Net Digests Specpro.

RULE 72 Hagans v.
Wislizenus1 Spec Pro Rule 72 Distinction between Civil Action and Special Proceedings Facts: Wislizenus is a judge in the CFI of Cebu. In a certain proceeding, he appointed assessors for the purpose of fixing the amount due to an administrator for his services and the expenses for the care, management and settlement of the estate of the deceased person. Hagans (doesnt say who he is but we can infer that he was a party to the case where the judge appointed the assessors) questioned the authority of Wislizenus to appoint such assessors. Wislizenus filed a demurrer to the petition of Hagans. He claims that provisions of Act 1902 permit him to appoint assessors in special proceedings Hence, this case for certiorari with the SC
In proceedings such as the one above, judges of Courts of First Instance are without authority to appoint assessors. The order of Judge Wislizenus in appointing assessors is annulled and set aside. Hernaez v. IAC Facts Petitioner Teodoro Hernaez Jr. (Jr.), represented by his mother and natural guardian, Evelyn Palmes, filed a complaint with the then Juvenile and Domestic Court (now Regional Trial Court) against Teodoro Hernaez Sr. (Sr.), private respondent, for acknowledgment and support with support pendente lite The court found for Jr. and declared him the recognized natural child of Sr. Sr. was ordered to give his son a monthly support of P400.00 (Decision A). Sr. appealed. Jr. moved to dismiss the appeal as it was filed beyond the reglementary period. Thus, Sr. filed a Motion to Give Due Course to Appeal or Petition for Relief. This was denied on the ground that the motion was filed out of time and the petition did not comply with Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court. Later, Sr., thru his new counsel, filed another Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging that he was not aware of the decision of the lower court. On the same date, Estrella Hernaez, Sr.s wife, together with their six children likewise filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with Motion to Intervene because they were not included as parties in the instant case. These were denied for lack of merit and on the ground that the decision had already become final and executory. After, Jr. filed a motion to require Sr. to deposit support in arrears or to be cited for contempt pursuant to Decision A. During the hearing of the motion for contempt, Sr.s counsel requested for 10 days within which to comply with Decision A. However, Sr., instead of complying with said decision, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus or alternatively, an action for the annulment of judgment with preliminary injunction with the Intermediate Appellate Court, which declared Decision A null and void for lack of summons by publication being an action in rem. Thus, Jr. instituted the instant Petition for Review.
Issue/Held: w/n a judge of the CFI, in special proceedings, is authorized under the law to appoint assessors for the purpose of fixing the amount due to an administrator or executor for his services and expenses in the care, management and settlement of the estate of a deceased person NO Ratio: The only provisions of law which could permit the appointment of assessors in special proceedings are sections 53-6 of Act no. 90. Sec 54 thereof states that either party to an action may apply in writing to the judge for assessors to sit in the trial. Upon the filing of such application, the judge shall direct the assessors to be provided. The interpretation of the word ACTION given by the SC in this provision is not one that includes a special proceeding. The court distinguished the two terms as such: Action Formal demand of ones legal right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by law; it is a method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules Special Proceeding An application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact Usually in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly provides; the remedy in special proceedings is generally granted upon application or motion.
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This case is barely 2 pages, so really, theres not much facts The case doesnt say what this act is, it just states the act no.
3A Digestgroup*SpecPro* 2008-2009
Issue/Held Does an action for compulsory acknowledgement and support of an illegitimate child fall under rule 72? NO. Jrs contention: Jr. Says that such an action is not one of the instances enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 72 of the Revised Rules of Court requiring publication of the petition before jurisdiction can be acquired by the Court. Under the "expressio unius est exclussio alterius" principle on statutory construction, this action should be considered a proceeding in personam. Ratio
An action for compulsory recognition is an ordinary civil action. Thus, service of summons on the putative parent shall be as provided for under Rule 14. Said action shall be brought against the putative parent only; his heirs may be made party defendants only under the circumstances mentioned in Article 285.
NATCHER V. COURT OF APPEALS & THE HEIRS OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO (G.R. No. 133000. October 2, 2001) FACTS:
An action for compulsory recognition of minor natural children is not among cases of special proceedings mentioned in Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, such an action should be governed by the rules on ordinary civil actions. The case at bar does not fall under Rule 105 of the Rules of Court since the same applies only to cases falling under Article 281 of the Civil Code where there has been a voluntary recognition of the minor natural child, i.e., prior recognition of the minor natural child in a document other than a record of birth or a will, which is absent in the instant case. Sr.s claim that notice of an action for compulsory recognition should also be given to the wife and legitimate children of the putative parent, Teodoro Hernaez, Sr., is unmeritorious. o First of all, in a case for compulsory recognition, the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself. Secondly, implicit in Articles 283 and 285 of the Civil Code is that an action for compulsory recognition should be brought against the putative father. The exceptions to this rule are: 1. 2. when either the putative parent died during the minority of the child, or when after the death of the parent a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both of the parents recognize the child, in which cases the action is brought against the putative parent's heirs.
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were the registered owners of a 9,322 sqm parcel of land located in Manila. Upon the death of Graciana, Graciano and his 6 children entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Gracianas estate adjudicati ng and dividing among themselves the Manila property. Graciano received 8/14 share while each child received 1/14 share. Accordingly, the old TCT was cancelled, and a new TCT issued in the name of Graciano and the 6 children. Then, the heirs executed and forged an Agreement of ConsolidationSubdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land covered by the new TCT. Graciano donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 sqm leaving only 447.60 sqm under his name. Subsequently, Gracianos portion was further subdivided into 2 separate lots (first lot and second lot). Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot to a third person but retained ownership over the second lot. 26 years later, Graciano married Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the second lot to Patricia and a TCT was issued in her name. 5 years later, Graciano died leaving Patricia and his 6 children by his first marriage, as heirs. In an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages filed before the RTC of Manila, the heirs of Graciano alleged that upon Gracianos death, Natcher, through fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired the TCT for the second lot, by making it appear that their faither executed a Deed of Sale in her favor. As a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired. In her answer, Natcher contended that she was legally married to Graciano and thus, she was likewise his compulsory heir. During his lifetime, Graciano already distributed in advance properties to his children, hence, they may no longer claim against his estate or against Natchers property. RTC Ruling: The sale between Graciano Del Rosario and Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law. The sale cannot also be considered as a valid donation.
But, it may be considered as an extension of advance inheritance of Natcher being a compulsory heir. CA Ruling: Reversed the RTC. The RTC should have merely ruled on the validity of the sale and left the issue on advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose since it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. The RTC trying an ordinary action for reconveyance/annulment of title went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. ISSUE/ HELD: May the RTC, acting as a court of general jurisdiction, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly in questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs? NO. RATIO: A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. An action is a formal demand of ones right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact. A special proceeding may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usuall, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. And, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion. An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding. Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction. Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings - meaning a probate court. The RTC in this case, acting in its general jurisdiction, has no authority to resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of Natcher. Whether a particular matter should be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. Thus, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice which may be waived. But in this case, no waiver was made. OTHER POINTS
Generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership. However, (1) if the interested parties are all heirs, or (2) the question is one of collation or advancement, or (3) the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership. No settlement of estate is involved when there is merely an allegation seeking appointment as estate administratrix. To arrive at the legal share due to a compulsory heir, first ascertain the net estate of the decedent. Deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death. Then, all donations subject to collation should be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir/s can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. PACIFIC BANKING CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS (1995) Difference between Civil Action and Special Proceedings FACTS These are two consolidated cases involving the question of whether a petition for liquidation is a special proceeding or an ordinary civil action. CASE 1. The Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under receivership by the Central Bank, and subsequently placed under liquidation. The Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (Union) filed a Complaint-in-intervention seeking payment of benefits due its members as employees of PaBC. The Trial Court ordered payment of the principal claims of the Union. The Liquidator filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but which was subsequently denied. The Liquidator then filed a notice of Appeal and a Motion for Addiditional Time to Submit Record on Appeal. The Trial Court disallowed the Notice of Appeal on the ground that it was filed more than 15 days after receipt of the decision. CASE 2. Ang Keong Lan and EJ Ang Intl filed claims for the payment of investment in the PaBC allegedly in the form of shares of stocks amounting to US$2,531,632.18. The Trial Court directed the Liquidator to pay private respondents the total amount of their claim as preferred creditors. After his Motion for Reconsideration was denied, the Liquidator filed a notice of Appeal. The Trial Court ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken off the record on the ground that it had been filed beyond the 15 day period from receipt of the decision. ISSUES/HELD
W/N a petition for liquidation is a special proceeding or an ordinary civil action. A petition for liquidation is a special proceeding W/N the appeals of the Liquidator should have been upheld. CASE 1 - YES CASE 2 - NO RATIO Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provide: 1. Action defined - Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong 2. Special proceeding distinguished Every other remedy, including one to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact, shall be by special proceeding. Civil Action: 1. The act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. 2. A formal demand of a right by one against another 3. Ex. Where a party litigant seeks to recover property from another Special Proceeding: 1. The act by which one seeks to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact 2. A petition for a declaration of a status, right or fact. 3. Ex. Where a party litigant seeks the appointment of a guardian for an insane, the remedy is a special proceeding to establish the fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship. A petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified as a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such a petition does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. A petition for liquidation merely seeks a declaration of the corporations state of insolvency and the concomitant right of creditors and the order of payment of their claims in the disposition of the corporations assets. In a petition for liquidation, the period of appeal is 30 days (Not 15) and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal.
In Case 2, the Liquidators notice of appeal was filed on time, having been filed on the 23rd day of receipt of the order granting the claim of the Stockholders. However, the Liquidator did not file a record on appeal, with the result that he failed to perfect his appeal. REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS (2005) Rule 72: Subject Matter of Special Proceedings FACTS Apolinaria Jomoc filed a petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of her absentee husband Clemente Jomoc before the RTC of Ormoc City. The RTC granted the petition and declared Clemente, who had left Apolinaria 9 years earlier, presumptively dead. The Republic appealed by filing a Notice of Appeal. The RTC noted that no Record on Appeal was filed and served by the Republic as required by Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure since this case was a special proceeding. Hence, the RTC disapproved the Notice of Appeal.3 So the Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA contending that the declaration of presumptive death under Art 41 of the Family Code is not a special proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring a record on appeal. CA denied the petition of the Republic on the ff grounds: 1. Republic failed to file a record on appeal, in addition to its notice of appeal. A record on appeal is required since the present petition is a special proceeding - The CA enumerated the difference: ORDINARY ACTION SPECIAL PROCEEDING A party sues another for the A remedy by which a party seeks to enforcement or protection of a right, or establish a status, right, or particular prevention or redress of a wrong fact Period to appeal is 15 days from notice Period to appeal is 30 days or decision or final order appealed from Appeal perfected by filing a notice of appeal Party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal to perfect its appeal - Following the above distinction, the present petition for the declaration of presumptive death of an absentee spouse is a special proceeding since it does not seek to enforce or protect a right or prevent or redress a wrong 2. Republic did not attach a certified copy of the assailed order of the RTC (declaring Clemente presumptively dead) to its Petition for Certiorari.
In Case 1, the Liquidator filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension to file a record of appeal on within 30 days from receipt of the order granting the Unions claim, and filed a record on appeal within the extension sought.
Rule 41, sec 2a): Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
ISSUE / HELD: W/N the declaration of presumptive death under Art 41 of the Family Code is a special proceeding, thus requiring a record on appeal, in addition to a notice of appeal NO, not a special proceeding but a summary proceeding pursuant to the Family Code Rule 72, section 1(m) of the Revised Rules of Court provides that the rules of special proceedings are provided for in the declaration of absence and death But Civil Code & Family Code provisions on the matter must be considered: 1. Art 390 CC: After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. 2. Art 41 FC: A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouses was already dead For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouses present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a reappearance of the absent spouse. 3. Art 238 FC: Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title4 shall apply in all cases provided for in this Codes requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. In declaring Clemente presumptively dead, the RTC cited Art 41 of the Family Code. From this fact, it can be inferred that the petition of Apolinaria to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead was due to her desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Therefore, the petition Apolinaria filed for that purpose is a summary proceeding, following above-quoted Art. 41, par 2 of the Family Code. The petition of Apolinaria required, and is, therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code . It is NOT a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court. It is a summary ordinary proceeding, and therefore, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial courts order sufficed. There is no need for a record on appeal to be filed by the Republic. Also, Art 254 of the Family Code provides that laws, decrees, executive orders, and rules and regulations inconsistent with the Family Code are repealed. This further strengthens the case of the Republic. Minor ISSUE / HELD: W/N failure of the Republic to attach to its petition a copy of the assailed order of the RTC is fatal NOT necessarily
Such failure is not fatal since rules of procedure are not to be applied in a technical sense. The CA, instead of dismissing the petition of the Republic upon this ground, should have directed the Republic to comply with the rule * So CAs decision is reversed, case to be remanded. PORTUGAL vs. PORTUGAL-BELTRAN (2005) Jose Portugal married Paz Lazo, who gave birth to Aleli Portugal-Beltran (ALELI). Later, Jose Portugal married Isabel de la Puerto who gave birth to Jose Portugal, Jr. (PORTUGAL). Jose Portugal inherited from his father the disputed land located in Caloocan City (CALOOCAN LAND). Under the TCT of said property, Paz was indicated as the wife (she died later). Jose Portugal died intestate leaving the CALOOCAN land as his only property. ALELI executed an Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person adjudicating to herself the Caloocan land. PORTUGAL later learned of the transfer of the subject property to ALELI. He filed a COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF ADJUDICATION and the TCT, alleging that ALELI was not really related to Jose Portugal. After the Answer, the PRE-TRIAL ORDER indicated the following issues to be resolved: 1. Which marriage (to PAZ or ISABELA) is the valid marriage? 2. Who (between ALELI and PORTUGAL) is the Jose Portugals legal heir? After trial and WITHOUT RESOLVING THE ISSUES indicated in the PRETRIAL ORDER, the RTC dismissed the complaint for: 1. lack of cause of action because PORTUGAL has not established that he is an heir in a probate proceeding; and 2. lack of jurisdiction over the case citing Guido vs. Del Rosario Simply, PORTUGAL must institute a special proceeding to determine his status as an heir before pursuing the complaint for annulment. ISSUE Whether PORTUGAL needs to institute the special proceedings before filing the complaint for annulment? GENERALLY, YES. BUT IN THIS CASE, NO. SUBJECT OF A SPECIAL PROCEEDING The establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact is remedied through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court ), not an ordinary civil action whereby a party sues another for the enforcement or
Title XI: Summary Judicial Proceeding in the Family Law
protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong. The operative term in the former is to establish, while in the latter, it is to enforce, a right.( Guido vs. Del Rosario) GENERALLY, the establishment of an heir (a right) should be made in a special proceeding NOT in a civil action. HOWEVER, the circumstances of this case warrant that the same be decided in the ordinary civil action. UNDER CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE, where the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, OR if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one , then the determination of heirship should be raised and settled in said SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally terminated OR if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased. NOTE that in this case, PORTUGAL lost the right to have himself declared an heir in a special proceeding as there was no judicial/probate proceeding to speak of since ALELI only made an AFFIDAVIT. ALSO, the case involves just ONE PROPERTY. THUS, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, to require a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of the heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pretrial. *The RTC in the ORDINARY ACTION is hereby directed to determine the issues in indicated in the PRETRIAL ORDER. Vda. De Manalo v. CA Distinction between ordinary and special civil actions FACTS: Troadio Manalo died intestate leaving his spouse Pilar and 11 children. He had real properties in Manila and Tarlac and a Machine Shop Business.
8 of the children filed a petition with the RTC of Manila for judicial settlement of the estate of Troadio and for the appointment of Romeo Manalo, a son of the decedent, as administrator thereof. It was set for hearing and the trial court issued an order after proper publication that declared the whole world in default, except the govt. This Order was set aside upon motion of the oppositors, the wife and the 3 other children. In their opposition, among other claims, they sought to schedule a preliminary hearing on their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the case. This was denied, thus, this petition for certiorari. For the dismissal of the case, the oppositors aver that (1) there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family as required by Article 222 of the Civil Code , and (2) no certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition. Oppositors claim that the proceeding is actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the same family. Certain averments of the petitioners in the judicial settlement case bolster this claim. In sum, these averments state that Antonio (one of the oppositors), without settlement of the properties managed and controlled the properties of the deceased, without proper accounting, to his own benefit and advantage and that this is to the damage and prejudice of the oppositors who are co-heirs. Oppositors claim that the case be dismissed under Rule 16(j) of the Rules of Court which states that a complaint may be dismissed on the ground that a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with. Relate this to Art. 222 stated above. ISSUES / HELD Whether or not the action is an ordinary civil action and must then be dismissed for not complying with a condition precedent. No, it is a special civil action. Articile 222 applies to adversarial proceedings. RATIO It is a fundamental rule that the averments and the character of the reliefs sought in the complaint or petition is controlling in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding. A perusal of the petition for judicial settlement shows that the action is a special civil action. The petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as: (1) the fact of death, (2) residence of the decedent. These are foundations upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest.
The petition also enumerates the names of the legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased. The prayer then asks for (1) the issuance of letters of administration, (2) an inventory of the assets, (3) settlement of debts and expenses, (4) the distribution of the properties to the heirs. It is conceded that some averments (mentioned in the facts) are typical of an ordinary civil action. The oppositors took advantage of this defect and filed an opposition which is actually an Answer containing admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaims for damages plus fees and costs. They made it look like an ordinary civil action. Oppositors may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate by raising matters that are irrelevant and immaterial to the petition. The trial court, sitting as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out onlin in an oridinary civil action. Thus, the court in this case cannot dwell on matters not called upon in this special proceeding, i.e. affirmative defenses and counterclaims. As to the claim of dismissal on the ground of non-compliance to a condition precedent to the filing of a complaint or petition, the court ruled that Article 222, as worded, applies to a suit between members of a family. It talks about an action by one party against another for the redress of an injury or enforcement of a right. Article 222 applies only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family. In this case, the oppositors are not being sued. No defendants were impleaded. The petitioners in the special civil action only seek to establish the fact of their fathers death and be recognized as heirs so they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court.
contract. The first installment was duly paid but as for the second, the sublessees satisfied only a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance of P50,600.00. Jaring sued the Alipios and Manuels for the collection of the said amount before the RTC in Bataan. Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her husband Placido passed away. She based her claim on Rule 3 Sec. 21 of the 1964 Rules of Court which provided that when the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the CFI, it shall be dismissed. TC: denied the motion since Purita was herself a party to the contract and could be directly impleaded together with the Manuel spouses and the death of Placido merely resulted in his exclusion. CA: dismissed the appeal. The rule that the action must be dismissed does not apply where there are other defendants against whom the action should be maintained (Climaco v. Si Uy); if the husband and wife bound themselves jointly and severally, in case of his death, her liability is independent and she may be sued for the whole debt (Imperial Insurance v. David). NOTE: Rule 3 Sec. 21 has been amended. Now, Rule 3 Sec. 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the case will be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. The issue then is whether the case can be filed against the wife Purita. ISSUES / HELD Whether a creditor can sue the surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is owed by the conjugal partnership of gains? NO, the creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse in an ordinary proceeding. The proper remedy is to file a claim in the settlement of the estate of the decedent. RATIO Upon the death of one spouse, the powers of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of estate proceedings. The Alipios obligation is one which is chargeable against their conjugal partnership. This was dissolved when Placido died and debts chargeable to it are to be paid in the settlement of estate proceedings in accordance with Rule 73 Sec. 2. The cases relied upon by the CA are based on different set of facts. In Climaco, the defendants were sued for damages for malicious prosecuton. Apart from not being spouses, the claim was one which does not survive the death of a co-defendant and thus continues as to the remaining defendant. In Imperial, the spouses therein jointly and severally executed an indemnity agreement. Because of the solidary liability, the surviving spouse could be independently sued in an ordinary action. The nature of the obligation in this case is not solidary but merely joint. If from the law or the nature or the wording of the obligation the contrary does not appear, an obligation is presumed to be joint.
RULE 73 ALIPIO V. COURT OF APPEALS (2000) Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons Dissolution of Marriage FACTS Respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a fishpond who subleased it to spouses Alipio and spouses Manuel. Each of the four sublessees signed the
Jaring does not cite any law providing that when there are two lessees or sublessees, the obligation to pay rent is solidary; nor that it is the nature of lease. Solidary liability can only come about when lessees or sublessees refuse to vacate the leased property after the lease period but they become liable as joint tortfeasors and not because of the contract. Since the obligation of the Alipios and the Manuels is chargeable against their respective conjugal partnership, the unpaid balance should be divided into two (P50,600/2=P25,300) Petition granted. Complaint against Purita dismissed without prejudice to filing of claim by respondent in proceedings for settlement of estate pf Placido for collection of share of the Alipios in the unpaid balance of the rent. BERNARDO VS. CA (1963) Dissolution of Marriage Rule 73 FACTS: Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. Eusebio died and a testate proceeding for the settlement of his estate was instituted. His will was admitted to probate disposing of his properties in favor of Hermogena and his cousins. Deogracias Bernardo was appointed as Eusebios executor. Hermogena died a year after. Bernardo filed a project of partition in the testate proceeding in accordance with the terms of Eusebios will, adjudicating the estate of Eusebio among the testamentary heirs with the exception of Hermogena, whose share was allotted to her collateral relatives. Hermogenas relatives filed an opposition to Bernardos project of partition and submitted a counter-project of partition of their own, claiming of the properties mentioned in Eusebios will on the theory that they belonged not only to Eusebio but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. The heirs of Eusebio and executor Bernardo contend that the properties belonged exclusively to Eusebio because Hermogena donated to him her half share of such partnership. The heirs of Hermogena contend that the deed of donation itself was determinative of the original conjugal character of the properties and that since the donation was null and void, Eusebio did not become the owner of the share of his wife and therefore could not validly dispose of it in his will. The probate court issued an order declaring the donation void for two reasons: First, the prohibition of donation between spouses during marriage and second, because the donation did not comply with the formalities of a will there being no attestation clause.
The probate court also disapproved both projects of partition and directed Bernardo to file another, dividing the property between the heirs of Eusebio and the heirs of Hermogena upon the basis that the properties were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE AND HELD: W/N the probate court has the power to adjudicate title having limited and special jurisdiction. Yes.
RATIO: As a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings except where one of the parties merely prays for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property. In which case, the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. However, when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property and when so submitted, the probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon. And with the consent of the parties, matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced. The question of whether certain properties involved in a testate proceeding belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively properly is a matter within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings. (This was the cited ratio in Herrera) It is true that the heirs of Hermogena are not the heirs of Eusebio, but Hermogena is an heir of Eusebio, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this right that is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and complies with the requirement of the exception that the parties interested are all heirs claiming title under the testator and no third persons are prejudiced.
CALMA VS. TANEDO FACTS: Eulalio Calma & Fausta Macasaquit are spouses and are owners of the property (conjugal property) subject of the proceedings. The spouses were also indebted to Esperanza Tanedo, chargeable against the conjugal property. On October 10, 1933, Fausta Macasquit died leaving a will wherein she appointed her daughter, Maria Calma, as administratrix of her properties. Maria Calma was indeed appointed as administratrix of Faustas estate during the probate proceedings. While the probate proceedings were pending, Esperanza Tanedo filed a complaint for sum of money against Eulalio Calma. The RTC ruled in favor of Tanedo and ordered the payment of the sum. In the execution of the judgment, despite the 3rd party claim filed by the estate of Fausta Macasaquit, the sheriff still sold the property. Maria Calma, as administratrix of Faustas estate, now brings this action and asks that the sale made by the sheriff of the subject property be nullified and that the estate of Fausta Macasaquit be declared the sole and absolute owner of it. ISSUE/HELD: Was the sale made by the sheriff void? YES. RATIO: Act No. 3176 provides: SEC. 685. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof shall be paid, in the testamentary or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, in accordance with the provisions of this Code relative to the administration and liquidation and partition proceeding, unless the parties, being all of age and legally capacitated, avail themselves of the right granted to them by this Code of proceeding to an extrajudicial partition and liquidation of said property. In case it is necessary to sell any portion of said community property in order to pay the outstanding debts and obligations of the same, such sale shall be made in the manner and with the formalities established by this Code for the sale of the property of deceased persons. Any sale, transfer, alienation or disposition of said property effected without said formalities shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that belonged to the vendor at the time the liquidation and partition was made. Under this provision, the administrative power of the husband ceases upon the death of one of the spouses. Such power is then passed to the administrator of the estate property in the testate or intestate proceedings if there are any debts to be paid. It must then be held that when Esperanza Tanedo filed the action against Eulalio Calma, he already did not have power of administration over their
conjugal property. The administrative power has already been passed to Maria Calma, the administratrix of the property. Thus, the action to recover the debt, being chargeable against the conjugal property, should have been filed in the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquits estate. Having to be filed according to Act No. 3176 under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relative to the administration and liquidation of properties of deceased persons, it should be filed before the committee on claims in said testamentary proceedings and, at all events, thereafter, by appeal to the corresponding Court of First Instance, in an ordinary action against the judicial administratrix. On the other hand, the property described in the complaint is included among the inventoried properties subject to the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit because, belonging as it does to the conjugal property, it should, under Act No. 3176, be included among the properties of the testamentary proceedings. The judgment on the action wrongly filed against Eulalio Calma must then be considered to have no legal effect and the sale made by the sheriff be considered null and void. The subject property must be deemed subject to the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquits estate.
CAMAYA vs. PATULANDONG (2004) Rule 73 A: Limited jurisdiction of probate court FACTS On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a notarized will wherein she devised, among others, Lot No. 288-A to her grandson Anselmo Mangulabnan5. Rufinas son, Bernardo Patulandong was appointed in the will as the executor. During her lifetime, Rufina filed a petition for probate of her will before the CFI (Sp. Pro. No. 128). CFI admitted the will to probate and on June 27, 1973, the testatrix executed a codicil6 modifying her will. On May 14, 1988, Rufina died. Anselmo sought the delivery to him by executor Bernardo Patulandong of the title to Lot 288-A. Bernardo refused
The pertinent portion of her will reads: IKALIMA. - Aking inihahayag at ginagawa na tagapagmana, sa aking kusang loob, ang pinalaki kong APO na si ANSELMO P. MANGULABNANaking ipinagkakaloob at ipinamamana, sa aking pagkamatay, angLOT NO. 228 -A 6 UNA. - Ang Lote No. 288-A na na aking ipinamana sa aking apong si ANSELMO P. MANGULABNANbasically, here Anselmo gets 1/5 of the property,as the codicil states that he shares lot w/4 other co-heirs
in view of the codicil. Mangulabnan then filed an "action for partition" against Patulandong w/ the RTC. TC ordered the partitioning of the properties and the delivery to Anselmo of the copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-47089. But the TC also stated that the partition is without prejudice to the probate of the codicil. Bernardo filed a petition for probate of the codicil of Rufina. The probate court then issued an Order setting the petition for hearing and ordering the publication of said order. By virtue of the decision in the partition case, Anselmo caused the cancellation of the title of Rufina over Lot No. 288-A and TCT No. NT2157507 was issued in his name. Anselmo later sold to petitioners Camayas Lot No. 288-A by a Deed of Sale, TCT issued to Camayas. TC (in Sp. Proc. No. 218) admitted the codicil to probate and declared the TCT issued in the name of Anselmo and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of Camayas as null and void; Anselmo was given 1/5 of the property pursuant to the codicil. Camayas and Anselmo appealed to CA but it was denied; hence present petition.
In this case, the property in question was in the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the CA should have denied the motion of the administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property. Following Cuizon, the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further declared the deed of sale and the titles of petitioners null and void, it having had the effect of depriving them possession and ownership of the property. Also, Section 48 of the Property Registry Decree provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. Under probate proceedings, Petitioners titles cannot be declared null and void. [minor issue] As to the 2nd issue, petitioners argue that by allowing the codicil to probate, it in effect amended the final judgment in the partition case w/c is not allowed by law. The Court ruled that although the judgment in the partition case had become final, it specifically provided that the decision was without prejudice to the probate of the codicil, thus the rights of prevailing parties were subject to the outcome of the probate of codicil. COCA v. BORROMEO SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONSRule 73 (Venue and Process)Limited Jurisdiction of the Probate Court FACTS: Spouses Juan and Teresa Pangilinan died intestate in 1943 and 1948, respectively. They possessed two parcels of land located in Misamis Occidental: Lot No. 1927 and Lot No. 1112. According to Guadalupe Pizzaras (surviving spouse of Francisco, son of Juan and Teresa) and her children, a third parcel of land, Lot No. 1920, with an area of eight hectares surveyed in the name of Concepcion Pangilinan (one of the daughters of the spouses Pangilinan) and adjoins Lots 1927 and 1112, also forms part of the estate of the deceased spouses. Special Proceeding No. 508 was instituted on 5 September 1963 for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses Juan and Teresa. On 25 September 1965, the administrator presented a project of partition wherein the combined areas of Lots 1927 and 1112, or 22.0082 hectares, were partitioned as follows: o Crispin Borromeo-three hectares, as payment of his attorneys fees o Francisco Pangilinan, represented by his widow Guadalupe Pizzaras-5.3361 hectares o Prima Pangilina-6.3361 hectares o Concepcion Pangilinan, represented by her heirs-7.3360 hectares in addition to the debt of the estate to her in the
ISSUES / HELD 1) W/n the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared null and void and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs of petitioners and the deed of sale? YES; TCTs of Camayas not null and void 2) W/n the final judgment in Civil Case 552 bars the allowance of the codicil (minor issue) No RATIO As to the 1st issue, Petitioners contend that the probate court has NO authority and jurisdiction to declare null and void the sale and titles of Petitioners; and that the probate court can only resolve the ff issues: (1) W/n the instrument offered for probate is the last will and testament of the decedent (question of identity) (2) W/n the will has been executed in accordance w/ formalities prescribed by law (question of due execution) (3) W/n the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will (question of capacity) In Cuizon vs. Ramolete, Court stated, in relation to limited jurisdiction of a probate court: a probate court cannot determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and equally claimed to belong to outside parties...the court only determine w/n properties should be included in the inventory of properties to be administeredif there is dispute, the parties, the administrator and opposing parties have to resort to ordinary action for final determination of conflicting claims of title b/c probate court cant do that.
amount of P5,088.50, to be borne by the 3 other heirs equally Guadalupe Pizzaras opposed that project of partition. She contended that such project of partition contravened the lower courts order of 6 December 1963, which recognized the right of the heirs of Francisco to the 12-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112; that Prima sold her share to Francisco and should thus be excluded from the project, among others. The lower court, in its order of 2 October 1965 directed the administrator to pay the debt of the estate to Concepcion. It deferred action however on the project of partition until the ownership of the 12 hectares claimed by Guadalupe and the 6 hectares being claimed by Crispin Borromeo is determined in an ordinary action. On 31 August 1966, after noting that no separate action had been filed to determine the ownership of the 12 hectares, the lower court issued an order approving the project of partition but excluding the 12 hectares being claimed by Franciscos heirs. This order is being appealed by Filomeno Coca as well as some of the heirs particularly because the same is incomplete. They contend that the lower court, as a probate court has no jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the 12-hectare portion of the estate. Guadalupe is contending that in excluding the 12-hectares from the project of partition, the lower court did not decide on the ownership of the parcel of land. ISSUE: Whether or not the ownership of a parcel of land left behind by the deceased may be decided in the probate proceeding. HELD: YES RATIO: As a general rule, the question as to title to property may not be passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate action. This general rule however, admits of exceptions justified by expediency and convenience. If the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of the parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership The probate court may provisionally pass upon in a probate proceeding the question the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. The instant case may be treated as an exception to the general rule because here the probate court has already received evidence on the ownership of the 12 hectares and that the interested parties are only the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding. Case REMANDED to the Lower Court for further proceedings in accordance with the following guidelines:
That the heirs of Francisco file in the intestate proceedings, a motion in the form of a complaint, wherein they must set forth their claim over the 12 hectares. Copies of that complaint-motion must be served upon the administrator, etc., who shall prepare their answer. After the issues have been joined, and in case no amicable settlement has been reached, the probate court must receive evidence, or a fulldress hearing should be held. Crispin Borromeo may also set forth his claim. CUENCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS (1973) Rule 73 - Venue and Process (Proceedings) FACTS Senator Mariano Cuenco died at Manila and was survived by his widow, petitioner Rosa Cuenco, and 2 minor sons, all residing at QC, and by his children of the 1st marriage, respondents Lourdes et.al. all residing in Cebu. Respondent Lourdes filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the CFI of Cebu alleging that decedent died intestate in Manila, that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left properties in Cebu and QC. The Cebu court issued an order setting the petition for hearing and ordering the publication at a newspaper of gen. circulation in Cebu. It was modified stating that it will be premature it to act, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction, the requisite publication of the notice of hearing not yet having been complied with and copies of the petition have not been served on all of the heirs specified. In the meantime, Rosa filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal (QC) for the probate of the last will and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. Having learned of the intestate proceeding in Cebu, Rosa filed an Opposition and MTD as well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator for which an order holding in abeyance its resolution on the MTD until after the CFI of QC shall have acted on the petition for probate. No MR or appeal was filed. Instead, respondents filed in the QC court an Opposition and MTD opposing probate and assailing its jurisdiction to entertain petition for probate in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court. The QC court denied the motion, giving as a principal reason the "precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding." It further found that the residence of the senator at the time of his death was at QC. If a party has two residences, the one which he himself selects or considers to be his home or
which appears to be the center of his affairs will be deemed his domicile. The petitioner, in filing in QC, follows the first choice of residence of the decedent and once the QC court acquires jurisdiction, it is to the exclusion of all others. Lourdes' two MRs were denied. The hearing for probate of the will was called three times but none of the oppositors appeared and the court proceeded with the hearing in their absence. Instead of appealing from the QC court's order admitting the will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed an SCA of certiorari and prohibition with PI with the CA which rendered a decision against Rosa and held that Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue for the settlement of the estate of a deceased, covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Cebu case having been filed ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. MR was denied, thus, Rosa filed with the SC a petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE / HELD Whether the QC court acted without jurisdiction or with GAD in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings filed with it? NO RATIO 1. The Judiciary Act concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all CFI over "all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73 lays down the rule of venue. The Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction. A fair reading of the Rule since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts. Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it
stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will. 2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner's filing with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the QC court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the QC court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the QC court, to the exclusion of all other courts. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon City court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to the probate petition and the residence of the decedent within its territory and venue. 3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court. Necessarily, neither could the QC court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the QC court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate. Since the QC court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the QC court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. 4. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile therein with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case. The last paragraph of said Rule expressly provides:
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. The exception therein given could probably be properly invoked, had such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction. 5. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner, who under all the applicable rules of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu court deferred to the Quezon City court would be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the way to Cebu and submit anew the decedent's will there for probate either in a new proceeding or by asking that the intestate proceedings be converted into a testate proceeding when under the Rules, the proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per the facts of record and as already affirmed by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-widow had their conjugal domicile. 6. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and instead deferring to the testate proceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of the decedent's last will, since the record before it showed the falsity of the allegation in the intestate petition that the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents never challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the decedent's will to probate. For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction.
FACTS: Rafael Dinglasan filed a case in the CFI of Capiz against Ang Chia in her personal capacity to recover the ownership and possession of a parcel of land. Dinglasan also filed a motion for the appointment of a receiver which was objected to by Ang Chia. It was only at the hearing of said motion when Dinglasan discovered that there was pending case in the same court concerning the intestate estate of Lee Liong, deceased husband of Ang Chia. Hence, the motion for the appointment of a receiver was withdrawn and Dinglasan filed an amended complaint seeking the inclusion as party-defendant of the administratrix of the estate, who also was Ang Chia. Dinglasan also filed in the intestate proceedings (1) a claim in intervention and (2) a motion praying the appointment of a co-administrator of the estate and (3) increase of the bond of the administratrix. Dinglasan prayed that the intestate proceedings be not closed until said civil case shall have been terminated. Ang Chia objected to all of these. The court issued an order denying the petition for a co-administrator but increasing the bond to P5,000. The administratrix did not appeal from said order nor file a new bond and instead moved for the closing of the proceedings and her discharge as administratrix on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. Dinglasan objected to this motion. The court then issued an order holding in abeyance the approval of the partition and the closing of the proceedings until after the decision in said civil case has been rendered. Ang Chia appealed this order. ISSUES/HELD: 1) W/N the lower court erred when it required the administratrix to file a new bond of P5,000, contending that by taking such action the court assumed jurisdiction over the case which it cannot do because its jurisdiction as probate court is limited and special. NO. The order increasing the bond of the administratrix to P5,000 was not appealed by the appellants and hence has become final. The present appeal is only from the order of the lower court which denied the motion of the appellees to terminate the intestate proceedings on the ground that they have already agreed on the extrajudicial settlement of the estate and to relieve the administratrix of the obligation of filing an increased bond. The lower court in its later order (2nd Order), reiterated its order to the administratrix to file a new bond in the amount of P5,000 within 30 days after receipt thereof, but this cannot have the effect of receiving the former order (increasing the bond; 1st order), nor does it give the appellants the right to question in this instance the validity of said order, which has long become final.
Dinglasan v. Ang Chia Special Proceedings Rule 73 Venue and Process; B. Proceedings
2) W/N the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the separate civil action filed by the Dinglasan. NO.
The act of the lower court in taking cognizance of civil case to recover the land is not tantamount to assuming jurisdiction over said case nor does it violate the ruling of this court which says that "when questions arise as to the ownership of property, alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the course of administration proceedings. The Court of First Instance, acting as probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a Court of First Instance to try and determine ordinary actions. . . ." If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to their desire to protect their interests; and the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case to recover the land, the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction. -
On 4 December 1953, Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos Eusebio, objected to said petition on the ground that Andres Eusebio was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga and asking for the dismissal of the case on the ground that venue had been improperly filed. On 10 March 1954, the court overruled this objection and granted the petition for appointment as an administrator. An appeal was taken, the appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on 28 November 1952 7.
ISSUE/HELD: W/N Andres Eusebio is a resident of Pampanga or Quezon City? Pampanga (Thus, whether or not the venue had been improperly filed - YES) It is not disputed that up to, at least, 29 October 1952, Andres Eusebio was, and had always been, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga where he had his home, as well as some other properties. The domicile of origin was San Fernando, Pampanga where he resided for over 70 years, the presumption is that he retained such domicile, and hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well settled that a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained. Under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another domicile, it must have been one of choice, for which the following conditions are essential: o Capacity to choose and freedom of choice o Physical presence at the place chosen o Intention to stay thereon permanently
Eusebio v. Eusebio FACTS: On 29 October 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a house and lot in A. Espana Extension. While transferring his belongings to this house, soon thereafter, Andres Eusebio suffered a stroke, for which reason Dr. Eusebio took him to Dr. Eusebios residence, where Andres Eusebio remained until he was brought to the UST hospital sometime before 26 November 1952. On this date, he contracted marriage in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in said hospital. 2 days l ater he died of acute left ventricular failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease. Consequently, he never stayed or even slept in said house at Espana Extension. On 16 November 1953, Eugenio Eusebio filed with the CFI a petition for appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who died on 28 November 1952 residing, according to said petition, in Quezon City.
ISSUE/HELD: W/N he manifested his intent to change his domicile? NO There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the Andres Eusebio appear to have manifested his wish to live indefinitely in said city. The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the Andres Eusebio because he had been advised to do so due to his illness. In fact, it is very likely, that said advice was given and followed in order that the patient could be hear his doctor and have a more effective treatment. It is well settled that domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for ones own health, even if coupled with knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home.
Rule 75 Secion 1 provides: If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFI of any province in which he had his estate xxx
Andres Eusebio did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Moreover, some of his children, who used to live with him in San Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that municipality. On 29 October 1952, or less than a month before his death, the decedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga as his residence. The marriage contract signed by Andres Eusebio when he was married in articulo mortis, to Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST Hospital, on 26 November 1952, or 2 days prior to his demise, stated that his residence is San Fernando Pampanga. The presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile which is particularly strong when the domicile is one of the origin as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently, was as regards Andres Eusebio has not been offset by the evidence of record.
Virginia Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and Jurisdiction." Judge Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the CFI of Laguna. Virginia Fule instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q19738 and to restrain Judge Pao from further acting in the case. It is important to note that in this case divergent claims are maintained by Virginia Fule and Preciosa Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition for letters of administration before the CFI of Calamba, Virginia Fule stated that Amado Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia Fule before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of Amado Garcia was at Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia Fule categorically alleged that Amado Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna." ISSUE: 1. W/N the petition for certiorari filed by Virginia should be granted. NO 2. What does the word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, mean? Actual/personal residence, not legal residence. 3. W/N the last place of the deceased Amado Garcia was at Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. YES RULING: 1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another.
Garcia Fule v. CA Venue FACTS: In 1973, Virginia Fule filed with the CFI of Laguna a petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging that Amado Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving some properties. She also moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate, which was granted. MR was filed by Preciosa Garcia, contending that the order appointing Virginia Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction. MR was denied. Preciosa Garcia filed MTDthen alleging that jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court and that venue was improperly laid. MTD was dismissed. Preciosa Garcia filed an MR. MR was denied. In 1974, she commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the CA to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of CFI of Laguna. CA rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C for lack of jurisdiction. Denied of their MR, Virginia Fule filed an appeal by certiorari. However, even before Virginia Fule could receive the decision of the CA, Preciosa Garcia had already filed a petition for letters of administration before the CFI of Rizal, QC over the same intestate estate of Amado Garcia. Preciosa Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate, which was granted by Judge Ericta. For the first time, in 1975, Preciosa Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the CFI of Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the CA. Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court until Preciosa Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case pending before the CA. This notwithstanding, Preciosa Garcia filed an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon CFI jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. The place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 2. Term "resides" connotes "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules, Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature, residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Terms "residence" and "domicile" as generally used in statutes fixing venue, are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." "Resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 3. The Court ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado Garcia was at Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death.The death certificate of Amado Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia Fule and by Preciosa Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate obtained three months before his death; the Deed of Donation transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City. The conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the CFI of Calamba, Laguna. Therefore, venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado Garcia and the appointment of special administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and the CFI Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the CFI of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.
Heirs of Doronio v. Heirs of Doronio (2007) II. A. Limited Jurisdiction of Probate Court FACTS Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, now both deceased, were the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by OCT 352. They had children whose number was not indicated in the records but two of them were Fortunato and Marcelino. The petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino while the respondents are the heirs of Fortunato. Sometime prior to their death the spouses executed a private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of Marcelino and his wife including a parcel of land described as follows: o Fourth A piece of residential land located in the barrio of Cabalitian but we did not measure it, the area is bounded on the north by Gabriel Bernardino; on the east by Fortunato Doronio; on the south by Geminiano Mendoza and on the west by a road to Villasis. Constructed on said land is a house of light materials also a part of the dowry. The parcel of land is covered by OCT 352, however, there was a discrepancy since OCT 352 described the land differently, as being bound on the east by the Najordas and not Fortunato Doronio as stated in the deed of donation. Both petitioner and respondent have been occupying the land. Petitioners claim their title by virtue of the deed of donation in favor of their predecessor Marcelino while the respondents stake their claim on the theory that spouses Simeon and Cornelia (parents of Marcelino and Fortunato) intended to donate only of the land as manifested by the discrepancy between the description in the OCT and the deed of donation. The theory is that the parents placed Fortunato, instead of the Najordas, as the owner of the property to the east because they recognized that the eastern half belonged to Fortunato. The petitioners heirs of Marcelino filed a case for registration of private deed of donation in the RTC. No respondents were named but the court ordered the posting of notices in several places. No objection was ever presented so the RTC ordered the registration of the deed of donation. After a year, the respondents, filed in the registration case, a petition for reconsideration seeking the annulment of the deed of donation. The petition was dismissed on the ground that the judgment of the court in the case had already become final. Respondent heirs of Fortunato filed an action for reconveyance and damages against the petitioners. Respondents claimed: o The spouses Simeon and Cornelia (the parents) intended to donate only half of the property. o The deed of donation is void. o They have acquired the property through acquisitive prescription. RTC: petitioners are rightful owners of the land. CA: reversed and held that the discrepancy between the OCT and the deed of donation manifested the intent of the parents of donating only
half of the property and that the donation is void because it impaired the legitime of Fortunato. ISSUES / HELD Whether the CA was correct in deciding in favor of the respondent heirs of Fortunato in ruling that the donation is void for having impaired the legitime of Fortunato. NO. The issue on legitime should be threshed out in a special proceeding and not in civil action for reconveyance and damages. RATIO
parties therein, the finality of the judgment cannot bid the respondents who were not parties to the case. Titled property cannot be a subject of acquisitive prescription. Donation of property made in a private instrument prior to the effectivity of the New Civil Code is void. The OCT written in Spanish, although not translated into English or Filipino is admissible as evidence due to lack of timely objection.
MACIAS v. UY KIM Rule 73/ VENUE
FACTS: A probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction is the best forum to ventilate This is a MACIAS filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale in Branch and adjudge the issue of impairment of legitime and as well as other matters involving 10 of Manila CFI, averring that: the settlement of the estate of the deceased. A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. On the other hand, a special proceeding is remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact. An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction. OTHER MATTERS: On the claim that the validity of the donation cannot be challenged by a party not impleaded in a petition for quieting of title or declaratory relief and that the judgment awarding the land to the plaintiffs can no longer be set aside since it has attained finality: o The validity of the donation was raised by the respondents in the pre-trial. A void contract is inexistent from the beginning and the right to set-up as a defense the illegality of the deed can never be waived and is available not only to the parties in the case but also to third parties who are directly affected by the contract. Since the respondents are directly affected by the donation, they may set-up its illegality. The decisio as reached without the respondents being heard in the case for registration. No notice was sent to them and the court directed only the posting of notices. Therefore since an action for quieting of title is an action quasi in rem, binding only the 1.) He is the beneficiary of the estate of Julian, in pending Special Proceeding 57405 (lets call this A), pending in Branch 6 and of Rosina Wolfson pending settlement in Special Proceedings 63866 (B) pending in Branch 8. In B, he appealed from the order appointing Cruz as the ancillary administrator. 2.) That he was named as special administrator of the estate of Rosina in Special proceeding 67302 (C) originally assigned to Branch 6 but later transferred to Branch 8 and consolidated with B, but C was afterwards dismissed 3.) To protect his interest over the properties in the estate, he caused a notice of lis pendens to be annotated on the TCT in the name of Rosina 4.) However, Judge Barcelona presiding in Special Proceeding B, authorized Cruz as the ancillary administrator to sell the properties to pay for the estate, inheritance and realty taxes and expenses of administration 5.) Cruz negotiated with Reliable Realty, organized by Uy Kim, who was willing to buy the property if the notice of lis pendens were cancelled. 6.) Judge Barcelona ordered the notice of lis pendens to be cancelled, allowing Cruz to enter into a sale with Uy Kim. Judge then approved the Deed of Sale, and Rosinas TCTs were cancelled, new ones issued to Uy Kim. 7.) Macias claims that the Orders were issued without due notice to him and without or in excess of jurisdiction since Judge Barcelona was already divested of jurisdiction in Special Proceeding B because of his appeal.
o UY KIM filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Branch 10 has NO JURISDICTION over the suit since the subject matter properly belongs to the exclusive jurisdiction of Branch 8 or branch 4 where Special proceedings A and B were pending since his alleged claim of beneficiary interest in the estate of Julian and Rosina depends upon the recognition thereof by the probate court. The Compliant was dismissed so Macias filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari
The various branches of the CFI of a province or city, having the same or equal authority as and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with the respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments.
MACIAS claims that his Complaint in Branch 10 was NOT for the annulment of the Order of Branch 8 because nowhere in its body or prayer did he seek such annulment. o Belied by par. 8 of the complaint alleging that the Order of cancellation of the Notice of lis pendens was made without due notice to him By par. 9, alleging that the issuance of the new TCT were null and void because Branch 8 was already divested of jurisdiction by reason of his appeal That even without par. 8 and 9, his prayer in the complaint for the nullification of the deed of sale may not be decreed without passing on the validity of the Orders of the Judge in Branch 8, wherein Branch 10 had no jurisdiction to pass upon
ISSUE / HELD: o 1.) W/N Branch 10 had jurisdiction to annul the Orders issued by the Presiding Judge of Branch 8 where the Special Proceeding was pending? - NO RATIO: Under Sec. 1 of Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. Pursuant to this, all questions concerning the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rosina should be filed before Branch 8 of the CFI of Manila where Special Proceeding for the settlement of her estate was filed and still pending The reason of the law - that the settlement of the estate of the deceased is but one proceeding, for the successful administration of the estate it is necessary that one court should be responsible who shall have exclusive control over every part of such administration. To entrust it to 2 or more independent courts would result in confusion and delay. This is for the public interest and not for the benefit of the parties litigants so the parties have no control over it. Any challenge to the validity of the will, any objection to its authentication, and every demand or claim of an heir or party in interest in a testate or intestate succession must be decided within the same special proceedings and not in a separate action and by the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate The orders sought to be annulled were assigned to branch 10 presided over by Judge Moya but such orders were issued by Judge Barcelona of branch 8 (because the 2 were coordinates)
His insistence that in Civil Case that he seeks to recover his distributive share of the estate of Rosina, all the more removes the case from the jurisdiction of Branch 10; because the distribution of the estate is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court. He must therefore seek his remedy in the same probate court Branch 8 which is hearing Special Proceedings B, (and was still pending since there was NO order terminating it), instead of filing a separate civil case in Branch 10.
ADDITIONAL RATIO: The better practice is for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of
MALOLES II VS. PHILLIPS Rule 73 Venue FACTS: On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City filed a petition of probate of his will with Branch 61 of RTC of Makati City(hereinafter probate proceeding) He had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. and that he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; Judge Gorospe of Branch 61(hereinafter Judge G61) granted the petition and allowed the will for probate. In Feb.1996, Dr. De Santos passed away. In April 1996, Maloles filed a Motion for Intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator's sister) he was the sole fullblooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. He thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of administration in his name. Meanwhile, Pacita Phillips, the executrix in the will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary with Branch 61 which she later on withdrew. Pacita Phillips then refiled the same through a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. This was raffled to Branch 65 of RTC of Makati (hereinafter appointment proceedings). Judge Abad Santos (hereinafter Judge A65) granted her petition and made her the estates special administrator. Maloles also sought to intervene in the appointment proceedings and to set aside the appointment of Phillips. He also claimed, among others, that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 are still pending, hence, Phillips committed forum shopping. Judge A65 then issued an order transferring the appointment proceeding to Branch 61 since the probate proceeding is still pending before it. However, Judge G61 refused to admit the appointment proceeding claiming that there is no estate proceeding pending before it. Judge A65 was then forced to continue the administration proceedings (i.e. determine w/n Maloles can be allowed to intervene) to expedite the proceedings (in short, napilitan lang siya) and under the concept that the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is but one court. Judge A65 never wanted to hear the case in the first place because he claims that since the probate proceedings were commenced in Branch 61, then such Branch must therefore continue to exercise its jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others (based on Sec. 1 Rule 73). Thoughn forced to hear the case, Judge A65 then granted Maloles petition to intervene. This was, however, set aside by the CA.
ISSUE: W/N Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate proceedings upon its issuance of an order allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos YES RATIO: Maloles contends that the probate proceedings must continue until the estate has been partitioned and distributed to the heirs/legatees/devisees pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 73. In probate of wills, it is well-settled that the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will. Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos, there was nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to Sec. 12 of Rule 73. Upon issuance of such certificate, the probate proceeding is terminated.
ISSUE (relevant!): W/N Branch 65 has jurisdiction to hear the petition to issue letters testamentary (appointment proceedings) considering that the probate proceeding was commenced in Branch 61 - YES Sec. 1 of Rule 73, specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the state," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes." It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. The appearance of such provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila) belongs to the RTC under B.P. Blg. 129. The different branches comprising each court in one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with each other. Although Sec. 1, Rule 73 applies insofar as the venue of the petition for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of the same court from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator after his death. The various branches of the RTC are a coordinate and co-equal courts, and the totality of which is only one RTC. The jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges. And when a case is filed in one
branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other branches. Trial may be held or proceedings continue by and before another branch or judge. Moreover, the apportionment and distribution of cases does not involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction attaches and continues to be vested in the RTC of the province/city, and the trials may be held by any branch or judge of the court. Based on the foregoing, Branch 65 has jurisdiction to hear the appointment proceedings. Other issues not discussed.
ISSUES / HELD Could Judge Reyes be ordered to inhibit himself at this point, considering the CA had already nullified the order of arrest, and the same order had already become final and executory? No, such inhibition is now too late. RATIO The main case out of which this review arose has already been decided by the CA. It had already nullified the arrest order, and lifted the freeze order. 1. There is no more reason why the inhibition of the judge should still be an issue. The Petition for such inhibition has now become moot and academic in view of the termination of the main case by the CA; It should be clear that the CA decision was the final, complete and absolute settlement of their respective shares and claims as heirs of their parents; As such, all incidents relating to the special proceedings should also be deemed to have been terminated; What is left to be done is simply the actual lifting of any freeze order and the release of any property originally deposited by the petitioner siblings in custodia legis; no issue pertaining to the settlement of the estate still exists.
MUNSAYAC-DE VILLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS Rule 73 Proceedings FACTS In this case, the Munsayac siblings argue over the estates of their parents. Three of the five siblings, Grace, Lily and Roy filed for the settlement of the estate of their parents. Grace was nominated administratrix. However, the two other siblings, Gelacio and Nora, opposed this nomination, and wanted Gelatio as administrator instead. Gelacio was eventually made adminstrator by the court through the order of Judge Antonio Reyes. In the same order, the Judge directed the Grace to produce by 2:00 of that afternoon certain bank deposit certificates and documents. The three siblings then filed for the inhibition of Judge Reyes. However, before he could act on it, the three siblings filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus against said judge. Moreover, they filed an administrative case asking not only for his suspension, but his permanent removal on the grounds of grave misconduct and inefficiency. Not having given in, Judge Reyes reiterated his order for the three siblings to surrender the amount of the bank investment, as well as all the pieces of jewelry given by their late mother. He also had them arrested. The case was elevated to the CA, and the CA nullified the arrest order. However, it ruled that there was no convincing proof shown to merit the conclusion that Judge Reyes had been suspicious in his rulings. It further ruled that the request for inhibition was unacceptable because the three siblings had come to court with unclean hands. This order in the meantime had become final and executory. The three siblings, upon review in the Supreme Court contended that the Court of Appeals erred in not having made Judge Reyes inhibit himself, and that it was not too late for inhibition, for there were still matters pending before the trial judge, such as the withdrawal and release of the money in custodia legis and the lifting of the freeze order on the jewelry. 2. 3. 4.
Case: Leonor Reyes (oppositor) v. Judge Ysip and Dr. Crisostomo (administratrix/ proponents side) Facts: This is a petition for writ of certiorari and mandamus to compel Judge Ysip to permit and allow Reyes to submit evidence of her claim that she is a natural daughter of the deceased Juan Reyes Panlilio (decedent herein) In special proceedings no. 563 of CFI, a petition was presented for the probate of the last will and testament of decedent Reyes filed an opposition thereto. The administratrix who had presented the will for probate objected to the personality and right of Reyes to contest the will and asked that the court resolve her right to contest the will before the hearing thereon. The court ruled: El Juzgado opina que dicha personalidad debe resolverse en la vista a fondo de esta asunto as translated: The Court thinks that this personality must be solved in the thorough view of this subject. o Both counsel for proponent of the will and the opponent understood such order as permitting the oppositor to appear and intervene in the hearing on the will, leaving her personality to be resolved later o Counsel of the proponent of the will asked the court to reconsider this order o Counsel of oppositor offered evidence of her alleged filiation
Judge Ysip held that only the probate of the will was at issue and that the question of the presentation of evidence as to the filiation of the oppositor was out of place. Oppositor asked for reconsideration refused by court; hence this case
Considerations of convenience and expediency, therefore, support the ruling of the court in refusing to admit evidence of petitioner's filiation and postponing the same at a later stage in the distribution proceedings
Issue-Held: W/N the oppositor should be allowed to submit evidence in the probate proceeding regarding her filiation/alleged personality as a natural daughter of the decedent No. Approving such will just cause multiplicity of issues. Ratio: It is to be noted that counsel for the administratix did not contest the right of the oppositor to intervene on the ground that she is not the illegitimate child of the testator what she contended was that the action for recognition should have been brought during the lifetime of decedent. o For this reason, the implication may be made that some relationship between the testator and the petitioner is admitted o On the part of the oppositor, the only ground why she insisted in submitting the evidence on her filiation is that: she is afraid that if the will was admitted to probate without evidence of her filiation then she may not have the right to appeal later on from the decision for lack of personality If the court prohibited or prevented the oppositor from intervening in the hearing on the will, then she may have been justified to compel the judge to admit evidence of her filiation o BUT: what the judge ruled only was - that the reception of evidence as to the filiation be POSTPONED to another occasion or hearing, and perhaps on the occasion of the hearing for the declaration of heirs. To allow petitioner, oppositor in the probate, to prove her filiation would be injecting matters different from the issues involved in the probate, which in this case were the alleged non-execution of the will, or the execution thereof under pressure or influence or by threat, or the alleged forgery of the signatures of the testator Also, if such evidence is permitted, the nature of the evidence submitted would only be prima facie and only to justify her intervention in the probate proceedings and it would not be decisive of her right to inherit as a recognized natural child, as the final decision on the matter would be made after hearing for the declaration of heirs. no advantage could have been gained by hearing the provisional or prima facie evidence of the petitioner on her filiation, anyway the court was not depriving her of the right or opportunity to contest the will the legal issue raised by the proponent of the will would also tend to confuse or increase the number of issues to be determined at the hearing on the will, all these without any benefit or advantage to the parties, or prejudice to the petitioner because she was not being denied the right to sustain or introduce evidence to sustain her opposition to the probate of the will.
*the order of the court did not amount to a prohibition to the petitioner to take part in the hearing for the probate of the will and was motivated by a desire to avoid a multiplicity of the issues thereat and the limitation thereof to the execution and the validity of the execution of the will Random thoughts: I think we can relate this case to what we learned in Succession that probate of a will is concerned more on the extrinsic validity. Intrinsic validity comes later when the will is already allowed for probate. REYES vs. SOTERO Evidence: Rule 73 Limited Jurisdiction of Probate Court Facts: September 15, 1998: respondent Corazon L. Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising before the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, where it was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 204 Chichioco claimed that she was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate. According to Chichioco, the deceased left real properties located in the municipalities of Ramos and Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as assorted pieces of jewelry and money which were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased. Chichioco prayed that she be appointed administrator of the estate, upon payment of a bond, pending settlement and distribution of Lisings properties to the legal heirs. Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition2 to the petition, claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latters husband, Serafin Delos Santos thus being the only heir there is no need for appointment of administrator, o Presented the following to prove that she was duly adopted: Certification issued by The Municipal Civil Registrar Certification from the RTC Clerk of Court as to the decision in a special proceeding for her adoption (she was declared legally adopted). Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the adoption decree docketed as SP No. 53457 o claimed that no proceedings for the adoption of petitioner took place o Reyes natural mother connived with the Clerk of Court and Civil Registrar
RTC ordered on October 4, 1999, the suspension of hearings in Spec. Proc. No. 204 pending the outcome of SP No. 53457 Court of Appeals dismissed15SP No. 53457 Respondents filed a criminal complaint against petitioner, for alleged falsification of the adoption decree. DISMISSED. Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, o petitioner insisted that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed since the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of SP No. 53457 constituted res judicata as to the former. o There was likewise no valid challenge to her adoption and she consequently remains to be the sole heir of the decedent. Thus, she stressed that there was no need for the appointment of an administrator or for the settlement proceedings CA refused to dismiss Spec. Proc. No. 204 since the dismissal of SP No. 53457 was not a judgment on the merits and did not operate as res judicata to the former. It was also incumbent upon petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouses since, according to the appellate court, "imputations of irregularities permeating the adoption decree render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt."
these proceedings the validity of the adoption decree in order to defeat petitioners claim that she is the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a categorical pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is void, the certifications regarding the matter, as well as the facts stated therein, should be deemed legitimate, genuine and real. Petitioners status as an adopted child of the decedent remains unrebutted and no serious challenge has been brought against her standing as such. Therefore, for as long as petitioners adoption is considered valid, respondents cannot claim any interest in the decedents estate. For this reason, the Court agreed with petitioner that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed.
Rodriguez v Borja Facts: Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the City of Manila. On March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez which Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine such. But before the court could rule on the petition, the same was withdrawn. On March 12, 1963, the Rodriguezes filed before the CFI of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Pque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate. On the same date, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probate of the will delivered by them in the CFI of Bulacan. It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Pque, Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in Pquw, and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan. The Rodriguezes contend that since the intestate proceedings in the CFI of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the CFI of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M., the latter court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate. Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, contend that the CFI of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963. The Rodriguez filed a motion to dismiss the Special Proceeding in the CFI of Bulacan (probate of will) due to the pendency of the Special Proceeding in the CFI of Rizal (settlement of intestate estate) but was denied. Hence, they went to the SC via certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE: W/N Reyes HAD TO PROVE THE VALIDITY OF HER ADOPTION (in the special proceeding for the settlement of Lising Estate S.P 204) DUE TO IMPUTATIONS OF IRREGULARITIES. Held: NO. o Petitioner already submitted different certifications which were issued under the seal of the issuing offices and were signed by the proper officers. These are thus presumed to have been regularly issued as part of the official duties that said public officers perform. o These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioner s adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere "imputations of irregularities" will not cast a "cloud of doubt" on the adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered. It must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be presented only in a separate action brought principally for the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree. The latter cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedents estate, as categorically held in Santos v. Aranzanso.40 Accordingly, respondents cannot assail in
The Rodriguezes rely on Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. o SEC. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and ifWh he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, as far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Issue/Held: Which court has jurisdiction? CFI of Bulacan Ratio: The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court. o SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. When a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has been filed by the testator himself. The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while the Rodriguezes initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable. Although the CFI of Bulacan is not the court having jurisdiction based on the Rules as Father Rodriguez was domiciled in Rizal and even considering that he spent 33 years of his life as parish priest in Bulacan he still had the intention of returning to Rizal, does not mean that the CFI of Bulacan lacked jurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions, the power to settle decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the court. (Kaw Singco case) The estate proceedings having been initiated in the CFI of Bulacan ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins that: The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. (Sec. 1) This presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be of proper venue, yet the rule grants precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is first invoked, without taking venue into account. There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One is that their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a view to divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules. Certainly the order of priority established in Rule 73 was not designed to convert the settlement of decedent's estates into a race between applicants, with the administration of the properties as the price for the fleetest.
The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate , since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will. Says Article 960 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place: (1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its validity; (2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place only with respect to the property in which the testator has not disposed;
(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or repudiates the inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right of accretion takes place; (4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases provided in this Code.
ISSUE(S) / RATIO Where should the settlement proceedings be had: in the place of permanent residence, or place of actual stay at the time of demise? IN QUEZON CITY, WHERE THE DECEDENTS ACTUALLY STAYED BEFORE THEIR DEMISE Rule 73, 1 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be settled, or letters of administration granted, in the proper court located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death. If he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the trial court of any province in which he had estate should be the venue for the settlement of his estate. All the documents presented by petitioner pertained not to residence at the time of death, but to permanent residence or domicile. The term resides connotes actual residence as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. The term resides, like residing or residence, is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. Rule 73, 1 is of such nature, and thus, residence rather than domicile is the significant factor . As generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term inhabitant. Resides should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual, or physical habitation of a person, actual residence, or place of abode. It simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, and it must be more than temporary. Petitioners insistence that venue for the settlement of estates can only refer to permanent residence or domicile because it is the place where the records of the properties are kept and where most of the properties are located is not persuasive. It does not necessarily follow that the records of a persons properties are kept in the place where he permanently resides, and neither can it be presumed that a persons properties can be found mostly in the place where he establishes his domicile. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning as thus defined, residence in the context of venue provisions means nothing more than a persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. PETITION DENIED. DECISION OF THE CA, AFFIRMED. MAY BE RELEVANT: The following is taken from Eusebio v. Eusebio, as invoked by the petitioner. The SC found this contention to be lacking in merit, although it might be relevant to the topic:
Aleli U. Concepcion JAO V. CA, 382 SCRA 407 (2002) SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS VENUE FACTS The parties to this case, petitioner Rodolfo Jao and respondent Perico Jao, were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively, leaving behind real estate, cash, shares of stock, and other personal properties. On April 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration before the RTC-QC Br.99 over the estate of his parents. Perico alleged that his brother Rodolfo was gradually dissipating the assets of the estate, more particularly, receiving rentals from the properties without rendering any accounting and forcibly opening vaults and disposing of the cash and valuables therein. Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue, alleging that the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths. Their actual residence, according to Rodolfo, is at Angeles, Pampanga, and that they stayed at Rodolfos residence in Quezon City solely for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment and hospitalization. Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided at Rodolfos house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths, as conclusively declared in their death certificates. Andreas death certificate was even signed by Rodolfo. Rodolfo, in his rejoinder, stated that he gave his address only as reference, reiterating that the spouses stay in his house was merely transitory. The case was archived shortly after, but was revived by Perico. In 1994, Rodolfos motion to dismiss was denied. The trial court found that the death certificates prove the fact that Quezon City was the decedents last place of residence. The CA affirmed this decision on appeal by way of petition for certiorari.
1) WON venue was properly laid. ~ YES. In determining residence at the time of death, the following factors must be considered, namely, that the decedent had: (1) Capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) Physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) Intention to stay therein permanently. 2) WON respondent Felicidad San Luis has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration. ~ YES. RATIO: 1) Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the RTC of the province in which he resides at the time of his death. The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." In the application of venue statutes and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature - residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. "Resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode . It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile . Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another. In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. 2) The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo under the laws of the USA. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
SAN LUIS vs SAN LUIS FACTS: The case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis, who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit out of which were born six children. Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. 5 years later, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son. However Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorc before the Family Court of the State of Hawaii, USA which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody. Subsequently Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before a minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, USA. He had no children with Felicidad but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death. Thereafter, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo's estate. She filed a petition for letters of administration before the RTC of Makati City. Felicidad alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent's surviving heirs are Felicidad as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30M more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. She prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her. Petitioner Rodolfo and Linda San Luis, two of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo's place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. ISSUE:
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. With regard to Felicidad's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, USA, she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry Felicidad in 1974, nevertheless, she has the legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part: SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. - A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x. An interested person has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. In the instant case, Felicidad would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo's capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the USA, then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. Meanwhile, if Felicidad fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code
which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. Felicidad's legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

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