EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST Case 1 Estrada v.

Desierto, 253 SCRA 452 (2001) FACTS: Following the aborted impeachment trial & the resignation of majority of the members of the Cabinet & the defection of the military & the police, at about noon of Jan. 20, 2001, V-pres Arroyo was sworn into office as Pres. of the Phil., while Pres. Estrada w/ his family left Malacanang. On the same day, however, Pres. Estrada wrote a letter to the Senate stating that he was unable to exercise the powers of the office of the Presidency & the operation of the Consti, the V-pres shall be Acting Pres. ISSUE: Is the Pres. only temporarily unable to act as Pres? RULING: NO. On Jan. 20, 2001, despite receipt of the letter, the House issued a resolution supporting the assumption of Arroyoi as Pres. Likewise, on Feb. 7, it confirmed the nomination by Pres. Arroyo of Sen. Guingona as V-Pres. On the same day, the Senate also confirmed the nomination. The Senate on Feb. 8, issued a resolution confirming the existence of a vacancy in the Senate brought about by the nomination of Sen. Guingona & urging the COMELEC to fill the vacancy. Finally, both Houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by Pres. Arroyo. It is therefore clear that Congress has recognized Arroyo as the Pres., & that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary. In the face of this determination by a co-equal branch, the court is w/out authority to review. It is a poll question, w/c cannot be decided by the Court w/out transgressing the princ. of separation of powers. Case 2 Estrada vs. Desierto GR NO. 146710-15, Mar. 2, 2001 FACTS: The petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998. Petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems: [Ilocos Sur Governos, Luis Chavit Singson, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords], [Senator Teofisto Guingona Jr, delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled I Accuse. He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson and He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur.]. Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines, the late President Corazon Aquino, former President Ramos and respondent Arroyo ask for the petitioners resignation however, the petitioner refused to resign. The heat goes, the impeachment trial started, the day to day trial was covered live TV, the trial later on adjourned in the sprit of Christmas. As the day goes, the Armed Forces of the Philippines defected, withdrawing their support to the government, many people rallied asking for the petitioners resignation. On Jan 20, 2011, 12:00 noon, petitioner turned to surrender. It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter: Sir:

By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. (Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA Issue: Whether or not the petitioner Joseph Erap Ejercito Estrada is permanently unable to act as President. Held: Yes. The petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada is permanently unable to act as President. Section 11 of Article VII provides that Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. l75 which states: Resolution expressing the Support of the House of Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulation and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of nations goal under the Constitution. The Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82 which states: Resolution confirming President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines. Unconditionally clear in that recognition is the assertion that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability. Even if petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Case 3 Wild Valley v CA Facts: Philippine Roxas (owned by Phil. Pres. Lines), vessel, arrived in Venezuela to load iron ore. When vessel was ready to leave the port, Mr. Vasquez (official pilot of Venezuela) was designated to navigate the vessel through the Orinoco River. The master of the vessel, Captain Colon, was at the bridge with the pilot when the vessel left the port. Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel was underway. The vessel experienced some vibrations but the pilot assured that they were just a result of the shallowness of the vessel. The vessel again experienced vibrations which led to the vessel being run aground in the Orinoco River, obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels. As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon (vessel owned by Wildvalley Shipping) was unable to sail out that day. For this reason, Wild Valley commenced an action for damages. Issue: 1. Whether or not fault can be attributed to the master(captain) of Philippine Roxas for the grounding of said vessel. 2. Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies.

Held: 1. No. It's the pilot's fault! There being no contractual obligation, the master was only required to give ordinary diligence in accordance with Article 1173 of the New Civil Code. In the case, the master exercised due diligence when the vessel sailed only after the main engine, machine rise and other auxiliaries were checked and found to be in good running condition and when the master left a competent officer - the pilot who is experienced in navigating the Orinoco River. Philippine rules on pilotage enunciate the duties and responsibilities of a master of a vessel and its pilot. The law is explicit in saying that the master remains the overall commander of the vessel even when there is a pilot on board. He remains in control despite the presence of a pilot who is temporarily in charge of the vessel. It is NOT required of him to be on bridge while the vessel is being navigated by a pilot. Furthermore, the Orinoco River being a compulsory pilotage channel necessitated the engaging of a pilot who was presumed to be knowledgeable of every shoal, bank, deep and shallow ends of the river. Admitting his limited knowledge of the River, Captain Colon deemed it best to rely on the knowledge and experience of pilot Vasquez to guide the vessel safely. The pilot should have been aware of the portions which are shallow and which are not. His failure to determine the depth of the river and his decision to plod on his set course, in all probability, caused damage to the vessel. Thus, he is negligent and liable for the grounding. 2. NO. The elements of res ipsa loquitor are: -accident was of such character as to warrant inference that it would not have happened except for defendant's negligence -accident must have been caused by an agency/instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of -accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. There was a temporary shift of control over the ship from the master to the pilot on a compulsory pilotage channel. Thus, requisites 1 and 2 (negligence and control) are not present in the following situation. Case 4 G.R. No. 144656 May 9, 2002

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GERRICO VALLEJO Y SAMARTINO alias PUKE, accused-appellant. PER CURIAM: This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, sentencing Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino to death and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for the rape-slaying of a 9-year old child, Daisy Diolola, in Rosario, Cavite on July 10, 1999.

The Information charging accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo with the crime of Rape with Homicide alleged: That on or about the 10th day of July 1999, in Barangay Ligtong I, Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Trial Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with DAISY DIOLOLA Y DITALO, a nine-year old child against the latters will and while raping the said victim, said accused strangled her to death. CONTRARY TO LAW.2 Accused-appellant was arraigned on July 26, 1999 and, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, whereupon trial ensued. Ten (10) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola, the victims mother; Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, medico-legal officer of the NBI; Atty. Lupo Leyva; Mayor Renato Abutan of Rosario, Cavite; Atty. Sikat Agbunag of the Public Attorneys Office; Pet Byron Buan, NBI Forensic Biologist; Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, NBI Forensic Chemist; SPO1 Arnel Cuevas of the Rosario, Cavite police station; and Jessiemin Mataverde and Charito Paras-Yepes, both neighbors of the victim. The victims mother, Ma. Nida Diolola, testified that at around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, she sent her 9-year old daughter Daisy Diolola to their neighbors house in Pilapil, Ligtong I, Rosario, Cavite, so that Aimee Vallejo, the sister of accused-appellant, could help Daisy with her lessons. Aimees house, where accused-appellant was also staying, is about four to five meters away from Daisys house. Ma. Nida saw her daughter go to the house of her tutor. She was wearing pink short pants and a white sleeveless shirt. An hour later, Daisy came back with accused-appellant. They were looking for a book which accused-appellant could copy to make a drawing or a poster that Daisy would submit to her teacher. After finding the book, Daisy and accused-appellant went back to the latters house. When Ma. Nida woke up at about 5:30 oclock after an afternoon nap, she noticed that Daisy was not yet home. She started looking for her daughter and proceeded to the house of Aimee, Daisys tutor. Aimees mother told Ma. Nida that Daisy was not there and that Aimee was not able to help Daisy with her lessons because Aimee was not feeling well as she had her menstrual period. Ma. Nida looked for Daisy in her brothers and sisters houses, but she was not there, either. At about 7:00 oclock that evening, Ma. Nida went back to her neighbors house, and there saw accusedappellant, who told her that Daisy had gone to her classmates house to borrow a book. But, when Ma. Nida went there, she was told that Daisy had not been there. Ma. Nida went to the dike and was told that they saw Daisy playing at about 3:30 oclock in the afternoon. Jessiemin Mataverde also told Ma. Nida that Daisy was playing in front of her house that afternoon and even watched television in her house, but that Daisy later left with accused-appellant. Ma. Nida and her brother and sister searched for Daisy the whole evening of July 10, 1999, a Saturday, until the early morning of the following day, July 11, 1999, a Sunday, but their search proved fruitless. Then, at about 10:00 oclock in the morning of July 11, 1999, she was informed that the dead body of her daughter was found tied to the root of an aroma tree by the river after the compuerta by a certain Freddie Quinto. The body was already in the barangay hall when Ma. Nida saw her daughter. Daisy was wearing her pink short pants with her sleeveless shirt tied around her neck. Barangay Councilmen Raul Ricasa and Calring Purihin reported the incident to the Rosario police. The other barangay officers fetched

accused-appellant from his house and took him to the barangay hall. At the barangay hall, Ma. Nida pointed to accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo as the probable suspect since he was with the victim when she was last seen alive.3 Another witness, Jessiemin Mataverde, testified that at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of that day, she saw Daisy playing with other children outside her house. She asked Daisy and her playmates to stop playing as their noise was keeping Jessiemins one-year old baby awake. Daisy relented and watched television instead from the door of Jessiemins house. About five minutes later, accused-appellant came to the house and told Daisy something, as a result of which she went with him and the two proceeded towards the compuerta. Jessiemin testified that at around 5:00 oclock that afternoon, while she and her daughter were in front of a store across the street from her house, accusedappellant arrived to buy a stick of Marlboro cigarette. Accused-appellant had only his basketball shorts on and was just holding his shirt. They noticed both his shorts and his shirt were wet. After lighting his cigarette, accused-appellant left.4 Charito Yepes, another neighbor of Ma. Nida, also testified. She said that at about 4:30 oclock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, while she and her husband and children were walking towards the compuerta near the seashore of Ligtong, Rosario, Cavite, they met a fisherman named Herminio who said that it was a good day for catching milkfish (bangus). For this reason, according to this witness, they decided to get some fishing implements. She said they met accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo near the seashore and noticed that he was uneasy and looked troubled. Charito said that accused-appellant did not even greet them, which was unusual. She also testified that accused-appellants shorts and shirt (sando) were wet, but his face and hair were not.5 SPO1 Arnel Cuevas testified that upon receipt of the report, Rosario Police Chief Ricardo B. de la Cruz, Jr. responded to the call together with his men, PO2 Garcia, SPO1 Araracap and PO2 Lariza. When they arrived, Daisys body was already in the barangay hall. SPO1 Cuevas took photographs of the body. At that time, Daisy was wearing pink short pants and a dirty white panty with a dirty white sleeveless shirt wrapped around her neck. The body was afterwards taken to the Samson Funeral Parlor in Rosario, Cavite. The inquiries conducted by the police showed that one Freddie Quinto was fishing near the compuerta when he accidentally hit the body of Daisy, which was in the mud and tied to the root of an aroma tree. Accused-appellant was invited by the policemen for questioning. Two others, a certain Raymond and Esting, were also taken into custody because they were seen with accused-appellant in front of the store in the late afternoon of July 10 1999. Later, however, the two were released. Based on the statements of Jessiemin Mataverde and Charito Paras-Yepes, the policemen went to the house of accusedappellant at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of July 11, 1999 and recovered the white basketball shirt, with the name Samartino and No. 13 printed at the back, and the violet basketball shorts, with the number 9 printed on it, worn by accusedappellant the day before. The shirt and shorts, which were bloodstained, were turned over to the NBI for laboratory examination.6 Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, testified that at about 9:00 oclock in the evening of July 11, 1999, he conducted a physical examination of accusedappellant. His findings7 showed the following: PHYSICAL FINDINGS:

Abrasions: thigh, right, antero-lateral aspect, lower 3rd 5.0 x 0.1 cm., knee, left, 7.0 x 6.0 cm. legs, right anterior aspect, 28.0 x 8.0 cms., left anterior aspect, 24.0 x 10.0 cms., feet, plantar aspects; right, 9.0 x 3.0 cms. and left, 13.0 x 5.0 cms. Hematoma, left ring finger, posterior aspect, 1.0 x 0.5 cm. Lacerations, left ring finger, posterior aspect, 0.3 cm. (Living Case No. BMP-9902, p. 101, records) At about 10:00 oclock in the evening, Dr. Vertido went to the Samson Funeral Parlor in Rosario, Cavite for an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim Daisy Diolola. The autopsy revealed the following postmortem findings:8 Body in early stage of postmortem decomposition characterized by foul odor, eyes and tongue protruding, bloating of the face and blister formation. Washerwomans hands and feet. Contusion, (pinkish) face, right, 14.0 x 10.0 cms. and left, 13.0 x 6.0 cms. Contused abrasions, forehead, 13.0 x 5.0 cms. upper lip, 5.0 x 22.0 cms., lower lip, 3.0 x 2.0 cms., neck (nailmarks) anterior aspect, 8.0 x 5.0 cms., arms, right antero-medial aspect, middle 3rd 3.0 x 15.0 cms. posterior aspect, upper 3rd, 1.5 x 1.0 cms., left posterior aspect, 20.0 x 9.0 cms., forearm, left, posterior aspect, 21.0 x 8.0 cms. left thumb, anterior aspect, 1.5 x 1.0 cms., left middle, ring and little fingers, dorsal aspect, .50 x 4.0 cms. knees, right, 3.0 x 2.0 cms. and left, 8.0- x 5.0 cms., legs, right anterior aspect, upper and middle 3rd 3.0 x 2.5 cms. foot right, dorsal aspect. Hematoma, periorbital right, 5.0 x 3.0 cms. and left, 4.5 x 3.0 cms. Fracture, tracheal rings. Hemorrhages, interstitial, neck, underneath, nailmarks. Petechial hemorrhages, subendocardial, subpleural. Brain and other visceral organs are congested. Stomach, contains rice and other food particles. CAUSE OF DEATH: -Asphyxia by Manual Strangulation. GENITAL EXAMINATION: Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora and minora, gaping and congested. Hymen, moderately tall, thick with fresh lacerations, complete at 3:00, 6:00 and 9:00 oclock positions, edges with blood clots. [Autopsy Report No. BTNO-99-152] Renato Abutan, Municipal Mayor of Rosario, Cavite, testified that he was informed of the rape and murder at past 10:00 oclock in the evening of June 11, 1999. The mayor said he immediately proceeded to the municipal jail, where accusedappellant was detained, and talked to the latter. Accused-appellant at first denied having anything to do with the killing and rape of the child. The mayor said he told accused-appellant that he could not help him if he did not tell the truth. At that point, accused-appellant started crying and told the mayor that he killed the victim by strangling her. Accused-appellant claimed that he was under the influence of drugs. The mayor asked accused-appellant if he wanted to have the services of Atty. Lupo Leyva, a resident of Rosario, as his lawyer. When accused-appellant said he did, Mayor Abutan fetched Atty. Leyva from his house and took him to the police station about 11:00 oclock that evening.9

Atty. Lupo Leyva corroborated Mayor Abutans testimony. He said that upon arriving at the police station, he asked accused-appellant if he wanted his services as counsel in the investigation. After accused-appellant assented, Atty. Leyva testified that he sort of discouraged the former from making statements as anything he said could be used against him. But, as accused-appellant was willing to be investigated, Atty. Leyva said he advised him to tell the truth. PO2 Garcia, the investigator, informed accused-appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel and warned him that any answer he gave could and might be used against him in a court of law. PO2 Garcia asked questions from accusedappellant, who gave his answers in the presence of Atty. Leyva. After the statement was taken, Atty. Leyva and accused-appellant read it and afterwards signed it. Atty. Leyva testified that he did not see or notice any indication that accused-appellant had been maltreated by the police. In his sworn statement (Exh. M), accusedappellant confessed to killing the victim by strangling her to death, but denied having molested her.10 Pet Byron Buan, Forensic Biologist of the NBI, testified that on July 12, 1999, he took blood samples from accused-appellant in his office for laboratory examination to determine his blood type. Likewise, the basketball shorts and shirt worn by accused-appellant on the day the victim was missing and the victims clothing were turned over to the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI by PO1 Amoranto of the Rosario, Cavite police for the purpose of determining the presence of human blood and its groups.11 The results of the examinations conducted by Pet Byron T. Buan showed accusedappellant to belong to Group O. The following specimens: (1) one (1) white no. 13 athletic basketball shirt, with patches Grizzlies in front and SAMARTINO at the back; (2) one (1) violet no. 9 athletic basketball short pants; (3) one (1) white small Hello Kitty T-shirt with reddish brown stains; (4) one (1) cut pink short pants with reddish brown stains; (5) one (1) cut dirty white small panty with reddish brown stains, were all positive for the presence of human blood showing the reactions of Group A.12 Pet Byron Buan also testified that before he took the blood samples, he had a conversation with accused-appellant during which the latter admitted that he had raped and later killed the victim by strangulation and stated that he was willing to accept the punishment that would be meted out on him because of the grievous offense he had committed. Mr. Buan observed that accused-appellant was remorseful and was crying when he made the confession in the presence of SPO1 Amoranto at the NBI laboratory.13 When accused-appellant was brought before Inquest Prosecutor Elpidia J. Itoc at around noon of July 13, 1999 in Cavite City, accused-appellant had with him a handwritten confession which he had executed inside his cell at the Municipal Jail of Rosario. In his confession, accused-appellant admitted not only that he killed the victim but that he had before that raped her. Accused-appellant said he laid down the victim on a grassy area near the dike. He claimed that she did not resist when he removed her undergarments but that when he tried to insert his penis into the victims vagina, she struggled and resisted. Accused-appellant said he panicked and killed the child. He then dumped her body in the shallow river near the compuerta and went home.14 Atty. Sikat Agbunag, a lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office, testified that at noon of July 13, 1999, while she was in their office in Cavite City, Prosecutor Itoc came together with accused-appellant and some policemen. Prosecutor Itoc asked Atty. Agbunag to assist accused-appellant about his confession. Atty. Agbunag read the

document, informed accused-appellant of his constitutional rights, and warned him that the document could be used against him and that he could be convicted of the case against him, but, according to her, accused-appellant said that he had freely and voluntarily executed the document because he was bothered by his conscience. Accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Agbunag, then affixed his signature to the document and swore to it before Prosecutor Itoc.15 At the instance of City Prosecutor Agapito S. Lu of Cavite City, NBI Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan took buccal swabs and hair samples from accused-appellant, as well as buccal swabs and hair samples from the parents of the victim, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola and Arnulfo Diolola. The samples were submitted to the DNA Laboratory of the NBI for examination. Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, conducted DNA tests on the specimens collected by Dr. Vertido. She testified that the vaginal swabs of the victim taken by Dr. Vertido during the autopsy contained the DNA profiles of accusedappellant and the victim.16 The defense then presented as witnesses accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo and his sister Aimee Vallejo. Their testimonies show that at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, accused-appellant, Aimee, and their sister Abigail were in their house in Barangay Talisay, Ligtong I, Rosario, Cavite when Daisy Diolola came to ask accused-appellant to draw her school project. After making the request, Daisy left.17 Accused-appellant did not immediately make the drawing because he was watching television. Accused-appellant said that he finished the drawing at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon and gave it to the victims aunt, Glory. He then returned home to watch television again. He claimed he did not go out of the house until 7:00 oclock in the evening when he saw Ma. Nida, who was looking for her daughter. Accused-appellant said he told her that he had not seen Daisy. After that, accusedappellant said he went to the pilapil and talked with some friends, and, at about 8:00 oclock that evening, he went home. At 9:00 oclock in the morning of July 11, 1999, barangay officials fetched accusedappellant from his house and took him to the barangay hall, where he was asked about the disappearance of Daisy. He claimed that he did not know anything about it. Accused-appellant was allowed to go home, but, at 11:00 oclock that morning, policemen came and invited him to the police headquarters for questioning. His mother went with him to the police station. There, accused-appellant was asked whether he had something to do with the rape and killing of Daisy. He denied knowledge of the crime. At 4:00 oclock that afternoon, accused-appellant accompanied the police to his house to get the basketball shorts and shirt he was wearing the day before, which were placed together with other dirty clothes at the back of their house. According to accused-appellant, the police forced him to admit that he had raped and killed Daisy and that he admitted having committed the crime to stop them from beating him up. Accused-appellant claimed the police even burned his penis with a lighted cigarette and pricked it with a needle. Accused-appellant confirmed that Mayor Renato Abutan and Atty. Lupo Leyva went to see him in the investigation room of the police station and told him that they would help him if he told the truth. Atty. Leyva asked him whether he wanted him to be his counsel, and accused-appellant said he answered in the affirmative. He said Atty. Leyva informed him of his constitutional rights. Accused-appellant claimed that, although he admitted to Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva the commission of the crime, this was because the police had maltreated him. Accused-appellant said he

did not tell the mayor or Atty. Leyva that he had been tortured because the policemen were around and he was afraid of them. It appears that the family of accused-appellant transferred their residence to Laguna on July 12, 1999 because of fear of reprisal by residents of their barangay.18 According to accused-appellant, Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva were not present when he gave his confession to the police and signed the same. Accused-appellant claims that although Exhibit N was in his own handwriting, he merely copied the contents thereof from a pattern given to him by the police.19 On July 31, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the offense charged. The dispositive portion of its decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide, as charged in the Information, accordingly hereby sentences him to the supreme penalty of DEATH. The accused is directed to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. SO ORDERED.20 Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that: I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY AND WEAKNESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION. II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT TO THE ALLEGED ORAL CONFESSIONS OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE ITS BEING HEARSAY IN NATURE. III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE WRITTEN EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME WAS OBTAINED THROUGH FORCE AND INTIMIDATION AND THAT THE LAWYER WHO ASSISTED HIM DURING HIS CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION DID NOT AND COULD NOT POSSIBLY GIVE HIM EFFECTIVE LEGAL ASSISTANCE. We find accused-appellants contentions to be without merit. First. An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, provided sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime.21 In rape with homicide, the evidence against an accused is more often than not circumstantial. This is because the nature of the crime, where only the victim and the rapist would have been present at the time of its commission, makes the prosecution of the offense particularly difficult since the victim could no longer testify against the perpetrator. Resort to circumstantial evidence is inevitable and to demand direct evidence proving the modality of the offense and the identity of the perpetrator is unreasonable.22 Under Rule 133, section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance;

(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.23 In the case at bar, the following circumstantial evidence establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellant: 1. The victim went to Aimee Vallejos house, where accused-appellant was residing, at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, for tutoring. 2. At around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, accused-appellant and Daisy went together to the latters house to get a book from which the former could copy Daisys school project. After getting the book, they proceeded to accused-appellants residence. 3. From accused-appellants house, Daisy then went to the house of Jessiemin Mataverde where she watched television. Accused-appellant thereafter arrived and whispered something to Daisy, and the latter went with him towards the compuerta. 4. At about 4:30 oclock in the afternoon, the spouses Iluminado and Charito Yepes saw accused-appellant coming out of the compuerta, with his clothes, basketball shorts, and t-shirt wet, although his face and hair were not. According to these witnesses, he looked pale, uneasy, and troubled (balisa). He kept looking around and did not even greet them as was his custom to do so. 5. The fishing boat which accused-appellant used as a bomber (a boat for catching fish with dynamite) was docked by the seashore. 6. A little before 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, Jessiemin Mataverde also saw accused-appellant buying a Marlboro cigarette from a store. Jessiemen also noticed that accused-appellants clothes were wet but not his face nor his hair. 7. By 5:30 oclock in the afternoon, as Ma. Nida Diolola looked for her daughter, she was told by accused-appellant that Daisy had gone to her classmate Rosarios house. The information proved to be false. 8. Daisys body was found tied to an aroma tree at the part of the river near the compuerta. 9. During the initial investigation, accused-appellant had scratches on his feet similar to those caused by the thorns of an aroma tree. 10. The clothes which accused-appellant wore the day before were bloodstained. The bloodstains on accused-appellants clothes and on Daisys clothes were found positive of human blood type A. 11. Accused-appellant has blood type O. 12. The vaginal swabs from Daisys body contained her DNA profile as well as that of accused-appellant. Accused-appellant contends that the bloodstains found on his garments were not proven to have been that of the victim as the victims blood type was not determined.

The contention has no merit. The examination conducted by Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan of both accused-appellants and the victims clothing yielded bloodstains of the same blood type A.24 Even if there was no direct determination as to what blood type the victim had, it can reasonably be inferred that the victim was blood type A since she sustained contused abrasions all over her body which would necessarily produce the bloodstains on her clothing.25 That it was the victims blood which predominantly registered in the examination was explained by Mr. Buan, thus:26 ATTY. ESPIRITU Q: But you will agree with me that more probably than not, if a crime is being committed, and it results in a bloody death, it is very possible that the blood of the victim and the blood of the assailant might mix in that particular item like the tshirt, shorts or pants? A: It is possible when there is a huge amount of blood coming from the victim and the suspect, Sir. It is possible. It will mix. Whichever is the dominant blood in it, it will be the one which will register. For example, if there is more blood coming from the victim, that blood will be the one to register, on occasions when the two blood mix. Q: But in these specimens number 1 to 5, it is very clear now that only type A and no type O blood was found? A: Yes, sir.

Accused-appellant also questions the validity of the method by which his bloodstained clothes were recovered. According to accused-appellant, the policemen questioned him as to the clothes he wore the day before. Thereafter, they took him to his house and accused-appellant accompanied them to the back of the house where dirty clothes were kept.27 There is no showing, however, that accusedappellant was coerced or forced into producing the garments. Indeed, that the accused-appellant voluntarily brought out the clothes sought by the police becomes more convincing when considered together with his confessions. A consented warrantless search is an exception to the proscription in Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution. As we have held, the consent of the owner of the house to the search effectively removes any badge of illegality.28 The DNA analysis conducted by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Viloria-Magsipoc is also questioned by accused-appellant. He argues that the prosecution failed to show that all the samples submitted for DNA testing were not contaminated, considering that these specimens were already soaked in smirchy waters before they were submitted to the laboratory. DNA is an organic substance found in a persons cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical twins, each persons DNA profile is distinct and unique.29 When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victims body for the suspects DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim.30

The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence sample and the reference sample.31 The samples collected are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile.32 The test may yield three possible results: 1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources (exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion; 2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation, contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the analysis might then be repeated with the same or a different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or 3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion).33 In such a case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical significance of the Similarity.34 In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among others things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. In the case at bar, the bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim and of accused-appellant, the smears taken from the victim as well as the strands of hair and nails taken from her tested negative for the presence of human DNA,35 because, as Ms. Viloria-Magsipoc explained: PROSECUTOR LU: Q: I noticed that specimens 1 to 5 consisting of bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim and of the accused gave negative results for the presence of human DNA. Why is it so? What is the reason for this when there are still bloodstains on the clothing? A: After this Honorable Court issued an Order for DNA analysis, serological methods were already conducted on the said specimens. And upon inquiry from Mr. Buan and as far as he also knew of this case, and we also interviewed the mother who came over to the laboratory one time on how was the state of the specimens when they were found out. We found that these specimens were soaked in smirchy water before they were submitted to the laboratory. The state of the specimens prior to the DNA analysis could have hampered the preservation of any DNA that could have been there before. So when serological methods were done on these specimens, Mr. Byron could have taken such portion or stains that were only amenable for serological method and were not enough for DNA analysis already. So negative results were found on the clothings that were submitted which were specimens no. 1 to 5 in my report, Sir. Q: I also noticed that specimen no. 6-B consisting of the smears taken from the victim also proved negative for human DNA, why is it so? A: Because when we received the vaginal smears submitted by Dr. Vertido, the smear on the slide was very, very dry and could have chipped off. I already informed

Dr. Vertido about it and he confirmed the state of the specimen. And I told him that maybe it would be the swab that could help us in this case, Sir. And so upon examination, the smears geared negative results and the swabs gave positive results, Sir. Q: How about specimen no. 7, the hair and nails taken from the victim, why did they show negative results for DNA? A: The hair samples were cut hair. This means that the hair did not contain any root. So any hair that is above the skin or the epidermis of ones skin would give negative results as the hair shaft is negative for DNA. And then the nails did not contain any subcutaneous cells that would be amenable for DNA analysis also, Sir. Q: So its the inadequacy of the specimens that were the reason for this negative result, not the inadequacy of the examination or the instruments used? A: Yes, Sir.

Thus, it is the inadequacy of the specimens submitted for examination, and not the possibility that the samples had been contaminated, which accounted for the negative results of their examination. But the vaginal swabs taken from the victim yielded positive for the presence of human DNA. Upon analysis by the experts, they showed the DNA profile of accused-appellant:36 PROSECUTOR LU: Q: So based on your findings, can we say conclusively that the DNA profile of the accused in this case was found in the vaginal swabs taken from the victim? A: Q: A: Yes, Sir. That is very definite and conclusive? Yes, Sir.

In conclusion, we hold that the totality of the evidence points to no other conclusion than that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged. Evidence is weighed not counted. When facts or circumstances which are proved are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but also inconsistent with his innocence, such evidence, in its weight and probative force, may surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the court.37 This is how it is in this case. Second. Accused-appellant challenges the validity of the oral and written confessions presented as evidence against him. He alleges that the oral confessions were inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay, while the extrajudicial confessions were obtained through force and intimidation. The claim is untenable. Section 12 of Art. III of the Constitution provides in pertinent parts: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision: (1) coerced confessions, the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, and intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of Section 12, and (2) uncounselled statements, given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same section.38 Accused-appellant argues that the oral confessions given to Mayor Abutan of Rosario, Cavite and to NBI Forensic Biologist should be deemed inadmissible for being violative of his constitutional rights as these were made by one already under custodial investigation to persons in authority without the presence of counsel. With respect to the oral confessions, Atty. Leyva testified:39 PROSECUTOR LU: Q: Upon meeting this Gerrico Vallejo at the police station were you able to confer with him? A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Did you ask him whether he really wants you to represent or assist him as a lawyer during that investigation? A: I did, as a matter of fact, I asked him whether he would like me to represent him in that investigation, Sir. Q: A: Q: And what was his answer? He said yes. After agreeing to retain you as his counsel, what else did you talk about?

A: I told him that in the investigation, whatever he will state may be used against him, so its a sort of discouraging him from making any statement to the police, Sir. Upon cross-examination, Atty. Leyva testified as follows:40 Q: You stated that you personally read this recital of the constitutional rights of the accused? A: Yes, Sir.

Q: But it will appear in this recital of constitutional rights that you did not inform the accused that the statement that he will be giving might be used against him in a court of justice? A: I did that, Sir.

Q:

But it does not appear in this statement?

PROSECUTOR LU The best evidence will be the statement, your Honor. ATTY ESPIRITU The only thing that is stated here is that Maaaring gamitin pabor o laban sa iyo. COURT Let the witness answer. A: I told him that, as a matter of fact, and I also told him to tell the truth and nothing but the truth. The testimony of Atty. Leyva is not only corroborated by the testimony of Mayor Renato Abutan,41 it is also confirmed by accused-appellant who testified as follows:42 ATTY. ESPIRITU: Q: Did Atty. Leyva explain to you the meaning and significance of that document which you are supposed to have executed and signed? A: Q: Yes, Sir. What did Atty. Leyva tell you?

A: That they are allowing me to exercise my constitutional right to reveal or narrate all what I know about this case, Sir. Q: Did Atty. Leyva tell you that if you do not want, nobody can force you to give that statement? A: Yes, Sir.

Q: And did he tell you that what you would be giving is an extra-judicial confession? A: Yes, Sir.

Clearly, accused-appellant cannot now claim that he was not apprised of the consequences of the statements he was to make as well as the written confessions he was to execute. Neither can he question the qualifications of Atty. Lupo Leyva who acted as his counsel during the investigation. To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. Indeed, counsel should not prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.43 Indeed, accused-appellant admitted that he was first asked whether he wanted the services of Atty. Leyva before the latter acted as his defense counsel.44 And counsel

who is provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where the latter never raised any objection against the formers appointment during the course of the investigation but, on the contrary, thereafter subscribed to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.45 Contrary to the assertions of accused-appellant, Atty. Leyva was not the municipal attorney of Rosario, Cavite but only a legal adviser of Mayor Renato Abutan.46 Accused-appellant contends that the rulings in People vs. Andan47 and People vs. Mantung48 do not apply to this case. We disagree. The facts of these cases and that of the case at bar are similar. In all these cases, the accused made extrajudicial confessions to the municipal mayor freely and voluntarily. In all of them, the extrajudicial confessions were held admissible in evidence, being the spontaneous, free, and voluntary admissions of the guilt of the accused. We note further that the testimony of Mayor Abutan was never objected to by the defense. Indeed, the mayors questions to accused-appellant were not in the nature of an interrogation, but rather an act of benevolence by a leader seeking to help one of his constituents. Thus, Mayor Abutan testified:49 PROSECUTOR LU: Q: And during the conversation you had with Accused Gerrico Vallejo, what exactly did he tell you? A: At first he said that he did not do that. That was the first thing he told me. Then I told him that I will not be able to help him if he will not tell me the truth. Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: And what was the reply of the accused? He had been silent for a minute. Then we talked about the incident, Sir. And what exactly did he tell you about the incident? I asked him, Were you under the influence of drugs at that time? What else did he tell you? I told him, What reason pushed you to do that thing? x x x

Q: Please tell us in tagalog, the exact words that the accused used in telling you what happened. A: He told me that he saw the child as if she was headless at that time. That is why he strangled the child, Sir. (Ang sabi niya po sa kin, nakita niya raw yung bata na parang walang ulo na naglalakad. Kaya po sinakal niya.) xxx COURT: Q: When you told the accused that you will help him, what kind of help were you thinking at that time? A: Q: I told him that if he will tell the truth, I could help give him legal counsel. And what was the answer of the accused? xxx xxx

A:

Yes, he will tell me the truth, Your Honor.

In People vs. Mantung,50 this Court said: Never was it raised during the trial that Mantungs admission during the press conference was coerced or made under duress. As the records show, accusedappellant voluntarily made the statements in response to Mayor Marquez question as to whether he killed the pawnshop employees. Mantung answered in the affirmative and even proceeded to explain that he killed the victims because they made him eat pork. These circumstances hardly indicate that Mantung felt compelled to own up to the crime. Besides, he could have chosen to remain silent or to do deny altogether any participation in the robbery and killings but he did not; thus accused-appellant sealed his own fate. As held in People v. Montiero, a confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience. And in People vs. Andan, it was explained: Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.51 For the same reason, the oral confession made by accused-appellant to NBI Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan is admissible. Accused-appellant would have this Court exclude this confession on the ground that it was uncounselled and that Mr. Buan, who initiated the conversation with accused-appellant, was part of the NBI. The issue concerning the sufficiency of the assistance given by Atty. Leyva has already been discussed. On the other hand, the questions put by Mr. Buan to accusedappellant were asked out of mere personal curiosity and clearly not as part of his tasks. As Buan testified:52 PROSECUTOR LU: Q: What was the subject of your conversation with him?

A: It is customary when we examine the accused. During the examination, we talk to them for me to add knowledge on the case, Sir. Q: A: Sir. Q: A: Q: What did you talk about during your conversation? I asked him if he was the one who did the killing on this victim, Daisy Diolola, And what was the reply of the accused? He said yes, Sir. What else did you ask the accused?

A: I remember that while asking him, he was crying as if feeling remorse on the killing, Sir. .... Q: A: Q: A: Q: And it was you who initiated the conversation? Yes, Sir. Do you usually do that? Yes, Sir. We usually do that. Is that part of your procedure?

A: It is not SOP. But for me alone, I want to know more about the case, Sir. And any information either on the victim or from the suspect will help me personally. Its not an SOP, Sir. The confession, thus, can be likened to one freely and voluntarily given to an ordinary individual and is, therefore, admissible as evidence. Third. The admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellant is also attacked on the ground that these were extracted from him by means of torture, beatings, and threats to his life. The bare assertions of maltreatment by the police authorities in extracting confessions from the accused are not sufficient. The standing rule is that where the defendants did not present evidence of compulsion, or duress nor violence on their person; where they failed to complain to the officer who administered their oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these will be considered as indicating voluntariness.53 Indeed, extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing that the declarants consent in executing the same has been vitiated, the confession will be sustained.54 Accused-appellants claim that he was tortured and subjected to beatings by policemen in order to extract the said confession from him is unsupported by any proof:55 ATTY. ESPIRITU: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: Did they further interrogate you? Yes, sir. What else did they ask you? They were asking me the project, Sir. What else? That is the only thing, Sir. Who was doing the questioning?

A: Q: A: Q: A: xxx Q: A:

The investigator, Sir. How many were they inside that room? Five, Sir. They are all policemen? Yes, Sir. xxx xxx

Until what time did they keep you inside that room? Up to 11:00 in the evening, Sir.

Q: Between 10:30 in the morning up to 11:00 oclock in the evening, what did you do there? A: Q: A: Q: A: They were interrogating and forcing me to admit something, Sir. In what way did they force you to admit something? They were mauling me, Sir. The 5 of them? Yes, Sir.

Q: The 5 of them remained inside that room with you throughout the questioning? A: Q: Yes, Sir. In what way did they hurt you?

A: They burned my private part with a lighted cigarette butt and pierced me with a needle, Sir. Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Who did these things to you? Mercado, Sir. Who is this Mercado? EPZA policemen, Sir. Did the other policemen help in doing these things to you? No, Sir. Were you asked to undress or you were forced to do that? They forced me to remove my clothes, Sir.

Q: A: Sir. Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A:

In what way did they force you to remove your clothes? They were asking me to take off the pants which I was wearing at the time, Did they do anything to you to force you to remove your pants? Yes, Sir. What? They boxed me, Sir. What else, if any? They hit me with a piece of wood, Sir. What did you feel when your private part was burned with a cigarette butt? It was painful, Sir. In what part of your body were you pricked by a needle? At my private part, Sir.

These bare assertions cannot be given weight. Accused-appellant testified that he was made to stay in the municipal hall from 10:00 oclock in the morning until 11:00 oclock that night of July 10, 1999, during which time he was boxed, tortured, and hit with a piece of wood by policemen to make him admit to the crime. However, accused-appellant was physically examined by Dr. Antonio Vertido at about 9:00 oclock in the evening of the same day. While the results show that accusedappellant did sustain injuries, the same are incompatible with his claim of torture. As Dr. Vertido testified:56 PROSECUTOR LU: Q: What were your findings when you conducted the physical examination of the suspect? A: I found abrasions, your Honor, abrasions on the thigh, knees, legs and feet of the suspect, and I also found hematoma on the left ring finger, posterior aspect and at the same time, a laceration on the left ring finger. xxx xxx xxx

Q: In your findings, it appears that the accused in this case suffered certain physical injuries on his person like this abrasion on the thigh, right anterior lateral aspect lower third of the knee, what could have caused this injury? A: Abrasions are usually caused when the skin comes in contact with a rough surface, Sir. Hematoma are usually caused by a blunt instrument or object and laceration is the forcible contact of the skin from that blunt object. Q: I am particularly interested in your findings hematoma on the left ring finger, posterior aspect and laceration left ring finger posterior aspect, what could have caused those injuries on the accused?

A: My opinion to these hematoma and laceration found on the said left ring finger was that it was caused by a bite, Sir. If the account of accused-appellant that he was beaten up is true, Dr. Antonio Vertido would have found more than mere abrasions and hematoma on his left finger. Dr. Vertidos findings are more consistent with the theory that accusedappellant sustained physical injuries as a result of the struggle made by the victim during the commission of the rape in the compuerta. At all events, even if accused-appellant was truthful and his assailed confessions are inadmissible, the circumstantial evidence, as already shown, is sufficient to establish his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. The prosecution witnesses presented a mosaic of circumstances showing accused-appellants guilt. Their testimonies rule out the possibility that the crime was the handiwork of some other evil mind. These witnesses have not been shown to have been motivated by ill will against accusedappellant. On the other hand, no other witness not related to accused-appellant was ever called to corroborate his claim. The defense presented only accused-appellants sister, Aimee Vallejo, to corroborate his story. We have held time and again that alibi cannot prosper if it is established mainly by the accused and his relatives, and not by credible persons.57 It is well settled that alibi is the weakest of all defenses as it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. For this reason, this Court looks with caution upon the defense of alibi, especially when, as in this case, it is corroborated only by relatives or friends of the accused.58 Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides that When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.59 Therefore, no other penalty can be imposed on accused-appellant. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, finding accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of DEATH and directing him to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, is hereby AFFIRMED. In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power. Case 5 RAYMOND PE LIM, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, JOANNA ROSE C. PE LIM, Minor represented by her Natural Mother and Guardian, MARIBEL CRUZ y TAYAG, Respondents. DECISION ROMERO, J.: All too often, immature men who allow their emotions to hold sway over their rational minds come to grief when their passions cool off, but not before inflicting irreparable psychic and spiritual damage on their victims and the fruits of their

wanton acts. As they sow the proverbial "wild oats," they are heedless of the dire consequences they heap on their heads. When the inevitable confrontation explodes and they are helpless to extricate themselves from the messy situation arising from their wrongdoing, eventually they invoke the help of the courts as their final arbiter. Before us is one of those cases where a man woos a maid, succeeds in seducing and impregnating her, only to disclaim the paternity of the child when made to account for his misdeeds. DNA,1 being a relatively new science, it has not as yet been accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity will still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts, verbal and written, by the putative father. This petition for review on certiorari sprang from a complaint filed by Maribel Cruz for child support on behalf of her daughter, private respondent Joanna Rose C. Pe Lim, against petitioner Raymond Pe Lim who, Maribel claims, is Joanna's father. Maribel's story unfolds, thus: Maribel was sixteen years old in 1978 and a part-time student. She also worked as a receptionist at Tonight's Club and Resthouse along Roxas Blvd., Manila. She met petitioner during her first night on the job. Petitioner wooed her and Maribel reciprocated his love. They soon lived together, with petitioner paying the rentals in a succession of apartments in Cubao, Quezon City, Tambo, Paraaque and Makati, Metro Manila. Maribel left for Japan in July 1981, already pregnant, and returned to Manila in October of the same year. The couple never married because petitioner claimed that he was not financially stable. On January 17, 1982, Maribel gave birth to their daughter at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. The bills for Maribel's three-day confinement at the hospital were paid for by Raymond and he also caused the registration of the name Joanna Rose C. Pe Lim on the child's birth certificate. After Joanna Rose's birth, the love affair between Maribel and petitioner continued. Towards the latter part of 1983, Maribel noted that petitioner's feelings toward her started to wane. He subsequently abandoned her and Joanna Rose. Maribel tried to support herself by accepting various jobs and with occasional help from relatives, but it was never enough. She asked petitioner for support but, despite promises to do so, it was never given. Maribel then filed a complaint against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Manila for support. Petitioner, on the other hand, has a different version: He claims that in 1978, he went to Tonight's Club and Resthouse along Roxas Boulevard, Manila to relax after a hard day's work. There he met Maribel, a pretty and aggressive hospitality girl. Raymond observed that while she had a pleasing personality, she seemed to be quite experienced because she started to kiss him on the cheeks and neck, whispering to him that they could go anywhere and rest. Raymond declined to take Maribel up on her offer saying that he only wanted someone to talk to. They became friends after that first meeting, and while he often saw her, there was no intimacy between them. He did admit giving Maribel sizeable tips because she confided in him that she needed money. Raymond alleged that he was not Maribel's only customer at the club. In 1980, she left for Japan to work as an entertainer. In 1981, she returned to Manila pregnant, and appealed to Raymond for help because she claimed that she could not face her

relatives in her condition. Raymond got her an apartment and paid its rentals until she gave birth to a baby girl on January 17, 1982. Raymond admits paying the hospital bills but claims that Maribel was supposed to pay him back for it. When she failed to do so, Raymond stopped seeing her. Raymond denies being the father of Maribel's child, claiming that they were only friends and nothing more. The trial court rendered a decision on June 10, 1971, the dispositive portion of which states: "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering herein defendant, Raymond Pe Lim to give support to his natural daughter, minor Joanna Rose Pe Lim in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). Philippine Currency, per month for the support, maintenance, education and well-being of said child, the same to be paid on or before the 5th day of each month and monthly thereafter starting June, 1991, until the said minor Joanna Rose Pe Lim, shall have reached the age of majority. The defendant is further ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of Seven Thousand Five Hundred (P7,500.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, for attorney's fees and other litigation expenses. No costs. SO ORDERED." Petitioner then elevated his case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's findings. Petitioner now argues before the Court that there is no clear and convincing evidence on record to show that there was actual cohabitation between him and Maribel. In fact, petitioner infers that Maribel became pregnant only when she went to Japan. In short, he denies that he is the father of Joanna Rose. He further questions the awarded support of P10,000.00 per month, saying that the same is beyond his means, considering that he has a family to support. We find no merit in this petition. In Alberto v. Court of Appeals,2 we said: "When a putative father manifests openly through words and deeds his recognition of a child, the courts can do no less than confirm said acknowledgment. As the immortal bard Shakespeare perspicaciously said: 'Let your own discretion be your tutor; suit the action to the word, the word to the action." The evidence in the instant case shows that petitioner considered himself to be the father of Joanna Rose as shown by the hand-written letter he wrote to Maribel: "Hi Love, I wrote you this letter because I would like to erase from your mind the thought of why I can not ever [sic] you marriage right now is because I have no longer love or care for both Joanna & you.

Last night when we talked things over, I was in a stage wherein everything was happening so fast that I was running out of time & works (sic) to make you understand me through this letter I would like to explain my side in a more detailed way and I hope you could understand. You know love, the main root of the problem of why marriage is impossible for us right now is not what my parents or my family circle will say about you, but the financial side of it. Okay, let say I did marry you right now disregarding my financial stability. Sooner or later they will come to know of it and I am sure that they will not consent it. I have no alternative but to leave them & to stick it up with you. This is where the financial side comes in. I can't allow myself walking away from my family making them think that I can stand on my own two feet but the truth of the matter is not and seeing both of you suffer for only one stupid mistake which is I was not yet financially ready to face the consequence. My plan is that if you could only stick it out with me until I am ready to face whatever consequence that might occur during our life or relation as husband and wife. You have already tried it before, why can't you stress it a little longer. In return, I promise to be a loving & caring husband & father to both of you. Love, I really don't want you to be taken away from me by anyone, whether he be single or married. This is the reason why I am still trying to convince you. But if you really have decided things up and really determined to push through with it. I guess I just have to respect your decision. Just remember I wish you the best of luck and take extra-care of yourself & Joanna. Remember, if the time comes when things get rough for you and you have no one to turn to, don't hesitate to call on me. I am very much willing to be at your side to help you. I love you very much! Miso Love, Raymond" (Underscoring supplied by Raymond himself) From the tenor of the letter and the statements petitioner made therein it is clear that, contrary to his vehement assertion that he and Maribel were just friends, they were actually lovers. In an earlier letter, this time sent to Maribel while she was in Japan, petitioner lovingly told her to take care of herself because of her "situation," obviously referring to the state of pregnancy of Maribel: "Aug. 11, 1981 Hi Love, Do you know how glad I was to receive a letter from you yesterday? At least now I'm a little bit at ease to know that everything is fine with you. Love, in your letter you seem so much concern (sic) about my situation once here. I really appreciate it, but please don't give too much thought about it because I'm physically o.k. here. The important thing is that don't think too much and have a lot of rest during your spare time especially in the situation you're in now. If you are feeling homesick just go out with your friends and try to enjoy yourself to the fullest while you are there

Love, you said in your letter that you regret very much your going there & wishes (sic) that you have not left anymore. I understand your feelings to what had happened after you told me about it in the telephone. xxx xxx xxx Love, I miss you so much that I always re-read those letters you had send me very often. At night I always think of you and the times we're together before going to sleep. xxx xxx xxx" (Underscoring supplied) It was only after petitioner separated from Maribel that he started to deny paternity of Joanna Rose. Until he got married to another woman, he did not object to being identified as Joanna Rose's father as disclosed in the Certificate of Live Birth. The evidence on record reveals that he even got a copy of the said Certificate when Joanna Rose started schooling, as shown by a receipt in his name from the San Juan Municipal Office. His belated denial cannot outweigh the totality of the cogent evidence which establishes beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner is indeed the father of Joanna Rose.3crlwvirtualibrry Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Article 172 of the Family Code states: "The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: '(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or '(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.' "In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: '(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or '(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a).'" This article adopts the rule in Article 283 of the Civil Code that filiation may be proven by "any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father."4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Petitioner has never controverted the evidence on record. His love letters to Maribel vowing to be a good father to Joanna Rose; pictures of himself on various occasions cuddling Joanna Rose and the Certificate of Live Birth say it all. Accordingly, his suit must fail. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Case 6 People vs Campuhan Facts: Primo Campuhan was accused of raping four year old Crysthel Pamintuan. Campuhan was caught by childs mother on April 25, 1996 at around 4pm in their house. Campuhan, helper of Corazons brother was allegedly kneeling in front of the child with both their pants downa dn child was crying ayoko, ayoko while Primo forced his penis into childs vagina Issue: WON crime is rape? Held: No. Modified to attempted rape 1. Consummated rape: perfect penetration not essential. Slight penetration is equivalent to rape. Mere touching of external genitalia considered when its an essential part of penetration not just touching in ordinary sense (People v. Orita). Labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated (People v. Escober) 2. Attempted no penetration or didnt reach labia/mere grazing of surface 3. Failed to prove that penetration occurred. Mothers testimony questionable with regards to her position relative to Primo and child. They failed to establish how she could have seen actual contact in her position 4. Mans instinct is to run when caught. Primo could not have stayed or to satisfy his lust even if .. seeing Corazon 5. Child denied penetration occurred 6. People v. Villamor consummation even when penetration doubted: pains felt, discoloration of inner lips of vagina or red labia minora or hymenal tags not visible. Now seen in case, Medico legal officer, though penetration not needed to prove contact, no medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact. Hymen intact. Case 7a People vs. Castillo Facts: Julian Castillo was charged with murder and illegal possession of firearms in 2 separate informations for having shot Rogelio Abawag using a homemade .38 caliber revolver without serial number, which resulted to the instantaneous death of Abawag. Three live ammunitions without authority and permit to carry them were also found. After trial, trial court convicted him with homicide and illegal possession of firearm aggravated by homicide. Castillo now asserts that his conviction was unwarranted as no proof was adduced by the prosecution that he was not licensed to posses the subject firearm; they relying solely on his admission that he had to permit to posses and carry the same. Issue: WON the conviction for illegal possession of firearm is correct. Held: No. Two (2) requisites are necessary to establish illegal possession of firearms: first, the existence of the subject firearm, and second, the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it 325 SCRA 613

outside his residence. The onus probandiof establishing these elements as alleged in the Information lies with the prosecution. The first element the existence of the firearm was indubitably established by the prosecution. However, no proof was adduced by the prosecution to establish the second element of the crime. This negative fact constitutes an essential element of the crime as mere possession, by itself, is not an offense. The lack of a license or permit should have been proved either by the testimony or certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused was not a licensee of the subject firearm14 or that the type of firearm involved can be lawfully possessed only by certain military personnel. Hence, in the case at bar, although the appellant himself admitted thathe had no license for the gun recovered from his possession, his admission will not relieve the prosecution of its duty to establish beyond reasonable doubt the appellants lack of license or permit to possess the gun. Note: If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use shall be considered as a special aggravating circumstance. Thus, Based on the facts of the case, the crime for which the appellant may be charged is homicide, aggravated by illegal possession of firearm,the correct denomination for the crime, and not illegal possession of firearm, aggravated by homicide Case 7b Facts: The lone witness saw the appellant running out of the house of his cousin, after a shot was heard. His cousin was later found dead. The appellant was convicted of murder. Issue Whether or not the testimony of the lone witness was sufficient. Held: No, the witness only testified that the appellant fled the scene of the crime in a rush with a gun. Flight, in most cases, strongly indicates guilt. As a lone circumstantial evidence, however, it does not suffice as plurality of circumstantial evidence is required before guilt beyond reasonable doubt may be inferred from such indirect proof. To fully dispose of this issue, the motive of accused-appellant is a key element in the web of circumstantial evidence. case digests, case digests of supreme court decisions, case digests Philippines, mobile phone deals, laptop computers, gadgets, free legal opinion, online jobs, best law firms in Mindanao Case 8 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO R. PASCUAL, accusedappellant. DECISION DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us on appeal is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, finding appellant Pedro Pascual y Reboca guilty of the crime of murder, in Criminal Case No. Br. 23-636, for the killing of Dr. Maximino P. Picio, Jr. Spped The appellant, Pedro R. Pascual, and a certain John Doe were charged with the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in an amended Information dated July 13, 1995, which reads: Misspped That on or about the 14th day of March, 1995, in the municipality of San Manuel, province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, together with John Doe, whose real identity is still to be determined, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, suddenly and unexpectedly and without giving him chance to defend himself, assault, attack and shoot for several times with short firearms one Dr. Maximino P. Picio, Jr., who as a result thereof, suffered multiple gunshot wounds on the different parts of his body which directly caused his death. CONTRARY TO LAW.[2] Upon being arraigned on July 13, 1995, appellant Pedro Pascual, assisted by his counsel, entered the plea of "Not guilty". Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The evidence adduced by the prosecution shows that the victim, Dr. Maximino Picio, Jr., was the Municipal Health Officer of San Manuel, Isabela. On March 14, 1995 at around 7:00 oclock in the evening, Dr. Picio went to the house of Marissa Robles who served as a midwife in the Rural Health Unit of San Manuel from January 26, 1994 until her services were terminated on August 5, 1994 by Municipal Mayor Reynaldo P. Abesamis of San Manuel, Isabela. While at the house of Marissa, Dr. Picio discussed with her certain matters concerning the Rural Health Unit of San Manuel.[3] At around 9:00 oclock in the evening, Dr. Picio decided to go home. He was accompanied by Marissa outside the house where his motor vehicle was parked at the roadside. After boarding his vehicle, and while he was about to leave, two (2) unidentified persons who were armed with short firearms suddenly appeared and walked toward Dr. Picio and Marissa. Alarmed, Marissa called the attention of the unsuspecting Dr. Picio that the "enemies" were coming ("May dumarating na kalaban").[4] One of the unidentified men shoved Marissa and at the same time told her to get out of the way.[5] Immediately thereafter, the two unidentified men started firing their guns at Dr. Picio even as the latter pleaded to them in Ilocano not to shoot for the reason that they were friends ("Saan kayo agkaskasta, agkakadua tayo.") Apparently determined to kill their victim, the assailants pulled Dr. Picio out of his vehicle and continued to shoot him several times as he laid helpless on the ground. The two assailants left only after the victim was already dead.[6] Prosecution eyewitness Marissa Robles recognized the assailants due to the electric light in front of the house generated by the Isabela Electric Company (ISELCO) and the light emanating from the headlights of the vehicle of Dr. Picio. There was also a moon that evening when the shooting incident happened.[7] Upon the arrest of appellant Pedro Pascual on the following day, March 15, 1995, Marissa pointed to him as one of the two assailants[8] whom she described as small, with white complexion and sporting a brushed-up hair. She also described the other assailant as tall, dark and slender.[9]

The said prosecution eyewitness disclosed that she had seen the appellant about one (1) week prior to the shooting incident in the Rural Health Unit of San Manuel, Isabela when the appellant arrived in the morning and stayed there briefly before he left the place.[10] Dr. Bernardo Layugan, Municipal Health Officer of Roxas, Isabela conducted the post mortem examination on the body of the victim on March 16, 1995. His findings as to the cause of death of the victim are contained in the Post Mortem Certificate of Death,[11] to wit: 1. Gunshot wound inlet left upper lip; 2. Gunshot wound inlet chin; 3. Gunshot wound anterior sternal portion; 4. Gunshot wound inlet right armpit; and 5. Gunshot wound anterior abdominal portion. Missc Rosalinda S. Picio, wife of the late Dr. Maximino Picio, Jr., testified on the civil aspect of the case. She stated that they spent around P 300,000.00 for the wake and funeral service. She also declared that her late husband used to receive a monthly salary of P13,000.00 as municipal health officer in addition to the P 240,000.00 annual income he used to earn in his farming and grains business.[12] On the other hand, appellant Pedro Pascual denied that he killed Dr. Maximino Picio, Jr. Appellant Pascual testified that he was released on recognizance from the provincial jail of Isabela on March 3, 1995 after being detained there for almost three (3) years as a suspect in an ambush that took place sometime in 1990 and for his past activities as a former member of the New Peoples Army (NPA). On March 8, 1994, his services as carpenter were hired by his kumpadre, Fernando Agaloos, in the construction of the house of a certain Napoleon Velasco. He worked in the construction until he was arrested by the police on March 15, 1995 in connection with the killing of Dr. Maximino Picio, Jr.[13] Appellant Pascual claimed that he stayed in his house in Barangay Eden, San Manuel, Isabela during the entire evening of March 14, 1995. At around 7:00 oclock in the evening of the said date his neighbors, Guillermo Velasco and Santiago Casticon, arrived in his house. Shortly thereafter, another neighbor, Elmer Velasco, also arrived. Among other matters, they talked about his life as a detention prisoner in the provincial jail. After his visitors had left at past 10:00 oclock in the evening, Pascual went to sleep.[14] On the following morning of March 15, 1995, appellant Pascual reported for work in the construction site of the house of Napoleon Velasco. However, he failed to return in the afternoon of the same date inasmuch as he was arrested by the police when he returned to his house from work to take his lunch. Scmis Upon his arrest, appellant Pedro Pascual was immediately brought by Police Senior Inspector Dionisio Borromeo to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service in Santiago City, Isabela for paraffin examination to determine the presence of gunpowder residue (nitrates) on the hands of the appellant. Boiled wax was poured on his hands.[15] The result of the paraffin examination however, did not show the presence of any gunpowder residue on the hands of the appellant.[16] The appellant denied that he knew Dr. Maximino Picio, Jr. as the Rural Health Officer of San Manuel, Isabela. He also denied having gone to the Rural Health Unit of San Manuel, Isabela one (1) week before Dr. Picio was killed. Defense witnesses Elmer Velasco, Guillermo Velasco and Santiago Casticon corroborated the testimony of appellant Pedro Pascual. The said defense witnesses respectively testified, in substance, that they were in the house of appellant Pascual between 7:00 oclock to 10:00 oclock in the evening of March 14, 1995 to welcome

him who had been away from their barangay for almost three (3) years; and that they talked about the life of the appellant as a detention prisoner in the Isabela provincial jail. They claimed that the appellant did not leave his house where they all stayed that evening.[17] After analyzing the evidence, the trial court rendered its Decision the dispositive portion of which reads, to wit: AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds accused Pedro Pascual guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder provided for and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P 300,000.00, the amount spent for the coffin, wake and burial of the victim, P 50,000.00 for life, without however subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost. Considering that the other accused has not been apprehended, let this case be archived to be revived upon apprehension of said accused and/or upon motion of the public prosecutor. SO ORDERED.[18] In his appeal, appellant Pedro Pascual interposed the following assignments of error: I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF MARISSA ROBLES THAT SHE SAW THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME AND RECOGNIZED THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS ONE OF THE KILLERS OF DR. MAXIMINO PICIO, JR. II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT AND WITNESSES ELMER VELASCO, GUILLERMO VELASCO AND SANTIAGO CASTICON ON THE GROUND THAT THEIR TESTIMONIES ARE "TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE". Sc III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING ANY EVIDENTIARY VALUE TO THE RESULTS OF THE PARAFFIN TEST ON ACCUSED-APPELLANT. IV THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ONE OF THE KILLERS OF THE VICTIM.[19] Appellant Pedro Pascual expressed grave doubt over the presence of Marissa Robles at the scene of the crime. He stated that Marissa, who is a young and single lady from the barrio, should have had enough time talking with the late Dr. Maximino Picio, Jr. for two (2) hours and so it was not necessary for her to still accompany him outside her house at such an unholy hour in the evening. Appellant also stated that if Marissa were indeed present at the crime scene, then she could have been hit by

bullets or she could have even been killed by the assailants knowing that she was a potential witness against them. The appellant further stated that even on the assumption that Marissa was beside the victim at the time the shooting incident occurred, her uncorroborated identification of the appellant allegedly because the scene of the crime was welllighted is unreliable; and that the suddenness of the attack could not have afforded her the time, calmness and presence of mind to recognize the assailants. Moreover, appellant Pascual opines that it was unlikely for prosecution witness Marissa Robles to have been at the Rural Health Unit of San Manuel, Isabela and saw him one (1) week prior to the shooting incident on March 14, 1995 inasmuch as she had been separated from the service as early as August 5, 1994; and that Marissa failed to disclose the purpose of her alleged visit therein and to explain how and why she had particularly noticed and recognized him. Xsc In addition, the appellant pointed out that the paraffin test conducted on his hands at the PNP in Santiago City yielded negative results. According to him while gunpowder traces or nitrates can be removed by acetic acid or the ordinary vinegar, there was no showing that he knew of such fact, and that he used vinegar to remove gunpowder traces from his hands. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides: Article 248. Murder.- Any person who not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity. 2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise. 3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin. 4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity. 5. With evident premeditation. 6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. After a careful review of the record, we find that the decision of the trial court finding the appellant guilty of the crime of murder is amply supported by the evidence. That the victim, Dr. Maximino Picio, Jr., died of multiple gunshot wounds in the evening of March 14, 1995 in front of the house of Marissa Robles in Barangay Villanueva, San Manuel, Isabela is not disputed. Appellant Pedro Pascual claimed that the lower court erred in giving credence to the uncorroborated testimony of prosecution eyewitness Marissa Robles while rejecting his alibi which was corroborated by his neighbors, namely: Elmer Velasco, Guillermo Velasco and Santiago Casticon. It should be emphasized however, that credibility does not go

with numbers.[20] The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction even in a charge of murder where it is positive and credible.[21] The participation of appellant Pedro Pascual in the killing of Dr. Maximino Picio, Jr. was duly established by the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Marissa Robles. During the trial Marissa positively identified and pinpointed appellant Pascual, whom she earlier described to the police authorities as small, with white complexion and sporting a brushed-up hair, as one of the two assailants of Dr. Picio. Marissa testified that she had spotted the appellant and his companion who were both carrying short firearms while they were walking toward Dr. Picio, prompting her to warn him of the approaching enemies ("May dumarating na kalaban"). Appellant Pedro Pascual even ordered Marissa to get out of the way as the latter was directly beside Dr. Picio who was then about to leave. Dr. Picio pleaded to the assailants not to shoot him inasmuch as they were friends, but to no avail. She had actually witnessed the shooting of the victim as well as recognized the two assailants due to the electric lights in front of her house being generated by the ISELCO and the illumination from the headlights of the victims vehicle which were already switched on. In addition, there was a moon on that evening when the shooting incident happened. Xlaw The testimony of Marissa was found by the lower court to be more credible, straightforward and worthy of belief.[22] On the other hand, appellant did not present proof to show that she was biased. There is also no evidence from which it can be inferred that the said prosecution eyewitness was motivated by any ill-will in testifying against him. If at all, the arguments advanced by the appellant in his attempt to cast doubt on the credibility of the said prosecution eyewitness are based mainly on conjectures that cannot prevail over the positive identification by the said eyewitness that the appellant was one of the two perpetrators of the crime. It is not difficult to imagine why Marissa remained unscathed during the shooting incident. The facts clearly show that she was not the object of the criminal act. That Marissas services in the Rural Health Unit of San Manuel, Isabela had been severed as early as August 5, 1994 does not run counter to her claim that she saw the appellant one (1) week before Dr. Picio was killed on March 14, 1995. The records of this case disclose that Marissa continued to visit Dr. Picio at the Rural Health Center in San Manuel, Isabela despite her severance from the service; a fact which prompted Mayor Reynaldo P. Abesamis, M.D., Municipal Mayor of San Manuel, Isabela, to issue a written order dated February 23, 1995 addressed to Dr. Maximino Picio, Jr. to bar Marissa Robles from the said office, otherwise he "will be constrained to institute drastic action." [23] In any case, it is a settled rule that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the findings and judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.[24] Besides, appellant failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the place where the crime was committed at the time of commission thereof.[25] Pascual claims that he was in his house in Barangay Eden, San Manuel, Isabela when the killing of Dr. Picio in Barangay Villanueva, San Manuel, Isabela took place. It should be noted that the distance between the two barangays is only about three (3) kilometers. They are connected by an irrigation road that can easily be negotiated by a motorized vehicle or even on foot.[26] Consequently, the defense of alibi by the appellant must fail. Sclex Appellant Pascual likewise faults the trial court for not according evidentiary weight to the result of the paraffin test per the Report issued by the police crime laboratory

in Santiago City, Isabela that shows appellant negative of any gunpowder residue (nitrates) on both his hands. It is a well-settled rule that a negative paraffin test result is not a conclusive proof that one has not fired a gun, because it is possible for a person to fire a gun and yet bear no traces of nitrates or gunpowder, as when the hands are bathed in perspiration or washed afterwards.[27] Additionally, defense witness Leonora Camurao, forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Adduru, Tuguegarao, Cagayan specifically stated that gunpowder or nitrates can be removed with the use of acetic acid or vinegar.[28] The lower court correctly found that treachery attended the shooting to death of the victim. The requisites for appreciating treachery (alevosia) in the commission of the crime of murder are: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) appellant consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of the attack employed by him.[29] From the eyewitness account of Marissa Robles, appellant Pascual and his companion who were both armed with short firearms approached Dr. Picio when the latter was inside his vehicle and about to leave. Dr. Picio became aware of their presence only after he was warned by Marissa. Immediately thereafter, appellant and his companion shot Dr. Picio several times despite his plea to spare his life. Sclaw It appears clear that the assailants purposely sought the opportunity so that their unarmed victim was not in a position to defend himself when they simultaneously shot him to death several times. The fact that Marissa called the attention of Dr. Picio upon noticing the approaching assailants did not negate the finding of treachery for the reason that treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his person.[30] The essence of treachery is the suddenness and unexpectedness of the assault without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked.[31] The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, however, does not obtain in the case at bench. The elements of evident premeditation are: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[32] The evidence adduced by the prosecution does not prove any of the said elements. Korte The lower court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the appellant in view of the absence of any aggravating and mitigating circumstance. In view of the death of the victim, Dr. Maximino P. Picio, Jr., his forced heirs are entitled to P50,000.00 representing civil indemnity ex delicto. They are also entitled to P50,000.00 by way of moral damages inasmuch as the widow of the victim, Rosalinda S. Picio, testified on how she felt over the loss of her husband.[33] Additionally, the appellant is liable to pay to the heirs of the victim damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased. However, actual damages may not be awarded in view of the absence of competent evidence to support the same. Rtcspped It appears that Dr. Maximino Picio, Jr. was 64[34] years old at the time of his death on March 14, 1995. Her widow testified that he used to receive a monthly salary of P13,000.00 as Municipal Health Officer of San Manuel, Isabela. In accordance with the American Expectancy Table of Mortality which was adopted by the Court,[35] the loss of earning capacity shall be computed as follows: Sdaadsc Net Earning Capacity (X) = Life Expectancy x (Gross Annual Income Living Expenses e.g. 50% of annual gross income)

= 2 (80-64) x (156,000.00-78,000.00) 3 = 10.667 x 78,000.00 = P 832,026.00 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, convicting appellant Pedro R. Pascual of the crime of murder and imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that the civil liability of the appellant in favor of the forced heirs of the victim shall be as follows: P50,000.00 representing civil indemnity ex delicto; P50,000.00 by way of moral damages; and P832,026.00 as damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased victim, Dr. Maximino P. Picio, Jr. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur. Case 8 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANASTACIO MALABAGO y MAQUINTO, accused- appellant. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: In a prosecution for rape, the complainants credibility is the single most important consideration. Her straightforward, clear and positive testimony, coupled with the absence of any motive to fabricate or to falsely implicate the accused, may be enough to convict the appellant. In the absence of credible supporting evidence such as love notes, mementos, pictures, etc., appellants bare assertion that complainant was his sweetheart is not enough to overturn such testimony. In a Complaint-Information docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-20531 and dated December 28, 1990, Private Complainant AAA charged Accused-Appellant Anastacio Malabago y Maquinto with the crime of rape before the Regional Trial Court, Branch xxx of xxx City.[1] The pertinent text of the Complaint-Information reads:[2] That on or about the 21st day of December 1990, at about 3:00 A.M., in the City of xxx, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of violence and intimidation, with deliberate intent, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned against her will. During the arraignment on April 5, 1991, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty.[3] Afterwards, trial on the merits ensued. In a Decision dated April 13, 1992, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, thus:[4] WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Anastacio Malabago y Maquinto is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having criminally raped AAA. He is accordingly sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to suffer the accessory penalties prescribed by law and to pay unto his victim the amount of P30,000.00 by way of

civil indemnity, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in view of the principal penalty imposed upon the accused. The costs of this instance shall also be taxed against the accused. SO ORDERED. The Facts The allegations of both the prosecution and the defense were narrated by the trial court as follows:[5] The complainant in this case is a frail, unsophisticated, neither comely nor unattractive country girl. She grew up in the neighboring province of Bohol, and had come to xxx City to pursue her secondary education while helping her elder half-brother BBB and his wife CCC eke out a living as scavengers at the Dumping Site, xxx City. At the time she took the witness stand, she was 17 years old. The punishing economic straits through which she must have been is suggested by the fact that at her age when most girls should have already entered college, she was still a sophomore at the xxx High School in xxx City. The complainant asserted that she was raped by the accused. She testified that at about 3:00 oclock in the morning of December 21, 1990 she went out of her brother BBBs house at Dumping Site, xxx City to answer a call of nature. On her way to the toilet beside the bodega she stumbled on a tin plate and she picked it up. She was putting the plate on the table when she heard someone call her Day (Inday). As she turned toward the direction of the voice, the accused Anastacio Malabago, alias Julio, embraced her from behind. Unable to free herself from his hold, she asked him what he was doing to her. The accused replied that if she so much as shouted, he would break her head and his own, so that they would die together. She shouted, and the accused promptly strangled her and pointed a knife on her neck. What happened after that the complainant narrated when she took the witness stand on May 27, 1991, thus -'ATTY. xxx: Q What else did Anastacio Malabago do to you aside from strangling your neck and pointing a knife on your neck? A He made me lie down on the table and he sat on my legs and he did what he wanted to do. Q Please explain to the Honorable Court what you mean when you said that Anastacio Malabago did what he wanted to do to you? A Maybe he wanted to insert his into mine so he could accomplish what he wanted to do. COURT: Please tell your witness to speak plainly and clearly. Are you ashamed to these people inside this courtroom who are listening to your testimony? WITNESS:

No. COURT: Speak plainly and clearly. ATTY. xxx: Q Please explain clearly to the Honorable Court what do you mean when you said that Anastacio Malabago wanted to accomplish something? A I mean that he wanted to insert his penis into my vagina.

Q Kindly tell the Honorable Court if Anastacio Malabago succeeded in his desire to have carnal knowledge of you? A Yes, Maam.

Q By the way, what was the physical appearance or condition of Anastacio Malabago when you noticed his presence for the first time? A Q At that time he was wearing a sleeveless shirt but I did not notice the trousers. Why did you say that you did not notice the trousers of Anastacio Malabago?

A Because when I tried to pull up my skirt because I dont want him to damage me I noticed that and I felt with my bare hands his thighs without any cover. Q You said that Anastacio Malabago inserted his penis into your vagina or that he succeeded in raping you, after that what happened to you? A And I stood up then he said that will show you who is Anastacio Malabago.

Q Then, what did you say after you were told by Anastacio Malabago that now you know who is Anastacio Malabago? A So I told him that I will take my revenge on you and I will have you arrested and I will put you in jail. Q And what did Anastacio Malabago say if any?

A So he told me to just do what I wanted to do if I ever wanted him to put in (sic) jail, but he cannot do anything because he said that it is his fault. Q After Anastacio Malabago told you that, what did you do?

A I went upstairs and cried on (sic) what he had done on (sic) me and why he raped me. (T.S.N. of May 27, 1991, pp. 5-7). On the afternoon of the same day, BBB (who had just arrived from Bohol that afternoon with his step-mother, who is AAAs mother) and his wife CCC brought the complainant to the xxx Medical Center for physical examination. There, the complainant was examined by Dr. xxx, who found among other things, that she was in a non-virgin state physically as her genital orifice admitted two fingers easily, and that her vaginal smear was positive for spermatozoa. Dr. xxxs detailed findings are reflected in Exhibit A, to wit:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: This is to certify that as per record of this hospital, Mr/Mrs./Miss AAA, (age) 17 yrs. old, (status) SINGLE, (natl.) FILIPINO, of xxx has been treated/consulted in the Out Patient/Emergency Room Department on December 2 (sic), 1990 at 5:46 P.M. because of the following: Genitalia -- no hematoma, no laceration -- admits 2 fingers w/ ease -- scanty bleeding (6th day menstruation) Vaginal Smear for Detection of Spermatozoa -- positive (SGD.) DR. xxx Attending Physician on Duty This certification is issued upon request of the Patient/immediate relative whose signature is shown below. (SGD.) AAA Patient/Relative Dr. xxx stressed that when she examined AAA, the latter told her that she was raped at 3:00 o clock that morning of December 21, 1990. From the xxx Medical Center, BBB and CCC brought AAA to the xxx Police Station in xxx City, where they lodged a complaint for rape against the accused Anastacio Malabago. In that station, that same afternoon, the complainant had a confrontation with the accused. The accused denied that he violated the complainant. He claimed that AAA was his sweetheart; that the sexual congress he had with her that early morning of December 21, 1990 was their mutual agreement; that in fact it was the complaining witness herself who came to him inside the bodega where he was asleep in a makeshift bed, awakened him from his sleep, and even suggested that they perform the sexual act in his make-shift bed atop the table in the bodega because the table was wider and more confortable (sic) than his make-shift bed. The accuseds mother, Soila Malabago and a neighbor, Eglerina Caballero, sought to corroborate the accuseds claim that he was AAAs sweetheart. The Issues Appellant imputes to the trial court the following alleged errors:[6] I The lower court erred in convicting the Accused-Appellant of the crime of rape defined and penalized under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, despite the insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. II The lower court likewise erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimony of complainant, AAA, despite its contradictions and implausibilities.

First Issue: Use of Force and Intimidation Appellant assails his conviction by the trial court claiming that the complainant failed to allege the basic element of force in the purported commission of rape.[7] We do not agree. It is clear from the testimony of private complainant that after appellant had forcibly embraced her, he threatened to break her head if she shouted; thereafter, he strangled her and pointed a knife at her neck. She testified:[8] ATTY. xxx: Q You said that in the morning of December 21, 1990 at about 3:00 o clock in the morning you were in the house of your brother BBB whose house is located at the dumping area of xxx City, could you tell us what were you doing? A Q A I went down the house to deficate (sic). Where did you go then in order to relieve yourself? To the toilet located beside the bodega.

Q While on your way towards the toilet which is located at the side of the bodega, tell us if anything unusual happened? A On my way I stumbled upon a tin plate and so I picked it up and put it on the table. Q A Q In effect, were you able to place that plate on the table? Yes, Sir. While you were placing that plate on the table, could you tell us what happened?

A In the process while I was placing the plate on the table somebody called me day, and when I turned he already embraced me from my back and I cannot free myself, so I asked what he was doing to me and he said if I shout he will break my head and afterwards he will also break his head so that we will go together. Q You were using the pronoun he referring to the person who embraced you, could you please tell us whom are you referring to when you said the pronoun he? A Q A Q Anastacio Malabago. While Anastacio Malabago was embracing you, what did you do? He strangled me and threatened me. How about you what did you do while he strangled you and threatened you?

A I shouted once but then the grip on my neck hurts me and he was also pointing a knife at me. Q Where did he point that knife, on what part of your body?

On my neck. (Underscoring supplied.)

The information alleges that appellant committed rape by means of intimidation; the threats uttered and the weapon used constituted intimidation, taking the place of the element of force and offer of resistance required in rape cases.[9] Any resistance private complainant may have wanted to put up was foiled by the strong grip of appellant on her and the danger posed by the knife at her neck. Indeed, the law does not impose upon private complainant the burden of proving resistance. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits herself against her will to the rapists lust because of fear for her life and personal safety.[10] The contrasting physiques of the two parties further stress the futility of any physical resistance that private complainant might have wanted to put up. On this point the trial court stated:[11] Above all, the accuseds ability to subdue the complainant can scarcely be doubted. Brawn-wise the two are a study in contrast: Whereas the accused is muscular, husky, intimidating, taller and much stronger than the complainant, the latter is a frail wisp of a girl. Another stark contrast between the two is craftiness: Whereas the accused is sly and devious, perhaps because street-wise (His fencing answers to the private prosecutor during his cross-examination shows up his smartness), the complainant is simple and unaffected. Second Issue: Credibility of Private Complainant as a Witness Appellant likewise raises the allegedly contradictory testimony of private complainant which he claims should have forewarned the trial court (not) to accept complainants story with precipitate credulity as gospel truth:[12] FIRSTLY, it is highly disquieting and very disturbing why complainant, after stumbling over the alleged tin plates on her way, would dare to pick them up and to place them on the table inside the bodega x x x if her intention really in going down the house was purely to answer an urgent call of nature, and not purposely to have a tryst with accused-appellant x x x. SECONDLY, equally disquieting is complainants testimony that she shouted when accused-appellant was kissing and embracing her x x x (i)f we believe this as true, then how come that Not one of accused-appellants several co-workers who were sleeping inside the bodega x x x did not even hear such shout? THIRDLY, if indeed complainant did not consent to what had happened to her, x x x why did she NOT immediately relate her sad story to her sister-in-law, CCC, the very first moment she returned to the house x x x FOURTHLY, how could accused-appellant forcibly placed complainant on top of a 4 foot high table while he was strangling her with his left hand and holding a knife at his right, if complainant did not cooperate? FIFTHLY, if complainant did not consent to what had happened to her, x x x (s)he could have used the bed pan, x x x instead of going to the makeshift toilet during the unholy hour of 3:00 o clock in the morning. She could have just ran the very moment appellant called her dai x x x. x x x. She could have easily awaken anyone inside the house to accompany her in going to the makeshift toilet to answer a call of nature. x x x.

The allegedly contradictory and improbable testimony of private complainant does not raise any reasonable doubt against the decision of the trial court. It was not strange for private complainant to have put the tin plate back on the table after she had stumbled upon it inside the bodega. It was an innocuous act that cannot be given an ulterior meaning; all that she planned to do that was to answer the call of nature. It was only natural for her to show concern by putting things in her surroundings in order, particularly when the bodega was owned by her halfbrother. Private complainant shouted only once because appellant gripped her neck after that. Besides, it is doubtful whether more shouts would have elicited much attention from the appellants co-workers.[13] In the first place, appellant failed to prove that he had slept with his co-workers that fateful night. He himself testified that he was not sure if they (appellants co-workers) were there because I usually sleep near where they used to sleep at the mezzanine.[14] Private complainants failure to inform her sister-in-law about the incident upon her return to their house does not at all affect her credibility. The incident happened at 3 o clock in the morning, when all the other persons inside the house, including her friend Susan, were sleeping.[15] It was barely three hours after the incident, at about 6:00 a.m., when private complainant narrated the incident to Susan who was already awake at that time.[16] Later, at 8:00 a.m., private complainant reported the same thing to her mother who had just arrived from Bohol. CCC, sister-in-law of private complainant, had awakened at 6 oclock that morning, after which she hurriedly rode in a delivery truck.[17] Private complainant was preparing breakfast when CCC left the house. Private complainant cannot be reproached for failing to inform her sister-in-law about the molestation. They just did not have any opportunity to talk about the incident. Furthermore, delay in reporting an incident of rape is not necessarily an indication of a fabricated charge nor does it invariably cast doubt on the credibility of a complainant. It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for some time the assault on their virtue because of the rapists threat on their lives.[18] Besides, rape is a traumatic event, and the shock concomitant with it may linger for a while. The trial courts description of appellants build as against that of the private complainant leaves no doubt that appellant was very much capable of placing the private complainant on top of the table even if the former was gripping her neck with one hand while holding a knife with the other. Appellant cannot fault private complainant for not using the bed pan inside the house in answering the call of nature. No proof whatsoever was presented by appellant that it was the habit of private complainant to use the bed pan for that particular purpose. Private complainant was totally unaware of what would happen to her the night she went out of the house; neither had she any hint of appellants motive in calling her Day. Thus, she could not be expected to take extraordinary precautions to avoid any possible violation of her virtue such as waking up somebody to accompany her to the toilet, or running away upon being called by her pet name Day. It goes without saying that in a prosecution for rape, the complainants credibility becomes the single most important issue. For when a woman says she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed; thus, if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis

thereof.[19] In this case, the test of credibility for a rape victim is more than sufficiently met. Moreover, the presence of spermatozoa in private complainants violated organ, as stated in the finding[20] of the doctor who had examined her, affirms the charge of rape much more than words or anger alone could.[21] What further strengthens private complainants credibility is that she had no ill motive to falsely accuse appellant of rape. When there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to testify falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.[22] Defense of Appellant Untenable The appellants sweetheart defense does not inspire belief. The bare allegation of appellant that private complainant was his girl friend was superficial and failed to convince even the trial court. The trial court reasoned:[23] x x x. Except for the accuseds bare assertion, that he was the complainants sweetheart -- which is of course self-serving -- he has not come up with any convincing or credible evidence of such relationship. He has not presented an endearing note or love letter from her, or any token of her affection, such as a ring, a birthday card, a Valentine card, or a Christmas card. Of course, the Court noted that the complainant particularly tensed up when the accused testified that she was his sweetheart, and that she gave him a severe, indignant look (with contempt visibly written on her face) when he reached the point in his testimony that it was the complainant who came to him that dawn of December 21, 1990 in the bodega and virtually seduced him. In any event, in her rebuttal testimony, the complainant categorically denied that the accused ever courted her or that she was his sweetheart, saying in this regard, that is only a product of his imagination. Appellant had the burden of proving that indeed he and private complainant were sweethearts. We agree with the lower court that he miserably failed to do so. Not only was his claim categorically denied by private complainant, but there was also no substantial evidence presented by appellant to support it, such as love notes, mementos or pictures.[24] WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. However, the indemnity to private complainant is increased to P50,000.00 in line with recent jurisprudence.[25] Costs against appellant. SO ORDERED. Narvasa (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur. Case 9 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL PRUNA y RAMIREZ or ERMAN PRUNA y RAMIREZ, accused-appellant. DECISION DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: A rosebud that had been snuffed out of its fragrance long before it could even blossom into a flower. Such is the case of Lizette Arabelle Gonzales (hereafter LIZETTE), who had been defiled at a very tender age. She was at the time voiding

her body waste at their neighbors backyard, but that did not deter herein appellant from imposing his lechery on her. Indeed, lust is no respecter of time and place.[1] On 27 January 1995, an information[2] for rape was filed against accused-appellant Manuel Pruna y Ramirez or Erman Pruna y Ramirez (hereafter PRUNA), the accusatory portion of which reads: That on or about January 3, 1995 at Sitio Tabing-ilog, Brgy. Panilao, Pilar, Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused thru force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeed to have sexual intercourse with the offended party, Lizette Arabelle Gonzales, a 3-year-old minor girl, against the will and consent of the latter, to her damage and prejudice. Upon motion of PRUNAs counsel, the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), the Information was amended changing the name of the accused from Manuel Pruna y Ramirez to Erman Pruna y Ramirez, which was the name reflected in his birth certificate.[3] However, when he testified in court, he stated that his name was Manuel Pruna; and in the minutes of the court proceedings, he signed the name Manuel Pruna. On 27 November 1995, upon the Motion to Put the Accused Under Psychiatric or Mental Examination[4] filed by PRUNAs counsel on the ground that he could not secure from PRUNA a coherent answer to even simple questions, the trial court ordered that the accused be brought to the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong City for psychiatric or mental examination.[5] Accordingly, the trial was suspended, and PRUNA was sent to the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), Mandaluyong City. On 28 June 1996, the trial court received a telegram[6] from the NCMH stating that PRUNA was in fair condition. The NCMH later submitted to the trial court a report[7] on the psychiatric evaluation of PRUNA with a recommendation to put him back to jail for the resumption of court proceedings. The report also stated that PRUNA narrated that while he and his friends were under the bridge sniffing rugby and drinking alcohol, they saw a 3-year-old girl defecating in the river bank; that they called her; and, upon the order of his friends he placed her on his lap and attempted to caress her sensitive parts. Said report was not, however, offered in evidence by the prosecution or the defense. The prosecution presented five witnesses, whose testimonies can be summed up as follows: Jacqueline Gonzales, the mother of LIZETTE, testified that on 3 January 1995, at 9:30 a.m., she was fetching water from the artesian well located ten meters away from her house, while LIZETTE was defecating at the back of the house of their neighbor Gloria Tolentino. Jacqueline then carried her pail of water and went back to her house. Since LIZETTE was not home yet, Jacqueline headed toward the place where the former was moving her bowel. She looked for LIZETTE but did not find her. It was when Jacqueline was already returning to her house that she saw LIZETTE from behind -- red-faced, crying, and appeared to be very frightened. When asked where she came from, LIZETTE answered that she was brought by a certain Boy to the grassy area at the back of Glorias house where she was sexually molested (or kinantot in the Tagalog dialect). LIZETTE then pulled her mother and led her to the house of PRUNA, which was about eight meters away from their house. PRUNA, the only one known in their community as Boy, was not there. Jacqueline

forthwith requested her mother-in-law to report the matter to the police, while Jacqueline and LIZETTE went to the Bataan Provincial Hospital.[8] Jacqueline further declared that at the time of the alleged rape, LIZETTE was 3 years old, but at the time Jacqueline testified on 17 October 1995, LIZETTE was 4 years old. LIZETTEs last birthday was on 19 April 1995.[9] LIZETTE testified that she knew PRUNA whom he called Boy. She pointed to him inside the courtroom. According to her, PRUNA laid her down in a grassy area and inserted his penis into her vagina. When the presiding judge asked her whether she knew that it is a sin to tell a lie, she answered in the affirmative.[10] Dr. Emelita Quiroz, an obstetrician and gynecologist at the Bataan Provincial Hospital, testified that on 3 January 1995, she conducted a complete physical examination on LIZETTE and took wet smear specimen from her vaginal wall through scraping. The specimen was sent to the laboratory for analysis by a medical technologist. Further, she requested a urinalysis for LIZETTE.[11] The Medico-Legal Report[12] prepared by Dr. Quiroz reveals the following findings: Essentially normal PE-Findings Infantile areola & nipples Flat breasts (-) hematoma (-) pubic hair Labia minora and majora well coaptated Hymenal ring intact (+) hyperemia (-) laceration (Vaginal Opening) LABORATORY RESULT: WET SMEAR: KOH - Negative for T-Vaginalis

NSS- Negative for fungi SPERM ANALYSIS -POSITIVE for sperm cells Gram staining-few, epithelial cells seen, no other microorganism URINALYSIS: WBC-0-2 Although not stated in the Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Quiroz, the urinalysis report[13] includes a positive finding for sperm cells. Dr. Quiroz explained that the presence of sperm cells in the vaginal canal signified that sexual intercourse and ejaculation had occurred on the person of the patient. There was no laceration; but there was hyperemia, which means reddening of the tissue around the vaginal opening. Among the causes of hyperemia is the insertion of a hard object like penis and finger.[14] RBC-3-7-/hpf epithelial cells few.

Teresita Magtagnob, the medical technologist who conducted the laboratory examinations and prepared the corresponding reports,[15] testified that sperm cells were found in the wet smear specimen and urine taken from LIZETTE.[16] SPO2 Romeo D. Bunsoy, a member of the Philippine National Police assigned at the Pilar Municipal Station, testified that on 3 January 1995 the parent of the minor rape victim filed a complaint against PRUNA. He referred the matter to the desk officer to have it blottered. Upon his advise, the minor was brought to the hospital for examination. When they returned from the hospital, he took their statements. Later, he conducted an ocular inspection and investigation at the alleged place of the incident and caused the place to be photographed, which showed that the grasses were flattened. He inquired from the people in the neighborhood, and one of them answered that he saw the minor being brought by PRUNA to the place where the minor was found. When PRUNA was brought to their station by four barangay tanods of Panilao, Pilar, Bataan, SPO2 Bunsoy tried to converse with him, but the former did not give any reply.[17] On the part of the defense, Carlito Bondoc and PRUNA took the witness stand. Carlito testified that on 3 January 1995, he fetched water at the public artesian well together with Jacqueline. After having drawn water from the well, Jacqueline called her daughter, who was then defecating on the road near the river; and they both went home. After a while, the parents of LIZETTE shouted that their daughter was raped, and then they proceeded to the house of PRUNA and accused him of having raped the child. Carlito asserted that PRUNA could not have raped LIZETTE because he (PRUNA) was in his house from the time that LIZETTE was moving her bowel up to the time that her mother went to the house of PRUNA. Carlito knew that PRUNA was at home because the former was also in the latters house to have coffee. Carlito and the Sulit family thereafter brought PRUNA to the barangay hall. Since the barangay captain was not around, they brought PRUNA to the municipal building to prove that he was innocent.[18] PRUNA denied having raped LIZETTE. He claimed that in the morning of 3 January 1995, he was in his house preparing coffee for Carlito. After Carlito left, several men arrived and boxed him for reasons not known to him. Carlito and the latters friend then brought him to the barangay hall. There, LIZETTEs father boxed him. He was thereafter brought to the Pilar Municipal Jail. There, the mother of the child threw at him the lid cover of a kettle. He was also asked by the police to take off his clothes and lie flat; then he was mauled. Thereafter, he was told to put his feet between the grills, and he was made to masturbate. Worse, his testes were burned with cigarette butts. Every night, he was asked to kneel on a chair and was hit with a 2x 2 piece of wood.[19] After trial, PRUNA was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape in its qualified form and sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death and to indemnify the victim in the sum of P50,000, plus costs.[20] Hence, this automatic review. In his Appellants Brief,[21] PRUNA attributed to the trial court the following errors: I IN RELYING ON THE TESTIMONY OF JACQUELINE S. GONZALES, THE MOTHER OF THE CHILD, THAT THE LATTER WAS THREE (3) YEARS OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED RAPE OCCURRED WHEN THE BEST EVIDENCE THEREFOR IS THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF THE CHILD.

II IN RELYING ON THE HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF JACQUELINE S. GONZALES AS TO THE ALLEGED RAPE OF HER CHILD. III IN ADMITTING AND RELYING ON THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT[ ] CHILD WHO WAS ONLY THREE (3) YEARS OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED RAPE OCCURRED EVEN AS SHE WAS ONLY FIVE (5) YEARS OLD WHEN SHE TESTIFIED. IV IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON DUBIOUS EVIDENCE. The Office of the Solicitor General (hereafter OSG) seeks the affirmation of the trial courts decision with the modification that an additional award of P50,000 as moral damages be granted in favor of the offended party. As culled from the arguments of the parties, the issues to be resolved in this case are as follows: (1) Whether LIZETTE was a competent and credible witness considering that she was allegedly only 3 years old when the alleged rape occurred and 5 years old when she testified; (2) Whether Jacquelines testimony as to the declarations of LIZETTE is hearsay; (3) Whether the failure of the prosecution to present Gloria Tolentino as a witness is fatal; (4) Whether appellants guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt;

(5) Whether the qualifying circumstance of minority has been duly proved as to justify the imposition of the death penalty. We shall resolve these issues in seriatim. I. LIZETTEs Competency and Credibility as a Witness Appellant disputes the competency of LIZETTE to testify by reason of her tender age. When LIZETTE was called to testify, his counsel interposed a vigorous objection to the admission of her testimony because of her tender age. The trial court noted the objection and allowed her to testify; thus: DIRECT EXAMINATION BY PROS. LUMABAS: Do you know Manuel Pruna? A Yes, sir.

Q How do you call Manuel Pruna?

Boy, sir.

Q Where is he? A There, sir. (Witness pointing to a person wearing blue T-shirt, who when asked, gave his name as Manuel Pruna) PROS. LUMABAS: What did Manuel Pruna or Boy do to you? A Inihiga niya ako and inserted his penis to my vagina, sir.

Q And in what place did he do this to you? A In the grassy area, sir.

Q After he inserted his penis to your vagina, what happened next? ATTY. BALUYOT: The witness for quite sometime could not answer the question. PROS. LUMABAS: I think that will be all for the witness.[22] After which, the defense counsel manifested that he would not cross-examine her and that he intended to file a motion for her disqualification as a witness.[23] The court then proceeded to ask her a few questions, thus: COURT : Do you know what will happen to a child if she is not telling the truth? A Sa lupa.

Q Do you know that it is a sin to tell a lie? A Yes, sir.

Q The witness is excused considering the manifestation of Atty. Baluyot that he will be filing a written motion for the striking out of the testimony of the witness considering her tender age.[24] No such motion is extant on the records. At the next hearing, the defense counsel cross-examined LIZETTE, as follows: ATTY. BALUYOT: On January 3, 1995, in the morning where were you? A I was in the grassy area, sir.

Q In that grassy area there were other children with you playing? A None, sir.

Q You were then removing[sic] your bowel, is it not? A Yes, sir.

Q Then while removing your bowel you saw your mother pass[ ] by, is it not? A Yes, sir.

Q She was then carrying a pail to fetch some water, is it not? A Yes, sir.

Q The water from where she will fetch is [sic] a few meter[s] away from you, is it not? A ATTY. BALUYOT: Considering that the grassy place where you were then discharging your bowel is beside a street? A Yes, sir. Near, sir.

Q And you saw your mother bringing a pail of water towards your house after her pumping from the well, is it not? A Yes, sir.

Q When she passed by she likewise saw you, is it not? A Yes, sir.

Q Then how far were you from your house when you were discharging your bowel? Please demonstrate the distance? A Up to that door, sir.

Q From that position you were at the grass you could see your house, is it not? A Yes, sir.

Q Could you tell the Honorable Court how long did it take you to discharge your bowel? A For a short period of time, sir.

(Sandali lang po.)[25]

As a general rule, when a witness takes the witness stand, the law, on ground of public policy, presumes that he is competent. The court cannot reject the witness in the absence of proof of his incompetency. The burden is, therefore, upon the party objecting to the competency of a witness to establish the ground of incompetency.[26] Section 21 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence enumerates the persons who are disqualified to be witnesses. Among those disqualified are [c]hildren whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and relating them truthfully. No precise minimum age can be fixed at which children shall be excluded from testifying. The intelligence, not the age, of a young child is the test of the competency as a witness.[27] It is settled that a child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive and, in perceiving, can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully the facts for which he is examined.[28] In determining the competency of a child witness, the court must consider his capacity (a) at the time the fact to be testified to occurred such that he could receive correct impressions thereof; (b) to comprehend the obligation of an oath; and (c) to relate those facts truly to the court at the time he is offered as a witness.[29] The examination should show that the child has some understanding of the punishment which may result from false swearing. The requisite appreciation of consequences is disclosed where the child states that he knows that it is wrong to tell a lie, and that he would be punished if he does so, or that he uses language which is equivalent to saying that he would be sent to hell for false swearing.[30] A child can be disqualified only if it can be shown that his mental maturity renders him incapable of perceiving facts respecting which he is being examined and of relating them truthfully.[31] The question of competency of a child-witness rests primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court. This is so because the trial judge sees the proposed witness and observes his manner of testifying, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, as well as his understanding of the obligation of an oath.[32] Since many of the witness manners cannot be photographed into the record, the finding of the trial judge will not be disturbed or reversed unless from what is preserved it is clear that such finding was erroneous.[33] In this case, appellant questions the competency of LIZETTE as a witness solely on the ground of her age. He failed to discharge the burden of showing her mental immaturity. From the above-quoted testimony, it can be gleaned that LIZETTE had the capacity of observation, recollection, and communication[34] and that she could discern the consequence of telling a lie. We, therefore, sustain the trial court in admitting her testimony and according it great weight. We are not persuaded by appellants assertion that LIZETTE should not be allowed to testify two years after the alleged rape when the interplay of frail memory combines with the imagination of earlier years. It must be noted that it is a most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to have a lasting impression of the manner in which the crime was committed and the identity of the person responsible therefor.[35] In a string of cases, we have said that the testimony of a rape victim who is of young or tender age is credible and deserves full credit,[36] especially where no motive is

attributed to the victim that would make her testify falsely against the accused.[37] Indeed, a girl of such age as LIZETTE would not concoct a story of defloration; allow the examination of her private parts; and undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, and the trauma of a public trial unless she was in fact raped.[38] II. The Alleged Hearsay Testimony of Jacqueline Gonzales Contrary to appellants contention, Jacquelines testimony that LIZETTE told her that appellant laid her in the grassy area and inserted his penis into her vagina is not covered by the hearsay evidence rule, which finds application when the declarant does not testify. This rule, as enunciated under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, provides that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The term hearsay as used in the law on evidence, signifies evidence which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited and which consequently does not depend wholly for its credibility and weight upon the confidence which the court may have in him; its value, if any, is measured by the credit to be given to some third person not sworn as a witness to that fact, and consequently not subject to cross-examination.[39] If one therefore testifies to facts which he learned from a third person not sworn as a witness to those facts, his testimony is inadmissible as hearsay evidence.[40] The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the party against whom the hearsay testimony is presented is deprived of the right or opportunity to crossexamine the person to whom the statements are attributed.[41] Moreover, the court is without opportunity to test the credibility of hearsay statements by observing the demeanor of the person who made them.[42] In the instant case, the declarant (LIZETTE) herself was sworn as a witness to the fact testified to by Jacqueline. The appellant even cross-examined her (LIZETTE). Moreover, the trial court had the opportunity to observe her manner of testifying. Hence, Jacquelines testimony on the incident related to her by her daughter cannot be disregarded as hearsay evidence. Even assuming that the aforementioned testimony of Jacqueline is hearsay, its nonadmission would not save the day for the appellant. Such testimony is not indispensable, as it merely serves to corroborate LIZETTEs testimony that PRUNA laid her down in the grass and inserted his private organ into hers. As discussed earlier, LIZETTEs testimony, which was found to be credible by the trial court, is sufficient basis for conviction. At any rate, Jacquelines testimony is proof of the victims conduct immediately after the rape. It shows that LIZETTE immediately revealed to her mother the rape incident and the identity of her defiler. As will be discussed later, such conduct is one of the earmarks of the truth of the charge of rape. III Non-Presentation of Gloria Tolentino as a Witness Appellant harps on the prosecutions failure to put on the witness stand Gloria Tolentino, who was listed as a witness and executed an affidavit on 4 January 1995 that she saw the appellant carrying and bringing LIZETTE to a grassy area at the back of her house. It is undisputed that at the time the case was called for trial, Gloria had already moved out of her residence in Panilao, Pilar, Bataan, and could not be found

anymore. In any event, as opined by the OSG, her intended testimony could be dispensed with, as it would only be corroborative of LIZETTEs testimony that Pruna brought her to a grassy area. IV. Sufficiency of the Prosecutions Evidence Against Appellant When LIZETTE was put in the witness stand, she unhesitatingly identified PRUNA, their neighbor, as the one who defiled her. A rape victim can easily identify her assailant especially if he is known to her because during the rape, she is physically close to her assailant that enables her to have a good look at the latters physical features.[43] LIZETTE testified that on 3 January 1995 PRUNA, whom she called Boy, laid her in a grassy area and inserted his penis into her genitalia. When a girl or a woman says that she has been raped she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was truly committed.[44] She is not expected to remember all the ugly details of the outrage committed against her.[45] And when her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof, for in most cases it is the only evidence that can be offered to establish his guilt.[46] Likewise, LIZETTEs mother testified that right after the incident LIZETTE disclosed what happened to her and readily identified PRUNA as the culprit. She even led her mother to the house of PRUNA.[47] Thereafter, the two went to the police authorities to report the incident, and then to the hospital for LIZETTEs medical examination. By and large, the medical evidence lends credence to LIZETTEs testimony that PRUNA inserted his penis into her vagina. The Medico-Legal Report shows that there was hyperemia or reddening of the vaginal opening of LIZETTE. As opined by Dr. Quiroz, who was presented as an expert witness, hyperemia can be caused by the insertion of a hard object like penis and finger.[48] The presence of sperm cells in the vaginal canal and urine of LIZETTE is also a mute testimony of the sexual contact that further strengthens LIZETTEs claim of rape. This Court is not oblivious of the finding that no laceration was found in LIZETTEs organ despite the fact that she was examined immediately after she was raped. We have already ruled, however, that the absence of fresh lacerations does not preclude the finding of rape,[49] especially when the victim is of tender age.[50] Well- settled is the rule that rape is consummated by the slightest penile penetration of the labia or pudendum of the female.[51] The presence of hyperemia in LIZETTEs vaginal opening and the existence of sperm cells in her vaginal canal and urine are clear indications that PRUNAs organ indeed touched the labia or pudendum of LIZETTE. In a nutshell, the following overwhelmingly establish the truth of the charge of rape: (a) the spontaneity of the identification by LIZETTE of PRUNA as the rapist; (b) her immediate revelation to her mother of the dastard act committed against her; (c) her act of leading her mother to appellants house right after the incident; (d) the prompt filing of the complaint before the authorities; (e) LIZETTEs submission to medical examination; (f) the hyperemia in her private part; and (g) the presence of sperm cells in her vaginal canal and urine. The trial court correctly disregarded the defense of alibi raised by the accused. We have consistently held that for alibi to prosper, it must be proved that during the commission of the crime, the accused was in another place and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. Just like denial, alibi is an inherently weak defense; and unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, the same

cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the victim.[52] We have also held that when alibi is established only by the accused, his relatives, or close friends, the same should be treated with strictest scrutiny.[53] Carlito, who was admittedly a close friend of appellants parents, corroborated PRUNAs testimony that he (PRUNA) was in his house during the time that LIZETTE was raped. It is, however, an established fact that the place where the rape occurred was just a few meters away from the house of PRUNA. Thus, there was no physical impossibility for PRUNA to be in the grassy area to consummate the crime of rape. The defense, through Carlito, attempted to impute motive to Jacqueline in filing against PRUNA the charge of rape. According to him, LIZETTEs grandparents, the Sulits, wanted to buy the place of the PRUNA family, but the latter refused.[54] Aside from the fact that such testimony was not corroborated, said motive, if at all, is too flimsy to be even considered. No mother in her right mind would use her offspring as an engine of malice. She would not subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace, and even the stigma attendant to a prosecution for rape unless she is motivated by the desire to bring to justice the person responsible for her childs defilement.[55] V. Sufficiency of Evidence of LIZETTEs Minority and Propriety of the Imposition of the Death Penalty The commission of the crime of rape by PRUNA having been duly established by the prosecution, we now come to the question of the penalty to be meted upon him. Article 335, seventh paragraph, no. 4, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed against a child below seven (7) years old. We have held that in such a case the minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. The failure to sufficiently establish the victims age is fatal and consequently bars conviction for rape in its qualified form.[56] A persons age is best proved by the birth certificate. But is the presentation of the victims birth certificate a sine qua non requirement to prove her age for the appreciation of minority either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance? Recent jurisprudence has conflicting pronouncements. In the following cases, no birth certificate was presented and this Court ruled that the age of the victim was not duly proved by the prosecution: 1. In People v. Vargas,[57] the testimonies of the victim and her aunt that the former was 10 years old at the time of the rape were not considered proof of her age for being hearsay. This Court also observed that the victim could easily be mistaken for a child below 12 years of age, and hence it was not correct to judge the victims age by her appearance. We held: The difference of two or three years in age may not always be readily apparent by mere physical manifestations or appearance. 2. In People v. Javier,[58] the victim was alleged to be 16 years old, and the accused did not contest her age. Ratiocinating that in this age of modernism, there is hardly any difference between a 16-year-old girl and an 18-year-old one insofar as physical features and attributes are concerned, this Court held that an independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim is vital and essential so as to remove an iota of doubt that the victim is indeed under 18 years of age as to fall under the qualifying circumstances enumerated in R.A. No. 7659.

3. In People v. Brigildo,[59] aside from the failure of the prosecution to present the offended partys birth certificate or other equally acceptable official document concerning her age, the testimonies on record were not clear as to her exact age. The victim declared that she was 11 years old when she testified in court a year after the incident, while her mother claimed that she was around 15 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. The informations even alleged a different age. Hence, this Court refused to appreciate the qualifying circumstance of minority because of the uncertainty regarding her age. 4. In People v. Tipay,[60] the offended party was alleged in the information to be under 16 years of age. No independent evidence was presented to prove it. This Court recognized that the minority of a victim who may be below the age of 10 is quite manifest and may be taken judicial notice of by the court. But when the victim is between the crucial years of 15 and 17 where minority may seem to be dubitable due to one's physical appearance, the prosecution should prove the fact of minority with certainty. The lack of objection on the part of the accused concerning the victims age does not excuse the prosecution from discharging its burden. 5. In People v. Cula,[61] the victim was alleged in the complaint to be 16 years old when the rape was committed, but no evidence at all was presented to prove her age. We held that the failure of the accused to deny such allegation cannot make up for the failure of the prosecution to prove with certainty the victims minority. Because of the lacuna in the prosecutions evidence, coupled with the trial courts failure to make a categorical finding of minority of the victim, we declined to consider the qualifying circumstance of minority. 6. In People v. Veloso,[62] the victim was alleged to be 9 years of age when she was raped. Citing People v. Vargas,[63] this Court refused to consider the testimonies of the victim and her father as sufficient proof of her age. 7. In People v. Pecayo,[64] the victim simply stated during the beginning of her direct examination that she was 14 years old and that she was born on 13 January 1983. We held that the victims casual testimony as to her age is not enough, and that the lack of denial on the part of the accused does not excuse the prosecution from proving her age through competent evidence such as a duly certified certificate of live birth, baptismal certificate, or some other authentic document showing her age. 8. In People v. Tundag,[65] the victim testified that she was 13 years of age when she was raped, but she did not know exactly when she was born. Unable to secure a copy of her birth certificate, the prosecution moved that judicial notice be taken of the fact that she was below 18 years old at the time of the rape. Despite the admission by the defense of such fact, this Court held that the age of the victim is not a matter of judicial notice, whether mandatory or discretionary. Under Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence, a hearing is required before such fact can be taken judicial notice of by courts. 9. In People v. Geraban,[66] the victims testimony was categorical in declaring that she was 15, but her mothers testimony regarding her age was not clear. We thus declared that the prosecution failed to discharge the burden of proving minority. 10. In People v. Liban[67] and People v. Llandelar,[68] the only evidence adduced to prove the minority of the victims was the victims bare testimony that they were 10 and 16 years old, respectively. This Court held that while the declaration of a victim as to her age, being an exception to the hearsay proscription, would be

admissible under the rule on pedigree, the question on the relative weight that may be accorded to it is another matter. The prosecution should present the victims birth certificate or, in lieu thereof, any other documentary evidence, like a baptismal certificate, school records, and documents of similar nature, or credible testimonial evidence that can help establish the age of the victim. Neither the obvious minority of the victim nor the absence any contrary assertion from the defense can exonerate the prosecution from its burden. Judicial notice of the issue of age without the requisite hearing under Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence would not be sufficient compliance with the law. 11. In People v. Alvarado,[69] the victim testified that she was 14 years old at the time of the rape, and this was confirmed by the accused, who was victims father. The victims mother, however, testified as to her date of birth which showed that she was 13 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime. For this doubt as to the victims age, the accused was held guilty of simple rape only and meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty. On the other hand, in the following cases, we ruled that the age of the rape victim was sufficiently established despite the failure of the prosecution to present the birth certificate of the offended party to prove her age: 1. In People v. Rafales,[70] the testimony of the victim and her mother that the former was only 10 years old when she was raped, which was not denied by the accused, was deemed sufficient to prove her age for the purpose of determining whether the accused could be held guilty of statutory rape, which is carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years of age. 2. In People v. De la Cruz,[71] the testimony of the mother alone that her two daughters were both 14 years old at the time of the rape incidents was deemed sufficient because there was no reason to doubt the testimony of the mother, who had personal knowledge of the ages of her children. Moreover, said testimony was never challenged by the accused and stood unrebutted by any other evidence. 3. In People v. Bali-balita,[72] the victims testimony as to her age, which was corroborated by her half-sister, was deemed sufficient. We noted that the victim testified in court four months after the rape, and hence it was not difficult for the trial court to take judicial notice that she was under 18 years of age. 4. In People v. Velasco,[73] the minority of the victim was deemed established by (a) the complainant herself, who was held to be competent to testify on her age, as it constituted family tradition; (b) the open admission of the accused that the victim was a 12-year-old minor; and (c) the categorical finding of the trial court that she was a minor of a little over twelve years. 5. In People v. Remudo,[74] the trial court appreciated the qualifying circumstance of minority on the strength of (a) the offended partys testimony as to the date of her birth, which showed that she was 13 years old at the time of the rape, and (b) the admission of said date of birth by the accused who was the victims brother. 6. In People v. LLanita[75] the only evidence presented by the prosecution to establish that the victim was below 7 years old at the time of the alleged rape was the victims own testimony. Although hearsay because she could not have personal knowledge of the date of her birth but could only acquire knowledge thereof from her parents or relatives, said testimony was held admissible for being an assertion of family tradition regarding pedigree. Her testimony and the accuseds admission

that she was 5 years old during the commission of the crime were held sufficient to establish her age. 7. In People v. Agustin,[76] the victims testimony that she was 14 years old at the time of the rape incidents, coupled with the express admission of her age by the accused who was her father, sufficiently proved her minority. 8. In People v. Esuela,[77] the testimony of the victims mother that the victim was 13 years of age at the time of the rape was held sufficient to establish minority for the reason that as a mother she was in the best position to know when she delivered her child. Also considered were the victims own testimony regarding her age, as well as the observation of the trial court that she could not have been more than 18 years old when she testified. In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance. 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. 2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age. 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. 4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.[78] 5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim. In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as a baptismal certificate of LIZETTE, was presented to prove her age. In imposing the death penalty, the trial court ratiocinated in this wise:

In the instant case, the victim, Lizette Arabelle Gonzales, was a 3-year-old minor girl as alleged in the information and the defense did not contest her age and as a matter of fact was questioning her qualification to testify because of her tender age when she testified two (2) years later in Court. The victims Medico-Legal Certificate date[d] January 3, 1995 established the fact that at the time of the commission of the rape on January 3, 1995, the child was only 3 years old.[79] It thus appears that the trial courts finding that LIZETTE was 3 years old when she was raped was based on the Medico-Legal Report prepared by Dr. Quiroz, as well as on the fact that the defense did not contest her age and even questioned her qualification to testify because of her tender age. However, the Medico-Legal Report relied upon by the trial court does not in any way prove the age of LIZETTE, for there is nothing therein which even mentions her age. Only testimonial evidence was presented to establish LIZETTEs age. Her mother, Jacqueline, testified on 17 October 1995 as follows: Q. Now, on January 3, 1995 at about 9:30 in the morning, do you still recall where you were? A. Yes, sir. Q. Where were you at that particular date and time? A. I was fetching water from an artesian well beside the house of my neighbor, sir. Q. Where was this daughter of yours then when you were fetching water? A. My daughter was discharging her bowel who was then at the back of the house of our neighbor, sir. How old is your daughter Lizette Arabelle Gonzales? A. Three years old, sir. Q. At the time that she was discharging her bowel, how old [was] she? A. Three years old, sir. She is four years old now. Q. When was her last birthday? A. April 19, 1995, sir.[80] Likewise, LIZETTE testified on 20 November 1996, or almost two years after the incident, that she was 5 years old.[81] However, when the defense counsel asked her how old she was on 3 January 1995, or at the time of the rape, she replied that she was 5 years old. Upon further question as to the date she was born, she could not answer.[82] For PRUNA to be convicted of rape in its qualified form and meted the supreme penalty of death, it must be established with certainty that LIZETTE was below 7 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. It must be stressed that the severity of the death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once carried

out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence.[83] In view of the uncertainty of LIZETTEs exact age, corroborative evidence such as her birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other authentic document should be introduced in evidence[84] in order that the qualifying circumstance of below seven (7) years old is appreciated against the appellant. The lack of objection on the part of the defense as to her age did not excuse the prosecution from discharging its burden. That the defense invoked LIZETTEs tender age for purposes of questioning her competency to testify is not necessarily an admission that she was below 7 years of age when PRUNA raped her on 3 January 1995. Such being the case, PRUNA cannot be convicted of qualified rape, and hence the death penalty cannot be imposed on him. However, conformably with no. 3(b) of the foregoing guidelines, the testimony of LIZETTEs mother that she was 3 years old at the time of the commission of the crime is sufficient for purposes of holding PRUNA liable for statutory rape, or rape of a girl below 12 years of age. Under the second paragraph of Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in relation to no. 3 of the first paragraph thereof, having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the penalty to be imposed on PRUNA should be reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty. As regards the civil liability of PRUNA, the indemnity in the amount of P50,000 awarded by the trial court is not sufficient. In accordance with recent jurisprudence, LIZETTE should also be awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000 without need of pleading or proof because the mental, physical and psychological trauma suffered by her is too obvious.[85] WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan, in Criminal Case No. 6044 is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that accused Manuel Pruna y Ramirez or Erman Pruna y Ramirez is held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape, and not qualified rape, and is sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim Lizette Arabelle Gonzales the sum of P50,000 as moral damages in addition to the indemnity of P50,000. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur. Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Ynarez-Santiago, Carpio, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., on official leave. NO CASE DIGEST FOR PEOPLE VS BASE PEOPLE VS VILLANUEVA