Proto-Maadhyamika in the Paali canon

By Luis O. Gomez Philosophy East and West 26:2 April 1976 p. 137-165

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

p. 137

El que all de s

llega de vero

mismo desfallesce; primero

cuanto sabia

mucho baxo le parece, y su sciencia tanto cresce, que se queda no sabiendo, toda sciencia trascendiendo.

These words of Saint taken as the epitome

John of the Cross could be of the wisdom of the

mystics--beyond

all human science, not to be grasped The mystic of his dwells own in the

by rational discourse.(1) unassailable fortress

silence.

Unfortunately (or, perhaps rather fortunately), there is more than one way of abiding in the sublime of the silentium attain it. mysticum, and more are legitimate bliss

than one way to and spurious

There

ecstasies, variously defined by different traditions. Moreover, whether mystic cannot he remains silent or speaks, the of

avoid

returning

to the province

worldly convention, where silence would speak as much as words. Silence is not univocal, nor is it

noncommittal, yet the ineffable There is no reason for

seems to require it. the beauty and

ignoring

mystery tension

of this dilemma. that

This is the mystic bind, a by more than one

has not been ignored

mystic tradition; thus there is the famous koan:

Wu-tsu said: 'Traveling Way, do not greet

a road you meet a man of the nor with silence.

him with words

But, tell me then, with what will you greet him?'

The equivocal nature of silence extends of course to the experience that evokes it, and nothing is

gained by asserting

that all mystics just preach and

praise

ultimate

silence.

Nor

can

we

avoid

the

important role of doctrinal contents and framework in the formation silence. The of and direction idea that of a mystical one could path of the

escape

complexities characterizing would

Buddhist it as a via

thought, for mystica Even

example, by a "yoga" original was an was

or as if the founder

be rather

simplistic. experience" all

"enlightenment experience nevertheless

of the

beyond

thought

categories, it

in some

way

specific.

The experience

behind the yoga is not contentless as such. This is not to say that

even when defined the idea of a

"doctrine of freedom from all conceptual contents" or "an experience free from the constraints of

conceptual

thought" is an impossibility.

There is a

certain specificity

to silence, and to the very idea position; otherwise

of the absence of a theoretical all the proponents to agree

of the voie du silence would have opponents,

with even their most vociferous

and this has yet to happen.

In fact, not silence indeed to

only

is the

mystical science mode of

science

of

a difficult a specific

and a definite behavior or

commitment

apprehension, there are also different

modes of this

"mystical science." The injunction to seek -------------------------------

Luis

O.

Gomez

is Associate of Far

Professor Eastern

of Buddhist and

Studies, Department

Languages

Literatures, at the University of Michigan.

p. 138

silence than

or to stop verbal profuseness than

can have more meaning. that the

one purpose, more

one intended consider

Obviously, the mystics themselves insufficiency level. of language

operates at more than one

In this article a few of these levels will be in the very specific framework of the

considered

A.t.thakavagga possible

of the Suttanipaata, while between

exploring

parallels

this Paali text and the

Madhyamaka of Naagaarjuna.

At the outset isolate, merely categories Buddhist

I would

like

to suggest

that we

as a heuristic

device, a few of the various

within

which one could consider purely or

views (not always inadequacy, categories at the

mystical) on the of

insufficiency, words. These

obstrusiveness not always one

are same

mutually does not

exclusive, necessarily distinguish

but

time

lead to or contain the other.

One could

two greater categories: (1)The Buddhist,

in attempting

to explain the experience of the goal, does affirm that

or the goal itself, may and often words cannot describe the

goal

(words

cannot the path are an

encompass the goal); to that goal,

and (2) in describing insist that words

he may

impediment the goal).

in the path (by words To a greater or

one does not reach extent, most

lesser

Buddhists emphasis the

agree

on the first proposition, but their and their interpretation the first and the of

on the second between

connection

second

differ radically from one school to another.

These two basic categories several "silence in ways. One could

can be broken down in to think that

be tempted

about the Buddha" is primarily and the "the Buddha's this

ontological silence" is

purport

methodological true.

in nature, but

is only

partly

Silence about the goal cannot be reduced to an stance. This type of silence includes a lot, for example, of the pragmatic poisoned silence. of

ontological very

heterogeneous as in the

silence

parable

arrow(3)---a clear One may also silence about

case

of methodological the first

subsume the

under

category

goal

the subclass

of laudatory told are

silence, as in those that the Buddha

cases

when we are simply that words

is so inscrutable

inadequate

to praise him.

There is also the silence

of the Buddha

himself, who "never preached

a single

dharma.(4) This class is inextricably related to both main categories; but, though it spans both the goal

and the path, it also includes the important class of silence becoming most as an element in the behavior a Buddha. which follows

Under silence about the goal the is, nevertheless, ontological goal does A Buddha not belong cannot to the

important

class

silence.

The ultimate

realm of the speakable.

be reached

"by the roads of speech."(5)

Our second main category, silence path, also doctrines may about be taken to include There

as part of the a variety of

language.

is the

pragmatic

silence mentioned in the previous category: if speech is superfluous in the practice of the path, then it

is merely a waste of time. (6) But speech can also be misleading, it could, by its very nature, lead astray the follower be of the path. to simple or This quality reasons of speech or to

could

due

moral even to

psychological reasons. because

reasons

epistemological

That is to say, talk could be an impediment it is the epitome of the world's sham and

frivolousness, as in "the most

p. 139

talked insofar

about," etc. as it and

Or

it to a

may

be

an

impediment

leads

mental Lastly,

distraction, it could

agitation, constitute of reality,

turbulence.

an obstacle because it offers a semblance thus fooling the practitioner into

complacently what he

believing that he has seen face-to-face knows by words. The Buddhist to

simply

scriptures

move back and forth from one category

the other, perhaps with very good reasons, for thirst (t.r.s.naa) and nescience generation.(7) (avidyaa) exist by mutual

Silence about and in the goal is mystical silence proper, that is, the silentium mysticum. in the path could "ascetic exercise be described more But silence as

accurately

silence," that is, silence as a preparatory (propaedeutica mystica) .(8) Basically it

falls into two classes: the path-silence proper which leads directly into mystical which for silence simply the and moral or the

eremetical

silence ground

prepares

environmental

former.(9) Ascetic of emptying to an influx contemplation the of of

silence, for instance, can be a way mind in order external to make it receptive

light, as in the infused mystics.

some of the Christian silence is often

This type of ascetic

connected

to, but still separable

from,

the

silence

that

stems

from before

humility: the the might of silence, the from worldly ille qui

recognition God.

of man's impotence

These two differ of which

from eremitical is to retreat

purpose commitment

and business, as in the beatus

procul negotiis. But all these forms can and often do coalesce in one ascetic practice, often appearing the instructions of the ascetics in

as interdependent

and mutually reinforced.

TEXTUAL NOTE

Some of these

views

on words

and silence

form the

leading themes in the fourth book of the Suttanipaata and are found in several significant fifth book. passages in the

The last two books of the Suttanipaata, and Paaraayanavagga, respectively,

A.t.thakavagga

constitute no doubt the oldest strata of the work and belong to the oldest of the Paali texts.(10) The

significance of these passages cannot be exaggerated. In many ways they anticipate (rather than foreshadow) some of the key doctrines often help establish transitions Buddhism discover neglected of the Great Vehicle and

possible connections

or smooth

from the Buddhism of the Nikaayas to the Vehicle. common One is tempted to

of the Great here a

ground,

unfortunately

by the Abhidharmist

and long forgotten by

the Great Vehicle.(11)

When I first Suttanipaata freshness originality. disputes that I and

read the Mahaaviyuuha-sutta was impressed not but only also

of the by its its

directness,

by

Somehow its advocacy of abstention from stood out as a unique stance reduced to a simplistic

and arguments not

could

be easily

doctrine of abstention

from disputes for the sake of It also seemed evident

the peace of noninvolvement. that the pronouncements be reduced

made in this sutta could not common teachings of the

to other, more

Paali Canon without doing some violence Stock phrases which in the Canon

to the text. used to

were

indicate the highest

p. 140

knowledge,

such

as

"jaanaami

passaami"

and

"~naa.na",(l2) were used here science of those

to indicate

the false to views.

who were still attached

Moreover their attachment was not deemed to be merely the attachment to wrong views, but to views in

general. Also, there was no question here of teaching the superior true dharma, rather of the path the point would not was that the prefer any

follower

dharma;

he would make no claims to the possession of

a higher dharma.(13)

Further from

consideration

of Suttanipaata and

passages showed

the A.t.thakavagga

the Paaraayana radically

that these two sections

differ

even from

the rest of the Sn itself. we have considered A.t.thaka--stand the

The Suttanipaata passages from the

in this article--mostly out among

the Paali texts much like passages most strike the and

Mahaaviyuuhasutta. as some of

These the of

reader

explicit

representative

statements

an extreme

apophatic

tendency found elsewhere in Buddhist literature. This tendency---or is it a contemplative tradition of some kind?--reappears later in the literature of the

Perfection of Wisdom, and, even more patently, in the Praasa^ngika lines. Maadhyamika and in the various Ch'an

This

tendency

could

be

characterized

in

the

theoretical realm as the doctrine of no-views, and in the practical realm as the practice of practicing dharmas. In its more extreme manifestations no this

tendency is diametrically right-views systematically "Morally" it and the

opposed to the doctrine of of gradually and

practice

cultivating the true or pure dharmas. stands on an ascetic discipline of

silence

which

corresponds

and leads

to the higher

goal of silencing

the mind's

imaginative-discursive

faculties, whereupon state of inner

the mystic reaches the ultimate to be itself

silence, considered

beyond all possible theoretical description.

Contrary views" views. of the

to the customary

insistence

on "right up all

the A.t.thakavagga

speaks

of giving

One cannot avoid feeling Nikaayas to give

that the injunction for truth,

up hankering

views, morality, and vows is only taken in earnest in the A.t.thaka.(14) The men again of wisdom are described or

and again as those who do not find support

preference in anything:(15)

They

fancy

not, they

prefer

not, and not a single can be led by

dharma do they adopt. vows or morality;

No true brahman

he who is thus, gone beyond, does

not rely on anything. (803)(16)

Instructions to the follower of the path could not be more explicit:

Renounce

all

vows

and moralities, and [all]

those

acts, whether blamable or unblamable, throw away [all ideas of] purity and impurity, fare dispassionate,

grasp not at peace. (900)

As we will

see presently, this

is no injunction

to

moral indifference. In what way is total renunciation like indifference?

How

is

this

renunciation

completed?

The

Suttanipaata shows that there is

p. 141

still

more

to

deny

in

defining

the

path.

This

mystical science excludes all views and theories:

Giving

up

assumption,

unattached,

he

builds

no

reliance on knowledge

itself...

he does not rely on

any view whatsoever. (800)(17)

This

attitude, if

we

may

describe

it

thus,

has

important summarizes among

behavioral

consequences "he does

which the stanza not take sides the various us This the

with the phrase who

[those

uphold] the time

assumptions."(18) But, for

being, let on views.

remain with the topic of not relying idea is in fact well known to

us

through

traditional doctrine of the Middle Path--avoiding the two extremes. Thus, not to rely on views is in a

certain way a form of nondualism.

However, one could

not

overemphasize

the

distinctive

mark

of

the

nondualism of the A.t.thakavagga (A.t.tha).(19) As in so many Middle Such passages from the Suutra literature, the

Path is primarily passages put on

the path of nonattachment. trial attachment effects, and not its the

destructive metaphysical moors in

psychological

validity of the two extremes. diverse The opinions, clinging clutches to views

The mind at of them this

passionately.

opinionated being is what perverts him; which opinion might be the "correct" one is ultimately irrelevant.

The A.t.tha's mooring or

recommendation

is to abandon this views, this

installation

(nivesana) in

leaning toward the extremes of this or that, which is the result of the mind's forging an immutable

apperception (sa~n~naa) of things. The truly wise are free of these fixations. According to the fourth poem of the A.t.tha:

He who

has

no leanings

here

to either

of the two

extremes: being no moorings

or not being, here or beyond, he has whatsoever, among no clutching while

distinguishing formed

dharmas.

(801)(20) He has not apperception in

(or fancied) even the least

what is here seen, heard or thought.., (802)(21)

He

is not

like

those

who

are

"entranced

by the

passion of their views" (891d).(22) For he knows that men are not released by means of opinions and

theories:

If a man were abandon having

made

pure

by viewing, or if he could

sorrow by means of knowledge, then one still additives (sopadhiko) would himself]. be purified by

something opinion

other [than

It is indeed

mere is

to speak thus.

(789)(23) A true brahman of something

not called pure because

other, whether or something

seen or heard, whether vows of morality thought. given

[He lives] unsoiled by sin or merit, having any more here.

up assumptions, not fashioning

(790)(24)

The purport

Mahaaniddesa of this

fails

to understand

the true

passage

when it glosses: "If a man

were made pure... by another, impure path, by a false path...other than the Noble Eightfold Path...."(25)

The very context

of the whole poem (788-795, A.t.tha

section iv), shows that the view under attack is that of him who relies about things on knowledge heard or (pacceti thought. xiv, ~naa.na.m) Moreover, our

seen,

another

stanza, from

section

confirms

interpretation:

p. 142

Only he should bring himself should brought the bhikkhu seek

to rest. peace.

not elsewhere who has

For him

himself

to rest there

there be

are no assumptions,

whence, then, could (26)

non-assumption? (919)

This emphasis on ''self" in opposition to "other" has no immediate metaphysical implications. a forceful manner of expressing from all dharmas: It is simply detachment

complete

Whatever

dharma

he

knows.

whether

in himself

or

outside, in it he makes

no station;

for the good do

not call this true rest. (917)(27)

Let him not by such [a dharma something Touched is

be led to] think even the

that same.

better, or worse, or forms, let fancying

by multiple or

him remain

without himself.

distinguishing (918)(28)

(vikappayan)

We may

now

return

to section

iv and

let

the

concluding stanzas sum up the message of the poem:

They do not fancy, they do not prefer, they do not say: 'This is total purification'. Once free from the knotted knot of grasping, they have longing for

nothing in the world. (794) Gone beyond all limits, a true brahman, he has no clutchings. whether by

knowing or seeing. He does not delight in passion nor does he delight in dispassion. For him there is

nothing more to clutch at here. (795)(29)

The

theme

of

grasping

or

clutching

recurs

throughout

the A.t.ha, and the root of this grasping

is always presented as bound to opinions and talk. It is extremely difficult to go beyond our habitual

mooring in views because of our habit of clutching at our distinctions among dharmas the man (801. of 795ab). our his This

grasping, moreover, is (84lab) . preferences, disputes Upon it a

cause builds

delusion world of and

attachments, pat-ties, contentions But, what is the cause misdirected faculty leads

(862-873).

of our mind, of to

preferences specifically apperception

and attachments? The the wrongly

applied

(sa~n~naa).(30) Apperception sorrow its

dualities, graspings, conflicts, and of its two primary functions:

because to

power

conceptualize toward

and define (sa.mkhaa) and its tendency and multiplicity (papa~nca). The

division

capacity of these faculties

to generate friction and

frustration is reinforced by the root apperception of "I" and "mine." The A.t.tha, however, does not have a consistent doctrine on the question of what causes

what, nor does it offer a complete on the role of the idea of a self key passage it seems that the

or clear teaching or an "I." In one

"I" idea and "thirst"

have similar or rather parallel roles:

Let him bring and

to a stop

all the root the

of conception `I am'.

dispersion, [that thirst

is, ]

thought

Whichever

there is in him let him drive away

as he trains ever mindful. (916)(31)

Venturing

free

gloss

of

this

stanza, one

may

understand the process by which mindfulness the moorings and hankerings of the mind

destroys in the

following way: mindfulness pulls the mind back to the ever-fleeting present, away from its extensions into way it acts process in of

the past and the future.(32) In this exactly the opposite direction

of the

apperception, and thus uproots con-

p. 143

ception (by which the "I" freezes views and desires) and dispersion

reality to fit our (by which the mind

runs

out

after

things

in

order

to

make

them

"mine").(33)

In the

extremely

important, yet

obscure

final

stanzas of the Kalahavivaadasutta (A.t.tha, poem xi), after a pithy by description means of how "form of the is made to of

cease"(34)

control

apperception,(35) the poem concludes: "for dispersion with conception have apperception series the of one the for their cause." in this poem in the take

(874)(36) The causal reminds us of

presented

described

Sakka-pa~nhaa-sutta human (not conflict old age

Diigha: (37) both as the final offer

and aggression and death) ,

effect

both

primarily

psychological

explanations

of the

problem, without

explicit references to cosmological or eschatological conceptions. In both texts man's choosing between the dear and the not dear is at the root of friction frustration, and this picking and choosing and

is rooted

in wishing or wanting (chanda). In the Diigha, chanda depends on vitakka (mental discourse), and vitakka

depends on mental (and verbal) dispersion (papa~nca). The Kalahavivaada is more subtle, but also more

repetitive and less linear. to deal with this difficult

This is not the occasion passage in detai1,(38)

suffice it here to say that, according to this sutta, opinions and desire (or wishes: chanda) are equally

rooted in the dualities

of pleasant

and unpleasant, are

coming to be and ceasing to be. caused by contact

These dualities

(phassa), which

here seems to be

synonymous with appropriation and the idea of "mine." Contact depends on name and form, and name and form

can be "made to cease"(39) by bringing about a change in the process of apperception. Thus, the calming or

bringing to rest of the process of apperception which lies at the is root the of clinging, and goal of therefore the way of of

suffering, silence. things

ultimate

Not holding

on to any view, not mooring in thought, quieting down all

seen, heard, or

talk (vaada) and contention (vivaada) is an important part in the process cognitive dispersion in the process, arm of quieting (prapa~nca); mindfulness, means down affective and

the other element is properly the mind the is

instrumental brought

by

of which

to a state

of emptiness

from apperception.

And this state of emptiness is the only state that is beyond suffering.

Having abandonment terms

arrived of views place are

at

this

juncture

where

the in

and opinions in the

is justified

of its

process to

of overcoming type of

suffering, we

introduced

another

silence: the silence of the goal. The goal is clearly a state in which "name and form are no more." This is

not must

a state take

of a few

unconsciousness, obviously, but lines to allow of nihilism the Sn itself

we to

dispel those suspicions provoked by the

which are still rhetoric of

over-enthusiastic

apophatic Buddhism.

Perhaps particular

such force

suspicions by the of

are

aroused

with famous

deservedly

Upasiivamaa.navapucchaa vii: 1069-1076). There

the

Paaraayana(section how to reach much

we are

told

release in the following words, which summarize of what has been said above:

p. 144

Mindfully relying Giving

watching

the

[realm

of]

no-thing, (40)

[only]

on "there

is not", cross the flood. from all talk, day and

up desire, detached

night look into the extinction who has left on behind

of thirst. to all

(1070) He desires, else, is

attachment abandoning

relying released

no-thing,

ought

in the ultimate

release from apperception.

There he is firm, not to be followed. (1071)(41)

This passage

should

not be interpreted

in terms of

the meaning that its vocabulary has in other parts of

the Tipi.taka, but, if it is understood as possible, it will reveal The to us

as literally a of fresh and

illuminating

message.

realm

no-thing be

(aaki~nca~n~nam), for construed

instance, cannot

properly

as a reference

to the classical hierarchy

of the samaapatti. Here this "nothing" is at the very core upon and apex of the meditational which the practitioner up path. It is that his

establishes

meditation. (desire-still

Giving

external looks

perturbations into the empty, to look and give

talk) he mindfully

point of his concentration.

In order

into this point up everything

he must rely on "no-thing" else (sense objects, leads

sensations, to release

conceptions, etc.). from apperception.

This practice

Is this then a state of unconsciousness? In spite of all the evidence the term sa~n~na to the contrary, one still finds (sa.mj~naa being taken to mean is

"consciousness"(42) That the meaning close to some of the Western is and clear from

of the term

philosophical from the

uses of

"apperception" literature

scholastic contextual basis (874) for ,

scattered is the

evidence.(43) In the conception apperceptions and

Sn, sa~n~na verbal

distinctions

are formed or fashioned (pakappitaa...

sa~n~naa) (802), they can be the object of attachment

(792, 847), and primary object

together of

with

views

they It

are the is also mean the

grasping

(847) . sa~n~naa of the

difficult

to see how the term in the context

could

"perception" sa~n~naa

Sn, where

are found to be formed or fashioned

by the

mind, and where we are told that dualities arise from the apperception of permanence (886). But then, is

the Upasiivamaa.navapucchaa

speaking

of a cessation when it defines

of apperception or conceptualization the highest question problem

goal as "the release from sa~n~na"? This The

is best answered by the Kalahavivaada. there is how to bring other words, which

to rest all "name and how do you stop the

form."(44) In conflict worldly

of dualities

is at the root to cease

of all in the

conflicts? Form

is made

following way according to the sutta:

When

he has

not

an apperception

of apperceptions,

when he had not an apperception when he does

of non-apperception, he does not

not not apperceive, when

have apperceptions without an object, for him who has attained to this, form ceases, for apperception is

the cause of dispersion and conception. (874)(45)

No matter

how we interpret

the term sa~n~naa, it is

obvious that the paradoxical rhetoric of this passage does not justify assuming that the goal is in any way

the mere

stopping

of mind

processes

or perception

tour court.

Another

passage in the A.t.tha throws some light

on the meaning of the abandonment of apperception. In the Maagandiyasutta, known by title to the

p. 145

compilers

of the Sa.myuttanikaaya,(46) the

goal

is

described in the following terse lines:

The truly wise does not form opinions on the basis of views or things thought out, he is not made thus. He

would not be led by actions nor by learning, he would not be led to moorings of any kind. (846) For him who is detached released from apperceptions there are no knots, Those who in the

by insight

he has no delusions.

hold on to apperceptions

and views go around

world in constant conflict. (847)(47)

The bringing

stopping to rest

of

apperceptions

follows

the

of all predispositons

of the mind

(732).(48) With this, all strife is ended:

For nowhere

in the world does the pure fashion views

about being or non-being.

The pure, having abandoned

all sham and opinions, completely detached, who could reach him? (786) Attachment leads to talk talk about is about the he

dharmas.

How

then, and who, could the has no

detached? For

assumptions, nor

without assumptions; he is here cleansed of all view. (787)(49)

The clear

emphasis

on nonduality

and freedom

from

opinions, freedom man released from

from talk (whether apperception

it be what the have to say

would

about the world, or what the world

would have to say

about him), is in fact quite apposite in the frame of reference Paaraayana There of the path suggested in the A.t.tha. uses a somewhat different The

terminology. and is

the vi~n~naa.na

is fixed

in becoming

thus perturbed by becoming; the goal is to bring this vi~n~naa.na to rest. This is not the place to discuss the meaning of this elusive term, but for the

Paaraayana

I find Hare's rendering quite appropriate very here on the of

("mind at work"), and the usual "consciousness" inappropriate. (50) Be that as it concerned the may, we are

only with the fact that in the section of Upasiiva (quoted earlier),

questions

Paaraayana the from

abstains from asserting the cessation actually speaks

vi~n~naa.na, and apperception

of a release Moreover, in

(sa~n~naavimokhe).

this very same passage brought up again

the question

of language of

is the

in a manner

reminiscent

A.t.tha and not so characteristic of the Paaraayana.

In the includes (1070).

first

place, the discipline from talk (virato

of the path kathaahi) highest

detachment In the second

place, the goal, the from

release, is found

in the release

apperception

(1072). Lastly, the man who has attained to this goal is himself beyond the province of way language described and or

conception, he defined:

cannot

be in any

"... he who is thus cooled and released, is there for such a one any ideation (vi~n~naa.na)?"

"As a flame blown out by a gust of wind "ceases" cannot be reached muni, released

and

by conception, in the same way the name and body, "ceases" and

from

cannot be reached by conception." (1074)(51)

He who has

gone

to cessation, is he no more? Or is

he in eternal well being?..." (1075)

"Of

him

who

has

gone

to cessation

there

is

no

measure, there is nothing in

p. 146

terms of which they could dharmas have

speak about him.

When all of speech

been uprooted, all the ways

have also been uprooted." (1076)(52)

These lines bring to mind immediately the concluding lines of the Kalahavivaada:

Some

wise

men

say

that

the highest others

here among on

is the [the the away. Muni

cleansing wise]

of the call

spirit, still themselves that they it

who

experts is

"remainderless"(53) say (876) But knowing that

passing

rely

still, the

knows and examines [the object of] their reliance.(54) The does man who is released not give does to not seek becoming dispute, he nor to

himself

non-becoming. (877)

According

to these passages, the way to the goal goal is beyond beyond words, and and the

is a way of silence, the

the man of the goal is himself speculation. Because an

all talk part of

essential

solution to the problem of sorrow and conflict is the eradication attachments can best of all "moorings of the mind",

to apperceptions, the path in terms

and the goal or

be described

of a nonduality

middle path. thirst

The man of wisdom seeks to abandon as much as the thirst

the for

for nonexistlence

becoming (856, 1068, 801). The path is also described in terms of this nonduality:

Cleansing

is not attained

by things

seen or heard,

nor by knowledge, nor by the vows of morality, nor is it attained knowing, Abandoning by not seeing or not hearing, nor by not by absence of morals and vows.

nor

all these, not grasping

at them he is at

peace, not relying, he would not hanker for becoming. (839)(55)

It is again significant that the Paaraayana's formulations of nonduality are often softer.(56) For of not grasping at any

instance, instead of speaking

dharma, as does the A.t.tha, the Paaraayana says that the man of wisdom (here called bhikkhu in contrast to braahma.na, which is more common in the A.t.tha) is

an expert in all dharmas (1039, 1112). The A.t.tha is always very explicit about its radical views:

When a man confined in views puts something the world as "the highest", calling beyond

first in "the

all else

lowest," he has not gone experts

dispute.

(796) The

call a knot (bond) that leaning on which one else to be lowly. Therefore the

regards everything

bhikkhu

does

not lean

on anything

seen, heard

or

thought, nor no morals and vows. (797)(57)

Those

who, grasping

at views

argue

and say: "Only say when talk to you in

this is the truth," to them you should begins: "There strife." taking are none here

to reply

(832) But those who do follow a path of not sides, who do not oppose who will views by means of

views, from them them

you obtain, Pasuura, from to grasp at?

who here do not have a "highest"

(833)(58)

In

conclusion, intention does it

it

is

obvious

then

that

the

A.t.tha's view. Nor

is not propose

to propose a nonview

a different (systematic rhetoric of

rejection

of all views).

The involved

this short text seems to be aimed at an injunction to detachment fixed in from the tendency and of the mind to become extremes, in

cognitive

affective

immutable could

mind-made polarities. interpret

I do not believe we A.t.tha as the

consistently

the

pronouncement of a self-serving

p. 147

Buddhist

who believes

that

the clash

of views

is

counterproductive correct (that view

merely

because

there is only one that view

and that

he who possesses

is, the Buddhist) can afford

not to enter the

ring of dispute, for, after right. No, we have in the

all, he knows that he is A.t.tha a doctrine of

nonduality, found elsewhere

in the Paali Canon

only

sporadically. Whether the practice of such a doctrine is humanly possible is another question, which is not the concern of this article.

The

A.t.tha

does, however, point

at a possible

reason why such a doctrine is necessary:

There are not in fact many and various truths, except for the worldly apperception on views, of they "permanents." pronounce a

Fashioning

arguments

duality of dharmas: `true and false." (886)(59)

The

holding

on

to

these

apperceptions

of

immutable

principles

or objects is growing roots in The stability of

mere figments these

of the imagination.

principles

is deceptive, for they are in fact

wrought by an unstable mind:

Who

still

has

principles and

(dhammaa) not

fashioned, he

constructed, prejudiced

cleansed, when

sees advantage in assumption, he is [only] relying on

a "peace" which depends on agitation. (784)(60)

The

defender

of views, of course.

favors

his

own

views above all others (904), but,

The true brahman or

does not attach himself not regard of any

to fancies as all Yet,

concepts, he does is

view

important, nor

he a friend

knowledge.

having known the opinions of men at large, he regards even-mindedly (911)(61) the extremes at which others clutch.

Whatever having them. who

opinions known, does

are not

held form

by men

at

large, he, to any of

attachment

Why should the unattached not give in to

seek attachment, he seen or heard?

does

things

(897)(62)

But together with its pronouncements on views and talk, the A.t.tha and moral weaves in important perhaps in contemplative ascetic) at

(or,

better, views,

recommendations. apperceptions, process is

Mooring not

grasping a

fundamentally

cognitive method

and it must be stopped by a specific

of ascetic training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . One should train ever mindful, driving out whatever

thirst there is within. (916cd) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Touched by multiple forms, he will not make a station in them fancing himself [as this] or that.(918cd)(63)

He should grow calm in himself, the bhikkhu would not seek peace from something else.... (919ab)

These lines are followed by specific instructions how to attain "calm within himself":

on

p.148

His eyes do not roll about,(64) he turns his ear away from village talk, he does not hanker after flavors,

nor does he consider as "mine" anything in the world. (922)

He does not gather drink, chew, or

and make store of things wear, nor is he afraid

to eat, of not

obtaining these. (924)

Let

him

be intent

on contemplation, not a stop

loitering

around, let him put be unheedful.

to worrying, let him not in a spot where

He will seek to dwell

noises are few. (925)

He

would

not

be led

to

speaking

falsehood, ever

watchful, he is free not despise others

of sham and malice,(65) he will for their way of life, for their

wisdom, for their morals or vows. (931)

But the most characteristic

elements

in the conduct

of the sage are his nongrasping and `mine' and the resulting

at the ideas of `me' from views,

detachment

opinions, and comparative judgments:

He who has no idea of `mine' nor grieves world. (950)

in all names and forms, in the

at what is not, he loses nothing

For whom there is no 'this is mine' or `another's that' with respect to make into `mine' mine'. (951)

is

to anything, he has found nothing and never grieves `this is not

The muni does not speak serene, having

of `equal', `low' or `high'; behind, he does not

left all egotism

grasp at anything nor does he reject anything. (954)

This man who does not form a support

on anything

is

then free from the thirst to become one thing or stop being another. (856)(66) He is no longer attached to

views and opinions, which are nothing but our attempt to fashion the world in our own image. Calm. desire to become, of desire to establish turns away from talks fact beyond detachment and disputes free of

himself, he he is in

(859);

talk, for his virtues, his calm, and his do not belong to the province of talk and

conception (913-914, 876-877, 1076).

The distinctive in the A.t.tha

moralizing tone of many passages be overlooked. At times one is

cannot

cannot avoid the feeling that the whole discourse

about the bliss of escaping worldly noise and strife. One is reminded of the words of Fray Luis de Leon:

iQue descansada vida la del que huye del mundanal ruido; y sigue la escondida senda por donde han ido los pocos sabios que en el mundo han sido !(67)

But the passages we have quoted above should convince the reader that the moralizing hermit's life are, in and the praise of the to a are more not

fact, ancillary and

fundamental

message.

Views

disputes

simply abandoned out of the convenience la vida retirada; at their roots

and peace of

is a fundamental moral

error, wrong

apperception, and

a fundamental

wrong, clinging to `I' and `mine'. Views and disputes are the external signs of passionate are apperception; the signs of

talking, opinionating, gimmicking inner turbulence and crazy

p. 149

grasping, The path recommended in the A.t.tha is then a path of detachment, but primarily of detachment

through silence, outer and inner silence.

Moreover, the goal itself is very appropriately a state of silence in the sense that the apperceptive into submission." At this stage Because it

faculty

is "calmed

the mind rests only on its silent center. clings now to no apperception, because dispersions the mind and fixations, there

it is free of

is no way that it, or pinpointed by

itself, can be described

the way of talk or concept. Thus, the primary purpose of methodological silence is not disengagement or

solitude but the discovery of the inner silence which is calm.

With regard does

to ontological a full

silence, the A.t.tha in the sense for of a the

not present

theory or

metaphysical

edifice

groundwork

ineffability

of

the

ultimate

goal.

Nor

can

we

interpret the A.t.tha in terms of a given right-views theory. In other words, the A.t.tha an indirect or preparatory cultivating a specific is not proposing or

means of establishing

right view, nor a world view of silence or

which must be hidden under the mantle protected those

from the worldly by reserving of it. What

it for only in the and human and

who are worthy

is found

A.t.tha

is (1) a psychology and (2) a few

of human pointers

friction to a

frustration, condition

beyond the present can

state of friction be summarized

frustration--all of which injunction to practice

in an

a type of silent mindfulness

and concentration, in which no specific view is to be sought or upheld.

Thus, the A.t.tha's way empty of a theory. theory with regard

doctrine of silence in is no There is, certainly, a basic and the ineffability

to clinging

of nonclinging. The A.t.tha's doctrine, however, is a `no-doctrine'' this doctrine in the sense that someone who accepts is expected to have an attitude with

respect to it which is precisely the contrary of what we normally expect from someone who espouses a

theory.

And this is not the philosophical silence of nor the methodological It is the simple bracketing of the fact that to be

skepticism

phenomenologist.

practically

consistent, a theory of the silencing of

the moorings of apperception must be self-abrogating. Thus, the theory is incomplete because theory cannot silence in a practice without the practice It its

itself by itself. which will bring

must culminate

consummation by consuming it.(68)

COMPARATIVE NOTE

One is of course immediately the religion with without the

tempted

to compare of of the the

an ultimate speculative

concern flights and

A.t.tha

Maadhyamika. stand

There

too

prapa~nca

adhinive`sa too

out as two of the main enemies.(69) There

all views

(d.r.s.ti) are to be given up for the sake

of a goal about which the Great Sage never pronounced a single word.

According emptiness

to the Prasannapadaa called

(Pras

351),(70) it is

is also

nirvaa.na

because

defined as the stopping dispersion (prapa~nca).

of all mental and linguistic This dispersion is nothing (Pras the

but talk, the talk 373, 448); it

that chains the

men to things between

involves

conflict

multiple polarities that define things in the world:

p. 150

knowledge

and the knowable, speakable

and

speaker,

doer and act, cause

and effect, jars, clothes, crown

and chariots, form and sensation, women and men, gain and loss, happiness and sorrow, fame and disrepute,

blame and praise, etc... (350)

When

the

mind

seizes

at

things

there

is

this

dispersion

(350-351) from which

results

the mind's

uncontrolled fancying (ayoni`so vikalpa: 350-351,374, 452).(71) As part of this mental disorder, mooring grows; of the

(abhinive`sa) in the ideas and this is the root

of `I' and `mine' perturbation

of the

kle`sas, which

is the cause

of rebirth.

(351) Only

when seizing at an immutable through the vision of

form for things ceases, the whole

emptiness, does

series end. (350-351)

The goal then apprehending putting to

is to put to rest

all seizing xxv. of goal

or

sarvopalambhopa`samah: rest the xxv. dispersions 24b). This

24a) , mind not

the is

(prapa~ncopa`samah:

defined by any ultimate principle, the Buddha in fact never taught a single dharma (xxv. 24cd). For what is sought is the bringing the mind. The to calm of the harborings seeks to stop of all

Maadhyamika

apprehensions

of

an

immutable

reality,

thing

or

principle, all apperceptions

of being and not being,

coming to be and ceasing to be. For,

When no being

is obtained, which

one could

imagine

not to exist, then, deprived non-being

of all basis, how could being

stand before the mind? When neither

nor non-being where else

stand before the mind, then, having no go, without support, the mind is

to

brought to rest.(72)

Thus, the true function the mind of its own

of emptiness and

is to free hankering.

harborage constitute

Emptiness, then, cannot principle;

itself a view, a

it cannot be reified

if it is to fulfill

its liberating role:

The non-operation from all

of all views and

which

is the escape is here

grasping

mooring,

that

emptiness. (247)

Emptiness, wrongly (xxiv. II)

perceived

brings destruction....

The conquerors

describe emptiness as the escape from for whom emptiness is a view,

all views, but those

they are called `incurable'. (xiii. 8)

The Master spoke of the abandonment of both coming to be and ceasing to be, therefore, nirvaa.na appropriately (xxv. 10) called neither being cannot be

nor non-being.

Ultimately, truth is beyond the reaches itself, beyond all speech. (374)

of knowledge

When

the

mind

processes

[of

fancying would

and

apprehending]

are no more, whence of signs

there be a this

superimposition

(nimitta),

without

[superimposition] of speech.

whence

would there be the process firmly established that

It is therefore

the Blessed Buddhas have never taught anything. (364)

Buddha

is

free

of

all

fancying beyond all

and

mental

fashioning.

He is therefore

speech, He

never preached any dharmas. (366)

Further-more, Buddha. Those

nothing

can

be

said

about

the to

who believe

that

they

can come

understand talk

the Buddha through the prolixity of their have not seen the Buddha in

and speculation

truth (xxii. 15). They are like blind

p. 151

men looking at the sun. (448)(73)

The Maadhyamika

doctrines

referred to above are Yet, there to the We miss

all strongly reminiscent of the A.t.tha.

are no parallels in the A.t.tha corresponding philosophical the rhetoric groundwork of the Madhyamaka. of the tetralemma, the

ontological

framework of causation and dependent origination, the double truth, etc. not break down It is true that the analogy of these differences; does the

because

basic elements which we recognized in the A.t.tha are for part the most of the part in the Madhyamaka: silence the workings all talk as a

way to calming a goal

of wrong and the

apprehension, conqueror or verbal

beyond

of the goal who is beyond apprehension. And these to the

all description are, no doubt, teachings of

characteristic both A.t.tha

of and central and Madhyamaka.

Yet, the differences

that exist are seldom unimportant, though they may be considered subtle or marginal to the religious quest.

The radical statement found in the in the Madhyamaka A.t.tha, or, for

of "Buddha's

silence"

as

is not to be found anywhere that matter, in the whole

Paali Canon. cling

One thing is to say that Buddhas do not and do not enter that from into disputes, and moment of his

to views is

another

to say

the

awakening only a

the Buddha question There

never spoke a word. of is emphasis an important or

It is not rhetorical

pyrotechnics. difference.

philosophical with a

In the first case we are dealing

very concrete description

of the way to do something

and of the results that follow, in the second case we are dealing with the ontological explanation and

justification of the experience and its value,

We find agreement

on the fact that truth

is not

multiple (Madhyamaka xviii.9, A.t.tha 886ab), but the A.t.tha makes no attempt to define the one truth. The Madhyamaka, it is true, ends up by declaring that the one truth is neither truth, nor untruth, etc. (xvii

8), but the point is that while Naagaarjuna establish dialectically and significance taking that for very and ontologically

seeks to the value is of

of nonapprehension, the A.t.tha nonapprehension as the point The

departure

practical

injunctions.

A.t.tha

requires silence because it contributes to final calm and release, the Maadhyamika, because all dharmas are beyond speech, ineffable, empty and from the

beginning pure (Pras. 539).

The A.t.tha with the

does not seem to be at all concerned of a formed body of Buddhist

existence (if there that with

--doctrines possibility incompatible whereas

was one of them), or with the these doctrines of could be

its

teachings

nonduality, of the

Naagaarjuna

is patently

conscious

conflict. On the one hand, he seeks to derive as much as possible of his doctrine from the rhetoric of

older speculations and dogmas. is forced to construct

On the other hand, he of two levels of

a hierarchy

truth, by means of which he will secure a place among Buddhist "truths" to the specifics of the path as

taught in the suutras.

It

is true

that

the

"ultimate and

truth"

of the

Madhyamaka (Pras.

is beyond

all words

understandings

493) and is thus placed on a similar position of the A.t.tha; truth" is but the moment posited truth the that a

as the goal

"conventional changes. This

situation

conventional

or transactional

truth (vyavahaara)

p. 152

is a necessary without it one

element could

in the plan of the path, for never reach the ineffable

ultimate

(xxiv.l0).

Such

subtleties

are a far cry to silence could of

from the direct and simple injunction the A.t.tha. The "double truth"

imply. the

Naagaarjuna's hypostatizing with freely

protestations

notwithstanding,

of silence.(74) The A.t.tha is content jumping is still from silence to with speech, the

Naagaarjuna inconsistency.

concerned

In other words, the A.t.tha effortlessly

seems to

have understood

that silence is not to is not literal or

be reified, that mystical

silence

physical silence. The Maadhyamika, on the other hand, requires the most abstruse rhetoric to wrestle with

the dilemma of words vs. silence.

But

the

greatest

difference points

between

the

two The

doctrines A.t.tha solution

lies

in their

of departure.

sets

out to find

(or describe) a practical merely the abstract

to human

sorrow, not

sorrow of rebirth, but the everyday and aggression. all Naagaarjuna lack This

sorrow of strife that

sets out to prove

dharmas

self-subsistence leads to a concern

(ni.hsvabhaavaadharmaa.h). with conduct

in the case of the A.t.tha, and, on the in the case of

other hand, a concern with dialectics Naagaarjuna.(75)

SPECULATIVE NOTE

In

conclusion,

the

A.t.tha's

"theory

of with

no-theory"

can be compared rather successfully

the Praasa^ngika Maadhyamika stand. Parallels between the two doctrines become more obvious and valuable if we are willing to concede that the practical

motivations or imperatives behind the Maadhyamika are close to those Maadhyamika's svalak.sa.na thoroughly with the of the A.t.thakavagga. opposition theories of to the the Moreover, the dharma and is

Abhidharmists

consistent, though A.t.tha's rejection

by no means identical of all mooring in

dharmas.

At

this

point arise. an

several First, early do

highly we of have a

speculative in the

questions

A.t.thakavagga tradition

example

continuous

of apophatic

Buddhism? If so, could we be in the

justified in speaking of a "protomaadhyamika" A.t.thakavagga? Last, what is the

historical

connection, if any, of this proto-Maadhyamika and a possible Indian "proto-Ch'an"? There is more than one reason why these legitimate historical questions must remain in the speculative realm. One does not have to bring back to life the specter of "original Buddhism" to be able to speak of earlier the Canon, and the A.t.tha or latter strata in

no doubt

belongs

to the

earliest.(76) The words "earliest" however, do chronology, not nor mean do much they, in in

or "quite early," terms of absolute help to

the

least,

clarify the A.t.tha's doctrinal or historical role in the development of Buddhist dogmatics. Moreover, the

propriety of the term "protomaadhyamika" depends also on the establishment of a definite connection between the A.t.tha and the Maadhyamikas. One first step in

this direction would be to show that Naagaarjuna knew the A.t.thakavagga or contemplative or that he belonged to a monastic tradition stemming from a religious

milieu close or identical

p. 153

to that

of the A.t.thakavagga.

Although

the

later

seems likely, it is a thesis falsification insofar as reliable wanting. spiritual lineages and hagiographies knowledge are

As to Naagaarjuna's

of the Paali

Canon, it seems quite obvious that he must have known some form of the Sa.myukta and by implication other AAgamas, but and the Madhyama AAgamas, that he knew the way of

we may conclude there is no

foolproof

determining specifically familiar with.

which were the texts he was he believed that the

Most certainly

avyaak.rtaani

held much

of the key to understanding

the whole

of the Buddha's

message, but there

is no

way of ascertaining whether the A.tt.ha was in anyway pivotal to his exegesis of the canonical texts.

If the connection with Naagaarjuna or impossible Ch'an

is difficult, with the of pure

to establish, any connection must remain in the realm

tradition

speculation. (77) It is somewhat suggestive that some Indian masters found Ch'an congenial to their view of the path. It is also interesting to note that as

Maadhyamika and its

turned toward

a svaatantrika became

position, it

abhidharmic

traits

stronger,

eventually no-doctrine

found itself path

in frank opposition at the bSam-yas

to the debate

of Ch'an

("Council of Lhasa").

In the present state of our knowledge it would be more reasonable to discard the possibility of a

one-line teachings perhaps, theory. type

transmission of the the

and assume that the apophatic the Maadhyamika one type of and, path this

A.t.tha,

Ch'an,

represent accurate

It is also more as a unique

to envision

not

and isolated

phenomenon, but

rather as one tendency among others that grew among a complex of doctrinal attempts to define, refine, or

map out the Buddhist mystical path.

Thus, difficulties A.t.tha

in

spite

of

the

differences

and

outlined above, the Maadhyamaka and the belong to the same type of Buddhist

both

tradition

with regard

to the value of views and the

function of conceptual thought. This is the same type to which such traditions as the Ch'an belong, and

which is characterized by the rejection of all views: views what are not given is to be up for the sake of right views, is attachment to views.

abandoned

Because the goal

such interpretation of complete

of the path presupposes of the conceptual connected to a of

eradication

harborages doctrine release.

of the mind, it is often of jiivan-mukti or

"leap plans

theory''

This class

of Buddhist

of the path

should be contrasted to the "right-views" theories in which the cultivation transformation of right views and the gradual

of mind is emphasized.(78) There are,

of course, intermediate types, such as we find in the latter Maadhyamika of the Bhaavanaakramas. While most Buddhists agree that the goal is beyond words, the

issue is whether the transition directives consummation the goal is or descriptions

from specific verbal the path to its

of

in the final face-to-face experience of best understood as a quantitative

transformation or as a qualitative leap.

The problem for the gradualist is the textual and

philosophic being

tradition which states that all dharmas, are empty, therefore Such

interdependent, and from

ungraspable

the beginning

at peace.

doctrines seem to exclude the possibility

p. 154

or functional value of a gradual path, or of any path at all.(79) By the same token, the "leap theory" must explain how it is that specific actions must precede

awakening and the final obtainment of the goal. If no specific steps are called for how is it that not

everyone is immediately liberated?(80)

The Madhyamaka traditional path as

attacks

the problem by using the of the middle connection However,

abhidharmic understanding

pratiitya-samutpaada. the specificity

Causal

guarantees Naagaarjuna theory has

of the

path.

is forced

to bring

in his double-truth after he of the

to save this very causal connection undermined it through his The

critique

self-subsistence

(svabhaava).

A.t.tha, on

other hand, never considers these problems.

Perhaps,

if we had to get an answer from the A.t.tha, we could assume that the answer is to be found in the fact

that true nonclinging

to views includes the negation

of all hypostases

of negation: neither

attached

to

passion nor attached to dispassion (A.t.tha 795, 813. et al.). efforts, In the end, in spite Naagaarjuna of all his scholastic agree with the

would probably

A.t.tha, for neither of the two is proposing calm and silence as a reifiable directive absolute to but as a In

self-abolishing

nonclinging.

principle, the problem of the function of the path in emptiness because arise. root never should have arisen, but precisely univocal, it had which to the to

negation

is in no way

The fundamental of samsaric

illusions belong

are at the realm of

bondage

language and conceptualization. But silence by itself leads nowhere, first, is because the process with of a

conceptualizing basic state

indissolubly and

connected speech

of

thought

dispersion

(prapa~nca) which is affective and second, because realm of speech. silence

as well as cognitive, itself belongs to the

Thus, our picture

of the Middle

Path

would

be

incomplete and unfaithful if we were to overemphasize the cognitive affective aspect (avidyaa) at the expense of the were to take the

(t.r.s.naa), or if we

directive to silence as an injunction bliss of the deaf and the mute. minding (ayoni`so

to live in the

The wrongly directed

manasikaara), which is at the base

of the agitation

of becoming, must be uprooted

by a and is

complete bringing to rest of clinging, affective cognitive. that purely the The pitfall of mystical directive ineffability

to silence, if understood level, could be reified of

at a and

cognitive into

transformed

a new

apprehension

speech, a

source of further dispersion of thought and wordiness. The directive of the A.t.tha thus comes close to that of the Maadhyamaka: to take the pronouncements on

emptiness as the true view is to moor in emptiness as if it were another object for clinging. the Maadhyamaka, the A.t.tha the connection between very But, unlike

aptly

emphasizes from

conduct

(abstention

strife, dispute, and

frivolous

talk) and meditation

(mindfulness, contemplation) on the one hand, and the abandonment of clinging to views, on the other. is, the A.t.tha of the various clearly levels That

sees the interconnectedness of silence. The Madhyamaka

lacks such a perception; but Naagaarjuna's masterwork is an attempt at grounding it the is not practice a guide in a to

philosophical practice.

rhetoric,

We should not make too much of its silence and practical side of

with respect to the affective

nonclinging, or assume that Naagaarjuna of this

was ignorant

p. 155

important aspect of Buddhism as a path of liberation.

In conclusion, one should Naagaarjuna. Many

not be too harsh

with

of the passages

from the A.t.tha in

that we have discussed above cannot be harmonized any way with much of what is found

in the abhidharma

tradition of the Hiinayaana, against which, no doubt, Naagaarjuna was reacting in the spirit of a tradition close to that of the A.t.tha. In his study on

prapa~nca and sa~n~naa, ~Naa.naananda makes it a point to criticize the Madhyamika for its excessive in the

dialecticism.(81) I tend to agree with his stance this regard, is but something lost I among cannot of the so spirit of

Tripi.taka flourish,

much

dialectical that

avoid

feeling

~Naa.naananda has chosen the wrong man to pick on. It is true that both the Prajnaapaaramitaa a similar and the

Maadhyamika Ch'an) tend

(and to word

later, in fall games

spirit, even into

(almost and

addictively) the

formulistic

overlook

simple,

practical recommendations the Paali

of some of the passages in in the Nikaayas. But, the

Canon, especially

then, the same accusation whole

could be made against

of Buddhism, much of the Tripi.taka which rose out of the Buddha's

included. silence

The religion

is no doubt

one of the

most

verbose, abstruse

and

pedantic of them all.

And this applies in particular was attempting to

to the abhidharma that Naagaarjuna refute. In many ways, Buddhism

has failed to follow from

the advice

of the A.t.thakavagga: to keep away

contentions and disputes by not grasping at views.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Early Buddhist theorization

views on the role of language and

do not contain anything comparable to a With the exception of the older and

theory of language. parts of the

Suttanipaata

(A.t.thakavagga

Paaraayana) and scattered the Paali tradition

passages

in the Nikaayas, of avidyaa

has adopted

a view

which suggests a condemnation of specific theories or views, rather clinging to than an outright and rejection of the The the the as the

theorizing

opinionating. to imply (as is not (as in seen in

ineffability impossibility Maadhyamika) , inextricably

of the goal is not taken of and theorization theorization to

connected

clinging the

Suttanipaata) .

Nevertheless,

Paali

tradition

preserves, in the Suttanipaata and elsewhere, several important discover classic passages in which one could perhaps

some kind of "proto-Maadhyamika."(82) These lines suggest, however, several

interpretations. not all of which lead necessarily to a Maadhyamika position.

The Paali tradition (and in a considerable approach

contains

in the first place of the cases)

majority

passages

which

the question

of languages

from a variety of ontological moral perspective of of talk (slander, unwholesome the

angles, namely: from a falsehood, roots) , of etc., from as the

generators perspective (frivolous

prophylaxis calm

meditation

destroys

and concentration),

from the point of view of established doctrinal truth (one should not adopt or promulgate false teachings), etc. But the least frequent passages These we have placed are of greater two basic

interest.

into

categories: (1) goal-silence (the goal is

p. 156

utterly undescribable) and (2) path-silence and theorizing are obstacles in the path).

(talking

The various levels at which these views on language and conceptualization are developed do not could and

necessarily be

meet in the texts and conceivably or accepted separately

considered

disconnectedly, could

as

they

often

are. However, built around

they the

all fall into

one pattern

ineffability

of the goal. where the

And this root of

happens

in the and to own

A.t.thakavagga, becoming

suffering tendency its

is discovered cling to

in the its

mind's

passionately prolific

own

fancies: rooted

conceptualizations,

in

wrong

apperception (sa~n~naa). This view of the position of the conceptual process in the plan of the path is

theoretically close to Naagaarjuna, and in this sense one could easily interpret most of the authentic

works of Naagaarjuna non-Mahaayaana type

as consistent with at least one

tradition.(83) Or one could propose a common to both the A.t.tha and in

or tendency

Maadhyamika

surviving

also in isolated passages

the Nikaayas, such as some canonical

interpretations

of the `indeterminables' (avyaak.rtaani).

However, one between the tone

all important of the

difference and

subsists of the

A.t.tha

that

Madhyamaka.

Some key passages from the A.t.tha could passages in the sense concepts of

be called "proto-Maadhyamika" that they anticipate the Maadhyamika.

some of the axial The A.t.tha,

however,

contains

explicit tone, for

directives, consonant the eradication

with

its moralizing and the way

of

clinging

abandonment

of theorization, and clearly

makes

for

corresponding References

contemplative

and

ascetic

practice. the

to this practice are absent in in the other works of

Madhyamaka

and scarce

Naagaarjuna.(84)

Moreover, Maadhyamika twofold

the

theoretical

framework

of

the The

is totally absent from the A.t.tha. and

truth, emptiness, causation,

dependent

origination, the indeterminables, the tetralemma, the equivalence of sa.msaara and nirvaa.na, are

conspicuous by their absence.

But then, perfect

correspondence

would

be just

that, and not anticipation. Whether one is willing to bestow A.t.tha the honorific of "proto-Maadhyamika" on the

depends mainly on whether the practical core

one is willing to around which

recognize

Naagaarjuna's dialectical edifice has been built.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Note: References to Paali texts Text Society editions.

are all to the Paali and page numbers

by volume

unless otherwise indicated.

Abbreviated References

Abhidharmako`sa: . kaarikaa

references in P.

by

ko`sasthaana

and

numbers

Pradhan,

AbhidharmJayaswal

Koshabhasya of Vasubandhu (Patna: K. Institute, 1967)

P.

A.s.taada`sa: Manuscript

referred

to by

folio

of the

Gilgit

as edited by Edward Conze.

The Gilgit

Manuscript of the A.s.taada`sasaahasrikaapraj~naapaaramitaa, Serie Orientale Roma, 26 and 46,

(Rome: ISMEO, 1962, 1974).

p. 157

Bhaavanaakramas: G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts, Part II Serie Orientale Roma, IX. 2, (Rome: ISMEO, 1958) . Sde-dge xylograph. Tohoku No. 3926. G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts, Part III Serie Orientale Roma, 48, (Pome: ISMEO, 1971).

Bodhicaryaavataara: references

to chapter and stanza

nos. in L. de la Vallee-Poussin's, ed., in Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta, 1901-1914).

Bodhicaryaavataara

Pa~njikaa: references

to page in

the edition mentioned above.

Chalmers: R. (Lord) Chalmers, Buddha's Teachings, Harvard Oriental Series, No. 37 (Cambridge, Mass., 1932).

Da`sabhuumika: Ryuko Kondo, Da`sabhuumii`svaro naama Mahaayaanasuutram (Tokyo: Daijyo Bukkyo Kenkyo-kai [sic], 1936).

Ga.n.davyuuha: ed. P. Institute, 1969).

L.

Vaidya (Darbhanga: Mithila

Hare: E. M. Hare, Woven Cadences, Sacred Books of the Buddhist, 15 (London, 1948).

Ka`syapaparivarta: ed.

(Baron)A.

von Stael-Holstein

(Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1926).

Lalitavistara: S. Lehre 1908). des

Lefmann, Lalita-Vistara, Leben und 2 (Halle, 1902,

Caakya-Buddha, Vol.

Madhyamaka:

references

to chapter

and karika in L. de

de la Vallee-Poussin, Muulamadhyamakakaarikaas Naagaarjuna avec la Prasannapadaa

Commentaire de 11 (St.

Candrakiirti, Bibliotheca Petersburg, 1903-1913).

Buddhica, No.

Madhyaantavibhaaga-.Tiikaa: ed. Susumu Yamaguchi (Nagoya: Librairie Hajinkaku, 1934).

Mahaavastu: ed. Emile Senart, 3 vols. (Paris, 1882-1897).

Neumann: K. der

E. Neumann, Die Reden Gotamo Buddhos aus der Bruchstucke Suttanipaato des

Sammlung

Paali Kanons, (Leipzig, 1911).

Nyanaponika:

annotated

German

translation

of

Suttanipaata, (Konstanz: Verlag Christiani, 1955).

Pa~ncavi.m`sati: Pa~ncavi.m`satisaahasrikaapraj~naapaaramitaa, ed. Nalinaksha Dutt, Calcutta Oriental Series, No. 28 (London, 1934).

Prasannapadaa:

ref. to pages in Madhyamaka, above.

Vajracchedikaa: Vajracchedikaapraj~naapaaramitaa, ed. E. Conze, Serie Orientale Roma, XIII, 2d ed.

(Rome: ISMEO, 1974).

NOTES

1.

The mismo

stanza is from St. hechas sobre

John's un

poem "Coplas de

del

extasis

harta

contemplacion", pp. Crisogono Lucinio de

410-412

in Ruano's del Ni~no

edition: Jesus, y de la

Jesus, Matias y obras Iglesia

Ruano, Vida de la

de San

Juan

Cruz, Doctor

Universal, (Madrid:

Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1972). The lines can be prosaicly translated: "He who truly arrives there, will loose consciousness of himself;

whatever to him,

he used to know now seems yet his science grows

insignificant so much beyond that all

afterwards science.'' mystic's conditions of the

he remains

knowing, even

The gulf that separates view of silence and

the Christian ignorance as

of the mystic can be

path and goal from that fully appreciated by

Buddhist

perusing St. John's remarks in Noche oscura, I. 10 ff., II.11 ff., these chapters are analyzed in

Leonard A. McCann, The Doctrine of the Void in St. John of the Cross (Toronto: Basilian Press, 1955). Compare also, St. ... John's comments on the lines " sonora..." in

la musica callada, la soledad

Cantico espiritual, canciones 14 y 15, sec. 25-26, in Ruano. Also, Dichos de luz y amor, 131, and

Federico Ruiz-Salvador, Introduccion a San Juan de la Cruz (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1968), pp. 99-104, 429-442.

2. Wu-men-kuan, case xxxvi. Furuta Shokin, Mumonkan, (Kyoto: problem up in the Kadogawa Bunsho, 1968) , p. 124. The taken

of words and silence is repeatedly Ch'an tradition, confer, for in Yuan-wu's lxv (pp.

example,

the locus classicus Pi-yen Sogen's lu's case

comments on the in Asahino Iwanami

269-278

edition, In

Hekigan-roku this passage

(Tokyo: the

Shoten, 1937).

simplistic

stereotype of Ch'an's aversion to words is exposed for what it is. There is a parallel compare case in

Wu-men-kuan

xxxii;

also

case

xxiv. for

Yuan-wu, by the

way, chastises

Vimalakiirti

his superficial "answer" to Ma~njusri's Important desiderata in this area studies of

question. Ch'an are

p. 158

of the mo-chao

ch'an and k'an-hua

ch'an conflict kung-an (gosen

and, of course, on the yen-ch'uan koan). 3. Majjhima Nikaaya, I. 426-432.

4. The Paali Canon never used such a strong to express the ineffability of the

formula Buddhist

message.

The stronger form is clearly Mahaayaana.

The classical statement is found in Prasannapadaa,

p. 366, a passage quoted by Bu-ston to show that sectarian and school differences in "ultimately" meaningless. 5. See our comments "roads of on Suttanipaata 1076, below. The are also mentioned in the Buddhism are

speech"

Ka`syapaparivarta, section 125: in Dharma

"He does not moor

even in terms of dispassionateness, how of the roads of

much less then by the utterances speech!" (vaakpathodaaharena). Nikaaya, II.

Compare A^nguttara

9, where the Tathagata is said to be Also compare, 184, Ga.n.davyuuha Da`sabhuumika

vaadapathaativatta.

(Vaidya) pp. 17, 21, 22 and (Kondo)

p.14, Pa~ncavi.m`satii, p. 212, and A.s.

taada`sa, folio 253a. 6. Cf. the interpretation of prapa~nca as "delay" or "obstacle" s.v. in the Pali compare, Text Society Pa~ncavi.m`sati Dictionary, pp. 200,

Also,

491-492, and A.s.taada`sa f. 250a. 7. Itivuttaka, p. 34; Abhidharmako`sa, III. vs. 27 29 and VI. vs. 3 (corresponding to L. de la

Vallee-Poussin, III. pp. 136-139. 8. E. Cornelis, religions in his

pp. 69-72, 88-91, and

VI.

Valeurs

chretiennes

des

non

chretiennes

(Paris: Ed. that

du Cerf, Jaspers

1965), p. 162, mentions considers nomenclatures "que de la

the fact

secheresse est

meme un

des

l'abhidharma

procede

stylistique exactement adapte aux necessites d'une propedeutique au silence mystique." Unfortunately

no reference is given. 9. The distinctions a priori on we have drawn or, this better, point do here seem to be formal, not and

purely

similarities necessary

contain of these John in para que

material

implications.

Some by St.

distinctions

are made explicitly

Subida del Monte Carmelo, III.II.I, "... el alma se venga de renunciar

a unir con Dios en esperanza, ha posesion de la memoria, pues sea entera de Dios, y ni

toda

que, para

que la esperanza

nada ha de haber en la memoria que no sea Dios; como (tambien hemos dicho) ninguna forma,

figura, ni imagen, ni otra noticia en la memoria

que pueda caer a El, ahora

sea Dios ni semejante

celestial, ahora terrena, natural o sobrenatural.... de aqui es que, si la memoria quiere hacer alguna presa de algo desto, se impide para Dios..."

Similar considerations appear in, op. cit., III.3.13, 5.3, and passim. For mystical silence, cf. Llama

de amor viva, 2.21, and Dichos de luz y amor,, 27, 99, and, on the anagoge, 138. see 121, On ascetic silence, 9; Dichos, 117, of 22

Subida, III.3.4, 5.1-2, and 155, 179, and St.

John's

letter

November 1587 to the nuns at Beas,in Ruano, p. 371. In some of these passages ascetic and eremitic

silence are not separated expected. 10. Regarding the age

in any way, as is to be

of the Suttanipaata

and the

"Arthavargiiya" in Yamada

see the summary of the question Daijo Bukkyo Butten , Seiritsu Ron

Ryujo,

Josetsu, Shiryo (Kyoto:

Hen: Bongo 1959)

no Shobunken,

Heirakuji,

pp. 54-55 (on

Arthavargiiya), 25-27 and 48 (on Suttanipaata). 11. In the scholastic literature, the Suttanipaata is quoted extensively only in the paracanonical Nettipakara.na however, one (canonical full in Burma). There work is, to

commentary

attributed

Buddhaghosa, the Paramatthajotikaa (the first part of which is dedicated to the Khuddakapaa.tha), and commentaries to books IV (A.t.thakavagga) and V

(Paaraayanavagga), the Mahaa- and Cuu.la- Niddesa, respectively (both canonical). 12. Sn, 908, 911. Henceforth all references to

Suttanipaata

will be given

with the abbreviation

Sn followed by the stanza number, according to the Paali stanza Text Society edition, or simply leaves with the

number

when the context

no doubt

about the source. 13. Sn 905 and passim. 14. On the traditional d.r.sti-`siilavrata-paraamar`sa, V. 7-8. But also compare 42:

cf. Abhidharmako`sa, A^nguttara-Nikaaya

(henceforth, AN), II., p.

"kaamesanaa bhavesanaa brahmacariyesanaa

saha iti

saccaparaamaaso di.t.thithana samussaya"; AN, III. p. 377, 433. etc. Majjhima-Nikaaya (henceforth, MN), I., p.

Digha-Nikaaya (henceforth, DN), III., p. 48, Compare the use of upaadaana in MN, I., pp.

50-51: "kaamupaadaana.m di.t.thupaadaana.m siilabbatupaadaana.m MN.I., pp. convictions attavaadupaadaana.m", also,

95-97. Detachment from all virtues and is also prescribed Subida del by St. John.

Confer, for example.

Monte

Carmelo,

Book II, i.2, xxix.8, and III, iii.3 and ix.3, but contrast Book II, xvii.4 and also Cautelas, 3, and Cantico Espiritual, iii.3, the inconsistencies St. John clearly from are the due ones to reasons in

quite similar

different

behind

inconsistencies in Buddhism,

p. 159

see, for

example, Subida

II, vi,l ff.

and Noche

Oscura, I, vi.8.

The relinquishment

of virtue is in Buddhism

not to be construed as antinomianism; the number of texts substantiating legion. classici Perhaps is the one of the most

this point are apposite loci

Sama.nama.n.dikasutta

(MN, II.,

pp. 22-29). `siila-vrata (siilabbata or siilavata) could be

read as a determinative but in Sn 839 the

or a copulative compound, word is broken up as a

copulative. The word `siila, incidentally, is also closer moral to the etymological and morality meaning of our words to the

(mores)

than

contemporary usage of these terms. 15. In quotations, the stanza number stanza being quoted. 16. A number of difficulties arise in translating will follow each

this passage. (as per

Purekkharoti seems to mean "prefer" 859), as it does sometimes in

794 and

classical

Sanskrit, but it also suggests the idea or "predetermining." could mean "to be Also, neyya followed" or

of "prejudging" (as in 846)

"imitated," that is, "to be copied, pin pointed or figured out" by means of his habits (`siila) and

convictions (vrata). 17. Here atta (apta) is clearly (cognitively "what is adopted or

assumed

and affectively)," compare, "assumption" "das and

787 and 790ff. Nyanaponika,

Hare translates so

not

gracefully,

einst

Geglaubte," implying

that there is a new `belief'

to be adopted once the past (non-Buddhist) beliefs have been abandoned. I am translating ni-`sri and its derivatives

(nissaya, nissito, etc.) with various forms of the verb "to rely." Hare uses "trust" or "have

recourse," which is quite alright, but I prefer to preserve something of the literal meaning of

"leaning on." 18. "Sa ve viyattesu na vaggasaarii" (800c). 19. Henceforth A.t.tha will stand for A.t.thakavagga. 20. The first line, "Yassuubhayante pa.nidhiidha n'

atthi," is rendered by Hare: "Who here directs his thoughts to neither course"; beiden da Nyanaponika, "Der Enden," Neumann. hinspaht";

kein Verlangen "Nach beiden

hat nach Enden

wer

nimmer

Chalmers, "When pray'rs for future life... cease." Basically, Neumann the problem seems to be pa.nidhi,

and Chalmers

take this world in its ]ate appropriately construed

meanings, but it is more

in its literal meaning of "placing down [-forth]," hence, "direct" or "fix" [the mind]. Hare and

Nyanaponika are both acceptable, but Nyanaponika's rendering follows fits the context Mahaa-Niddesa better. As usual, be

closely, where the word is

glossed (p. 109), "ta.nhaa...abhijjhaa, lobho...." But, in this being passage is the inclination something more (pa.nidhi) than mere

described

longing; in

the word obviously refers to inclination and the two extremes could be

general,

emotional, moral, or conceptual.

21.

Kappa

and

pakappayati: "form the process by

[in

the

mind]," the

"fancy,"

means

of

which

apperception (sa~n~naa) is formed, this gives rise to the multiplicity of fancies factor or imaginings

(vikappa).

The dividing

is the papa~nca, The kappa is (Hare) of notes of Sn

the fixation factor is the sa^nkhaa. the active the function See

of the "moulding" the pertinent

sa^nkhaara. in pp.

Nyanaponika

266 (on

Sn 209), 281 (on

373), 293 (on Sn 530), 257-258 (on the key stanza 538). sa^nkhaara, p.305. fails to see the related

(Sn 148), and 293

However, his comments on he to His

are not as apposite, since closeness term: of the Sn usage

another,

abhisa^nkharoti. in the

interpretation

of sa~n~naa

Kalahavivaada for he still there in the schema,

also seems to be a bit off the mark, feels that the term is being used

context of the classical which is obviously not

four samaapatti the case.

Nyanaponika,

however, does take part of his note

the term on

as we do in a latter 874, where he

stanza

translates "Vorstellung (p.332). But

papa~ncasa.mj~naasa^nkhaa und his Begriff der

with "

Vieiheitswelt, of 874d

translation

is weak: in

"Denn vom Bewusstsein stammt die Vielheitswelt ihren notes. Teilen," this in spite of his

commentary

Muta take

has also been

variously

interpreted;

it to belong

with the root sa.mmuti

man (thus, with and stanzas 714,

muni, etc.).

Compare

798-799, 846, and, especially "Erfahrendes' seems to me

839. a

Nyanaponika's compromise

good

between the commentatorial

derivation from m.r`s-

and the derivation from man-; he takes it, though, correctly to be cognate to mata. p. 298, and (Also, compare, pp.

Cuu.la-Niddesa, 87-89.)

Mahaa-Niddesa,

It

would

seem

pertinent

at

this

point

to

mention two important passages from the Nikayas in which nonattachment to things seen, heard, etc. is formulated but in the succint reference manner of the A.t.tha, to mindfulness. The

in obvious

Bahiya-sutta (Udaana I. of the craving two and makes

10) is the most condensed no explicit This reference aspect to

for sense

objects.

of the

doctrine is

p. 160

brought out in the Maalu^nkya-sutta of the Sa^myuttra

(or Maalukya)

Nikaaya (hence-forth, SN), IV.,

pp. 72-74, where mindfulness is presented not only as the antidote to lust, but also as the final and

condition moorings

of the mind, beyond of the mind

all dualities

(Saara.t.thapakaasinii, Compare, also,

however, interprets

differently).

Theragaahaa, stanzas 794-817. 22. "Sandhi.t.thiraagena hi te `bhirattaa." 23. I take upadhi literally of course a certain The poet is (upa-dhaa), but there is, up," "sham." the idea up up of as a

sense of "cover here with

playing

foraneous "additives" semblance

matter or

(a~n~nena)

piling to build

"agglutinants"

of a self. that

An upadhi is a "substratum" it is a base we build in

only in the sense

order to have something a real

to lean on, but it is not added to the true

base, it is something

nature of things, not something underlying them or giving any real support to illusion. 24. "Fashioning", pakubbamaano. Compare, abhi(ni)sa^mkharoti. 25. Pp. 790. 26. This passage could not be more reminiscent of the Maahdyamika. 860d. 27. "Rest," nibbuti. 28. "Naatumaanam vikappayan ti.t.the." An equally Compare, also, Sn 795d, 813d, and 85-86. Followed by Nyanaponika in 789 and

acceptable forms, he

rendering: "Though touched my multiple would not make a station [in them]

fancying himself [to be this or that]." Evidently, vikappayan is to be taken in the sense of

"separating and contrasting" to the multiple forms of

oneself with respect the man The world. sein word Thus, Selbst ruupa,

Nyanaponika, vergleichend

"Nicht

moge

unterscheiden."

however, encompasses much more than the "Tugenden" of Nyanaponika's rendering. 29. Nyanaponika takes samuggahiita as a noun meaning of much with or

"dogmas," but it is clearly broader uggahita, meaning, "that and is

a participle interchangeable

which

grabbed, grasped,

clutched." The change from the third person plural of 794 to the singular text. 30. Sec note 21, herein. excellent study Also see Bhikkhu Nanananda's on papa~nca and Reality and in of 795 is in the original

papa~ncasa~n~na-sa^nkhaa: Concept Early Buddhist Thought

(Kandy:

Buddhist

Publication Society, 1971). sa~n~naa (sa^mj~naa) is

Our interpretation of confirmed by the

also

scholastics: see, for II.

example, Abhidharmako`sa, .

stanza 47ab, and commentary to II. stanza 24 stanza 14cd; Visuddhimagga chapter XIV,

and I.

par. 130.

31. "Muula.m

papa~ncasa^mkhaayaa

mantaa

asmiiti /

sabbam uparundhe / yaa kaaci ta.nhaa ajjhatta.m taasa.m 1111: vinayaa

sadaa sate sikkhe //"Compare, Sn ca bahiddhaa ca vedana.m

"ajjhatta~n

naabhinandato / eva.m satassa carato vi~n~naa.na.m uparujjhati //" The doctrine in the of no-self There is not presented

explicitly important statements passage

Sn.

are, however, two as

passages of such

that could be interpreted a doctrine.

In the classical the

at Sn 1119, the Buddha is attributed loka.m avekkhasu... uuhacca...."

words: "su~n~nato attaanudi.t.thim as empty... [the / your] lines as an

sadaa sato

("regard the world views about these in the

always

mindful, uproot Whether of

self"). example

we construe

anattavaada

classical

sense or as an example of the A.t.tha's

teaching advising the monk not to fancy himself as being this or that, being or not being (918, see

note 28, herein), is truly not as important as the fact that this passage brings out the important

connections: `emptiness-mindfulness-selflessness'. The other passage on which the seems to contain a

pronouncement

self

question

is Sn 756: nivi.t.tham

"anattani attamaanam naamaruupasmim, `ida.m ("See that the world

passa loka.m... sacca.m' ti

ma~n~nati." of self with

has thoughts

regard to that which is not [the] self, mooring in name and form, the world thinks "this is the

true". ) 32. Compare note 31, herein, 855, and Sn 1070-1072 1055-1056,

(discussed 1105-1111. are

below), also, Less

1041,

important,

but of some interest 1119 (see on

933, 1026, 1035-1036, 1039, 1062, Notice that

note 31, herein).

most passages

mindfulness are from the Paaraayana. 33. In the practice of mindfulness, no doubt one must difference between A few passages a moment, to be (and

find the first irreconciliable Christian in St.

and Buddhist mysticism. Subida seem, for

John's

speaking

of something

close to mindfulness minimal

there is, to be sure, a certain

point of

contact). Thus, Subida, II. 12. 3, II. 14. 11, and III. 2. 14, from and emphasize the fruit the importance of

withdrawing faculties" except and

of the "imiginative of everything

emptying

the mind

the "memory" of

of God.

But the true nature (olvido, in

purpose

this

withdrawal

contrast to

p. 161

sm.rti) comes through transparently

in II.

8-9,

II. 12. 4ff., II. 3.

14.

10, and III. 11-14, Llama in the whole edifice of A how one

19-21 and of course

the noche pasiva del espiritu in Noche oscura. careful perusal of these passages shows

superficial type

any attempt would be at reducing to the terms

of mysticism by

of another, as example, George

attempted

so many

(see, for

Grimm in his "Christian the Buddha's, " Indian

Mysticism in the Light of Historical Quarterly 4

(1928): 306-338). 34. On the basis of 872 we must surmise that in 873-874 ruupam stands for naamaruupa. Equivalent, no doubt, to the naamakaaya of 1074. Compare, 530, 736, 756. 35. This is the only way I can interpret what is described in 874, discussed below. Compare, the Po.t.thapaada-sutta (DN I.178 ff.), where (p.181)

the idea of control, rather than suppression, is clearly suggested. 36. "Sa~n~nanidaana hi papa~ncasa.mkhaa." Compare

916, also 530, 886, and 1041. Compare Itivuttaka, pp. 53-54, but contrast Udaana, p. 77. 37. DN I.276-277. 38. Compare also the causation "series" in the

Dvayataanupassanaa-sutta, Sn, pp. 139 ff. 39. The Paali is here less active: "form... "vibhoti ruupam." 40. On this refreshingly different use of the term ceases,"

aaki~nca~n~na, confer, Sn 1100, 1115.

976, 1063, 1091, 1098in 490,

Also, Compare, aki~ncana,

501, 620, 645, and, of less

value, 176, 455.

41. "Anaanuyaayii": Hare, "untrammelled," Nyanaponika, following Cuula-Niddesa, "nicht weiter-wandern." Perhaps better, "not having anything else to follow," that is, he is an asaik.sa. 42. Also, "perception." in his herein. 43. Confer, notes 30 and 36, herein. 44. Confer the notes 34 and 39, herein. itself does not The context allow a of Path By Nyanamoli, for instance, 21,

of Purification.

Confer, note

sutra

literal

interpretation, that is, "making body and mind to cease completely." The cessation is to take place in this life. Confer the ditthaddhammaabhinibbutaa of 1087. But, perhaps this is to be interpreted like the di.t.the dhamme aniitiham of 1053, or in the light of the twofold typology of nirvaana (sopaadisesa and nirupaadisea). 45. There is no place here for the reduction passage to the meditational of this

stage of the eighth .

aruupa-samaapatti

(nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naa)

Compare, Nyanaponika pp. 331-332). considers the person who has gone

Mahaa-Niddesa through the

path described

here as an aruupa-magga-sama^ngii

(pp.279-280) and does not seem to appreciate the

ascending and dialectic nature of the four steps. It also seems to ignore the fact that about the the

Kalahavivaada complete rate, the

is explicitly

talking

ending of becoming meaning of the

and sorrow. four (or

At any five) if

samaapattis is not at all clear, particularly we insist

on nevasa~n~naanaas~n~nasamaapatti and as mental states "without

the nirodhasamaapatti

perception" or "without feeling." It is difficult to see how the sa~n~naavedayitanirodha, which beyond the state of is

nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naa, to "na sa~n~naa." The

could be a simple

return

key to the term is no doubt in the word vedayita. But a clarification The canonical must await further research. is not always very

literature

helpful. Passages where the highest samaapatti is praised and recommended without a clear

definition are abundant (see, for example, AN IV. 429-432, 433-434, and MN I 159-160). In other

places the canon seems to confirm interpretations like those of Buddhaghosa with words such as

those of MN III. 45: "ayam, bhikkhave, bhikkhu na ki^mci kenaci ma~n~nati, ma~n~nati." na kuhi~nci ma~n~nati, na

But, then, contrast

MN 111.

28: "puna ca param, bhikkhave, saariputto sabbaso nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naayatana^m sa~n~naavedayitanirodha^m samatikkamma

upasampajja viharati /

pa~n~naaya

cassa

disvaa

aasavaa

parikkhiinaa

honti / so taaya samaapattiyaa / so taaya samaapattiyaa dhammaa atiitaa niruddhaa samanupassati `eva^m

sato vu.t.thahati ye

sate vu.t.thahitvaa viparinataa dhammaa / so

te dhamme ahutvaa tesu

kirame

sambhonti hutvaa pa.tiventi' ti dhammesu

anupaayo anapayo anissito appa.tibaddho cetasaa ti

vipamutto visa^myutto vimaariyaadikatena viharati / so `natthi uttari

nissaranam

pajaanaati / tabbahuliikaaraa natthitvevassa hoti /". Also, compare, the analysis and samaapattis of the jhaanas of

in the Cuulasu~n~nataa-sutta

the MN (III. pp. 104 ff.). Release the is not always (a fact attained known by way of to the

samapattis of the

well

defenders meditation

satipa.t.thaana Confer.

or vipassanaa for example,

system) .

Mahaasatipatthaana-sutta, DN II., pp. 290ff., and Sama~n~naphala-sutta, DN I., pp. 75ff. Compare, also, the analysis of the samaapattis in DN I., pp. 178ff. (Potthapaada-sutta). In the traditional account of the Buddha's enlighten-

p. 162

ment

it is said that Sakyamuni samaapattis

learnt

the third Kalama

and fourth

from his teachers

and Ramaputra, realized that these did not lead to emancipation, and method. proceeded to develop his own

The nirodhasamaapatti is not presented as

the culmination of the new path. See references in Andre Bareau, Recherches sur la biographie du

Buddha, Premiere Partie (Paris: Ecole Francaise d' Extreme Orient, 1963). See also, Buddhacarita,

Canto XII. The Nettipakara.na (pp. 76, 100) enumerates five samaapattis with terms reminiscent of the Sn:

sa~n~naa, asa~n~na, nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naa, vibhuutasa~n~naa, commenting nirodhasa~n~naa. Dhammapaala, list, is obviously

on this unorthodox

at a loss as to its meaning. Compare, Nyanaponika, pp. 331-332. 46. SN III.,p.9. 47, Notice the contrast and between the person who is

sa~n~na-ratta

the one who is pa~n~naavimutta

and, therefore, sa~n~naaviratta. 48. "Sabbasa^mkhaarasama thaa sa~n~naaya uparodhanaa," compare, the passages in note 27, herein. 49. It is interesting are here taken to note that to be in some a person's way the basis views and

cause of the view others take of him. Could we say that a person's "own thing" and "gimmick" is that

by which others being? 50. The vi~n~naana

and he himself

identify

his own

of

the

Sn

is

closer

to

the

vij~napti (active) of Yogaacaara

psychology, than It

to the fundamental awareness of consciousness. is the active graha.na and upalabdhi

of the mind

(Abhidharmako`sa I. vs. 16a.), the act of notation by means of which the sa~n~naa operates

(Abhidharmako`sa II. vs. 34ab.). 51. I am not at all satisfied with my rendering, This is a

"ceases," for atta.m paleti (gacchati).

standard idiom for the setting of the sun, and, as pointed out by Nyanaponika in his note (p. it has been purposefully idea of annihilation 355),.

chosen to avoid both the

and the idea of a permanent

blissful abode, a duality about which Upasiva will question the Buddha in the next stanza (1075).

Compare also, 876-877. The simile of fire is also used to avoid extremes: fire, one of the basic both

elements, does

not cease to exist, it simply becomes imperceptible or ungraspable point, confer, when it runs out of fuel. E. Frauwallner, vol. pp. On this der Otto his

Geschichte 1(Salzburg: 225ff., and

indischen Muller

Philosophie, Verlag, 1953) ,

important reference to Mahaabhaarta XII.187.2, 5-6 in note 131, p. 470. Also, to the question "so uda

vaa so n'atthi udaahu ve sassatiyaa arogo" (1075), the answer is: "... na pamaa.nam atthi," etc.

(1076) translated below. 52. Compare, note 5, herein. Also the stock phrase for many of the passages on the indeterminables is the uprooting

(avyaak.rtaani), where the topic

of the thirst and the grasping of the skandhas, by means of which one could pinpoint world, but Confer, not a Buddha example, SN who has a person of the uprooted them.

for

IV., pp.

373-380, 384,

401-403, (compare, SN IV., p. 52). On the viannana of the man who is released, compare the

Upaya-sutta of SN III. 53-54. 53. "Remainderless" : anupaadisesa!! 54. The idea that the Buddha "sees through" those who, believing themselves experts in release, are still deeply rooted in attachment, who reminds me of the

Kierkegaard's

ironist,

sees

through

inauthenticity of the pious. Compare, for example, the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. F. Swenson and W. Lowrie, Press, (Princeton, N. 1941, pp. D. J.:

Princeton

University

537-544. is

Another interesting, but also partial parallel found in St.

John's remarks on those who cling to

the mental images of meditation without letting go into the void of contemplation (Subida del Monte Carmelo,II.xii.6)

55. The question is not the metaphysical

validity

of

any theory, of any of the extremes, but rather the deceit problem and is destructiveness mooring na hi in of clinging. views; The

785ab,

"di.t.thiinivesaa niccheyya

svaativattaa / dhammesu Both extremes are a

samuggahiita.m."

bond (801), whether it is becoming

or nonbecoming

makes no difference (776, 856, 786, 877, 1068). 56. The differences between Paaraayana and A.t.tha

are mostly differences of emphasis. Both texts are very close, especially when compared with the rest of the Sn. But differences in approach, language, suggest different origins for

meter, and style

A.t.tha and Paaraayana. 57. Notice that no view As we is to be the considered point a out below, for the this the

highest.

will

"choicelessness"

creates

problem

formulation of directives in the path. This is the "nondual and bind" which has important implications, have in an philosophical in of the these

practical I

especially some on the

Mahaayaana. implications

considered article

Buddhist

"absolute" to appear shortly in the special volume on Buddhism of Estudios de Asia y Africa del Norte (Mexico, DF)

p. 163

58. A "highest" could also be a "beyond" (param). far will off the mark is the from Mahaa-Niddesa its gloss

How

at times

be appreciated "senaa

of the word /

visenikatvaa:

vuccati

maarasenaa

kaayaduccarita.m maarasenaa,

maarasenaa,

vaciiduccarita.m maarasenaa... / yato

manoduccarita.m

sabbaakusalaabhisa.mkhaaraa

maarasenaa

catuuhi ariyamaggehi sabbaa ca maarasenaa sabbe ca patisenikaraa kilesaa jitaa ca paraajitaa... vuccati visenikatvaa ti..." (pp. 174-175). 59. This is one of the most doubtful A.t.tha, it is also metaphysical Maadhyamika h'eva one of the passages few with in the evident tena

implications

(possible The Pali naanaa

parallel to reads: "na /a~n~natra

ontology, too). bahuuni

saccaani

sa~n~naaya

niccaani

loke." Chalmers: "Apart from truths exist." Hare:

consciousness, no "Indeed from there surmise

diverse

are not many on

divers in

truths, Save the world."

`lasting' gibt

Nyanaponika: "Nicht

es Wahrheit Geltung

vielerlei, Welt, es

verschieden, Von ew'ger sei denn bloss vielfach

in der

im Dunken." ich

Neumann: "Verschieden Wahrheit, Only Bloss Hare

kenn'

keine

wahrgenommen

die da ewig

bleibe...."

comes close to an acceptable

rendering.

The word

sa~n~naaya niccaani

must

be

construed

verbally

with

as its object.

The Chinese (Taisho 198,

p. 182-b-14) is unclear. 60. "Kuppapa.ticcasanti.m