor in "public service" relative to the telecommunications network, which the petitioners even consider as an "indispensable requirement" of an on-line lottery system. Finally, it states that the execution and implementation of the contract does not violate the Constitution and the laws; that the issue on the "morality" of the lottery franchise granted to the PCSO is political and not judicial or legal, which should be ventilated in another forum; and that the "petitioners do not appear to have the legal standing or real interest in the subject contract and in obtaining the reliefs sought." 23 In their Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, public respondents Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona, and the PCSO maintain that the contract of lease in question does not violate Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and that the petitioner's interpretation of the phrase "in collaboration, association or joint venture" in Section 1 is "much too narrow, strained and utterly devoid of logic" for it "ignores the reality that PCSO, as a corporate entity, is vested with the basic and essential prerogative to enter into all kinds of transactions or contracts as may be necessary for the attainment of its purposes and objectives." What the PCSO charter "seeks to prohibit is that arrangement akin to a "joint venture" or partnership where there is "community of interest in the business, sharing of profits and losses, and a mutual right of control," a characteristic which does not obtain in a contract of lease." With respect to the challenged Contract of Lease, the "role of PGMC is limited to that of a lessor of the facilities" for the on-line lottery system; in "strict technical and legal sense," said contract "can be categorized as a contract for a piece of work as defined in Articles 1467, 1713 and 1644 of the Civil Code." They further claim that the establishment of the telecommunications system stipulated in the Contract of Lease does not require a congressional franchise because PGMC will not operate a public utility; moreover, PGMC's "establishment of a telecommunications system is not intended to establish a telecommunications business," and it has been held that where the facilities are operated "not for business purposes but for its own use," a legislative franchise is not required before a certificate of public convenience can be granted. 24 Even granting arguendo that PGMC is a public utility, pursuant to Albano S. Reyes, 25 "it can establish a telecommunications system even without a legislative franchise because not every public utility is required to secure a legislative franchise before it could establish, maintain, and operate the service"; and, in any case, "PGMC's establishment of the telecommunications system stipulated in its contract of lease with PCSO falls within the exceptions under Section 1 of Act No. 3846 where a legislative franchise is not necessary for the establishment of radio stations." They also argue that the contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that the Articles of Incorporation of PGMC authorize it to enter into the Contract of Lease; and that the issues of "wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial review." Finally, the public respondents allege that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit, citing our resolution in Valmonte vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. 26 Several parties filed motions to intervene as petitioners in this case, 27 but only the motion of Senators Alberto Romulo, Arturo Tolentino, Francisco Tatad, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Vicente Sotto III, John Osmea, Ramon Revilla, and Jose Lina 28 was granted, and the respondents were required to comment on their petition in intervention, which the public respondents and PGMC did. In the meantime, the petitioners filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on 29 March 1994 a petition against PGMC for the nullification of the latter's General Information Sheets. That case, however, has no bearing in this petition. On 11 April 1994, we heard the parties in oral arguments. Thereafter, we resolved to consider the matter submitted for resolution and pending resolution of the major issues in this case, to issue a temporary restraining order commanding the respondents or any person acting in their place or upon their instructions to cease and desist from implementing the challenged Contract of Lease. In the deliberation on this case on 26 April 1994, we resolved to consider only these issues: (a) the locus standi of the petitioners, and (b) the legality and validity of the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign." On the first issue, seven Justices voted to sustain the locus standi of the petitioners, while six voted not to. On the second issue, the seven Justices were of the opinion that the Contract of Lease violates the exception to Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid and contrary to law. The six Justices stated that they wished to express no opinion thereon in view of their stand on the first issue. The Chief Justice took no part because one of the Directors of the PCSO is his brother-in-law. This case was then assigned to this ponente for the writing of the opinion of the Court. The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the petitioners should, indeed, be resolved in their favor. A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, 29 this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821)." Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained," 30 or that it "enjoys an open discretion to entertain the same or not." 31 In De La Llana vs. Alba, 32 this Court declared: 1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge de la Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion in People vs. Vera [65 Phil. 56 (1937)]. Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement [Ibid, 89]. The other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered as devoid of "any personal and substantial interest" on the matter. There is relevance to this excerpt from a separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections [L-40004, January 31, 1975, 62

SCRA 275]: "Then there is the attack on the standing of petitioners, as vindicating at most what they consider a public right and not protecting their rights as individuals. This is to conjure the specter of the public right dogma as an inhibition to parties intent on keeping public officials staying on the path of constitutionalism. As was so well put by Jaffe; "The protection of private rights is an essential constituent of public interest and, conversely, without a well-ordered state there could be no enforcement of private rights. Private and public interests are, both in a substantive and procedural sense, aspects of the totality of the legal order." Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue has been amply demonstrated. There would be a retreat from the liberal approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, foreshadowed by the very decision of People v. Vera where the doctrine was first fully discussed, if we act differently now. I do not think we are prepared to take that step. Respondents, however, would hard back to the American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v. Frothingham, with their claim that what petitioners possess "is an interest which is shared in common by other people and is comparatively so minute and indeterminate as to afford any basis and assurance that the judicial process can act on it." That is to speak in the language of a bygone era, even in the United States. For as Chief Justice Warren clearly pointed out in the later case of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set up if not breached has definitely been lowered. In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan, 33 reiterated in Basco vs. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 34 this Court stated: Objections to taxpayers' suits for lack of sufficient personality standing or interest are, however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, this Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions. and in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 35 it declared: With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, we hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. [ Ex Parte Levitt, 303 US 633]. And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised. In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were invoking only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objective that they were not proper parties and ruled that the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. We have since then applied this exception in many other cases. (Emphasis supplied) In Daza vs. Singson, 36 this Court once more said: . . . For another, we have early as in the Emergency Powers Cases that where serious constitutional questions are involved, "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." The same policy has since then been consistently followed by the Court, as in Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections [21 SCRA 774] . . . The Federal Supreme Court of the United States of America has also expressed its discretionary power to liberalize the rule on locus standi. In United States vs. Federal Power Commission and Virginia Rea Association vs. Federal Power Commission, 37 it held: We hold that petitioners have standing. Differences of view, however, preclude a single opinion of the Court as to both petitioners. It would not further clarification of this complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction, the solution of whose problems is in any event more or less determined by the specific circumstances of individual situations, to set out the divergent grounds in support of standing in these cases. In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this Court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities. Among such cases were those assailing the constitutionality of (a) R.A. No. 3836 insofar as it allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives and to elective officials of both Houses of Congress; 38 (b) Executive Order No. 284, issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on 25 July 1987, which allowed members of the cabinet, their undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions; 39 (c) the automatic appropriation for debt service in the General Appropriations Act; 40 (d) R.A. No. 7056 on the holding of desynchronized elections; 41 (d) R.A. No. 1869 (the charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation) on the ground that it is contrary to morals, public policy, and order; 42 and (f) R.A. No. 6975, establishing the Philippine National Police. 43 Other cases where we have followed a liberal policy regarding locus standi include those attacking the validity or legality of (a) an order allowing the importation of rice in the light of the prohibition imposed by R.A. No. 3452; 44 (b) P.D. Nos. 991 and 1033 insofar as they proposed amendments to the Constitution and P.D. No. 1031 insofar as it directed the COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976; 45 (c) the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan; 46 (d) the approval without hearing by the Board of Investments of the amended application of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation to transfer the site of its plant from Bataan to Batangas and the validity of such transfer and the shift of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas; 47 (e) the decisions, orders, rulings, and resolutions of the Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Commissioner of Customs, and the Fiscal Incentives Review Board exempting the National Power Corporation from indirect tax and duties; 48 (f) the orders of the Energy Regulatory Board of 5 and 6 December 1990 on the ground that the hearings conducted on the second provisional increase in oil prices did not allow the petitioner substantial cross-examination; 49 (g) Executive Order No. 478 which levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter or P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products; 50 (h) resolutions of the Commission on Elections concerning the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of Sanggunians; 51 and (i) memorandum orders issued by a Mayor affecting the Chief of Police of Pasay City. 52 In the 1975 case of Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, 53 this Court, despite its unequivocal ruling that the petitioners therein had no personality to file the petition, resolved nevertheless to pass upon the issues raised because of the far-reaching implications of the petition. We did no less in De Guia vs. COMELEC 54 where, although we declared that De Guia "does not appear to have locus standi, a standing in law, a personal or substantial

interest," we brushed aside the procedural infirmity "considering the importance of the issue involved, concerning as it does the political exercise of qualified voters affected by the apportionment, and petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and violation of the Constitution by respondent." We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of. And now on the substantive issue. Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amending by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign." Section 1 provides: Sec. 1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, hereinafter designated the Office, shall be the principal government agency for raising and providing for funds for health programs, medical assistance and services and charities of national character, and as such shall have the general powers conferred in section thirteen of Act Numbered One thousand four hundred fifty-nine, as amended, and shall have the authority: A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities, in such frequency and manner, as shall be determined, and subject to such rules and regulations as shall be promulgated by the Board of Directors. B. Subject to the approval of the Minister of Human Settlements, to engage in health and welfare-related investments, programs, projects and activities which may be profit-oriented, by itself or in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign, except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A), for the purpose of providing for permanent and continuing sources of funds for health programs, including the expansion of existing ones, medical assistance and services, and/or charitable grants: Provided, That such investment will not compete with the private sector in areas where investments are adequate as may be determined by the National Economic and Development Authority. (emphasis supplied) The language of the section is indisputably clear that with respect to its franchise or privilege "to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities," the PCSO cannot exercise it "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with any other party. This is the unequivocal meaning and import of the phrase "except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)," namely, "charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities." B.P. Blg. 42 originated from Parliamentary Bill No. 622, which was covered by Committee Report No. 103 as reported out by the Committee on Socio-Economic Planning and Development of the Interim Batasang Pambansa. The original text of paragraph B, Section 1 of Parliamentary Bill No. 622 reads as follows: To engage in any and all investments and related profit-oriented projects or programs and activities by itself or in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign, for the main purpose of raising funds for health and medical assistance and services and charitable grants. 55 During the period of committee amendments, the Committee on Socio-Economic Planning and Development, through Assemblyman Ronaldo B. Zamora, introduced an amendment by substitution to the said paragraph B such that, as amended, it should read as follows: Subject to the approval of the Minister of Human Settlements, to engage in health-oriented investments, programs, projects and activities which may be profit- oriented, by itself or in collaboration, association, or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign, for the purpose of providing for permanent and continuing sources of funds for health programs, including the expansion of existing ones, medical assistance and services and/or charitable grants. 56 Before the motion of Assemblyman Zamora for the approval of the amendment could be acted upon, Assemblyman Davide introduced an amendment to the amendment: MR. DAVIDE. Mr. Speaker. THE SPEAKER. The gentleman from Cebu is recognized. MR. DAVIDE. May I introduce an amendment to the committee amendment? The amendment would be to insert after "foreign" in the amendment just read the following: EXCEPT FOR THE ACTIVITY IN LETTER (A) ABOVE. When it is joint venture or in collaboration with any entity such collaboration or joint venture must not include activity activity letter (a) which is the holding and conducting of sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar acts. MR. ZAMORA. We accept the amendment, Mr. Speaker. MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Speaker. THE SPEAKER. Is there any objection to the amendment? (Silence) The amendment, as amended, is approved. 57 Further amendments to paragraph B were introduced and approved. When Assemblyman Zamora read the final text of paragraph B as further amended, the earlier approved amendment of Assemblyman Davide became "EXCEPT FOR THE ACTIVITIES MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH (A)"; and by virtue of the amendment introduced by Assemblyman Emmanuel Pelaez, the word PRECEDING was inserted before PARAGRAPH. Assemblyman Pelaez introduced other amendments. Thereafter, the new paragraph B was approved. 58 This is now paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42. No interpretation of the said provision to relax or circumvent the prohibition can be allowed since the privilege to hold or conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, or other similar activities is a franchise granted by the legislature to the PCSO. It is a settled rule that "in all grants by the government to individuals or corporations of rights, privileges and franchises, the words are to be taken most strongly against the grantee .... [o]ne

who claims a franchise or privilege in derogation of the common rights of the public must prove his title thereto by a grant which is clearly and definitely expressed, and he cannot enlarge it by equivocal or doubtful provisions or by probable inferences. Whatever is not unequivocally granted is withheld. Nothing passes by mere implication." 59 In short then, by the exception explicitly made in paragraph B, Section 1 of its charter, the PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of collaboration, association or joint venture. Neither can it assign, transfer, or lease such franchise. It has been said that "the rights and privileges conferred under a franchise may, without doubt, be assigned or transferred when the grant is to the grantee and assigns, or is authorized by statute. On the other hand, the right of transfer or assignment may be restricted by statute or the constitution, or be made subject to the approval of the grantor or a governmental agency, such as a public utilities commission, exception that an existing right of assignment cannot be impaired by subsequent legislation." 60 It may also be pointed out that the franchise granted to the PCSO to hold and conduct lotteries allows it to hold and conduct a species of gambling. It is settled that "a statute which authorizes the carrying on of a gambling activity or business should be strictly construed and every reasonable doubt so resolved as to limit the powers and rights claimed under its authority." 61 Does the challenged Contract of Lease violate or contravene the exception in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with" another? We agree with the petitioners that it does, notwithstanding its denomination or designation as a (Contract of Lease). We are neither convinced nor moved or fazed by the insistence and forceful arguments of the PGMC that it does not because in reality it is only an independent contractor for a piece of work, i.e., the building and maintenance of a lottery system to be used by the PCSO in the operation of its lottery franchise. Whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument. In order to give life or effect to an instrument, it is essential to look to the intention of the individual who executed it. 62 And, pursuant to Article 1371 of the Civil Code, "to determine the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered." To put it more bluntly, no one should be deceived by the title or designation of a contract. A careful analysis and evaluation of the provisions of the contract and a consideration of the contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and PGMC indubitably disclose that the contract is not in reality a contract of lease under which the PGMC is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work, but one where the statutorily proscribed collaboration or association, in the least, or joint venture, at the most, exists between the contracting parties. Collaboration is defined as the acts of working together in a joint project. 63 Association means the act of a number of persons in uniting together for some special purpose or business. 64 Joint venture is defined as an association of persons or companies jointly undertaking some commercial enterprise; generally all contribute assets and share risks. It requires a community of interest in the performance of the subject matter, a right to direct and govern the policy in connection therewith, and duty, which may be altered by agreement to share both in profit and losses. 65 The contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and the PGMC reveal that the PCSO had neither funds of its own nor the expertise to operate and manage an on-line lottery system, and that although it wished to have the system, it would have it "at no expense or risks to the government." Because of these serious constraints and unwillingness to bear expenses and assume risks, the PCSO was candid enough to state in its RFP that it is seeking for "a suitable contractor which shall build, at its own expense, all the facilities needed to operate and maintain" the system; exclusively bear "all capital, operating expenses and expansion expenses and risks"; and submit "a comprehensive nationwide lottery development plan . . . which will include the game, the marketing of the games, and the logistics to introduce the game to all the cities and municipalities of the country within five (5) years"; and that the operation of the on-line lottery system should be "at no expense or risk to the government" meaning itself, since it is a government-owned and controlled agency. The facilities referred to means "all capital equipment, computers, terminals, software, nationwide telecommunications network, ticket sales offices, furnishings and fixtures, printing costs, costs of salaries and wages, advertising and promotions expenses, maintenance costs, expansion and replacement costs, security and insurance, and all other related expenses needed to operate a nationwide on-line lottery system." In short, the only contribution the PCSO would have is its franchise or authority to operate the on-line lottery system; with the rest, including the risks of the business, being borne by the proponent or bidder. It could be for this reason that it warned that "the proponent must be able to stand to the acid test of proving that it is an entity able to take on the role of responsible maintainer of the on-line lottery system." The PCSO, however, makes it clear in its RFP that the proponent can propose a period of the contract which shall not exceed fifteen years, during which time it is assured of a "rental" which shall not exceed 12% of gross receipts. As admitted by the PGMC, upon learning of the PCSO's decision, the Berjaya Group Berhad, with its affiliates, wanted to offer its services and resources to the PCSO. Forthwith, it organized the PGMC as "a medium through which the technical and management services required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO." 66 Undoubtedly, then, the Berjaya Group Berhad knew all along that in connection with an on-line lottery system, the PCSO had nothing but its franchise, which it solemnly guaranteed it had in the General Information of the RFP. 67 Howsoever viewed then, from the very inception, the PCSO and the PGMC mutually understood that any arrangement between them would necessarily leave to the PGMC the technical, operations, and management aspects of the on-line lottery system while the PCSO would, primarily, provide the franchise. The words Gaming and Management in the corporate name of respondent Philippine Gaming Management Corporation could not have been conceived just for euphemistic purposes. Of course, the RFP cannot substitute for the Contract of Lease which was subsequently executed by the PCSO and the PGMC. Nevertheless, the Contract of Lease incorporates their intention and understanding. The so-called Contract of Lease is not, therefore, what it purports to be. Its denomination as such is a crafty device, carefully conceived, to provide a built-in defense in the event that the agreement is questioned as violative of the exception in Section 1 (B) of the PCSO's charter. The acuity or skill of its draftsmen to accomplish that purpose easily manifests itself in the Contract of Lease. It is outstanding for its careful and meticulous drafting designed to give an immediate impression that it is a contract of lease. Yet, woven therein are provisions which negate its title and betray the true intention of the parties to be in or to have a joint venture for a period of eight years in the operation and maintenance of the on-line lottery system. Consistent with the above observations on the RFP, the PCSO has only its franchise to offer, while the PGMC represents and warrants that it has access to all managerial and technical expertise to promptly and effectively carry out the terms of the contract. And, for a period of eight years, the PGMC is under obligation to keep all the Facilities in safe condition and if necessary, upgrade, replace, and improve them from time to time as new technology develops to make the on-line lottery system more cost-effective and competitive; exclusively bear all costs and expenses relating to the printing, manpower, salaries and wages, advertising and promotion, maintenance, expansion and replacement, security and insurance, and all other related expenses needed to operate the on-line lottery system; undertake a positive advertising and promotions campaign for both institutional and product lines without engaging in negative advertising against other lessors; bear the salaries and related costs of skilled and qualified personnel for administrative and technical operations; comply with procedural and coordinating rules issued by the PCSO; and to train PCSO and other local personnel and to effect the transfer of technology and other expertise, such that at the end of the term of the contract, the PCSO will be able to

effectively take over the Facilities and efficiently operate the on-line lottery system. The latter simply means that, indeed, the managers, technicians or employees who shall operate the on-line lottery system are not managers, technicians or employees of the PCSO, but of the PGMC and that it is only after the expiration of the contract that the PCSO will operate the system. After eight years, the PCSO would automatically become the owner of the Facilities without any other further consideration. For these reasons, too, the PGMC has the initial prerogative to prepare the detailed plan of all games and the marketing thereof, and determine the number of players, value of winnings, and the logistics required to introduce the games, including the Master Games Plan. Of course, the PCSO has the reserved authority to disapprove them. 68 And, while the PCSO has the sole responsibility over the appointment of dealers and retailers throughout the country, the PGMC may, nevertheless, recommend for appointment dealers and retailers which shall be acted upon by the PCSO within forty-eight hours and collect and retain, for its own account, a security deposit from dealers and retailers in respect of equipment supplied by it. This joint venture is further established by the following: (a) Rent is defined in the lease contract as the amount to be paid to the PGMC as compensation for the fulfillment of its obligations under the contract, including, but not limited to the lease of the Facilities. However, this rent is not actually a fixed amount. Although it is stated to be 4.9% of gross receipts from ticket sales, payable net of taxes required by law to be withheld, it may be drastically reduced or, in extreme cases, nothing may be due or demandable at all because the PGMC binds itself to "bear all risks if the revenue from the ticket sales, on an annualized basis, are insufficient to pay the entire prize money." This risk-bearing provision is unusual in a lessor-lessee relationship, but inherent in a joint venture. (b) In the event of pre-termination of the contract by the PCSO, or its suspension of operation of the on-line lottery system in breach of the contract and through no fault of the PGMC, the PCSO binds itself "to promptly, and in any event not later than sixty (60) days, reimburse the Lessor the amount of its total investment cost associated with the On-Line Lottery System, including but not limited to the cost of the Facilities, and further compensate the LESSOR for loss of expected net profit after tax, computed over the unexpired term of the lease." If the contract were indeed one of lease, the payment of the expected profits or rentals for the unexpired portion of the term of the contract would be enough. (c) The PGMC cannot "directly or indirectly undertake any activity or business in competition with or adverse to the On-Line Lottery System of PCSO unless it obtains the latter's prior written consent." If the PGMC is engaged in the business of leasing equipment and technology for an on-line lottery system, we fail to see any acceptable reason why it should allow a restriction on the pursuit of such business. (d) The PGMC shall provide the PCSO the audited Annual Report sent to its stockholders, and within two years from the effectivity of the contract, cause itself to be listed in the local stock exchange and offer at least 25% of its equity to the public. If the PGMC is merely a lessor, this imposition is unreasonable and whimsical, and could only be tied up to the fact that the PGMC will actually operate and manage the system; hence, increasing public participation in the corporation would enhance public interest. (e) The PGMC shall put up an Escrow Deposit of P300,000,000.00 pursuant to the requirements of the RFP, which it may, at its option, maintain as its initial performance bond required to ensure its faithful compliance with the terms of the contract. (f) The PCSO shall designate the necessary personnel to monitor and audit the daily performance of the on-line lottery system; and promulgate procedural and coordinating rules governing all activities relating to the on-line lottery system. The first further confirms that it is the PGMC which will operate the system and the PCSO may, for the protection of its interest, monitor and audit the daily performance of the system. The second admits the coordinating and cooperative powers and functions of the parties. (g) The PCSO may validly terminate the contract if the PGMC becomes insolvent or bankrupt or is unable to pay its debts, or if it stops or suspends or threatens to stop or suspend payment of all or a material part of its debts. All of the foregoing unmistakably confirm the indispensable role of the PGMC in the pursuit, operation, conduct, and management of the On-Line Lottery System. They exhibit and demonstrate the parties' indivisible community of interest in the conception, birth and growth of the on-line lottery, and, above all, in its profits, with each having a right in the formulation and implementation of policies related to the business and sharing, as well, in the losses with the PGMC bearing the greatest burden because of its assumption of expenses and risks, and the PCSO the least, because of its confessed unwillingness to bear expenses and risks. In a manner of speaking, each is wed to the other for better or for worse. In the final analysis, however, in the light of the PCSO's RFP and the above highlighted provisions, as well as the "Hold Harmless Clause" of the Contract of Lease, it is even safe to conclude that the actual lessor in this case is the PCSO and the subject matter thereof is its franchise to hold and conduct lotteries since it is, in reality, the PGMC which operates and manages the on-line lottery system for a period of eight years. We thus declare that the challenged Contract of Lease violates the exception provided for in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid for being contrary to law. This conclusion renders unnecessary further discussion on the other issues raised by the petitioners. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the challenged Contract of Lease executed on 17 December 1993 by respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and respondent Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) is hereby DECLARED contrary to law and invalid. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 11 April 1994 is hereby MADE PERMANENT. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Regalado, Romero and Bellosillo, JJ., concur. Narvasa, C.J., took no part.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000] INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents. DECISION KAPUNAN, J.: At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (th e Marines) to join the Philippine National Police (the PNP) in visibility patrols around the metropoli s. In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the AFP), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local

Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000xxxi[1] (the LOI) which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.xxxii[2] Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila. Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief.xxxiii[3] In the Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols.xxxiv[4] The President further stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary.xxxv[5] Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.xxxvi[6] Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved.xxxvii[7] The LOI explains the concept of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols as follows: xxx 2. PURPOSE: The Joint Implementing Police Visibility Patrols between the PNP NCRPO and the Philippine Marines partnership in the conduct of visibility patrols in Metro Manila for the suppression of crime prevention and other serious threats to national security. 3. SITUATION: Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated not only by ordinary criminals but also by organized syndicates whose members include active and former police/military personnel whose training, skill, discipline and firepower prove well-above the present capability of the local police alone to handle. The deployment of a joint PNP NCRPO-Philippine Marines in the conduct of police visibility patrol in urban areas will reduce the incidence of crimes specially those perpetrated by active or former police/military personnel. 4. MISSION: The PNP NCRPO will organize a provisional Task Force to conduct joint NCRPO-PM visibility patrols to keep Metro Manila streets crime-free, through a sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/Military personnel. 5. CONCEPT IN JOINT VISIBILITY PATROL OPERATIONS: a. The visibility patrols shall be conducted jointly by the NCRPO [National Capital Regional Police Office] and the Philippine Marines to curb criminality in Metro Manila and to preserve the internal security of the state against insurgents and other serious threat to national security, although the primary responsibility over Internal Security Operations still rests upon the AFP. b. The principle of integration of efforts shall be applied to eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes perpetrated by organized crime syndicates operating in Metro Manila. This concept requires the military and police to work cohesively and unify efforts to ensure a focused, effective and holistic approach in addressing crime prevention. Along this line, the role of the military and police aside from neutralizing crime syndicates is to bring a wholesome atmosphere wherein delivery of basic services to the people and development is achieved. Hand-in-hand with this joint NCRPOPhilippine Marines visibility patrols, local Police Units are responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in their locality. c. To ensure the effective implementation of this project, a provisional Task Force TULUNGAN shall be organized to provide the mechanism, structure, and procedures for the integrated planning, coordinating, monitoring and assessing the security situation. xxx.xxxviii[8] The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM City), Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic Airport.xxxix[9] On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the IBP) filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that: I THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IN THAT: A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY REMOTELY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION; B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION; C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO PERFORM THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT. II IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY MAKING THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.xl[10] Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement. Without granting due course to the petition, the Court in a Resolution,xli[11] dated 25 January 2000, required the Solicitor General to file his Comment on the petition. On 8 February 2000, the Solicitor General submitted his Comment. The Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of the act of the President in deploying the Marines, contending, among others, that petitioner has no legal standing; that the question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same involves a political question; that the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution. The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing; (2) Whether or not the Pres idents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review; and, (3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP. The petition has no merit. First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to raise the issues in the petition. Second, the President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution.

The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit: Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.xlii[12] The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.xliii[13] The term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.xliv[14] The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.xlv[15] In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed militarization of law enforc ement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed injury not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy. Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved.xlvi[16] In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.xlvii[17] Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.xlviii[18] In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.
The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.

In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual determination of the President of the necessity of calling the armed forces, particularly the Marines, to aid the PNP in visibility patrols. In this regard, the IBP admits that the deployment of the military personnel falls under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. What the IBP questions, however, is the basis for the calling of the Marines under the aforestated provision. According to the IBP, no emergency exists that would justify the need for the calling of the military to assist the police force. It contends that no lawless violence, invasion or rebellion exist to warrant the calling of the Marines. Thus, the IBP prays that this Court review the sufficiency of the factual basis for said troop [Marine] deployment. xlix[19] The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the issue pertaining to the necessity of calling the armed forces is not proper for judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question and the resolution of factual issues which are beyond the review powers of this Court. As framed by the parties, the underlying issues are the scope of presidential powers and limits, and the extent of judicial review. But, while this Court gives considerable weight to the parties formulation of the issues, the resolution of the controversy may warrant a cr eative approach that goes beyond the narrow confines of the issues raised. Thus, while the parties are in agreement that the power exercised by the President is the power to call out the armed forces, the Court is of the view that the power involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace and order and promotion of the general welfare.l[20] For one, the realities on the ground do not show that there exist a state of warfare, widespread civil unrest or anarchy. Secondly, the full brunt of the military is not brought upon the citizenry, a point discussed in the latter part of this decision. In the words of the late Justice Irene Cortes in Marcos v. Manglapus: More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the Presidents powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The American Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the Presidents exercising as Commander -in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security. xxxli[21] Nonetheless, even if it is conceded that the power involved is the Presidents power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, the resolution of the controversy will reach a similar result.

We now address the Solicitor Generals argument that the issue involved is not susceptible to review by the judiciary because it involves a political question, and thus, not justiciable. As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court review.lii[22] It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are political questions. The reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the le gality, of a particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution. As Taada v. Cuencoliii[23] puts it, political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. Thus, if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is held to be a political question. In the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr,liv[24] [p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a courts under taking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one question. The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that (T)he Judicial power shall be vested in one S upreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. lv[25] Under this definition, the Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable - the problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom.lvi[26] Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court.lvii[27] When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.lviii[28] By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.lix[29] Under this definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated. But while this Court has no power to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President, it may look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion.lx[30] A showing that plenary power is granted either department of government, may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable controversy.lxi[31] When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the Presidents wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of wheth er such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of this Courts duty of purposeful hesitationlxii[32] before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Pre sidents judgment. To doubt is to sustain. There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which embodies the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, provides in part: The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. xxx The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling out power is also implied and further reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII which reads, thus: xxx Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to c all out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.lxiii[33] That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its letter says, i.e., that the power to call is fully discretionary to the President, is extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission, to wit: FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a graduated power of the President as Commander-in-Chief. First, he can call out such Armed Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless violence; then he can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he can impose martial law. This is a graduated sequence. When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his judgment is subject to review. We are making it subject to review by the Supreme Court and subject to concurrence by the National Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it is my opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody. xxx FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when we only have imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the first sentence: The Pre sident may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. So we feel that that is suff icient for handling imminent danger. MR. DE LOS REYES. So actually, if a President feels that there is imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the First Se ntence: The President....may call out such Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless violen ce, invasion or rebellion. So we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger, of invasion or rebellion, instead of imposing martial law or suspending the writ of habeas corpus, he must necessarily have to call the Armed Forces of the Philippines as their Commander-in-Chief. Is that the idea? MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to judicial review.lxiv[34] The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court. Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The implica tion is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers. If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof. On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country. The determination of the necessity for the calling out power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary restraining order every time it is exercised. Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the Presidents exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court. The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his Memorandum, he categorically asserted that, [V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila... lxv[35] We do not doubt the veracity of the Presidents assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power. The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of the police force. Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to justify the calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Section 3, Article IIlxvi[36] of the Constitution. We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visi bility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols.lxvii[37] Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures.lxviii[38] It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines.lxix[39] It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers.lxx[40] In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police

force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.lxxi[41] In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited provision. The real authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Such being the case, it does not matter whether the AFP Chief actually participates in the Task Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any authority or control over the same. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP. Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no insidious incursion of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in th e Constitution. It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippine experience reveals that it is not averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the implementation and execution of certain tra ditionally civil functions. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, some of the multifarious activities wherein military aid has been rendered, exemplifying the activities that bring both the civilian and the military together in a relationship of cooperation, are: 1. Elections;lxxii[42] 2. Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross;lxxiii[43] 3. Relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters;lxxiv[44] 4. Amateur sports promotion and development;lxxv[45] 5. Development of the culture and the arts;lxxvi[46] 6. Conservation of natural resources;lxxvii[47] 7. Implementation of the agrarian reform program;lxxviii[48] 8. Enforcement of customs laws;lxxix[49] 9. Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities;lxxx[50] 10. Conduct of licensure examinations;lxxxi[51] 11. Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high school students;lxxxii[52] 12. Anti-drug enforcement activities;lxxxiii[53] 13. Sanitary inspections;lxxxiv[54] 14. Conduct of census work;lxxxv[55] 15. Administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board;lxxxvi[56] 16. Assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices;lxxxvii[57] 17. Peace and order policy formulation in local government units.lxxxviii[58] This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resulting from a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and, yet, never before questioned.lxxxix[59] What we have here is mutual support and cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian supremacy. In the United States, where a long tradition of suspicion and hostility towards the use of military force for domestic purposes has persisted,xc[60] and whose Constitution, unlike ours, does not expressly provide for the power to call, the use of military personnel by civilian law enforcement officers is allowed under circumstances similar to those surrounding the present deployment of the Philippine Marines. Under the Posse Comitatus Actxci[61] of the US, the use of the military in civilian law enforcement is generally prohibited, except in certain allowable circumstances. A provision of the Act states: 1385. Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.xcii[62] To determine whether there is a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act in the use of military personnel, the US courtsxciii[63] apply the following standards, to wit: Were Army or Air Force personnel used by the civilian law enforcement officers at Wounded Knee in such a manner that the military personnel subjected the citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsoryxciv[64] George Washington Law Review, pp. 404-433 (1986), which discusses the four divergent standards for assessing acceptable involvement of military personnel in civil law enforcement. See likewise HONORED IN THE BREECH: PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE LAWS WITH MILITARY FORCE, 83 Yale Law Journal, pp. 130-152, 1973. 64 in nature, either presently or prospectively? x x x When this concept is transplanted into the present legal context, we take it to mean that military involvement, even when not expressly authorized by the Constitution or a statute, does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act unless it actually regulates, forbids or compels some conduct on the part of those claiming relief. A mere threat of some future injury would be insufficient. (emphasis supplied) Even if the Court were to apply the above rigid standards to the present case to determine whether there is permissible use of the military in civilian law enforcement, the conclusion is inevitable that no violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution is committed. On this point, the Court agrees with the observation of the Solicitor General: 3. The designation of tasks in Annex Axcv[65] does not constitute the exercise of regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory military power. First, the soldiers do not control or direct the operation. This is evident from Nos. 6,xcvi[66] 8(k)xcvii[67] and 9(a)xcviii[68] of Annex A. These soldiers, second, also have no power to prohibit or condemn. In No. 9(d)xcix[69] of Annex A, all arrested persons are brought to the nearest police stations for proper disposition. And last, these soldiers apply no coercive force. The materials or equipment issued to them, as shown in No. 8(c)c[70] of Annex A, are all low impact and defensive in character. The conclusion is that there being no exercise of regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory military power, the deployment of a handful of Philippine Marines constitutes no impermissible use of military power for civilian law enforcement.ci[71] It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the military will gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Such apprehensions, however, are unfounded. The power to call the armed forces is just that - calling out the armed forces. Unless, petitioner IBP can show, which it has not, that in the deployment of the Marines, the President has violated the fundamental law, exceeded his authority or jeopardized the civil liberties of the people, this Court is not inclined to overrule the Presidents determination of the factual basis for the calling of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

One last point. Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in January, 2000, not a single citizen has complained that his political or civil rights have been violated as a result of the deployment of the Marines. It was precisely to safeguard peace, tranquility and the civil liberties of the people that the joint visibility patrol was conceived. Freedom and democracy will be in full bloom only when people feel secure in their homes and in the streets, not when the shadows of violence and anarchy constantly lurk in their midst. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000] BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a JUNK VFA MOVEMENT, BISHOP TOMAS MILLAMENA (Iglesia Filipina Independiente), BISHOP ELMER BOLOCAN (United Church of Christ of the Phil.), DR. REYNALDO LEGASCA, MD, KILUSANG MAMBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, GABRIELA, PROLABOR, and the PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER, petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY DOMINGO SIAZON, DEFENSE SECRETARY ORLANDO MERCADO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, SENATE PRESIDENT MARCELO FERNAN, SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, SENATOR BLAS OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO BIAZON, and SENATOR FRANCISCO TATAD, respondents. [G.R. No. 138572. October 10, 2000] PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC.(PHILCONSA), EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA, AMADOGAT INCIONG, CAMILO L. SABIO, AND RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioners, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary, HON. ORLANDO MERCADO, as Secretary of National Defense, and HON. DOMINGO L. SIAZON, JR., as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, respondents. [G.R. No. 138587. October 10, 2000] TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., RAUL S. ROCO, and SERGIO R. OSMEA III, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, RONALDO B. ZAMORA, DOMINGO L. SIAZON, JR., ORLANDO B. MERCADO, MARCELO B. FERNAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, BLAS F. OPLE and RODOLFO G. BIAZON, respondents. [G.R. No. 138680. October 10, 2000] INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by its National President, Jose Aguila Grapilon, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, in his capacity as President, Republic of the Philippines, and HON. DOMINGO SIAZON, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, respondents. [G.R. No. 138698. October 10, 2000] JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO TAADA, ZENAIDA QUEZON-AVENCEA, ROLANDO SIMBULAN, PABLITO V. SANIDAD, MA. SOCORRO I. DIOKNO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, JOKER P. ARROYO, FRANCISCO C. RIVERA JR., RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, KILOSBAYAN, MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, SENATE PRESIDENT MARCELO B. FERNAN, SENATOR BLAS F. OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO G. BIAZON, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING THEIR CONTROL, SUPERVISION, DIRECTION, AND INSTRUCTION IN RELATION TO THE VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT (VFA), respondents. DECISION BUENA, J.: Confronting the Court for resolution in the instant consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition are issues relating to, and borne by, an agreement forged in the turn of the last century between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America -the Visiting Forces Agreement. The antecedents unfold. On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft.cii[1] In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines.ciii[2] With the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the periodic military exercises conducted between the two countries were held in abeyance. Notwithstanding, the defense and security relationship between the Philippines and the United States of America continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty. On July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on the complementing stra tegic interests of the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity). Negotiations by both panels on the VFA led to a consolidated draft text, which in turn resulted to a final series of conferences and negotiationsciv[3] that culminated in Manila on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on February 10, 1998. On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA.cv[4] On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines,cvi[5] the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the Presidentcvii[6] and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The Senate, in turn, referred the VFA to its Committee on Foreign Relations, chaired by Senator Blas F. Ople, and its Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo G. Biazon, for their joint consideration and recommendation. Thereafter, joint public hearings were held by the two Committees.cviii[7] On May 3, 1999, the Committees submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443cix[8] recommending the concurrence of the Senate to the VFA and the creation of a Legislative Oversight Committee to oversee its implementation. Debates then ensued. On May 27, 1999, Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 was approved by the Senate, by a two-thirds (2/3) votecx[9] of its members. Senate Resolution No. 443 was then re-numbered as Senate Resolution No. 18.cxi[10]

On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of Notes between respondent Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Hubbard. The VFA, which consists of a Preamble and nine (9) Articles, provides for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines, and is quoted in its full text, hereunder: Article I Definitions As used in this Agreement, United States personnel means United States military and civilian personnel temporarily in the Philippines in connection with activities approved by the Philippine Government. Within this definition: 1. The term military personnel refers to military members of the United States Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard. 2. The term civilian personnel refers to individuals who are neither nationals of, nor ordinary residents in the Philippines and who are employed by the United States armed forces or who are accompanying the United States armed forces, such as employees of the American Red Cross and the United Services Organization. Article II Respect for Law It is the duty of the United States personnel to respect the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and, in particular, from any political activity in the Philippines. The Government of the United States shall take all measures within its authority to ensure that this is done. Article III Entry and Departure 1. The Government of the Philippines shall facilitate the admission of United States personnel and their departure from the Philippines in connection with activities covered by this agreement. 2. United States military personnel shall be exempt from passport and visa regulations upon entering and departing the Philippines. 3. The following documents only, which shall be presented on demand, shall be required in respect of United States military personnel who enter the Philippines: (a) personal identity card issued by the appropriate United States authority showing full name, date of b irth, rank or grade and service number (if any), branch of service and photograph; (b) individual or collective document issued by the appropriate United States authority, authorizing the travel or visit and identifying the individual or group as United States military personnel; and (c) the commanding officer of a military aircraft or vessel shall present a declaration of health, and when required by the cognizant representative of the Government of the Philippines, shall conduct a quarantine inspection and will certify that the aircraft or vessel is free from quarantinable diseases. Any quarantine inspection of United States aircraft or United States vessels or cargoes thereon shall be conducted by the United States commanding officer in accordance with the international health regulations as promulgated by the World Health Organization, and mutually agreed procedures. 4. United States civilian personnel shall be exempt from visa requirements but shall present, upon demand, valid passports u pon entry and departure of the Philippines. 5. If the Government of the Philippines has requested the removal of any United States personnel from its territory, the Uni ted States authorities shall be responsible for receiving the person concerned within its own territory or otherwise disposing of said person outside of the Philippines. Article IV Driving and Vehicle Registration 1. Philippine authorities shall accept as valid, without test or fee, a driving permit or license issued by the appropriate United States authority to United States personnel for the operation of military or official vehicles. 2. Vehicles owned by the Government of the United States need not be registered, but shall have appropriate markings. Article V Criminal Jurisdiction 1. Subject to the provisions of this article: (a) Philippine authorities shall have jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to offenses committed within the Philippines and punishable under the law of the Philippines. (b) United States military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the Philippines all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the military law of the United States over United States personnel in the Philippines. 2. (a) Philippine authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the Philippines, punishable under the laws of the Philippines, but not under the laws of the United States. (b) United States authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the United States, punishable under the laws of the United States, but not under the laws of the Philippines. (c) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 3 of this article, an offense relating to security means: (1) treason; (2) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to national defense. 3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following rules shall apply: (a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over all offenses committed by United States personnel, except in cases provided for in paragraphs 1(b), 2 (b), and 3 (b) of this Article. (b) United States military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over United States personnel subject to the military law of the United States in relation to. (1) offenses solely against the property or security of the United States or offenses solely against the property or person of United States personnel; and (2) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in performance of official duty.

(c) The authorities of either government may request the authorities of the other government to waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case. (d) Recognizing the responsibility of the United States military authorities to maintain good order and discipline among their forces, Philippine authorities will, upon request by the United States, waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction except in cases of particular importance to the Philippines. If the Government of the Philippines determines that the case is of particular importance, it shall communicate such determination to the United States authorities within twenty (20) days after the Philippine authorities receive the United States request. (e) When the United States military commander determines that an offense charged by authorities of the Philippines against United states personnel arises out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty, the commander will issue a certificate setting forth such determination. This certificate will be transmitted to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines and will constitute sufficient proof of performance of official duty for the purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2) of this Article. In those cases where the Government of the Philippines believes the circumstances of the case require a review of the duty certificate, United States military authorities and Philippine authorities shall consult immediately. Philippine authorities at the highest levels may also present any information bearing on its validity. United States military authorities shall take full account of the Philippine position. Where appropriate, United States military authorities will take disciplinary or other action against offenders in official duty cases, and notify the Government of the Philippines of the actions taken. (f) If the government having the primary right does not exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of the other government as soon as possible. (g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall notify each other of the disposition of all cases in which both the authorities of the Philippines and the United States have the right to exercise jurisdiction. 4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the authorities of the Philippines and United States shall assist each other in the arrest of United States personnel in the Philippines and in handling them over to authorities who are to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this article. 5. United States military authorities shall promptly notify Philippine authorities of the arrest or detention of United States personnel who are subject of Philippine primary or exclusive jurisdiction. Philippine authorities shall promptly notify United States military authorities of the arrest or detention of any United States personnel. 6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United States military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings. United States military authorities shall, upon formal notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay, make such personnel available to those authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which the person has been charged in extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall present its position to the United States Government regarding custody, which the United States Government shall take into full account. In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the United States shall be relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one-year period will not include the time necessary to appeal. Also, the one-year period will not include any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed because United States authorities, after timely notification by Philippine authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to do so. 7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United States and Philippine authorities shall assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary investigation into offenses and shall cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses and in the collection and production of evidence, including seizure and, in proper cases, the delivery of objects connected with an offense. 8. When United States personnel have been tried in accordance with the provisions of this Article and have been acquitted or have been convicted and are serving, or have served their sentence, or have had their sentence remitted or suspended, or have been pardoned, they may not be tried again for the same offense in the Philippines. Nothing in this paragraph, however, shall prevent United States military authorities from trying United States personnel for any violation of rules of discipline arising from the act or omission which constituted an offense for which they were tried by Philippine authorities. 9. When United States personnel are detained, taken into custody, or prosecuted by Philippine authorities, they shall be accorded all procedural safeguards established by the law of the Philippines. At the minimum, United States personnel shall be entitled: (a) To a prompt and speedy trial; (b) To be informed in advance of trial of the specific charge or charges made against them and to have reasonable time to prepare a defense; (c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and to cross examine such witnesses; (d) To present evidence in their defense and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses; (e) To have free and assisted legal representation of their own choice on the same basis as nationals of the Philippines; (f) To have the service of a competent interpreter; and (g) To communicate promptly with and to be visited regularly by United States authorities, and to have such authorities present at all judicial proceedings. These proceedings shall be public unless the court, in accordance with Philippine laws, excludes persons who have no role in the proceedings. 10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippine and United States authorities. United States Personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to visits and material assistance. 11. United States personnel shall be subject to trial only in Philippine courts of ordinary jurisdiction, and shall not be s ubject to the jurisdiction of Philippine military or religious courts. Article VI Claims 1. Except for contractual arrangements, including United States foreign military sales letters of offer and acceptance and leases of military equipment, both governments waive any and all claims against each other for damage, loss or destruction to property of each others armed forces or for death or injury to their military and civilian personnel arising from activities to which this agreement applies. 2. For claims against the United States, other than contractual claims and those to which paragraph 1 applies, t he United States Government, in accordance with United States law regarding foreign claims, will pay just and reasonable compensation in settlement of meritorious claims for damage, loss, personal injury or death, caused by acts or omissions of United States personnel, or otherwise incident to the non-combat activities of the United States forces.

Article VII Importation and Exportation 1. United States Government equipment, materials, supplies, and other property imported into or acquired in the Philippi nes by or on behalf of the United States armed forces in connection with activities to which this agreement applies, shall be free of all Philippine duties, taxes and other similar charges. Title to such property shall remain with the United States, which may remove such property from the Philippines at any time, free from export duties, taxes, and other similar charges. The exemptions provided in this paragraph shall also extend to any duty, tax, or other similar charges which would otherwise be assessed upon such property after importation into, or acquisition within, the Philippines. Such property may be removed from the Philippines, or disposed of therein, provided that disposition of such property in the Philippines to persons or entities not entitled to exemption from applicable taxes and duties shall be subject to payment of such taxes, and duties and prior approval of the Philippine Government. 2. Reasonable quantities of personal baggage, personal effects, and other property for the personal use of United States personnel may be imported into and used in the Philippines free of all duties, taxes and other similar charges during the period of their temporary stay in the Philippines. Transfers to persons or entities in the Philippines not entitled to import privileges may only be made upon prior approval of the appropriate Philippine authorities including payment by the recipient of applicable duties and taxes imposed in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. The exportation of such property and of property acquired in the Philippines by United States personnel shall be free of all Philippine duties, taxes, and other similar charges. Article VIII Movement of Vessels and Aircraft 1. Aircraft operated by or for the United States armed forces may enter the Philippines upon approval of the Government of the Philippines in accordance with procedures stipulated in implementing arrangements. 2. Vessels operated by or for the United States armed forces may enter the Philippines upon approval of the Government of the Philippines. The movement of vessels shall be in accordance with international custom and practice governing such vessels, and such agreed implementing arrangements as necessary. 3. Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft operated by or for the United States armed forces shall not be subject to the payment of landing or port fees, navigation or over flight charges, or tolls or other use charges, including light and harbor dues, while in the Philippines. Aircraft operated by or for the United States armed forces shall observe local air traffic control regulations while in the Philippines. Vessels owned or operated by the United States solely on United States Government non-commercial service shall not be subject to compulsory pilotage at Philippine ports. Article IX Duration and Termination This agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the parties have notified each other in writing through the diplo matic channel that they have completed their constitutional requirements for entry into force. This agreement shall remain in force until the expiration of 180 days from the date on which either party gives the other party notice in writing that it desires to terminate the agreeme nt. Via these consolidatedcxii[11] petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners - as legislators, non-governmental organizations, citizens and taxpayers - assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute to herein respondents grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement. We have simplified the issues raised by the petitioners into the following: I Do petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA? II Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution? III Does the VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty? a. Are Philippine courts deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses committed by US military personnel? b. Is the Supreme Court deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher? IV Does the VFA violate: a. the equal protection clause under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution? b. the Prohibition against nuclear weapons under Article II, Section 8? c. Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution granting the exemption from taxes and duties for the equipment, materials supplies and other properties imported into or acquired in the Philippines by, or on behalf, of the US Armed Forces?
LOCUS STANDI

At the outset, respondents challenge petitioners standing to sue, on the ground that the latter have not shown any interest in the case, and that petitioners failed to substantiate that they have sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result of the operation of the VFA.cxiii[12] Petitioners, on the other hand, counter that the validity or invalidity of the VFA is a matter of transcendental importance which justifies their standing.cxiv[13] A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show not only that the law is inval id, but also that he has sustained or in is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. He must show that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of.cxv[14] In the case before us, petitioners failed to show, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers.cxvi[15] On this point, it bears stressing that a taxpayers suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.cxvii[16] Thus, in Bugnay Const. & Development Corp. vs. Laroncxviii[17], we held: x x x it is exigent that the taxpayer-plaintiff sufficiently show that he would be benefited or injured by the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party in interest. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a g eneral interest common to all members of the public. Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are involved in this case, and in the absence of any allegation by petitioners that public funds are being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA. Similarly, Representatives Wigberto Taada, Agapito Aquino and Joker Arroyo, as petitioners-legislators, do not possess the requisite locus standi to maintain the present suit. While this Court, in Phil. Constitution Association vs. Hon. Salvador Enriquez,cxix[18] sustained the legal standing of a

member of the Senate and the House of Representatives to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bull, we cannot, at this instance, similarly uphold petitioners standing as members of Congress, in the absenc e of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong. Beyond this, the allegations of impairment of legislative power, such as the delegation of the power of Congress to grant tax exemptions, are more apparent than real. While it may be true that petitioners pointed to provisions of the VFA which allegedly impair their legislative powers, petitioners failed however to sufficiently show that they have in fact suffered direct injury. In the same vein, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is stripped of standing in these cases. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, the IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the absence of a board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its National President to commence the present action.cxx[19] Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of the issues raised in the petitions, this Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, brushes aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions, as we have done in the early Emergency Powers Cases,cxxi[20] where we had occasion to rule: x x x ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by P resident Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. We have since then applied the exception in many other cases. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343). (Underscoring Supplied) This principle was reiterated in the subsequent cases of Gonzales vs. COMELEC,cxxii[21] Daza vs. Singson,cxxiii[22] and Basco vs. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corporation,cxxiv[23] where we emphatically held: Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Courts duty, under the 1987 Co nstitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of pro cedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. x x x Again, in the more recent case of Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr.,cxxv[24] thisCourt ruled that in cases of transcendental importance, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow a suit to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the doctrine of separation of powers, which enjoins upon the departments of the government a becoming respect for each others acts, cxxvi[25] this Court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant petitions.
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

One focal point of inquiry in this controversy is the determination of which provision of the Constitution applies, with regard to the exercise by the senate of its constitutional power to concur with the VFA. Petitioners argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is applicable considering that the VFA has for its subject the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines. Respondents, on the contrary, maintain that Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch as the VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement which involves merely the temporary visits of United States personnel engaged in joint military exercises. The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements. Section 21, Article VII, which herein respondents invoke, reads: No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. Section 25, Article XVIII, provides: After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the subject treaty, or international agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on treatise or international agreements and applies to any form of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter, such as, but not limited to, extradition or tax treatise or those economic in nature. All treaties or international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective. In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Sec tion 25, Article XVIII further requires that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, r atified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state. It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far from contradicting each other, actually share some common ground. These constitutional provisions both embody phrases in the negative and thus, are deemed prohibitory in mandate and character. In particular, Section 21 opens with the clause No treaty x x x, and Section 25 contains the phrase shall not be allowed. Additionally, in both in stances, the concurrence of the Senate is indispensable to render the treaty or international agreement valid and effective. To our mind, the fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article VII, and that the Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements. On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate, as will be further discussed hereunder. It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special provision or law prevails over a general one. Lex specialis derogat generali. Thus, where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include what is

embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language which are not within the provision of the particular enactment.cxxvii[26] In Leveriza vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,cxxviii[27] we enunciated: x x x that another basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give way to a special legislation on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable (Sto. Domingo vs. de los Angeles, 96 SCRA 139), that a specific statute prevails over a general statute (De Jesus vs. People, 120 SCRA 760) and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor special ly should prevail (Wil Wilhensen Inc. vs. Baluyot, 83 SCRA 38). Moreover, it is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a military base. On this score, the Constitution makes no distinction between transient and permanent. Certainly, we find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines. It is a rudiment in legal hermenuetics that when no distinction is made by law, the Court should not distinguish- Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. In like manner, we do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. Notably, a perusal of said constitutional provision reveals that the proscription covers foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops and facilities without any foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer to foreign military bases, troops, or facilities collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects. The use of comma and the disjunctive word or clearly signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from the others included in the enumeration,cxxix[28] such that, the provision contemplates three different situations - a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities - any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII. To this end, the intention of the framers of the Charter, as manifested during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is consistent with this interpretation: MR. MAAMBONG. I just want to address a question or two to Commissioner Bernas. This formulation speaks of three things: foreign military bases, troops or facilities. My first question is: If the country does enter into such kind of a treaty, must it cover the three-bases, troops or facilities-or could the treaty entered into cover only one or two? FR. BERNAS. Definitely, it can cover only one. Whether it covers only one or it covers three, the requirement will be the same. MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the Philippine government can enter into a treaty covering not bases but merely troops? FR. BERNAS. Yes. MR. MAAMBONG. I cannot find any reason why the government can enter into a treaty covering only troops. FR. BERNAS. Why not? Probably if we stretch our imagination a little bit more, we will find some. We just want to cover every thing.cxxx[29] (Underscoring Supplied) Moreover, military bases established within the territory of another state is no longer viable because of the alternatives offered by new means and weapons of warfare such as nuclear weapons, guided missiles as well as huge sea vessels that can stay afloat in the sea even for months and years without returning to their home country. These military warships are actually used as substitutes for a land-home base not only of military aircraft but also of military personnel and facilities. Besides, vessels are mobile as compared to a land-based military headquarters. At this juncture, we shall then resolve the issue of whether or not the requirements of Section 25 were complied with when the Senate gave its concurrence to the VFA. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, whether under the general requirement in Section 21, Article VII, or the specific mandate mentioned in Section 25, Article XVIII, the provision in the latter article requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it. As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII particularly requires that a treaty or international agreement, to be valid and effective, must be concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. On the other hand, Section 25, Article XVIII simply provides that the treaty be duly concurred in by the Senate. Applying the foregoing constitutional provisions, a two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate is clearly required so that the concurrence contemplated by law may be validly obtained and deemed present. While it is true that Section 25, Article XVIII requires, among other things, that the treaty-the VFA, in the instant case-be duly concurred in by the Senate, it is very true however that said provision must be related and viewed in light of the clear mandate embodied in Section 21, Article VII, which in more specific terms, requires that the concurrence of a treaty, or international agreement, be made by a two -thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. Indeed, Section 25, Article XVIII must not be treated in isolation to section 21, Article, VII. As noted, the concurrence requirement under Section 25, Article XVIII must be construed in relation to the provisions of Section 21, Article VII. In a more particular language, the concurrence of the Senate contemplated under Section 25, Article XVIII means that at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate favorably vote to concur with the treaty-the VFA in the instant case. Under these circumstances, the charter provides that the Senate shall be composed of twenty-four (24) Senators.cxxxi[30] Without a tinge of doubt, two-thirds (2/3) of this figure, or not less than sixteen (16) members, favorably acting on the proposal is an unquestionable compliance with the requisite number of votes mentioned in Section 21 of Article VII. The fact that there were actually twenty-three (23) incumbent Senators at the time the voting was made,cxxxii[31] will not alter in any significant way the circumstance that more than two-thirds of the members of the Senate concurred with the proposed VFA, even if the two-thirds vote requirement is based on this figure of actual members (23). In this regard, the fundamental law is clear that two-thirds of the 24 Senators, or at least 16 favorable votes, suffice so as to render compliance with the strict constitutional mandate of giving concurrence to the subject treaty. Having resolved that the first two requisites prescribed in Section 25, Article XVIII are present, we shall now pass upon and delve on the requirement that the VFA should be recognized as a treaty by the United States of America. Petitioners content that the phrase recognized as a treaty, embodied in section 25, Article XVIII, means that the VFA shoul d have the advice and consent of the United States Senate pursuant to its own constitutional process, and that it should not be considered merely an executive agreement by the United States.

In opposition, respondents argue that the letter of United States Ambassador Hubbard stating that the VFA is binding on the United States Government is conclusive, on the point that the VFA is recognized as a treaty by the United States of America. According to respondents, the VFA, to be binding, must only be accepted as a treaty by the United States. This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty.cxxxiii[32] To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution,cxxxiv[33] is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.cxxxv[34] Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.cxxxvi[35] To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty. A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is an international instrument concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments, and whatever its particular designation.cxxxvii[36] There are many other terms used for a treaty or international agreement, some of which are: act, protocol, agreement, compromis d arbitrage, concordat, convention, declaration, exchange of notes, pact, statute, charter and modus vivendi. All writers, from Hugo Grotius onward, have pointed out that the names or titles of international agreements included under the general term treaty have little or no legal significance. Certain terms are useful, but they furnish little more than mere description.cxxxviii[37] Article 2(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that the provisions of paragraph 1 regarding the use of terms in the present Convention are without prejudice to the use of those terms, or to the meanings which may be given to them in the internal law of the State. Thus, in international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers.cxxxix[38] International law continues to make no distinction between treaties and executive agreements: they are equally binding obligations upon nations.cxl[39] In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements even without the concurrence of the Senate or Congress. In Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading,cxli[40] we had occasion to pronounce: x x x the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts. x x x xxx xxx Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized the validity and constitutionality of executive agreem ents entered into without Senate approval. (39 Columbia Law Review, pp. 753-754) (See, also, U.S. vs. Curtis Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 81 L. ed. 255; U.S. vs. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 81 L. ed. 1134; U.S. vs. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 86 L. ed. 796; Ozanic vs. U.S. 188 F. 2d. 288; Yale Law Journal, Vol. 15 pp. 1905-1906; California Law Review, Vol. 25, pp. 670-675; Hyde on International Law [revised Edition], Vol. 2, pp. 1405, 1416-1418; willoughby on the U.S. Constitution Law, Vol. I [2d ed.], pp. 537-540; Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 210-218; Hackworth, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 390-407). (Italics Supplied) (Emphasis Ours) The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission which drafted the 1987 Constitution is enlightening and highly-instructive: MR. MAAMBONG. Of course it goes without saying that as far as ratification of the other state is concerned, that is entirely their concern under their own laws. FR. BERNAS. Yes, but we will accept whatever they say. If they say that we have done everything to make it a treaty, then as far as we are concerned, we will accept it as a treaty.cxlii[41] The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA.cxliii[42] For as long as the united States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution. Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the concurrence of the Senate should be taken as a clear an unequivocal expression of our nations consent to be bound by said treaty, with th e concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder. Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government, as the case may be, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed.cxliv[43] A State may provide in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. The consent of the State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when: (a) the treaty provides for such ratification, (b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States agreed that ratification should be required, (c) the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to ratification, or (d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its representative, or was expressed during the negotiation.cxlv[44] In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.cxlvi[45] With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the exchange of notes between the Philippines and the United States of America, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II of the Constitution,cxlvii[46] declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations. As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be bound by generally accepted rules for the conduct of its international relations. While the international obligation devolves upon the state and not upon any particular branch, institution, or individual member of its government, the Philippines is nonetheless responsible for violations committed by any branch or subdivision of its government or any official thereof. As an integral part of the community of nations, we are responsible to assure that our government, Constitution and laws will carry out our international obligation.cxlviii[47] Hence, we cannot readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for non-compliance with our obligations, duties and responsibilities under international law.

Beyond this, Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the International Law Commission in 1949 provides: Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty.cxlix[48] Equally important is Article 26 of the convention which provides that Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to i t and must be performed by them in good faith. This is known as the principle of pacta sunt servanda which preserves the sanctity of treaties and have been one of the most fundamental principles of positive international law, supported by the jurisprudence of international tribunals.cl[49]
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

In the instant controversy, the President, in effect, is heavily faulted for exercising a power and performing a task conferred upon him by the Constitution-the power to enter into and ratify treaties. Through the expediency of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioners in these consolidated cases impute grave abuse of discretion on the part of the chief Executive in ratifying the VFA, and referring the same to the Senate pursuant to the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution. On this particular matter, grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.cli[50] By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of State, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the chief architect of the nations foreign policy; his dominance in the field o f foreign relations is (then) conceded.clii[51] Wielding vast powers an influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as Jefferson describes, is executive altogether."cliii[52] As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it .cliv[53] Consequently, the acts or judgment calls of the President involving the VFA-specifically the acts of ratification and entering into a treaty and those necessary or incidental to the exercise of such principal acts - squarely fall within the sphere of his constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck down, much less calibrated by this Court, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion. It is the Courts considered view that the President, in ratifying the VFA and in submitting the same to the Senate for concu rrence, acted within the confines and limits of the powers vested in him by the Constitution. It is of no moment that the President, in the exercise of his wide latitude of discretion and in the honest belief that the VFA falls within the ambit of Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution, referred the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the aforementioned provision. Certainly, no abuse of discretion, much less a grave, patent and whimsical abuse of judgment, may be imputed to the President in his act of ratifying the VFA and referring the same to the Senate for the purpose of complying with the concurrence requirement embodied in the fundamental law. In doing so, the President merely performed a constitutional task and exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the functions of his office. Even if he erred in submitting the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the provisions of Section 21 of Article VII, instead of Section 25 of Article XVIII of the Constitution, still, the President may not be faulted or scarred, much less be adjudged guilty of committing an abuse of discretion in some patent, gross, and capricious manner. For while it is conceded that Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to national security, it has not altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations.clv[54] The High Tribunals function, as sanctioned by Article VIII, Sect ion 1, is merely (to) check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing (of) grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective powerIt has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.clvi[55] As to the power to concur with treaties, the constitution lodges the same with the Senate alone. Thus, once the Senateclvii[56] performs that power, or exercises its prerogative within the boundaries prescribed by the Constitution, the concurrence cannot, in like manner, be viewed to constitute an abuse of power, much less grave abuse thereof. Corollarily, the Senate, in the exercise of its discretion and acting within the limits of such power, may not be similarly faulted for having simply performed a task conferred and sanctioned by no less than the fundamental law. For the role of the Senate in relation to treaties is essentially legislative in character;clviii[57] the Senate, as an independent body possessed of its own erudite mind, has the prerogative to either accept or reject the proposed agreement, and whatever action it takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act. In this sense, the Senate partakes a principal, yet delicate, role in keeping the principles of separation of powers and of checks and balances alive and vigilantly ensures that these cherished rudiments remain true to their form in a democratic government such as ours. The Constitution thus animates, through this treaty-concurring power of the Senate, a healthy system of checks and balances indispensable toward our nation s pursuit of political maturity and growth. True enough, rudimentary is the principle that matters pertaining to the wisdom of a legislative act are beyond the ambit and province of the courts to inquire. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents, this Court- as the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch sentinel of the rights of the people - is then without power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such affairs purely executive and legislative in character and nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the metes and bounds within which each of the three political branches of government may exercise the powers exclusively and essentially conferred to it by law. WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. EN BANC [G. R. No. 140835. August 14, 2000] RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDRES R. NARVASA, as Chairman, PREPARATORY COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS; HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary; COMMISSION ON AUDIT; ROBERTO AVENTAJADO, as Presidential Consultant on Council of Economic Advisers/Economic Affairs; ANGELITO C. BANAYO, as Presidential Adviser for/on Political Affairs; VERONICA IGNACIO-JONES, as Presidential Assistant/ Appointment Secretary (In charge of appointments), respondents. DECISION GONZAGA-REYES, J.: In this petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants from acting

as such, and to enjoin Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora from enforcing their advice and recommendations. In addition, petitioner seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Finally, petitioner prays for an order compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner with information on certain matters. On January 28, 2000, respondent Hon. Andres R. Narvasa, impleaded in his capacity as Chairman of the PCCR, filed his Comment to the Petition. The rest of the respondents, who are being represented in this case by the Solicitor General, filed their Comment with this Court on March 7, 2000. Petitioner then filed a Consolidated Reply on April 24, 2000, whereupon this case was considered submitted for decision. I. Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, an d the manner of implementing the same.clix[1] Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR on two grounds. First, he contends that it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.clx[2] Secondly, petitioner asserts that by creating such a body the President is intervening in a process from which he is totally excluded by the Constitution the amendment of the fundamental charter.clxi[3] It is alleged by respondents that, with respect to the PCCR, this case has become moot and academic. We agree. An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead.clxii[4] Under E.O. No. 43, the PCCR was instructed to complete its task on or before June 30, 1999.clxiii[5] However, on February 19, 1999, the President issued Executive Order No. 70 (E.O. No. 70), which extended the time frame for the completion of the commissions work, viz SECTION 6. Section 8 is hereby amended to read as follows: Time Frame. The Commission shall commence its work on 01 January 1999 and complete the same on or before 31 December 1999. The Commission shall submit its report and recommendations to the President within fifteen (15) working days from 31 December 1999. The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on December 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the President on the same day. It had likewise spent the funds allotted to it.clxiv[6] Thus, the PCCR has ceased to exist, having lost its raison detre. Subsequent events have overtaken the petition and the Court has nothing left to resolve. The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of granting the relief prayed for by petitioner. Basically, petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR from acting as such.clxv[7] Clearly, prohibition is an inappropriate remedy since the body sought to be enjoined no longer exists. It is well established that prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli.clxvi[8] At this point, any ruling regarding the PCCR would simply be in the nature of an advisory opinion, which is definitely beyond the permissible scope of judicial power. In addition to the mootness of the issue, petitioners lack of standing constitutes another obstacle to the successful invoca tion of judicial power insofar as the PCCR is concerned. The question in standing is whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.clxvii[9] In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. Nos. 43 and 70, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer.clxviii[10] A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.clxix[11] In Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato,clxx[12] we denied standing to petitioners who were assailing a lease agreement between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation, stating that, in Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, G.R. No. 78716, Sept. 22, 1987, standing was denied to a petitioner who sought to declare a form of lottery known as Instant Sweepstakes invalid because, as the Court held, Valmonte brings the suit as a citizen, lawyer, taxpayer and father of three (3) minor children. But nowhere in his petition does petitioner claim that his rights and privileges as a lawyer or citizen have been directly and personally injured by the operation of the Instant Sweepstakes. The interest of the person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of. We apprehend no difference between the petitioner in Valmonte and the present petitioners. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. It does not detract from the high regard for petitioners as civic leaders to say that their interest falls short of that required to maintain an action under Rule 3, d 2. Coming now to the instant case, petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any injury in this case since, accor ding to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the legislatures powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities. Clearly, petition er has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen. A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution.clxxi[13], Thus payers action is properly brought only when there is an e xercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.clxxii[14] This was our ruling in a recent case wherein petitioners Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines (TELEBAP) and GMA Network, Inc. questioned the validity of section 92 of B.P. N o. 881 (otherwise knows as the Omnibus Election Code) requiring radio and television stations to give free air time to the Commission on Elections during the campaign perio d.clxxiii[15] The Court held that petitioner TELEBAP did not have any interest as a taxpayer since the assailed law did not involve the taxing or spending power of Congress.clxxiv[16] Many other rulings have premised the grant or denial of standing to taxpayers upon whether or not the case involved a disbursement of public funds by the legislature. In Sanidad v. Commission on Elections,clxxv[17] the petitioners therein were allowed to bring a taxpayers suit to question several presidential decrees promulgated by then President Marcos in his legislative capacity calling for a national referendum, with the Court explaining that ...[i]t is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statute Presidential Decrees are of such nature may be contested by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries an appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes. Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions. The interest of

the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds. In still another case, the Court held that petitioners the Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., a non-profit civic organization - had standing as taxpayers to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3836 insofar as it provides for retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leaves to Senators and Representatives and to the elective officials of both houses of Congress.clxxvi[18] And in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works,clxxvii[19] the Court allowed petitioner to maintain a taxpayers suit assailing the constitutional soundne ss of Republic Act No. 920 appropriating P85,000 for the construction, repair and improvement of feeder roads within private property. All these cases involved the disbursement of public funds by means of a law. Meanwhile, in Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation v. Laron ,clxxviii[20] the Court declared that the trial court was wrong in allowing respondent Ravanzo to bring an action for injunction in his capacity as a taxpayer in order to question the legality of the contract of lease covering the public market entered into between the City of Dagupan and petitioner. The Court declared that Ravanzo did not possess the requisite standing to bring such taxpayers suit since [o]n its face, and there is no evidence to the contrary, t he lease contract entered into between petitioner and the City shows that no public funds have been or will be used in the construction of the market building. Coming now to the instant case, it is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 millio n is appropriated for its operational expenses to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President. The relevant provision states Appropriations. The initial amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) is hereby appropriated for the operational expenses of the Commission to be sourced from funds of the Office of the President, subject to the usual accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Additional amounts shall be released to the Commission upon submission of requirements for expenditures. The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. In fact, there was no an appropriation at all. In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid ou t of the Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors. clxxix[21] The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to section 25 (5) of artic le VI of the Constitution. In the final analysis, it must be stressed that the Court retains the power to decide whether o r not it will entertain a taxpayers suit.clxxx[22] In the case at bar, there being no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the creation of the PCCR in his capacity as a taxpayer, but rather, he must establish that he has a personal and substantial interest in the case and that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement.clxxxi[23] In other words, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit.clxxxii[24] Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation. II. Presidential Consultants, Advisers, Assistants The second issue raised by petitioner concerns the presidential consultants. Petitioner alleges that in 1995 and 1996, the President created seventy (70) positions in the Office of the President and appointed to said positions twenty (20) presidential consultants, twenty-two (22) presidential advisers, and twenty-eight (28) presidential assistants.clxxxiii[25] Petitioner asserts that, as in the case of the PCCR, the President does not have the power to create these positions.clxxxiv[26] Consistent with the abovementioned discussion on standing, petitioner does not have the personality to raise this issue before the Court. First of all, he has not proven that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any injury as a result of the appointment of such presidential advisers. Secondly, petitioner has not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayers interest i n this particular issue. Unlike the PCCR which was created by virtue of an executive order, petitioner does not allege by what official act, whether it be by means of an executive order, administrative order, memorandum order, or otherwise, the President attempted to create the positions of p residential advisers, consultants and assistants. Thus, it is unclear what act of the President petitioner is assailing. In support of his allegation, petitioner merely annexed a copy of the Philippine Government Directory (Annex C) listing the names an d positions of such presidential consultants, advisers and assistants to his petition. However, appointment is obviously not synonymous with creation. It would be improvident for this Court to entertain this issue given the insufficient nature of the allegations in the Petition. III. Right to Information Finally, petitioner asks us to issue a writ of mandamus ordering Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora to answer his letter (Annex D) dated October 4, 1999 requesting for the names of executive officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments, and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacanang.clxxxv[27] The right to information is enshrined in Section 7 of the Bill of Rights which provides that The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Under both the 1973clxxxvi[28] and 1987 Constitution, this is a self-executory provision which can be invoked by any citizen before the courts. This was our ruling in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,clxxxvii[29] wherein the Court classified the right to information as a public right and when a [m]andamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. However, Congress may provide for reasonab le conditions upon the access to information. Such limitations were embodied in Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise knows as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which took effect on March 25, 1989. This law provides that, in the performance of thei r duties, all public officials and employees are obliged to respond to letters sent by the public within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof and to ensure the accessibility of all public documents for inspection by the public within reasonable working hours, subject to the reasonable claims of confidentiality.clxxxviii[30] Elaborating on the significance of the right to information, the Court said in Baldoza v. Dimaanoclxxxix[31] that [t]he incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nations problems, nor a meaningful democratic decisionmaking if they are denied access to information of gener al interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. The information to which the public is entitled to are those concerning matters of public concern, a term which embrace[s] a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of i nterest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.cxc[32]

Thus, we agree with petitioner that respondent Zamora, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, has a constitutional and statutory duty to answer petitioners letter dealing with matters which are unquestionably of public concern that is, appointments made to public offices and the utilization of public property. With regard to petitioners request for copies of the appointment papers of certain official s, respondent Zamora is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of the same subject to the reasonable limitations required for the orderly conduct of official business.cxci[33] WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, with the exception that respondent Zamora is ordered to furnish petitioner with the information requested. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 112497 August 4, 1994 HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, CITY TREASURER ANTHONY ACEVEDO, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD AND THE CITY OF MANILA, respondents. The City Legal Officer for petitioner. Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for Caltex (Phils.). Joseph Lopez for Sangguniang Panglunsod of Manila. L.A. Maglaya for Petron Corporation. CRUZ, J.: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code reading as follows: Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction. Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. 1 In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. 2 The present petition would have us reverse that decision. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. Parenthetically, this petition was originally dismissed by the Court for non-compliance with Circular 1-88, the Solicitor General having failed to submit a certified true copy of the challenged decision. 3 However, on motion for reconsideration with the required certified true copy of the decision attached, the petition was reinstated in view of the importance of the issues raised therein. We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, 4 even as the accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its discussion. 5 It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down. In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances and, inferentially, to annul them. He cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter," while the second is "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law." 6 His conclusion was that the challenged section gave to the Secretary the power of control and not of supervision

only as vested by the Constitution in the President of the Philippines. This was, in his view, a violation not only of Article X, specifically Section 4 thereof, 7 and of Section 5 on the taxing powers of local governments, 8 and the policy of local autonomy in general. We do not share that view. The lower court was rather hasty in invalidating the provision. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision. The case of Taule v. Santos 9 cited in the decision has no application here because the jurisdiction claimed by the Secretary of Local Governments over election contests in the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay was held to belong to the Commission on Elections by constitutional provision. The conflict was over jurisdiction, not supervision or control. Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act, which provided in its Section 2 as follows: A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage, unless the ordinance shall provide otherwise: Provided, however, That the Secretary of Finance shall have authority to suspend the effectivity of any ordinance within one hundred and twenty days after receipt by him of a copy thereof, if, in his opinion, the tax or fee therein levied or imposed is unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, or when it is contrary to declared national economy policy, and when the said Secretary exercises this authority the effectivity of such ordinance shall be suspended, either in part or as a whole, for a period of thirty days within which period the local legislative body may either modify the tax ordinance to meet the objections thereto, or file an appeal with a court of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax ordinance or the part or parts thereof declared suspended, shall be considered as revoked. Thereafter, the local legislative body may not reimpose the same tax or fee until such time as the grounds for the suspension thereof shall have ceased to exist. That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power was never questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure. The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another matter. In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written notices of public hearings on the proposed Manila Revenue Code that were sent to interested parties as required by Art. 276(b) of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code nor were copies of the proposed ordinance published in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Art. 276(a). No minutes were submitted to show that the obligatory public hearings had been held. Neither were copies of the measure as approved posted in prominent places in the city in accordance with Sec. 511(a) of the Local Government Code. Finally, the Manila Revenue Code was not translated into Pilipino or Tagalog and disseminated among the people for their information and guidance, conformably to Sec. 59(b) of the Code. Judge Palattao found otherwise. He declared that all the procedural requirements had been observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only five days within which to gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court. To get to the bottom of this question, the Court acceded to the motion of the respondents and called for the elevation to it of the said exhibits. We have carefully examined every one of these exhibits and agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced by Exhibits G-1 to 17. The minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that the proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the approval of local development plans and public investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax ordinances. We make no ruling on the substantive provisions of the Manila Revenue Code as their validity has not been raised in issue in the present petition. WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged decision of the Regional Trial Court insofar as it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional but AFFIRMING its finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 79732 November 8, 1993 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HENRICO UVERO, ET AL., respondents. The Solicitor General for petitioner. Raymundo T. Nagrampa for private respondents. VITUG, J.: The Republic of the Philippines has sought the expropriation of certain portions of land owned by the private respondents for the widening and concreting of the Nabua-Bato-Agos Section, Philippine-Japan Highway Loan (PJHL) road. While the right of the Republic is not now disputed, the private respondents, however, demand that the just compensation for the property should be based on fair market value and not that set by Presidential Decree No. 76, as amended, which fixes payment on the basis of the assessment by the assessor or the declared valuation by the owner, whichever is lower. The Regional, Trial Court ruled for the private respondents. When elevated to it, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence, the instant petition by the Republic. In Export Processing Zone Authority ("EPZA") vs. Dulay, etc. et al., 1 this Court held the determination of just compensation in eminent domain to be a judicial function and it thereby declared Presidential Decree No. 76, as well as related decrees, including Presidential Decree No. 1533, to the contrary extent, as unconstitutional and as an impermissible encroachment of judicial prerogatives. The ruling, now conceded by the Republic was reiterated in subsequent cases. 2 The petition for review, despite the aforesaid pronouncement by this Court, has been given due course upon the pleas of the Solicitor General to have us address the following concerns: I EFFECT OF JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PD 1533 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID; UP TO WHEN RETROACTIVELY; EFFECT ON A PENDING APPEALED CASE WHERE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PD 1533 NOT ASSAILED BEFORE COURT A QUO. II WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN EPZA VS. HON. DULAY, ETC., ET AL. (G.R. NO. 59603, APRIL 29, 1987) DECLARING PD 1533 UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID, BE APPLIED IN THIS CASE. III WHETHER OR NOT VALUATION OF LAND SOUGHT FOR EXPROPRIATION AS APPEARING ON THE TAX DECLARATION BE USED AS PRELIMINARY BASIS FOR THE TEN PER CENT (10%) DEPOSIT REQUIRED UNDER RULE 67 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AS AMENDED BEFORE PLAINTIFF IS PERMITTED ENTRY THEREON. The last item is not an issue; being merely provisional in character, the matter has not been questioned by the private respondents. 3 We will thus limit ourselves to the first two issues which, in turn, really boil down to whether the declaration of nullity of the law in question should have prospective, not retroactive, application. The petitioner proposes the affirmative. Instruction is the brief treatise made by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, whose words we quote There are two views on the effects of a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statute. The first is the orthodox view. Under this rule, as announced in Norton v. Shelby, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no right; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed. It is therefore stricken from the statute books and considered never to have existed at all. Not only the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality, which means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total nullity. The second or modern view is less stringent. Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. The court may give its reasons for ignoring or disregarding the law, but the decision affects the parties only and there is no judgment against the statute. The opinion or reasons of the court may operate as a precedent for the determination of other similar cases, but it does not strike the statute from the statute books; it does not repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul the statute. The parties to the suit are concluded by the judgment, but no one else is bound. The orthodox view is expressed in Article 7 of the Civil Code, providing that "when the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. . . . 4 The strict view considers a legislative enactment which is declared unconstitutional as being, for all legal intents and purposes, a total nullity, and it is deemed as if had never existed. Here, of course, we refer to the law itself being per se repugnant to the Constitution. It is not always the case, however, that a law is constitutionally faulty per se. Thus, it may well be valid in its general import. but invalid in its application to certain factual situations. To exemplify, an otherwise valid law may be held unconstitutional only insofar as it is allowed to operate retrospectively such as, in pertinent cases, when it vitiates contractually vested rights. To that extent, its retroactive application may be so declared invalid as impairing the obligations of contracts. 5 A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void act occurring prior to such a declaration. Thus, in our decisions on the moratorium laws, 6 we have been constrained to recognize the interim effects of said laws prior to their declaration of unconstitutionality, but there we have likewise been unable to simply ignore strong considerations of equity and fair play. So also, even as a practical matter, a situation that may aptly be described as fait accompli may no longer be open for further inquiry, let alone to be unsettled by a subsequent declaration of nullity of a governing statute. The instant controversy, however, is too far distant away from any of the above exceptional cases. To this day, the controversy between the petitioner and the private respondents on the issue of just compensation is still unresolved, partly attributable to the instant petition that has prevented the finality of the decision appealed from. The fact of the matter is that the expropriation cases, involved in this instance, were still pending appeal when the EPZA ruling was rendered and forthwith invoked by said parties. In fine, we hold that the appellate court in this particular case committed no error in its appealed decision. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.