Names

Both Frege and Russell are often attributed the view that names have, in some sense, descriptive meaning: e.g. the meaning of the name Julius Caesar' ma be given b the description, the Roman con!ueror of "aul'. #his thesis was brilliantl criticised b $aul %rip&e in Naming and Necessit , '()ford: Blac&well, *+,-.. /espite the apparentl narrow range of the topic, %rip&e's wor& has had a deep effect on man areas of philosoph . #he whole boo& is essential reading. 'Bear in mind that one could consistentl hold %rip&e's views on names together with Russell's view on descriptions 0 %rip&e for e)ample gives a defence of Russell on descriptions in the paper cited in section ii above..

For an introduction to this issue, see section * of 1ar& $ainsbur , 2hilosophical 3ogic', in 4. C. "ra ling, ed., 2hilosoph 0 1cCulloch, ch. 50 and 6vans, #he Causal #heor of Names', in 1oore and in 1artinich. $ee also, 1arga Reimer's article on Reference' at http:77plato.stanford.edu7entries7reference7, much of which is about names. John $earle defends a descriptive theor of proper names in 2roper Names' 'in 1artinich, originall in 1ind 89 '*+:,.*88;*9<..

1ore advanced discussion can be found in "areth 6vans, #he =arieties of Reference, '()ford: Clarendon 2ress, *+,>., ch. **0 and in 1. /ummett, Frege: 2hilosoph of 3anguage, '3ondon: /uc&worth, *+,*., appendi) to ch.:0 #. B urge, Reference and 2roper Names', Journal of 2hilosoph 9- '*+9<. 5>:; 5<+0 Jason $tanle , Names and Rigid /esignation' in B. ?ale and C. @right, eds., 4 Companion to the 2hilosoph of 3anguage '()ford: Blac&well *++9.0 $cott $oames, Be ond Rigidit : #he Anfinished $emantic 4genda of Naming and Necessit . ()ford: ()ford Aniversit 2ress >-->0 Christopher ?ughes, Names, Necessit and Bdentit '()ford: ()ford Aniversit 2ress >--5..

B4C% #( #(2

Conditionals

Conditional statements, those involving if...then...' constructions, are central to logic and to reasoning in general. But there are man &inds of conditional statement, and there is no clear consensus about how to understand, or even to classif , these different &inds.

#wo e)cellent introductions to the whole area are /oroth 6dgington, Conditionals' http:77plato.stanford.edu7entries7conditionals7, and Jonathan Bennett, 4 2hilosophical "uide to Conditionals '()ford: ()ford Aniversit 2ress >--<.. /oroth 6dgington's (n Conditionals', 1ind *-5 '*++:: ><:; <>+., gives a more detailed 'and difficult. introduction to the main issues.

Bn propositional logic we learn to translate if...then...' as the material conditional 's mbolised as C '.. But this does not seem to capture the meaning of if...then...' in natural language. For one thing, there are the so; called parado)es of material implication': according to the truth;tables for C ', an conditional with a false antecedent is true0 and an conditional with a true conse!uent is true. '#he antecedent is the statement before the then'0 the conse!uent is the statement after the then'.. $o Bf the 2ope is not Catholic, then 2aris is in Btal ' and Bf 2aris is in Btal , then the 2ope is Catholic' both come out true on this interpretation. $ee $ainsbur , 3ogical Forms, chapter <, for a useful introduction. #he essa s b "rice, Jac&son, $talna&er 'essa =BB. and 6dgington, in F. Jac&son, ed., Conditionals, '()ford: ()ford Aniversit 2ress, *++*. are essential further reading.

2hilosophers tend to draw a distinction between two t pes of conditionals. Compare Bf Booth didn't &ill 3incoln, someone else did' with Bf Booth hadn't &illed 3incoln, someone else would have'. #he former is assertible on the basis simpl of &nowing that 3incoln was indeed assassinated, while one will onl assert the latter if one believes in conspirac theories. #he distinction described as that between indicative' versus subDunctive' conditionals, or between indicative' and counterfactual' conditionals, but these labels are controversial as is the criterion and place to ma&e the division.

1odern discussion of counterfactual7subDunctive' conditionals begin with N. "oodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, '5 th ed. Cambridge, 1ass.: ?arvard Aniversit 2ress, *+,<.. /avid 3ewis ' Counterfactuals, '()ford: Basil Blac&well, *+9<.. and $talna&er '6ssa BB in Jac&son. give an account of counterfactuals in terms of possible worlds: if it were the case that 4, then it

would be the case that B' is anal sed as, in the closest possible worlds in which 4 is true, B is true.' #his anal sis has been ver influential in other areas 'for instance in NoEic&'s theor of &nowledge: see 6pistemolog F 1ethodolog ..