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Eusebio v Eusebio, et al. Facts: Petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio. He alleged that his father, who died on November 28, 1952, resided in Quezon City. Eugenios siblings (Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos), stating that they are illegitimate children of Andres, opposed the petition and alleged that Andres was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. They prayed that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been improperly laid. The CFI of Rizal granted Eugenios petition and overruled his siblings objection. Issue: Whether venue had been properly laid in Rizal? Held: No. Don Andres Eusebio up to October 29, 1952, was and had always been domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. He only bought a house and lot at 889-A Espana Extension, Quezon City because his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City. Even before he was able to transfer to the house he bought, Andres suffered a stroke and was forced to live in his sons residence. It is well settled that domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one owns health even if coupled with knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home. Having resided for over seventy years in Pampanga, the presumption is that Andres retained such domicile. Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City permanently. There is no direct evidence of such intent Andres did not manifest his desire to live in Quezon City indefinitely; Eugenio did not testify thereon; and Dr. Jesus Eusebio was not presented to testify on the matter. Andres did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Some of his children remained in that municipality. In the deed of sale of his house at 889 A Espana Ext., Andres gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. The marriage contract signed by Andres when he was married in articulo mortis to Concepcion Villanueva two days prior to his death stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga. The requisites for a change of domicile include (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice, (2) physical presence at the place chosen, (3) intention to stay therein permanently. Although Andres complied with the first two requisites, there is no change of domicile because the third requisite is absent. Anent the contention that appellants submitted themselves to the authority of the CFI of Rizal because they introduced evidence on the residence of the decedent, it must be noted that appellants specifically made of record that they were NOT submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of assailing the same. In sum, the Court found that Andres was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the CFI of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly. Doctrine: Domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained. It is not changed by presence in a place for ones own health.

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents. FACTS: 1. On May 2, 1973, Virginia Fule, creditor, filed with CFI of Laguna, at Calamba presided over by Judge Malvar, a petition for letters of administration alleging that Amado Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna and in other places, within the jurisdiction of this Court. She also moved ex parte to be appointed as special administratrix over the estate. She was appointed as such by Judge Malvar. 2. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa Garcia on May 8, 1973 contending that the order appointing Virginia was issued without jurisdiction since no notice of the petition for letter of administration has been served upon all persons interested in the estate. As the surviving spouse of Amado, she claimed that she should be preferred in the appointment as special

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administratrix. She filed a petition for letters of administration before the CFI of Rizal, QC branch over the same intestate estate of Amado. 3. As claimed by Fule in her supplemental petition for the appointment of regular administration the original petition was modified in these respect: a. that Amado was elected as Constitutional delegate to the first district of Laguna and his last place of residence was Calamba, Laguna b. the deletion of the names of Preciosa Garcia and Agustina Garcia (child) as legal heirs of Amado c. that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado and that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of Virginia d. That Virginia be appointed as regular administratrix. This supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa since it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the CFI of Laguna. Preciosa then filed an opposition to the original and supplemental petitions for letters of administration raising the issue of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia in the estate and her disqualification as special administratrix. ISSUES/ HELD: 1. Where is the proper venue for this action, in Quezon City where Amado died or in Calamba, Laguna where he has properties? Under Sec. 1, Rule 73, it is provided that: Section 1.Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedents is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. a. The submitted death certificate shows that Amado resided in QC at the time of his death. b. Amados residence certificate which was taken three months before his death showed his residence as QC. c. The Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated Nov. 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative and the Deed of Donation dated Jan. 8, 1973 transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land to Agustina Garcia (child) showed his residence as QC. These documents all showed his residence as QC. Thus, the proper venue is QC. 2. Who is the proper adnministratrix of the estate? The consideration that overrides is the beneficial interest of the appointee of the Court in the estate of the decedent. The Court ruled that Preciosa is prima facie entitled to the appointment as special administratrix, being the wife of Amado. Virginia, who is the illegitimate sister of Amado is incapable of any successional right. In the donation inter vivos in favor of the child, Amado indicated Preciosa as his wife. Also in his certificate of candidacy as constitutional delegate, Preciosa was indicated as the wife. It needs to be emphasized that the appointment is merely temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed by the Court.

ROSE BUSH MALIG and JOE, THOMAS, and JOHN all surnamed BUSH, represented in this suit by their attorney-in-fact, ROSE BUSH MALIG, plaintiffs-appellants,

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vs. MARIA SANTOS BUSH, defendant-appellee. FACTS: Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging they are the only direct and natural heirs of John Bush under a common law relationship with Apolonia Perez. o Plaintiffs allege that their parents were not suffering from any disability to marry each other. o That during Johns lifetime, they were considered and treated as natural children. o Upon Johns death, he left several real and personal properties. o Maria Santos-Bush falsely claims that she was the legal wife so she was appointed as administratrix by the CFI. o Maria filed for partition of the said properties of John, claiming that John left a will to bequeath his estate to Maria Bush, Anita Bush and Anna Berger. o Maria knew very well that the plaintiffs are the acknowledged natural children. o Plaintiffs discovered the fraud and misrepresentation of Maria and prayed for annulment of the partition, an inventory and accounting of all properties, etc. Defendant Maria moved to dismiss, alleging lack of Cause of Action, res judicata and statute of limitation. DENIED. On the hearing, defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the court, stating that the action was to annul a partition approved by the probate court, making the probate court the one which should hear the case, citing Rule 75, Section 1. APPROVED *not because of defendants argument but because the action had prescribed*. not indubitable. The defendant insists Rule 73, Sec. 1, where the rule fixes jurisdiction for purposes of the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate." The matter really concerns venue, as the caption of Rule cited indicates, and in order to preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." In the final analysis this action is not necessarily one to annul the partition already made and approved by the probate court, and to reopen the estate proceeding so that a new partition may be made, but for recovery by the plaintiffs of the portion of their alleged inheritance of which, through fraud, they have been deprived. Wherefore, the case is remanded for further proceedings. ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN, respondents. FACTS: Petitioners Rodriguez petition this Court for a writ of certiorari and prohibition to the CFI Bulacan, for its refusal to grant their motion to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 1331, which said Court is alleged to have taken cognizance of without jurisdiction. Alleged in Motion to dismiss, CFI Bulacan has no jurisdiction to try the above-entitled case in view of the pendency of another action for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez in the CFI Rizal. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on Feb 12, 1963 in Manila. Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan the last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez. Petitioners Rodriguez filed petition for leave of court to allow them to examine alleged will. Before the court could act on the petition (examination of will) it was withdrawn. Petitioners Rodriguez filed before CFI Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging that he was a resident of Paranaque, Rizal and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special

ISSUE: Whether the lower court can dismiss a case on a ground not alleged in the motion to dismiss? RULING: NO!!! In dismissing the complaint upon a ground not relied upon, the lower court did so motu proprio. The court did not even state why the action had prescribed, and why in effect, without any evidence or new arguments on the question, it reversed its previous ruling that the ground of prescription was

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Administratrix of the estate. Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probation of the will delivered by them. It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Paraaque, Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in Paraaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan. Petitioners Rodriguez contend that since the intestate proceedings in the CFI Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the CFI Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate, citing as authority in support thereof the case of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De Borja, G.R. No. 7792, July 27, 1955. The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand that the CFI Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963. This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be of proper venue, yet the rule grants precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is first invoked, without taking venue into account. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. When a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has been filed by the testator himself. The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable. There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One is that their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a view to divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules. Certainly the order of priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was not designed to convert the settlement of decedent's estates into a race between applicants, with the administration of the properties as the price for the fleetest.

ISSUE: WON the domicile of the testator affects the jurisdiction of the Court. HELD: No. The power to settle decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court. CFI Bulacan was entitled to priority in the settlement of the estate in question, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate proceedings, said court did not commit any abuse of discretion. It is the proceedings in the Rizal Court that should be discontinued. The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins that: The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. (Sec. 1)

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ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents. FACTS: Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow(petitioner) and two minor sons, residing in Q.C. and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a petition for letter of administration with the CFI Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Q.C. The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife(widow), filed a petition with CFI Rizal Q.C. for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but the said court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon City shall have acted on the probate proceedings. CFI Cebu, in effect deferred to the probate proceedings in the Quezon City court. Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon City, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were both denied. Lourdes filed special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent CA. CA favored Lourdes holding that CFI Cebu had first acquired jurisdiction. Yes. SC ruled that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish. Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. Such court, may upon learning a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the Q.C. court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would be shown to be false and improper,and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the .Q.C. court to the exclusion of all other courts. No. Under the facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court. Necessarily, neither could Q.C. court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. It is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court undisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, Q.C. court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Q.C. was the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court could not be contested except by appeal from

ISSUE/S WON CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition against Q.C. ordering it to refrain from proceeding with the testate proceedings .WON CFI Quezon City acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference tot he precedence of probate over intestate proceedings.

HELD:

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said court in the original case except when want of jurisdiction appears on the record. When proceedings for settlement of estate will not be annulled even if court had improper venue the mischievous effect in the administration of justice of considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over again the same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another province is too obvious to require comment. It would be an unfair to petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court. Issue: W/N the proceedings for the summary settlement of the estate of a deceased person, the court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the question of title to real property. Held: This is true only where the title is disputed by a third person, not by the surviving spouse or heirs of the deceased, as successors of the latter. There are two conjugal partnership involved here. Under the circumstances, it would be fair to hold that the property in question belongs to the two conjugal partnership, share and share alike. LEONOR P. REYES, assisted by her husband, AGUSTIN ARCON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE BONIFACIO YSIP, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, and Dr. AURELIO CRISOSTOMO, Special Administratrix in Special Proceedings No. 563, respondents. FACTS: This is a petition for a writ of certiorari and mandamus to compel Judge Ysip to allow petitioner to submit evidence on her claim of filiation to Juan Reyes Panlilio. Prior to the above case, there was a special proceeding wherein a petition was presented for the probate of the last will and testament of Juan Reyes Panlilio. o Petitioner filed an opposition to this. o Special Administratrix objected to the personality and right of petitioner to oppose and contest the will. Thereafter, the administratrix ask the court to resolve the right of petitioner to contest the will. o The court permitted the petitioner to appear and intervene in the special proceedings. o Petitioner offered evidence on her filiation. This was objected by the administratrix.

De Borja vs Tan (c/o Jo Lumbres) Macias vs Uy Kim et al (c/o Charmaine Mejia) In the Matter of the Summary Settlement of the Estate of Patricio Sanchez, Deceased. VicentaFalcatan,petitioner and appellant,vs.Anastacio Sanchez and Josefa Miguel, the latter in her own behalf and as the mother of the minors BENJAMIN, ALFREDO, DELFIN and ZENAIDA, all surnamed SANCHEZ,oppositors and appellees. Facts: This an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of the City of Zamboanga providing for the summary settlement of the estate of Patricio Sanchez, deceased. Appellant assails the decision upon the ground that in proceedings for the summary settlement of the estate of a deceased person, under Section 2, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the question of title to real property.

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Judge Ysip held that the only issue in this case is the probate of the will and that the presentation of evidence for filiation was out of place. o So petitioner instituted this present petition for a writ of certiorari and mandamus. Petitioner claims that it is the policy of the court to allow a duly acknowledged natural child to intervene in the proceedings for the probate of the will and establish her status as such. o Marta Torres objected to the appointment of any one except herself, while Juan Cailles Tan Poo, on behalf of the Chinese woman, opposed the appointment of Marta Torres. The probate court being unable to determine who, if either, was the lawful wife of the deceased, appointed a disinterested third person to act as administrator.

Issue/Held: WON the probate courts decision must be affirmed- YES Ratio: Section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that letters of administration should be granted, first, to the surviving husband or wife; second, to other relatives in the order named; third, in case the surviving wife or next of kin or person selected by them be unsuitable, the administration may be granted to some other person, such as one of the principal creditors; and fourth, if there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, the administration may go to such person as the court may appoint. It appears that Tan Y. Soc was appointed administrator of the said Tan Po Pic, deceased, the Court of First Instance of Manila under the misapprehension that Tan Po Pic was a resident of the city of Manila at the time of his death. After it had been ascertained that the deceased was a resident of the Province of Rizal, the Court of First Instance of Manila transferred the case to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. In that court, as we have already seen, the appointment by the Court of First Instance of Manila was disregarded the proceedings were begun for the appointment of an administrator by the Court of First Instance of Rizal. It must be remembered that the probate court did not find as a fact that there was a wife in China; nor does his appointment of a third person determine the fact of the existence of another wife in China. The court considered the facts and circumstances as they were presented in the proceedings and upon the whole believed it for the best interest of all concerned to appoint as administrator a disinterested third person, particularly in view of the fact that there was likely to be litigation between Marta Torres and the Chinese wife as to which is in fact his legal wife and entitled to an interest in the estate of the deceased Tan Po Pic. We do not find the errors assigned sufficient to warrant any action on the part of this court.

ISSUE: In a hearing for the probate of a will, is petitioner allowed to present evidence of her filiation and oppose the probate? RULING: The determination of the persons entitled to inherit should only be made after payment of all debts, funeral charges, etc. is effected. As provided in the Rules of Court, the submission of evidence to determine the persons entitled to inherit is in the last stage of the proceedings. To allow petitioner to present evidence to prove her filiation would be injecting issues that are really not part of the case for probate of the will. Moreover, if petitioner was allowed to do such a thing, the nature of the evidence submitted would only be prima facie, wherein it would only justify her right to intervene and not her right to inherit. Basically, for the sake of avoiding confusion of issues in a petition for the probate of the will of Juan Reyes Panlilio, petitioner is not allowed to present evidence not because she was being deprived of her right but to avoid multiplicity of issues. TORRES VS JAVIER Facts: TC: refused to appoint Marta Torres who claimed to be the lawful wife of the deceased, and, instead, appointed Juan L. Javier administrator. The appeal is taken by Marta Torres from that order of appointment. It appears that two women are claiming to be the legal wife of Tan Po Pic, deceased, Marta Torres and a Chinese woman named Yu Teng New.

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The court had a right in view of the controversy between the women to name a disinterested third person as administrator and leave the controversy between them to be settled in the administration proceedings at the proper time. INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO BORROMEO-HERRERA, petitioner, vs. FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, respondents. Facts: Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died in Paranaque, Rizal at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu. Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the probate of a one page document as the last will and testament left by the said deceased, devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and designating Junquera as executor thereof. The document, drafted in Spanish, was allegedly signed and thumbmarked by the deceased in the presence of Cornelio Gandionco, Eusebio Cabiluna, and Felixberto Leonardo who acted as witnesses. Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. After due trial, the probate court held that the document presented as the will of the deceased was a forgery. The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings. Several parties came before the court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo. The court also ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal and equitable shares among the 9 declared intestate heirs. Respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier claimed as heir under the forged will, filed a motion before the trial court praying that he be declared as one of the heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, alleging that he is an illegitimate son of the deceased and that in the declaration of heirs made by the trial court, he was omitted, in disregard of the law making him a forced heir entitled to receive a legitime like all other forced heirs. As an acknowledged illegitimate child, he stated that he was entitled to a legitime equal in every case to four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child. Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was already barred by the order of the court declaring the persons named therein as the legal heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, the court dismissed the motion. Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In the memorandum he submitted to support his motion for reconsideration, Fortunato changed the basis for his claim to a portion of the estate. He asserted and incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary Rights. In the waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The motion was opposed on the ground that the trial court, acting as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim; that respondent Fortunato Borromeo is estopped from asserting the waiver agreement; that the waiver agreement is void as it was executed before the declaration of heirs; that the same is void having been executed before the distribution of the estate and before the acceptance of the inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and inexistent for lack of subject matter. After due hearing, the trial court concluding that the five declared heirs who signed the waiver agreement assigning their hereditary rights to Fortunato Borromeo had lost the same rights, declared the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo. In the present petition, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the trial court's order declaring respondent Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo. The petitioner argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of respondent Fortunato Borromeo because it is not a money claim against the decedent but a claim for properties, real and personal, which constitute all of the shares of the heirs in the decedent's estate, heirs who allegedly waived their rights in his favor. The claim of the private respondent under the waiver agreement, according to the petitioner, may be likened to that of a creditor of the heirs which is improper.

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Respondent Borromeo asserts that since the waiver or renunciation of hereditary rights took place after the court assumed jurisdiction over the properties of the estate it partakes of the nature of a partition of the properties of the estate needing approval of the court because it was executed in the course of the proceedings. He further maintains that the probate court loses jurisdiction of the estate only after the payment of all the debts of the estate and the remaining estate is distributed to those entitled to the same. Held: With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, we hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver agreement. It must be noted that in Special Proceedings No. 916-R the lower court disallowed the probate of the will and declared it as fake. Upon appeal, this Court affirmed the decision of the lower court on March 30, 1967, in G.R. No. L-18498. Subsequently, several parties came before the lower court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo. We see no impediment to the trial court in exercising jurisdiction and trying the said claims or petitions. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the trial court extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate. In view of the foregoing, the questioned order of the trial court dated December 24, 1974, is hereby SET ASIDE. In G.R. No. 41171, the order of the respondent judge dated December 24, 1974, declaring the respondent entitled to 5/9 of the estate of the late Vito Borromeo and the order dated July 7, 1975, denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned order are hereby SET ASIDE for being NULL and VOID; SO ORDERED. LEOPOLDO MORALES and PRINCESITA SANTERO MORALES, petitioners. vs.COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, BR. V, ATTY. ROLANDO DIAZ, in his capacity as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of SIMONA PAMUTI, ROBERTO MELGAR and FELISA JARDIN, respondents. Facts: On February 12, 1968, SimonaPamuti mortgaged a saltbed fishpond (property) located in Cavite in favor of her grandchild, petitioner PrincesitaSantero Morales for P15,000.00. The property was extrajudicially foreclosed in favor ofPrincesita for P15,452.00. Simona survived both her husband Pascual and son Pablo. Petitions for letters of administration of the intestate estate of PascualSantero and Pablo Santero in Special Proceedings Nos. N2061 and N-2062 were filed by JuanitoSantero, Pablo's eldest nd natural child with his 2 wife. o Princesita was an oppositor in these proceedings. Clerk of Court, Atty. Rolando Diaz, was appointed, as special administrator and later as regular administrator During the pendency of the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estates of Pascual and Pablo, Juanito filed a petition for guardianship over the properties of SimonaPamuti(SP. Proc. No. N2068). Atty. Rolando Diaz was appointed legal guardian of SimonaPamuti. He filed a motion to use the funds of the estates of Pascual and Pablo Santero to redeem Simona's property that had been sold at auction to petitioner Princesita. GRANTED in an order dated July 11, 1975 on August 4, 1975, the respondent court, on the finding that Simona is a forced heir of both Pablo Santero and PascualSantero, reiterated its Order of July 11, 1975 and ordered the respondent Clerk of Court "to redeem the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 5469 immediately." The date of the Order, August 4, 1975, is the same date on which the redemption period was set to expire. On August 6, 1975, the Deputy Sheriff of Cavite tendered to petitioner/s Prudential Bank Check No. 140867 dated July 17, 1975 in the sum of P16, 342.00 by way of redemption of the property in question. o The tender was not accepted by the petitioner/s on the ground that the check was not a certified check, that the amount tendered was insufficient and that the tender was made after the lapse of the redemption period. o On August 8, 1975, the petitioner/s executed an affidavit of Consolidation and requested the Provincial Sheriff of Cavite to execute the final deed of conveyance. The

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provincial sheriff did not issue the final deed requested by the petitioner/s. Neither did he issue any certificate of redemption in favor of the legal guardian of Simona. SimonaPamuti died intestate. In the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Simona, one FelisaPamuti-Jardin claimed to be Simona's sole surviving heir. o Petitioner PrincesitaSantero was allowed to intervene not as heir but as "creditors of the intestate estate of the late SimonaPamuti, or as co-owners, together with said intestate estates, of certain properties as the interests of said oppositors may appear". o The same respondent Clerk of Court was appointed Administrator and eventually, the three special proceeding/s for the settlement of the intestate estates of PascualSantero, Pablo Santero and SimonaPamuti were consolidated. On June 15, 1976, the respondent Clerk of Court, in his capacity as administrator of the intestate estate of SimonaPamuti, filed a "Motion to Order the Provincial Sheriff of Cavite To Issue Certificate of Redemption" GRANTED on January 13, 1977. o Court ruled that the administrator herein has complied with the requirements of law for the redemption of mortgaged properties. o the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the grounds that the respondent probate court does not have jurisdiction to resolve the validity of the redemption of the property in question; that there was no valid redemption and that the motion was resolved without giving the herein petitioners a chance to be heard DENIED In the May 17, 1977 Order, the administrator was temporarily enjoined from taking over possession of the property, from disposing of its produce and was required to surrender possession of the property. To implement the just cited order, the respondent court, on June 16, 1977, ordered the administrator to break open the bodega standing on the property. The petitioner/s allege/s that on June 18, 1977, the respondent sheriff Melgar together with two policemen entered the premises, forced his way in, opened the bodega by force, hauled the salt from the bodega. Thus, the instant petition. ISSUE: WON the Orders on January 13, 1977, May 17, 1977 and June 16, 1977 were VOIDon the principal ground that the issue regarding the validity of the redemption involves a question of ownership which is outside the jurisdiction of the respondent court as a probate court and that the petitioners may be deprived of possession of the property only through a separate civil action? HELD: YES, the questioned orders were VOID. The controversy was not whether or not the redemption ordered by the respondent court was done, but whether or not such redemption, as done, was valid. According to settled jurisprudence, such controversy is outside the jurisdiction of the probate court. Parenthetically, it must be mentioned that the respondent court itself had, at that time, already determined that the petitioners are intervenors in the settlement proceedings of Simona's estate not as heirs but as "co-owners" with the intestate estates, and the respondent court in fact would later state in the January 13, 1977 order that the petitioners have "not been called to participate in the proceedings." The petitioners are, therefore, outside parties claiming title to property included in the inventory of properties under administration. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the questioned Orders of January 13, 1977, May 17, 1977 and June 16, 1977 are declared VOID for having been issued beyond the jurisdiction of the probate court. G.R. No. 139587 November 22, 2000

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF DECEASED ISMAEL REYES, THE HEIRS OF OSCAR R. REYES, petitioners, vs.CESAR R. REYES, respondent. Facts: Spouses Ismael Reyes and FelisaRevita Reyes are the registered owners of parcels of land in Arayat Street, Cubao, Quezon City covered by TCT Nos. 4983 and 3598 (39303). The spouses have seven children, namely: Oscar, Araceli, Herminia, Aurora, Emmanuel, Cesar and Rodrigo, all surnamed Reyes.

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On April 18, 1973, Ismael Reyes died intestate. Prior to his death, Ismael Reyes was notified by the BIR of his income tax deficiency which arose out of his sale of a parcel land located in TandangSora, Quezon City. For failure to settle his tax liability, the amount increased to about P172,724.40 and since no payment was made by the heirs of deceased Ismael Reyes, the property covered by TCT No. 4983 was levied,sold and eventually forfeited by the BIR in favor of the government. In 1976, Oscar Reyes availed of the BIRs tax amnesty and he was able to redeem the property covered by TCT No. 4983 upon payment of the reduced tax liability amounting to P18,000. On May 18, 1982, the Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City sent a notice to FelisaRevita Reyes informing her that the Arayat properties will be sold at public auction on August 25, 1982 for her failure to settle the real estate tax delinquency from 1974-1981. On December 15, 1986, petitioners predecessor Oscar Reyes entered into an amnesty compromise agreement with the City Treasurer and settled the accounts of Felisa R. Reyes. On May 10, 1989, private respondent Cesar Reyes, filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration with the RTC of Quezon City praying for his appointment as administrator of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes which estate included 50% of the Arayat properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983 and 3598. o Oscar Reyes filed his conditional opposition thereto on the ground that the Arayat properties do not form part of the estate of the deceased as he (Oscar) had acquired the properties by redemption and or purchase. o Court GRANTED the petition BUT stated that this determination is provisional in character and shall be without prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought hereafter in the proper Court on the issue of ownership of the properties o Oscar Reyes filed his objection to the inventory reiterating that the Arayat properties had been forfeited in favor of the government and he was the one who subsequently redeemed the same from the BIR using his own funds. Oscar Reyes filed a motion demanding for accounting to be done by oppositor is-DENIED o MR-DENIED o He then filed his appeal with the CA. While the appeal was pending, Oscar died and he was substituted by his heirs, herein petitioners. CA affirmed probate courts order. MR DENIED

ISSUE: (1)WON respondent Court erred in ruling that the court a quo correctly included one half (1/2) of the Arayat properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983 and 3598 (39303) in the inventory of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes (2)WON respondent Court erred in upholding that the court a quo has no jurisdiction to determine the issue of ownership. HELD: 1) NO. The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and the probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of administrators, executors, guardians and trustees. The question of ownership is as a rule, an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality.Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate proceeding, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. We find that the respondent Court did not err in affirming the provisional inclusion of the subject properties to the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes without prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought thereafter in the proper court on the issue of ownership considering that the subject properties are still titled under the torrens system in the names of spouses Ismael and FelisaRevita Reyes which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law. The declaration of the provisional character of the inclusion of the subject properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the Probate Court.

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2) NO. Settled is the rule that the RTC acting as a probate court exercises but limited jurisdiction, thus it has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent,UNLESS the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced. The facts however, do not call for the application of the exception to the rule. The purpose why the probate court allowed the introduction of evidence on ownership was for the sole purpose of determining whether the subject properties should be included in the inventory which is within the probate courts competence. In fact, the probate court in its Order stated that "for resolution is the matter of the inventory of the estate, mainly to consider what properties should be included in the inventory and what should not be included." There was nothing on record that both parties submitted the issue of ownership for its final resolution. Thus the respondent Court did not err in ruling that the trial court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of ownership conclusively. CUNANAN vs AMPARO (c/o Rocky Baliao) VALERA et al vs INSERTO et al (c/o Eloisa Barretto) Intestate Estate of the deceased Lee Liong. RAFAEL A. DINGLASAN, ET ALS., vs. ANG CHIA, as Administratrix of the above intestate, LEE BING HOO alias CLARO LEE, and LEE BUN TING FACTS: Rafael Dinglasan et al. filed a case in the Court of First Instance of Capiz on February 16, 1948, against Ang Chia, her son Claro Lee and one Lee Bun Ting to recover the ownership and possession of a parcel of land located at Capiz, Capiz, and damages. Subsequently, the plaintiffs discovered that there was pending in the same court a case concerning the intestate estate of Lee Liong. The plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint seeking the inclusion as party-defendant of the administratrix of the estate, who is the same widow Ang Chia, who was already a party-defendant in her personal capacity. The plaintiffs also filed in the intestate proceedings a verified claim in intervention and a motion praying that a co-administrator of the estate be appointed and the bond of the administratrix be increased. By their claim in intervention, the plaintiffs made of record the pendency of the aforesaid civil case and prayed that the intestate proceedings be not closed until said civil case shall have been terminated. The court granted the paryer to increase the administratixs bond but however took cognizance of the pendency of said civil case. The administratrix did not appeal from said order nor file a new bond and instead moved for the closing of the proceedings and her discharge as administratrix on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. ISSUE: Whether it was proper for the Probate Court to take cognizance of the civil case. The act of the lower court in taking cognizance of civil case is not tantamount to assuming jurisdiction over said case nor does it violate the ruling of this court which says that "when questions arise as to the ownership of property, alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the course of administration proceedings. The Court of First Instance, acting as probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a Court of First Instance to try and determine ordinary actions. . . ." The court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases it cannot be branded as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or administrator". This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be

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rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs. Another rule of court provides that "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased." (Section 17, Rule 3.) This rule also implies that a probate case may be held in abeyance pending determination of an ordinary case wherein an administrator is made a party. MA. DIVINA ORTAEZ-ENDERES, for herself and as the Judicially Appointed Special Administratrix of the Philinterlife Shares of Stocks of DR. JUVENCIO P. ORTAEZ, JOSE N. ORTAEZ, ROMEO JOVEN N. ORTAEZ, ENRICO N. ORTAEZ, CESAR N. ORTAEZ and LIGAYA S. NOVICIO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, JOSE C. LEE, CARLOS LEE, ANGEL ONG, CARMENCITA Y. TAN, BENJAMIN C. LEE, MA. PAZ C. LEE and ALMA AGGABAO, respondents. FACTS: Petitioners filed before the SEC a case for the annulment of transfer of shares of stocks to private respondents, annulment of sale of corporate properties authorized by private respondents who compose the management of the corporation, annulment of subscriptions on increased capital stocks, accounting and inspection of corporate books and records, and damages. Petitioners also prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against private respondents to enjoin them from exercising their rights as stockholders of Philinterlife on the ground that their shares of stock were acquired through illegal and fraudulent schemes. Petitioners alleged that Philinterlife is a registered corporation founded in 1954 by the late Dr. Juvencio Ortaez; that at the time of his death in 1980, Dr. Ortaez owned at least fifty-one percent (51%) of the capital stock of the company; that special proceedings were pending with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85, for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Dr. Ortaez, where Rafael S. Ortaez and Jose S. Ortaez were jointly appointed as special administrators. Petitioners further stated that after the death of Dr. Ortaez and without the prior authorization of the intestate court, one-half (1/2) of the shares of stock of Dr. Ortaez were transferred in the names of private respondents through the manipulations, devices and machinations of the latter; that the shares of stocks of private respondents lawfully belonged to the estate of Dr. Ortaez and hence, they are not entitled to enjoy and exercise their rights and privileges as stockholders of the company. Contrary to the contentions of petitioners, private respondents Jose Lee, Carlos Lee, Benjamin Lee and Alma Aggabao became stockholders of Philinterlife on March 23, 1983 when Jose S. Ortaez, the principal stockholders at that time, executed a deed of sale of his shares of stock to the private respondents; and that the right of petitioners to question the Memorandum of Agreement and the acquisition of shares of stock of private respondents is barred by prescription. Case ruled by SEC Hearing Officer, then SEC en banc, then CA. In all levels, petitioners were denied and petition dismissed. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals as well as that of the SEC En Banc and SEC Hearing Officer denied the prayer of petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain private respondents from exercising their rights as stockholders on record of Philippines International Life Insurance Co., Inc. (Philinterlife, for brevity).

ISSUE: WON the whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the SEC when it ruled that petitioners had not established clear existing legal rights to entitle them to a writ of injunction to enjoin private respondents from exercising their rights as stockholders on record of Philinterlife. HELD: No. Injunction may issue pendente lite only in cases of extreme urgency, where the right to the possession, during the pendency of the main case, of the property involved is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in favor of the complainant seeking the possession of the property pendente lite; where there was willful and unlawful invasion on plaintiff's right, over his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one. Before an injunction can be issued, it is

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essential that the following requisites be present: (1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. We agree with the findings of the SEC as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that petitioners failed not only to establish a threatened violation of a right but they also failed to discharge the burden of clearly showing the right to be protected. 11 On the mere contention that the shareholdings of private respondents belong to the estate of the late Dr. Ortaez which is still the subject of settlement before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, petitioners had not established their clear legal rights to obtain injunctive relief against private respondents. Injunction, whether preliminary or final, is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Petitioners cited in their reply the issuance of an Order by the intestate court declaring that the shares of stock of Philinterlife belong to the estate. It is admitted that the special proceedings are still pending before the court and the estate had not been partitioned and distributed. Notwithstanding the proceedings being conducted by the intestate court, the petitioners' rights or interests over the estate or over the assailed shareholdings in the name of private respondents are still future and unsettled rights which cannot be protected by the writ of injunction. The rule is well settled that the jurisdiction of the regional trial court as a probate or intestate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The intestate court may pass upon the title to a certain property for the purpose of determining whether the same should or should not be included in the inventory but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be constituted by the parties. The court in charge of the intestate proceedings cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. Therefore, the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of violation of an actually existing right of petitioners over the shareholdings presently in the possession of private respondents is no ground for an injunction being a mere damnum absque injuria. Contrary to the contentions of petitioners, the SEC found that private respondents are bona fide owners of shares of stock in Philinterlife constituting the majority thereof or 94% of the outstanding capital stock of the company. Records show that they have been stockholders of Philinterlife since 1983 up to the present. It was only in 1994 that petitioners sought the annulment of the shareholdings of private respondents before the SEC. The grant of the writ of injunction against private respondents by restraining them from exercising their rights as stockholders would in effect dispose of the main case without a trial. The SEC acted correctly in denying the issuance of the writ until the merits of the case can be heard. Further, it is a basic procedural postulate that a preliminary injunction is not proper where its purpose is to take the property out of control or possession of one party and transfer the same to the hands of another who did not have such control at the inception of the case and whose title has not been clearly established by law Angelita Valdez v. Republic of the Philippines FACTS: Petitioner married Sofio in Jan 11,1971 wherein the former gave birth to their only child , Nancy. Petitioner states that she and Sofio argue constantly because of the latters unemployment and did not bring home any money. Eventually, Sofio left their conjugal dwelling. 3 years have passed that petitioner did have any knowledge of Sofios whereabouts until Oct, 1975 , Sofio showed up and they talked and agreed to separate and executed a document to that effect. They didnt see each other anymore after that. petitioner believing that Sofio was dead, married Virgilio Reyes on June 20, 1985. Due to the denial of Virgilios application for naturalization in the US department of Homeland Security because of the subsisting marriage of petitioner with Sofio, Petitioner filed a petition before RTC seeking declaration of presumptive death. RTC: dismissed petition for lack of merit and held that Angelita was not able to prove a well grounded belief that Sofio was already dead (Art 41, FC). Further stating that she did not exert any effort in finding her husband anymore. Petitioner filed a motion for recon arguing that Civil Code provisions apply in this case and not Family Code. Because marriage was celebrated on Jan 11, 1971 long before Family Code took effect. Further arguing that she acquired a vested right under the Civil Code and stricter provisions in the FC should not applied against her ( Art. 384 and 390) To apply it would impair petitioner rights acquired under the Civil Code. RTC denied Motion for Recon. Hence this petition.

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ISSUE: WON RTC erred in applying FC and holding that petitioner needed to prove a well- founded belief that Sofio was already dead?

HELD: YES. RTC is wrong. Petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and said marriage is legal and valid. Court dismissed the petitioner since no decree of presumption of Sofios death can be granted under the Civil Code. Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence. Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982. Consequently, at the time of petitioners marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioners capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the Family Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion. To rectroactively apply provision of the Family Code would go against the objectives that Family Code wishes to achieve.

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