Pakistan's relationship with United States of America (all aspects)

NOW that the initial government-encouraged euphoria over the recent offer by Washington to sell F-16 aircraft to Islamabad has subsided to some extent and the heady feeling of being a major non-N !O ally of the "# is being replaced by gro$ing concerns over the fast developing "#-India strategic partnership as evidenced by the "#-India %efence &act signed at the end of 'une and the subse(uent Indo-"# nuclear deal) time has come to ta*e an objective and detached loo* at &a*istan-"# relations+ ,istorically spea*ing) &a*istan-s relations $ith the "nited #tates have gone through several phases of close cooperation and estrangement+ !he current phase of close &a*istan-"# relations began $ith the "-turn in &a*istan-s pro-!aliban policy in the $a*e of the events of ./11 leading to the full resumption of the "# economic and military assistance to &a*istan and its designation as a non-N !O ally+

&a*istan-"# relations have seen many ups and do$ns) and there is no guarantee that the future course of this relationship is going to be any different despite the reassuring statements made from time to time in both Washington and Islamabad+ !he strength of this relationship obviously $ill depend on the convergence of the national interests of the t$o countries0 the greater the convergence) the stronger $ith this relationship be+ 1et us see $hat the "# global and regional interests in #outh they converge $ith &a*istan-s national interests+ sia are and the extent to $hich

!he over-arching "# strategic objective since the end of the cold $ar and the collapse of the #oviet "nion is to remain the predominant global po$er as it is no$ and to prevent the rise of another po$er capable of challenging its global supremacy+ &resident 2ush couldn-t have said it more une(uivocally $hen he declared at West &oint on 'une 1) 3443) 5 merica has) and intends to *eep) military strengths beyond challenge) thereby ma*ing the destabili6ing arms races of other eras pointless) and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace+7 In other $ords) the main "# strategic objective is to *eep this $orld unipolar as long as possible and to bloc* or at least to slo$ do$n the emergence of a multipolar $orld+ "# strategic objectives in various regions basically flo$ from the main goal of establishing the "# global hegemony or &ax mericana+ lthough it has almost become a cliche to say that the 31st century $ould be the sian century) it still is a valid statement+ sia) currently $ith the second largest economy in the $orld 8'apan9) the fast gro$ing economy of :hina $ith the estimated ;%& of <1+=> trillion) $ith t$o of the biggest countries in the $orld in terms of population 8:hina and India9) $ith the fast gro$ing military muscle of :hina) 'apan) India and #outh ?orea) $ith most of the $orld oil and gas reserves) and $ith the dynamic economies of the sean and #outh ?orea) is a continent $hich is destined to play an increasingly important role in international politics in the 31st century+

It is understandable) therefore) that the "# $ould li*e to be actively involved in the security architecture in sia+ ccording to a senior "# official (uoted recently in Ne$ %elhi) 5!he $orst outcome for the "# is an sia from $hich $e are excluded+++ !he *ey challenge for the "# over the past 144 years has been to remain engaged every$here and not allo$ any other industrial po$er to dominate a given region+ If I $ere :hina) I $ould be $or*ing on *ic*ing the "# out of sia+ @ight no$) $e have a lot of alliances but there is no architecture embedding us in sia+ !his $orries us+7 !he "# vie$s :hina as posing in due course a challenge to its po$er and influence in sia as the latter-s economic and military po$er gro$s further+ Washington is therefore engaged in building up a security structure aimed at containing :hina+ !he "# alliances $ith 'apan and #outh ?orea $ill play this role in the Far Aast+ !he developments of the past fe$ years clearly indicate that the "# has decided to build up India in the hope that it $ill ultimately emerge as a counter$eight to :hina on the sian continent and help in containing :hina on its southern periphery+ :onversely) India needs the support of the "# for building itself up as a major global po$er and establishing its hegemony in #outh sia+ !he fast gro$ing strategic partnership bet$een the "# and India neatly dovetails the strategic objectives of a global hegemon and an aspiring regional hegemon+ 8In vie$ of the recent Indo-:hina agreement establishing a strategic partnership bet$een them) it remains to be seen ho$ India $ill play its cards in dealing $ith the t$o contradictory partnerships+9+ India is also a big mar*et for the "# exports and armaments+ !he landmar* event in the fast developing "#-India strategic partnership) in the $a*e of the announcement from Washington in Barch this year that the "# intended to help India become a 5major $orld po$er in the 31st century7 $as the signing in Washington on 'une 3>) 344C) of 5the ne$ frame$or* for "#-India defence relationship7 by the defence ministers of the t$o countries+ !his defence pact) $hich tal*s about the common belief of the t$o largest democracies in freedom) democracy and the rule of la$) $ill support) and $ill be an element of) the broader "#India strategic partnership+ It commits the t$o countries to cooperation in missile defence) combating terrorism and violent religious extremism) preventing the proliferation of $eapons of mass destruction) technology transfer and defence trade+ It also mentions that the "#-India defence cooperation in a short span of time had advanced to unprecedented levels unimaginable in 1..C+ !here are already reports of the offer by the "# to sell to India F-16 and F-1> aircraft) and the &atriot & :-D anti-missile system+ !he "#-India defence pact $as soon follo$ed by a nuclear agreement bet$een the t$o sides) concluded during &rime Binister Banmohan #ingh-s visit to the "#+ !his $ould enable India to ac(uire nuclear reactors and technology for peaceful purposes in disregard of the restrictions imposed by the "# Nuclear Non-&roliferation ct and the guidelines of the nuclear suppliersgroup+ Interestingly) the "# officials commenting on the Indo-"# nuclear deal have indicated that the 2ush administration is unli*ely to offer a similar deal to &a*istan+ In short) the "# is developing its strategic partnership $ith India in pursuance of its grand design for sia in $hich India is expected to play a *ey role+ !he concept of a strategic partnership implies an element of e(uality bet$een the t$o partners+ :onse(uently) India $ill expect the "#

to be sensitive to its ambition of emerging as a great po$er E something $hich the "# has already conceded in the hope of establishing its hegemony in #outh sia and the Indian Ocean region+ It is also li*ely) despite the assurances given by the "# secretary of state to our foreign minister and by president 2ush to our president) that the "# in its efforts to build up India as a counter$eight to :hina $ill ignore the re(uirements of a strategic balance in #outh sia+ In contrast $ith the "#-India strategic partnership) $hich is based on the convergence of the long-term fundamental interests of the t$o countries) the current &a*istan-"# relationship has a sha*y foundation+ s far as common beliefs are concerned) &a*istan-s trac* record in practising democracy is far less appealing than that of India as $e still appear to be groping for a democratic system $hich suits the genius of our people+ &a*istan-s all-$eather friendship $ith :hina has been a pillar of strength and security+ It has neither the capacity nor the desire to counter :hina in any $ay+ !herefore) it cannot help in fulfilling the most fundamental "# strategic objective on the sian continent of containing :hina+ !he "# $illingness to build up India as a major po$er runs contrary to &a*istan-s consistent efforts to oppose Indian hegemony in #outh sia+ !he $ave of religious extremism) $hich has fractured and brutali6ed our society in the aftermath of the fghan jihad against the #oviet occupation and the subse(uent militancy in fghanistan and ?ashmir) remains a source of concern to the "# as numerous articles and stories in its media indicate+ s for the peaceful settlement of ?ashmir) $hich is the core issue for &a*istan in its relations $ith India) the "# interest does not go beyond mere verbal encouragement to the t$o sides to try to reach a negotiated settlement of all their differences as the recent pronouncement by &resident 2ush during the visit of the Indian prime minister to Washington indicates+ Its real objective is to prevent &a*istan from doing anything $hich $ould raise tensions in &a*istan-India relations+ It is true that the "# appreciates the important role that &a*istan is playing in the $ar against terrorism and has re$arded us $ith economic and military assistance as $ell as the status of a major non-N !O ally+ ,o$ever) going through the articles and commentaries appearing in the "#) one gets the uneasy feeling that Washington regards &a*istan both as a problem and as an important ally in the $ar against terror+ No $onder there is constant pressure on &a*istan to do more than $hat it has already done in ridding its society of the scourge of violent religious extremism) in combating $hich both the "# and India are committed to cooperate under the "#-India defence pact of 'une) 344C+ 2y no$ it is crystal clear that behind the facade of 5dehyphenating7 "# relations $ith India and &a*istan as #ecretary of #tate :ondolee66a @ice described it or having 5individual relationships7 $ith these t$o countries as "# "nder-#ecretary of #tate Nicholas 2urns recently put it) Washington has decided to place its relations $ith India at a higher plane in terms of priority and importance than those $ith &a*istan+ !he current "#-&a*istan relationship) therefore) suffers from serious limitations and uncertainties+ First of all) there is no (uestion of an element of e(uality in an alliance bet$een a superpo$er and a middle-ran*ing country li*e &a*istan+ !he grant of the non-N !O ally status to &a*istan basically means that it has accepted a subordinate role in the service of the "# strategic interests in return

for economic and military assistance+ #econdly) the convergence of their strategic interests is currently limited to the $ar on terror in $hich $e are playing a *ey role in collaboration $ith the "# instead of &a*istan being a part of any grand "# strategic design+ !his ma*es the relationship extremely fragile and uncertain) especially *eeping in vie$ the internal societal convulsions through $hich &a*istan is passing and the past "# trac* record+ !hirdly) the promised sale of F-16 aircraft and other "# military e(uipment to &a*istan may meet our essential needs for maintaining a credible deterrent+ ,o$ever) loo*ed at more closely from the "# point of vie$) it is meant to *eep &a*istan) especially its military establishment) on a tight leash in the service of the "# strategic interests in the foreseeable future+ !his is the reality that $e face behind the smo*escreen of empty rhetoric and assurances $hich are full of sound and fury signifying nothing+ It is time to face the realities as they are so as not to be confronted $ith disappointments and unpleasant surprises do$n the road+ Our objective should be to adopt a ne$ mix of internal and external policies $hich $ould safeguard our national interests and provide a more solid and durable foundation for our friendship $ith the "# as $e cannot afford to be on less than friendly and cordial terms $ith it+ It is axiomatic that $e must *eep our national interests supreme in the management of &a*istan"# relations+ !herefore) $hile there are several factors relevant to &a*istan-"# relations $hich $e cannot change) there are others that $e can modify to our advantage in strengthening this vital relationship+ !he promotion of a stable democratic order in &a*istan) based on national consensus) is one such factor $hich is not only desirable in its o$n right but $ould also help in bringing the t$o countries closer together+ !he same is true of improving the performance of the economy) raising the standard of human development in the country) particularly through increased attention to education and health) and ridding ourselves of the scourge of obscurantism) retrogression and religious extremism+ In the realm of foreign affairs) $e need to broaden our options at the regional and global levels $hile persisting in our policy of friendship $ith the "#+ ,o$ever) $e should not develop our relations $ith it) mar*ed as it as by serious limitations and uncertainties) at the expense of our friendly relations $ith neighbours such as :hina and Iran+ s the saying goes) one can choose one-s friends but not one-s neighbours+ coherent regional policy should be the central element of our over-all foreign policy+ In particular) $e should avoid a repetition of the strategic blunders of the 1..4s $hen $e pursued the pro-!aliban policy in fghanistan $hich isolated us regionally and globally besides encouraging religious extremism and *lashni*ov culture in our society+ We are still living $ith the disastrous conse(uences of that illconceived policy both internally and externally+