PETITIONS CHALLENGING REPUBLIC ACT NO.

10175
1. 2. G.R. No. 203299 o Louis "Barok" C. Biraogo Vs. National Bureau of Investigation and Philippine National Police G.R. No. 203306 o Alab ng Mamamahayag (alam), Hukuman ng Mamamayan Movement Inc., Jerry S. Bertini "Toto" Causing, Hernani Q. Cuare, Percy Lapid, Tracy Cabrera, Ronald E. Renta, Cirilo P. Sabarre, Jr., Dervin Castro, et a. Vs. Office of the President, represented by President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, Senate of the Philippines and House of Representatives G.R. No. 203335 o Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Rowena S. Disini, Lianne Ivy P. Medina, Janette Toral and Ernesto Sonido, Jr. Vs. The Secretary of Justice, The Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, The Executive Director of the Information and Communications Technology Office, The Chief of the Philippine National Police and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation G.R. No. 203359 o Senator Teofisto DL Guingona III Vs. Executive Secretary, The Secretary of Justice, The Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, The Chief of the Philippine National Police, and Director of the National Bureau of Investigation G.R. No. 203378 o Alexander Adonis, Ellen Tordesillas, Ma. Gisela Ordenes-Cascolan, H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., Romel R. Bagares, and Gilbert T. Andres Vs. The Executive Secretary, The Department of Budget and Management, The Department of Justice, The Department of the Interior and Local Government, The National Bureau of Investigation, The Philippine National Police, and the Information and Communications Technology Office-Department of Science and Technology G.R. No. 203391 o Hon. Raymond V. Palatino, Hon. Antonio Tinio, Vencer Mari Crisostomo of Anakbayan, Ma. Katherine Elona of the Philippine Collegian, Isabelle Therese Baguisi of the National Union of Students of the Philippines, et al. Vs. Paquito N. Ochoa Jr., in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, Leila De Lima in her capacity as Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 203407 o Bagong Alyansang Makabayan Secretary General Renato M. Reyes, Jr., National Artist Bienvenido L. Lumbera, Chairperson of Concerned Artists of the Philippines, Elmer C. Labog, Chairperson of Kilusang Mayo Uno, Cristina E. Palabay, Secretary General of Karapatan, Ferdinand R. Gaite, Chairperson of Courage, Joel B. Maglunsod, Vice President of Anakpawis Party-List, Lana R. Linaban, Secretary General of Gabriela Women's Party, Adolf Ares P. Gutierrez and Julius Garcia Matibag Vs. His Excellency Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, President of the Republic of the Philippines, Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Executive Secretary, Senate of the Philippines, represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, House of Representatives, represented by Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr., Hon. Leila De Lima, Secretary of the Department of Justice, Louis Napoleon C. Casambre, Executive Director of the Information and Communications Technology Office, Nonnatus Caesar R. Rojas, Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, D/Gen. Nicanor A. Bartolome, Chief of the Philippine National Police, Manuel A. Roxas II, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government G.R. No. 203440 o Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Amparita Sta. Maria, Ray Paolo J. Santiago. Gilbert V. Sembrano, and Ryan Jeremiah D. Quan (all of Ateneo Human Rights Center) Vs. Honorable Paquito Ochoa in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Honorable Leila De Lima in her capacity as Secretary of Justice, Honorable Manuel Roxas in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of the Department of Interior and Local Government, The Chief of the Philippine National Police, The Director of the National Bureu of Investigation (all of the Executive Department of Government) G.R. No. 203453 o National Union of Journalistsj of the Philippines (NUJP), Philippine Press Institute (PPI), Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility, Rowena Carranza Paraan, Melinda Quintos-De Jesus, Joseph Alwyn Alburo, Ariel Sebellino and The Petitioners in The ePetition http://www.nupj.org/no-to-ra10175/ Vs. The Executive Secretary, The Secretary of Justice, The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, The Secretary of Budget and Management, The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, The Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center, and all Agencies and Instrumentalities of Government and All Persons

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Acting Under Their Instructions, Orders, Direction in Relation to the Implementationof Republic Act No. 10175 G.R. No. 203454 o Paul Cornelius T. Castillo & Ryan D. Andres Vs. The Hon. Secretary of Justice, The Hon. Secretary of Interior and Local Government G.R. No. 203469 o Anthony Ian M. Cruz; Marcelo R. Landicho; Benjamin Noel A. Espina; March Ronald C. Rimorin; Julius D. Rocas; Oliver Richard V. Robillo; Aaron Erick A. Lozada; Gerard Adrian P. Magnaye; Jose Reginald A. Ramos; Ma. Rosario T. Juan; Brendalyn P. Ramirez; Maureen A. Hermitanio; Kristine Joy S. Rementilla; Maricel O. Gray; Julius Ivan F. Cabigon; Benralph S. Yu; Cebu Bloggers Society, Inc. President Ruben B. Licera Jr.; and Pinoy Expat/OFW Blog Awards, Inc. Coordinator Pedro E. Rahon Vs. His Excellency Benigno S. Aquino III, in his capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, in his capacity as Senate President; House of Representatives; Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; Hon. Leila De Lima, in her capacity as Secretary of Justice; Hon. Louis Napoleon C. Casambre, in his capacity as Executive Director, Information and Communications Technology Office; Hon. Nonnatus Caesar R. Rojas, in his capacity as Director, National Bureau of Investigation; and P/Dgen. Nicanor A. Bartolome, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine National Police G.R. No. 203501 o Philippine Bar Association, Inc. Vs. His Excellency Benigno S. Aquino III, in his official capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines; Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., in his official capacity as Executive Secretary; Hon. Leila M. De Lima, in hes official capacity as Secretary of Justice; Louis Napoleon C. Casambre, in his official capacity as Executive Director, Information and Communications Technology Office; Nonnatus Caesar R. Rojas, in his official capacity as Director of the National Bureau of Investigation; and Director General Nicanor A. Bartolome, in his official capacity as Chief of the Philippine National Police G.R. No. 203509 o Bayan Muna Representative Neri J. Colmenares Vs. The Excutive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. G.R. No. 203515 o National Press Club of the Philippines Inc., represented by Benny D. Antiporda in his capacity as President and in his personal capacity Vs. Office of the President, Pres. Benigno Simeon Aquino III, Department of Justice, Department of Interior and Local Government, Philippine National Police, National Bureau of Investigation, Department of Budget and Management and All Other Government Instrumentalities Who Have Hand in the Passage and/or Implementation of Republic Act 10175 G.R. No. 203518 o Philippine Internet Freedom Alliance, composed of Dakila-Philippine Collective for Modern Heroism, represented by Leni Velasco, Partido Lakas ng Masa, represented by Cesar S. Melencio, Francis Euston R. Acero, Marlon Anthony Romasanta Tonson, Teodoro A. Casio, Noemi Lardizabal-Dado, Imelda Morales, James matthew B. Miraflor, Juan G.M. Ragragio, Maria Fatima A. Villena, Medardo M. Manrique, Jr., Lauren Dado, Marco Vittoria Tobias Sumayao, Irene Chia, Erastus Noel T. Delizon, Cristina Sarah E. Osorio, Romeo Factolerin, Naomi L. Tupas, Kenneth Keng, Ana Alexandria C. Castro Vs. The Executive Secretary, The Secretary of Justice, The Secretary of Interior and Local Government, The Secretary of Science and Technology, The Executive Director of the Information Technology Office, The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, The Chief, Philippine National Police, The Head of the DOJ Office of Cybercrime, and the Other members fo the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordination Center

Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor General

The Office of the Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of R.A. No. 10175, in its entirety, except only as to Section 19, on restricting or blocking access. With all due respect to the Congress, the OSG submits that Section 19 is constitutionally impermissible, because it permits a form of final restraint on speech without prior judicial determination. As to Section 12, on the real time collection of traffic data, the OSG defends its constitutionality. However, again with all due deference to Congress, the OSG submits that the Congress may, in its wisdom, consider amending the Section to provide for prior judicial authorization. Preliminary Issues:

Issue Whether petitioners have standing to bring the petitions.

Sol Gens Argument transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation. Compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi. the following are determinants of whether a matter is of transcendental importance: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and, (3) the lack of the any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised. None of the foregoing determinants are established by petitioners. Petitioners who invoke the transcendental importance doctrine have not identified their personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA No. 10175 would result in direct injury to their organization and members. Neither locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress, whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding. None of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law. Generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a Direct and personal interest is key.

Whether the issues raised are ripe for adjudication.

Penal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from its very existence, and if a facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws to deter socially harmful conduct. on-its-face invalidation of penal statutes are not allowed in this jurisdiction petitioners merely claim that they are suing in their respective capacities as: citizen, netizen, legislator, internet blogger, internet user, multimedia journalist, media organization, or person maintaining a twitter or facebook account. petitioners also fail to establish that there is an imminent threat of an actual filing of a criminal offense against them for violation of the assailed law to warrant its review.

Substantive Issues and Arguments: Whether the following sections of Republic Act No. 10175 are unconstitutional for the reasons given: Provision I. Sec. 4(a)(1) Description Petitioners Argument Sol Gens Argument The application of strict scrutiny is not called for because Section 4(a)(1) regulates hacking, a socially harmful conduct; it does not regulate, prevent or punish speech. Considering that illegal access is globally recognized as a offense against the confidentiality,

Makes access to the whole Failure to meet strict or part of a computer scrutiny standards (PIFA, system without right a et al. Petition) cybercrime;

integrity and availability of computer data and systems, the Philippines has no reason not to include the same II. Sec. 4(a)(3) Makes the intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer data, electronic document or electronic data message without right including the introduction or transmission of viruses, a cybercrime; Violation of freedom of expression guarantee (Reyes, et al. Petition) Section 4(a)(3) penalizesconduct, not speech. Section 4(a)(3) regulates data interference because it is socially harmful conduct. It does not regulate, prevent or punish speech. The protected legal interest here is the integrity and proper functioning of or use of stored computer data or computer programs. Violation of equal protection clause (PIFA, et al. Petition) The difficulty in tracing the real perpetrators of cybercrimes or persons usingaliases cannot be a deterrent to the passage and implementation of the law. The cybercrime law was enacted precisely to allow law enforcement authorities to go after the perpetrators of cybercrime whether they be known or hidden under the veil of pseudonyms. Besides, a person who commits a crime using his actual name is as guilty as a person who commits a crime using an alias. Cybersquatting is the oldest and best-known form of nuisance in cyber space. Cybersquatters will generally either offer to sell the name back to the trademark owner for an extortionate price, or make money from internet traffic accidentally landing on their page. The practice is a nuisance for the growing number of companies that do business over the internet and are loath to lose valuable traffic to rogue websites. In our jurisdiction, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies of which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance,

III.

Sec. 4(a)(6)

Makes the acquisition of a domain name over the internet in bad faith, for profit, to mislead or destroy reputation and deprive others from registering the name a cybercrime;

a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. IV. Sec. 4(b)(3) Makes the intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration or deletion of identifying information belonging to another without right a cybercrime; Violation of due process clause (Reyes, et al. Petition) Section 4(b)(3) is intended to protect ones right to privacy and to protect ones right to property. The offenders rights to privacy protected speech are Violation of right to and privacy of irrelevant in computer-related communication and offenses. correspondence guarantee (Reyes, et al. Petitioner Reyes fear focus on Petition) the words acquisition transer and possession in relation to Violation of the freedom journalists fundamental work of information is of the press guarantee reporting unfounded. (Reyes, et al. Petition) Petitioners Reyes fear can be easily soothed when the principle noscitur a sociis is applied. By noscitur a sociis, the correct construction of a word or phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated. the words intentional acquisition, transfer, and possession, must be associated with the term identity theft and must be understood to mean any such acts done with the intention of appropriating anothers identity for acquisitorial use. V. Sec. 4(c)(1) Makes the willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration a cybercrime; Violation of freedom of expression clause (Guingona, et al. Petition) Congress, in enacting Section 4(c)(1), seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade and pornography for favour and consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam. The risks to publishers of publishing nude materials in the internet or to film producers of creating artistic works is no different or greater than the risks presently confronting them under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. Since 1932, Article 201 punishes obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows. To date, Article 201 has not been declared

unconstitutional. VI. Sec. 4(c)(3) Makes the transmission of commercial electronic communication with the use of computer systems seeking to advertise, sell or offer for sale products and services a cybercrime; Violation of due process clause (ALAM, et al. Petition) Violation of equal protection clause (PIFA, et al. Petition) Unsolicited Commercial Communications or SPAM is outlawed because worldwide, SPAM messages waste the storage and network capacities of Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and are simply offensive to the unwilling recipient. Flooding the internet with useless and nuisance and bulk emails burden the internet networks and reduce the efficiency of commerce and technology. They also result to tremendous losses in revenue if left unpunished. Spam can, in principle, properly be considered a type of trespasssince it is a means by which the spammer uninvitedly use anothers property. Spam can also be considered a nuisance because of its substantial interference with the peaceful enjoyment of a property, which causes considerable amount of damage consisting of clogged disc spaces, network congestion, financial loss and loss of productivity. Spamming is at most commercial speech not worthy of constitutional protection. It is intrusive to the privacy of the internet users and unlawful appropriates the storage and network of ISPs without compensation and for profit. The government has an interest in the free, efficient flow of information, commercial technology in the Internet. VII. Sec. 4(c)(4) Makes libel as defined under Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code when committed through a computer system or any other similar means a cybercrime; Violation of due process clause (Biraogo Petition; Guingona Petition; Adonis, et al. Petition; Palatino et al. Petition; Reyes, et al. Petition; Sta. Maria et al. Petition; Castillo, et al. Petition; Cruz, et al. Petition; PBA, et al. Petition; NPCP et al. Petition; Violation of equal Online libel is not a new crime. Online libel is a crime punishable under the Articles 353, in relation to Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. Section 4(c)(4) just made express an avenue already covered by the term similar means under Article 355, to keep up with the times. This would immediately negate the oft-used defense that libel committed through the use of the internet is not punishable. That said, the relevant provisions of the Revised Penal Code on libel

protection clause (Guingona Petition; Sta. Maria, et al. Petition; Castillo et al. Petition; NPCP, et al. Petition) Abridgment of freedom of speech, expression and press guarantees (Biraogo Petition; Disini, et al. Petition; Adonis, et al. Petition;

and jurisprudence on the subject gives ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable an accuses to determine the nature of his violation. The computer system is just another means of publication Libel committed through a computer system can therefore be defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future. Libel is not constitutionally protected speech. even without Section 4(c)(4), a public malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead, made with the use of the computer system already constitutes libel. online libel was already a crime punished under Articles 353 to 362 of the Revised Penal Code, and to date, has never been declared unconstitutional on the ground of abridging the right to free speech, freedom of expression and of the press. it must be emphasized that cyber libel was not given a higher penalty under Section 4(c)(4). Notably, R.A. No. 10175 did not provide for a distinct penalty for Section 4(c)(4). The one degree higher penalty was imposed under Section 6 for all the crimes under the Revised Penal Code and special penal laws committed with

the use of ICT. Violation of the rule on double jeopardy (NPCP, et al. Petition) Being a bill of attainder (NUJP, et. al. Petition) Being an ex factolaw (PIFA Petition) et post al. libel committed by using computer system is punishable under Articles 353-362 of the Revised Penal Code. Section 4(c)(4) merely made expressed another venue for the commission of libel. Said addition does not make said provision ex post facto. Libelous statements made through computer systems prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 10175 are already considered punishable under the Revised Penal Code. Libel is unprotected speech. It remains to be a crime in many nations. The text of the ICCPR does notmandate the decriminalization of libel. In fact, ICCPR recognizes that the freedom carries with it special duties and responsibilities and may be subject to certain restrictions as are provided by law and as are necessary for the respect of the rights or reputations of others A criminal statute does not become void just because of its reference to general terms, or in this case, of its use of the terms aid or abet, and attempt. There is no constitutional or statutory duty on the part of the lawmakers to define every word in a law, as long as the intent can be gathered from the entire act. The test in determining the ambiguity of a statute is whether the words convey a sufficiently definite warning with respect to the proscribed conduct based on common understanding and practice. The words of a statute are interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. There is no need for absolute precision in order to appreciate the words of the statute. A reasonable degree

Violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Adonis, et al. Petition; Reyes, et al. Petition)

VIII.

Sec. 5

Declares the aiding or abetting in the commission of Cybercrime and the attempt in its commission as a cybercrime offense.

Violation of due process clause (Reyes, et al. Petition; Sta. Maria, et al. Petition; Cruz, et al. Petition; PBA, et al. Petition; NPCP, et al. Petition) Violation of equal protection clause (NPCP, et al. Petition) Violation of freedom of expression clause (NUJP, et al. Petition) Violation of rule on double jeopardy (NPCP, et al. Petition) Being a bill of attainder

(NUJP, et al. Petition)

of certainty and flexibility, with clearly delineated limitations, is acceptable. a person who is guilty of aiding and abetting is simply considered an accomplice. Section 5, when read together with Section 8, last paragraph of R.A. No. 10175, shows that a person guilty of aiding and abetting is penalized as an accomplice. The laws on libel and as now contained in Section 4(c)(4) do not operate as prior restraints to speech. These libel acts provide for subsequent punishment. Thus, petitioners are free toexercise their right to speak out. If what they express is libelous, then they risk subsequent punishment.

IX.

Sec. 6

Imposes a penalty one degree higher for crimes penalized by the Revised Penal Code and special laws, if committed with the use of information and communication technology.

Violation of due process clause (Guingona, et al. Petition; NUJP, et al. Petition; Cruz, et al. Petition; NPCP, et al. Petition) Violation of equal protection clause (Guingona, et al. Petition; Adonis, et al. Petition; Sta. Maria, et al. Petition; Cruz, PBA et al. Petition; NPCP, et al. Petition) Violation of freedom of expression clause (NUJP, et al. Petition; Cruz, et al. Petition; NPCP, et al. Petition) Violation of rule on double jeopardy (Disini et al. Petition; Reyes, et al. Petition; Sta. Maria, et al. Petition; NPCP, et al. Petition) Being a bill of attainder (NUJP, et al. Petition) Being incompatible with Art. 19, par. 3 of the

The presumption is that the language used in a statue, which has a technical or well known legal meaning, is used in that sense by legislation. thus the first sentence of Section 6 is clear, delimited in scope and is valid. Double jeopardy is inherently a procedural defense or a shield that forbids a defendant from being subjected to the possibility of being penalized twice, or being tried again on the same (or similar) charge following a legitimate acquittal or conviction. It is not a constitutional prohibition against laws that may present possible prosecution for an offense penalized under other laws or statutes. Hence, the mere possibility of prosecution for two separate offenses by itself would not render either law unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill. It has consistently refused to invalidate a law or provision of law, on the ground that the bill from which it originated contained no such

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on freedom of expression (PIFA, et al. Petition)

provision, and was merely inserted by the Bicameral Conference Committee of both houses. The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification. The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary. The classification rests on substantial distinction because of the scope of reach, accessibility, and effect Thus, due to this nature of the internet, any person with minimal equipment and once online can have the opportunity to create worldwide chaos or intrude into the privacy of others without much obstacle. The principle purpose of the law is to maintain minimum standards of decency, morality and civility in human society. The qualifying circumstance of use of ICT was included in Section 6 as means to deter the increasing commission of cyber offenses. the increase in penalties under Section 6 of R.A. No. 10175 is, therefore justified and consistent with the policy of the law. The Act is not a bill of attainder, Section 6 does not seek to punish a status or a group but the action, i.e, using ICT to commit crimes. Section 6 does not punish internet users without the benefit of a trial. It merely makes the use of ICT a qualifying circumstance for all crimes and offenses. All elements including the use of ICT, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

X.

Sec. 7

Provides that prosecution under this law is without prejudice to any liability for violation of the Revised Penal Code or special laws.

Violation of due process clause (NUJP, et al. Petition; Cruz, et al. Petition) Violation of equal protection clause (Disini et al. Petition; Sta. Maria, et al. Petition; NUJP, et al. Petition) Violation of freedom of expression clause (NUJP, et al. Petition; Cruz, et al. Petition) Violation of rule on double jeopardy (Disini et al. Petition; Guingona, et al. Petition; Adonis, et al. Petition; Reyes, et al. Petition; Sta. Maria, et al. Petition; NUJP, et al. Petition; PBA, et al. Petition)

Supreme court said that when two different laws defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one does not bar prosecution of the other although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime, involve some important act which is not essential element of the other, the protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense.

XI.

Penal Provisions

Unconstitutional (Biraogo, et al. Petition)

it is within the power of the legislature to determine what acts or omissions other than those set out in the Revised Penal Code or other existing statues are to be condemned as separate, individual crimes and what penalties should be attached thereto. This legislative power is not diluted or improperly wielded simply because at some prior time the act or omission was but an element or ingredient of another offense, or might usually have been connected with another crime. The collection of traffic data will not result in any search or seizure of petitioners persons and/or property. The right to privacy does not extend to traffic data. Traffic data is non-content data that consists of the origin, destination, route, time, and date of the communication. The rationale for the collection of traffic data is analogous to the one used and recognized in a valid warrantless search of a moving

XII.

Sec. 12

Authorizes law enforcement authorities, by technical means, after finding due cause, to collect or record traffic data in real-time, associated with specified communication transmitted by means of a computer system.

Violation of due process clause (Castillo, et al. Petition) Violation of freedom of expression clause (Biraogo, et al. Petition; Castillo, et al. Petition) Violation of rule on searches and seizures (Reyes, et al. Petition; Castillo et al. Petition, Cruz, et al. Petition; PBA, et al Petition) Allows warrantless

electronic surveillance (NUJP et al. Petition)

vehicle and to that under exigent circumstances under existing technology, it is quite impossible Violation of right to to describe the place, things and privacy (Reyes, et al. persons to be searched because Petition; NUJP et al. what is originally posted or made Petition; Castillo et al. available online or stored in local systems may be Petition, Cruz, et al. computer changed, removed, or passed on to Petition; PBA, et al another instantaneously. Petition) Real-time collection of traffic data is akin to the collection of information derived from visual surveillance of an open physical space and does not intrude into private space. There is no necessity to secure a warrant where there is no invasion of personal space. Because traffic data is noncontent information, the Constitution does not require that it may be collected only upon the prior authority of a judicial warrant. No privacy can be expected from information revealed to or made available to a third party. XIII. Sec. 13 Preserves data. Violation of due process clause (Palatino, et al. Petition) Sec. 13 is directed to a service provider and not to individual users.

Violation of right to Requirement under the first privacy (PIFA, et al. sentence of Sec. 13 is a mere Petition) amendment to the franchise of telephone companies. Sec. 13 only calls for the preservation of traffic data and subscriber information The subscribers use and disposition of the preserved data are not being restricted. XIV. Sec. 14 Empowers law enforcement authorities, upon securing a search warrant, to issue an order requiring any person or service provider to disclose or submit traffic data within his possession or control. Undue delegation of judicial powers to PNP and NBI (NUJP et al. Petition) The order referred to in Sc. 14 is to be issued upon securing a court warrant. There is no need to conduct the search and seizure themselves, law enforcement agencies will just require or order the date custodian to produce the relevant

data. Its done pursuant to a court issued warrant. The power to issue subpoena is inherent in the power to investigate and may thus be exercised by the law enforcement authorities. Having subpoena powers does not necessarily clothe law enforcement agencies with judicial power. XV. Sec. 15 Defines the powers and duties of law enforcement authorities in the implementation of the search and seizure warrant Undue delegation of judicial powers to PNP (NUJP et al. Petition) Being an unlawful search and seizure (Palatino, et al. Petition) Search and seizure is a plainly law enforcement function. This Honorable Court already recognized the authority of law enforcement agencies to seize, retain, and destroy computer hardware and software containing pornographic materials in violation of Art 201 of the Revised Penal Code. Sec 17 merely provides for a process of clearing up the telcos systems to avoid overloading their storage capacity. The clean up protects individuals from unnecessary delay in the investigation and prosecution of a cybercrime. Violation of due process clause (Disini, et al. Petition; Guingona, et al. Petition; Sta. Maria, et al. Petition; NUJP, et al. Petition; Castillo, et al. Petition; Cruz, et al. Petition; NPCP, et al. Petition) Being an unlawful search and seizure (Guingona, et al. Petition; Castillo, et al. Petition; Cruz, et al. Petition; NPCP, et al. Petition) Sec. 10 is an impermissible final restraint on the freedoms of speech and expression. Sec. 19 seeks to restrain access to, circulation and dissemination of computer data prima facie found to be violative of the provisions of RA 10175. It covers not just conduct but broadly and dangerously sweeps speech. DOJs findings are unprotected speech and expression.

XVI.

Sec. 17

Authorizes service providers and law enforcement authorities, upon expiration of the periods under Sec. 13 and 15 to immediately and completely destroy the computer data subject of a preservation and examination. Authorizes Department of Justice to issue an order to restrict or block access to computer data foundprima facie to be in violation of RA 10175

Violation of due process clause (Reyes, et al. Petition; Palatino, et al. Petition)

XVII.

Sec. 19

It does not provide for constitutionally mandated Violation of right to procedural safeguards that would privacy of justify final restraint. communication (Sta. Maria, et al. Petition; Castillo, et al. Petition;

NPCP, et al. Petition) Violation of freedom of expression clause (Sta. Maria, et al. Petition; Cruz, et al. Petition) Violation of rule on double jeopardy (Sta. Maria, et al. Petition) Undue delegation of legislative authority (Disini, et al. Petition) Being a grant of unbridled power to the Sec. of Justice to act as a judge, jury and executioner of all cyber crime related complaints (Disini, et al. Petition; Reyes, et al. Petition) Undue delegation of judicial function (Adonis, et al. Petition; NUJP, et al. Petition) XVIII. Sec. 20 Penalizes any person who fails to comply with the order from law enforcement authorities. Violation of right to privacy of communication and correspondence (Biraogo, et al. Petition) Violation of freedom of expression clause (Biraogo, et al. Petition) Being a bill of attainder (NUJP, et al. Petition) XIX. Sec. 24 Gives the CICC the power to formulate a national cyber security plan Undue delegation of legislative power (NUJP, et al. Petition) Sec. 20, by its reference to PD No. 1829, clearly sets the definitive elements that will constitute noncompliance. A person must still be prosecuted for obstruction of justice and thereafter, proven to have knowingly or willfully defied the orders of law enforcement authorities before he will be penalized for non-complaince. Powers of the CICC with respect to enactment of relevant laws, issuances, measures, and policies is merely recommendatory. A perusal of Sec. 2 of RA 10175 readily reveals that the policy of the State deals with the interest of law and order, public interest, and justice and equity are sufficient standards.

FEBRUARY 5, 2013 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

"The Court Resolved to EXTEND the Temporary Restraining Order issued on October 9, 2012, until further orders from this Court." "NOW, THEREFORE, effective until further orders from this Court, You, Respondents, your agents, representatives, or persons acting in your place or stead, are hereby CONTINUALLY ENJOINED from implementing and/on enforcing Republic Act No. 10175 (Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012)."

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/ Retrieved 11/28/13

Cybercrime Law Oral Arguments Set on January 15; Justice Abad Confers with Counsels for Orderly Oral Arguments
Posted: January 4, 2013; By Gleo Sp. Guerra
The 15 petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 10175, more commonly known as theCybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, will be coming up for oral arguments before the Supreme Court in the afternoon of Tuesday, January 15, 2013. It is the first oral arguments of the Court to be presided over by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno since her appointment as such on August 24, 2012. To help prepare the counsels for the parties in relation to the multiple issues raised, SC Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad took the initiative of meeting with the said counsels this afternoon to discuss possible ground rules. One of the purposes of the meeting was to determine which of the many issues presented by the various petitions should be heard on oral arguments and which of the remaining issues could be argued in written Memoranda to be submitted to the Court after the oral arguments. The final list and sequence of issues to be argued, the counsels to argue the same, the time allotted for the said counsels to present their arguments, and additional dates for oral arguments, if any, will be resolved by the Court en banc in its first session of the year on January 8, 2012, and embodied in an Advisory to be issued to all the parties. Last October 9, the Court had issued a temporary restraining order, effective for 120 days, against the implementation/enforcement of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 after various groups from the media and civil society; and several individuals, including some members of Congress, had petitioned the Court to strike down some or all of the provisions of the law. The Solicitor General, as counsel for the government, has already submitted its Comment to the various petitions arguing in favor of the constitutionality of a majority of the provisions of the law.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/bulletin1.php Retrieved 11/28/13