ZALDIVAR V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 79690-707, FEB. 1, 1989 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R.

No. 79690-707 F !"#$"% 1, 1989 ENRI&UE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, vs. T'E 'ONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN $() 'ONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, *+$,-,(. /o ! $() $*/,(. $0 T$(o)!$%$(-O-!#)0-$( #() " /1 1987 Co(0/,/#/,o(, respondents. G.R. No. 80278 F !"#$"% 1, 1989 ENRI&UE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, vs. 'ON. RAUL M. GONZALES, *+$,-,(. /o ! $() $*/,(. $0 T$(o)!$%$(-O-!#)0-$( #() " /1 1987 Co(0/,/#/,o(, respondent.

RESOL

!"ON

PER CURIAM3 #e have e$a%ined carefull& the len'th& and vi'orousl& (ritten Motion for Reconsideration dated October )*, )+** filed b& counsel for respondent Raul M. ,on-ale-, relatin' to the per curiam Resolution of the Court dated October ., )+**. #e have revie(ed once %ore the Court/s e$tended per curiam Resolution, in the li'ht of the ar'u%ent adduced in the Motion for Reconsideration, but %ust conclude that (e find no sufficient basis for %odif&in' the conclusions and rulin's e%bodied in that Resolution. !he Motion for Reconsideration sets forth copious 0uotations and references to forei'n te$ts (hich, ho(ever, (hatever else the& %a& depict, do not reflect the la( in this 1urisdiction. Nonetheless, it %i'ht be useful to develop further, in so%e %easure, so%e of the conclusions reached in the per curiam Resolution, addressin' in the process so%e of the 2!en 3)45 Le'al Points for Reconsideration,2 %ade in the Motion for Reconsideration. ). "n respondent/s point A, it is clai%ed that it (as error for this Court 2to char'e respondent 6(ith7 indirect conte%pt and convict hi% of direct conte%pt.2 "n the per curiam Resolution 3pa'e 845, the Court concluded that 2respondent ,on-ale- is 'uilt& both of conte%pt of court in facie curiae and of 'ross %isconduct as an officer of the court and %e%ber of the bar.2 !he Court did not use the phrase "in facie curiae" as a technical e0uivalent of 2direct conte%pt,2 thou'h (e are a(are that courts in the nited States have so%eti%es used that phrase in spea9in' of 2direct conte%pts/ as 2conte%pts in the face of the courts.2 Rather, the court sou'ht to conve& that it re'arded the contu%acious acts or state%ents 3(hich (ere %ade both in a pleadin' filed before the Court and in state%ents 'iven to the %edia5 and the %isconduct of respondent ,on-ale- as serious acts flaunted in the face of the Court and constitutin' a frontal assault upon the inte'rit& of the Court and, throu'h the Court, the entire 1udicial s&ste%. #hat the Court (ould stress is that it re0uired respondent, in its Resolution dated : Ma& )+**, to e$plain 2(h& he should not be punished for conte%pt of court and;or sub1ected to ad%inistrative sanctions2 and in respect of (hich, respondent (as heard and 'iven the %ost a%ple opportunit& to present all defenses, ar'u%ents and evidence that he (anted to present for the consideration of this Court. !he Court did not su%%aril& i%pose punish%ent upon the respondent (hich it

could have done under Section ) of Rule .) of the Revised Rules of Court had it chosen to consider respondent/s acts as constitutin' 2direct conte%pt.2 :. "n his point C, respondent/s counsel ar'ues that it (as 2error for this Court to char'e respondent under Rule )<+ 3b5 and not )<+ of the Revised Rules of Court.2 "n its per curiam Resolution, the Court referred to Rule )<+ 3b5 of the Revised Rules of Court pointin' out that= 6R7eference of co%plaints a'ainst attorne&s either to the "nte'rated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor ,eneral is not %andator& upon the Supre%e Court such reference to the "nte'rated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor ,eneral is certainl& not an e$clusive procedure under the ter%s of Rule )<+ 3b5 of the Revised Rules of Court, especiall& (here the char'e consists of acts done before the Supre%e Court. !he above state%ent (as %ade b& the Court in response to respondent/s %otion for referral of this case either to the Solicitor ,eneral or to the "nte'rated Bar of the Philippines under Rule )<+ 3b5. Other(ise, there (ould have been no need to refer to Rule )<+ 3b5. "t is thus onl& necessar& to point out that under the old rule, Rule )<+, referral to the Solicitor ,eneral (as si%ilarl& not an e$clusive procedure and (as not the onl& course of action open to the Supre%e Court. "t is (ell to recall that under Section ) 3entitled 2Motion or co%plaint25 of Rule )<+, 2Proceedin's for the re%oval or suspension of attorne&s %a& be ta9en b& the Supre%e Court, 3)5 on its o(n %otion, or 3:5 upon the co%plaint under oath of another in (ritin'2 3Parentheses supplied5. !he procedure described in Sections : et seq. of Rule )<+ is the procedure provided for suspension or disbar%ent proceedin's initiated upon s(orn co%plaint of another person, rather than a procedure re0uired for proceedin's initiated b& the Supre%e Court on its o(n %otion. "t is inconceivable that the Supre%e Court (ould initiate motu proprioproceedin's for (hich it did not find probable cause to proceed a'ainst an attorne&. !hus, there is no need to refer a case to the Solicitor ,eneral, (hich referral is %ade 2for investi'ation to deter%ine if there is sufficient 'round to proceed (ith the prosecution of the respondent2 3Section <, Rule )<+5, (here the Court itself has initiated a'ainst the respondent. !he Court %a&, of course, refer a case to the Solicitor ,eneral if it feels that, in a particular case, further factual investi'ation is needed. "n the present case, as pointed out in the per curiamResolution of the Court 3pa'e )*5, there (as 2no need for further investi'ation of facts in the present case for it 6(as7 not substantiall& disputed b& respondent ,on-ale- that he uttered or (rote certain state%ents attributed to hi%2 and that 2in an& case, respondent has had the a%plest opportunit& to present his defense= his defense is not that he did not %a9e the state%ents ascribed to hi% but that those state%ents 'ive rise to no liabilit& on his part, havin' been %ade in the e$ercise of his freedo% of speech. !he issues (hich thus need to be resolved here are issues of la( and of basic polic& and the Court, not an& other a'enc&, is co%pelled to resolve such issues.2 "n this connection, (e note that the 0uotation in pa'e . of the Motion for Reconsideration is fro% a dissentingopinion of Mr. >ustice Blac9 in Green v. United State. 1 "t %a& be pointed out that the %a1orit& in Green v. United States, throu'h Mr. >ustice ?arlan, held, a%on' other thin's, that= @ederal courts do not lac9 po(er to i%pose sentences in e$cess of one &ear for cri%inal conte%ptA that cri%inal conte%pts are not sub1ect to 1ur& trial as a %atter of constitutional ri'htA nor does the 3 S5 Constitution re0uire that conte%pt sub1ect to prison ter%s of %ore than one &ear be based on 'rand 1ur& indict%ents. "n his concurrin' opinion in the sa%e case, Mr. >ustice @ran9furter said= #hatever the conflictin' vie(s of scholars in construin' %ore or less dubious %anuscripts of the @ourteenth Centur&, what is indisputable is that from the foundation of the United States the constitutionality of the power to punish for contempt without the intervention of a jury has not been doubted. !he @irst >udiciar& Act conferred such a po(er on the federal courts in the ver& act of their establish%ent, ) State .<, *<, and of the >udiciar& Co%%ittee of ei'ht that reported the bill to the Senate, five %e%ber includin' the chair%an, Senator, later to be Chief >ustice, Ells(orth, had been dele'ates to the Constitutional Convention 3Oliver Ells(orth, Chair%an, #illia% Paterson, Caleb Stron', Ricard Basett, #illia% @e(. ) Annals of Con' ).5. "n the @irst Con'ress itself no less than nineteen %e%ber includin' Madison (ho conte%poraneousl& introduced the Bill of Ri'hts, had been dele'ates to the Convention. And

(hen an abuse under this po(er %anifested itself, and led Con'ress to define %ore e$plicitl& the su%%ar& po(er vested in the courts, it did not re%otel& den& the e$istence of the po(er but %erel& defined the conditions for its e$ercise %ore clearl&, in an Act 2declarator& of the la( concernin' conte%pts of court.2 Act of Mar. :, )*<), B Stat B*.. $$$$$$$$$ Nor has the constitutionality of the power been doubted by this ourt throughout its e!istence . "n at least two score cases in this ourt, not to mention the vast mass of decisions in the lower federal courts, the power to punish summarily has been accepted without question. . .. 4 !o sa& that a 1ud'e (ho punishes a conte%nor 1ud'es his o(n cause, is si%plistic at best. !he 1ud'e (ho finds hi%self co%pelled to e$ercise the po(er to punish for conte%pt does so not reall& to aven'e a (ron' inflicted upon his o(n personA rather he upholds and vindicates the authorit&, di'nit& and inte'rit& of the 1udicial institution and its clai% to respectful behaviour on the part of all persons (ho appears before it, and %ost especiall& fro% those (ho are officers of the court. <. "n his point C, respondent counsel ur'es that it is error 2for this Court to appl& the 2visible tendenc&2 rule rather than the 2clear and present dan'er2 rule in disciplinar& and conte%pt char'es.2 !he Court did not purport to announce a ne( doctrine of 2visible tendenc&,2 it (as, %ore %odestl&, si%pl& paraphrasin' Section < 3d5 of Rule .) of the Revised Rules of Court (hich penali-es a variet& of contu%acious conduct includin'= 2an& i%proper conduct tendin', directl& or indirectl&, to i%pede, obstruct or de'rade the ad%inistration of 1ustice.2 !he 2clear and present dan'er2 doctrine invo9ed b& respondent/s counsel is not a %a'ic incantation (hich dissolves all proble%s and dispenses (ith anal&sis and 1ud'%ent in the testin' of the le'iti%ac& of clai%s to free speech, and (hich co%pels a court to e$onerate a defendant the %o%ent the doctrine is invo9ed, absent proof of i%pendin' apocal&pse. !he clear and present dan'er2 doctrine has been an accepted %ethod for %ar9in' out the appropriate li%its of freedo% of speech and of asse%bl& in certain conte$ts. "t is not, ho(ever, the onl& test (hich has been reco'ni-ed and applied b& courts. "n #ogun$ad v. %da. de Gon$ales, 5 this Court, spea9in' throu'h M%e. >ustice MelencioD?errera said= ...&he right of freedom of e!pression indeed, occupies a preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties 2 3Philippine Bloo%in' Mills E%plo&ees Or'ani-ation v. Philippine Bloo%in' Mills Co., "nc., 8) SCRA )+) 6)+E<7. "t is not, however, without limitations. As held in ,on-ales v. Co%%ission on Elections, :. SCRA *<8, *8* 6)+E47= 2@ro% the lan'ua'e of the specific constitutional provision, it (ould appear that the ri'ht is not susceptible of an& li%itation. No la( %a& be passed abrid'in' the freedo% of speech and of the press. &he realities of life in a comple! society preclude however, a literal interpretation. 'reedom of e!pression is not an absolute. "t would be too much to insist that all times and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. &here are other societal values that press for recognition. 2 &he prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. (nother criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, (hich includes such vehicles of the %ass %edia as radio, television and the %ovies, is the "balancing)of)interests test" 3Chief >ustice Enri0ue M. @ernando on the Bill of Ri'hts, )+.4 ed., p. .+5. &he principle "requires a court to ta*e conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation 3Separate Opinion of the late Chief >ustice Castro in ,on-ales v. Co%%ission on Elections, supra, p. *++5. 3E%phasis Supplied5 6 nder either the 2clear and present dan'er2 test or the 2balancin'DofDinterest test,2 (e believe that the state%ents here %ade b& respondent ,on-ale- are of such a nature and (ere %ade in such a %anner and under such circu%stances, as to transcend the per%issible li%its of free speech. !his conclusion (as i%plicit in the per curiamResolution of October ., )+**. "t is i%portant to point out that the 2substantive evil2 (hich the Supre%e Court has a ri'ht and a dut& to prevent does not, in the instant case, relate to threats of

ph&sical disorder or overt violence or si%ilar disruptions of public order. 2 #hat is here at sta9e is the authorit& of the Supre%e Court to confront and prevent a 2substantive evil2 consistin' not onl& of the obstruction of a free and fair hearin' of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the de'radation of the 1udicial s&ste% of a countr& and the destruction of the standards of professional conduct re0uired fro% %e%bers of the bar and officers of the courts. !he 2substantive evil2 here involved, in other (ords, is not as palpable as a threat of public disorder or riotin' but is certainl& no less deleterious and %ore far reachin' in its i%plications for societ&. B. "n his point ?, respondent/s counsel ar'ues that it is error 2for this Court to hold that intent is irrelevant in char'es of %isconduct.2 #hat the Court actuall& said on this point (as= Respondent ,on-ale- disclai%s an intent to attac9 and deni'rate the Court. !he sub1ectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as characteri-ation of his conduct or %isconduct is concerned. ?e (ill not, ho(ever, be allo(ed to disclai% the natural and plain i%port of his (ords and acts. "t is, upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out that the respondent offered no apolo'& in his t(o 3:5 e$planations and e$hibited no repentance 3Resolution, p. .A footnotes o%itted5. !he actual sub1ectivities of the respondent are irrelevant because such sub1ectivities 3understood as p&scholo'ical pheno%ena5 cannot be ascertained and reached b& the processes of this Court. ?u%an intent can onl& be sho(n derivativel& and i%plied fro% an e$a%ination of acts and state%ents. !hus, (hat the Court (as sa&in' (as that respondent/s disclai%er of an intent to attac9 and deni'rate the Court, cannot prevail over the plain i%port of (hat he did sa& and do. Respondent cannot ne'ate the clear i%port of his acts and state%ents b& si%pl& pleadin' a secret intent or state of %ind inco%patible (ith those acts or state%ents. "t is scarcel& open to dispute that, e.'., one accused of ho%icide cannot successfull& den& his cri%inal intent b& si%pl& assertin' that (hile he %a& have inserted a 9nife bet(een the victi%/s ribs, he actuall& acted fro% hi'h %otives and 9ind feelin's for the latter. 8 "n his point ), respondent/s counsel ar'ues that it is error 2for this Court to punish respondent for conte%pt of court for out of court publications.2 Respondent/s counsel as9s this Court to follo( (hat he presents as alle'ed %odern trends in the nited Fin'do% and in the nited States concernin' the la( of conte%pt. #e are, ho(ever, unable to re'ard the te$ts that he cites as bindin' or persuasive in our 1urisdiction. !he Court (ent to so%e len'th to docu%ent the state of our case la( on this %atter in its per curiam Resolution. !here is nothin' in the circu%stances of this case that (ould su''est to this Court that that case la(, (hich has been follo(ed for at least half a centur& or so, ou'ht to be reversed. E. "n his point >, respondent/s counsel pleads that the i%position of indefinite suspension fro% the practice of la( constitutes 2cruel, de'radin' or inhu%an punish%ent2. !he Court finds it difficult to consider this a substantial constitutional ar'u%ent. !he indefiniteness of the respondent/s suspension, far fro% bein' 2cruel2 or 2de'radin'2 or 2inhu%an,2 has the effect of placin', as it (ere, the 9e& to the restoration of his ri'hts and privile'es as a la(&er in his o(n hands. !hat sanction has the effect of 'ivin' respondent the chance to pur'e hi%self in his o(n 'ood ti%e of his conte%pt and %isconduct b& ac9no(led'in' such %isconduct, e$hibitin' appropriate repentance and de%onstratin' his (illin'ness and capacit& to live up to the e$actin' standards of conduct ri'htl& de%anded fro% ever& %e%ber of the bar and officer of the courts. ACCORC"N,LG, the Court Resolved to CENG the Motion for Reconsideration for lac9 of %erit. !he denial is @"NAL. !he Court also NO!EC the E$DParte Manifestation and Motion, dated October :8, )+** and the Supple%ental Manifestation, dated October :., )+**, filed b& respondent 'ernan, .+., Narvasa, ,elencio)-errera, Gutierre$, +r., ru$, .aras, 'eliciano, Gancayco, .adilla, /idin, Sarmiento, ortes, Gri0o)(quino, ,edialdea and 1egalado, ++., concur.