Transcending Traditionalism: The Emergence of Non-State Military Formations in Afghanistan Author(s): Kristian Berg Harpviken Source: Journal of Peace

Research, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 271-287 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/425160 Accessed: 08/03/2010 01:37
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? Journalof Peace Research,vol. 34, no. 3, 1997, ISSN: 0022-3433, pp. 271-287

The Emergenceof NonTranscendingTraditionalism: State MilitaryFormationsin Afghanistan*

KRISTIANBERG HARPVIKEN Peace ResearchInstitute,Oslo (PRIO)& Departmentof Sociology and Human International Geography,Universityof Oslo*
Non-state organizationswith a state-like coercive capability are key actors in a numberof internalwars. Often emerging in responseto the threatof a state's coercive apparatus, they tend to maintaina life of their own after the initial threathas disappeared.A key analyticalquestion is when non-statemilitaryorganizationsare likely to take on a permanentnature.This question has often been answered from a traditional-modern dichotomization, which this article deems inadequate.It is exactly the movements incorporating establishedcommunityrelations that are most likely to develop into large-scale, militarilyeffective, organizations.A version of collective action of how and why theory is proposedwhich emphasizes the role of community,opening up for an understanding 'traditional'modes of social organizationare centralfor 'modemrn' organizationswith large war-makingcapacity. This extended logic of collective action is used to analyse the emergence of various armed formations in Afghanistansince the coup in 1978. The articledeals specifically with organizationsemergingwithin two ethnic populations, the newly assertive Hazara, and the historically dominant Pashtun, including an analysis of the Talibanmovement. It is arguedthat currentinternational policy-makingon Afghanistanis informedby analysis based on the traditional-modern dichotomy, neglecting crucial changes initiatedby the war. The cases analysed here give considerablesupportfor furtherapplicationsof the extended logic of collective action, particularly to non-westerncase material.

1. Introduction Under what circumstancesdoes war ignite the establishment of non-state organizations that have a high capacity and propensityfor collective violence? The effect of war on social organizationhas been poorly studied, but conflict transformationmeasures based on a prewar social analysis are likely to neglect crucial changes. War leads to, and is carriedon by, the formation of new coercive organizations be* Materialfor this articlewas collected when I was working in Pakistanand Afghanistanin the period 1990-2, and during shortvisits in 1994 and 1996. I express my gratitudefor financial support to the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS), Copenhagen; the Department of Sociology, University of Oslo; the Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund;and the University of Oslo studentscholarships. I am grateful for comments on earlier versions of the article from J. 'Bayo Adekanye, Malvern Lumsden, Olivier Roy, Amrne Strand, Astri Suhrke and Odd Arne Westad. I am deeply indebted to a number of people who shared their time and experience with me, through interviews which form a crucial source for this work, but who will remain anonymous. A cautionarynote: conditions for fieldwork in Afghanistan are extremely difficult, unavoidably affecting the empiricalmaterialavailable. I have done my best in terms of necessary precautionsto safeguardthe quality of this work, and take all responsibilityfor the final version.

yond the state, the distinction between traditional and modern organization often being invoked to account for this change. However, as 'traditional' modes of organization generally form the basis for large-scale protractedwarfare,the traditional-modern dichotomyhas little explanatory power. In this article I intend to demonstratethat an expandedtheory of collective action, emphasizing the role of existing community, provides a better starting-pointfor understanding the emergence of non-state armedorganizations. Since the fall of the communists in April 1992, Afghanistanhas continuedto be the scene of massive military conflict, primarily about controlover centralpower,between groupswith various ethnic or religious affiliations(Table I). A variation of the traditional-moderndichotomy, the tribalistthesis, has continuedto inform academic analysis and international policymaking on Afghanistan. The tribalist thesis largely worked in prewar Afghanistan, dominated by the triballyorganizedPashtun.As a result of the war, large-scalepolitical and military organizations have emerged within the other ethnic populations, bringing about an end to social organPashtundominance.Furthermore, ization among the Pashtun has undergone

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Figure 1. MajorEthnicGroupsin Afghanistanand NeighbouringAreas*

*The map gives an impressionof the distributionof ethnic groups. It has two principallimitations.First,theremight be different criteriafor what constitutes an ethnic group. Second, most areas are not uni-ethnic.The map fails to display multiethnicity within a territory,as well as settlementsof one group in a concentratedarea within a largerarea dominatedby a differentgroup.

severe change, and the tribalistthesis can only ing on the changes following the 1978 coup and be misleading as a perspective on present-day the 1979 Soviet invasion. Sections 4 and 5 analyse wartime organizations among the politics in Afghanistan. In this article I focus on war organizations within two ethnically defined populations, the Table I. Estimated Populationsand DominantReligion by Pashtunand the Hazara(Figure 1), populations EthnicGroupin Afghanistan illustrating well the difference between tribal and non-tribalorganization.They also represent EthnicGroup DominantReligion PopulationEstimate (millions) the historically dominantversus the least priviSunni 6.0 leged ethnicity in the country. Further, the Pashitun 3.4 Sunni boundariesbetween them are well defined,par- Tajik 0.1 Sunni Baluchi ticularly because ethnic distinctions are being Uzbek 1.3 Sunni reinforced by the sectarian difference between Turkmen 0.4 Sunni Shi'ia and Sunni Islam. 1.1 Shi'ia Hazara 0.5 Sunni The next section locates this study within the Aimaq 0.6 Shi'ia and elaboratesthe theoreti- Farsiwan theoreticalliterature Sunni Nuristani 0.1 cal foundation.Section 3 is a brief introduction to Afghanistan'srecent political history, focus- Source: Adamec (1991).

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Pashtunand the Hazararespectively,while section 6 looks at the Talibanmovement,emerging in late 1994. Finally, I outline the implications of this study for the analysis of currentpolitics in Afghanistan,as well as for futureapplications of collective action theory to the study of nonstate militaryformations. 2. Warand Organization There has long been extensive researchinterest in the study of the causes of war, but less in the consequences of war (Rasler & Thompson, 1992; Stein & Russett, 1980). War-induced social change often leads to new roundsof collective violence. The issue of how war changes social organizationand non-statemilitarycapabilities remains largely un-addressed.Today's conflict pattern,with a predominanceof domestic conflict, necessitates a reorientation.Earlier wars have often led to the establishmentof nonstate organizationswith state-likecapabilitiesin making war. In general, societies that have undergone extensive war emerge significantlydifferently from their prewarappearance.Conflict transformationtheories which neglect the war experience will not be viable. This article starts out from the assumption that external aggression initiates changes in social organization within a resisting population, potentially leading to new violent conflicts after the initial conflict is resolved.' The of majoremphasiswill be on the transformation social organization, the particular researchquestion being: When is an organizationwith massive coercive capabilitymost likely to develop in response to external threat? Dominant explanations are based in some version of a traditional versus modern dichotomy. I argue that this approachunderestimatesthe value of pre-existing organization, and I suggest a redefinition of traditionwhich brings to the fore its crucial role in providing the community relations on which successful collective action depends. A dominant approach to the study of warmaking organizationshas been to startout from a distinction between primitive and modem warfare,which I here call the traditionalistthesis. It was Tumey-High (1971), with his book Primitive War:Its Practice and Concepts from 1949, who gave this distinctiona dominantpos-

ition in the field. He establisheda set of five criteria, largely coincidingwith the generalcriteria of civilization. The underlying assumption is that modemrn warfarerequiresan organizational a rupture with the past.2 revolution,representing Although Turney-Highacknowledged the efficiency of traditionalloyalties in mobilization, he did not believe that anything other than a state-led formal organizationhad the capability of ensuring large-scale and enduring military action: 'Only governmentcan command,not request, and can punishthose who do not feel like fighting the day' (Turney-High,1971, p. 258).3 Another key theorist in the field, Keith F. Otterbein,has based his analysis of warfareon a model of the feud, deducing causes and consequences of war in general from an understanding of how this functioned in traditional,and overwhelmingly tribal, societies. While he accepts that modernwarfaremight lead to higher casualties,he rejectsthe conceptionthatwarfare was less frequent in traditional societies (Otterbein,1973, p. 946). Underliningthe continuity between the feud and modem warfare, Otterbein is in opposition to the traditionalist thesis. He has presentedmassive evidence that warfarepracticesturnmore sophisticatedwithin an evolutionary process rather than through rupture (Otterbein, 1970). In a more recent review on the anthropologyof war, Otterbein concludes that a process of theoretical convergence has taken place over the twenty years since his 1973 review article (Otterbein,1992), inherently suggesting that more complex models have replacedexplanationsbased on the traditional-modemdichotomy. Nonetheless, the traditionalistthesis continues to be influentialin a variety of manners.A vulgar version of the thesis is in wide use, particularlyin popularizedaccountsof currentconflicts. It assumes that primitivepeople live in a state of nature,where every person, or at least every tribe, is destined to fight everybody else (e.g. Horsman& Marshall,1994). Hence, peace Within can only follow political modernization. research,too, the traditionalistthesis maintains prevalence. For example, in discussing the prospects for peace in post-Soviet Afghanistan, Suhrke (1990) has established two possible scenarios: re-tribalizationand externalization.4 Suhrkegoes on to suggest that the formeris inherently more peaceful, and bases policy pro-

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posals thereon.The problemwith all versions of the traditionalistthesis is that they deny the possibility thatwarfarepracticesbecome gradually more sophisticatedthroughevolution, without which the successful mobilization of a stateless population against a modem state's army becomes almost incomprehensible. thesis is underminedby the The traditionalist frequency with which traditionalforms of association have formed the basis of majorpolitical uprisings (Calhoun, 1983). Following Weber, there has been a tendency to define tradition in historical terms alone (Weber [1922] 1968, p. 25), neglecting that traditioncan, and should, be seen also as representingeveryday social practice. The major issue in the present context is that traditionrepresentscommunity, and any mobilizationthat does not build on existing social ties is unlikely to succeed. Hence, 'tradition',in the sense of community,becomes a crucialresourcefor, ratherthan an obstacle to, mobilization. Calhounrelatesthis to the free-rider problem, first formulatedby MancurOlson in his classic book TheLogic of CollectiveAction(1965). The individualcontributionto large-scale collective action is unlikely to make a major difference, while the outcome will be equally shared between participantsand non-participants. Hence, the collective good can be enjoyed also by someone who did not contributeto its production, the free-rider.Rationaland informedindividuals, Olson presumes, will not participate unless enticed by selective incentives, understood here in a wide sense as encompassingboth negative incentives, such as physical penalty or social deprivation,and positive incentives, such as material benefits or career opportunities. Fundamentally,incentive definitions that presuppose an atomized individual assessing whetheror not to engage in collective action can only be misleading, since people are already embedded in communityrelations(McAdam et al., 1995, pp. 25-26). The debate on collective action that has followed Olson's book has focused mainly on the question of how collective action is possible. A recent survey of possible solutions to the problem of collective action concludes thatthere is a rich variety of solutions as to why rationalactors rebel. The problem is that 'almost no CA [collective action] theorists have gone on to

study the many substantiveproblems arising in revolts and protests' (Lichbach, 1994, p. 9). There is a need for applying collective action theory to concrete empirical studies of conflict. Partof the reason for the relativepoverty of insights generated from research within the collective-actionapproachis the over-emphasison game-theoreticalformulations,to the detriment of socially and historically specific studies. Indeed, if the basic theoretical assumptions of the collective-action programme prove valid, they should be expressed in widely different mechanisms in different societies. Here, I concentrateon how existing communityties shape mobilization.5 The still influential traditional-modem dichotomy, as applied to the study of non-state militaryformations,assumes that if such organizations are to meet the requirements of modem war, a break is needed with 'traditional'social organization.I argued, from a community-centred version of the collective-action thesis, that it is exactly the organizationsthatare able to integrate, but transcend, existing social ties that have the largest potential for successful nonstate militarymobilization.This is so primarily because existing social organizationis effective in ensuringmonitoring,as well as in expressing selective incentives. I now go on to challenge and develop these ideas in the encounter with cases from the past two decades of war in Afghanistan. 3. Background:The VulnerableState of Afghanistan A state named Afghanistan has existed since 1747. Its currentborders were established towards the end of the last century, during the period of King Abdur Rahman (1880-1901), who made the first attempt at state-building. Abdur Rahmanbuilt up an independentarmy, but still relied on the supplementof triballevies, dominantly Pashtun.The army was constantly used in campaigns to expand state power (Kakar, 1979, p. 114). The king resettled resistant Pashtuntribes in the non-Pashtunareas in the north, effectively converting enemies into close allies. He launcheda massive campaignto establish dominancein the centralmountainregion, Hazarajat, engaging both the regulararmy and tribal levies. The 'Hazara war' (Munshi,

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[1900] 1980, pp. 276-285) had grave effects, with large numberskilled, many enslaved, and immense infrastructural destruction.It has been arguedthatAbdurRahman'suse oftribal levies, violating the tribal warfare codex, proves that tribal warfare has been romanticized (Suhrke, 1990, p. 242). However, fighting for an expanding state, these triballevies were not involved in tribal warfare;Abdur Rahmanwas able to exploit existing, or 'traditional,' organization in the service of a modernizingstate. More encompassingdevelopmentof the state, in areas like infrastructure and education, did not gain force until the 1950s. This was also a period of expansionof the armedforces, further decreasingthe state's dependence on the tribes (Dupree, 1980, pp. 494-498). From 1963, there were experiments in political liberalization, with a number of political parties being established. The political partieslacked a basis in the ruralareas, operatingin limited intellectualcircles in the cities, mainly in Kabul. The leftist parties, whether oriented towards China or the Soviet Union, attemptedto infiltratethe army. In 1973, formerprimeministerDaud Khantook power in a coup. The Islamists had built up small armed groups clandestinely, but did not connect up with existing communitystructures. When they attempteda coup in 1975, their total lack of popularbacking was revealed: Most of the activists were handed over to the police by the local population. The coup on 27 April 1978 initiatedan era of extensive armed conflict in Afghanistan. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which took power, was a marginalorganization, continuing to alienate all existing elites also after the coup. It had an estimated 5000 members, mostly students and bureaucrats, and only 200 members in the army (Bradsher,1983, p. 242).6 The new government soon set out to implement dramatic reforms throughoutthe country. The state apparatusit inherited was designed to administer on the basis of fragile local compromises, not to implement dramatic political reforms (Shahrani, 1984, p. 24). The new regime replacedqualified military and administrativeleaders with young and inexperienced party cadres who took the lead in implementing reforms, within land redistribution committees, local administrations or as teachers in the campaign for literacy and

materialism.The contentof the reforms,such as land distribution,was not necessarily unpopular, but the way in which it was introduced doomed it to failure. If anyone objected to reforms, the partycadres quickly resortedto violence, calling in army units. Simultaneously,the governmentran a campaignto exterminatetraditional and religious leaders. The use of violence in implementing reforms and the campaigns to exterminate established elites were of an unprecedentedscale. Given that the PDPA lacked alliance partnersin the local communities, people had no alternativebut to stand up and fight, even in cases where the political reforms as such were welcome. Overall, the PDPA government, aiming at total territorial control and administrativedomination, totally broke with the establishedmodel of governance throughalliances with local elites. The aim behind the Soviet invasion on 24 December 1979 was to install a more moderate regime, realizing that a more accommodative line would be necessary for the PDPA government to succeed (Westad, 1994, p. 64). However, the massive presence of Soviet armed forces, equally unable to make the needed compromises, underminedthe conciliatory ambitions.7 The Soviets applied a conventional military strategy, and brought new technology into the battlefield:armouredvehicles, artillery, aircraft,and helicopters.It was an encounterbetween armed organizationsof extremely different complexity. The large and inflexible Soviet units were inefficient in dealing with the resistance (Urban, 1990, p. 158). By 1984, the Soviets changed strategy, intensifying their attacks on the guerrillas, and starting to target civilians more directly. By then, the resistance was both organizationallyand technologically strengthened.There was an escalation of the war, and externalsupplies to the resistancemultiplied throughoutthe next couple of years. The regime modifiedits policies by late 1986, abandoning communist rhetoric and starting a campaign to buy off resistance leaders and traditional authorities,not without success (Roy, 1989). A real watershed for all parties was Gorbachev'swithdrawalannouncement of early 1988. The divided resistancewas faced with the prospects of a falling regime, and the potential need to be able to offer an alternative. The Soviet forces were out by 15 February1989, but

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the governmentmanaged to cling on to power for anotherthree years, thanks both to support from the USSR, and the inability of the resistance to launch any concertedaction. The fall of the governmentin April 1992 was the result of internalconflicts that escalated with the disappearance of Soviet supplies, rather than the result of resistancepressure.With little indigenous support, and no external resources, the fragile balance of elites that constituted the partybroke down. 4. Resistance Organizationsamong the Pashtun The governmentof Afghanistanhas historically based its power on alliances with the Pashtun tribes. The kings have all been Pashtun,except for a ten-monthperiod in 1929. Top positions in the government, the administration and the army were almost exclusively occupied by Pashtun(Poullada, 1970). Before the war it was claimed that a majority of the population was Pashtun. Now, the Pashtun undoubtedly form less than half of the population,due to a comparatively larger refugee outflow from Pashtun areas (Connor, 1988, p. 179). 4.1 Resistanceamong the TribalPashtun The Pashtuntribes were slow to revolt after the communistcoup in April 1978. The Islamistactivists who triggered early uproar elsewhere were lacking in the tribalareas (Roy, 1986a, p. 101). The first tribal uprisings occurredby the summer of 1979, in response to government agents from Kabul who came either to implement literacy or land reforms,or to arrestlocal notables. The revolt followed an old recipe: it spreadquickly to the boundariesof the primary solidary group; a branchof the tribe, occasionally the tribe. Such limited tribaluprisingswere the normal way of demonstratingpolitical discontent, before enteringnegotiations.However, the PDPA leadership perceived resistance among the Pashtuntribes as a majorthreat,and responded by massive armed counterattacks. The government'sfailureto launcha symmetrical response led to a massive escalation of conflict (Dupree, 1989, pp. 30-31). The preference for small-scale groups in a tribally organizedsociety can be seen as an obstacle to initiatinglarger-scaleresponse. An established way to overcome fragmentation

among the Pashtunis to invoke Islam, and mobilize around Islamic networks, dominated by the ulama, the Sunni Islamic clergy, which is a highly informal body.8 The religious networks revolve aroundthe madrasa, a religious school. A reputed teacher gets followers who consult him regularly;ties between teacherand student, as well as between fellow students, become strong. The madrasa curriculum consists of classical Arabic and Islamic subjects,repetition is the main pedagogic principle(Roy, 1986a, p. ori46). The ulama have a truly fundamentalist entation in the sense of looking back at a historic ideal Islamic society, in sharp contrast to the Islamists, whose aim it is to base a radical political ideology in Islam in order to face world. The ultithe challenges of the modemrn mate reference for the Islamists is the state, for the ulama it is civil society. Accordingly, the ulama are hesitantto set up a political programme. situationsthe ulama's authIn extraordinary ority is invoked, as for example in declaring jihad. Jihad goes beyond tribal warfare by having the whole Islamic communityas its ultimate reference,it applies only to war againstan external enemy. Jihad has been the main concept of the resistance in Afghanistan;most resistance leaders in the Pashtun areas were ulama. The major resistanceparty in the early 1980s, the Harakat-e Inqelab, was built on ulama networks,and was led by MaulawiNabi, a former teacher at the famous madrasa in Ghazni. Harakat's organization reflects the ulama networks, being a loose association of fronts with little administrativecapacity. The unwillingness to establish formal structuresbecame a major problem for Harakat, the ability to coordinatelarge-scalemilitaryaction was seand the partybecame an arena verely restrained, for conventional leadership rivalries. The bulk of the fightingforce consistedof part-timefighters, which again restrainedthe party's ability to monitor its troops. The net result was that the military effectiveness of Harakat was limited, and in terms of militarycontrolthe partygradually lost ground to other groups. Undoubtedly, the party's inabilityto obtain substantial foreign funds addedto the misery, but this was an effect ratherthan a cause of its limited militaryeffectiveness. diIn accordancewith the traditional-modern

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chotomy, it has been argued that jihad has simply adopted the strategy of tribal warfare, thus not carryingthe potentialto become largescale and mobile (Roy, 1994a, pp. 153-154). This is an argument with considerable credibility in the case of organizations among the tribal Pashtunin the early 1980s, but it fails to account for how, in many other areas and at differenttimes, it is exactly the pre-existingcollectivities that have been crucial in ensuring commitmentwithin new forms of organization. I argue, in line with collective-action theory, thatthe crux of the issue is thatneitherof the existing tribal or religious forms of organization were able to generatethe organizationalcoherence necessary for larger-scale organization. Attempts to establish efficient control at levels beyond the village, valley or tribe, were counteredby an extremelyegalitarianform of organization, where permanentleadershipwas rareat any level. While the groups in question commanded the basic resource of existing community ties, they failed to convert this into incentive structures that could overcome the localized and multiple loyalties of their individual supporters. 4.2 The Pashtun Exception:Hezb-e Islami The Islamist organization that had emerged from the mid-1960s became increasingly radicalized from the early 1970s, and split into several factions. One of these, the Hezb-e Islami, was mainly recruitingamong Pashtunwho had distanced themselves from tribal loyalties, either educated youth in the cities, or Pashtun resettled in the North by AbdurRahmanlate in the last century. The Islamists among the Pashtunhave been unwilling to build alliances with traditionalreligious leaders, in contrastto the Jamiat-eIslami, anotherIslamistgroup,particularly strong among the Tajik population in the North, who successfully linked up with both ulama and Islamic mysticist networks.Hezb had established a strong, hierarchic organization throughoutthe 1970s, with the claimed aim of taking state power, and with the built-in secrecy of a resistanceorganization(Edwards,1993, pp. 617-619). The organizational structure was outstandingin Afghanistan,and was to become its major asset in the coming war. The party's majorproblemwas to expandbeyond this organizationalcore; the lack of existing ties to wider

segments of the populationgreatly restrictedits mobilizationpotential. In terms of strategy,Hezb was unique in the resistance. It commanded truly mobile forces, but was never able to establish substantialterritorial controlwithin the country,its strongholds tended to be islands within larger territories dominatedby people of a differenttribe or ethnicity. It operated long-term, the struggle against the Soviet army was only one step towards establishingtrue Islamic rule, and its engagement in military action was constrained accordingly. The party demonstratedlittle respect for civilian lives, as in victimizing the civilian population of government-held areas throughindiscriminateshelling or by hindering food convoys, provoking further tension between the partyand the populationat large. Prior to the war, there was no rural support for the Islamists, a situation that continued to prevail in the Pashtuntribal areas. Among the refugees in Pakistan,the party developed broad support,which is not too surprising,given the incentives it controlled.Membershipin a resistance party was compulsory for achieving refugee status, and Hezb's command of resources was outstanding.9Yet, the degree to which Hezb was favoured when it came to foreign financial and military supplies makes one wonder why it did not obtain a larger following within the country. A tentative answer could be thatjoining Hezb was a relatively dramatic decision to take, given its outright confrontationwith all establishedorganizationsand leaders (Roy, 1994b, p. 78). However, even if popular support remained limited, one cannot disregard the demonstrative effects of the Islamist resistance, representinga new model for social and political organizationthat proved efficient in the war situation. Throughoutthe war, most of the fronts led by non-Islamist leaders adapted elements from this model and established a skeleton state-like administration in their area. The story of Hezb is in stark contrastto the mainstream Pashtunmilitaryorganizationsdealt with above. Hezb was truly outstandingin its ability both to sanction and monitor the members within its organizational core, and was able to build mobile and highly competent fighting units. For most of the period of communist domination, this, together with its foreign

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support,made it a majoractoron the war scene, in spite of its rathermarginalpopular support. The problemfor Hezb was its inabilityto link its own hierarchyto existing social organizationin alliances that could have broadenedits support, a problem strikingly similar to that of the PDPA. 5. ResistanceOrganizationsamong the Hazara The Hazarapopulationconstitutes the majority of Afghanistan'sShi'ia religious minority.They inhabitthe country's mountainousand resource and are distinscarce central region, Hazarajat, guishable by a strongly Mongoloid appearance. During the last 40 years, labour migration has become increasingly importantfor the regional economy. The Hazara have been under-privileged to an extent reminiscentof an outcaste in a caste society (Canfield, 1972, p. 6). For the Hazara,religious difference, geographical sepand phenotype aration,economic subordination act together, constitutingstrong boundariesbetween them and the other ethnicities of the country. 5.1 From Local Resistance to Regional Coordination Targetingof Hazaraelites was high on the communists' agenda,since they had neithersupportThe campaignstarted ers nor allies in Hazarajat. soon after the 1978 coup, when community leaders were systematically exterminated by government missions. This triggered massive local uprisings,fought with primitivearms, and with minimalcoordinationbetween localities to begin with (Grevemeyer,1985, p. 18). Earlyuprisings were led by the establishedlocal leadership, with the support and legitimization of religious authorities.10These first uprisings among the Hazarawere motivatedby the simple need for survival. In spite of the tension that existed locally between populationand leaders, the government's failure to offer an alternative organizationalchannel secured massive united uproar. By late spring 1979, the government in practicemaking was expelled from Hazarajat, the region autonomous. As early as mid-1979, at a time when the Pashtunuprisingswere about to gain force, and priorto the Soviet invasion, an initiativeto form was taken. a regional organizationin Hazarajat

The Shura-eIttefaqwas initially meantto be an umbrella organization facilitating a common understandingon the resistance and on local governance (Grevemeyer, 1985, pp. 16-18). The local uprisingspriorto the Shuraestablishment had mostly been led by local worldly leaders, who used to act as middlemenbetween the government and local populations, basing their authorityon the ability to extract government resources. When the Shura was established, most of its leadership positions were filled by sayyid, the functioningreligious authorities in Hazarajat. The sayyid are seen to descend from the Prophet,and are believed to have the ability to performmiracles. They are perceived as Arabs and constitute an endogamous caste within the Hazarasociety. The sayyid also form a network throughoutHazarajat, serving as a counterforce to the divisive tendenciesin Hazarasociety, acting as mediatorsin times of peace, and as an integrativeleadershipin times of crisis (Kopecky, 1982, p. 89). They rarely have any formal religious education, but for those who have, this significantlyenhancestheir prestige. The Shura soon developed an administration modelled on the state, being particularlyharsh in mattersof taxationand conscription.It set out to establish a professional army, every eighth family having to contribute one conscript. A militia was also established, introducingmore compulsory contributions. Furthermore, the Shura disarmed its population, effectively demobilizing its supporters. By mid-1981 military activity by the Soviets and the government ceased in Hazarajat.The Shura leadership, in alliance with a group of sheikh, formal clergy educated in Iran, and inspired by the Iranian revolution, launched a brutal campaign targeting the old leadershipwhich either fled or was killed (Bindemann, 1987, p. 62). Administrativeindependencewas at first appreciated by the population. However, it soon became clear that the Shura's demands on the populationwere large, while what it gave in return was limited. The Shura attemptedto build a strong formalizedorganizationovernight,but did not have the qualified core organizationrequired for success. The expectation that the sayyid would be able to rally support from Iran's new Islamist government was not met. The Shura became more and more unpopular,

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being seen as both repressive and corrupt. In general,therewas a decreasein political interest resulting from the absence of Soviet or government troops,as well as from the Shura's general demobilization.The Shuramodelled its military on the governmentarmy, its forces stationedin garrisonsthroughoutthe territory,with a resulting lack of mobility (Roy, 1986a, p. 180). A lack of training, particularly at officer level, made it into an inefficient army. Most importantly, the conscription system was highly unpopular.As we shall see, the regional domination of the Shura was to be short-lived. In fact, the Shura leadership seems to have commanded the community ties necessary for success, but violated them throughthe accelerated organizational formalization, which distanced them from the broaderpopulation. Comparedwith the mainstreamPashtun resistance, the Shura emergence brings an interesting point to the forefront:the absence of a medium-scale organizational form, like the tribe, facilitatedthe establishmentof large-scale organization. The Pashtun tribes were sufficiently largeto preventa similarprocess, but the small solidarygroupsamong the Hazaradid not have such a potential. The campaign launched against the old Hazara leadership in the early years of the war marginalized this group entirely, in contrast to the situation among the Pashtun,where a localized resistancecontinued to be influential. 5.2 EnterIslamism:the RevolutionWithin With increasingpopulardissatisfactionwith the Shura, and continued assertiveness of the sayyid, the sheikh contingent within the Shura became impatient. The sheikh, the formally trained Shi'ia Islamic scholars, had been of minor importance in rural Afghanistan. The Hazara brand of Shi'ism emphasized authority by descent ratherthan formaltheology. In Iran, the formalclergy played a majorrole in politics since the early 1960s. Shi'ia from Afghanistan also attendedthe religious training institutions in Najaf in Iraq and Qum in Iran. There is a strong hierarchical organization among the Shi'ia clergy, distinguishingthem from both the Shi'ia sayyid and the Sunniulama. Anotherdistinctive trait is the openness to ideas of nonMuslim origin, often integrated into larger theoreticalsyntheses. The Iranianrevolution of

effect, stimFebruary1979 had a demonstrative ulating the popularity of Afghanistan's Shi'ia clergy, who were educated at the same institutions, and were followers of the ayatollahs now leading events in Iran. With the witheringof the externalthreat,the Shura was quickly losing support.In Hazarajat, it was now being challengedboth from without and within. Without, several Iranian-supported Islamist groups emerged, built around the sheikh hierarchies. Typically, they expanded theirrelationsstep-by-stepwith local communities around a major madrasa in Hazarajat,assisted by strong supportamong labourmigrants returningfrom Iranafterthe revolution.Within the Shura, there was a potential threat from those sayyid who also had higher Islamic education, holding a dual identity as both sayyid and sheikh. They constitutedup to half of the Shura leadership. In 1982, they joined hands with the external Islamist opposition, and attempted a coup to gain control over the Shura (Grevemeyer, 1985, p. 87). The now broadened Islamist initiative succeeded in driving the Shura away from their headquarters in Waras by 1984, definitively gaining the upperhand in the struggle for control of Hazarajat. The internal war in Hazarajat,which lasted until 1989, was to cost more lives than the war againstthe governmentand its Soviet allies. Through its excesses, the Shura had prepared the ground for an Islamist takeover. Administratively, the Islamists had a softer practice (Dorronsoro, 1991, p. 6), which became a majorattraction for people to join them. Compared with the Shura, the Islamists had anothermajoradvantage: the existence of an organizational core of cadre groups, educated, politicized and organizedmainly in Iran.While the sheikhhierarchyformedthe backboneof the cadre groups, they had successfully recruited among Hazaralabourmigrantsin Iran.11 These cell-like and dedicatedgroups,establishedprior to the war, were far more efficient thanthe noncommitted, badly trained, and badly organized soldiers of the Shura.The Islamistscould adopt a relative leniency in administrativematters, due to the existence of an organizationalcore ready to engage in military matters. However, this is a trait the Shi'ia Islamists share with Hezb-e Islami, which failed to foster popular support. Another similarity is that the sheikh,

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too, were relatively weakly integratedin the societies priorto the war. While this might appear to contradict the collective-action thesis presented earlier, the crucial difference is the ability of the Shi'ia Islamists to base their expansion on a well-known, althoughnot broadly observed, religious practice, a base from which it carefully expanded its popularsupport.After 1983, when the IranianIslamists had consolidated their power, the economic and military contributionswere also significant, a fact that made them less dependent than the Shura on generatingfinancialresourcesinternally. The success of the Islamistswas furtherconsolidated with the establishment of Hezb-e Wahdatin 1989, involving all partiesthat were dominantly Hazara, also the remains of the Shura.The new partyplaced more emphasis on the ethnic rightsof the Hazara,withoutbreaking with Islamism (Harpviken, 1996, p. 103). The Rawalpindi meeting in February 1989 was a major impetus to the formationof Wahdat:the Pakistan-basedSunni parties here set up an interim governmentexpecting soon to take power in Kabul, but failed to accommodatethe Shi'ia groups. For the latter, the interim government posed a potentialthreatto their semi-autonomy. The unification of the Shi'ia parties was enhanced by a considerablewill to apply dramatic in encoursanctionsto non-joiners,instrumental aging formerlydeadly enemies to join hands. Following the fall of the communistsin April 1992, Wahdatwas supportedby a majority of the Hazarapopulationin Kabul,gaining control over an estimatedhalf of the capital's territory. Interestingly,it was not Wahdatwhich led the events in Kabul in the early days afterthe comas munist fall, but a varietyof community-based well as more formal Hazara groups who took control of buildings and localities with little coordination between themselves.'2 Wahdat could come in and take charge of victories gained. With this success the Hazara had a totally unprecedented political position. Wahdat established a relatively competent civilian administration in the areas of Kabul that it controlled.

large-scale refugee exodus. The majoractors in the fighting were Hezb-e Islami and the Tajikdominated Jamiat-e Islami, the only parties commanding truly mobile forces. The latter party dominatedthe so-called government,and was involved in extensive conflict with Wahdat was unableto from mid-1992 onwards. Wahdat gain durablepolitical concessions on the basis of its position in Kabul. The fighting, particularly in the capital, developed a distinctive ethnic character.'3 In this, apparently stalemated, situation, a new movement, the Taliban, emerged in the area. Talibanfirstbecame known as a Kandahar local groupfor taking action against a commander who had abducted, raped and killed three women. By October 1994 it took over a major Hezb-e Islami arms depot at the border with Pakistan. The area under its control grew quickly; by mid-February1995 it had captured Hezb's strongholds at the southern edge of Kabul. The Taliban had still not faced major armed resistance, with opposing forces simply defecting to the new movement. The movement soon gained popularityamong business people, being able as it was to re-establishsecurity and to dismantleall the roadblocks at which tax was demanded on any transport.Quickly securing control over large territories,the Talibangot a base from which it could generate furtherresources. It is also clear that it has been supported by Pakistan,although how, and to what extent, remains unclear.'4 In March 1995 the Talibanclosed in on Kabul,and sufferedits first defeat by government forces.15 However, later that year, the movement took control over Herat, before taking control over the capital in late September1996, fundamentally alteringthe internalstrategicbalance. Talibanmeans 'studentsof Islam'. The backbone of the movement is the net of madrasa, primarily in the border provinces of Pakistan, but also within Afghanistan(Christensen,1995, pp. 68-70). This madrasa system had been greatly expanded throughout the war, effectively transformingan age-old institution into also serving as semi-military training camps, but without violating existing social organization. Offering food, shelter and education free Revisited? 6. Taliban' 'Traditionalism' After the government abdication in 1992, of charge, the madrasa were attractive for resistance parties engaged in a struggle for the refugee families from Afghanistan who had capital, resulting in physical destruction and little else to offer their children. The madrasa

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were run with support from Pakistan, Saudi Arabiaand the Gulf states, and were often organized by one of the many Islamistor fundamentalist parties in Pakistan. The Talibanis presentedas a religious movement, and is based on traditionalSunni Islamic institutions. As demonstratedwhen discussing early Pashtun resistance, these institutions are well establishedin Pashtunruralareas, facilitating popularmobilization. Once it became clear that the Taliban were willing and able to deal with the warlordismof local commanders,they also had the supportof the populationat large. Unlike the early Pashtunresistance,but similar to Hezb-e Islami and the Shi'ia Islamists, the Talibancould startout with a militarycore, consisting of recruitsfrom the madrasa,whose students were easily controlled. For the madrasa students, starting out with few resources, the prospect of becoming the saviours of the countrybecame an importantincentive in itself. The Talibanmovementavowed as its task the liberationof Afghanistanfrom the brotherswho had gone astray, and the preparationof the ground for peace. Programmaticdeclarations are scarce, but the ideology they presentcan be described as orthodox Islam, incorporating elements of common social practice from the Pashtunruralareas.A numberof restrictionsare introduced:limitationin educationand employment for women; prescription of traditional dress, beardand hat for men; implementation of a traditionalpenalty code; a ban on music and television. The extentto which these regulations are enforcedvaries from one areato another,revealing a fragmentedand weak administration, as well as an unclear policy formulatedby the movement's leaders. In ruralPashtunareas, the strict Taliban regulations cause relatively few problems,to a large extent because they comply with how people are used to living their lives. However, there are incidental problems when Taliban reformsare too strict, and in the longer run the movement might have a problem because its hard-coremilitary recruits expect an extremely strict policy, which may alienate a broaderconstituency.'6In the cities, particularly the more liberal ones like Herat and Kabul, relations with the local populationhave been very problematic,and the Taliban cannot rely on its political promise, nor on people's affiliation to ulama networks, for securing popular support.

The limited supportthat the Talibanstill enjoys among the townspeople derives from the fact that it has re-established a sense of law and orderwhere there was lawless chaos. However, as became particularly evident after the takeover of Kabul, the movement lacks people as well competentin runningan administration, as conceptions on how their policy can eventually be translatedinto practice. The religious network on which the Taliban is based coincides to a large extent with the ethnic boundariesof the Pashtun.Kandahar, which servedas Taliban'scentreof commandup to the recent captureof Kabul, is a traditionalcentre for Pashtunnationalism.The Talibanhas so far carefully avoided applying ethnic rhetoric,and the Hazarain Kabul have in practice enjoyed a semi-autonomous status in the period under Taliban rule. Yet, representativesof the other nationalities tend to see in the Taliban an attempt to establishPashtunrule at their expense. The existence of a few non-Pashtun within Taliban's rulershipcannot compensatefor this. Comparing the present situation with that of 1992, when there was no group that could be claimed to represent the Pashtun population, there is now a much largerpotential for the developmentof a clear-cutethnicconflict, Pashtun against non-Pashtun. Taliban's 'traditional' orientation is paralleled by a large-scale, mobile, and in many ways, modem war organization.The early recruits were madrasa students, many of whom had fightingexperience,but who had withdrawn to the madrasa when the Soviets left. After its initial successes, the movement also startedto recruit people from other resistance units or from the communistregime, adding both to its size and its competence. In the process, the Taliban consistently refused to relate to other parties or groups as allies, insisting that anybody wanting to join the movement did so as a 'good Muslim,' and would have to give up any previous group affiliation. In contrast to other organizationswith a rural Pashtun constituency,the Talibanhas taken up many statelike practices. A primary example is how, in areas under its control, it has by principle installed administrators originatingelsewhere, an age-old state practice in Afghanistan.Another, and relatedaspect, is that the Talibanhas taken control over territoriesbeyond the influence of

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KristianBerg Harpviken Figure2. Territoryas Controlledby the MajorArmed Formationsin Afghanistanas of April 1997*

the networkon which it is based, and beyond its own constituency. That is particularlyvalid for Heratand Kabul, but also for some of the rural areas in the northwest that it controls. Hence, one can talk about two phases in the Taliban's expansion:a firstphase when it expandedto the boundaries of its primary constituency, and a second phase where it used that basis for taking control over the rest of the country. was the In the firstphase,whatwas remarkable the fragmentary tendenciesof abilityto transcend Pashtunsociety, andbuild a larger-scale organizcoherence.The existence ation with considerable of cell-like unitson which a militaryorganization could be based marks a difference between the Taliban and earlier resistance organizations within the same constituency,but is something the Taliban has in common with the Shi'ia for both the Talibanand Islamists.Furthermore, the Shi'ia Islamists, these organizationswere mainly built up in exile. Such cell-like organizthe needs ationsarethe idealtype for maintaining at an early for sanctionsand controls,particularly stage were success seems but a distant goal (Hechter,1987).However,the Hezb-eIslamiwas also built on a similar organizationalbasis, alreadypriorto the war. I would arguethatthe determiningfactorin the limitedsuccess of Hezb in popular recruitmentwithin the country was its that was not connectedto any core organization establishedinstitutions.If so, this underlinesthe to existing forms of communityas a attachment crucialfactorin mobilization.The success of the Talibanmovement is cruciallylinked to its mobilizationof existing organizations. The second phase has presentedthe Taliban with an entirely new set of challenges, as it expands into areas where a majority of the local population do not belong to its constituency, whether defined by ethnicity or by culturaland religious practices. Indicationsare that this has provoked fissures within the movement's leadershipbetween those who want to inflexibly implement Taliban rules and regulations, and those who want to seek consolidation through compromise. The permanence of the organization remains to be seen, since it appears that the potential for popular mobilization in the non-Pashtunareas is limited. One can already sense thatthe Talibanis in a situationof organizationaloverstretch,militarilyas well as administratively.

* For explanations,see text and endnote 17.

7. Implications for the Studyof Afghanistan Illustrating major processes of war-induced change in Afghanistan,it has been my ambition fail to come to show thatprewarunderstandings to grips with postwar reality. Much current analysis and policy-formationis still situatedin a prewarparadigm. 7.1 A New Ethnicand Religious Balance A majorconsequence of the war is how the minorities have built organizationalcapabilityand political assertiveness. The emergence of Wahdatamong the Hazararepresentsa broader trend.t7These transformationstowards largerscale forms of organizationhave been successful because they have been able to build upon existing communityties, but transcendthem by integratingthem into a largerwhole (Figure 2), graduallyintroducingformalmeans of monitoring and sanctioning.While the existence of nonstate armed organizations is the most visible one should not assign of this transformation, sume that the weakening of one particularorganization implies that the broader societal changes which it representswill wither away. For that,the changes are too deep. This also means the demise of Pashtundominance. The difficultythat many Pashtunhave in adjustingto this change, and of acceptingits imis in plications for futuregovernancestructures, itself a majorobstacle for solutions. The emergence of the Taliban,a new large-scale organization based in the Pashtun population, might further delay the necessary process of adjust-

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ment to new realities. Regardless of the future of the Taliban, there will not be a viable solution to the Afghanistan conflict if the nonPashtunpopulationsare not accommodated. 7.2 Revisiting Tribalism Tribalism is very unlikely to re-emerge as a competitive form of organizationat the national This stems from level, politically or militarily.'18 the fact that it will not be a sufficient basis for balancing off the newly gained strengthof the non-Pashtuns,as well as from the changes in social organizationthat have taken place within the Pashtun population itself. Tribal organization is transcended by new organizational forms, and will in and by itself not be capableof meeting the requirementsof the new situation. This conclusion is in direct opposition to analysts who have suggested that post-communist Afghanistan might experience retribalization (e.g. Suhrke, 1990), and it is a major lesson for future peace missions. So far, United Nations negotiators have concentrated on reinstalling the old elite, now in exile, neglecting the change in ethnic organizationand interethnicpower-relations that have resultedfrom the war. 7.3 The Role of ExternalSupport It is common, also today, to blame foreign interferencefor the continuedwar in Afghanistan. Emphasizingthe importanceof foreign support for the success of military popular movements does not necessarily contradictthe collectiveaction approach. For example, one can argue thatforeign supportis instrumental in the movements' ability to pay incentives to participants, as well as for participants'belief that victory is within reach.However, it has also been claimed thatstudyingprocesses internalto movementsis less centralthan studying their 'foreign policy' (e.g. Westad, 1992, p. 455). Among the cases discussed here, the early Pashtunresistance, as well as the HazaraShurafailed to raise substantial foreign support,and they failed in building truly effective military organizations. The PDPA, as well as the Hezb-e Islami, enjoyed massive external support,but, lacking the basis of community, they both failed in broadermobilization. The Hezb-e Wahdatand Taliban,enjoying the privilege of communitybasis as well as foreign support,were successful in terms of both military ability and popular backing. The

tentative conclusion emerging from this analysis is that for non-statemilitary mobilizationto succeed, foreign supportis a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition. The distinctive character of successful movements is still to be traced in the relationshipbetween the movement and its constituentcommunity. 8. Implications for a Collective-ActionTheory of Warand Organization The applicationof the theoreticalposition that I have called the traditionalistthesis is not restrainedto the study of Afghanistan.Criticizing this position from a collective-action perspective, emphasizingthe role of 'tradition'as community, brings several issues to the foreground, with implicationsfor studies inspiredby collective-action theory. 8.1 DefiningIncentives As emphasizedearlier,a narrowdefinitionof incentives has been a major obstacle to progress within the collective-action programme. One needs to take the social structures in which people are alreadyembeddedas a starting-point. People rarelyact in responseto distantlydefined objectives, however attractivethey are, as the PDPA experienced when their political reform programme was met with massive resistance, not because of the content of reforms, but because the party was so distant from all existing social relations. Hezb-e Islami, in spite of its financial and military superioritywithin the resistance, could not mobilize broadlybecause of its inability to integrate existing social ties. Hence, attractive political objectives are not likely to ignite popular action unless they are mediatedby existing structures, inspiringconfidence as well as being channels for more immediate incentives, ranging from economic benefits to social recognition. The limited material analysed here leads to the propositionthat negative and positive sanctions have different functions in mobilization. For the activist core of organizationslike Hezbe Islami, Hezb-e Wahdatand Taliban,negative sanctionsare importantin securingcompliance, which works because of members' dependence on the organization.Negative sanctions often play a crucial role in the early mobilizationof a movement, when its resources are scarce, and

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when the likelihood of success seems distant. Turningto broaderpopular mobilization, positive sanctions seem to take on a more crucial of the role, as exemplifiedby the instrumentality Shi'ia Islamists' softening of administrative policies, or the Taliban's restoration of basic security. Positive sanctionsare likely to become more importantas the mobilization expands in time and in scope, particularly as it moves from being a mobilizationof a limited numberof activists to becoming a broad popular mobilization. With broadened support, the ultimate positive incentive, victory, gains in likelihood.

continuing to dominate major resources in society, such organizations might very well become a major obstacle to overcoming the conflict. Somewhat counterintuitively, societies seen as war-proneprior to meeting an external threatmight be more capable of re-establishing normalcy than societies forced to build a new war-makingcapabilitythatbecomes permanent. Non-state organizations with war-making as their rationale can develop into extreme independence vis-a-vis civil society. 8.3 'Traditionalism'vs. CollectiveAction Theory The collective action approach, as applied in this article,has considerableexplanatorypower. Yet, it has here been appliedretrospectively- to use it as a basis for predicting political mobilization is hardly realistic. This article has focused on one particular variable, a movement's integrationwith an existing community, yet it is clear that this variable interacts with other variables, such as relations with and the composition of other groups, or the extent of foreign support. As Lichbach (1994) has pointed out, this problem is not only familiar from applications of rational-choicetheory to other problems, it is also equally shared by all competing theoretical approachesto the study of mobilization.Loweringour level of ambition with respect to prediction, collective-action theory can, and should, be subjectedto further empirical tests, aiming to develop insight into how various solutions to the collective-action dilemma are played out in varying contexts. Applying, and developing, existing insights in the meeting with new empirical material, not least from the non-westernworld, would be particularlyuseful. Finally, the shortcomingsof the traditionalist thesis shouldhave been sufficientlyhighlighted. to colApplying a community-centred approach lective action has broughtto the forefrontthat it is exactly those movements that are able to integratethe best of 'tradition',in the sense of existing community ties, yet transcending its limitations in terms of organizationalscale and effectiveness, that are most likely to succeed.

8.2 Mechanisms for Monitoring The ability to distributeincentives is dependent on the ability to monitor individual action efficiently. The strength of pre-existing organization is again underlined, whose informal control mechanisms are efficient in monitoring individualaction. In two of the cases studied,informal control has been heavily relied on: namely the wartime organization among the tribal Pashtun, as well as the early resistance among the Hazara.It seems that informal control in itself is insufficient for building largerscale military organizations.That is not to say that attempts at establishing formal control guaranteesuccess. Both the HazaraShura and Hezb-eIslami prove that formalcontrolsystems are only one criterionfor successful large-scale mobilization.The role of a pre-existingcore organization discussed in the case of the Shi'ia Islamists, the Hezb-e Islami and the Taliban, also refers directlyto the issue of control.These parties are, not incidentally, those which have commanded strongly committed fighters, willing to fight beyond their locality, even when stakes are high. In a situationcharacterized by grave military threats, as in Afghanistan, potential resistance organizationswill build on existing social structures. A selection process is played out: among the multiple organizationalforms existing in a society, those that are most fit for collective resistance will be favoured.The social and political changes initiated by external threat are possibly greaterin societies where a capacityfor large-scale collective violence did not exist beforehand.If new organizationalforms emerge, they are exclusively designed for the conflict NOTES 1. Explaining the situation.19Lacking experience of peace, but

interplay between external aggression

TranscendingTraditionalism 285 and resisting organizationsis not the aim of this article, where the focus is on processes within resisting groups. For analysis of intergroupprocesses and the dynamics of identity, with a focus on the Hazaraof Afghanistan, see Harpviken(1995, 1996). 2. This approach is a variation over classical political modernization and modernare theory,where traditional seen as mutually exclusive. The idea has always been influential within the social sciences, expressed for example in Tonnies Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaftdistinction (Tonnies [1887], 1957). For an early, but encompassing, criticismof political modernizationtheory, see Gusfield (1967). 3. The conceptionthattribalsociety and state are mutually exclusive entities has been informingmuch work on the interrelation between the two, as reflectedby the contributions in Khoury& Kostiner(1991). Here, the contribution by Richard Tapper is particularlyinteresting, rejectingthis conception on empiricalgrounds. 4. As defined by Suhrke,externalization:'... is likely to producewarlordismof a modernstyle, characterized by ideologized and heavily armed factions, inflexible alliances and sharpboundariesbetween hostile groups,in many respects resembling the contemporaryLebanese situation' (Suhrke, 1990, p. 245). 5. Lichbachhas constructeda typology where solutions to the collective action dilemma are grouped as Market, Community,Contractor Hierarchy.Once applied, this categorizationbreaks down, as each one either presupposes, or is integratedwith, the others. For example, a crucial aspect of Communityis the provision of functioning Hierarchyfor the emerging movement. 6. The PDPA consisted of two factions, Khalq and Parcham.The Khalqwas both most numerousand most doctrinaire, with the membership mainly being educated Pashtunfrom a ruralbackground.The other faction, Parcham, primarilyrecruitedamong children of well-established Kabul families with various ethnic backgrounds(Dupree, 1979, pp. 37-39). Soon afterthe coup, the two factions split, and Khalq removed all Parcham ministersby 1 July, biddingfarewell to the initial pragmatism. 7. The so-called 'Christmas coup' involved the deployment of 85000 soldiers within a month, while the country'sown armywas reducedfrom 100 000 to some 30000 fighting men, mainly through defections (Bradsher,1983, p. 206). 8. There are other types of religious leaders who have played a role in political mobilization among the Pashtun. An interesting elaboration is found in Edwards' (1986) article on varieties of charismatic leadershipin Afghanistan. 9. Hezb was favouredby Pakistan,which controlled supplies both to frontsand to refugees. Pakistanchannelled most of the aid to Afghanistanduringthe war, including large military supplies from the US and Saudi Arabia, and used its position as the dominant exile country to select six partiesonly for official recognition,membership being compulsory for obtaining military and humanitarian aid alike. 10. The tribal structureamong the Hazarahad been gradually fragmenting since Abdur Rahman's war in the 1880s; local administrationswere established at increasingly lower levels, encompassing only a few villages or a valley (Canfield, 1972, p. 7). Contactbetween governmentagent and people was mediatedby a local representative,while there was minimal contact between different localities. In rural Hazarajat,this system, effectively facilitatingstate controland preventing regional opposition,was dominantup to the war. For a more comprehensiveaccount of political mobilization (1995, among the Hazaraduringthe war, see Harpviken 1996). 11. The networkof sheikhwas a resourcereadyto be set in action, existing long before the Iranianrevolution(Roy, 1990, pp. 65-67). In Iran'seffortsto 'exportthe Islamic revolution', these humanresourceswere more of a key factorthan were financialand militarysupplies. 12. The existence of Wahdatwas indirectly importantfor events in Kabul, by giving confidence among the Hazarathat what was gained would eventually be safeguardedby a representative party. 13. There was a remarkable lack of Pashtunrepresentation amongthe resistancegroupswho ralliedto the capitalin April 1992. The partiesbased in the tribalbelt were unable to mobilize people. There was an interestingpattern in the fall of governmentgarrisonsthroughoutthe country:in the tribal Pashtunbelt, soldiers were demobilized, installations dismantled, equipment shared. Elsewhere, the cohesion of army units was maintained, as they were coopted by existing resistance organizations (Rubin, 1995, p. 265). Hezb-e Islami, trying to invoke ethnic arguments, got little response, being largely alien to Pashtunsociety. 14. Overall,the extent to which the movementhas received support from abroadis a subject of much speculation, with little documentation. It is unclearhow disputedthe Pakistanisupportpolicy is within the country's factionridden administration. Other alleged supportingcountries are Saudi-Arabia and the United States, but whether this supporthas come to materialexpression, or has been limited to the political-diplomaticfield cannot be ascertained(Goodarzi, 1996). 15. The success of the Taliban put a dramatic end to Wahdat'spresencein Kabul.With Talibanapproaching Kabul, Wahdat was caught between the lines of the Jamiat governmentand Taliban, and chose to join the latter. As the Taliban set out to disarm Wahdats people, the governmentattacked,and gained full control over the capital for the first time. Wahdat'sleader, Abdul Ali Mazari, got killed while in Taliban's custody. Wahdathad in one stroke lost its most important resource,the controlover partsof Kabul,and its ability to make itself heard in the national political game has been severely reduced. 16. Taliban leaders, discussing women's rights with representatives of internationalhumanitarian organizations, have invoked the argumentthat they cannot take the risk of loosening restrictionsas long as they are at war, because that would be opposed by a majority of its fighters. 17. Of particular importance is the organizationaltransformationamong the Tajik and the Uzbek populations, currently represented by the Jamiat-eIslami(dominantly Tajik) and the Jumbush-e Milli (dominantly Uzbek). Jumbush-eMilli is led by Abdul Rashid Dostum, a for-

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KRISTIAN BERG HARPVIKEN, b. 1961; Cand. Polit. in Sociology 1995 (University of Oslo); Project Coordinator and Director, Norwegian Afghanistan Committee, Peshawar (1990-2); Research Fellow, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (1995-7); Research Fellow, Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo (1997- ). Research interests: political mobilization, migration, conflict resolution, arms control, focusing on Afghanistan and southern Africa.