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Rcpi vs ca 143 scra 657 Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code Negligence Loreto Dionella alleges that the

e defamatory words on the telegram sent to him by the operator RCPI not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment and affected adversely his business as well because other people have come to know said defamatory words. Dionella filed for damages and was granted by the trial court and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals the liability of petitioner company employer predicated under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. RCPI now comes to the Supreme Court for review by certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability of RCPI is predicated under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. The cause of action of private respondent is based on Artciles 19 and 20 of the new Civil Code as well as respondents breach of contract thru negligence of its own employees.

Torts and Damages Case Digest: Lopez v. Pan American (1966)


Labels: 1966, Case Digest, Factors in determining amount, G.R. No. L-20434, July 30, Juris Doctor, torts and damages, torts and damages case digest

G.R. No. L-20434

July 30, 1966

Lessons Applicable: Factors in determining amount (Torts and Damages) Laws Applicable: FACTS:

August 1, 1960: Pan American Employees Association staged a strike so Pan Am forced them to take a leave of absence without pay on February 22, 1961 to February 23, 1961 court a quo: affected them financially and economically, it ordered Pan America to pay them their two days salaries CA: affirmed.

ISSUE: W/N the employees should be awarded back wages. HELD: NO. AFFIRMED in so far as it declares petitioner Pan American World Airways, Inc. not guilty of unfair labor practice, but IS REVERSED in so far as it orders said petitioner to pay the members of the respondent labor union, Pan American Employees Association, their wages or salaries for February 22 and 23, 1961 when they were made by the petitioner to go on

furlough. The petitioner is absolved from paying the said back wages. No pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

The dismiss employee is not entirely without remedy if his charge of unfair labor practice fails and his complaint dismissed, because the breach by the employer of the obligation to him may be redressed like an ordinary contract or obligation in placing its employees on furlough for two days, petitioner acted in good faith. The record shows that before laying them off it asked permission from the industrial court and only effected the furlough after said court authorized it to do so. the step taken by respondent was necessary to protect its interest whose business is mainly dependent on the flight of its planes," giving as additional reason that "lack of work as a cause of lay-off is justified. Inasmuch as petitioner acted in good faith, it should not be ordered to pay back wages to its laid off employees. not paid their wages for only two days, We do not believe that the same would place them in such a financial and economic distress as to warrant the award of their back wages Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-5767 October 30, 1954 The Testament of the Late PLACIDA MINA; CRISANTO UMIPIG, ET ALS, petitioners. ATTY. JESUS Q. QUINTILLAN, claimant-appellee, vs. LAZARO DEGALA, GERMANA ESCOBAR, GREGORIO GUERZON, TEODORO, FELIE, CRISTINA, GUERZON, BOLONIA TAMAYO, LEONA LEONES, SIMONA MENDOZA, ISABEL DIRECTO, PLACIDA DIRECTO , ANDRES DIRECTO, PETRA DIRECTO, PAULA DIRECTO, and CLARO QUEBRAL, oppositors-appellants. Antonio Directo for appellants. F. V. Vergara for appellee. BENGZON, J.: This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur awarding to Jesus Quintillan the sum of P50,000 as attorney's fees payable by the estate of the late Placida Mina. After the death of said woman in July 1939, three different instruments alleged to be duly executed wills. The first was Civil Case No. 3685 filed by Dr. Eufemio Domingo; the second, Civil Case No. 3686 instituted by Crisanto Umipig, Marietta Quintillan, Roberto A. Desierto and Cecilia Reyes, who are four out of six trustees and children of trustees designated in the will of Placida Mina. The court found this third document to be true testament of the deceased.

These trustees successfully opposed the probate of the first two documents alleged to be wills in the two previous cases Nos. cases by Attorney Jesus Quintillan pursuant to their contract Annex A-1 reading as follows: We, Roberto A. Desierto , Cecilia Reyes, Crisanto Umipig and Marieta F. Quintillan, declare the fact that because we desire to oppose the probate of the will sought to be probated by Dr. Eufemio Domingo, and the will sought to be probated by Mr. Joaquin Escobar, who claim that such testaments they are respectively presenting are the true wills of the late Doa Placida Mina, and because the will we desire to be probated is the true will of the late Doa Placida dated the year 1927, we made an agreement with Atty. J. Q. Quintillan that he be our lawyer in all said cases and we promised him that if he can succeed in not allowing the wills presented by said Dr. Eufemio Domingo and Mr. Joaquin Escobar to probate, and in obtaining the probate of the will of Doa Placida Mina dated the year 1927, we will give to the said Atty. J. Q. Quintillan as his fees 30 percent of the entire estate left by the deceased Placida Mina, and it was agreed that the said attorney shall be responsible for all necessary expenses in these cases. In the event that no result shall be obtained in his attending us in said cases, we shall not be under any obligation to him for expenses incurred by him and for his attorney's fees. Having performed his part and obtained the probate of the will, Attorney Quintillan submitted his claim for professional services in this expediente. He requested payment of P150,000 (30 percent) asserting that the entire estate of Placida Mina actually was worth more than half-a million pesos. Leona Leones and Cipriano Alcantara, tow other trustees of the authentic will, opposed the request. Attorney Antonio Directo for the heirs, likewise objected. Subsequently, however, all the heirs and parties interested in the estate subscribed to a stipulation, the pertinent part of which read: (g) That the parties recognize that Atty. Jesus Q. Quintillan is entitled to certain attorney's fees for services rendered in the testamentary proceedings of Placida Mina and for other services rendered for which he filed a claim thereof, but it is understood that the court shall decide the reasonableness of such attorney's fees and whatever sum the court will adjudicate the same shall constitute a charge as express of administration in the testamentary proceedings of Placida Mina, Civil Case No. 3689, both of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. Pursuant to said stipulation the court proceed to determine the reasonable amount payable to Atty. Quintillan, adjudging to him the sum "of P50,000 as his attorney' s fees, and the Court orders that the part of this amount that has not yet been collected by Atty. Quintillan be paid to him by the estate of the late Placida Mina, said amount to constitute a charge as expenses of administration in the testamentary proceedings." The heirs appealed directly to this Court. Their brief assigns severally errors in support of their two principal contentions, to wit, (a) the lower court lacked had not been presented in tie and (b) the reasonable compensation should be around P7,000 only. Inasmuch as the amount involve does not exceed P50,000 this appeal would not be properly here, except for the jurisdictional issue tendered by appellants. The point out that the court's directive requiring all money claims against the deceased was published July 3, 1950 and the period expired January 3, 1951. They argue that Quintillan's claim having been filed April 21, 1951 was belated and the court had no jurisdiction to act thereon. They invoke section 5 of Rule 87 partly providing as follows:

All claims for money against the decedent arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, or contingent, all, claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent , and judgment for money against the decedent must be filed within the time limited in the notice or otherwise they are barred forever. (Emphasis by appellants.) Upon careful examination we find their argument to have no juridical basis. The section refers obviously to claims "against the decedent arising from contract" with her. It applies to demands "which are proper against the decedent, that is, claims upon a liability contracted by the decedent before his death" . . . "except funeral expenses" etc.1 Anyway the judge may, in his discretion, permit a creditor to prove his claim even after the expiration of the period originally fixed. (section 2, Rule 87). Furthermore, all the sureties interested in this litigation covenanted on October 16, 1951 after the expiration of the period to submit Atty. Quintillan's claim to the court's decision so that reasonable attorney's fees may be fixed chargeable as expense of administration. Hence the appellants may not be heard to complain that the court rendered the award and practically extended the time for presentation of the attorneys claim. In connection with appellants' second contention, "The records of the case and the evidence adduced" says the trial judge "show that said Atty. Quintillan rendered professional services as counsel for the petitioner in the petition for probate of the will of the late Placida Mina, in the present case, Civil Case No. 3689; said Atty. Quintillan rendered his professional services as counsel for said petitioners in their opposition to the petition of one Dr. Eufemio Domingo (Civil Case No. 3689) for the probate of another supposed will of said late Placida Mina. The supposed will in said Civil Case No. 3685 was denied probate on appeal by the Court of Appeals and the petition of Joaquin Escobar in Civil Case No. 3686 was dismissed at the instance of the petitioner. "The will in the present case No. 3689, was allowed to probate in this Court, and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision appealed from. "In the sum, the claimant Atty. Jesus C. Quintillan, as counsel in the three above mentioned civil cases, obtained favorable decisions. Aside from his services for the benefit of the estate of the deceased Placida Mina. He defended the validity of the provisions of the probated will in Civil Case No. 303 of this Court, for although the claimant lost his case in this Court, he appealed and succeeded in securing the dismissal of the petition for declaratory judgment by the Supreme Court." To determine the compensation for legal services, courts in this jurisdiction take into account, in the absence of contract, several factors, namely, " (1 amount and character of the services rendered; (2) labor, time, and trouble involved; (3) nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the services were rendered; (4) responsibility imposed; (5) amount of money or value of the property affected by the controversy, or involved in the employment; (6) skill and experience called for in the performance of the services; (7) professional character and social standing of the attorney; (8) results secured; (90 whether or not the fee is absolute or contingent, it being a recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is to be contingent than when it is not2 ." These are generally questions of fact, within in this instance should be left mostly to the trial judge, since the heirs'' appeal direct to this Court is logically confined to questions of

law. At any rate, no material circumstance has been shown to justify a declaration that the amount awarded was excessive, having a declaration that the amount awarded was excessive , having in mind the principles and practice where counsel is engaged on the basis of quantum meruit or contingent fees. It is observed that an absolute majority of the trustees of the will (four) agreed in Exhibit A-1 to give the appellee 30 per cent of the entire estate valued at P500,000 and more3." Although such contract has not been submitted to the court of approval4, still it could be a proper element to reckon. At least in one case, an agreement whereby attorneys were promised compensation equal to 2/6 of the hereditary estate if they succeeded in impugning a will, was declared not to be excessive or unreasonable5. The allowance of counsel fees in probate proceedings "rest largely in the sound discretion of the court, which should not be interpreted with except for manifest abuse, but it may be modified by the reviewing court when the fee allowed is inadequate or excessive6." Premises considered the appealed order should be, and is hereby affirmed, with costs. Paras, C.J., Pablo, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo. Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and

Candida Virata vs Victorio Ochoa


On July 23, 2011

81 SCRA 472 Torts and Damages Double Recovery of Civil Liability

In September 1975, Borilla was driving a jeep when he hit Arsenio Virata thereby causing the latters death. The heirs of Virata sued Borilla through an action for homicide through reckless imprudence in the CFI of Rizal. Viratas lawyer reserved their right to file a separate civil action the he later withdrew said motion. But in June 1976, pending the criminal case, the Viratas again reserved their right to file a separate civil action. Borilla was eventually acquitted as it was ruled that what happened was a mere accident. The heirs of Virata then sued Borilla and Ochoa (the owner of the jeep and employer of Borilla) for damages based on quasi delict. Ochoa assailed the civil suit alleging that Borilla was already acquitted and that the Viratas were merely trying to recover damages twice. The lower court agreed with Ochoa and dismissed the civil suit. ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Virata may file a separate civil suit. HELD: Yes. It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action under the Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent act. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. But said article forestalls a double recovery.

Alitalia v. IAC
Facts: Dr. Felipa Pablo, an associate professor in the University of the Philippines and a research grantee of the Philippine Atomic Energy Agency, was invited to take part at a meeting of the Department of Research and Isotopes in Italy in view of her specialized knowledge in foreign substances in food and the agriculture environment. She would be the second speaker on the first day of the meeting. Dr. Pablo booked passage on petitioner Alitalia. She arrived in Milan on the day before the meeting, but was told that her luggage was delayed and was in a succeeding flight from Rome to Milan. The luggage included her materials for the presentation. The succeeding flights did not carry her luggage. Desperate, she went to Rome to try to locate the luggage herself, but to no avail. She returned to Manila without attending the meeting. She demanded reparation for the damages. She rejected Alitalias offer of free airline tickets and commenced an action for damages. As it turned out, the luggage was actually forwarded to Ispra, but only a day after the scheduled appearance. It was returned to her after 11 months. The trial court ruled in favor of Dr. Pablo, and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Issues: (1) Whether the Warsaw Convention should be applied to limit Alitalias liability (2) Whether Dr. Pablo is entitled to nominal damages Held: (1) Under the Warsaw Convention, an air carrier is made liable for damages for: a. The death, wounding or other bodily injury of a passenger if the accident causing it took place on board the aircraft or I the course of its operations of embarking or disembarking; b. The destruction or loss of, or damage to, any registered luggage or goods, if the occurrence causing it took place during the carriage by air; and c. Delay in the transportation by air of passengers, luggage or goods. The convention however denies to the carrier availment of the provisions which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct, or by such default on his part as is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct. The Convention does not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances of an airline's liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. It should be deemed a limit of liability only in those cases where the cause of the death or injury to person, or destruction, loss or damage to property or delay in its transport is not attributable to or attended by any

wilful misconduct, bad faith, recklessness, or otherwise improper conduct on the part of any official or employee for which the carrier is responsible, and there is otherwise no special or extraordinary form of resulting injury. In the case at bar, no bad faith or otherwise improper conduct may be ascribed to the employees of petitioner airline; and Dr. Pablo's luggage was eventually returned to her, belatedly, it is true, but without appreciable damage. The fact is, nevertheless, that some species of injury was caused to Dr. Pablo because petitioner ALITALIA misplaced her baggage and failed to deliver it to her at the time appointed - a breach of its contract of carriage. Certainly, the compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. Pablo cannot under the circumstances be restricted to that prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for delay in the transport of baggage. (2) She is not, of course, entitled to be compensated for loss or damage to her luggage. She is however entitled to nominal damages which, as the law says, is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff that for any loss suffered and this Court agrees that the respondent Court of Appeals correctly set the amount thereof at PhP 40,000.00. The Court also agrees that respondent Court of Appeals correctly awarded attorneys fees to Dr. Pablo and the amount of PhP 5,000.00 set by it is reasonable in the premises. The law authorizes recovery of attorneys fees inter alia where, as here, the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest or where the court deems it just and equitable

Picart v. Smith
Facts: Plaintiff Amado Picart was riding on his pony on the Carlatan Bridge in San Fernando, La Union when the defendant, riding on his car, approached. Defendant blew his horn to give warning. Plaintiff moved the horse to the right instead of moving to the left, reasoning that he had no sufficient time to move to the right direction. Defendant continued to approach, and when he had gotten quite near, he quickly turned to the left. The horse was frightened that it turned his body across the bridge. His limb was broken and the rider was thrown off and got injured. The horse died. An action for damages was filed against the defendant. Issue: Whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done Held:

As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences. It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party

Gan v. CA
Facts: Petitioner Hedy Gan was driving along North Bay Boulevard on July 4, 1972. There were 2 vehicles parked on the right side of the road. As the petitioner approached the place where the vehicles were parked, a vehicle from the opposite direction tried to overtake another vehicle and encroached the lane of her car. To avoid collision, the petitioner swerved to the right and hit a pedestrian. The pedestrian was pinned to the rear of the parked jeepney, and died on arrival to the hospital. Petitioner was found guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence by the trial court. The Corut of Appeals modified the decision and found her guilty of homicide through simple imprudence. Issue: Whether the petitioner is negligent as to hold her guilty for the death of the pedestrian Held: We reverse.

The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty oil the doer to take precaution against its mischievous results and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence." Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple Imprudence resulting in Homicide The course of action suggested by the appellate court would seem reasonable were it not for the fact that such suggestion did not take into account the amount of time afforded petitioner to react to the situation she was in. For it is undeniable that the suggested course of action presupposes sufficient time for appellant to analyze the situation confronting her and to ponder on which of the different courses of action would result in the least possible harm to herself and to others. The appellate court is asking too much from a mere mortal like the petitioner who in the blink of an eye had to exercise her best judgment to extricate herself from a difficult and dangerous situation caused by the driver of the overtaking vehicle. Petitioner certainly could not be expected to act with all the coolness of a person under normal conditions. The danger confronting petitioner was real and imminent, threatening her very existence. She had no opportunity for rational thinking but only enough time to heed the very powerfull instinct of selfpreservation.

Lopez v. Pan American World Airways


Facts: Reservation for first class accommodation in Pan American Airlines from Tokyo to San Francisco was made by Delfin Faustino for then Senator Fernando Lopez and company. First class tickets were issued and paid for. The party left Manila for Tokyo as scheduled. Senator Lopez requested Minister Busuego to contact the airlines regarding their accommodation. However, they were informed that there was no accommodation for them. Because of some urgent matters to attend to in San Francisco, they were constrained to take the tourist flight under protest. Issues: (1) Whether the defendant acted in bad faith for deliberate refusal to comply with its contract to provide first-class accommodation to the plaintiff (2) Whether moral and exemplary damages should be awarded Held:

(1) From the evidence of defendant it is in effect admitted that defendant - through its agents - first cancelled plaintiffs, reservations by mistake and thereafter deliberately and intentionally withheld from plaintiffs or their travel agent the fact of said cancellation, letting them go on believing that their first class reservations stood valid and confirmed. In so misleading plaintiffs into purchasing first class tickets in the conviction that they had confirmed reservations for the same, when in fact they had none, defendant wilfully and knowingly placed itself into the position of having to breach its a foresaid contracts with plaintiffs should there be no last-minute cancellation by other passengers before flight time, as it turned out in this case. Such actuation of defendant may indeed have been prompted by nothing more than the promotion of its self-interest in holding on to Senator Lopez and party as passengers in its flight and foreclosing on their chances to seek the services of other airlines that may have been able to afford them first class accommodations. All the time, in legal contemplation such conduct already amounts to action in bad faith. For bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill-will. At the time plaintiffs bought their tickets, defendant, therefore, in breach of its known duty, made plaintiffs believe that their reservation had not been cancelled. Such willfulnon-disclosure of the cancellation or pretense that the reservations for plaintiffs stood and not simply the erroneous cancellation itself - is the factor to which is attributable the breach of the resulting contracts. And, as above-stated, in this respect defendant clearly acted in bad faith. (2) First, then, as to moral damages. As a proximate result of defendant's breach in bad faith of its contracts with plaintiffs, the latter suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety and mental anguish. For plaintiffs were travelling with first class tickets issued by defendant and yet they were given only the tourist class. At stopovers, they were expected to be among the first-class passengers by those awaiting to welcome them, only to be found among the tourist passengers. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers; it is humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to be expected from the contractual undertaking. The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide an example or correction for public good. Defendant having breached its contracts in bad faith, the court, as stated earlier, may award exemplary damages in addition to moral damages. In view of its nature, it should be imposed in such an amount as to sufficiently and effectively deter similar breach of contracts in the future by defendant or other airlines. In this light, we find it just to award P75,000.00 as exemplary or corrective damages.

Tan v. Northwest Airlines


Facts: On May 31, 1994, Priscilla Tan and Connie Tan boarded a Northwest Airlines plane in Chicago bound to the Philippines with a stop-over at Detroit. Upon their arrival, they found out that their baggage was missing. On June 3, they recovered the baggage and

discovered that some were destroyed and soiled. They filed an action for damages, claiming that they suffered mental anguish, sleepless nights and great damage. Northwest offered to reimburse the cost of repairs of the bags or purchase price of new bags. The trial court awarded actual, moral and exemplary damages, and also attorneys fees. The Court of Appeals partially affirmed the decision by deleting moral and exemplary damages. Hence, Tan filed this instant petition. Issue: Whether respondent Airline is liable for moral and exemplary damages for willful misconduct and breach of contract of carriage Held: We agree with the Court of Appeals that respondent was not guilty of willful misconduct. "For willful misconduct to exist there must be a showing that the acts complained of were impelled by an intention to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of one's rights. It must be evidenced by a flagrantly or shamefully wrong or improper conduct." Contrary to petitioner's contention, there was nothing in the conduct of respondent which showed that they were motivated by malice or bad faith in loading her baggages on another plane. Due to weight and balance restrictions, as a safety measure, respondent airline had to transport the baggages on a different flight, but with the same expected date and time of arrival in the Philippines. It is admitted that respondent failed to deliver petitioner's luggages on time. However, there was no showing of malice in such failure. By its concern for safety, respondent had to ship the baggages in another flight with the same date of arrival.

OSCAR VENTANILLA,

plaintiffappellant, vs.
G

RE
G

ORIO CENTENO,

defendantappellee.

G.R. No. L-14333 January 28, 1961 PADILLA,


J

.:
y

an action to recover damages claimed - by the

plaintiff due to the defendant's neglect in perfectingwithin the reglementary period his appeal from an adverse judgment

rendered by the CFI


y

the case sprang from a civil case, wherein Ventanilla retained the

service of Atty. Centeno


y

decision unfavourable to Ventanilla was received by Centeno , which was not

conformable toCenteno and that he wanted to file an appeal by which Ventanilla agreed.
y

Atty. Centeno wrote a letter to

the plaintiff enclosing forms for an appeal bond. Ventanilla, however,instead of executing an appeal bond, and because use of

his reluctance to pay the premium on theappeal bond, decided to file a cash appeal bond of P60.00.
y

8/18/1955, Ventanilla went

to the Office of Atty Centeno but was informed by the clerk that Centenowas in Laguna campaigning for his candidacy as

member of Provl Board


y

Ventanilla issued a P60.00 check and handed it to the clerk with an instruction to

give it to AttyCenteno
y

8/17, Centeno prepared the motion for extension of time to file the record

on appeal, w/c was filed on8/20


y

8/22. centeno encash the check and went to the office of the Clerk of Court to

file the appeal bond


y

Acdg. To Atty Centeno, it was not accepted because the period of appeal

had already expired


y

The court does not believe Centeno, neither the Clerk of Court, or any of the employees

has the rightto refuse an appeal bond that is being filed, for it is not in his power to determine whether or not theappeal bond

has been filed within the time prescribed by law. In fact the record on appeal wasaccepted and filed on September 5,

1955, but no appeal bond has been filed by Atty. Centeno


RULIN
G

: Judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.


RATIONALE

:
y

Art. 2199

: one is entitled to an adequate compensation, referred to as actual or compensatoryda mages.


y

by not paying the appeal bond of P60, Ventanilla lost his chance to recover from the defendantstherein P4,000 and moral & actual

damages, w/c he could have recovered if the appeal had dulybeen perfected
y

Art. 2217

. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,besmirch ed reputation, wounded

feelings, moral shocks, social humiliation, and similar injury. Thoughincapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages

may be recovered if they are the proximateresult of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
y

Art. 2219

. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminaloffense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction,abduct ion, rape, or other lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5)

Illegal or arbitrary detentionor arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8)

Maliciousprosecu tion (9) Acts mentioned in article 309; (10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26,

27,28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.. .


Art. 2219

specifically mentions "quasidelicts causing physical injuries,"as an

instance when moral damages may be allowed, thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts notresulting in

physical injuries are excluded


G.R. No. L-22405 June 30, 1971 PHILIPPINE EDUCATION CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. MAURICIO A. SORIANO, ET AL., defendant-appellees. Marcial Esposo for plaintiff-appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Attorney Concepcion Torrijos-Agapinan for defendants-appellees.

DIZON, J.: An appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the complaint filed by the Philippine Education Co., Inc. against Mauricio A. Soriano, Enrico Palomar and Rafael Contreras. On April 18, 1958 Enrique Montinola sought to purchase from the Manila Post Office ten (10) money orders of P200.00 each payable to E.P. Montinola withaddress at Lucena, Quezon. After the postal teller had made out money ordersnumbered 124685, 124687124695, Montinola offered to pay for them with a private checks were not generally accepted in payment of money orders, the teller advised him to see the Chief of the Money Order Division, but instead of doing so, Montinola managed to leave building with his own check and the ten(10) money orders without the knowledge of the teller. On the same date, April 18, 1958, upon discovery of the disappearance of the unpaid money orders, an urgent message was sent to all postmasters, and the following day notice was likewise served upon all banks, instructing them not to pay anyone of the money orders aforesaid if presented for payment. The Bank of America received a copy of said notice three days later.

On April 23, 1958 one of the above-mentioned money orders numbered 124688 was received by appellant as part of its sales receipts. The following day it deposited the same with the Bank of America, and one day thereafter the latter cleared it with the Bureau of Posts and received from the latter its face value of P200.00. On September 27, 1961, appellee Mauricio A. Soriano, Chief of the Money Order Division of the Manila Post Office, acting for and in behalf of his co-appellee, Postmaster Enrico Palomar, notified the Bank of America that money order No. 124688 attached to his letter had been found to have been irregularly issued and that, in view thereof, the amount it represented had been deducted from the bank's clearing account. For its part, on August 2 of the same year, the Bank of America debited appellant's account with the same amount and gave it advice thereof by means of a debit memo. On October 12, 1961 appellant requested the Postmaster General to reconsider the action taken by his office deducting the sum of P200.00 from the clearing account of the Bank of America, but his request was denied. So was appellant's subsequent request that the matter be referred to the Secretary of Justice for advice. Thereafter, appellant elevated the matter to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, but the latter sustained the actions taken by the postal officers. In connection with the events set forth above, Montinola was charged with theft in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Criminal Case No. 43866) but after trial he was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. On January 8, 1962 appellant filed an action against appellees in the Municipal Court of Manila praying for judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that after hearing defendants be ordered: (a) To countermand the notice given to the Bank of America on September 27, 1961, deducting from the said Bank's clearing account the sum of P200.00 represented by postal money order No. 124688, or in the alternative indemnify the plaintiff in the same amount with interest at 8-% per annum from September 27, 1961, which is the rate of interest being paid by plaintiff on its overdraft account; (b) To pay to the plaintiff out of their own personal funds, jointly and severally, actual and moral damages in the amount of P1,000.00 or in such amount as will be proved and/or determined by this Honorable Court: exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000.00, attorney's fees of P1,000.00, and the costs of action. Plaintiff also prays for such other and further relief as may be deemed just and equitable.

On November 17, 1962, after the parties had submitted the stipulation of facts reproduced at pages 12 to 15 of the Record on Appeal, the above-named court rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendants to countermand the notice given to the Bank of America on September 27, 1961, deducting from said Bank's clearing account the sum of P200.00 representing the amount of postal money

order No. 124688, or in the alternative, to indemnify the plaintiff in the said sum of P200.00 with interest thereon at the rate of 8-% per annum from September 27, 1961 until fully paid; without any pronouncement as to cost and attorney's fees.

The case was appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila where, after the parties had resubmitted the same stipulation of facts, the appealed decision dismissing the complaint, with costs, was rendered. The first, second and fifth assignments of error discussed in appellant's brief are related to the other and will therefore be discussed jointly. They raise this main issue: that the postal money order in question is a negotiable instrument; that its nature as such is not in anyway affected by the letter dated October 26, 1948 signed by the Director of Posts and addressed to all banks with a clearing account with the Post Office, and that money orders, once issued, create a contractual relationship of debtor and creditor, respectively, between the government, on the one hand, and the remitters payees or endorses, on the other. It is not disputed that our postal statutes were patterned after statutes in force in the United States. For this reason, ours are generally construed in accordance with the construction given in the United States to their own postal statutes, in the absence of any special reason justifying a departure from this policy or practice. The weight of authority in the United States is that postal money orders are not negotiable instruments (Bolognesi vs. U.S. 189 Fed. 395; U.S. vs. Stock Drawers National Bank, 30 Fed. 912), the reason behind this rule being that, in establishing and operating a postal money order system, the government is not engaging in commercial transactions but merely exercises a governmental power for the public benefit. It is to be noted in this connection that some of the restrictions imposed upon money orders by postal laws and regulations are inconsistent with the character of negotiable instruments. For instance, such laws and regulations usually provide for not more than one endorsement; payment of money orders may be withheld under a variety of circumstances (49 C.J. 1153). Of particular application to the postal money order in question are the conditions laid down in the letter of the Director of Posts of October 26, 1948 (Exhibit 3) to the Bank of America for the redemption of postal money orders received by it from its depositors. Among others, the condition is imposed that "in cases of adverse claim, the money order or money orders involved will be returned to you (the bank) and the, corresponding amount will have to be refunded to the Postmaster, Manila, who reserves the right to deduct the value thereof from any amount due you if such step is deemed necessary." The conditions thus imposed in order to enable the bank to continue enjoying the facilities theretofore enjoyed by its depositors, were accepted by the Bank of America. The latter is therefore bound by them. That it is so is clearly referred from the fact that, upon receiving advice that the amount represented by the money order in question had been deducted from its clearing account with the Manila Post Office, it did not file any protest against such action.

Moreover, not being a party to the understanding existing between the postal officers, on the one hand, and the Bank of America, on the other, appellant has no right to assail the terms and conditions thereof on the ground that the letter setting forth the terms and conditions aforesaid is void because it was not issued by a Department Head in accordance with Sec. 79 (B) of the Revised Administrative Code. In reality, however, said legal provision does not apply to the letter in question because it does not provide for a department regulation but merely sets down certain conditions upon the privilege granted to the Bank of Amrica to accept and pay postal money orders presented for payment at the Manila Post Office. Such being the case, it is clear that the Director of Posts had ample authority to issue it pursuant to Sec. 1190 of the Revised Administrative Code. In view of the foregoing, We do not find it necessary to resolve the issues raised in the third and fourth assignments of error. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision being in accordance with law, the same is hereby affirmed with costs. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur. Castro and Makasiar, JJ., took no part.

Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co.


Teodora Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co. G.R. No. L-33380. 17 December 1930. Malcolm, J.: Facts: In August, 1928, a young man by the name of Juan Astudillo met his death through electrocution, when he placed his right hand on a wire connected with an electric light pole situated near Sta Lucia Gate, Intramuros, in the City of Manila. Shortly thereafter, the mother of the deceased instituted an action in the CFI Mla to secure from the defendant, Manila Electric Company, damages. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Issue: WON defendant did not exercise due care and diligence so as to render it liable for damages. Ruling: The SC concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to damages. It is well established that the liability of electric light companies for damages for personal injuries is governed by the rules of negligence. Such companies are, however, not insurers of the safety of the public. But considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be.

In the case at ber, the cause of the injury was one which could have been foreseen and guarded against. The negligence came from the act of the defendant in so placing its pole and wires as to be w/n proximity to a place frequented by many people, with the possibility ever present of one of them losing his life by coming in contact with a highly charged and defectively insulated wire.

Cariaga v. LTB Co. Facts: At about 3:00 pm on June 18, 1952, a collision occurred between LTB bus and a train, which resulted to the death of the bus driver, and severe injury to its passengers, including plaintiff Edgardo Cariaga. Edgardo was a 4th year medical student at the University of SantoTomas. LTB paid the sum of P16,964.45 for his hospital bills, and daily allowance of P10 up to January 15, 1953, which totalled P775.30. On April 24, 1953, the present action was filed to recover for Edgardo the sum of P312,000 as actual, moral and compensatory damages from LTB and MRR Co. LTB disclaimed liability and filed a crossclaim against MRR for the medical assistance extended to Edgardo. The trial court awarded P10, 490 to Edgardo against LTB, and dismissed he cross-claim against MRR. The Cariagas and LTB both appealed. The Cariagas claim that the trial court erred in merely awarding P10,490 as compensatory damages, while LTB contends that the collision was due to the fault of the train engineer. Issues: (1) Whether it was the railroad company, and not LTB, who should be held liable (2) Whether actual and moral damages should be awarded to Edgardo (3) Whether Edgardos parents are entitled to damages Held: (1) The findings of the lower court are predicated mainly upon the testimony of Gregorio Ilusondo, a witness for the Manila Railroad Company. Notwithstanding the efforts exerted by the LTB to assail his credibility, we do not find in the record any fact or circumstance sufficient to discredit his testimony. We have, therefore, no other alternative but to accept the findings of the trial court to the effect, firstly, that the whistle of locomotive was sounded four times two long and two short "as the train was approximately 300 meters from the crossing"; secondly, that another LTB bus which arrived at the crossing ahead of the one where Edgardo Cariaga was a passenger, paid heed to the warning and stopped before the "crossing", while as the LTB itself now admits, the driver of the bus in question totally disregarded the warning. (2) Appellant LTB admits that under Art. 2201 of the Civil Code the damages for which the obligor, guilty of a breach of contract but who acted in good

faith, is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach and which the parties had forseen or could have reasonably forseen at the time the obligation was constituted, provided such damages, according to Art. 2199 of the same Code, have been duly proved. Upon this premise it claims that only the actual damages suffered by Edgardo Cariaga consisting of medical, hospital and other expenses in the total sum of P17,719.75 are within this category. We are of the opinion, however, that the income which Edgardo Cariaga could earn if he should finish the medical course and pass the corresponding board examinations must be deemed to be within the same category because they could have reasonably been foreseen by the parties at the time he boarded the bus No. 133 owned and operated by the LTB. At that time he was already a fourth-year student in medicine in a reputable university. While his scholastic may not be first rate, it is, nevertheless, sufficient to justify the assumption that he could have passed the board test in due time. As regards the income that he could possibly earn as a medical practitioner, it appears that, according to Dr. Amado Doria, a witness for the LTB, the amount of P300.00 could easily be expected as the minimum monthly income of Edgardo had he finished his studies. Upon consideration of all the facts mentioned heretofore this Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the compensatory damages awarded to Edgardo Cariaga should be increased to P25,000.00. Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35. In the case of Cangco, vs. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil. 768, We established the distinction between obligation derived from negligence and obligation as a result of a breach of contract. Thus, we said: It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its

performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially in the legal viewpoint from the presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by Article 1903 of the Civil Code (Art. 2180 of the new), which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection of supervision. Article 1903 is not applicable to obligations arising EX CONTRACTU, but only to extra-contractual obligation or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to CULPA AQUILIANA' and not to CULPA CONTRACTUAL. (3) The claim made by said spouses for actual and compensatory damages is likewise without merits. As held by the trial court, in so far as the LTB is concerned, the present action is based upon a breach of contract of carriage to which said spouses were not a party, and neither can they premise their claim upon the negligence or quasi-delict of the LTB for the simple reason that they were not themselves injured as a result of the collision between the LTB bus and train owned by the Manila Railroad Company. Go vs. CA Case Digest
Go Vs. Court of Appeals 206 SCRA 138 G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992 Facts: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down petitioners plate number and reported the same to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner presented himself in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was brought against him. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary investigation. Issue: Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful. Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.

Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the offenses, which however constituted continuing crimes, i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed organization, etc. There was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is because the arresting officers were not actually there during the incident, thus they had no personal knowledge and their information regarding petitioner were derived from other sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply. Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he neither expressed surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a complaint was filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation should have been scheduled to determine probable cause. Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge, where the same is required appear thereat. Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary investigation, trial for the criminal case is suspended pending result from preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered released upon posting a bail bond. Gan vs ca

July 4, 1972 (8am): Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota Crown Sedan along North

Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila

While driving two vehicles, a truck and a jeepney, are parked at the right side of theroad

While driving, there was a vehicle coming from the opposite direction and anotherone who overtakes the first vehicle

To avoid a head-on collision, the Gan served to the right and as a consequence:
o

The front bumper of the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man

pedestrian(Isidoro Casino) ~ DOA to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital Casino was pinned against the rear of the parked jeepney and thejeepney

moved forward hitting the truck


o

Sedan was damaged on its front


o

The jeep suffered damages


o

The truck sustained scratches

Gan was convicted of Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence

On appeal, the conviction was modified to Homicide thru Simple Imprudence

Petitioner now appeals to the said ruling

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC DECISION October 30, 1954 G.R. No. L-5767 . LAZARO DEGALA, GERMANA ESCOBAR, GREGORIO GUERZON, TEODORO, FELIE, CRISTINA, GUERZON, BOLONIA TAMAYO, LEONA LEONES, SIMONA MENDOZA, ISABEL DIRECTO, PLACIDA DIRECTO , ANDRES DIRECTO, PETRA DIRECTO, PAULA DIRECTO, and CLARO QUEBRAL, oppositors-appellants. Antonio Directo for appellants. Bengzon (Jose), J.: PLACIDA MINA. CRISANTO UMIPIG, ET ALS, vs. LAZARO DEGALA, ET AL. Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-5767 October 30, 1954 The Testament of the Late PLACIDA MINA; CRISANTO UMIPIG, ET ALS, petitioners. ATTY. JESUS Q. QUINTILLAN, claimant-appellee, vs. LAZARO DEGALA, GERMANA ESCOBAR, GREGORIO GUERZON, TEODORO, FELIE, CRISTINA, GUERZON, BOLONIA TAMAYO, LEONA LEONES, SIMONA MENDOZA, ISABEL DIRECTO, PLACIDA DIRECTO , ANDRES DIRECTO, PETRA DIRECTO, PAULA DIRECTO, and CLARO QUEBRAL, oppositors-appellants. Antonio Directo for appellants.

F. V. Vergara for appellee. BENGZON, J.: This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur awarding to Jesus Quintillan the sum of P50,000 as attorneys fees payable by the estate of the late Placida Mina. After the death of said woman in July 1939, three different instruments alleged to be duly executed wills. The first was Civil Case No. 3685 filed by Dr. Eufemio Domingo; the second, Civil Case No. 3686 instituted by Crisanto Umipig, Marietta Quintillan, Roberto A. Desierto and Cecilia Reyes, who are four out of six trustees and children of trustees designated in the will of Placida Mina. The court found this third document to be true testament of the deceased. These trustees successfully opposed the probate of the first two documents alleged to be wills in the two previous cases Nos. cases by Attorney Jesus Quintillan pursuant to their contract Annex A-1 reading as follows: We, Roberto A. Desierto , Cecilia Reyes, Crisanto Umipig and Marieta F. Quintillan, declare the fact that because we desire to oppose the probate of the will sought to be probated by Dr. Eufemio Domingo, and the will sought to be probated by Mr. Joaquin Escobar, who claim that such testaments they are respectively presenting are the true wills of the late Doa Placida Mina, and because the will we desire to be probated is the true will of the late Doa Placida dated the year 1927, we made an agreement with Atty. J. Q. Quintillan that he be our lawyer in all said cases and we promised him that if he can succeed in not allowing the wills presented by said Dr. Eufemio Domingo and Mr. Joaquin Escobar to probate, and in obtaining the probate of the will of Doa Placida Mina dated the year 1927, we will give to the said Atty. J. Q. Quintillan as his fees 30 percent of the entire estate left by the deceased Placida Mina, and it was agreed that the said attorney shall be responsible for all necessary expenses in these cases. In the event that no result shall be obtained in his attending us in said cases, we shall not be under any obligation to him for expenses incurred by him and for his attorneys fees. Having performed his part and obtained the probate of the will, Attorney Quintillan submitted his claim for professional services in this expediente. He requested payment of P150,000 (30 percent) asserting that the entire estate of Placida Mina actually was worth more than half-a million pesos. Leona Leones and Cipriano Alcantara, tow other trustees of the authentic will, opposed the request. Attorney Antonio Directo for the heirs, likewise objected. Subsequently, however, all the heirs and parties interested in the estate subscribed to a stipulation, the pertinent part of which read: (g) That the parties recognize that Atty. Jesus Q. Quintillan is entitled to certain attorneys fees for services rendered in the testamentary proceedings of Placida Mina and for other services rendered for which he filed a claim thereof, but it is understood that the court shall decide the reasonableness of such attorneys fees and whatever sum the court will adjudicate the same shall

constitute a charge as express of administration in the testamentary proceedings of Placida Mina, Civil Case No. 3689, both of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. Pursuant to said stipulation the court proceed to determine the reasonable amount payable to Atty. Quintillan, adjudging to him the sum of P50,000 as his attorney s fees, and the Court orders that the part of this amount that has not yet been collected by Atty. Quintillan be paid to him by the estate of the late Placida Mina, said amount to constitute a charge as expenses of administration in the testamentary proceedings. The heirs appealed directly to this Court. Their brief assigns severally errors in support of their two principal contentions, to wit, (a) the lower court lacked had not been presented in tie and (b) the reasonable compensation should be around P7,000 only. Inasmuch as the amount involve does not exceed P50,000 this appeal would not be properly here, except for the jurisdictional issue tendered by appellants. The point out that the courts directive requiring all money claims against the deceased was published July 3, 1950 and the period expired January 3, 1951. They argue that Quintillans claim having been filed April 21, 1951 was belated and the court had no jurisdiction to act thereon. They invoke section 5 of Rule 87 partly providing as follows: All claims for money against the decedent arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, or contingent, all, claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent , and judgment for money against the decedent must be filed within the time limited in the notice or otherwise they are barred forever. (Emphasis by appellants.) Upon careful examination we find their argument to have no juridical basis. The section refers obviously to claims against the decedent arising from contract with her. It applies to demands which are proper against the decedent, that is, claims upon a liability contracted by the decedent before his death . . . except funeral expenses etc.1 Anyway the judge may, in his discretion, permit a creditor to prove his claim even after the expiration of the period originally fixed. (section 2, Rule 87). Furthermore, all the sureties interested in this litigation covenanted on October 16, 1951 after the expiration of the period to submit Atty. Quintillans claim to the courts decision so that reasonable attorneys fees may be fixed chargeable as expense of administration. Hence the appellants may not be heard to complain that the court rendered the award and practically extended the time for presentation of the attorneys claim. In connection with appellants second contention, The records of the case and the evidence adduced says the trial judge show that said Atty. Quintillan rendered professional services as counsel for the petitioner in the petition for probate of the will of the late Placida Mina, in the present case, Civil Case No. 3689; said Atty. Quintillan rendered his professional services as counsel for said petitioners in their opposition to the petition of one Dr. Eufemio Domingo (Civil Case No. 3689) for the probate of another

supposed will of said late Placida Mina. The supposed will in said Civil Case No. 3685 was denied probate on appeal by the Court of Appeals and the petition of Joaquin Escobar in Civil Case No. 3686 was dismissed at the instance of the petitioner. The will in the present case No. 3689, was allowed to probate in this Court, and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision appealed from. In the sum, the claimant Atty. Jesus C. Quintillan, as counsel in the three above mentioned civil cases, obtained favorable decisions. Aside from his services for the benefit of the estate of the deceased Placida Mina. He defended the validity of the provisions of the probated will in Civil Case No. 303 of this Court, for although the claimant lost his case in this Court, he appealed and succeeded in securing the dismissal of the petition for declaratory judgment by the Supreme Court. To determine the compensation for legal services, courts in this jurisdiction take into account, in the absence of contract, several factors, namely, (1 amount and character of the services rendered; (2) labor, time, and trouble involved; (3) nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the services were rendered; (4) responsibility imposed; (5) amount of money or value of the property affected by the controversy, or involved in the employment; (6) skill and experience called for in the performance of the services; (7) professional character and social standing of the attorney; (8) results secured; (90 whether or not the fee is absolute or contingent, it being a recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is to be contingent than when it is not2 . These are generally questions of fact, within in this instance should be left mostly to the trial judge, since the heirs appeal direct to this Court is logically confined to questions of law. At any rate, no material circumstance has been shown to justify a declaration that the amount awarded was excessive, having a declaration that the amount awarded was excessive , having in mind the principles and practice where counsel is engaged on the basis of quantum meruit or contingent fees. It is observed that an absolute majority of the trustees of the will (four) agreed in Exhibit A-1 to give the appellee 30 per cent of the entire estate valued at P500,000 and more3. Although such contract has not been submitted to the court of approval4, still it could be a proper element to reckon. At least in one case, an agreement whereby attorneys were promised compensation equal to 2/6 of the hereditary estate if they succeeded in impugning a will, was declared not to be excessive or unreasonable5. The allowance of counsel fees in probate proceedings rest largely in the sound discretion of the court, which should not be interpreted with except for manifest abuse, but it may be modified by the reviewing court when the fee allowed is inadequate or excessive6. Premises considered the appealed order should be, and is hereby affirmed, with costs.