The popularization of more philosophical approaches to political discourse may be evident, but it is also undesirable- it prioritizes kritik over

action and disavows any attempt to act to fix concrete problem and creates a vicious cycle whereby kritik overdetermines action entirely and paralyzes change Owen 2 David, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton, Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning, illennium: !ournal of International Studies, "ol# $%, &o# $, http:''mil#sagepu(#com'cgi'reprint'$%'$')*$ +ommenting on the ,philosophical turn- in IR, ./ver remar0s that ,1a2 fren3y for words like epistemology and ontology often signals this philosophical turn, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely#4 5o6ever, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars# In one
respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no dou(t that such reflection can play a valua(le role in ma0ing e7plicit the commitments that characterise 8and help individuate9 diverse theoretical positions# :et,

such a philosophical turn is

not without its dangers and I 6ill (riefly mention three (efore turning to consider a confusion that has, I 6ill suggest, helped to promote the IR theory 6ars (y motivating this philosophical turn# The first danger 6ith the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter t6o 6ere merely a simple function of the former# ;ut while the explanatory++y and'or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments 8other6ise criticism of these features 6ould not (e a criticism that had any value9, it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments# Thus, for e7ample, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in 6hich dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded# It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems i#e#, ho6 it is that the relevant actors come to e7hi(it features in these circumstances that appro7imate the assumptions of rational choice theory9 and! if this is the case! it is a philosophical weakness"but this does not undermine the point that! for a certain class of problems! rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us# In other words! while the critical #udgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical #udgement! it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind$ %he second danger run (y the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory&construction from philosophical first principles! it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR$ Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can (e put li0e this: since it is the case that
there is al6ays a plurality of possi(le true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide 6hich is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in <uestion given the purposes of the in<uiry= yet, from this standpoint, ,theory>driven 6or0 is part of a reductionist program- in that it ,dictates al6ays opting for the description that calls for the e7planation that flo6s from the preferred model or theory-#* The ?ustification offered for this strategy rests on the mista0en (elief that it is necessary for social science (ecause general e7planations are re<uired to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms# 5o6ever, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ,6hether there are general e7planations for classes of phenomena is a <uestion for social>scientific in<uiry, not to (e pre?udged (efore

this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity$ %he third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR@6hat might (e called 8only slightly tongue in chee09 ,the 5ighlander vie6-@ namely! an image of warring theoretical approaches with each! despite occasional temporary tactical alliances! dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field$ It encourages this view because the turn to! and prioritisation of! ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right# %his image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers! and so a potentially vicious circle arises$ It should (e noted that I am not claiming that such a
conducting that in<uiry-#) oreover, vicious circle has (een esta(lished in IR (y virtue of the philosophical turn, nor am I claiming that IR is alone in its current e7posure to this threat= on the contrary, Shapiro-s remar0s are directed at 8primarily &orth American9

the philosophical turn in IR increases its exposure to these dangers and! hence, its vulnerability to the kind of vicious circle that they can! collectively! generate #
political science# I am simply concerned to point out that