Nash Equilibrium of Example Games

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Nash Equilibrium of Example Games

or, minus your delay), and the second number represents your colleagues

Nash Equilibria of Example Games

C C D 1, 1 0, 4 D 4, 0 3, 3

Figure 3.1 The TCP users (aka the Prisoners) Dilemma.

e options what should you adopt, C or D? Does it depend on what you lleague will do? Furthermore, from the perspective of the network operad of behavior can he expect from the two users? Will any two users behave en presented with this scenario? Will the behavior change if the network ws the users to communicate with each other before making a decision? changes to the delays would the users decisions still be the same? How ers behave if they have the opportunity to face this same decision with the part multiple times? Do answers to the above questions depend on how gents are and how they view each others rationality? Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham Nash Equilibrium of Example Games
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or, minus your delay), and the second number represents your colleagues in Figure 3.5.

Nash Equilibria of Example Games

C C D 1, 1 0, 4 D 4, 0 3, 3

Left Left Right

Right

1, 1 0, 0

0, 0 1, 1

Figure 3.1 The TCP users (aka the Prisoners) Dilemma. Figure 3.5: Coordination game.

e options what should you adopt, C or D? Does it depend on what you lleague will do? Furthermore, from the perspective of the network operaZero-sum d of behavior can he expect fromgames the two users? Will any two users behave en presented with this the behavior change the network zero-sum game Atscenario? the other Will end of the spectrum fromif pure coordination games lie zero-sum games, ws the users to communicate with each other the before makingwe a decision? which (bearing in mind comment made earlier about positive afne transchanges to the delays would the users decisions still be the same? How games. Unlike common-payoff constant-sum formations) are more properly called constant-sum ers behave if they have the opportunity to face this same decision with the game games, constant-sum games are meaningful primarily in the context of two-player part multiple times? Do answers to the above questions depend on how (though not necessarily two-strategy) games. gents are and how they view each others rationality? Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham Nash Equilibrium of Example Games
.

or, minus your delay), and the second number represents your colleagues in Figure 3.5.

Nash Equilibria of Example Games

Rock Paper Scissors 0 C 1 D 1 C D 1 1, 1 1 0, 4 0 4, 0 1 3, 3 1 0

Left Left Right

Right

1, 1 0, 0

0, 0 1, 1

Figure 3.6 Rock, Paper, Scissors game. Figure 3.1 The TCP users (aka the Prisoners) Dilemma. Figure 3.5: Coordination game.

B F e options what should you adopt, C or D? Does it depend on what you lleague will do? Furthermore, from the perspective of the network operaB 2, 1 0, 0 Zero-sum d of behavior can he expect fromgames the two users? Will any two users behave en presented with this the behavior change the network zero-sum game Atscenario? the other Will end of the spectrum fromif pure coordination games lie zero-sum games, ws the users to communicate with 1 each other the before makingwe a decision? F 0 ,0 , in 2 mind which (bearing comment made earlier about positive afne transchanges to the delays would the users decisions still be the same? How games. Unlike common-payoff constant-sum formations) are more properly called constant-sum ers behave if they have the opportunity to face this same decision with the game games, constant-sum games are meaningful primarily in the context of two-player Figure 3.7 Battle of the Sexes game. part multiple times? Do answers to the above questions depend on how (though not necessarily two-strategy) games. gents are and how they view each others rationality? Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham Nash Equilibrium of Example Games
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or, minus your delay), and the second number represents colleagues situations of pure competition; oneyour players gain must come at the expense of the in Figure 3.5. This property requires that there be exactly two agents. Indeed, if other player. you Rock 0 allow more 1 agents, any 1 game can be turned into a zero-sum game by adding Right C player Dwhose actions do notLeft a dummy impact the payoffs to the other agents, and whose own payoffs are chosen to make the payoffs in each outcome sum to zero. Paper 1 classical 0 1 Matching A example game Left game 1, 1 is the0 , 0 of Matching Pennies. In this C 1, 1 4, 0 of a zero-sum Pennies game game, each of the two players has a penny and independently chooses to display either Scissors 1 heads or 1 tails. The0two players then compare their pennies. If they are the Rightand otherwise 0, 0 1, 1 2 pockets them. The payoff D same 0, 4 player 3, then 13 pockets both, player matrix isPaper, shown in Figure 3.6. Figure 3.6 Rock, Scissors game. Figure 3.1 The TCP users (aka the Prisoners) Dilemma. Figure 3.5: Coordination game. Heads Tails B F e options what should you adopt, C or D? Does it depend on what you lleague will do? Furthermore, from the perspective of the network Heads 1, 1 opera1, 1 B 2, 1 0, 0 Zero-sum d of behavior can he expect fromgames the two users? Will any two users behave en presented with this the behavior change the network zero-sum game Atscenario? the other Will end of the spectrum fromif pure coordination games lie zero-sum games, Tails 1 , , 1 about positive afne transws the users to communicate with 1 each other the before making a1decision? F 0 ,0 , in 2 mind which (bearing comment we made 1 earlier changes to the delays would the users decisions still be the same? How games. Unlike common-payoff constant-sum formations) are more properly called constant-sum ers behave if they have the opportunity to face this same decision with the game games, constant-sum games are meaningful in the context of two-player Figure 3.7 Battle of the Sexes game. Figure 3.6: Matching primarily Pennies game. part multiple times? Do answers to the above questions depend on how (though not necessarily two-strategy) games. gents are and how they view each others rationality? Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham Nash Equilibrium of Example Games
.

Nash Equilibria of Example Games