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Synthesis report

Analysis of financing mechanisms and funding streams to enhance emergency preparedness

Jan Kellett Hannah Sweeney

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Synthesis report Analysis of financing mechanisms and funding streams to enhance emergency preparedness
October 2011
Development Initiatives Keward Court, Jocelyn Drive Wells, Somerset, BA5 1DB United Kingdom

This study has been funded by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) on behalf of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Task Team on Funding for Preparedness. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed are the responsibility of the authors and not those of the donor or Development Initiatives. For comments or suggestions please contact info@devinit.org

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Contents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................................................. IV EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................................... 1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 5 BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................................................ 5 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THIS STUDY ........................................................................................................................ 6 STRUCTURE OF THIS REPORT ...................................................................................................................................... 7 KEY FINDINGS FROM THE INCEPTION REPORT ................................................................................................................. 7 METHODOLOGY ...................................................................................................................................................... 8 THE DEFINITION OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ............................................................................................................ 9 THE SCALE AND LOCATION OF THE NEED ....................................................................................................... 12 PREPAREDNESS FUNDING: CURRENT STATUS ................................................................................................ 14 PREPAREDNESS FUNDING WITHIN DEVELOPMENT AID ................................................................................................... 15 THE COMPLEXITIES OF CALCULATING CONFLICT PREPAREDNESS EFFORTS .................................................... 17 DONOR ARCHITECTURE ................................................................................................................................. 20 THE TASK BEFORE DONORS ...................................................................................................................................... 20 WHAT DOES THE DATA TELL US ABOUT DONOR FINANCING?........................................................................................... 20 THE ABSENCE OF CONFLICT ...................................................................................................................................... 21 RISING FUNDING OBSCURES ISSUES ........................................................................................................................... 23 ELEMENTS OF IMPROVED DONOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS........................................................................................ 24 INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE ..................................................................................................................... 26 INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES MATRIX ......................................................................................................................... 27 FUNDING ............................................................................................................................................................. 29 INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS ......................................................................................................... 31 CONSOLIDATED APPEALS PROCESS (CAP) ...................................................................................................... 34 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................................... 34 OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES ............................................................................................................................ 34 FINANCING ARCHITECTURE............................................................................................................................ 39

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POOLED FUNDS ..................................................................................................................................................... 39 POLICY AND DATA ANALYSIS OF POOLED FUNDS CURRENTLY IN USE .................................................................................. 39 POTENTIAL CRITERIA FOR MORE EFFECTIVE PREPAREDNESS FINANCING ............................................................................. 47 BUILDING ON EXISTING FUNDS ................................................................................................................................. 48 TRACKING ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................................................... 49 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................................... 49 THE TRACKING METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................................ 49 BACKGROUND DAC ANALYSIS TRENDS OVER TIME ..................................................................................................... 50 TRACKING RESULTS ................................................................................................................................................ 52 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS FINANCING IN NEPAL: DESK REVIEW ............................................................... 55 BACKGROUND TO RISK AND FINANCE IN NEPAL ............................................................................................................ 55 DRR/PREPAREDNESS STRUCTURES AND INITIATIVES IN NEPAL ........................................................................................ 56 NEPAL RISK REDUCTION CONSORTIUM (NRRC) .......................................................................................................... 57 LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE CONSORTIUM ................................................................................................................. 60 TOWARDS IMPROVED AND PREDICTABLE PREPAREDNESS FINANCING: KEY FINDINGS, OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................................... 63 OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................................................................... 63 POLICY CONTEXT FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MECHANISMS .................................................................................... 64 ALL ACTORS FOR CHANGE ........................................................................................................................................ 66 EXAMINING THE OPTIONS........................................................................................................................................ 67 THE ADDED VALUE OF A VERTICAL FUND ..................................................................................................................... 70 DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION........................................................................................................ 71 SUGGESTED COMPONENTS FOR PHASE II: ..................................................................................................... 77 ANNEX 1: DONOR PROFILES ........................................................................................................................... 83 ANNEX 2: INSTITUTIONAL PROFILES .............................................................................................................. 99 ANNEX 3: FINANCING MECHANISMS PROFILES ............................................................................................ 111 ANNEX 4: LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................................................... 127 ANNEX 5: LIST OF PEOPLE CONSULTED/INTERVIEWED................................................................................. 132 ANNEX 6: DEFINITIONS: ............................................................................................................................... 134

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Acknowledgements
The work has been led within Development Initiatives by Jan Kellett and Hannah Sweeney. Other staff members involved in data investigation and analysis were Dan Sparks, Kerry Smith, Lydia Poole and Jos Fernandez. External contributors included Andrew Rogerson (Special Advisor to Development Initiatives), Emily Wilkinson (Research Fellow for Climate Change, Environment and Forests at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI)) and Philip Tamminga (Head of the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) at DARA). It has been proofread by Georgina Brereton. Judith Randel, director at Development Initiatives, oversaw quality control of the work.

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Not all the solutions are within our [humanitarians] hands but perhaps we are best placed to ensure overall aid is targeted correctly, because we are otherwise left with the failure of not doing so.
Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Donor

In many countries development funding is declining whilst humanitarian funding is increasing at an alarming rate. Yet a number of these countries are not receiving any preparedness funding. How can this be addressed?
UN representative

Preparedness is essential - it saves lives; and it is more cost-effective than response. National and local authorities are central in this regard they are the first responders in every emergency, and we have to focus on further strengthening their knowledge and capacity so that they can respond better.
Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos

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Executive summary
The aim of emergency preparedness is to strengthen local, national and global capacity to minimise loss of life and livelihoods, to ensure effective response, to enable rapid recovery and increase resilience to all hazards (including conflict and epidemics). This entails readiness measures (risk assessment, contingency planning, stockpiling of equipment and supplies, training, community drills and exercises) and institutional preparedness (coordination arrangements, early warning systems, public education) supported by legal and budgetary frameworks.1 This report was commissioned by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) on behalf of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in order to examine the current financing architecture for emergency preparedness as well as the structures that promote or hinder that financing, to highlight the challenges and opportunities that are inherent in the current humanitarian and development system and to make recommendations for change, especially with regards to the financing architecture. Throughout the life of this study (which is the first of a planned two-phased initiative) there has been renewed and increasing emphasis on the importance of preparedness. At the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) substantive session in 2011 every main segment and most of the side events focused upon preparedness as the main or related topic, no doubt fuelled in part by what was happening in East Africa, where a particularly devastating drought, the latest in a cyclical chain of such events in the region, underlined the need for improvements in preparedness funding. The initial stages of this study have shown there to be an almost universal acceptance of the need for urgent change in the way that preparedness is understood, engaged with and funded. Indeed, a sharper focus on preparedness is seen by many stakeholders as potentially transformative. It could connect humanitarian and development actors better and focus national priorities, as well as lower the costs of humanitarian intervention In an era of increasing pressure on humanitarian financing, preparedness expenditures are very low, coming in at less than 5% of all humanitarian funding in 2009. Looking at the top 20 humanitarian recipient countries for 2005-2009, for every US$100 spent on humanitarian assistance only 62 cents went to disaster prevention and preparedness. Our real-time tracking of funding in 2011 highlights that where donors and agencies do fund preparedness it is likely to take place immediately after a crisis, a trend which must change. Current reporting remains very weak and the limitations of available systems need addressing. Yet despite these issues with the data, it is clear that in general donors still give a low priority to preparedness financing, representing a fraction of overall humanitarian spend. An examination of nine specific financing mechanisms shows that preparedness funding is already undertaken through six of these funds, though its proportion of overall amounts spent is relatively small. Even the humanitarian fund with the largest proportion of humanitarian financing for preparedness in 2011 (the Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF)) spent only 3.8%. The Global
1

This definition of emergency preparedness was developed as part of this study. See page 8 of main report for more details.

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Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), a development fund, despite being tied directly to track five of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) on preparedness, still only directs 15% of its budget to this area. More importantly, none of the existing funds are easily adaptable to meeting the need of improving funding for preparedness and making it more predictable. It is revealing that the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), despite a lack of specific guidance, is already being used by humanitarian country teams to prioritise preparedness within sectors and projects. There are also some specific quick-win possibilities in using the CAP (see below), though it should be understood that it is not a comprehensive solution. A desk study examining the progress of preparedness in Nepal was undertaken, in part due to the ongoing work of the sub-working group for preparedness in this country. The Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC) has shown that a properly articulated country programme that has developed from lessons learnt in other countries, can garner both interest and funding for preparedness as part of a broader disaster risk reduction (DRR) framework. It bridges the humanitarian and development divide, brings all actors together, and involves government within an overall funding and coordinating umbrella supported by the presence of a strong Resident Coordinator. Nonetheless, not all donors have bought into the programme as yet, with the absence of evidence of impact (a characteristic of the global debate on preparedness) cited as a key factor. The programme has also taken three years to really gain traction, engagement and funding, highlighting that if it is to work, a long-term view is needed as well as financial investment. Finally, and very importantly, if the Consortium were to become a model to be used across the world in prioritised countries it must be adapted to fit a broad range of contexts. The problem is that donor humanitarian agencies are not set up to respond to such a request, even if it were forthcoming. For most donors, policy and funding linked to preparedness are largely based on the HFA, focusing on natural disasters and part of a longer-term DRR policy. Yet responsibility for preparedness itself almost always remains within donors humanitarian divisions, who report that they do not have the funds to deal with this on top of their growing response expenditures. Meanwhile, few donors consider conflict and disaster preparedness together, and if conflict preparedness is mentioned in policy it is usually connected to prevention and seen as a political issue, managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Throughout the development of the study, particular attention has been focused upon the issue of conflict and how it relates to emergency preparedness, and by extension the complexity of calculating conflict preparedness efforts. We conclude that there is a need for a more inclusive view of preparedness which focuses upon all emergencies, hazards and risks, and a focus upon measures that contribute to building capacity and resilience to minimise the effects of these risks. However, this holds out a further challenge, as whilst preparedness for disasters is already articulated within a long-term perspective of DRR, there is no comparable and coherent long-term policy perspective for conflict preparedness. These different but interrelated analyses have fed into the examination of financing options, where a series of alternatives were explored, including the setting up of a new global, regional or countrylevel fund, using the CAP, increased bilateral funding or utilising existing funds. Although this initial investigation highlighted that no one suitable mechanism currently exists to meet all the requirements outlined above, further research is needed especially at a country level to determine whether they should be adapted or a new fund created. Perhaps a short-term solution would be to

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split conflict from disaster and use a mechanism such as the emergency response fund for the former and GFDRR for the latter. This study highlights the fact that financing for emergency preparedness should above all be prioritised, based on needs and put in place before the crisis has struck. At present none of the mechanisms or institutions working in preparedness carry out multi-risk analyses and fund according to the risks and needs presented. Currently all of them, if they do risk analysis at all, do it for natural disasters alone. There are, however, some all-risk assessments made that could be adapted for use to improve and prioritise financing, and this should be examined further. As a result of the analysis undertaken and described above the study team has developed specific recommendations for change, especially with regards to the financing architecture (a fuller list of recommendations is included in the final section). Enabling environment : Work with donors via forums such as the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) group and the G20 to address the issue of bifurcated aid architecture and especially its impact on funding. Develop working partnerships with key actors working in the same environment as humanitarians, including the development community, peacekeepers, private sector etc. Develop an understanding of how emergency preparedness fits with other processes such as peacebuilding and transition.

The Risk Context: Undertake comprehensive risk analyses which address multi-hazards including conflict, and which will ensure emergency preparedness financing is needs driven. Explore exactly what is meant by conflict preparedness and how it relates to disaster preparedness, both short and long term. Evaluate the need for further cost benefit analysis specifically related to preparedness, that can make the case clearly. This should be based on a common understanding of all risks, highlighting strategies to reduce those risks. Disseminate existing cost benefit analyses and ensure they reach senior decision makers.

Financing: Increase preparedness financing using existing pooled funds that already channel money to preparedness and adapt them to fit. Explore in detail the value-added feasibility of a creating a new vertical fund dedicated to EP for all risk sources. Consider setting aside funds for specific preparedness projects within existing funding mechanisms.. Use the CAP to fund preparedness strategically. Include preparedness in guidance notes, and track investment in preparedness through a marker.

Leadership and Role Clarification Work to reduce duplication and promote global coordination by identifying global leads that work to an overarching risk reduction framework linked to different funding streams.

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Extend and adapt the country-based model: Investigate the possibilities of adapting the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium model of integrated preparedness and DRR to fit other country contexts.

Reporting: Work with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) to improve reporting of preparedness of all kinds by establishing coherent coding. All actors to greatly improve the transparency of all preparedness expenditures.

Whilst these recommendations go some way to addressing issues concerning the financing architecture and are likely to bring more predictable funding for preparedness there remain considerable structural and systematic hurdles. These, such as the humanitarian/development aid structure and conflict/disaster complexity need to be examined in detail, in order to create a longterm sustainable solution to better preparedness financing. This is generally beyond the reach of this study but attempts have been made to highlight these issues wherever possible.

Recommendations for Phase II


The limitations of this exercise need acknowledgement. The preliminary data investigation has shown the need for future work to go beyond the available databases and examine data forensically at project level to extract and re-aggregate spending on preparedness. It has also shown that tracking preparedness realtime solely through FTS is of some value but needs to be undertaken long-term as part of other improvements in both expenditure and tracking. Thirdly, and more importantly, research for this phase of the study has been (with the exception of the Nepal desk-based study) limited to discussions with headquarterbased stakeholders (and largely humanitarian ones) and the examination of policies, databases and financial information at a global level, which provides only part of the picture. Examining emergency preparedness in a variety of country contexts will be essential if we are to understand the interplay between the different kinds of activities undertaken, the actors involved, and how the work is financed. This work needs to be complemented by an examination of all the remaining actors (and their work) not included in great depth in this study, including the private sector, peacekeeping, non-DAC donors, domestic governments and also development actors including donors, both globally and at country level. Core elements of Phase II will also address the need to identify any issues of mandate and leadership, duplications and gaps in delivery and programming. In addition, advocacy and outreach are seen as essential to making preparedness an important issue for all those with decision making responsibility. Based on this work and building on the synthesis report, clear recommendations for change should be made which build upon those already present here.

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Introduction
Background
This report was undertaken by Development Initiatives (DI) and commissioned by the United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) on behalf of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in order to examine the current financing of emergency preparedness as well as the structures that promote or hinder that financing. Its task was also to highlight the challenges and opportunities that are inherent in the current humanitarian system and to make recommendations for change, especially with regards to the financing architecture. The IASC has clearly recognised current weaknesses in preparedness financing and has stated that adequate funding is not about money but also proper structures, planning and processes. It has also made considerable connections between preparedness and longer-term disaster risk reduction (DRR). Whilst it has underlined that humanitarian actors do need to play a key role in preparedness, it has also indicated that only a holistic approach involving all stakeholders, one where development actors are part of the solution and national actors are central, can ensure that needs are met in a sustainable way2. Last year, the IASC Humanitarian Finance Group formed a Task Team on Funding for Preparedness with a view to identifying ways to ensure a more coherent and predictable approach to funding, which also includes building capacities of local and national actors. Within this framework, the IASC Working Group asked the Task Team to: track humanitarian financing to preparedness in the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and in pooled funding mechanisms, based on an agreed definition support the fundraising pillar of the five-country case study being undertaken by the SubWorking Group (SWG) on Preparedness, and engage in a structured discussion with the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD).

More recently, the IASC Principals tasked the Task Team to provide support to the SWG preparedness pilots in an effort to strengthen global inter-agency coordination in providing better support-to-country efforts for preparedness capacity development. Specifically, the request was to: prepare a resourcing advocacy strategy to support SWG preparedness country pilots, with individual pilot country strategies completed by the end of 2011 explore possibilities within existing financing mechanisms including national budgets, to support country-level preparedness activities, and advocate for a predictable, flexible, timely and risk-tolerant financing architecture.

In order to bring the above recommendations into effect, the FAO, as Task Team Chair, tendered for a consultancy group to undertake elements of this work, to be supported by the Task Team, in a project entitled Analysis of financing mechanisms and funding streams to enhance funding for emergency preparedness.

It is important to note that the work being carried out by the United Nations is only one part of a wider preparedness and resilience agenda that is being pursued by others such as the GHD group of donors and the G20. The preparedness agenda is also moving at a fast past. Every attempt is made to ensure that the analysis and recommendations are in line with current debates up until the publishing date of October 2011.

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Objectives and scope of this study


The terms of reference (TOR) for this piece of work incorporated the following: establish a framework for tracking emergency preparedness funding. To achieve this DI will undertake a review of the existing preparedness funding architecture, including policies, structures, stakeholders and financing.3 DI agrees with FAO, the IASC and others that the agenda has moved on from the time when this TOR was developed. There is renewed high profile focus on the need for better preparedness. Conflict has become a much more central element of the study. It would be fair to say that the tracking itself is no longer a primary issue (although it is covered in a section of this report, beginning at page 45). However, the review of the existing preparedness funding architecture is certainly apposite, and is essentially at the core of this synthesis reports investigation. At times a line is drawn under how far this part of the study can go in investigating some of the bigger issues regarding preparedness funding. Where this is the case, it is indicated in the text and is referenced, as appropriate, as a suggested component of Phase II of the work. The implicit consideration underlying this study, which has been driven by the meetings, discussions and investigations to date, is not only that the current financing architecture for preparedness is inadequate to meet needs, with current mechanisms either not fit for purpose or insufficiently used, but also that a single fund, either existing or to be constructed, could meet the range of needs described below. Considerable work has therefore been undertaken to examine such a possibility, framed in the context of current preparedness financing issues and options for the way forward which have been presented. This synthesis report forms part of Phase I of a planned two-phase project analysing these financing mechanisms and funding streams, and is designed to set the stage for the work ahead. A series of interconnected activities have helped produce the results. An institutional mapping of key stakeholders highlighted connections and gaps. A detailed preliminary investigation of current data has examined trends in preparedness financing. This has been followed by a series of consultations and bilateral meetings with key stakeholders (drawn from the donor, coordinating and implementing agency communities), supported by presentations on early data findings, aimed at exploring current structures, policies and future opportunities. In addition, a substantial literature review has provided important background material. The study included investigations consisting of an analysis of the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC), the tracking of preparedness financing within the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) together with detailed examinations of both donor agencies and nine specifically relevant financing mechanisms. This synthesis report brings together these elements with the findings of the inception report. The findings of this study, whilst forming only the first and shorter phase of the much larger project, have already confirmed not only that more work must be done to improve the situation, including a much needed examination of how aid structures work in complex policy areas that cut across the humanitarian/development divide, but also that there is an urgent need to move forward,

Taken directly from the Terms of Reference for this study.

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particularly in light of recent events such as the drought in the Horn of Africa and in the context of current financial pressures. A suggested list of components and objectives of Phase II of the project can be found on page 72.

Structure of this report


The report has 12 sections and a series of supporting annexes. This section introduces the study and its objectives, restates some of the key findings from the inception report including the agreed definition for preparedness financing, sketches out the scope of the study, including the ongoing tracking work, and presents the methodology for the study. Section two presents a brief analysis of the scale and location of the needs related to preparedness. The third section presents an analysis of current funding to preparedness. Section four discusses the complexities of conflict in relation to preparedness. The fifth section examines donor architecture in detail, including policy, priorities, and funding. Section six outlines the current institutional architecture for preparedness and highlights any gaps or duplications that exist. Section seven investigates whether a standing element within the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) and CAP can meet the needs for emergency preparedness. Section eight offers a detailed analysis of nine of the most relevant financing mechanisms in view of using them to encourage greater investment. Section nine is the first report on a year-long preparedness tracking initiative. The tenth section examines the NRRC and draws out key lessons that can be learnt from this initiative. Section eleven is key in synthesising all these findings and offers conclusions and recommendations for further reflection and action where appropriate. The final section suggests a number of components that should be considered for Phase II of the study. A series of annexes can be found at the end of the report that support much of the study, including profiles of the nine financing mechanisms, 12 donors, as well as key institutions and the private sector.

Key findings from the inception report


During the completion of the inception stage of this study the team identified various issues that helped to frame the work undertaken within the larger synthesis report. Five main lessons were drawn out: the central complexity: preparedness bridges the divide between humanitarian and development aid expenditure on preparedness is increasing, both in volume and proportion, but only incrementally the structure of the humanitarian financing system is a hindrance there are significant and related competing pressures on donors conflict is still orphaned in these discussions; work in this area remains more incoherent than for disasters, with an absence of joined-up work and policies.

In addition to these five issues three central tensions were identified as appearing in various different analyses: conflict and natural disaster local/national and institutional short-term preparedness and long-term risk reduction.

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Despite these issues and tensions, and to an extent because of them, there is universal acknowledgement from all sides that engagement and investment in preparedness must be improved. Key outputs from the inception report that directly inform the completion of this phase of the study are as follows. The definition: the detailed analysis of data and discussions with stakeholders have helped to form a precise definition of emergency preparedness, one which both connects to existing work but also goes further, ensuring the context of conflict is included. It is important to note however that a clear definition of emergency preparedness alone is not the answer to more preparedness funding. Tracking preparedness: the establishment of the definition has also allowed the study team to develop methodology for tracking expenditures over the period of a year, which was a key task. From the work undertaken thus far two key findings should inform better preparedness. Firstly, and this is supported by all stakeholders, this exercise should be used to help bridge the aid divide. We should not, for example, equate emergency preparedness with the humanitarian segment of longer-term DRR, which would only reemphasise the divide and lead to more short-term planning. Secondly, the way to avoid this divide is to focus attention on actual requirements in the countries and communities most in need of better preparedness, and less on our own structures and definitions. Recipients are not interested in where investments come from they are looking for change.

Methodology
DI used a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches to inform the study, which included one-to-one interviews, group discussions, presentations, desk reviews and financial analysis. Following the identification of key stakeholders DI carried out 29 meetings with 69 people at headquarters (HQ) level, both face-to-face and via teleconferencing. These covered a wide range of UN agencies, donor governments, institutions and non-governmental organisations with the aim of understanding how they view preparedness. In addition to discussions with donors, DI carried out a review of 11 donors that belong to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), looking at their policy and structure, to identify where the blockages to financing preparedness exist. The team also reviewed the five main institutions involved in preparedness to highlight any overlapping mandates and identify gaps. Separate profiles were produced looking at the private sector as a whole and the engagement of non-DAC donors (NDD). A literature review was conducted to better understand the scope of preparedness and to assist in agreeing definitions for the data tracking. The team carried out a detailed financial analysis of preparedness funding over time using the OECD DACs Creditor Reporting System (CRS). Though limited to those donors reporting to the DAC, this analysis enabled a more robust examination of past trends, key recipients and donors and the channels that have been used to provide financial support to preparedness activities. This database also allowed us to go beyond the data coded as prevention and preparedness within the

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humanitarian expenditure to examine the levels of funding that are found within official development assistance (ODA). A key element of the study involved detailed tracking of funding to emergency preparedness expenditures for a set of ten countries over a period of a year, using the FTS managed by the UN. This database was used as it provides up-to-date information and allows real-time examination of expenditures, although it is important to note that it is focused purely on humanitarian aid. Another limitation of the FTS is that there is no separate reporting category for tracking preparedness. To overcome this DI carried out a detailed search of the dataset using a pre-defined set of words based on the agreed definition of emergency preparedness. All project lines that contained the relevant words in the subcategory description were examined one by one and marked according to whether they are solely focused on emergency preparedness or could include elements of it. This was done using a traffic light system, classifying projects as being either fully focused on preparedness, preparedness mixed with other activities such as response, or being DRR-focused with no specific reference to preparedness. This is similar to project marking, such as that undertaken in the CAP for gender. A further search was conducted for activities considered to go beyond emergency preparedness, but that were considered as wider DRR. To stress the importance of transparent reporting of preparedness funding and DRR more broadly, DI analysed under which codes the funding is found, highlighting inconsistencies in current reporting practices.

The definition of emergency preparedness4


Through working with key stakeholders and an examination of essential documentation we decided upon the following as the definition to be used as a basis for this study, and in particular for the tracking exercise. The aim of emergency preparedness is to strengthen local, national and global capacity to minimise loss of life and livelihoods, to ensure effective response, to enable rapid recovery and increase resilience to all hazards (including conflict and epidemics). This entails readiness measures (risk assessment, contingency planning, stockpiling of equipment and supplies, training, community drills and exercises) and institutional preparedness (coordination arrangements, early warning systems, public education) supported by legal and budgetary frameworks. The first part of the definition describes the broad aims of emergency preparedness, ensuring that people are the focus for all measures undertaken. It also stresses that emergency preparedness is not just about preparing to respond but must also be connected to the whole crisis cycle prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery - and will contribute to increasing resilience.

Towards the end of the preparation of this report there has been a suggestion that there needs to be more work done on the definition itself, particularly in how it may or may not recommend to donors exactly what activities should be funded. Given the need for this to be discussed in detail by many stakeholders there is no time to review that in detail before this report is finalised. It is recommended this be undertaken as part of Phase II of this study. www.devinit.org SYNTHESIS REPORT P a g e |9

The second part of the definition is based upon that used by UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) for disaster preparedness, which lists examples of specific activities falling within preparedness5 (this is not exhaustive and we understand that there are many more measures and activities that could be included). As previously discussed the definition will not be focused solely on environmental hazards but is extended to encompass preparation for all eventualities, including conflict. Emergency preparedness: the methodology of the definition Issues will clearly arise around any definition when there are many stakeholders involved, all with their own opinions of what is or is not preparedness (and in some cases with mandates that are determined by such definitions). During our discussions with these stakeholders and throughout this report we have applied the definitions used by UN ISDR. However, given the need to move from disasters to all risks there has been a need to reinvent and adapt to a degree, and following discussion the definition above has been agreed upon. The need to both isolate emergency preparedness as something that can be tracked over time whilst also ensuring that it remains connected to wider DRR work has become clear to us, as indicated in the early findings which are presented in this report. Indeed, preparedness should be seen as one element of DRR, as indicated in the ISDR definition which follows (our emphasis): The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events. In the following diagram we have used concentric circles to denote connections between the various elements of DRR, resilience, emergency preparedness etc. This is meant to act as a guide to where we see the work of this study sitting within the overall effort to ensure that natural events do not become natural disasters or complex crises, and is again drawn from ISDR definitions as well as our own for emergency preparedness. The circles represent some of the key processes, with the shared areas suggesting a particular connectedness. We have also indicated some of the activities or subprocesses that these shared areas may represent. At this point conflict-related processes such as peacebuilding and peacekeeping are not added; this may become appropriate if all risks are to be assessed together, as is recommended in this report.

http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology

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Figure 1: Concentric circles denoting connections between the various elements of DRR, resilience, emergency 6 preparedness etc.

This figure has been created by the authors to provide an idea of how the various areas within DRR, preparedness and climate change fit together. It is not meant to be a definitive examination of the connections but intended rather to provide a visual guide to how elements may interrelate.

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The scale and location of the need


Despite the acknowledgment of the need to significantly increase funding for emergency preparedness it is considerably challenging to put any figure on the amount needed given the global data available to us. We can offer at this stage only a series of proxies which indicate in different ways both the location and scale of need. The numbers of those affected by natural disasters have increased since 2006 from 126 million to 214 million. This is despite the fact that the number of disasters has declined over the same period from 401 to 352, with 2010 seeing more disasters than the previous two years (just over 500). This alone provides the evidence for the need for increased preparedness to help reduce the number of those affected. The long-term trend also suggests an overall increase in the number of disasters; if this continues on the same trajectory without further investment in DRR and preparedness, the number of those affected is also likely to rise.
Number of affected (millions) P a g e | 12 500 Number of disasters 400 300 200 100 0 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0

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Total number affected (millions)

Linear (Number of disasters)

Figure 2: Number of natural disasters and people affected. Source: Development Initiatives based on data from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED)

There is however little information on exact numbers of people affected by conflict. Numbers can be gleaned from battle report data collected by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) or a use of the rather crude recipient figures within the CAP, but there is no comprehensive information available. What we can say, however, is that millions of people affected by natural disasters each and every year, actually live in conflict-affected countries, reaching a high of over 80% in 2008.
100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Figure 3: Number of people affected by natural disaster, by conflict or non-conflict-affected (millions of people). Source: Development Initiatives based on CRED and other sources

18.6

8.8 40.2

12.3 32.2
Non-conflict-affected (excluding China)

56.5

28.3 49.8

58.1 37.6
Conflict-affected

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2010

We can also say very clearly that the bulk of humanitarian financing goes to conflict-affected states with levels increasing to close to 70% of all funding in each of the last four recorded years.
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 0% 25.9% 24.8% 26.7% 24.6% 20.9% 22.1% 21.6% 17.2% 13.3% 13.7% 10% 20% 30.6% 26.4% 30% 40% 50% 60% 35.3% 28.0% 28.2% 28.7% 39.1% 42.2% 35.6% 42.0% 49.9% 50.1% 54.0% 56.1% 59.9% 70% 80% 90% 100% 35.0% 33.0% 37.7% 33.4% 43.8%

% of total humanitarian aid to top 3 conflict-affected recipients % of total humanitarian aid to all other conflict-affected recipients % of total humanitarian aid to non conflict-affected recipients Figure 4: Proportion of total official humanitarian assistance by conflict-affected states, 2000-2009.

The global demand for humanitarian financing is not only driven specifically by natural or conflictrelated hazards in country; global and local economic factors profoundly influence both peoples vulnerability to crisis as well as the financial cost of meeting humanitarian needs. Fluctuations in food and energy prices in particular have had far-reaching effects on levels of humanitarian need and the ability of the system to respond.
2000=100 (constant 2000 prices) 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

Food Price Index

Energy Price Index

Figure 5: Changes in commodity prices, 1990-2011 (first quarter). Note: Food and energy price indices here show variation from the year 2000 when the index value is set at 100. Source: Development Initiatives based on World Bank Global Economic Monitor (GEM) of Commodities

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Preparedness funding: current status


Following a review of OECD DAC and FTS data we have determined that reported preparedness and DRR funding has increased over the last five years both in volume and proportion of overall humanitarian spend7. The data suggests however that a low priority is given to preparedness financing which, despite having increased significantly since 2004, still only represents a fraction of overall expenditure. Only eight of the 23 donors reporting to the DAC spend more than 5% on preparedness, and only three of those spend more than 10%. Priority is still given to material relief assistance and services and emergency food aid, which are essentially the core codes dealing with response rather than preparedness/prevention or reconstruction.
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 0% 10% 20% 5,414 5,223 4,672 4,985 6,731 4,251 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 3,286 3,604 2,247 2,214 2,612 1,756 80% 90% 455 333 99 41 70 6 100%

Material relief assistance and services Relief co-ordination; protection and support services Disaster prevention and preparedness

Emergency food aid Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation

Figure 6: Funding to prevention and preparedness code, 2004-2009 (US$m constant 2009 prices). Source: OECD DAC data

By 2009 funding to prevention and preparedness reached US$455 million of the total humanitarian expenditure. This represents a 4.2% share of total humanitarian and a 0.3% of overall ODA.
500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 455 333 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

US$ million (constant 2009 prices)

% of total HA

Disaster prevention and preparedness

70 6 2004 2005

99 41 2006 2007 2008 2009

% of total humanitarian aid on disaster prevention and preparedness

Figure 7: Funding to prevention and preparedness code as percentage of total humanitarian aid, 2004-2009 (constant 2009 prices). Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

Amounts received for preparedness activities have not been significant for any of the top humanitarian recipients in the past five years. Only eight of the top 20 humanitarian recipients

A disaster prevention and preparedness code was introduced by the OECD DAC in 2004 but has only really started to be widely used by donors in 2007.

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have received more than US$10 million for prevention and preparedness between 2005 and 2009, and of those only two (Iraq and Indonesia) received more than US$30 million.
Indonesia (9) Afghanistan (8) Pakistan (8) DRC (7) Sudan (6) Uganda (6) Ethiopia (6) Average (5.5) Serbia (5) Chad (5) Lebanon (5) Liberia (5) Somalia (5) Zimbabwe (5) Burundi (5) Kenya (5) Sri Lanka (5) Iraq (5) Angola (4) Jordan (3) Palestine/OPT (2) 0
30.0 11.9 15.6 11.4 3.6 8.8 16.5 9.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 3.5 4.2 5.5 11.1 11.6 47.4 0.5 0.2 1.9 1,602 1,996 6,081 2,585 1,454

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

US$ million
Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation Disaster prevention and preparedness Total remaining humanitarian

Figure 3: Prevention and preparedness expenditure on major humanitarian recipients, 2005-2009, ranked by mortality risk (figures in brackets). Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UNISDR data

For certain countries in Africa the situation is much worse. In the five years between 2005-2009 a total of only US$33.3 million was spent in seven conflict-affected countries combined Burundi, Chad, DRC, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda and Angola while in those same years more than 17.5 million people have been affected by natural disaster, especially drought. Of the US$6.4 billion spent in Sudan in the past five years, only US$3.6 million has been spent on preparedness and prevention, while over the same period nearly 5.5 million people have been affected. For these top 20 humanitarian recipient countries, for every US$100 spent on humanitarian assistance only 62 cents has gone to disaster prevention and preparedness.

Preparedness funding within development aid


Preparedness funding Disaster prevention and preparedness Other humanitarian funding Development funding Total US$ million 454.6 73.7 130.2 658.5

Figure 8: Total disaster preparedness funding found within total ODA (2009). For detail on method and terminology applied in the search please see section on tracking data for preparedness, page 45. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD CRS data

Preparedness expenditure is not, however, only found within the specific humanitarian code used by the DAC. Our detailed keyword search on all other expenditure beyond disaster prevention and

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preparedness has revealed a further US$203.9 million found in projects spanning 61 sectors, each of which have an element of preparedness.

Health policy & admin. management 2% Relief coordination; protection and support services 2% Infectious disease control 3% Flood prevention/control 5% Emergency/distress relief 8%

Civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution 2%

Reconstruction relief 1%

Agricultural extension 1% Public sector policy and adm. management 1% Remaining 51 sectors 6%

Disaster prevention and preparedness 69%

Figure 9: Disaster preparedness funding within total ODA, 2009. Note: sectors coloured red fall under humanitarian funding. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

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The complexities of calculating conflict preparedness efforts


Recent disasters such as the Pakistan floods, Haiti earthquake or famine in the Horn of Africa have led to renewed calls for more strategic investment in disaster preparedness and risk reduction measures in humanitarian and development assistance programmes. Unfortunately, the issue of conflict preparedness receives considerably less attention from donor governments. This is despite the fact that the bulk of humanitarian assistance about 65% in 2009 was allocated to a handful of countries that are considered fragile states, or in a post-conflict transition8. These same countries also receive significant funding provided through ODA, stabilisation funds, or other programmes. The OECD reports, for example, that in 2008, US$34.6 billion in ODA went to fragile states, 31% of the total9. Add to this the presence of multilateral peacekeeping operations, with costs estimated at US$7.1 billion in 2009, and the scale and dimension of funding allocated to conflicts and fragile states becomes even higher.10 With these kinds of numbers, the argument for a more coherent and integrated approach to include conflict preparedness in overall emergency preparedness efforts seems patently obvious. Yet the debate is still in its infancy, making it difficult to develop a clear consensus on how to best approach the issue. Part of the problem is the absence of a clear international policy framework to orient conflict preparedness activities there is no equivalent of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) and few agencies have any direct mandate or experience in conflict preparedness. The UNDPs Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) is one of the main actors in the field of conflict prevention, managing a budget of US$153.8 million in 2009 to cover activities in 122 countries11, however little is known about how much is actually spent on conflict preparedness. Its budget is a miniscule amount compared to the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) 2010-2011 operating budget of US$7.3 billion (although it should be stated that some of this budget goes towards preparedness and prevention activities). 12 Another considerable challenge, similar to the one that has been faced by disaster preparedness, is that there is no clear definition of what constitutes conflict preparedness. As a recent OECD report on transition financing points out consensus on how to categorise transition activities is lacking. The report highlights compartmentalised aid architecture and artificial divisions between humanitarian and development assistance, and fragmentation between different funding instruments as some of the key barriers to a more effective approach. This is compounded by a lack of reliable data or evidence base through which to compare the costs and benefits of conflict preparedness to more complicated interventions aimed at protection of civilians, stabilising the country, peacebuilding and supporting the transition to recovery and development. In effect, these

8 9

GHA Report 2011, p.55-56 http://www.oecd.org/document/13/0,3746,en_2649_33693550_45789965_1_1_1_1,00.html 10 These figures exclude military operations or expenditures reported for use of military assets in the delivery of humanitarian assistance a practice that is contrary to international guidelines that state costs should not be imputed as humanitarian funding. See: GHA Report 2011, p.55-56 11 http://www.undp.org/cpr/annualreports/2009/flash/home.html 12 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/yir2010.pdf

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are exactly the same concerns as those raised about disaster preparedness, so on the surface at least, there may be grounds for stronger alignment between the two areas. The issue of how conflicts are conceptualised is also worthy of discussion. To date, most of the focus on conflict situations has been on dealing with armed groups for example, disarmament and reintegration process, training of national police forces, promoting rule of law etc. These are all valid efforts, and may contribute to better preparedness to minimise the potential for future conflicts. But as Michele Bachelet, the Head of UN Women, recently argued, this is a perpetrator-centred paradigm of peacebuilding, not a peacebuilder-centered one where civil society, and in particular women, have a more inclusive role in conflict resolution, conflict early warning and community-led processes to avoid, prevent, and when necessary respond to situations of conflict and violence.13 This last point is particularly important, as the nature of conflict has changed dramatically in recent years. Rather than dealing with wars involving states or clearly organised non-state actors fighting over political interests, the actors in conflict have become more fragmented, less motivated over political issues and less inclined to engage with international actors. In Colombia and other countries, for example, armed groups formerly demobilised under peace processes have now reemerged as armed gangs engaged in criminal activities, and violence has become endemic at the community level.14 Yet the effects of that violence remain the same. Therefore, the international communitys approach to conflict preparedness needs to adapt to this new reality, just as disaster preparedness is gradually moving away from an almost exclusive focus on natural risks and hazards towards a more nuanced view of risk drivers that contribute to disaster impacts.15 A final and important area of complexity to be considered in any attempt to integrate preparedness for both conflict and disaster is the practical logistics, in relation to the role of preparedness in longterm risk reduction. For disasters, considerable amounts of policy exists connecting preparedness to long-term DRR, the HFA being a prime example. There are no such equivalents for conflict, which link preparedness to long-term processes in such a uniform and well articulated manner. Conflict prevention is discussed by donors and agencies but rarely includes preparedness. This suggests a need firstly for much more examination of how conflict preparedness can be linked to longer-term processes, and secondly for investigation into whether such processes are compatible with those which already exist for disasters. Perhaps the place to start is a more inclusive view of preparedness, as proposed by this study, to focus on all types of emergencies, hazards and risks, including conflicts, and to focus on measures that contribute to building capacity and resilience to minimise the effects of those risks. Under this definition, many of the same interventions for disaster preparedness are equally relevant and appropriate for conflict preparedness. This includes, for example, better tools to assess risks, vulnerabilities and capacities, contingency planning, first aid training, early warning systems16, and community-level preparedness measures, including knowledge and awareness of resources available to communities facing a crisis.

13

http://www.unwomen.org/2011/09/un-women-executive-director-michelle-bachelet-keynote-speech-on-daghammarskjold%E2%80%99s-legacy/ 14 http://daraint.org/humanitarian-response-index/humanitarian-response-index-2010/response-to-crises/colombia/# 15 http://daraint.org/human-impact-of-climate-change/disaster-risk-reduction-initiative/ 16 It should be noted here that not all processes for disasters and conflict are the same. For example, early warning for cyclones is a very specific scientific process which has been developed through four decades of research.

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At the international level, it may be too early to begin an ambitious effort aimed at integrating disaster and conflict, and preparedness financing and programming. However, there are some incremental first steps that would go a long way towards achieving closer alignment. These might include: clearer consensus on definitions of preparedness measures, especially conflict more consistent reporting on funding for preparedness, using internationally comparable standards (such as OECD CRS and UN OCHAs FTS) better tools to assess multiple risks and hazards facing a country, and better integration of this into programming stronger evidence base built on the costs and benefits of preparedness as well as best practice, to complement the examination of risks and needs at country level less rigid compartmentalisation of funding streams and more flexibility to include preparedness measures in all programming.

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Donor architecture17
The task before donors
It is fundamental that well integrated emergency preparedness ensures an effective response, enables rapid recovery and helps increase resilience to all hazards, natural disasters as well as conflicts and epidemics. This comprehensive approach is strongly supported by the literature, which also suggests that emergency preparedness needs to be addressed holistically, recognising the complexity from which humanitarian crises can arise18. For instance, a recent study by UNDP concluded that disasters and conflict that happen at the same time intensify risk of future crises and damage peoples lives which further undermines their coping capacities and increases their poverty levels19. Similarly, one can expect that natural disasters that occur in conflict areas, already characterised by weak institutions, can further reduce the ability of national governments and the international community to effectively operate within the disaster management cycle. This interplay between conflict and natural hazards is key; natural events such as drought may lead to or exacerbate conflict whilst conflict can lead to a reduced capacity to deal with those events. Consequently, it is essential that an emergency preparedness strategy encompass all risks and the interaction between them. The question asked in this section is whether or not donors follow a comprehensive approach? Are they able or willing to fund one? Do they have adequate policies? Do they have the necessary structure?

What does the data tell us about donor financing?


Norway EU USA UK Japan Australia Germany Sweden Canada Denmark Switzerland
Material relief assistance and services Relief co-ordination; protection and support services Disaster prevention and preparedness

22 77 59 53 46 28 25 23 6 3 2 0% 20% 40%
Emergency food aid Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation

60%

80%

100%

Figure 10: Breakdown of humanitarian aid by ten donors profiled, 2009 (US$ million). Development Initiatives based on OCED DAC data

17

It is clear from undertaking this study that the divisions in aid structure that inhibit adequate preparedness expenditure extend beyond donors to coordinating and implementing institutions and organisations. A separate section of this report (page 24) undertakes a review of the major global organisations and their work. However our ability to go into detail beyond this, such as the structures of the UN implementing agencies, NGOs and other organisations is limited in this study. 18 See: Disaster-Conflict Interface: Comparative Experiences; Conflict and Disaster and Climate Change and Security. 19 Disaster-Conflict Interface: Comparative Experiences

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Reported funding highlights immediately how different donors give a different priority to what is termed disaster prevention and preparedness within the DAC database20. Of the ten donors examined in this section only Japan in 2009 gave more than 10% of humanitarian financing to preparedness, with Australia and Norway following at around 10%. Some donors appear to give very low priority to preparedness, such as the United States and Switzerland, both providing only 1% of their total humanitarian aid to this area in 2009. The US figure is particularly significant since this means that only US$59 million of nearly US$4.4 billion (which accounts for more than 33% of all governments humanitarian aid in 2009) went to preparedness.
Total Norway Switzerland Sweden Denmark Canada Australia Japan Germany USA UK EU

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

National and local capacity building Reconstruction and Recovery Early warning Prevention - conflict and natural disasters Conflict preparedness Emergency Operations (response and management)

Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Broad DRR Institutional capacity building Livelihoods - Resilience Climate change adaptation Civil Protection

Figure 11: The detailed profile of what is funded by donors within 'prevention and preparedness'. Note: this is drawn from DIs examination of each project line and a bringing together of expenditures by core activity. It therefore does not correspond to a code or sub-code within the DAC CRS. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data.

When examining the reported funding levels in detail we see significant variations around what donors report to the same code. In fact there is no clear pattern and no single programme activity undertaken by all donors, except for institutional capacity building. Some expenditure seems to be misplaced, such as climate change or civil protection. Three donors report conflict preparedness to the disaster prevention and preparedness code, even though it is actually only intended for disasters. The reported data however, and even a detailed investigation within codes, which reveals both significant differences in priority given to preparedness, as well as considerably different activities being undertaken which donors class as preparedness, needs to be placed in the context of the varying policies that exist.

The absence of conflict


An examination of all 11 donors preparedness policies reveals that none of them have a policy that is capable of addressing short- as well as long-term complexities in an integrated and comprehensive
20

It should be noted that the data examined here is disaster prevention and preparedness as per the DAC database code. It does not include preparedness for conflict, for which no separate code exists in any part of the DAC database.

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manner i.e. one that also includes preparation for conflict (see the table below). Similarly, only one donor has an emergency preparedness definition that is clearly their own. In most cases, donors have adopted preparedness definitions exclusively within the context of natural disaster as defined by the ISDR and as specified by priority 5 of the HFA. The one exception is the emergency management policy described by USAID's Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) where preparedness includes a set of activities for conflict as well as epidemic emergencies. However, within this policy there is no definition that addresses all the specific risk factors in an integrated and comprehensive manner21. Of the ten donors considered in detail in this study only the US and Canada appear to have implemented conflict preparedness programmes in 2009. For instance, when analysing Canadas emergency preparedness policies, it is not apparent that it addresses conflict preparedness within a humanitarian aid context. However, the data in the OECD DAC shows that at least one programme with these characteristics has been financed in 2009. This is by no means an isolated case but rather one of many examples, which reflects both inconsistencies among donor policies as well as reporting to the OECD DAC database.
Donor Preparedness definition Own Adopted HFA ISDR X Y Y Y Y Y X Y Y X Y Y X Y Y X Y Y X Y Y X Y Y X Y Y X Y Y X Y Y Funding mechanism Hum. Aid Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Dev. Aid Y Y Y Y Y X X X Y Y X Other X Y X X Y X X X X X X
*

Emergency preparedness policy Integrated All Risk Policy X X X X X X X X X X X Nat. Disaster Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Conflict Y Y * X * X *23 X * X * X * X * X * X * X Pandemic Y Y X Y 24 Y 25 X 26 X 27 X 28 Y X 29 Y
22

Canada ** USA Japan United Kingdom Germany European Union Switzerland Sweden Australia Denmark Norway

Figure 12: Donor policy and financial mechanisms matrix. Indicates donor has a conflict prevention strategy and ** possibly has a conflict preparedness policy. Indicates a country has an emergency preparedness policy with substantial elements of disaster, pandemic and conflict preparedness, but not integrated a single coherent strategy.

21 22

For more details on USAIDs emergency preparedness activities see USAID Budget: OFDA. CIDA funds pandemic preparedness through its Development Aid programmes, Key Development Challenges. 23 For more information see Germanys Action Plan for Conflict Prevention 24 The Initiative for Pandemic Preparedness is commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The Initiative collaborates closely with local German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) offices and international organisations. Source: Strengthening pandemic preparedness in partner countries 25 The European Unions mandate to ECHO *Regulation (CE) n 1257/96] is to provide emergency assistance and relief to the victims of natural disasters or armed conflict outside the European Union. 26 Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) engages in conflict prevention, but not in conflict preparedness. Source: Conflict prevention - A cooperation priority 27 Swedens International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) supports conflict prevention, but not conflict preparedness. Source: Peace and Security 28 AusAID funds both conflict and pandemic through development aid programmes. Sources: Pandemics and Emerging Infectious Disease Framework 2010-2015 and Conflict and Development Policy 29 Norway addresses pandemic preparedness in its policy on the prevention of humanitarian crises.

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Looking at some other examples of donor policies it is clear that despite the disparities many address conflict prevention although the extent to which this includes conflict preparedness is unknown. Germany works on conflict prevention within a climate change context, and is likely to engage in conflict preparedness activities. However, it does not have a specific conflict preparedness policy30. The disaster preparedness programme of the European Commissions Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO/DIPECHO) encompasses natural and man-made disasters (i.e. technological hazards, fires) but excludes conflict.31 Nevertheless it is possible that ECHO engages in conflict preparedness through its conflict prevention strategy. The UK is similarly likely to fund elements of conflict preparedness through its policy focus on conflict prevention32. Denmark funds emergency preparedness from its humanitarian and development aid as part of the new development policy strategy freedom and development. Conflict prevention is defined, but not conflict preparedness.33 What humanitarian donors say about their own policies
Our funding is restricted to reactive life-saving policies. We have the *preparedness+ needs but we dont have the funding. We have no discussion or coordination with development actors. There is no national policy. Changes are taking place to allow preparedness to be funded from humanitarian budgets. DRR is seen as a development issue but is addressed by us humanitarians. Preparedness is for disasters mainly *in our policy+, not conflict. DRR is spent by the development agency but the preparedness is under the humanitarian aid division. Bilateral funding to DRR comes from country budgets. Multilateral funding to GFDRR comes from humanitarian budgets.

Rising funding obscures issues


Nevertheless, despite these conflict-related issues, overall funding for the disaster part of preparedness has seen reasonably significant increases since 2006. Since there is an overlap between the natural disaster and conflict preparedness activities funded, donors can (and probably do) use the same framework to address some aspects of humanitarian emergencies as a result of conflict. For example, activities such as building community capacity, stockpiling of emergency commodities and constructing internally displaced person (IDP)/refugee camps are among a number of activities that are part of an effective response to both natural disaster and conflict emergencies. However the evidence suggests that much of this increase is probably down to the positive impact that the global DRR strategy set by the HFA has had on disaster preparedness policy strategies and funding. Clearly emergency preparedness associated with risk factors such as conflict and epidemic are not being addressed either financially or strategically in an integrated manner34. The individual donor analysis indicates that donors have separate policies and funding mechanisms to address all aspects of emergency preparedness. It is this separation that largely leads to humanitarian financing being
30 31

Climate Change and Security Challenges for German Development Cooperation ECHO - Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Preparedness 32 CHASE Operational Plan 2011-2015 33 Strategy for Denmark's Development Cooperation 34 Please refer to disaster and conflict complexity section, page 15.

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left responsible to fund preparedness activities. For example in 2009 80% of all funding for emergency preparedness reported to the DAC (using a detailed examination of all projects reported that year) was marked as humanitarian35. This in turn limits both the amount of funds available, and probably the effectiveness and sustainability of preparedness programmes financed36. This emphasis on using largely humanitarian funding to do preparedness programming and activities is significant. Humanitarian funding is primarily set up to work in post-crisis environments, based on the need to respond and thus prioritises shorter-term interventions. Therefore, does it have the necessary structural flexibility to meet the needs of both long- and short-term preparedness programming? This would appear to be an important obstacle towards a comprehensive and integrated emergency preparedness policy. It reinforces our preliminary findings about the practical choices donors make, which suggest that sometimes humanitarian donors fund preparedness activities despite the system rather than because of it.

Elements of improved donor emergency preparedness


A summary of donor emergency preparedness policy and engagement is as follows: funding for preparedness has increased since 2006, in part due to donor commitments to support the HFA the fact that reporting alternatives are poor help reinforce inadequate policies there is wide disparity in priority and activities funded humanitarian funds are financing preparedness, not development policies on preparedness usually relate to disaster only. conflict preparedness is rarely articulated, and when it is it is usually within the bounds of prevention; it is not clear what, if any, conflict preparedness activities are undertaken reporting appears to be quite poor donor engagement with preparedness is built on the bifurcated aid structure foundation.

A key question that underpins future developments in donor funding for emergency preparedness is whether or not humanitarian financing is either enough money or the right kind of money for the kind of preparedness programming that is envisioned for the purpose of bringing about real change.

35

It should be noted that it is possible for donors to, on the one hand, articulate internally certain funding as development and yet report it as humanitarian within the DAC, and vice versa. 36 See page 14 for details.

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Non-DAC donors and preparedness


Although this section of the report focuses on donors that are members of the OECD DAC, it is important to highlight the contributions that non-DAC donors (NDD), a group of donors that sits outside this member group, can make to preparedness and the wider DRR agenda. In 2010 NDD contributed US$622.5 million in humanitarian aid (as reported to UN OCHAs FTS), an increase of US67.2 million from 2009 figures. Saudi Arabia was the largest NDD, contributing US$255.9 million. Top 10 Non-DAC donors in 2010 1. Saudi Arabia 2. Turkey 3. Russian Federation 4. United Arab Emirates 5. China 255.9 60.9 38.3 37.8 37.6 6. India 7. Brazil 8. Thailand 9. Mexico 10. Kuwait 36.5 28.9 11.7 10.7 10.6

Figure 13: Top 10 non-DAC donors of humanitarian aid, 2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on OCHA FTS

Several NDDs already channel money through DRR-related funds, such as UNDPs Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR-TTF) and the UN Trust Fund for Disaster Risk Reduction of ISDR. In 2010 ten NDD channelled a total of US$9.2 million to the TTF-CPR and three contributed US$0.9 million to ISDR. Brazil is the only NDD to contribute to GFDRR up until 2010, to a total of US$1.6 million. It has pledged a further US$0.2 million for the period 2011-2012 along with Nigeria, a second NDD that has pledged US$0.5 million. Brazil is also the largest NDD to the TTF CPR and ISDR. These pooled funds along with others such as the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and country level emergency response funds (ERFs) also provide NDDs that do not have field presence or in-depth country knowledge with an alternative channel for their funding. They also help to reduce the administrative burden associated with bilateral funding. Many of these NDDS are also focused on DRR at a national level, due to the risks posed by a range of hazards. This knowledge and experience could be built upon by the international community and any lesson learnt applied to other country contexts. As many NDDs are already key actors in the humanitarian community and gaining prominence in relation to DRR both internationally and at a national level, it is essential to ensure that they are involved in any dialogue relating to the preparedness agenda. Only then will their potential as partners for assisting in a more coherent and predictable approach to funding emergency preparedness be understood.
Information and excerpts are taken from the Non-DAC donors and humanitarian aid report produced by the Global Humanitarian Assistance programme (GHA) http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/report/non-dacdonors-and-humanitarian-aid-2.

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Institutional architecture
Background Major institutions have been established to champion disaster risk reduction (DRR), promote engagement with key issues, advocate for its importance and for the need for change in policies, and help obtain funding. At the same time, already existing institutions working across a wide range of issues interconnected with DRR, including those directly responsible for the aftermath of poor investment in this area, have evolved to contribute to the DRR agenda. This mix of new and evolving institutions is key to understanding how gaps and duplications exist. This section takes into account the fact that the institutional architecture did not develop from a tabula rasa but rather grew over time into the complex interconnected picture we see now. (It should be made clear at the outset that this is very much a preliminary review of the key institutions and their activities, based on interviews with a few officials in each organisation, with a review of the existing documentation and an analysis of funding. A more detailed examination is advocated for Phase II of this study). The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), adopted in 2005, is a key force behind setting the current DRR agenda. Its five priorities for action often form a fundamental basis for institutions strategic approaches, with DRR and preparedness mainstreamed throughout policies, agencies and programmes. This section will examine five major institutions involved in DRR and preparedness the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR)37, UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR)38, UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR)39, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)40 and the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC)41. The following section consists of a matrix outlining each institutions structure, role, partnerships, mandate, country focus and key areas of work42.

37 38

http://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/ http://www.unisdr.org/ 39 http://www.beta.undp.org/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/overview.html 40 http://www.unocha.org/ 41 http://www.ifrc.org/ 42 Please see Annex 2 for more detailed institutional profiles.

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Institutional structures matrix


GFDRR Level Role Global/national. To be main global forum for DRR; provide technical and financial assistance to mainstream DRR in national strategies. Managed by the World Bank. In partnership with ISDR system to support the HFA. UNDP-BCPR Global/national (supports country offices of UNDP). To advance peace and development by strengthening capacities to prevent and recover from crisis. Managed by UNDP. Member of CADRI with OCHA 43 and ISDR. Partner of ISDR. UN OCHA Global/regional/national. To be main coordinator of humanitarian response. UN-ISDR Global/regional/national. To be UN focal point for DRR; create system of partnerships to generate support for global DRR movement. IFRC Global/regional/national/ community. To carry out relief operations assisting victims of disasters, as well as strengthen the capacities of national societies and enhance safety and resilience at community level. In partnership with ISDR, GFDRR, UN OCHA, DFID and ECHO.

Institutional partnerships

Member of CADRI with UNDP and ISDR. Partner of ISDR.

Supports HFA

All 5 priority areas.

All 5 priority areas.

Mandate

To mainstream DRR and climate change adaptation (CCA) in country development strategies by supporting a country-led and -managed implementation of the HFA. 20 priority low-income countries most at risk to

Country focus

Responsible for advancing peace and development by strengthening capacities of countries to prevent and recover from crisis and regenerating the well-being and livelihoods of those affected by natural disaster and armed violence. 86 countries, 100 country offices.

Priority 5: strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels. Resolution 46/182: To strengthen the UNs response to both complex emergencies and natural disasters.

In partnership with GFDRR to support the HFA. Sits under the authority of the UnderSecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs. Member of CADRI with OCHA and UNDP. All 5 priorities of the HFA. Tasked with supporting the implementation of HFA. To serve as the focal point in the UN system for the coordination of disaster reduction and to ensure synergies among disaster reduction activities.

All 5 priority areas.

To inspire, encourage, facilitate and promote at all times, all forms of humanitarian activities by national societies, with a view to preventing and alleviating human suffering.

All countries in humanitarian crisis.

Coordination with various partners around the world,

Present through network of 186 national societies.

43

Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative, CADRI, brings together three core organisations - OCHA, ISDR Secretariat and UNDP in a collaborative mission to deliver as one on DRR: http://www.cadri.net/

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GFDRR multiple natural hazards plus additional 11 44 countries. The multidonor trust funds retain 20% that is open to any country. Track I: Global and Regional Partnerships Track II: Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) in Development Track III: Standby Recovery Financing Facility (SRFF) for Accelerated Disaster 45 Recovery.

UNDP-BCPR

UN OCHA

UN-ISDR representing numerous countries. Seven global offices.

IFRC

Key focus areas for preparedness and DRR

1. 2. 3. 4.

5. 6.

Conflict prevention Crisis governance and rule of law DRR and Climate Risk Management Women in conflict, prevention, peacebuilding and recovery Immediate crisis response Livelihoods and 46 Economic Recovery.

1. OCHA's internal response capacity 2. The capability of the humanitarian coordination system's in-country members to make a coordinated emergency response 3. The capacity of national authorities and regional organisations to request/mobilise international humanitarian assistance effectively utilise the in-country humanitarian coordination 47 system. Various humanitarian pooled funds none specific to preparedness and DRR. Not clearly articulated though clearly conflict-affected countries are part of their core caseload.

Objective 1: DRR accepted and applied for climate change adaption Objective 2: Measurable increase in investments in DRR Objective 3: Disaster-resilient cities, schools and hospital Objective 4: Strengthened international system for DRR.

Disaster preparedness and mainstreaming DRR should be prioritised and integrated into all IFRC and programmes. Three core components of preparing 48 for disasters: 1. Mitigation/prevention, Risk reduction fully integrated into sustainable development planning 1. Vulnerability and Capacity Assessments 2. Disaster preparedness for response. Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) and global appeal for community preparedness and risk reduction. Maybe

Pooled funds

Multi donor trust fund (MDTF).

Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR TTF). Perhaps through work on conflict prevention, though not clear.

United Nations Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction.

Conflict preparedness

No

No

44 45

List of countries: http://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/sites/gfdrr.org/files/GFDRR_Partnership_Strategy_2009-2012.pdf http://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/node/56 46 http://www.beta.undp.org/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/focus_areas.html 47 http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination/preparedness/overview 48 http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/preparing-for-disaster/

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Funding
There has been an increase in funding to a number of institutions working on DRR and preparedness, although funding levels vary significantly. Financial support to UNISDR increased from US$2.1 million in 2000 to US$28.6 million in 2010 and funding to UNDPs BCPR has nearly doubled from US$84.9 million in 2001 to US$156.7 million in 2010. BCPR total expenditure on the DRR and recovery category increased from US$2.7 million in 2004 to US$25 million in 2010. Over the period of 2004 to 2009 it is reported that early warning and preparedness activities accounted for 4.5% of total UNDP expenditure (US$866 million) in the area of disaster prevention and recovery (this includes expenditure through BCPR). GFDRR has different reporting periods but funding doubled from US$43.8 million in the period 20062008 to US$88.1 million in 2010-2011. IFRCs total expenditure on DRR increased from CHF68.1 million in 2009 to CHF88.1 million in 2010. This increase demonstrates some growing donor support to DRR and preparedness activities, although total funds to the institutions are still dwarfed by funding to humanitarian crisis, for example, which was estimated at US$16.7 billion in 2010.49
Institution (US$m) UNISDR funding UNDP expenditure on disaster prevention & recovery UNDP BCPR Total funding to BCPR Contributions to CPR TTF Allocations received from UNDPs regular resources Total DRR & recovery expenditure Expenditure of CPR TTF DRR and recovery window Expenditure by fund category of regular resources DRR and recovery 0 0 0 0 84.9 84.9 0 0 119.1 119.1 0 0 128.8 128.8 0 0 170.9 170.9 0 2.7 2.7 248.4 248.4 0 55.5 55.5 115.9 115.9 0 20.1 20.1 151.2 99.2 52.0 10.6 10.6 138.4 86.4 52.0 20.0 12.8 7.2 127.1 73.1 54.0 15.9 10.6 5.3 156.7 105.1 51.6 25.0 17.1 7.8 1,441.4 1,231.8 209.6 149.8 129.5 20.3 2000 2.1 2001 0.8 2002 3.7 2003 3.6 2004 9.1 52.9 2005 17.9 150.8 2006 15.0 180.0 2007 21.0 152.9 2008 28.9 143.5 2009 15.5 186.1 2010 27.1 Total 146.1 866.2

Figure 14: Institutional funding for DRR. Source: Development Initiatives based on institutional annual reports

50

It should be noted that it is difficult to understand exactly which activities have been undertaken and whether or not they fell within preparedness or wider DRR.

49 50

GHA Report 2011 http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/report/gha-report-2011 For more financial information on UNDP please see Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to Disaster Prevention and Recovery http://erc.undp.org/evaluationadmin/downloaddocument.html?docid=4397

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2010-2011 2008-2010 2006-2008 0 20 40 60 80 100

Figure 15: Contributions to GFDRR, 2006-2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on World Bank data

World Vision: An example of NGO Preparedness


World Vision (WV) addresses preparedness through a dedicated disaster management policy. This policy places emphasis on working in partnerships and collaborations, and increasing quality and accountability to complement technical capacity and assistance that WV provides from early warning, preparedness, mitigation, response, recovery, and transition. Closely connected to these aspects of WV work is disaster risk reduction (DRR). WV has in place preparedness standards which address the period leading up to the declaration of a disaster. They apply to all WV offices and are considered requirements for normal operations even when no disaster is occurring or anticipated. These clarify where responsibility for implementing each standard lies. They have been updated recently to reflect what WV has learnt in the last ten years. In the last decade, WV has invested in preparedness by expanding offices for strategy and quality assurance, which increase the quality of preparedness through organisational learning, better policy analysis, development of standards and management systems, initiatives to increase downwards accountability, and improved quality of the preparedness systems. Some of WVs preparedness mechanisms are as follows. A worldwide logistics network with three global hubs and regional warehouses near areas prone to emergencies. Relief supplies and equipment are maintained in a constant state of readiness to enable WV to respond to up to three major disasters at the same time. The Partnership Emergency Preparedness and Response Fund (EPRF) which enables preparation for and response to emergencies. The EPRF has inherent fund recovery and replenishment mechanisms rather than being simply a discretionary fund which provides grants, as it is usually approved within 48 hours. WV National Emergency Preparedness and Response Fund (NEPRF) may be utilised for preparedness, pre-positioning and rapid response activities and can be used to fund responses to any emergency. Each national office will determine the size of its NEPRF depending on individual country vulnerabilities. It can be funded from a variety of sources including funding from long-term development resources. As the NEPRF is managed locally by senior national office staff, disbursements can be made without delay. The Global Rapid Response Team (GRRT) is a group of highly skilled professional relief practitioners from within the WV Partnership who can be mobilised in teams at short notice.

Most of WV preparedness activities are funded from a variety of sources such as private donors, government grants and corporate funding.

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Institutional issues: a preliminary analysis


Preliminary conversations with key stakeholders both within and outside of these organisations as well as an examination of their policies and interrelated work has suggested that there are areas that need to be investigated further, and that there are perhaps illogicalities, gaps and duplications that need to be addressed. There does appear to be some top level duplication with regards to who is in the lead globally51. All of the institutions have committed to implement the HFA in their strategies for DRR and preparedness. However all but one of the institutions (OCHA) state that they work in all five of the areas for the HFA and it is not clear whether there is a delineation of duties or responsibilities to deliver either between themselves or within the five objectives of the HFA itself. Of those institutions, BCPR and GFDRR state that they work operationally52 at a global level, but there does not appear to be clear designation of what each of their roles should be, in which areas they take the lead or otherwise. This appears to be replicated at a country level where World Bank and UNDP country offices undertake activities to support national governments in areas such as mainstreaming DRR in their development strategies, but it is not clear who does what and where. This appears to be further complicated in those countries where OCHA is present, where it also supports governments to build national capacity. Interestingly, one member of these institutions suggested that in this area it was not duplication but gaps that are the main issue, especially at country level; due to the fact that there is no clear lead and no clear prioritisation, whether or not countries with preparedness needs will receive the necessary focus is largely unpredictable. There have been visible efforts to join up coordination. For example, the Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI) brings three UN organisations, OCHA, UNDP and ISDR, together at a global and country level in a collaborative mission to deliver as one on disaster risk reduction.53 There has been direct cooperation between the World Bank and the UN to jointly engage in DRR and preparedness, for example GFDRR (World Bank) and ISDR (UN) have agreed to jointly support HFA implementation and this joint work has been recognised by other stakeholders as an important step in partnership development and coordination. GFDRRs Track I currently finances ISDR (tapping a separate World Bank internal funding source, rather than the GFDRR multi-donor trust fund) with the aim of promoting global and regional partnerships, and the World Bank is the second largest donor to ISDR. This partnership is particularly important as it links an operational institution with a coordinator at a global level. However there are clearly improvements to be made. The OCHA 2009 meta-evaluation, for example, whilst acknowledging the importance of the organisation ensuring that DRR and preparedness are elements of its strategy, highlights a lack of connections between OCHA and UNDP, and OCHA and ISDR54. All of these institutions claim that they work in conflict-affected areas in one way or another, with OCHA and IFRC having a particularly strong country-level focus. However, it is not evident from
51

One element of the structure of coordinating work on DRR and preparedness that does not seem appropriate is the reporting line of the head of ISDR to the ERC. With ISDR dealing with long-term DRR (as well as preparedness) and OCHA more concerned in that part of preparedness closest to humanitarian need, it does seem to be incorrect. However in this phase of the report there is no time to go beyond a bald presentation of the issue, not how it works in practice and what the alternatives might be. 52 Finances or carries out projects at a global and country level. 53 http://www.cadri.net/
54

http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/OCHA_Meta-evaluation_Final_Report.pdf

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reviewing their policy whether or not they carry out specific conflict preparedness activities. This is almost certainly due to the fact that disaster preparedness has profile, clear leadership and consistent policies whilst conflict preparedness still requires more detailed articulation. Greater transparency and visibility of exactly what is being done by each organisation on preparedness could provide clarity of information and reduce duplications, whilst also highlighting gaps. One donor interviewed stated that time had been spent trying to understand what was being done by who globally, but the information was either fragmented or did not exist. This would suggest that meeting HFA objectives is going to be challenging at the very least, but could also lead to inefficiencies of expenditure. Some institutions have made a considerable effort to measure the results of DRR and preparedness financing and make that information transparent. The GFDRR has set up a Result Based Management System (RBMS) and is operationalising a new results framework,55 whilst an outcome from UN ISDRs evaluation was that it lacks systematic monitoring and evaluation. The institution is addressing this by developing and implementing an RBMS. In summary, whilst it is acknowledged in this study that the work to examine institutions is only preliminary at this stage, it is evident that there are issues to be addressed. Specific actions and individual activities have not been clearly delegated to relevant institutions, and organisations with the greatest knowledge and expertise are perhaps not leading in the specific areas where they would be best placed to do so. The Nepal Consortium56, whilst not without challenges, has designated key institutions to lead those flagship areas most relevant to their work, while linking them to a single coordinator for all of the work. As things stand, with the current institutional architecture, both globally and at country level, there does not seem to be a clear segmentation of roles and responsibilities for delivering on the HFA.

55 56

http://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/node/44) See page 51.

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The private sector and emergency preparedness


The private sector is mentioned by many actors as a key player, actual or potential, with regard to emergency preparedness. Whilst there is not enough time to go into detail on private sector activities in this phase of the study, some key facts are highlighted here, indicating scope and scale of private sector involvement in preparedness to date. Funding financial mechanisms: it is not only government that is able to donate to pooled funds. In recent years the private sector has utilised these funds to channel contributions; however these are general contributions and only the funding for the UNDP CPR-TTF may have been expended on preparedness activities. In 2010 a total of seven private organisations channelled US$0.4 million through the Haiti ERF. A further number of individuals and smaller unspecified organisations donated US$0.3 million. Foundations, private individuals and individual organisations such as the UAE Red Crescent have contributed to the CERF. By 2010 there were 22 private sector donors providing contributions of over US$10,000 to the fund. The amount received reached US$4.4 million (1.2% of the total). UNDPs Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR -TTF) receives funding from private sector donors. In 2010 this amounted to US$1 million.

Funding Haiti: after the 2010 earthquake the private sector contributed considerable amounts of money in response to the earthquake. The figures below (covering the period January 2010 to May 2011) reveal sizeable contributions, but these are all for response: total humanitarian aid (from all donors): US$3.9 billion, (with US$20.2 million for DRR) private sector humanitarian aid: US$959 million, (with no funds for preparedness) total number of private sector companies, corporations, foundations contributing: 447, of which 343 included a cash component.

Partnership development is a key component.

OCHA facilitates partnerships between operational agencies and private companies wishing to complement existing mechanisms and disaster response tools. A website provides orientation to businesses on how to contribute to relief efforts. OCHA is active with the Disaster Resource Network, a World Economic Forum initiative to grant expertise and equipment to humanitarian organisations. It also collaborates with companies such as Ericsson which provides deployment of communications solutions and skills. OCHA has a partnership with PricewaterhouseCoopers, offering pro bono services for accountability and transparency. ISDR works with members of the private sector through its private sector advisory group. There are currently 13 members who represent companies that are taking the lead in ensuring the safety of long-term investments and planning ahead to protect industry and society from disasters, economic disruptions, while ensuring business continuity. BCPR receives funding from the private sector and UNDP has a private sector strategy that provides a framework for UNDP private sector interventions at global, regional and country office levels.

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Consolidated appeals process (CAP)


This section of the report examines the possibility of using the United Nations consolidated appeals process (CAP) for better engagement and articulation of emergency preparedness,57 including investigating the potential for standing sections within humanitarian action plans dedicated to preparedness.

Introduction
The UN-led CAP is a strategic planning tool with the overall goal of supporting a collective humanitarian response to crises with rational and equitable coverage. The CAP cycle includes: strategic planning leading to a Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) resource mobilisation (leading to a consolidated appeal or a flash appeal) coordinated programme implementation joint monitoring and evaluation revision, if necessary; and reporting on results.58 Consolidated appeals include projected activities for the following year where the needs are relatively predictable. Flash appeals are a rapid strategic and fundraising tool based on immediately identied needs following sudden onset disasters. These appeals often cover only the first three to six months of a new emergency. The volume of humanitarian financing flowing through the UN CAP has grown from US$1.1 billion in 2000 to US$7.1 billion by 2010. Moreover, the CAP is a key tool for informing donor financing decisions and therefore engaging with the UN CAP process to promote more strategic emphasis on financing for preparedness is an opportunity that cannot be overlooked.

Opportunities and challenges


There are a number of pragmatic advantages in using the CAP to promote funding of preparedness as a strategic priority. Not least, the CAP is well established and many donors rely on the analysis and prioritisation within the CAP to inform their funding allocations. This is particularly important for donors who have limited capacity for in-house situation analysis, including non-traditional and smaller donors. Whereas the focus of much preparedness and DRR funding is on natural disasters, the overwhelming majority of funding within the UN CAP flows to complex emergencies, many of which are conflictaffected. All but four of the 17 or 18 countries being considered for a consolidated appeal in 2012 have conflict as a key driver of humanitarian need. Consolidated appeals therefore provide potential opportunities to pursue a more coordinated response to preparedness in conflict-affected crises.
57

The use of the CAP to encourage engagement with preparedness issues and investment has already been examined in some detail by Humanitarian Outcomes (on behalf of the Norwegian Government) in investigating the possibility of establishing a thematic CAP for disaster preparedness, and many of the main advantages or disadvantages have already been discussed. These are included in this summary and added to where appropriate with examples specifically connected to the use of the CHAP/CAP processes. 58 http://www.reliefweb.int/glossary/pageloader.aspx?lista=C

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Given that most consolidated appeals take place in chronic crises, where needs can often be anticipated, it is not surprising that despite limited attention to DRR and preparedness in the official consolidated appeals guidance,59 many appeals do already include preparedness projects, and in some cases preparedness is identified as a strategic priority. This is a prime example of actors on the ground being ahead of policy development. In the 2011 humanitarian appeal, preparedness is mentioned 18 times and two of the 18 appeals (Djibouti and West Africa) have sectors entitled Emergency Preparedness and Response.60 These are for preparedness activities usually focused on coordination, logistics, working with government crisis management agencies etc. At the same time a degree of preparedness mainstreaming is evident. In the 2011 CAP for example, projects are spread across most sectors with health and nutrition (23 projects), and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) (13 projects) being the sectors where the need for emergency preparedness is most clearly articulated.

Figure 16: Preparedness projects within the 2011 consolidated appeal mid-year review, using search terms developed to track preparedness expenditures in FTS. See page 45 for details. Source: Development Initiatives using OCHA FTS data

Mainstreaming thematic priorities however poses problems from the perspective of tracking investments. We were able to manually identify 74 projects in the 2011 CAP that fall either fully or partly into emergency preparedness, but clearly this sort of approach to tracking preparedness is unsatisfactory and unsustainable.

59

The guidance note of 2012 has only two references in the entire document, one suggesting it as a possible strategic objective and the other in reference to when the Humanitarian Dashboard triggered. 60 Activities within these sectors include disaster management, logistics hubs, capacity development for humanitarian responders, national response capacity enhancement and health emergency preparedness.

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Yet there is no obvious barrier to introducing new procedures and guidance to the CAP. Despite being a relatively new concept, early recovery is now firmly mainstreamed within the CAP process, with a section on how to programme early recovery within the CAP, and a standalone document agreed by the CAP SWG that provides the necessary detail for humanitarian country teams (HCTs) to programme early recovery. Similarly, a gender marker was introduced in 2011. The impact of the gender marker on the funding priority gender receives is worth paying close attention to. The introduction of a preparedness marker would improve traceability of preparedness funding and give greater visibility to preparedness as a strategic priority at the global level. There are also opportunities to improve the emphasis and priority given to preparedness within appeals at the national planning level. In practice, appeals are relatively heterogeneous in the way processes are organised and priorities set at the national level, and humanitarian coordinators have considerable latitude. This provides important opportunities for alignment and coordination with structures and actors at the national level including national disaster management platforms and UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAF). The extent to which this is possible may be limited by the capacity of domestic actors and the stage of evolution of disaster management structures and plans, however, it is an area in which the global CAP, OCHA and resident and humanitarian coordinators could afford much greater priority and leadership. Innovation and good practice are already evident at the country level, and this could be shared and replicated. The Somalia HAP incorporates the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) system, which enables clear benchmarked statements about the severity and scale of food security and livelihoods needs, and the necessary humanitarian response - including strategic mitigating responses as well as functioning as a crisis early warning mechanism. The DRC 2011 HAP included regional rankings against four humanitarian risk factors (natural hazard, armed conflict, displacement and epidemic), which were considered alongside vulnerability, response capacities and needs analysis to inform regional CAP priorities. These two examples represent an important shift in thinking about the starting point of humanitarian problem analysis and the phasing of humanitarian intervention in a crisis. Shifting the conceptual framing of humanitarian problems to consider the risk, likelihood and likely impact of potential crisis as opposed to manifest humanitarian need could have a powerful effect in raising preparedness and mitigating action higher in the list of funding priorities. Where preparedness is identified as an important priority within some humanitarian action plans, country-level pooled humanitarian funds (emergency response funds and common humanitarian funds) provide humanitarian coordinators with powerful tools to direct humanitarian financing in support of these priorities. In some cases these funds are already being used to channel financing to preparedness activities.61 However, the CAP also has inherent structural limitations which mean that it can only provide a partial contribution to a complex problem. For example, the CAP has limited coverage in global

61

For more information see page 34

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terms. Some major recipients of humanitarian assistance opt not to participate,62 while other crises may not be considered of sufficient scale or severity to warrant an appeal. This, by default, excludes many countries with chronic needs which hover below emergency thresholds but which are acutely vulnerable to shocks and would be ideal candidates for investing in preparedness. CAP appeals are not inclusive of all actors who have a stake in humanitarian preparedness and response. The IFRC and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are not part of the CAP, and they have their own emergency and annual appeal process. There is no requirement in CAP appeals to include national stakeholders in planning and prioritisation, which has been highlighted by the IASC Principals and others as an essential element of better emergency preparedness. Successful preparedness requires multi-annual funding commitments and planning. It is likely that programmes requiring longer-term financing would be marginalised within a competitive prioritisation process that often privileges short-term humanitarian outcomes and which is predicated on, at most, a one year planning cycle. The heterogeneous nature of the CAP, with devolved responsibility for situation analysis and prioritisation, generates a great deal of variation in quality and emphasis. While some appeals move towards shifting assessment and intervention paradigms towards analysing risk, vulnerability and promoting mitigating early action, the UN acknowledges that inter-sectoral needs analysis remains a challenge for most CAPs63, and there seems to be little investment or drive at present to support country teams to replicate this good practice. There remain no clear guidelines, no clear roles and responsibilities and no clear champion for preparedness within the CAP at a global or national level, and while there are a number of opportunities to advance the articulation of preparedness within the CAP, the impact of this is limited by the inbuilt limitations in the coverage and influence of the CAP on donor behaviour.64 Therefore, changes within the CAP should be seen as a necessary but not sufficient part of the solution. Our recommendations for these changes include: that work is undertaken to place emergency preparedness as a specific element within the CAP, including within the guidance note and in supporting material that provides definitions of terminology and stipulates reporting practices that the possibility of using a marker for tracking levels of preparedness funding within individual projects within the CAP should be examined that a decision is taken to make a single institution responsible for articulating, presenting, and developing policy on emergency preparedness within the CAP, both at a global and country level that emergency preparedness is integrated as a core component of work underway within the CAP SWG to make the CAP more strategic that setting a certain target for minimum preparedness expenditure is considered.

62

Ethiopia, for example, received US$4.8 billion of humanitarian assistance between 2000 and 2009 and has had no formal CAP appeal. 63 UN Humanitarian Appeal 2011, http://ochaonline.un.org/cap2006/webpage.asp?Page=1911 64 The consolidated appeals in Somalia, Kenya and Djibouti in 2011 anticipated and called for funding to enable early preventive action, which was met with a disappointing funding response until the situation escalated into a major crisis.

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It should not be forgotten that work in encouraging preparedness investments through the CAP will only be a part of the overall requirements; above all there needs to be a way of connecting greater investment in emergency preparedness through the CAP to longer-term processes, which in the context of the UN implies connection to the UNDAF at the very least.

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Financing architecture
Pooled funds
Pooled funds are now a significant tool of the aid system. Whether for humanitarian, development or environmental assistance, they provide donors with the opportunity to pool their financial resources, sharing risk, reducing overall costs and allocating funds based on an overall strategy. They also allow for coordinated, coherent and flexible action to address identified needs or priorities at either a global or national level. Yet these funds vary greatly in size, have different mandates, use different implementing agencies, are managed by different institutions and have several advantages and disadvantages one over the other.

Policy and data analysis of pooled funds currently in use


There is currently no one financing mechanism that attracts resources solely required for addressing the need of a country or system to prepare for an emergency. With this in mind DI has researched nine funds that are currently in operation, three of which are humanitarian, three which have a DRR focus and three a climate change focus, to analyse their current structures and policies, and identify whether they can be used to channel more money for emergency preparedness. The funds that have been analysed include: Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) Common humanitarian funds (CHFs) Emergency response funds (ERFs) UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) Thematic Trust Fund (CPR-TTF) United Nations Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) The Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Strategic Climate Funds (SCFs) The Adaptation Fund. In addition to these nine funds DI has also revisited the idea put forward in a previous study carried out by Humanitarian Outcomes that suggests using the model of the Global Fund to create a new mechanism to finance emergency preparedness and DRR activities (see page 67).

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Humanitarian Fund Full name of fund CERF Central Emergency Response Fund Global Yes DAC Non-DAC Private sector UN agencies CHF Common humanitarian fund National Yes DAC ERF Emergency response fund National No DAC Non-DAC CPR-TTF Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery Global/national No DAC Non-DAC Private sector Organisations Governments NGOs Partly Development UNDP UNDP Prevention, response, recovery

Development GFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery Global/national No DAC Non-DAC Organisations Governments UN agencies NGOs Yes Development World Bank World Bank Risk reduction, recovery, adaptation Yes 2006-2011 147 approx. UN-TFDR UN Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) Global No DAC, NonDAC, IFIs, Private sector Organisations LDCF (GEF)* Least Developed Countries Fund Global No DAC Non-DAC

Climate change adaptation SCF Strategic Climate Fund Adaptation fund The Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund Global No DAC Non-DAC

Coverage Support to CAPs Donors

Global No DAC

Implementing agencies Specific to DRR Mandate Managed by Financially administered by Main activities

UN agencies NGOs No Humanitarian OCHA UNDP Planned response

UN agencies NGOs No Humanitarian OCHA UNDP Emergency response

UN agencies and IFIs No Climate change GEF World Bank Mitigation and climate change adaptation Yes 2006-2011 254 (2002 to March 2011)

No Humanitarian OCHA UNDP Emergency Response

Yes Development ISDR ISDR Risk reduction

AfDB, AsDB, EBRD, IDB, WB No Climate change SCF World Bank Mitigation and climate change adaptation No 2008-2011 1,150 (to May 2011)

National entities UN agencies World Bank No Climate change GEF World Bank Climate change adaptation

Priority countries Timeframe Size (US$m) 2006-2010

No 2006-2011 1,957

Yes 2006-2011 1,346

Yes 1998-2011 431

Yes 2000-2011 466

No 2000-2011 106

No 2009-2011 86

Figure 17: Characteristics of funds. Note: At the time of writing GFDRR is administering a consultative process to develop a strategic approach to include and serve civil society organisations. Source: Development Initiatives based on various sources - information up to 2010

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Humanitarian funds Of the three humanitarian funds analysed only the country-level mechanisms have channelled money to preparedness activities; at present the global CERF does not have the ability to go beyond its emergency response mandate and some of those donors that fund this mechanism would prefer that it did not. At a country level there is an ongoing debate as to whether the CERF should expand to fund emergency preparedness especially in contexts such as Somalia where humanitarian funding makes up a large proportion of the countrys aid. The four country-level CHFs in operation attract a large amount of donor support, US$261 million in 2010, nevertheless only two of these funds, Sudan and DRC, reported spending on preparedness activities amounting to a very modest 0.9% (or US$1.8 million) of the total disbursed (US$203.5 million) that year. So far in 2011 the CHF in both Somalia and South Sudan have reported to have spent 2.1% and 3.8% respectively on preparedness. The activities financed have concentrated on institutional preparedness and the capacity of clusters and agencies to respond. The CHFs fund planned humanitarian response for the following year based on strategic planning and identification of needs that includes an element of risk analysis, the likely event of an emergency occurring and therefore addressing the need to prepare for that emergency. It is perhaps surprising therefore that the CHFs have supported very few emergency preparedness activities to date, especially in countries that are at risk of natural disasters and affected by conflict. Perhaps the level of funding for emergency preparedness from CHFs could be increased and more money directed to strengthening community preparedness capacity in these conflict-affected contexts; this could go some way to reducing the need for the same level of response in the future. A more detailed investigation of this possibility is needed at the country level. ERFs are much smaller in scale; the 14 funds combined attracted US$164 million in 2010, the majority of which went to Haiti and Pakistan following the emergencies. Despite the emergency response mandate of the ERFs and their short-term funding period of up to six months, several have disbursed funds to emergency preparedness projects. In 2009 the ERFs in Somalia and Zimbabwe spent 5.9% and 2.9% respectively on emergency preparedness out of the total money allocated in country. In 2010 the fund in Kenya spent 20% of its budget on flood preparedness, one of only four projects funded that year. The ERFs could continue to fund emergency preparedness where possible, however their small-scale and short-term funding will not allow them to address all the long-term needs in country. DRR-focused funds The UN Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction (UN-TFDR) is not an operational fund; it finances ISDR which is mandated to coordinate DRR at a global level and ensure synergies between actions to address disaster risk. As a result it does not fund the implementation of emergency preparedness activities at a national level, although it does support the creation of national platforms that aim to coordinate the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). An element of its expenditure could be seen as supporting institutional preparedness through the strengthening of the international system, strategic objective four and the dissemination of information, however it is not possible to ascertain exactly what amount is spent on preparedness specifically. UNDPs Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR-TTF) is well supported with over an average of US$100 million in contributions since 2001. It is not mandated to finance DRR

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alone, though one of its five funding windows focuses on DRR and recovery relating to the HFA five priority areas. The fund does not only address risk due to natural disasters but also funds conflict prevention. Although it is a global fund it finances DRR operations at a national level that address community and national emergency preparedness through contingency planning, establishing early warning systems and creating policy frameworks. Of the five windows, the one for DRR and recovery had the third highest expenditure between 2007 and 2010, US$51.2 million (12.3% of total), although the amount that was spent on emergency preparedness alone is not available in the annual reports. Information gathered from an evaluation of UNDPs contribution to disaster prevention and recovery suggests that between 2004 and 2009 US$35.6 million was spent on emergency preparedness projects, which accounted for 4.1% of the total US$866 million spent on disaster prevention and recovery over that period. The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) is the only operational65 fund that is solely focused on DRR. Around 70% of its funding comes from humanitarian aid budgets. It is managed by the World Bank at a global and national level with the aim of mainstreaming DRR and climate change adaptation within a countrys development plan. In order to achieve this it relies on working with national governments to address risk from natural disasters - it does not address conflict but does operate in conflict-affected countries. It has received almost US$150 million since its inception in 2006, which includes contributions from both DAC and non-DAC donors, and has received pledges of the same amount for the next three years. Track II of the fund allocates money to 20 priority countries deemed to be most at risk to disasters plus 11 donor earmarked countries. The fund aims to address all the priority areas of the HFA including preparedness, and its expenditures are broken down to reflect this. Up until September 2010, US$13 million had been spent on priority area 5, disaster preparedness. This accounted for 14.5% of the total. Climate change adaptation funds The Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF) is focused on mitigation and climate change adaptation and is one of the funds managed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The primary objective of this fund is to address the adaptation needs of the 49 least developed countries as identified by the UN66. A reduction in vulnerability is sought through the implementation of National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) which supports the countries to become climate resilient. Once these programmes are in place the fund supports different sectors to ensure resilience. A holistic approach is taken addressing prevention, mitigation and preparedness. As a result 29% of the total expenditure of the fund since 2001 has reportedly been spent on disaster preparedness and risk management activities, the largest share of funding. The Strategic Climate Fund (SCF), a relatively new fund created in 2008, is one of two funds within the Climate Investment Funds (CIF). One of the focus areas of the fund is the Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR) which provides funding to multilateral development banks to pilot ways in which climate risk and resilience can be integrated into development planning and implementation. Pilots that are successful can then be scaled up. As the focus of the fund is on climate resilience it could be said that this will include DRR and emergency preparedness activities, however it is difficult to ascertain specific funding levels for these areas. One example that can be provided is a
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Finances or carries out projects at a global and country level. For a list of these countries please visit: http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3641&lang=1

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Hydrometeorology Modernisation project in Tajikistan. This will include the improvement of the forecasting, warning, operational response and early warning system of the Committee for Emergency Situations67 which can be deemed to sit partly within emergency preparedness. Nevertheless, of the US$7 million that the PPCR has approved for the project, it is not known how much will be spent on this emergency preparedness component. The Adaptation Fund is also managed by the GEF and was operationalised in 2009. It provides financing to projects that contribute to reducing the adverse affects of climate change, to developing countries that are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. Unlike the other funds analysed, the Adaptation Fund does not rely on donor contributions alone. It receives a large proportion of its income through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) that allows emission-reduction projects in developing countries to earn Certified Emission Reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one tonne of CO2. These CERs can be traded and sold, and used by industrialised countries to meet part of their emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol.68 A 2% share of certified CERs goes to the Adaptation Fund. As part of its activities it supports capacity building, including institutional capacity, for preventive measures, planning, preparedness and management of disasters relating to climate change, including contingency planning. As the Fund is still in its early stages only ten projects have been approved to date and the amount of money spent on emergency preparedness has not yet been reported. Donor support for the funds Donors support different financing mechanisms for different reasons. Some prefer to provide earmarked money so that they have control over where it is spent, others are restricted by their aid structures and budgetary regulations, determining rigidly what activities can be funded with a certain pot of money. Those donors that have a strong presence in a country may prefer to fund bilaterally to already established implementing partners or choose a fund that is aligned with their funding priorities. Even by solely analysing the contributions to the nine funds from the 11 donors that have been profiled as part of this study, clear differences can be identified. Japan, the EU and the US have channelled more money through development or climate funds than humanitarian funds, others such as Sweden and Norway have done the opposite. The UK has contributed almost three times as much, US$1,078.2 million, through humanitarian funds compared to climate change adaption funds (US$377.7 million) and even less to the three development funds. For a number of donors, contributions to development funds have come from a humanitarian budget due to restrictions of donor budgets. Germany, for example, funds GFDRR from its humanitarian budget. Norway and Canadas contributions to ISDRs trust fund (UN-TFDR) are also reported as humanitarian expenditure. What is also evident from the analysis of the subset of donors is that certain funds such as the CERF, CHF and the SCF receive substantially greater financial support than the others, although the total income of the CHFs (936.9 million) and SCF (US$633.7 million) can be attributed to large contributions from the UK, US$628.8 million and US$359 million respectively. The Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR-TTF) has received US$310.9 million compared to the GFDRR

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http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/sites/climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/IBRD_tajik_pid.pdf http://cdm.unfccc.int/about/index.html

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that received only US$89.4 million to carry out similar activities. This can perhaps be attributed to the fact that the CPR-TFF is well established and has been in existence since 2000 whereas the GFDRR only began in 2006.
Donors Humanitarian CERF Australia Canada Denmark EU Germany Japan Norway Sweden Switzerland UK US Total 62.6 12.7 248.5 262.1 28.6 358.2 25 1257.2 936.9 206.2 103.8 181 0.3 628.8 39 54 2.9 91.2 44.7 168 46.8 6.2 16.8 CHFs ERFs 2.2 1 15.9 CPR-TTF 12.5 33.9 21 21.9 4.1 21.2 43.5 56.3 7.5 75.6 13.4 310.9 89.4 Development GFDRR 15.8 3.1 8.4 2.8 10 9 7.6 17.9 3.5 11.3 UN-TFDR 4.8 1.2 2.3 12.7 5.5 4.9 6.9 19.7 3.6 10 0.5 72.1 41.3 0.3 12.6 12.1 5.3 18.7 30 171.3 359 55 633.7 28.5 20.7 56 12 14.6 13.9 Climate change adaptation LDCF 14.3 6.5 30.2 SCF 33 84 14 Adaptation fund

Figure 18: Donor contributions to financing mechanisms, 2006-2010 (US$ million). Source: Development Initiatives based on various sources

Fund comparison Of the nine existing funds analysed six currently fund emergency preparedness activities to varying degrees, although the exact amount of money that is allocated is difficult to extract. The analysis relies on the reporting carried out by each fund as there is no one database that contains the relevant information. Two of the funds might have financed elements of emergency preparedness due to their focus on DRR and climate change adaptation but the available information does not allow us to identify this for certain. The table below considers each of the nine funds against essential criteria that we believe would enable increased funding to emergency preparedness. It also includes an analysis of The Global Fund as a model that would allow for tailoring of the funds design to enable specific funding for DRR and emergency preparedness. As can be seen no one fund exists that fulfils all the criteria. This does not mean that they should be discounted as each fund contributes elements and has comparative advantages which could be built upon. The GFDRR and CPR-TTF are two current funds that fulfil most of the criteria. Three of the funds already go some way to promoting the profile of preparedness through their wider DRR agenda and more could be done using other humanitarian and environmental funds that do finance preparedness. Only two existing funds, GFDRR and CPR-TTF, prioritise their financing based on risk analysis, however this is restricted to disasters. No fund considers the risk of multihazards (including conflict and pandemic). Even with the creation of a new DRR vertical fund it would be challenging to include conflict risk, as there is currently no comprehensive framework or risk analysis for conflict to base funding on. It is extremely challenging to determine whether any of the funds currently finance specific conflict preparedness activities especially as there is no clear

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articulation of what these activities are (see page 16). The CPR-TTF does support conflict prevention which could include conflict preparedness, and other funds such as the CHFs that operate in conflictaffected countries could also be considered as channelling money to fund these activities. However, until there is a clear consensus on what constitutes conflict preparedness it remains difficult to understand whether this is indeed the case. Allowing all implementing actors access to preparedness financing is important so measures can be taken at a global, regional, national and community level, yet none currently do this. A new vertical fund could attempt to address this issue. What is clear from the overall analysis that has been undertaken is that the transparency of information and data related to preparedness is poor in most funds. Data is reported in varying formats, using different timeframes and against different polices and frameworks, which makes it difficult to extract information. This greatly inhibits a comprehensive comparison.

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CERF

CHFs

ERFs

CPR-TTF

GFDRR

UNTFDR No Yes No Partially No Yes No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Partially No No Maybe No

LDCF (GEF)* No No No Yes No No No No Yes ? No No No Yes No Maybe No Yes Partially

SCF

Adaptation Fund No No No Partially No No No No Yes ? No No No Yes No Maybe No Yes No

Global Fund DRR model No Yes Yes Partially No No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Partially

All risks considered All countries considered Comprehensiveness Prioritised countries based on risk National ownership Country-level based Managed at a country level All donor types fund* Flexible donorship (e.g. facility with more than one fund available) Stakeholders All implementers can access funding Coordinated globally (policy and decisions) Coordinated with national DRR priorities Expansion/start up costs minimal Allows earmarking by country Allows earmarking by theme Donorship Reduces donor administration Helps to raise preparedness profile Competition with existing pooled funds Earmarks for preparedness Preparedness financing Funds preparedness Transparency of funding data, marking used

No Yes No No No No No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No

No No No No Yes No No No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes No

No No No No Yes No No No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes No

No No Yes Yes Partially Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Partially Maybe No Yes No

No Yes Yes Yes Partially No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Partially Maybe No Yes Partially

No No No Maybe No No No No Yes ? No No Yes Yes No Maybe No Maybe No

Coordination focus Administration

Fund profile

Figure 19: Pooled funds assessed against essential criteria for financing emergency preparedness. * Includes, DAC and Non-DAC donors, private sector, international financial institutions and agencies. Information is up to 2010. Source: Various.

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Potential criteria for more effective preparedness financing


Donor access Only the Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction of the ISDR receives contributions from a wide range of donors (DAC, non-DAC, international financial institutions, agencies, organisations and the private sector). However, this fund is limited to coordination - the remaining operational funds are supported by only a subset. Finding a fund that suits the needs and aid architecture of all donors is very challenging as they are not a homogenous group - their priorities, policies and financing architecture vary, creating restrictions on which funds they can or will support. This is especially relevant for a financing mechanism for preparedness as it seems to fall between the humanitarian and development divide at a donor level.69 National leadership and funding Pooled funds operate in all contexts ranging from countries with a stable government and society to countries where no government exists and conflict is widespread. It is therefore important to understand that one fund may not meet the needs of all countries that require investments in preparedness, as demonstrated by the nine funds analysed. Where a government exists that has sufficient capacity and political engagement, funding could aim to support that government directly, with funds supporting government-led policies and strategies. Promoting national ownership is essential for long-term preparedness to be effective as part of a wider sustainable risk reduction agenda. This is a characteristic of the operational DRR and climate change funds. If no stable government is present then funding should be aimed at other national-level stakeholders that have relevant knowledge and expertise and should ensure capacity is built. National-level funds can allow greater flexibility to adapt to different country contexts. Holistic approach Preparedness is a key humanitarian concern that requires a long-term approach linked to conflict prevention, wider risk reduction and building resilience. It is just one element of the HFA on DRR. With this in mind it would be inappropriate to create a standalone fund solely for the purpose of funding preparedness; a holistic approach is needed to ensure the coordination of policy and implementation is achieved. This has been the idea of several existing operational funds, GFDRR and CPR-TTF, that finance DRR and preparedness, and the LDCF and Adaptation Fund that finance climate change adaptation, DRR and preparedness. Yet although their approach is comprehensive, neither earmark a proportion of income for preparedness, and it is very difficult to ascertain how much is actually spent on preparedness through the current reporting. To enable greater visibility of preparedness expenditure and ensure that activities are financially supported a fund could set aside a certain amount of total income for specific preparedness activities (though this should not replace the need for the development of multi-risk prioritisation). Based on risk Only two of the funds, GFDRR and CPR-TTF, base their financing on a set of countries that have been identified as most at risk, analysis that is also limited to natural disaster hazards. Funding for emergency preparedness would need to examine multi-risk hazards and prioritise accordingly. The World Risk Index which has recently been developed by the University Institute for Environment and
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For more information on this see the section on donor architecture on page 18.

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Human Security goes some way to combining an assessment of risk, vulnerability and capacities of each country and could be used to prioritise funding to ensure a high return on investment. However, it too is only based on exposure to natural hazards; to date no such tool exists to provide a comprehensive country assessment that could assist in the prioritisation of preparedness funding. Analysing all risks for preparedness
There is considerable work to be done to make all-risk analysis a central part of preparedness financing. Discussions with stakeholders throughout this study have revealed that many see disaster risk as something that has been analysed in great detail, that there is a wealth of material mapping out all kinds of environmental hazards by location, severity, frequency, and that many of the key institutions working globally to coordinate DRR work alone and with partners in natural hazard risk analysis. It was further implied or sometimes stated that this same coherence was not as evident for conflict risk. This is not necessarily the case. There are examples of considerably complex conflict analyses. For example, Carleton University has developed a methodology for assessing risk bringing together a number of key indicators, including the history of armed conflict, economic performance, political instability, militarisation etc. It also links these political/security indicators to natural hazards and demographics. The International Crisis Group, perhaps the most high profile of organisations analysing conflict risk, has three programmes looking at conflict early warning. UNOCHA prepared a detailed analysis of natural and conflict hazards in Southeast Asia. Most institutional funding for these organisations comes from government donors. During its lifetime the Carleton University project has received funding from both Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). In 2010 the International Crisis Group (ICG) received funding from 21 government donors, not including the European Commission. Some donors have, meanwhile, compiled their own risk analysis; DFID in Pakistan compiled a comprehensive political risk analysis that included politics and society, economic growth/policy, governance though this did not go so far as to link these issues to natural hazards. A few donors base funding decisions partly only examples of analysis of all risks; ECHOs Crisis and Vulnerability Index is prominent but also one of the few examples. As one GHD member stated, we dont spend according to risk. We spend according to how easy the country is to spend in . Financing mechanisms are mixed when it comes to funding based on risk analyses. Some funds are not built upon risk analyses at all. Those that are, GFDRR and TT-CPR, look only at natural hazards and do not have joined up analyses for making funding decisions.

Building on existing funds


It is evident that financing for preparedness is already being channelled through several of the funds and it could be scaled up with perhaps specific earmarking, helping to ensure a minimum of funding for emergency preparedness. However of the nine funds analysed in this section it is clear that no one fund fulfils the essential criteria for an effective mechanism to channel preparedness financing. Adapting them to do this may require architectural changes at a donor level and certainly amendments to the mandates of existing funds, all of which requires the consensus of key actors and could take some time. Nevertheless this should be vigorously examined.

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Tracking analysis
Introduction
A requirement of this study is to track funding to emergency preparedness expenditures for a set of countries over a period of a year, using the UN-managed FTS. The tracking looks to examine levels of funding and the quality of reporting, outlined as one of the key recommendations put forward by the Task Team, the aim of which is to contribute to enhancing the predictability and quality of emergency preparedness. The tracking focused on the ten case study countries identified in the inception report which were chosen to ensure a wide range of contexts, geographical coverage and countries with and without existing funding mechanisms, CAPs etc.; these are shown below. Four of these countries have also been chosen as pilot projects for improved preparedness by the SWG on preparedness. Bangladesh Haiti Colombia Nepal DRC Somalia Ethiopia Sri Lanka Ghana Uganda

The tracking methodology


Currently within UN OCHA FTS there is no separate reporting category for emergency preparedness. The only way to identify programmes and activities for emergency preparedness is to investigate the project descriptions for each reported contribution. Using an agreed pre-defined set of words associated with emergency preparedness, a macro in excel was developed to pull out all project lines that contain the relevant words in the subcategory description70.
Emergency preparedness Preparedness (any derivations ) Early warning Mapping Drills Pre-positioning Emergency operation centres (EOC) Capacity Planning (contingency) Stockpiling Evacuation Risk assessment/analysis Exercise Hazard Search and rescue Emergency services Disaster risk management Stand-by Simulation

Each project line was then marked according to whether it is solely focused on emergency preparedness or could include elements of it, using a traffic light system. Project line corresponds entirely to emergency preparedness. Project line includes elements of emergency preparedness but also broader activities. Project line does not specifically mention any of the elements of emergency preparedness but focuses on broader DRR and resilience which could include aspects of emergency preparedness (this could also be an element of a larger project).

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This methodology can also be applied to data extracted from the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS). See page 13 for details.

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A second macro was created to pull out broader activities beyond emergency preparedness such as DRR and resilience. These were marked in the latter two categories of emergency preparedness.

Broader activities Mitigation Climate DRR Adaptation Resilience Risk Protection Prevention

Data for funding reported to the UN OCHA FTS in 2011 was downloaded in September 2011. The funding dates reflect the reported decision date. Some funding for 2011 appeals was reported in the later months of 2010. As the FTS is a real-time database which is retrospectively amended, values and decision dates can vary on different downloads. Use of OECD DAC and UNOCHA FTS data sources
The differences in the quality of reporting procedures means that OECD DAC and FTS data cannot be easily examined together. The methodology in the introduction of this study highlights the strengths and weaknesses of both data sources. While the OECD DAC CRS is useful for looking at past trends in preparedness funding, it is not possible to look at figures beyond 2009. An advantage of the UN OCHA FTS is that it is a real-time database with more recent data available. Thus, the tracking exercise uses the FTS to extract funding for preparedness from the beginning of 2011 and track the money on an ongoing basis.

Background DAC analysis trends over time


The OECD DAC CRS can be used to measure trends of ODA to specific countries, sectors and from donors, as well as ODA performance against targets. This is useful in providing background information on the levels and types of ODA for the ten case study countries. The OECD DAC CRS also provides probably the most accurate and easiest way to track funding for preparedness over time. The project-level data in CRS allows particular issues to be examined through sector codes and project descriptions. Using the CRS we can examine trends in preparedness funding and how it relates to overall volumes of ODA in each of the ten case study countries. Over the last five years the ten case study countries have received significant levels of ODA. For all of the countries between 2005 and 2009 levels of development assistance have been higher than levels of humanitarian assistance (HA), with the exception of Somalia where HA has been the dominant proportion of total aid, peaking at 80% in 200971.

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Using GHA analysis based on OECD DAC and FTS data.

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16 US$ billion (constant 2009 prices) 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Bangladesh Colombia DRC Ethiopia Ghana Other ODA Haiti HA Nepal 6.9 3.9 0.4 0.5 5.2 2.2 0.1 10.6 0.5 6.2 3.1 0.3 2.8 0.6 Somalia Sri Lanka Uganda 1.9 2.7 1.2 6.8 1.0 2.8

Figure 20: Total humanitarian aid as a share of ODA, 2005-2009. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

Between 2005 and 2009 Ethiopia (US$2.8 billion), DRC (US$2.2 billion), and Somalia (US$1.9 billion) have been consistently in the top ten recipients of humanitarian assistance72. Noticeably for Ghana (1%), Bangladesh (6%), Nepal (10%) and Colombia (11%) humanitarian assistance makes up a very small proportion of the total ODA received in the five year period. Funding for disaster prevention and preparedness for all countries increased from US$70 million in 2005 to US$455 million in 2009 when it accounted for 4.2% of total humanitarian assistance. For the ten countries selected for tracking, levels of funding for disaster prevention and preparedness have increased from US$4 million in 2005 to US$71 million in 2009. The ten countries in the five year period have made up 15% of total disaster prevention and preparedness funding.

Total Bangladesh Haiti Ethiopia Sri Lanka DRC Nepal Uganda Somalia Colombia Ghana 0%
Emergency food aid Reconstruction relief Disaster prevention and preparedness Figure 21: Humanitarian breakdown for ten case study countries, 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC data

US$151m US$53m US$32m US$16m US$12m US$11m US$11m US$9m US$3m US$3m US$0.3m 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Emergency/distress relief Relief co-ordination; protection and support services

Combined funding for disaster preparedness and prevention for our case study countries made up 1% of total humanitarian assistance since 2005, increasing to 3% in 2009. Of the case study
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Using GHA calculation but does not include private contributions.

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countries Bangladesh (US$53 million) and Haiti (US$32 million) have received the largest volumes for disaster prevention and preparedness. For Bangladesh this has accounted for 11% of total HA while for Haiti it was 5%. Noticeably Somalia, DRC and Ethiopia, who are large recipients of humanitarian assistance, have received very little for disaster prevention and preparedness. Although Ethiopia has received US$16 million this makes up less than 1% of total HA funding. The percentage of preparedness and prevention funds is even smaller in Somalia and DRC.

Tracking results
Country by country breakdown of emergency preparedness funding Funding for emergency preparedness identified in the tracking exercise totalled US$71 million for 2011 up until the beginning of September. The majority of funding identified, US$39 million (56%), fell within programmes with a broader DRR agenda (red).
Recipients Emergency preparedness (green) 1.4 10.5 1.5 0.0 2.2 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 18 Part preparedness (amber) 1.2 2.5 1.0 2.0 2.3 0 2.0 1.4 1.1 13 Broader DRR (red) 19.1 4.8 7.7 4.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.6 39 Total preparedness Total HA reported to the FTS 2011 396.3 857.3 630.7 27.0 38.7 501.6 44.7 146.6 32.1 0.3 71 2675.3 % of HA 2011

Haiti Somalia Ethiopia Bangladesh Nepal DRC Colombia Sri Lanka Uganda Ghana Total

21.7 17.8 10.1 6.5 5.1 3.1 3.0 1.9 1.8

5% 2% 2% 24% 13% 1% 7% 1% 5% 0% 3%

Figure 22: Country comparison of disaster preparedness financing reported to the FTS in 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS

Haiti (US$22m), Somalia (US$18m) and Ethiopia (US$10m) have received the largest reported volumes for emergency preparedness, however this makes up a small proportion of total HA reported to the FTS for all three countries. Disaster preparedness has made up a significant proportion of funding to both Bangladesh (24%) and Nepal (13%). Noticeably for Ghana there is no disaster preparedness data and a very small amount of humanitarian assistance has been reported to the FTS. The vast majority of Ghanas aid is through development assistance. Emergency preparedness projects in Ghana may be reported against the West Africa UN Consolidated Appeal (CAP), which has not been tracked in this exercise. While it is difficult to connect FTS and DAC data, some of the trends that emerge are similar. The percentage of preparedness funding as a total of HA is relatively consistent in both data sets. For example in the FTS and DAC, Bangladesh has the highest percentage of preparedness funding, while large humanitarian recipients such as Somalia and Ethiopia have very low levels relative to their total HA.
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Emergency preparedness funding within the CAP Preparedness funding to appeals Democratic Republic of the Congo 2011 Haiti 2011 Somalia 2011 Sri Lanka Floods Flash Appeal (Revised) (January - June 2011) No Appeal Total US$m 3 16 15 1 35 71

Figure 23: Preparedness funding to appeals 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS

Of the ten case study countries Haiti, Somalia and DRC have a CAP for 2011. There has also been a flash appeal for Sri Lanka in 2011. Not one of the three countries with a 2011 CAP has a dedicated sector/cluster for emergency preparedness. The only two with dedicated emergency preparedness and response sectors for 2011 CAPs are West Africa CAP and Djibouti. Of the preparedness funding identified, 49% fell outside of the CAP. The appeals that have received the highest levels of funding have been Haiti (US$16m) and Somalia (US$15m). The importance of preparedness and DRR is a common theme throughout the Haiti 2011 CAP document. The CAP highlights how disaster preparedness in Haiti was overwhelmed by the devastating earthquake of 12th January 2010. One of the key strategic objectives of the Haiti appeal is to enhance disaster preparedness and contingency planning: put in place disaster risk reduction methods and contingency plans to reduce the impact of disasters. Emergency preparedness sector breakdown
SHELTER AND NONFOOD ITEMS, US$1.8m SECTOR NOT YET SPECIFIED, US$6.8m PROTECTION/HUMAN RIGHTS/RULE OF LAW, US$2.0m

WATER AND SANITATION, US$12.1m AGRICULTURE, US$10.5m

HEALTH, US$4.1m COORDINATION AND SUPPORT SERVICES, US$27.3m

FOOD, US$5.8m ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND INFRASTRUCTURE, US$0.6m

Figure 24: Sector breakdown of emergency preparedness funding for ten case study countries in 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS

Preparedness funding falls across sectors, with coordination and support sectors accounting for the largest volumes (US$27m). Other noticeable sectors include US$11 million to agriculture emergency preparedness in the Somalia 2011 CAP, which makes up 59% of the total preparedness funding identified for the country.
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Emergency preparedness is often a theme within sector specific programmes such as food or agriculture, which makes it difficult to extract an exact figure for funding. Currently emergency preparedness does not have a separate reporting category and is often hidden within wider programmes. Tracking preparedness funding over time 2011
14 12 10 US$ million 8 6 4 2 0 Oct-10 Nov-10 Dec-10 Jan-11 Feb-11 Mar-11 Apr-11 May-11 Jun-11 Jul-11 Aug-11 Bangladesh Colombia DRC Ethiopia Haiti Nepal Somalia Sri Lanka Uganda 0.1 2.8 6.1 4.5 9.8 8.9 5.9 3.9 12.6 9.8

6.5

Figure 25: Tracking 2011 preparedness funding reported to the FTS by month. Note: period from 2011 FTS downloaded on September 5 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS

The tracking exercise aims to look at investments in emergency preparedness over time. The funding identified suggests the majority of emergency preparedness funding is tied in with response measures. For example, the peaks in emergency preparedness funding to Haiti in November and December 2010 coincide with peaks in overall funding reported to the FTS. Of the US$91 million reported to Haiti in December 2010, US$9 million was for emergency preparedness. This funding relates to prevention efforts in response to the cholera outbreak and also coincides with the release of the Haiti appeal.73

73

Whether the FTS is a useful resource for tracking funding dates for preparedness is questionable. As mentioned in the methodology, the FTS is a real-time database; values and decision dates can be retrospectively amended and may not necessarily reflect when the funding has actually been delivered. Also donors may not necessarily report funding in time with disbursements.

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Emergency preparedness financing in Nepal: desk review74


Background to risk and finance in Nepal
Risk profile: background Nepal experiences a range of natural hazards, some of which occur year on year such as floods and landslides and others which occur less frequently but have the potential to cause more devastation, such as earthquakes in particular. This makes the country one of the 20 most disaster-prone countries in the world.75 The World Risk Index ranks it 99 out of 173 countries in terms of overall risk scoring very high in terms of vulnerability (61.7%) and high in terms of susceptibility (50.7%), with a lack of coping capabilities (81.8%) and lack of adaptive capacities (52.5%).76 The risk of exposure to natural hazards has been exacerbated by the fact that the country has only recently emerged from ten years of intrastate conflict. It is still vulnerable and has a long way to go in terms of development. In 2007, a year after the conflict ended the country was ranked fourth out of the 23 regional countries in terms of the probability of intrastate conflict occurring in 2008.77 Lack of government capacity, weak infrastructure (roads, buildings) and over-population in urban areas, makes it difficult to reduce the risk. There is a high need for prevention and preparedness approaches and DRR strategies that take account of the countrys vulnerability. Aid to Nepal Over the last 15 years Nepal has received US$8.3 billion in ODA, ranking it 39 out of 175 countries. The amount of humanitarian aid received as a percentage of ODA has averaged at 6.5% since 1995. However, following a peak in 2002 (US$38.3 million) humanitarian aid increased steadily from US$32.7 million in 2004 to US$85.3 million in 2008 before declining by 7.8% in 2009 (to US$78.7 million). This increase can be attributed to support for those people affected by conflict or floods.

74

The IASC SWG on preparedness that works in collaboration with the Task Team on financing for preparedness is undertaking a five-country initiative focusing developing national and international contingency plans. The role of the Task Team is to assist in identifying funding options to support national contingency planning and the resulting preparedness. Nepal is one of five countries selected for this initiative along with Ghana, Uganda, Haiti and another to be decided upon. 75 The NRRC http://www.un.org.np/sites/default/files/report/2011-04-19-nrrc-doccument-version-april-2011.pdf 76 http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_2240.pdf - the results of the World Risk Index have been calculated with non-dimensional ranks with values between 0 and 1. To facilitate comprehension and for cartographic implementation, they have been converted into percentages. 77 http://www.grid.unep.ch/product/publication/download/Naturalconflictrelatedhazard_Asia_Pacific.pdf

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900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0

End of conflict Floods Floods

0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Other ODA Humanitarian aid No. people affected

Figure 26: Development and humanitarian aid to Nepal, 1995-2009 (constant 2009 prices) and number of people affected by disasters. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and CRED data

Tracking preparedness and DRR through UN OCHA FTS


In order to get an idea of current funding for preparedness, data has been analysed from OCHAs FTS. There is no code for preparedness funding in the FTS so each project line has to be examined and extracted. Between 2007 and 2009 levels of preparedness funding averaged US$1.7 million, however by July 2011 preparedness funding had already reached US$4.0 million for the first seven months of the year, all contributed by only one donor, the European Commissions Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO). This accounts for 10% of humanitarian aid to Nepal for the same period.
2011 * 2010 2009 2008 2007 0% 20% 40% 33 74 121 125 88 60% 80% 4.0 1.3 Broad DRR 2.1 1.6 1.9 100% Total remaining HA Total preparedness

Figure 27: Funding for disaster preparedness reported through UNOCHA FTS, 2007- 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS *2011 data download 28 July 2011

DRR/preparedness structures and initiatives in Nepal


The hazards to which Nepal is exposed make it a priority country for risk reduction initiatives and preparedness interventions. The institutionalisation of disaster risk management is proposed through various strategies as well as revision of existing legislation relating to disasters. Legislation Current legislation in Nepal is largely focused on response and relief and the Natural Calamity Act 1982, the guiding legislation for disaster management which does not detail systems or procedures for preventative or preparedness measures. A revision of this is currently going through parliament

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No. affected

US$ million

and is waiting to be passed. This new act will be titled the National Disaster Management Act and will include DRR. Despite a lack of current legislation covering DRR, the Government of Nepal has taken steps to address risk reduction in several plans and strategies. The environmental policy and action plan was introduced in 1993 by the Government to decentralise disaster risk management; this was complemented by the Local Self-Governance Act in 1999 that grants local leaders the responsibility and decision making capability for local-level disaster management. In order to facilitate the dissemination to all levels of information relating to disasters, the Disaster Preparedness Network (DPNet) was established in 1996. More recently the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management was devised in 2008 (approved in October 2009) by the Government in partnership with UNDP and endeavours to facilitate the required change in order to achieve the goal of a disaster resilient Nepal by providing guidance for improving the policy and legal environment, and by prioritising the strategic interventions78. It builds on the aims of the tenth National Development Plan (2002-2007) and the Interim National Development Plan (2008-2010) to establish an organised approach to DRR and reinforce this approach in plans and strategies based on the capacities of national actors. In order to effectively reduce the risks caused by hazards the Government of Nepal led a multihazard assessment. This was facilitated by the Ministry of Home Affairs in collaboration with multidisciplinary technical and scientific partners and supported by the World Banks GFDRR. It includes detailed assessments of different risk exposure, hazard by hazard, which lead to initial recommendations for risk-reducing interventions in key at-risk areas.79

Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC)


The Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC) was launched by the Government of Nepal in May 2009 and is supported by a number of international institutions and donors. Building on the success of other countries such as Bangladesh and Mozambique, the Consortium aims to generate funding for, and improve the coordination of, disaster preparedness and risk reduction in Nepal. It attempts to build on the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management (NSDRM) and help support the Government of Nepal develop a DRR Action Plan. The NRRC is based on the assumption that a coordinated approach between different organisations engaged in DRR issues needs to be adopted, drawing on the experience and strengths of different institutions. The objectives of the Consortium are based on the pending draft Act which will replace the 1982 National Calamity Act. In recent years the frequency and impact of global seismic activity in Haiti, New Zealand and Japan has demonstrated the severity and destructive outcome of such disasters, highlighting the need for preparedness and preventative measures in Nepal. Flagship areas and budget The Consortium has been broken down into five flagship areas with a coordinating institution assigned to each, details of which can be found in the table below. These five areas have been identified as priority areas for addressing DRR in Nepal. The flagships have each proposed a budget

78 79

http://www.undp.org.np/pdf/NSDRMFinalDraft.pdf http://gfdrr.org/gfdrr/node/331

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based on a three year programme, which have an estimated total of US$146.8 million. The individual budgets vary in size, as does the current funding committed to each area.
Flagship 1 School and hospital safety 30% of schools at risk of collapse during major earthquake, 80% of hospitals require seismic retrofitting Flagship 2 Emergency preparedness and response capacity Lack of emergency responders e.g. Fire Service and Urban Search and Rescue, difficulties in coordination and communication OCHA Flagship 3 Flood management in Koshi River Basin Annually, floods and landslides cause 300 deaths and estimated economic damage of US$10 million Flagship 4 Communitybased DRR/DRM Annually 10,000 families affected by disaster, an average loss of two lives each day IFRC Flagship 5 Policy and institutional support for DRM The previous four flagship areas will only work if they have strong institutional guidance and support from the government through legislation UNDP

Area

Issues

Coordinator

Government of Nepal focal point

Budget Estimated committed funds

Asian Development Bank (ADB) (supported by WHO) Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health and Population, Ministry of Physical Planning and works US$50.8 million 54% funded

World Bank

Ministry of Home Affairs

US$28 million 13-20% funded by bilateral arrangements, currently limited resources

Ministry of Irrigations and Department of Water Induced Disasters, Ministry of Environment and Department of Hydrology and Meteorology US$24.2 million Scheduled for 2012

Ministry of Local Development

US$30 million

Ministry of Home Affairs, Office of the Prime Minister, National Planning Commission, Ministry of Law and Justice US$13.8 million 40% funded

Donors Donors have two options for providing support to the Consortium: to fund government departments for the activities covered by the Consortium to form bilateral agreements with agencies that are implementing activities under the Consortium, which relies on agencies own fundraising efforts. Funding inside and outside the Consortium There are currently six donors that are funding or plan to fund activities inside the Consortium; information can be found in the table below. For some, especially those that joined in 2011, the exact detail of their financial support is yet to be decided.

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Donor DFID

Funding to Consortium 20 million

Agencies tbd

Timeframe April 2011March 2015

Flagship areas 1, 2, 4, 5

Date joined 2011

Funding outside the Consortium 25 million (April 2011-March 2015) Nepal Climate Change Support Programme 20 million (April 2011-March 2015) Forestry US$900,000 (to date) - risk assessment at district level Glacial lake outburst floods mapping Seismic safe school programme -

GFDRR

US$10.4 million

3 years

1, 2, 3

2009

ECHO* (DIPECHO) AusAID

3.2 million

7 NGOs, 3 UN Agencies ADB

March 2011-Sept 2012 2011-2012

1-5

2010

tbd

2011

AUD400,000 (June 2008-Dec 2010) establishment of the Nepal Emergency Operations Centre and Surakshit Samudaya AUD141,367 (June 2009-Dec 2010) building disaster resilient communities in Nepal (Banke, Sunsari and Udaypur) Info pending

USAID Japan Asian Developm ent Bank (ADB)

Information pending US$1.5 million tbc

tbc Via World Bank

tbc 1

2010

US$5.1 million

2010-2014

Planned intervention to support the Government to prevent water induced disasters

*NOTE: There is no direct funding from ECHO to the NRRC. ECHO contributes to the various NRRC flagship programmes through its own DIPECHO programmes. This funding can either be placed inside or outside the Consortium.

The role of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) IFRC is not an implementing organisation in Nepal. Its function is to support the activities of the Nepalese Red Cross through technical support as well as help coordinate support for other partners. IFRC is the lead for flagship area 4 community-based DRR (CBDRR)/management. It will work with and support the Ministry of Local Development and partners as well as support the rolling out of the work plan, meet targets and generate funding, whilst internally supporting the Nepalese Red Cross. Flagship area 4 has progressed fairly quickly and has set clear targets, established an advisory committee, developed a work plan and implemented M&E guidance. IFRC will actively seek funding for flagship area 4 after a funding strategy has been developed. The World Health Organisation (WHO) With the introduction of the Consortium, WHO has been nominated to take the lead in health related DRR and preparedness measures in Nepal; these are covered predominantly by flagship

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areas 1 and 2. In relation to flagship 1, WHO has been designated as the agency responsible for the hospital safety component on behalf of the NRRC. It recently received funding from ECHO for further structural and non-structural assessments in three MOHP identified priority hospitals. The MOHP have also developed a proposal to conduct detailed assessments in MOHP identified hospitals that require retrofitting and rehabilitation and estimated cost that would be associated with this work. With this information WHO in consultation with the MOHP will develop a detailed proposal with a 5 year plan to build the capacity of the health sector and improve the safety of infrastructure. Under flagship 2s health component (emergency preparedness and response capacity) WHO has developed a concept note to expand its preparedness activities in particular training and capacity building exercises. This will continue to be financed by WHO core funding as well as support from donors.

Before and after: what has the Consortium done for preparedness in Nepal?
Funding to Nepal for preparedness, as reported through the UNOCHA FTS, shows an increase from US$1.9 million in 2007 to US$4.0 million in 2011 (see funding to UNOCHA FTS section). Whilst this increase could be linked to the establishment of the Consortium, which may have raised the profile of funding for preparedness in Nepal, this cannot be said for certain based only on only an analysis of humanitarian data. The US$4 million has been committed by only one donor, European Commission Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection Department (ECHO), whereas we know that other donors such as the UK have also committed funding. The reason for this is that the donors, excluding ECHO, that have provided details of their financial support for the Consortium have indicated that the money will come from a development budget, as opposed to the humanitarian, and is therefore unlikely to be reported to the FTS. As many of the funding commitments are still to be confirmed it would be premature to assume that the Consortium has assisted in greater financial support to preparedness in Nepal. The Consortium is still in its early stages; the implementation of activities is just commencing so any assessments on impact and outcomes will come much later. In addition, the increase in funding to preparedness activities in 2011 may actually reflect improved reporting of preparedness activities.

Lessons learnt from the Consortium


The Consortium is still in its infancy, a three year process that has only recently gained momentum. In 2011 a number of donors made significant financial commitments. At this stage therefore, it is a little too premature to assess the Consortiums successes, outcomes and impact and to use it as a template and tool for future effective preparedness financing. However, a number of lessons can be learnt and good practice identified. The coming year is a crucial time for the Consortium in terms of project implementation and assessing its impact. Strengths Timing The strategic focus and the timing of the development of the Consortium have been important elements of its success. It evolved during a period of mega disasters such as the Haiti earthquake and Pakistan floods in 2010, and the realisation that Nepal could be next. By the time it came to implementation in 2011 a number of donors were already committed to investing in DRR activities.

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Multi-stakeholder approach its institutional set up is unique in that it provides a platform for multiple stakeholders - governments, UN agencies, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and NGOs - to become engaged in DRR/preparedness issues, set around an agreed framework. It attempts to bridge the development and humanitarian divide the Consortium brings together humanitarian and development actors and financing, whereas previously preparedness activities in Nepal had come mainly from humanitarian budgets and were delivered by humanitarian actors. A fundamental component for emergency preparedness and DRR activities is the capacity for longterm planning in terms of both strategy and investment. This aspect makes the institutional set up of the Consortium essential, with a mix of both long- and short-term actors. Engagement with IFIs a notable success of the Consortium, in attempting to overcome development and humanitarian silos, has been the engagement with development agencies such as the IFIs, with the Ministry of Finance also involved in this partnership development. Strong leadership with support at senior level the Consortium has had strong leadership and political buy-in at a senior level which has helped raise the profile and visibility of risk reduction needs in Nepal. The Government of Nepal leads the Consortium and actively endorses it; without its involvement, the Consortium would lack the national ownership required for long-term sustainability. A crucial aspect was gaining support from the Ministry of Finance which was essential for engaging the IFIs. The role of the UN Resident Coordinator has also been critical in pushing priorities and driving the process, as has public support from Margareta Wahlstrm, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for DRR. Holistic approach in order to ensure adequate national frameworks and legislation support activities on the ground, the Consortium combines the development of DRR policy with the implementation of projects. Furthermore, it seeks to prevent new risks from occurring as well as mitigating the effects of known risks. Challenges Balancing humanitarian and development approaches, planning and financing a key issue is getting the right balance between humanitarian and development perspectives and partners. Whilst long-term planning, or the lack thereof, can be a problem within the humanitarian system, humanitarian financing is often delivered quickly. In contrast, within the development system there is less urgency, and in some cases funding can take up to a year or more to be approved. With this in mind, preparedness approaches need to include long-term planning and financing with the same sense of short-term humanitarian urgency. Building a strong evidence base one of the main challenges facing the Consortium and preparedness activities in general is building an evidence base which demonstrates value for money in these types of investments. This might explain why there was initial reluctance amongst donors to invest in the Consortium, because there are no quick visible results and often the impact and benefits are difficult to quantify. The current focus of the Consortium is on implementation rather than fundraising as it does not want to generate too much income without having the capacity to implement or the evidence of outcomes. There is obviously a balance between project implementation, investment in future fundraising and building an evidence base.

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Regional buy-in and inclusion there appears to be limited involvement and engagement with key regional actors. Outreach with influential countries such as India and China might prove significant, especially in emergency response planning. India is a neighbouring country to Nepal and it would probably be the first to respond internationally. It also has previous experience of responding to disasters domestically. An earthquake that hit the Himalayan region on 18 September 2011, affecting Bhutan, India, Nepal and Tibet, and the Koshi valley disaster in 2007 that greatly affected Eastern Nepal and Indias Bihar state, demonstrate the importance of regional coordination in preparedness and DRR strategies, planning, activities and funding. Government leadership as previously mentioned the priorities of the Consortium were based upon the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management (NSDRM) and the NRRC continues to work with the Government and relevant ministries to further these priorities. Despite high turnover within the Government and ministries there has been a consistently high level of cooperation and responsiveness. The multiple challenges facing a state such as Nepal in a post-conflict phase can mean that ensuring that comprehensive risk management remains near the top of the agenda can be difficult. One consequence of this is that the legislation approving the new National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) is still to be passed despite the fact that the Cabinet approved it in 2009. As some of the more structural elements of the NRRC work plan depend on the passing of this legislation, this is a critical issue. Nevertheless it is clear that in a range of government agencies including the Ministry of Finance and the National Planning Commission, DRR has a higher profile and is more clearly embedded in planning than ever before. Information sharing key to the purpose of the Consortium is to improve coordination and communication, and whilst it is set up in such a way that allows core sponsors to take responsibility and ownership for individual flagship areas, this in itself could create silos. It is currently difficult to assess how much money has been committed by each donor to each flagship area. There is limited information sharing amongst agencies and publically available funding documents. Whilst the Consortium is still in its infancy and information sharing needs to be improved, as of July 2011 DFID is resourcing the Consortium Secretariat which will enable greater capacity to coordinate information sharing.

Pooled funds and the Consortium


A pooled funding mechanism, where donors contribute finances into one single fund, has not yet been set up for the Nepal Consortium. There have been initial discussions but a decision has been taken not to develop one at present. According to Nepal-based stakeholders this is largely because the Consortium is still in its early stages. Establishing a fund prematurely could be detrimental as it has the potential to put additional pressure on absorption and capacity and extra resources would be required.

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Towards improved and predictable preparedness financing: key findings, opportunities, challenges and recommendations
Overview
Humanitarian aid is being stretched. Millions of people in sub-Saharan Africa are living with conflict and its legacy; natural disasters such as the earthquake in Haiti and the floods in Pakistan have disrupted, even paralysed economic and social infrastructure; recovery and reconstruction remain uneven following large-scale conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan; and political turmoil has escalated throughout the Middle East and North Africa, heralding in civil strife and even outright war. Increasingly, the people affected by crises face additional threats, their livelihoods made more insecure by the effects of climate change and the vagaries of the global economy. The pressure on the humanitarian system appears to be growing. Aid from governments reached US$12.4 billion in 2010, the highest figure on record. At the same time the CAP for 2010 reached its highest ever figure of US$11.2 billion, double what it was in 2006, and for the first time in five years the level of needs met fell significantly80. This is occurring alongside a rise of basic commodity prices that on the one hand creates more need and on the other reduces the amount of aid that each humanitarian dollar can buy. At the same time there is considerable pressure on donors to be spending less or justifying each dollar spent, prioritising value for money and pushing for more and more impact with the same expenditure. Whilst it would be overly dramatic to say the humanitarian system is near breaking point, it cannot be denied that it is under substantial strain. The humanitarian community has responded to these multiple needs and risks by making preparedness a priority. The IASC has already prioritised preparedness, considering it to be an issue that can help forge a link between humanitarian and development actors. The GHD group, now cochaired by Germany and Poland, will have preparedness as one of its key elements over the next year. At the 2011 United Nations Economic Social and Cultural Organisations humanitarian segment, which brought together a range of key donors, UN agencies, NGOs and others, preparedness made its way onto the agenda of almost every main session or side event. Senior agency representatives and donors talked continuously of the need to considerably increase investment in preparedness and disaster risk reduction, and this all occurring as the crisis in East Africa (which has seen 42 droughts and more than 10 million people affected in the last 30 years) was escalated to famine status. This all comes in the context of what appears to be both an ineffective preparedness financing architecture and inadequate levels of financing. Only 4.2% of total humanitarian aid in 2009 was for disaster prevention and preparedness. For every US$100 spent on the top twenty humanitarian recipients over the past five years only 62 cents are spent on preparedness; for every US$100 spent on the much larger development aid only US$1 was spent on all aspects of DRR.

80

See the GHA report 2011 for full details.

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This has been the setting for the work of this study so far, comprising an inception report and this synthesis, with the aim of highlighting opportunities and challenges of the current system to address preparedness financing. There are many positives to be taken from the process itself. Clearly humanitarians have recognised the importance of obtaining greater investment in preparedness as well as the limitations in their mandates, policies and financing. The IASC Principals and most of those interviewed have talked of the need for preparedness to be considered as both a conflict and disaster matter that must be tackled in multiple ways, both in the short-term and as part of a long-term plan. It should also involve development actors and wherever possible be led by national actors.

There have also been specific positive examples of how preparedness is articulated and funded. HCTs find ways of using the CAP for preparedness funding in the absence of clear guidance. Humanitarian donors go out of their way to make preparedness needs a priority for their development counterparts and work together to get around funding silos. Some financing mechanisms do fund preparedness activities of different types in different contexts. Global institutions have formed both informal and formal relationships to improve preparedness, especially for disasters. The Nepal Consortium, though the start-up process was lengthy and considerable international advocacy was required, is an example of how a well argued and articulated plan can garner both attention and funding.

However it is also clear that the current architecture for financing and delivering preparedness highlighted is inadequate for delivering emergency preparedness expenditure. Improving the preparedness financing means addressing the policy context as well as the financing modalities.

Policy context for emergency preparedness mechanisms


Through the work of this study a series of policy issues have arisen that need consideration when making a choice on the development of existing or new financing mechanisms for emergency preparedness. Systemic division between humanitarian and development assistance The major challenge in enabling adequate and predictable preparedness financing is the bifurcated aid structure; appropriate preparedness financing cannot be developed if it is conceptualised as a humanitarian issue. Finding ways of overcoming or working around this systemic divide will also progress other key areas for preparedness including the importance of country- and needs-driven approaches, being based on all risks, part of a long-term solution, allowing any donor to fund and funding any appropriate actor to implement. Financing architecture and mechanisms therefore need to meet these requirements and enable funding from development and humanitarian budgets. Specific key findings are as follows. Emergency preparedness is a key humanitarian concern that requires a long-term developmental approach in combination with shorter-term activities, but is usually mandated to humanitarians who have smaller budgets and shorter-term planning horizons, leading to

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activities more likely to be led by global institutions and agencies rather than national authorities or communities. Though DRR policies often articulate a holistic approach to reducing risk, preparedness still tends to find its way into the humanitarians responsibility, though largely without the necessary funding or ability to plan in a long-term manner. 81 Currently, there is no evidence that any of the evaluated donors (or as a matter of fact, any institution) have adopted a holistic and integrated approach to emergency preparedness in line with the definition we have proposed as central to this study, which incorporates all risks, including conflict. The current policy and funding dynamics for emergency preparedness have potentially reduced its effectiveness. Most donors address emergency preparedness from a humanitarian and natural disaster context and, as a result, focus on post-emergency actions rather than preemergency measures. This is often informed by the political and media realities of aid funding. In order to increase the effectiveness of emergency preparedness, an environment is needed where donors can agree on an inclusive strategy, developing a preparedness policy that recognises its complexity but acknowledges the benefits to cost-effective humanitarian action, and includes financial commitments.

Long-term risk reduction and building resilience, for disasters and conflict The lack of consistent preparedness donor policies which cover conflict, disasters, epidemics or an interaction between all of these, is given as part of the explanation for the failure to develop holistic approaches, coherent policy targets or adequate financial commitments. While many donors have adopted preparedness as defined by the UNISDR and its policy actions in line with priority 5 of the HFA, these cover only natural disasters. There is no equivalent framework for placing conflict preparation within a longer-term conflict risk reduction. Neither the terminology, policies or institutions exist in the same way as they do for disasters. Furthermore, situating preparedness financing in the context of long-term risk reduction and building local and national resilience is important, but it is also a challenge for donors and agencies, because the parts of the institution which focus on long-term issues and national capacities are not necessarily found in the humanitarian wings. National leadership and ownership Promoting national ownership is essential if long-term preparedness is to be effective as part of a wider sustainable risk reduction agenda. National leadership and ownership should ensure that financing will be directed to programmes considered to be a national priority, will be integrated with other national policies and strategies, will be mixed and matched with national budgets and will be sustainable. Realistically however, there are situations where national leadership is weak or unwilling. Two things flow from this. Firstly, if no stable government is present then funding should be aimed at other national-level stakeholders that have relevant knowledge and expertise and should ensure capacity is built. Secondly, the mandates for financing mechanisms must be flexible, enabling national leadership of all kinds wherever possible, but not preventing actions by donors or

81

An additional advantage of having all actors working together on DRR was offered by the UN Resident Coordinator in Nepal, who suggested that one intrinsic success of the initiative was bringing the urgency and pragmatic (and often community-level) approach of humanitarians to bear on the long-term planning and larger budgets of development actors.

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multilateral agencies where that is more appropriate. In all cases however, local knowledge and expertise needs to be effectively incorporated, especially given the importance of community mobilisation in many preparedness initiatives and its role as the first line of response when a crisis occurs. All- risk analysis and appropriate prioritisation It is clear that a financing mechanism that has as its key role the provision of adequate funding for all emergency preparedness, must be based on a synthesised analysis of all risks to a country, those risks then being compared across different contexts to ensure that priority is given to those countries most in need and lacking in national capacity. This will enable the invariably limited funds to be targeted appropriately (see page 48 for more details). A mechanism open to all Any financing mechanism for preparedness should be open to all actors. Any donor of any kind, whether institutional, donor agency, corporation or private should be able to contribute, which in turn demands flexibility in its procedures. For example, a global facility akin to GFDRR, which allows donor earmarking of different tracks within an overall fund, will encourage greater engagement and investment. Furthermore, the funding should be accessible to all appropriate actors working on preparedness, whether international or national, government or civil society. All should be eligible to receive funding for those activities they are best placed to undertake, even whilst understanding that there may be a need for lead or umbrella agencies. All funds should therefore be available for both national governments (a point which has been stressed by the IASC Principals and many donors during this investigation) as well as for key organisations, agencies and NGOs82 undertaking preparedness activities. Funding should be granted to those best placed to work in each situation. Due consideration should be given to ensuring that funds do not stay at central level but are disbursed to communities which are directly involved in DRR at local level. In a conflict setting (or where a government is seen as corrupt or simply lacking adequate capacity) an institutional or international actor may well be best placed to undertake preparedness. National actors can and are used to take the lead even in these more complicated scenarios, the Red Cross Red Crescent national societies being a prime example. This range of contributors and implementing agencies places considerable pressure on the fiduciary and governance structures to get the right balance between access and accountability.

All actors for change


All actors working in environments with preparedness needs should be brought together.. This is where the link is made from the humanitarian system and its particular actors to those working in peacebuilding and transition, to the development community and its donors and institutions, to peacekeeping (both UN and other) and private sector and foundations.

82

It should be noted here that the issue of institutional preparedness is something that is beyond the scope of this work. There are many questions that have not yet been examined in detail. For example, is funding for the cluster system actually preparedness? Are all mechanisms to respond that are prefunded, such as UNDAC, preparedness expenditures? Do agencies already mainstream preparedness expenditure through their programming, such as the examples from our examination of the 2012 CAP?

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Examining the options


Funding despite the system, not because of it It is clear from the interviews and feedback received during the study that many agencies and donors manage to finance preparedness despite the system they find ways around the obstacles or inertia. Thus, there is a corresponding opportunity to improve the quantity and quality of preparedness finance, by addressing the architecture and mechanisms. But changes in the mechanisms can only deliver if the political economy provides the right incentives. This section therefore examines in detail both mechanisms and incentives to explore what recommendations for improved preparedness financing can be made. Mechanism Criteria83 Based on the above essential criteria the study has examined the potential approaches for creating a new fund or amending an existing one. The possibilities have been examined for their: comprehensiveness of approach connection to country-level needs and priorities global coordination of priorities possible levels of accountability relationship with global institutions administrative costs and speed ability to bring in many stakeholders ability to foster good donorship likely profile given to preparedness.

Strengths and challenges facing funding mechanisms for emergency preparedness The Task Team working on financing transition as part of the DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) has commented on the dangers of assuming that a new fund will be successful where existing mechanisms have fallen short, and on the risks of fund proliferation. Consequently any proposals for a new vertical fund are likely to be treated with caution. On the positive side however, any new fund is likely to bring immediate profile to DRR and preparedness issues. With clear leadership and mandate, policies and strategy, it could also bring clarity, focus and urgency to preparedness investments. Although a new fund can take time to set up, the challenges in adapting existing instruments should not be underestimated and may be complicated by institutional interests and politics. It is clear that any global fund, whether new or building upon an existing facility, would be likely to share characteristics with other global vertical funds. They may be less prepared to work with the dynamics of national actors, priorities and processes, given their more specific mandate. A global fund may be vulnerable to being over-influenced by its donors. There is also a risk that a new global fund would add to transaction costs and further complicate global coordination. On the plus side, it is likely that a global fund would bring much needed profile to preparedness in general and there is a
83

The methodology of this table is as follows: for the new global, regional and country-level funds a generic example is considered and the answers are suggested as those most likely. Increased bilateral funding and using the CAP are as stated.

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clear gap in global leadership and visibility for the issue as a global public good. It would also be more likely to ensure that there is a coherent single policy and strategy, with decision making based on comparable indicators of need and programming prioritised accordingly. It may be less constrained than other donors by wider institutional interests or procedures. Any country-level fund would have strengths where a global one would have weaknesses. It would be likely to be more closely tied into country needs and programming and to be driven by national priorities. It would be in a much better position to draw on local expertise and knowledge and have a sustained engagement, although it may need to guard against capture by particular interest groups. Country-level funds would not enable comparisons across situations or equitable prioritisation of resources and it would be more difficult to unify policy and strategy across different countries. It is likely that a country fund could be accessible to actors to whom a global fund may not be (such as local civil society and NGOs) but the obvious down-side to the country-level specific element is that the fund would be largely unnoticed outside of the country, unless the government or other key actors invested considerably in international advocacy. A country-level fund could however provide a vehicle for many different donors to contribute, increasing the volume of resources without adding to the coordination burden or transaction costs.

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Comprehensiveness Administration

Country-level based

Stakeholders

Coordination focus

Donorship

Institutional issues

Fund profile Accountability

All risks considered All countries considered Prioritised countries Scale/start-up speed Start-up costs minimal National ownership Demand driven Expertise and knowledge local All donor types can fund Flexible donorship (e.g. facility-fund) available All implementers can access funding Avoids proliferation/fund fatigue Coordinated globally (policy and decisions) Coordinated with national priorities Avoids earmarking by country/issue Reduces donor administration Donor trust in processes, objectivity etc. Agency conflict minimised Clear leadership offered Institutional resistance to change unlikely Mechanism recognition Raises preparedness profile Competition with existing funds unlikely Likely transparency of funding choices

New global fund Yes Yes Yes No No Maybe Partially No Yes Yes No No Yes Maybe Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes No Yes

New regional fund Yes No No No No Maybe Partially Partially Yes No No No No Maybe Partially Yes Partially Yes No No No Partially Partially Yes

New country fund Yes No No No No Maybe Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Maybe Partially Partially Partially Yes No No No No Partially Partially

Increased bilateral fund Maybe No No Yes Partially Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes No No Partially Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No

Using the CAP[1] Partially No Partially Yes Yes No Partially Partially No No No Yes Partially Maybe No Partially Partially Partially No Partially Yes No Yes Partially

Using existing global fund Yes Yes Yes Partially Yes Maybe Partially No No Yes No Yes Yes Maybe Yes Yes Yes Partially No No Yes Partially Yes Yes

Using existing country fund Yes No No Partially Yes Maybe Yes No No Yes Yes No Maybe Partially Partially Partially Partially No No Yes No Yes Partially

Figure 28: Detailed examination of strengths and weaknesses of possible financing mechanism solutions for better emergency preparedness.

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The added value of a vertical fund84


While there is clearly a debate to be had about the merits and downfalls of a vertical fund, this report approaches the issue more from the perspective of what value it would add to existing instruments and channels as part of a suite of financing mechanisms. If a vertical fund were to be created, it would not replace all current financing tools and it is important that the expectations placed on any new mechanism are realistic. Preparedness financing needs to operate in both disaster and conflict settings, to fund institutions as well as national agencies, to finance short-term needs and long-term risk reduction, to be open to all actors (whether as donor or recipient), to be country- and needs-driven, and secure coherent, predictable funding. A vertical fund could add value in some of these areas but it clearly cannot provide a perfect solution to all of these demands. It is clear from other vertical funds that they can be effective in raising profile and providing a vehicle for a very wide range of donor contributions. Both of these are needed for preparedness. Preparedness is often a small part of other programmes and many donors lack both the policies and expertise to design their own programmes. If they can entrust these complex situations to a vertical fund, that may give them the confidence to increase their financial contributions. Evidence from other funds also suggests that the visibility that a vertical fund can create may also encourage financial commitments through pledging rounds and similar techniques. Other options for a strategic mix of funding structures include, firstly, funding for disaster preparedness as part of long-term global DRR funding (similar to GFDRR or a DRR-focused Global Fund), and secondly, funding for preparing for conflict to be increased through additional funds to ERFs (and where appropriate creating new ones) or through a CERF with an expanded mandate.

Feedback on funding mechanisms and a global fund


Through interviews, several UN staff have suggested that we need a global fund like that which exists for AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria (GFATM). One stated that we need to fund through regional bodies and avoid global coordination. One representative suggested that we must avoid the creation of a preparedness empire . Others say that we need a fund which can suit many different contexts. Some agencies argued (supported by some donors) for increased institutional funding for preparedness through a mechanism (especially for conflict). One donor suggested that no such mechanism was needed at all, that rather there should be funds pre-positioned at agency level. Why do we need another mechanism? one person asked, when GFDRR already funds in 31 priorit y countries. One donor suggested that it was still too early for discussing a funding mechanism for preparedness the scope of what preparedness means was still too disparate between donors.

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Global Programs or vertical funds focus vertically on specific issues or themes, in contrast with the horizontal approach of the country-based model of aid. International Development Association.

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Draft recommendations for consideration


1. Creating an enabling environment for improved funding To be successful, any financing mechanism for better preparedness must have built-in incentives for donor governments to consider using it. These could include the reduction of transaction costs, the increase in profile for the funding government, or the sharing of risk. Similarly, the policy context for preparedness needs to be positive and based on increasing levels of dialogue between key actors of all kinds. Connections should be made to all the other key actors working in the same environments where preparedness is needed. 1.1 Establish a programme of further structured engagement on preparedness with donors via forums such as the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) group and the G20. Within this programme of engagement, promote the importance of prioritising preparedness in the context of both humanitarian and development programmes. Attention needs to be given to reaching out to key non-DAC donors outside the GHD such as China and India. Work with the GHD group to support their members to develop policies and working practices on preparedness and to lead discussions with their counterparts working on development and conflict. The sub-components of this key area, all of which should link to building long-term resilience, include consideration of: State of readiness of donor financing for large-scale multi-country crises such as the food crises in East Africa the development of specific principles of preparedness financing and linking this to or incorporating into existing GHD principles the development of policy that makes funding for preparedness an issue for aid in general, neither humanitarian nor development alone, so that proper financing is set aside that does not unnecessarily stretch humanitarian response funding. working to combat artificial distinctions in aid structures even now by focusing on joint programmes based on thorough examination of all risks (see recommendations in section 2 for more detail) identify the structures and policies that would encourage donor support for multi-year mechanisms.

1.2

1.1

There should be a considerable widening of partnerships between those working in disaster and conflict preparedness, prevention and mitigation. This should include actors working on peacebuilding, UN and other peacekeeping and political development and transition, and include the military, development actors and institutions, and all those working domestically. This work should not only include developing an understanding of current activities (global and country-level) but also examine potential contributions.

Many stakeholders state that although cost-benefit analyses exist, they are not well disseminated, nor have they permeated institutions to reach senior decision makers, nor are they as strong as they need to be to make substantial policy revisions. Particularly in situations where preparedness

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P a g e | 72 is treated as part of other approaches, the data on cost effectiveness and value for money can be a useful tool in ensuring adequate investment. 1.4 Communicate to stakeholders the relevance, evidence and benefits of improved emergency preparedness financing, and in particular, the existing data on cost-benefit of preparedness investments should be synthesised and proactively disseminated. Conduct direct advocacy with key groups of senior stakeholders beyond the IASC and the GHD, including the G20, African Union, ASEAN community etc.

It is evident that conflict preparedness does not seem to be explicitly receiving much financial or policy attention amongst all donors. Firstly, conflict preparedness requires a complex approach in itself, with both short- and long-term strategies, and little of this is seen in donor policies. Secondly, several donors have also referred the issue of conflict preparedness to their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which suggests that there is an automatic connection between this, and state-building or stabilisation.85 1.5 Donors should investigate further how conflict preparedness can be better served in their policies. This should include how conflict in general relates to disasters, how conflict preparedness is connected to disaster preparedness and how conflict is articulated as something needing to be tackled by long-term risk reduction.

2. Defining the scale of need and prioritising through comprehensive risk analysis There is no figure for what resources are needed by the system in order to achieve an adequate level of preparedness. Ideally, funding would be allocated according to demand, based on a synthesised analysis of all risks to a country, which are then compared across different contexts, to ensure that priority is given to those most in need and lacking in national capacity. 2.1 2.2 Examine in more detail what is meant by conflict preparedness, both in the short- and long-term. Identify tools for a comprehensive risk analysis that addresses multi-hazards including conflict in all contexts (urban and rural) as well as the interface between conflict and disasters, to ensure emergency preparedness financing is needs-driven. For national hazards this could for example draw on The World Risk Index which has recently been developed by the University Institute for Environment and Human Security and goes some way to combining an assessment of risk, vulnerability and capacities of each country. This can be used to prioritise funding to ensure a high return on investment. Ensure that work to define needs and decide priorities is designed to help bridge the aid divide. It should not, for example, equate emergency preparedness with the humanitarian segment of longer-term DRR, which would only reemphasise the divide and further reduce the planning horizon. Start with analysis of overall requirements in the countries and communities most in need of better preparedness, and not with only those requirements which are eligible for either humanitarian or development funding. Analysing need within the narrow confines of eligibility for funding, risks masking the overall requirement. The response

2.3

2.4

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Note that this complex area is explored further in a note on the subject on page 15 of this study.

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P a g e | 73 may have to be limited, but the analysis of requirements should not obscure the gaps in funding. 2.5 Bring in to risk analyses likely future scenarios and trends, such as urbanisation, food prices and scarcity, and climate change impacts, in order to maximise the effectiveness of preparedness.

3. Offering leadership and champions, clarifying roles Leadership is essential throughout this developing work on improving preparedness expenditures and implementation. To date the IASC Principals (and Task Teams for preparedness and preparedness financing) have led the way. Nepal is also cited as example of leadership, obtaining as it has clear results for preparedness. However, more has to be done. Champions are needed across key constituents, including donors. More clarity on specific roles and responsibilities is required. 3.1 In particular, the IASC and UNDG should identify and resolve issues of mandate and leadership, duplications and gaps in delivery and the relationships between the UN ISDR, GFDRR, OCHA and UNDP, leading to a clearer articulation of the role of all actors, including the cluster system and humanitarian coordinators. Set out options to reduce duplication and promote coordination by identifying global leads that work to an overarching risk reduction framework linked to different funding streams. This could be similar to the Nepal Consortium and could operate at both global and country level, similarly to cluster operations. Given the importance of national ownership and local views, review guidelines and policies which enable appropriate engagement and ownership in different conflict situations. There is a need for clearer leadership on the issue of preparedness amongst the donor community and constituencies such as G20 and GHD. Recommend a single institution responsible for articulating, presenting, and developing policy on emergency preparedness within the CAP, taking account of developments within DRR engagement and financing where appropriate. In the absence of a cluster for preparedness, or a clear preparedness leader at global and national level within the CAP process, this recommendation could lead to increased clarity between global institutions working in preparedness.

3.2

3.3

3.4 3.5

4. Replicating the lessons of the Nepal model The Nepal Consortium is still in its infancy, a three year process that has only recently gained momentum. However, it has shown that a properly articulated country programme can garner both interest and funding. It bridges the humanitarian and development divide, bringing actors from both sides together within an overall funding and coordinating umbrella. It involves government, although their leadership is not always strong. However not all donors have bought into the programme as yet, with the absence of evidence (a characteristic of the global debate on preparedness) cited as a key factor. 4.1 In a much more comprehensive fashion, bring to bear lessons learnt from Nepal and other countries that have had significant success in programming and funding DRR.

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P a g e | 74 4.2 Document and disseminate the lessons from the National Disaster Management Legislation as a tool for strengthening national resilience that can be applied in other settings.

5. Building a suite of financing mechanisms Existing pooled fund mechanisms Pooled funds are now significant tools being used throughout the aid system, and there are several which finance or have the potential to finance emergency preparedness. Of the nine funds examined six finance preparedness, although the proportion disbursed is considerably variable and relatively small compared to overall amounts of expenditure. The comparative advantages of these funds can be drawn on to enable more predictable funding to preparedness in a range of country contexts. It should be noted that the possibility of using any mechanism for preparedness is also contingent on donors willing to commit more funding. 5.1 Increase preparedness financing using existing pooled funds that already channel money to preparedness such as Track II of GFDRR and UNDPs Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR-TTF). Investigate setting aside a percentage of the Funds income for preparedness based on prioritised risk analysis. Review the role of CHFs in supporting preparedness, with particular attention to countries where national leadership is not viable, and direct more money to strengthening community preparedness capacity. Consider expanding ERFs to include preparedness activities and the number of countries in which such expanded ERFs can operate. Give further consideration to the expansion of the CERF to enable it to fund emergency preparedness measures. Engage further with donors and implementing agencies at a global and country level to understand any concerns they may have and the implications of such an expansion.

5.2

5.3 5.4

Vertical fund The lack of adequate delivery channels for effective preparedness has been cited as a brake on adequate funding and, as highlighted by the inception report, a number of stakeholders in the system are looking for a mechanism that can work in both disaster and conflict preparedness. This is different from having a fund that tackles natural disasters in a conflict setting86. 5.5 Consider the added value of a vertical fund solely focussed on preparedness based on analysis in this report and in the context of the challenge presented by both combining disaster and conflict preparedness, and spanning the divide between humanitarian and development assistance in many donors and agencies, and identify next steps as appropriate.

Role of the CAP

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In this study there is no time to go into detail on the interplay between natural disasters and conflict. The UNDP authored document Disaster-Conflict Interface: Comparative Examples is a useful guide to this complex area: http://www.beta.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/DisasterConflict72p.pdf

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P a g e | 75 It is not at all clear how the current system of flash appeals in response to largely natural disasters, and consolidated appeal planned response to complex emergencies or large-scale disasters requiring ongoing humanitarian financing, fit with long-term preparedness engagement and funding. There remain no clear guidelines, no clear roles and responsibilities and no clear champion at a global or national level. However, despite this the CAP is being used for preparedness expenditures. The CAP process itself does connect directly to needs on the ground and is therefore well placed to contribute to discussion about the need for preparedness investment. 5.6 5.7 Incorporate a strong component of emergency preparedness within the developing work on making the CAP more strategic. Take the necessary steps to make emergency preparedness a specific element within the CAP, both within the guidance note and with supporting material where appropriate. Specifically use this process to encourage articulation of preparedness needs, ensure consistency of terminology and processes and clearly delineate project and reporting practices. Assess the possibility of using a marker for tracking levels of preparedness funding within individual projects within the CAP to allow donors and others to better track their existing and future investments in preparedness.

5.8

An element of this studys work that has not been examined in any detail is the actual quality of preparedness programming, whether standalone or mainstreamed. 5.9 6 Whilst calling for improved funding for emergency preparedness, also investigate how good current activities are and what can be improved.

Building the evidence and improving the data

Data on financing for preparedness is poor. Improved reporting which captures more preparedness spending and enables more accurate tracking is an important tool for measuring impact and progress, drawing attention to funding requirements and maintaining commitment. 6.1 Using the methodologies developed in this study provide a forensic analysis of preparedness spending from project-level data for both development and humanitarian aid. From this, work to support ongoing initiatives such as those being undertaken by the World Bank and ISDR to improve coding and reporting preparedness (and DRR) expenditures which are consistent with the requirements of the DAC CRS, the FTS and the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) common standard.87 Promote the introduction of a marker in OECD DAC and OCHA FTS databases for projects which include preparedness activities. This work should also help examine in detail what is meant by conflict preparedness, working towards a clear consensus (as well as investigating what is currently reported in key databases).

6.2

6.3 6.4

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The IATI standard offers considerable scope to improve reporting, with multiple sector codes, more timely publication of data and links to project documents.

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P a g e | 76 6.5 6.6 Track preparedness funding requirements and receipts within all CAP appeals (see recommendations 5.5 to 5.6). Advocate for much better preparedness reporting by all actors and therefore obtain greater visibility of existing funding for preparedness, not just within key databases but in their annual reports and other documentation. This should extend beyond those already working with a clear focus on emergency preparedness such as implementing and coordinating humanitarian organisations and agencies, and extend to actors also working in those same environments, such as peacekeepers. It needs to include the financing mechanisms.

Final Point: the aid architecture The recommendations developed in this report, if discussed, refined and implemented are likely to increase both engagement and investment in preparedness. However, they alone will not tackle the fundamental schism in donor aid architecture that perpetuates a situation where humanitarians are left dealing with the consequences of a lack of development investment in risk reduction. Only by tackling this core issue can a sustainable, long-term solution to preparedness financing be found.

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Suggested components for Phase II: country focus and all actors
Whilst the study thus far has presented some key recommendations that can be achieved with action from system actors, and from within current budgets, there are clearly elements that need to be built upon through the work of Phase II. In part, these elements arise from the fact that Phase I has been limited largely to a global study working with global architecture, institutions, mechanisms and data. It has been focused on the supply of emergency preparedness and its financing, not the demand. Furthermore, the work in the synthesis report has revealed much needed investment in areas such as a detailed review of global institutions working on preparedness and decision making and advocacy previously not envisioned. In addition, whilst not limited to humanitarian thinking alone, this first phase has been discussed largely with key humanitarian players within the IASC and partners, and donors significant efforts in Phase II must be made to connect to the other actors often working in the same environments as humanitarians. Therefore, interconnected elements recommended to be within the second phase are as follows. Country-level work essential Research for Phase 1 has been (with the exception of a desk study on Nepal) limited to discussions with HQ-based stakeholders and the examination of policies, databases and financial information at the global level. These provide us with only a very partial picture. Examining emergency preparedness in a variety of country contexts will be essential if we are to understand the interplay between the different kinds of activities undertaken, the actors involved, how the work is financed (including detailed country work on different financing channels) and how international and national policies and priorities work together. An important element of this country work is identifying a representative cross section of environments where preparedness is needed, including countries in conflict and those where natural disasters are more important, those with issues of rapid urbanisation and those prone to drought or famine, those with or without UN appeals etc. All actors examined and partnerships developed Country-level work will enable a full understanding of the work of all actors. More detailed investigation is also needed at a global level on the preparedness activities and expenditures of those outside of the humanitarian/development system, including non-traditional donors, military actors, peacekeeping and the private sector. This work should go beyond simply exploring data and activities and move towards building partnerships across groups not previously connected. This should include dedicated conversations with the development arms of key donors. Phase II of this study should investigate what is needed and work with the IASC and others to ensure the right interconnections are made. Forensic data examination The preliminary data investigation has shown the need for future work which goes beyond the available databases and examines data forensically using tailored means to pull out and amalgamate spending on preparedness. Data and reporting advocacy

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P a g e | 78 Based on the work so far on the limitations of current data reporting, Phase II will include direct support to existing initiatives on improving the way in which preparedness (and DRR) expenditures are recorded. Risk analysis The need for comprehensive risk analysis to underpin prioritised expenditures on preparedness has been highlighted in this study as essential to ensuring demand-driven, prioritised interventions, to bring the same rigour and multi-stakeholder approach to conflict as is applied to natural disasters. The interplay between conflict and disaster is of considerable importance and more investment is needed to explore this, vis--vis preparedness. All risks should be mapped and analysed together. Phase II will examine the interplay between conflict and disaster in more detail and investigate the current development of multi-risk analysis, making recommendations for how this can be achieved at country level and how it can feed into global prioritisation. This analysis should include investigation on long-term trends such as urbanisation, commodity prices and the effects of climate change on natural hazards. Financing mechanisms Not all financing mechanisms have been examined as part of Phase I of this study. For example, stabilisation funds and other conflict-related mechanisms could well be funding preparedness activities. Direct engagement with the owners and managers of these other funds is needed. Analysing the Quality of Activities There is a need to not only improve the level of financing for emergency preparedness but this should not be done without thinking of current preparedness activities and examining whether they are appropriate. Part of this examination should include whether or not the definition developed for this is comprehensive enough to ensure understanding of what should or should not be funded. Advocacy and engagement There are clearly moves being made to give emergency preparedness a higher profile amongst decision makers. Phase II of this study should support these initiatives, and where needed start its own, with tailored presentations to key audiences made, and support given to the IASC and others in making the case for improved engagement and funding for preparedness. Improvement of preparedness system Phase II of the study should pick up on the early work on institutions and the comments of many actors regarding the need for more dedicated work to resolve system issues on preparedness. A core element of Phase II will be to identify any issues of mandate and leadership, duplications and gaps in delivery. Clear recommendations will be given on how to resolve these issues, bring clarity, and effectively focus leadership.

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Figures
Figure 1: Concentric circles denoting connections between the various elements of DRR, resilience, emergency preparedness etc. .............................................................................................................. 11 Figure 2: Number of natural disasters and people affected. Source: Development Initiatives based on CRED. ............................................................................................................................................... 12 Figure 3: Number of people affected by natural disaster, by conflict or non-conflict-affected (millions of people). Source: Development Initiatives based on CRED and other sources. ................. 12 Figure 4: Proportion of total official humanitarian assistance by conflict-affected states, 2000-200913 Figure 5: Funding to prevention and preparedness code, 2004-2009 (US$m constant 2009 prices). Source: OECD DAC data ........................................................................................................................ 14 Figure 6: Funding to prevention and preparedness code as percentage of total humanitarian aid, 2004-2009 (constant 2009 prices). Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data ......... 14 Figure 7: Total disaster preparedness funding found within total ODA (2009). Source Development Initiatives based on OECD CRS data...................................................................................................... 15 Figure 8: Disaster preparedness funding within total ODA, 2009. Note: sectors coloured red fall under humanitarian funding. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data ................ 16 Figure 9: Breakdown of humanitarian aid by ten donors profiled, 2009 (US$ million). Development Initiatives based on OCED DAC data ..................................................................................................... 20 Figure 10: The detailed profile of what is funded by donors within 'prevention and preparedness'. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data.. ............................................................... 21 Figure 11: Donor policy and financial mechanisms matrix. .................................................................. 22 Figure 12: Institutional funding for DRR. Source: Development Initiatives based on institutional annual reports ...................................................................................................................................... 29 Figure 13: Contributions to GFDRR 2006-2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on World Bank data. ............................................................................................................................................. 29 Figure 14: Preparedness projects within the 2011 consolidated appeal, mid-year review, using search terms developed to track preparedness expenditures in FTS. Source: Development Initiatives using OCHA FTS data. ........................................................................................................... 35 Figure 15: Characteristics of funds. Source: Development Initiatives based on various sources. Information up to 2010......................................................................................................................... 40 Figure 16: Donor contributions to financing mechanisms 2006-2010 (US$ million). Source: Development Initiatives based on various sources .............................................................................. 44 Figure 17: Total humanitarian aid as a share of ODA 2005-2009. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data...................................................................................................................... 51 Figure 18: Humanitarian breakdown for ten case study countries, 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC data ....................................................................................................................................................... 51 Figure 19: Country comparison of disaster preparedness financing reported to the FTS 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS ..................................................................... 52 Figure 20: Preparedness funding to appeals 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS ......................................................................................................................................... 53 Figure 21: Sector breakdown of emergency preparedness funding for ten case study countries in 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS ........................................................... 53 Figure 22: Tracking 2011 preparedness funding reported to the FTS by month. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS. ................................................................................. 54 Figure 23: Development and humanitarian aid to Nepal, 1995-2009 (constant 2009 prices) and number of people affected by disasters. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and CRED data ............................................................................................................................................. 56 Figure 24: Funding for disaster preparedness reported through UNOCHA FTS 2007- 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS *2011 data download 28 July 2011 ......................... 56 Figure 25: Detailed examination of strengths and weaknesses of possible financing mechanism solutions to better emergency preparedness. ..................................................................................... 69

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P a g e | 80 Figure 26: Allocation of Australia's humanitarian funding, 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 27: Australias contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: Various ............................. 83 Figure 28: Examples of Brazils funding to DRR. Source: Development Initiatives based on OCHA FTS Figure 29: Brazils contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: Various .................................. 85 Figure 30: Allocation of Canada's humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source OECD DAC Figure 31: Canadas contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: Various ............................... 87 Figure 32: Allocation of Denmark's humanitarian funds, 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 33: Denmark's contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: Various ............................ 88 Figure 34: EUs contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: OECD DAC Figure 35: Allocation of EUs humanitarian funds, 2005-2009. Source OECD DAC .............................. 89 Figure 36: Allocation of Germany's humanitarian funds, 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 37: Germanys contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: Various.......... ......... 91 Figure 38: Allocation of Japan's humanitarian funds, 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 39: Japan's contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: Various............... .............. 92 Figure 40: Allocation of Norways humanitarian funds, 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 41: Norway's contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: Various............................... 93 Figure 42: Allocation of Sweden's humanitarian funds, 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 43: Sweden's contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: Various .............................. 94 Figure 44: Allocation of Switzerland's humanitarian funds, 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 45: Switzerland's contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: Various ........................ 95 Figure 46: Allocation of UK's humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 47: UKs contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: Various....................................... 96 Figure 48: Allocation of USAs humanitarian funds, 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 49: USAs contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: Various ................ 97 Figure 50: Unearmarked contributions to OCHA as of 6 December 2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on OCHA in 2011: Annual Plan and Budget ............................................................. 100 Figure 51: Expenditure of the DRR and recovery window of the CPR-TTF. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNODP data........................................................................................................ 102 Figure 52: Contributions and pledges by GFDRR to Tracks II and III (US$ million), as of July 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on World Bank data. ............................................................ 106 Figure 53: Annual appeal for community preparedness and risk reduction, 2010. Source Development Initiatives based on IFRC. ............................................................................................. 108 Figure 54: Donor contributions to the CERF, 2006-2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA CERF .................................................................................................................................... 111 Figure 55: Donor contributions to the CHFs, 2006-2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS ...................................................................................................................................... 112 Figure 56: Examples of preparedness activities funded by CHFs. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS....................................................................................................................... 113 Figure 57: Donor contributions to the ERFs, 2006-2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS ...................................................................................................................................... 114 Figure 58: Examples of preparedness activities funded by ERFs. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS....................................................................................................................... 115 Figure 59: Contributions to the TTF-CPR, 2001-2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNDP data .......................................................................................................................................... 116 Figure 60: Expenditure of the TTF-CPR according to the five windows of the fund, 2007-2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNDP data. ..................................................................... 118 Figure 61: Contributions to UN Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction. Source: Development Initiatives based on ISDR data ............................................................................................................................. 118 Figure 62: Expenditure of the UN Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction according to the strategic objectives of ISDR, 2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on ISDR data................................ 119 Figure 63: Expenditure of GFDRR according to HFA priority areas up until September 2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on GFDRR data. ................................................................................. 121

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P a g e | 81 Figure 64: Examples of preparedness activities funded by LDCF. Source: Development Initiatives based on GEF data. ............................................................................................................................. 123 Figure 65: Allocation of LDCF resources to approved projects, up to 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on GEF data.............................................................................................................. 123 Figure 66: Examples of funding for preparedness through the Adaptation Fund. Source: Development Initiatives based on Adaptation Fund .......................................................................... 126

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Abbreviations
CAP CERF CHF CPR-TTF CRS DAC DI DRR ERC ERF FSNAU FTS GEF GFDRR GHD HCT HFA IASC IFRC ISDR LDCF NRRC OCHA ODA OECD PPCR SCF SWG UN Consolidated appeal process Central Emergency Response Fund Common humanitarian fund Conflict Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund Creditor reporting system Development Assistance Committee Development Initiatives Disaster risk reduction Emergency Relief Coordinator Emergency response fund Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit Financial Tracking Service Global Environmental Facility Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery Good Humanitarian Donorship Humanitarian Country Team Hyogo Framework for Action Inter-Agency Standing Committee International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Least Development Country Fund Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Official development assistance Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Pilot Program for Climate Resilience Strategic Climate Fund Sub-working group United Nations

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Annex 1: Donor profiles


Australia profile
Policy and structure
Australia, through AusAID, has had a long engagement in disaster management, mitigation and preparedness, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. The Australian Government has invested in a broad range of disaster risk reduction activities at the regional, bilateral and community level in over 30 countries. AusAID views preparedness as a component of wider disaster risk reduction (DRR). DRR has been a policy focus for AusAID since the publication of the Humanitarian Action Policy (2005). AusAID has stated a desire to dedicate significant human and financial resource to embed DRR within its development programming. A policy for DRR was released in 2009 named Investing in a safer future. Within AusAID the management of DRR policy is undertaken by the Humanitarian and Peacebuilding Branch. Implementation is carried out by AusAID development programmes at a country level. Thus, funding for DRR comes from both humanitarian and development budget lines. Total expenditure on DRR across the aid programme has increased since the launch of the policy.

Finance
Climate

2009
2008 2007 2006 2005 0%

114 113 103

78 77 4

84 73 38

28 13 2

Adaptation fund SCF LDCF* GFDRR

43 14 16

DRR

132
213 20% 40% 60%

48

36
13

ISDR UN Trust fund BCPR TTF

5
13 2 45
0 10 20 30 40 50

Humanitarian

80%

100%

ERF CHF CERF

Material relief assistance and services Emergency food aid Relief co-ordination; protection and support services Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation Disaster prevention and preparedness

US$ million

Figure 29: Allocation of Australia's humanitarian funding 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 30: Australias contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no annual breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various

Australia has reported funding to prevention and preparedness since 2006 with significant contributions in 2008 and 2009. In 2009 it was the fifth largest donor to prevention and preparedness accounting for 9% of humanitarian aid in that year.

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Total expenditure in 2008-2009 was just over $40 million. In 2009-2010 this figure rose to over $59 million . The largest recipient of Australias US$43 million (2006 -2009) to prevention and preparedness has been Indonesia (US$13.8 million). This highlights Australias 89 strong links with Indonesia, and with disaster risk reduction activities and knowledge sharing .
88

88
89

Progress report for the DRR Policy 2009-2010

Australia Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR) announced in 2008 a $67 million commitment over five years for DRR in Indonesia and the region, a unique partnership between AusAID and BNPB. *From 2002, no annual breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF.

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Brazil profile
Policy and structure
Brazils international focus on DRR and preparedness is part of its humanitarian assistance policy that is led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Humanitarian assistance is any action that contributes to an immediate and effective response to protect, prepare, prevent, reduce, mitigate suffering and help other 90 countries or regions that are momentarily or otherwise, in emergency situations. Brazil is also focused on DRR at a national level. It works towards DRR under the twin-track approach of emergency and structural actions. Its strategy on disaster risk is based on two pillars: 1) national system of civil defence 2) participatory public policies for strengthening the resilience of vulnerable groups and areas. Brazil is also committed to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) which is coordinated by the Ministry for National Integration. At present there is no national platform for DRR in Brazil.

Finance
Climate

Adaptation fund SCF

Channel Bilateral (to affected government) WFP FAO

Appeal Mozambique 2009 Timor-Leste 2009 Nicaragua 2010

Project description Disaster prevention Disaster prevention Resilience of agrarian populations to socio-natural disasters

US$m 0.04

LDCF*
GFDRR

DRR

0.10 0.05

ISDR UN Trust fund BCPR TTF

Humanitarian

ERF CHF CERF

4
US$ million

10

Figure 31: Examples of Brazils funding to DRR. Source: Development Initiatives based on OCHA FTS

Figure 32: Brazils contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no annual breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various

90

http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas/acao-contra-a-fome-e-assistencia-humanitaria/assistencia-humanitaria/view; translated from Portuguese using Google Translate.

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It is not possible to track Brazils contributions to preparedness through the OECD DAC as they do not report their spending to this database. However some money to DRR can be found in the UN OCHA FTS; see table above. Brazil is the only non-DAC donor to contribute to the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) up until 2010 and also the largest non-DAC donor to the thematic trust fund for crisis prevention and recovery (CPR-TTF).

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Canada profile
Policy and structure
The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) considers reducing the impact of natural disasters to be an integral component of poverty reduction and sustainable development. DRR and disaster preparedness programmes are for the most part under the umbrella of CIDA's International Humanitarian Assistance Programmes. Additionally, CIDA is currently funding DRR and disaster preparedness efforts across a variety of development as well as governance programmes. CIDA provides proactive financial support to the ISDR and other key international disaster risk reduction actors for their preparedness, mitigation, and early warning activities in support of the HFA. CIDA does not have a specific percentage allocated for DRR or disaster and emergency preparedness. Such activities may be targeted or integrated across a range of projects.

Finance
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 0% 20% 97 112 40% 60% 80% 121 166 135 129 3 100% 173 132 99 6 12 6 2
Climate Adaptation fund SCF LDCF* 7 3 1 34 1 6 168 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 US$ million 140 160 180 84

GFDRR
DRR ISDR UN Trust fund

BCPR TTF
Humanitarian ERF CHF CERF

Material relief assistance and services Emergency food aid Relief co-ordination; protection and support services Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation Disaster prevention and preparedness Figure 33: Allocation of Canada's humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source OECD DAC

Figure 34: Canadas contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no annual breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various

Canada has reported US$26.8 million between 2006 - 2009 on disaster prevention and preparedness through the OECD DAC, peaking at US$12 million in 2008 (3% of humanitarian spending). Canada is unique in its reporting practices for projects that cross sectors as they work out the percentage breakdown for each sector. For example, a project that addresses health (50%), education (25%) and prevention and preparedness (25%) will be reported separately under each sector with the appropriate share of total project funding assigned to each sector. This gives a clear a picture of the total amount of financing that a specific activity is allocated within one cross-sector project.

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Denmark profile
Policy and structure
Disaster risk reduction (DRR) has increased in prominence in the development of Denmarks foreign aid. The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has been an ardent supporter of both GFDRR and UNISDR and an active participant of EU DRR processes. This support is in line with MFA policies on protecting the most vulnerable and the focus of their strategy for humanitarian action to strengthen the resilience of societies to disasters. In Denmarks Strategy for Humanitarian Action it is acknowledged that disaster preparedness is often a component of DRR, however, they do differentiate between the two. Disaster preparedness is often very concrete and limited to preparing what to do when the sudden onset disaster strikes. Risk reduction is more subtle, varied and general in its concept, while being specific in each sector and is mainly employed before a disaster. Denmarks humanitarian aid is managed by the Danish Development Cooperation (DANIDA) a sub-agency of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and this is where the majority of funding for disaster preparedness comes from and some DRR financing. Lots of DRR which may include preparedness comes from development funding. DANIDA also supports a variety of NGOs and multilateral organisations that specialise in disaster preparedness and DRR, which can fall across both budgets.

Finance
Climate

2009
2008 2007 2006 2005 0% 10 20%

93 96 84 82 14 40% 60%

1 14 19 6

12 14 15 10

3 4 2

Adaptation fund
SCF LDCF* GFDRR 8 2 21 16 17 47 0 10 20 US$ million 30 40 50 30 36

8 3 11

DRR

ISDR UN Trust fund BCPR TTF

Humanitarian

80%

100%

ERF CHF CERF

Material relief assistance and services Emergency food aid Relief co-ordination; protection and support services Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation Disaster prevention and preparedness Figure 35: Allocation of Denmark's humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC CRS

Figure 36: Denmark's contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no annual breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various

Denmark reported a relatively small amount of funding for disaster prevention and preparedness, US$8 million between 2007 and 2009, 2% of total humanitarian aid. Five countries received direct funding, Myanmar (US$2m), Bangladesh (US$2m), Ethiopia (US$1m), Tajikistan (US$0.4m) and Mali (US$0.2m). Denmark has been a significant supporter of global DRR efforts between 2006 and 2010, contributing US$8 million to GFDRR, US$2 million to UNISDR, US$21 million to BCPR and also global climate funds such as The Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (US$36 million).

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European Union profile


Policy and structure
The overall objective of the EUs strategy for DRR is to contribute to sustainable development and poverty eradication by reducing the burden of disasters on the poor and the most vulnerable countries and people. DRR and disaster preparedness activities are undertaken as an integral part of the European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Offices (ECHO) relief operations in areas affected by ongoing humanitarian crises. ECHOs disaster preparedness policy rests on three pillars: the European Commission Humanitarian Aid departments Disaster Pr eparedness Programme (DIPECHO), 92 mainstreaming and advocacy . DIPECHOs main objective is to address Disaster Preparedness and Prevention (DPP) in a regional framework, targeting the most vulnerable populations in the main disaster-prone areas across the world (with low coping capacities). Its main focus is on "preparation rather than mitigation or prevention. ECHOs contribution to disaster preparedness goes well beyond the DIPECHO programme as many of ECHOs major humanitarian fina ncing decisions include disaster preparedness or mitigation of disaster impacts as an objective. Even post-disaster emergency responses often have a risk reduction element.
91

Finance
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 0% 20% 741 561 797 791 40% 842 555 626 217 239 60% 80% 581
DRR

342 501

241 328 375

77 95 26
Climate

Adaptation fund SCF LDCF* GFDRR ISDR UN Trust fund BCPR TTF

Humanitarian

100%

Material relief assistance and services Emergency food aid Relief co-ordination; protection and support services Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation Disaster prevention and preparedness

ERF CHF CERF 0 5 10 15 20 25

US$ million

Figure 37: Allocation of EU humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source OECD DAC

Figure 38: The EUs contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no annual breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various

91 92

EU Strategy for Supporting Disaster Risk Reduction in Developing Countries 2009 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/dipecho/presentations/programme_overview_11_07_en.pdf

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Between 2007 and 2009 the EU reported US$198 million to the OECD DAC and has consistently been the largest donor in those three years, accounting for 22% of total prevention and preparedness funding. A total of 68 countries have received funding, the largest being Bangladesh (US$12m) and Nepal (US$7m). Disaster prevention and preparedness funding has predominantly been channelled through the public sector (US$69m) and NGOs (US$52m). Since 1998, DIPECHO has spent 186.42 million in prevention and preparedness activities. In 2008 alone, ECHO allocated 32.3 million for disaster preparedness in the regions of Central Asia, South East Asia, Central America, South East Africa and South West Indian Ocean.

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Germany profile
Policy and structure
Germany regards disaster risk reduction and management as crucial to sustainable development and closely links them with the overarching MDG of reducing poverty. The Federal Government has stepped up its engagement in the field of disaster reduction over the past years. The aim is to earmark 5-10% of the regular emergency humanitarian aid funds each year for disaster reduction. Germany addresses DRR and disaster preparedness in a comprehensive way from many different angles and agencies. DRR and disaster preparedness are addressed at the inter-ministerial level within the Federal Government. Measures are carried out within the framework of emergency humanitarian aid by the Federal Foreign Office, as part of development-oriented emergency and transitional aid by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and as part of the disaster relief activities of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, which although primarily responsible for disaster relief in Germany also supports some operations abroad through the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW). disaster ppreparedness measures are also supported by the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety.

Finance
Climate

2009 2008 2007 2006 2005

183
164 151 243 221

115
77 56 90 98 30

6 41
9 36 48 80 52

25
11 4

Adaptation fund SCF LDCF* GFDRR 10 5 4

14 21 41

DRR

ISDR UN Trust fund BCPR TTF

Humanitarian

ERF CHF CERF 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 63 70

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Material relief assistance and services Emergency food aid Relief co-ordination; protection and support services Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation Disaster prevention and preparedness

US$ million

Figure 39: Allocation of Germany's humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC

Figure 40: Germanys contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no annual breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various

Germany has reported US$40.5 million towards disaster prevention and preparedness between 2007 and 2009. In 2009 disaster prevention and preparedness spending made up 7% of total budget allocation (meeting targets outlined in their policy of 5% to 10% of HA). The major delivery channels German disaster prevention and preparedness funding have been NGOs (32%), the public sector (29%) and the World Bank (21%).

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Japan profile
Policy and structure
Preparedness is a key component of Japans overall policy on disaster risk reduction in international development cooperation. Japans official humanitarian budget is allocated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and administered by the Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Relief Division within the International Cooperation Bureau. The Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) manages the bilateral component and is responsible for promoting and incorporating disaster risk reduction initiatives within country programme partnerships (OECD DAC peer review Japan 2010). Within JICA, DRR and post-crisis reconstruction assistance are incorporated within the fourth mission statement, achieving human security, which aims to protect people from threats and build societies where they can live with dignity. According to JICA preparedness is preparation to minimise the damage even if a disaster occurs, and falls under development strategy goal 1, building disaster-resilient communities and societies as set out in their guidelines for DRR (JICA 2007).

Finance
Climate

2009 2008 2007 2006 2005

57 119

23 9 84

140 92

49 90 22 4 1 20 48 45

46 46 1

Adaptation fund SCF LDCF* GFDRR 0.25 56

9
5 21

DRR

321 561

ISDR UN Trust fund BCPR TTF

Humanitarian

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

ERF CHF CERF 0 10 13 20 30 US$ million 40 50 60

Material relief assistance and services Emergency food aid Relief co-ordination; protection and support services Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation Disaster prevention and preparedness

Figure 41: Allocation of Japan's humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC

Figure 42: Japan's contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no annual breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various

Japan has only reported significant financial spend to the prevention and preparedness code of the DAC CRS since 2008. In both 2008 and 2009 Japan has been amongst the top five donors under the prevention and preparedness code. In 2009 15% of Japans humanitarian spending went towards pre vention and preparedness, the highest percentage of the top donors. The bulk of Japans funding to disaster preven tion and preparedness has been bilateral and only a few recipients have received funding: Bangladesh (US$10m), Philippines (US$8m) and Sri Lanka (US$7m). All of Japans disaster prevention and preparedness funding has been channelled through the public sector.

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Norway Profile
Policy and structure
Through the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Norway views preparedness and risk reduction as key to preventing humanitarian crises and an area that requires stronger international focus. Norways polices and strategies on risk reduction and emergency preparedness are documented in several government white papers, including Norwegian policy on the prevention of humanitarian crises and Norways humanitarian policy. Norway aims to follow up and strengthen cooperation on 93 prevention, preparedness and adaptation to climate change with countries that are especially vulnerable to natural disasters . Preparedness must be integrated into all development activities. The main activities in which Norway engages are concentrated in pilot countries China, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Cuba and Uganda. In addition, Norway supports the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC) in Bangkok, and through it, more than 20 countries in their network. The main focus is on strengthening capacity at national and local levels, with concentration upon low-cost technology measures, assisting in building up weather forecasting and reporting systems and timely information dissemination to the people who need it.

Finance
Climate

2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 0% 20%

171 213 314 252 311

22 8

Adaptation fund SCF LDCF*

GFDRR
DRR ISDR UN Trust fund BCPR TTF Humanitarian

40%

60%

80%

100%

ERF CHF CERF US$ million 0 50 100 150 200 250 300

Material relief assistance and services Emergency food aid Relief co-ordination; protection and support services Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation Disaster prevention and preparedness

Figure 43: Allocation of Norways humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC

Figure 44: Norway's contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no annual breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various


93

Between 2008 and 2009 Norway increased its funding to prevention and preparedness by over 150%. Just over half of the total amount (US$22 million) went to national NGOs. Preparedness and DRR funding comes from Norways humanitarian budget. There is no separate budget line for DRR but there have been discussions to do this.

http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Hum/humpolicy_eng.pdf

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Sweden profile
Policy and structure
Reducing risk is a priority of the Swedish International Development Agency s (Sida) current humanitarian policy. They see reducing risk and improving preparedness as a key component of humanitarian assistance, and as complementary to the long term development assistance efforts, in accordance with the principles of the HFA. Disaster prevention is one of two key perspectives that inform the goals of Sidas humanitarian assistance policy. Sida supports measures to prevent natural disast ers and reduce vulnerability at national and local level with a particular focus on countries where Sida is involved in humanitarian action. Sida promotes the inclusion of disaster 94 prevention measures in the regular programmes of humanitarian partner organisations and support measures to strengthen international DRR system .

Finance
Climate

2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 0% 20%

281 275 246 268 232 40% 60%

29

42 27

23

Adaptation fund SCF LDCF* GFDRR

15

19 6 7 4

2 10 15 4 39

12 18 20 56 54 181 262 0 50 100 150 US$ million 200 250 300

DRR

ISDR UN Trust fund BCPR TTF

11 23
Humanitarian

80%

100%

ERF CHF CERF

Material relief assistance and services Emergency food aid Relief co-ordination; protection and support services Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation Disaster prevention and preparedness

Figure 45: Allocation of Sweden's humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC

Figure 46: Sweden's contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no annual breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various

Between 2007 and 2009 Sweden has reported US$34 million to disaster prevention and preparedness through the OECD DAC, account ing for 6% of Swedens humanitarian funding in 2009. The majority of Swedens disaster prevention and preparedness f inancing has not been allocated to a specific country (68%). The majority of Swedens disaster prevention and preparedness funding has been channelled through multilateral organisations : UNDP (25%), UNISDR (14%), World Bank group (9%). This highlights that since 2006 Sidas DRR strategy has focused on bilateral support to global and regional mechanisms. Sweden has been one of the largest donors to UNISDR, contributing US$20 million between 2006 and 2010, as well as giving US$18 million to GFDRR.

94

Taken from the Strategy for Humanitarian Assistance provided through Sida 2011-2014

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Switzerland profile
Policy and structure
Within the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC), disaster risk reduction (DRR) and preparedness lie with the Humanitarian Aid Department. SDC define preparedness as activities and measures taken in advance to ensure effective response to the impact of hazards, including the issuance of timely and effective early warnings and the temporary evacuation of people and property from threatened locations. Preparedness is incorporated within DRR objectives in the SDCs 2010 strategy document. DRR is one of the four priority areas of its Humanitarian Aid Department. SDCs preparedness activities focus on supporting partners through awareness raising and/or capacity development (institution building, networking, system reforms). SDC follows the conceptual framework of risk management defined in the HFA. SDC seeks to eliminate or minimize the effects of natural disasters through three targeted mechanisms: mitigation, response and recovery. DRR is not defined as a crosscutting issue in SDC. Therefore, it is not compulsory that it be taken into account in all activities.

Finance
Climate

2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 0% 101 20%

170 175 207 161 46 40% 60%


Emergency food aid

46 50 42 44 60 80%

12 13 15 9 13

Adaptation fund SCF LDCF* GFDRR

DRR

ISDR UN Trust fund BCPR TTF

100%

Humanitarian

ERF

Material relief assistance and services Relief co-ordination; protection and support services Disaster prevention and preparedness

CHF
CERF 0 5 10 15 US$ million 20 25 30

Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation

Figure 47: Allocation of Switzerland's humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC

Figure 48: Switzerland's contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no annual breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various

Switzerland has only reported a small amount to OECD DAC to prevention and preparedness in their humanitarian spending, just US$2m in 2009 (1% of total reported HA in that year). The top recipients were Georgia (US$0.5m), Syria (US$0.5m) and El Salvador (US$0.25m).

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United Kingdom profile


Policy and structure
One of DFIDs policy focus areas is resilience (economic, physical, social, environmental and national), an element of which is response preparedness. Despite the terminology DFID does not limit this to specific preparedness activities for response to an emergency; rather it has a wider remit and incorporates areas of work such as the building of institutional frameworks and legislation at a national level. The Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) responds to humanitarian needs arising from conflict and natural disasters. It also works to identify emerging risks in order to build greater security and access to justice, and improve the resilience of communities in order to prevent conflict situations arising or escalating and reducing the damage of natural disasters. CHASE hopes to produce a strategy on preparedness in the near future that will be based on the wider DFID policy commitments made on resilience in their recent response to the 2011 Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR). These policy commitments help to link DFIDs work on DRR to climate change and provide the basis for a move towards a cross-departmental approach to resilience.

Finance
2009 489 129 53
Adaptation fund SCF** LDCF* GFDRR DRR 19 11 10 76 91 629 358 0 100 200 300 400 500 US$ million 600 700 599

2008
2007 2006 2005 0% 20%

435
421 439 417 40% 60%

92
27 100 48 80%

29

Climate

ISDR UN Trust fund


BCPR TTF

Humanitarian

100%

ERF CHF CERF

Material relief assistance and services Emergency food aid Relief co-ordination; protection and support services Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation Disaster prevention and preparedness

Figure 49: Allocation of UK's humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC

Figure 50: UKs contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no annual breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various

In 2009 prevention and preparedness accounted for 7% of total humanitarian spending. Of the US$81.8 million reported to the prevention and preparedness code, US$81.7 million came from DFID whereas US$0.1 million came from the foreign and commonwealth office (FCO), the exact channel is unknown. The majority of the money that the UK reported to prevention and preparedness is not allocated to a specific country a total of US$47.8 million. Of this money, 42.9% was channelled to national NGOs.

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United States profile


Policy and structure
Funding for DRR and disaster preparedness activities is provided through the USAID/OFDA office as part of their humanitarian assistance programme. The disaster preparedness activities are designed to promote at least one of the five priorities identified by the HFA, with the aim of mitigating both natural disasters and complex emergencies, in order to reduce the loss of human life, alleviate suffering, and reduce the economic impact of disasters. DRR and disaster preparedness funding includes Natural Disaster as well as Conflict Preparedness programmes. In 2009 OFDA provided 3% of its budget to the Risk Reduction sector. However, DRR and preparedness funding was also allocated to other sectors (e.g. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene, Economic Recovery etc.), which comprise DRR and preparedness components. All DRR programmes from 2006-2008 contain prevention and preparedness activities in their programme descriptions. However, from the budget outline it is unclear and difficult to determine exactly how much of the total programme budget is directed to prevention and preparedness activities (OFDA Annual Report 2009).

Finance
Climate

2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 0%

2211 1869 1608 1645 1620 20% 40% 60%

1942 2264 1236 1355 1748 80%

59 30 14 15 57 100%

Adaptation fund SCF LDCF* GFDRR 30 55

DRR

ISDR UN Trust fund BCPR TTF

0.5 13

Humanitarian

ERF CHF CERF

Material relief assistance and services Emergency food aid Relief co-ordination; protection and support services Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation Disaster prevention and preparedness

25

10

20

30 US$ million

40

50

60

Figure 51: Allocation of USAs humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC

Figure 52: USAs contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no annual breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various

Between 2005 and 2009 the United States has reported US$175 million to disaster prevention and preparedness through the OECD DAC making it the second largest donor since the disaster prevention code was created.

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In 2009 disaster prevention and preparedness made up 1% of the United States humanitarian spending. The United Sates reported US$59 million in 2009 to the OECD DAC. This is consistent with approximately US$60 million highlighted from USAIDs disaster risk reduction budget out lined in their 2009 Annual 95 Report (the total DRR budget for 2009 was US$86.7 million). The top recipients of United States disaster prevention and preparedness funding between 2005 and 2009 have been Iraq (US$47.3 million), Haiti (US$16.7 million) and Ethiopia (US$5.9 million).

95

Preparedness identified within project descriptions and totalled using USAIDs OFDA Annual Report 2009.

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Annex 2: Institutional profiles


Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) profile
Approach to preparedness OCHA is mandated by the United Nations (UN) to act as the coordinator of humanitarian response. As a result the organisations approach to preparedness is to enhance the response of all actors, as part of a comprehensive framework to address DRR. OCHA does not have its own definition of preparedness, rather it has incorporated the UNISDR definition into its agenda whilst adopting a multi-hazard approach. Emergency preparedness is The knowledge and capacity developed by governments, recovery organizations, communities and individuals to anticipate, respond to and recover from the impact of potential, imminent or current hazard events, or emergency situations that call for a humanitarian response.96 The definition does not restrict the organisation to addressing natural hazards alone; it incorporates highly vulnerable areas prone to both risk of disaster as well as conflict. Nevertheless the central focus of OCHAs work in this area remains on disasters, as seen from its work on disaster preparedness planning. Policies In 2010 OCHA adopted a new response-preparedness policy. OCHAs disaster preparedness objectives are in line with priority 5 of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), and they aim to strengthen the capacity of all actors, local, regional, national and international, to respond in a timely manner to assist affected communities. This is achieved by defining tasks and responsibilities and providing guidance on activities that need to be undertaken in the case of a disaster.97 OCHAs preparedness four-year strategy: OCHA will aim to more clearly define its role in preparedness, consistent with its mandate, to support governments and regional organizations in response preparedness. OCHA will intensify discussions among partners to help provide greater understanding and predictability on institutional roles, responsibilities and accountabilities.98 Internal structure All offices within OCHA (regional and country level as well as headquarters) play an important role in disaster response and preparedness. At a global level the Preparedness Support Section within the Emergency Services Branch takes a lead on these issues.

96 97

OCHA Preparedness Overview OCHA Disaster Response Preparedness Toolkit: DRR Programming 98 Reference Guide for OCHAs Strategic Framework 2010-2013

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Financial flows Donors to OCHA are grouped in an informal OCHA Donor Support Group (ODSG). They provide financial, political and technical support towards fulfilling OCHAs mandated coordination activities. The group currently comprises Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand (Chair), the Netherlands, Norway, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States and the European Commission. Members commit to annual funding of a minimum threshold (currently US$0.5 million), which is preferably unearmarked.99
Sweden UK Norway Netherlands Australia New Zealand US Finland Other donors Denmark Japan Germany Ireland Belgium France Canada

8 10 US$ million

12

14

16

18

Figure 53: Unearmarked contributions to OCHA as of 6 December 2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on OCHA in 2011: Annual Plan and Budget

99

http://www.unocha.org/about-us/ocha-funded

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Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) profile


Approach to preparedness One of the focus areas of the Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) is DRR and climate risk management. This reinforces UNDPs mandate as the organisation responsible for operationalising natural disaster mitigation, prevention and preparedness. BCPRs strategic goal on DRR is based on the HFA and its five priority areas. It works to build national capacities to manage risks and reduce loss of life by the identification of institutional gaps and technical skills that need to be improved for disaster risk management. This is supported by the promotion of early recovery with the overall aim of protecting development investments. As part of its DRR policy BCPR addresses preparedness as outlined in HFA priority area five. It has no set definition on preparedness, rather it uses the one provided by ISDR. BCPR focuses on preparedness for natural hazards mainly due to the fact that disasters can be scientifically identified and mapped, whereas this is much more difficult to do in the case of conflict. In a disaster situation, there is generally speaking more potential for coordination with the government, whereas this can be more challenging in a conflict situation. However, conflict is addressed through another of BCPRs focus areas, that of conflict prevention. This supports national and local institutions and leadership in their efforts to prevent violence, manage conflicts constructively, and engage peacefully in political transitions and rapid change processes.100 Policies The main DRR goals of BCPR consist of101:

Working closely with countries at risk of disasters involving natural hazards, assisting them in adopting new laws and policies and establishing new institutions addressing the need to anticipate and minimize the effects of disasters, prevent losses, and recover when disasters occur. Helping high-risk countries to build their ability to analyze, prevent and manage risks related to climate variability and change droughts, floods, sea level rise and extreme temperatures and define risk management solutions over the short and longer terms. Integrating climate risk management and disaster risk reduction into broader national development and recovery plans. Implementing community-level disaster preparedness and recovery activities such as contingency planning, early warning systems, and restoration of community infrastructure. Promoting the use of gender analysis to differentiate womens risks, impacts and needs from those of men and encouraging womens participation and leadership in disaster risk reduction.

100

UNDP Annual Report 2010: Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery http://www.beta.undp.org/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/focus_areas/climate_disaster_risk_re duction_and_recovery/introduction.html
101

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Coordinating the UN system for recovery planning after disasters, and collaborating with the World Bank and the European Commission in integrating tangible risk reduction commitments into post-disaster needs assessments and recovery frameworks.

Work with the private sector By engaging with the private sector, UNDP increases the coverage and effectiveness of its risk reduction programmes. UNDP collaborates with Deutsche Post DHL to develop a disaster preparedness capacity building programme, Get Airports Ready for Disaster (GARD). Internal structure The BCPR is managed at a global level under UNDPs Office of the Administrator. UNDP country offices can also engage in preparedness at the national level which is funded through bilateral country programmes. Financial flows The bilateral programmatic work of UNDP country offices in DRR is supported by the BCPR through two main sources of funding: a portion (7.2%) of UNDP regular resources (known as TRAC 1.1.3), and voluntary contributions to the Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR-TTF). For more information on the CPR-TTF please see the profile on page 108. In 2010, resources from TRAC 1.1.3 and the CPR-TTF were disbursed in 103 countries. The largest thematic area, both in terms of contributions and expenditures, was conflict prevention and recovery, followed by early recovery and disaster risk reduction.102
Expenditure in 2010 Conflict prevention and recovery Disaster risk reduction and recovery Early recovery (and immediate response under TRAC 1.1.3) Gender equality Policy and programme support CPR-TTF (US$m) 71.7 17.1 37.4 5.3 10.6 TRAC 1.1.3 (US$m) 20.5 7.8 13.2 10.2

The amount received for TRAC 1.1.3 in 2010 was $51.6 million. Contributions received through the CPR-TTF totalled $105.1 million. Of this amount, $42.4 million was unearmarked.
2010 2009 2008 2007 0 2 4 6 8 10 US$ million 12 14 16 18

Figure 54: Expenditure of the DRR and recovery window of the CPR-TTF. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNODP data

102

UNDP Annual Report 2010: Financial Summary

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International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) profile


Approach to preparedness The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) system provides a vehicle for cooperation among governments, organizations and civil society actors to assist in the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) adopted in 2005. It was set up to coordinate UN DRR activities at a global level and is therefore not operational. ISDR sits under the authority of the Under-SecretaryGeneral for Humanitarian Affairs. It is a distinct and separate entity from OCHA, and is not integrated in the administrative and financial structures and processes of OCHA. As previously mentioned the ISDR has set a definition for preparedness that is used widely among actors.103 This is used to inform implementation in line with HFA priority area 5, that of strengthened preparedness. What is not clear however is to what extent ISDR itself contributes to preparedness in its coordinator role. ISDR has developed tools, guidance and training packages that could be considered as institutional preparedness measures. It coordinated the development of a guidance and indicator package for strengthening disaster preparedness efforts by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ISDR is focused on natural disaster risk and does not incorporate conflict risks. This is apparent when looking at the General Assembly Resolution on ISDR. : [The General Assembly] Acknowledges that disaster risk reduction and increasing resilience to all types of natural hazard, including geological and hydro meteorological hazards, in developing countries, in line with the Hyogo Framework for Action , in line with the Hyogo Framework for Action, can promote the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, and that reducing vulnerabilities to these hazards is therefore a high priority for developing countries 104 Policies ISDRs four strategic objectives are integral to driving forward the global disaster risk reduction imperative and in particular implementation of the HFA 20052015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities in Disasters:105 Strategic objective 1 - disaster risk reduction accepted and applied for climate change adaptation Strategic objective 2 - measurable increase in investments in disaster risk reduction Strategic objective 3 - disaster-resilient cities, schools and hospitals Strategic objective 4 - strengthened international system for DRR.

Internal structure ISDR is managed by a secretariat team that sits in Geneva. The team is split into four separate units and is led by Margareta Wahlstrom, the Assistant Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction and Special Representative for the implementation of the HFA.

103 104

2009 UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction http://unisdr.org/files/resolutions/N1052196.pdf 105 UNISDR summary annual report and financial statement 2010

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Source: Evaluation of the UNISDR Secretariat Asia and Pacific 2009

Work with the private sector ISDR does engage with the private sector through the private sector advisory group which includes representatives from the leading companies. ISDR also helps to promote partnerships through the private sector partnerships initiative. Financial flows ISDR is funded entirely from voluntary contributions. The United Nations Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction was set up in 2000 to manage these contributions. See the financing mechanism profile on United Nations Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction (UNTF-DR) for more information. The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs (USG) and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction provides overall guidance for the use of the Trust Fund. This guidance is based on priorities set by the General Assembly, and the outcomes of the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction.

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Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) profile


Approach to preparedness GFDRR was set up in 2006 and is managed by the World Bank. Its mission is to mainstream disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation in country development strategies by supporting a country-led and managed implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA).106 The aim of GFDRR is to build institutional capacity of countries which can then be used to leverage further funding either from the World Bank or other donors. At risk countries are identified using a ranking and focus is on natural disasters. As a result GFDRR does carry out preparedness measures according to the definition provided by ISDR. It prioritises countries based on risk analysis, however this is confined to natural hazards and does not include conflict risk. GFDRR recognises that natural disasters are a key concern for sustainable development particularly in a changing climate. 107 The GFDRR coordinates its activities with the ISDR. World Bank provides funding to ISDR through the Development Grant Facility (DGF). Policies The three objectives of GFDRR are: 1. Enhanced advocacy, partnerships and knowledge management for mainstreaming disaster risk reduction. 2. Standardised and harmonised disaster risk reduction tools and methodologies. 3. Improved coordination, coherence of actions and communication among ISDR systems partners to support HFA implementation. The GFDRR programmes on DRR are: Track I - Global and Regional Cooperation: this track aims to enhance global and regional advocacy, strategic partnerships, and knowledge management for mainstreaming disaster risk reduction whilst promoting the standardisation of hazard risk management tools, methodologies, and practices. These activities leverage Track II country programmes for ex-ante investment in prevention, mitigation, and preparedness activities, particularly in high-risk, low- and middle-income countries.108 Track II - Risk Reduction: provides ex-ante assistance to developing countries to mainstream and expand DRR and climate change adaptation (CCA) activities. Under this business line, GFDRR works closely with the World Bank regional teams, UN agencies, and client governments to integrate DRR into national poverty reduction strategies and country development agendas. Track III - Sustainable Recovery: is aimed at early, post-disaster recovery in low-income countries
106 107

GFDRR Partnership Strategy, 2009-2012 http://gfdrr.org/docs/GFDRR_Partnership_Strategy_2009-2012.pdf GFDRR programs: Disaster Risk Reduction Building Resilience in Changing Climate http://gfdrr.org/gfdrr/sites/gfdrr.org/files/publication/GFDRR_Building_Resilience.pdf 108 Track I: Partnership in DRR

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through its Standby Recovery Financing Facility (SRFF). SRFF assists country governments with reliable and internationally acceptable damage, loss and needs assessments; it provides technical assistance for subsequent post-disaster recovery and reconstruction planning and financing; and, it promotes accelerated recovery through needs-based and speedy recovery programmes in extreme situations. South-South Cooperation Programme: is a special GFDRR initiative to promote institutional cooperation among low- and middle-income disaster-prone countries to mainstream DRR and CCA in development planning. By systematically sharing experiences and lessons learned, disaster-prone countries facing similar challengesand operating under comparable financial and political constraintscan arrive at better solutions to climate change and disaster-related problems. Internal structure GFDRRs day-to-day operations are managed by a secretariat which is housed at the World Bank headquarters in Washington, DC. The programme manager and head of the secretariat is Mr. Saroj Kumar Jha, who leads a team of dedicated experts in Washington, DC., Brussels, and Geneva.109 Financial flows Combined contributions and pledges for tracks II and III have increased dramatically since the funding period 2006-2008, from US$43.8 million to US$88.1 million for 2010-2011. For detailed financial information please see the financing mechanism profile on GFDRR on page 110. 2006-2008 43.8 2008-2010 65.5 2010-2011 2011-2012 88.1 50.0 2012-2013 38.9 2013-2014 33.7 Total 320.0

Figure 55: Contributions and pledges by GFDRR to tracks II and III (US$ million), as of July 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on World Bank data

109

http://gfdrr.org/gfdrr/node/62

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International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) profile
Approach to preparedness The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) does not have an official definition of preparedness but it is included in the constitutional mandate of the organisation and provides a basis for work carried out by the federation and national societies. The Disaster Preparedness Policy essentially involves reducing the vulnerability of households and communities in disaster-prone areas and improving their ability to cope with the effects of disasters as well as strengthening the capacities of the national societies in disaster preparedness. When referring to preparedness IFRC tends to use the ISDR definition of disaster preparedness. IFRC focuses more on natural disasters but when it comes to building the capacities of the national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies across the world many of their activities align with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)s work on conflict preparedness at a global level. The IFRCs approach to preparedness is to build national capacity. This is done holistically by building leadership, legislative frameworks, policies etc. The various national societies use their money for different activities but it can all come under the umbrella of preparedness. Disaster preparedness is also described as those measures that help ensure a timely and effective first line of response supported by national societies volunteers, branches, regional and national capacities, e.g., community action teams backed up by national society contingency planning and regional and/or international response teams.110 Policies To reduce disaster risk, the International Federation has three main strategies: to strengthen the preparedness and capacities of communities so that they are in a better position to respond when a disaster occurs to promote activities and actions that mitigate the adverse effects of hazards to protect development projects such as health facilities from the impact of disasters.

The IFRC DRR efforts aim to support the five priorities established by the HFA. The IFRC supports the HFA priorities through the following programmatic outputs111: increase community orientation in global and national DRR policies and strengthen national and local institutions for disaster risk reduction encourage and support expanded community-based programming to identify and tackle disaster risks integrate enhanced community-centred DRR measures as part of comprehensive disaster response management whenever this is applied strengthen national society capacities to deliver and sustain scaled up programmes in disaster risk reduction.

110

http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/preparing-for-disaster/risk-reduction/reducing-disasterrisk/ 111 Global Alliance for Disaster Risk Reduction

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The IFRCs Framework for Community Safety and Resilience represents a common Red Cross Red Crescent understanding of DRR, and provides a foundation upon which all activities contributing to the building of safe and resilient communities can be created, developed and sustained. The greatest strength of the International Federation in DRR is its background in community-based programmes, implemented by branches and volunteers rooted in their communities. The rapid progress of DRR initiatives in South East Asia and the Americas, in particular, has been bolstered by longstanding community-based programming. One of the key tools of the IFRC on disaster prevention is the Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment (VCA). The VCA uses various participatory tools to gauge peoples exposure to and capacity to resist natural hazards. It is an integral part of disaster preparedness and contributes to the creation of community-based disaster preparedness programmes at the rural and urban grass-roots level. The aims of VCA are to: assess risks and hazards facing communities and the capacities they have for dealing with them involve communities, local authorities and humanitarian and development organisations in the assessment from the outset draw up action plans to prepare for and respond to the identified risks identify risk-reduction activities to prevent or lessen the effects of expected hazards, risks and vulnerabilities.

Internal structure The IFRC secretariat is responsible for the day-to-day operations whilst the decisions on its policy are made by governing bodies. In addition there are 186 national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies around the world that are responsible for their own day-to-day management. National Red Cross or Red Crescent societies have special status by national laws to function as auxiliary partners. At the secretariat level the IFRCs DRR framework has been consistently under the scrutiny of a Global Alliance on DRR advisory group set up from among disaster management staff, while the disaster preparedness and risk reduction group of the Participating National Societies has also been regularly consulted. Financial flows In 2010 IFRC launched a specific global appeal for community preparedness and risk reduction. It received CHF3.4 million (approximately US$3.7 million) making it 105% funded.
Annual budget 3.3 3.2 4.7 0.8 4.6 Opening balance 0.2 1.0 1.3 1.5 0.5 Income 1.6 2.4 0.5 -1.0 4.1 Total funding 1.8 3.4 1.9 0.5 4.6 Total expenditure 1 2.4 1.5 0.2 3.9 Closing balance 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.5 1.0 % Funding vs budget 54% 105% 40% 64% 99% % Expend vs budget 30% 76% 32% 35% 77%

Shelter and settlement Community preparedness & risk reduction Logistics Disaster management strategy and coordination Disaster services

Figure 56: Annual appeal for community preparedness and risk reduction, 2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on IFRC

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Private sector profile


Policy and structure Although states have the primary responsibility for implementing measures to reduce disaster risk, the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) calls for a comprehensive approach to DRR. An effective DRR policy relies on the efforts of many stakeholders including the private sector. Therefore public-private partnerships (PPP) are an essential component of the HFA. Recently, the ISDR and members of the private sector released the Statement of Commitment for Disaster Prevention, Resilience and Risk Reduction outlining two aims in support of the HFA and UNISDR risk reduction efforts: 1. The commitment to make DRR and resilience building an integral part of the private sector sustainable development strategy, goals and programmes. 2. To embrace, support and enact, within the spheres of influence and capacities, Five Essentials for Business in Disaster Risk Reduction, and to partner with the public sector with a focus on local action, taking into account the most vulnerable population groups, such as women, children, elderly and the poor. The private sector issued a Statement of Commitment for Disaster Prevention, Resilience and Risk Reduction and outlined Five Essentials for Business: 112 1. Promote and develop public-private partnerships for DRR to analyse the root causes of continued non-resilient activity, such as in the urban built environment and related infrastructure, and develop frameworks and policies to change these causes. Encourage, develop and use financial risk-sharing mechanisms to ensure the resilience of facilities and communities to hazards and allocate adequate resources for these. 2. Leverage sectoral private sector expertise and strengths to advance DRR and mitigation activities, including enhanced resilience and effective response. 3. Foster a collaborative exchange and dissemination of data: share information on assessment, monitoring, prediction, forecasting and early warning purposes and action between the public and private sectors, including through cooperation with UNISDR, ISDR System Partners and other international, regional and national actors. 4. Support national and local risk assessments and socio-economic cost-benefit analyses and capacity-building, and demonstrate opportunities where resilience building and DRR is a sound economic strategy, with attractive returns and competitive advantages. 5. Support the development and strengthening of national and local laws, regulations, policies and programmes that enhance DRR and improve resilience. There have been calls to further engage with the private sector on DRR. The Chairs summary from the 2011 Global Platform on DRR asked for a commitment to fully engage the private sector as leaders in the construction of resilient infrastructure, sustainable development of urban areas, energy safety, and the protection of critical resources.113

112

113113

http://www.unisdr.org/files/19873_statementofcommitmentbytheprivatese.pdf http://www.preventionweb.net/files/20102_gp2011chairssummary.pdf

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This is due to the recognition that the private sector can contribute to DRR efforts by partnering with the local and national government as well as communities by: taking the lead in ensuring the safety of long-term investments planning ahead to protect industries and society from disasters and economic disruptions while ensuring business continuity investing more in human, technical and financial resources to increase the resilience of nations and communities.114

114

http://www.unisdr.org/partners/private-sector

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Annex 3: Financing mechanisms profiles


Humanitarian pooled funds
Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)
500 450 400 350 US$ million 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 % total HA 2010 Funding to CERF 299 385 453 392 10% 429 9% 8% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0%

Figure 57: Donor contributions to the CERF, 2006-2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA CERF

According to General Assembly Resolution 60/124 the CERF was established to: ensure a more predictable and timely response to humanitarian emergencies, with the objectives of promoting early action and response to reduce loss of life, enhancing response to time-critical requirements and strengthening core elements of humanitarian response in underfunded crises, based on demonstrable needs and on priorities identified in consultation with the affected State as appropriate.115 The CERF provides donor governments and the private sector with the opportunity to pool their financing on a global level in order to respond to those affected by natural disasters and armed conflicts. Donor contributions are unearmarked. There are two funding windows, one provides rapid funding to countries in response to an emergency and the other distributes money to countries where an underfunded crisis has been identified. These decisions are based on needs assessments, the percentage of needs met and consultations with agencies and humanitarian coordinators. Since its inception in 2006 the CERF has received total contributions of US$2.1 billion and a further US$254 million in pledges from more than 150 government and non-government donors, together with a great number of individual contributions from private citizens. Direct funding is only available to UN agencies, although some of this money will be channelled to NGOs. CERF can enable agencies to leverage funding from other donors for a particular project or programme. They can also apply to the fund for a loan in order to bridge the gap whilst they are waiting for other funding from donors or country-level pooled funds.
115

http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/495/04/PDF/N0549504.pdf?OpenElement

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Fund management The CERF is managed by a secretariat which sits within the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in New York. The team comprises financial and humanitarian affairs officers who report to the Chief, currently Steve OMalley. Direct disbursements from the fund are administered by the UN controller in New York. There is no funding minimum or maximum limit imposed by the CERF Secretariat. In order to provide an oversight of the use of funds an advisory group was established which at present has 18 members. Their role is to offer periodic policy guidance and expert advice on the use and impact of the Fund. Members include both donor and recipient government officials, representatives of humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and academic experts. The majority of donors provide funding on a yearly basis, however there are a few such as the United Kingdom and Sweden that have set up multi-year funding contracts. Preparedness financing At present the CERF does not fund preparedness activities, rather its focus remains on response. In order for the fund to accept preparedness project proposals it would need agreement by member states and the advisory group but not necessary a general assembly resolution. Common humanitarian funds (CHF)
350 300 250 US$ million 200 150 100 50 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 % total HA 2010 Funding to CHFs 3.5% 3.0% 2.5% 2.0% 1.5% 1.0% 0.5% 0.0%

Figure 58: Donor contributions to the CHFs, 2006-2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS

Common humanitarian funds (CHFs) are in-country pooled mechanisms that allow humanitarian coordinators (HC) to fund strategically within country-level humanitarian workplans. Funding received is totally unearmarked. The objective of a CHF is to provide core funding towards the consolidated appeals process (CAP). As a result these funds are often much larger than emergency response funds (ERFs). During the allocation process cluster leads and other humanitarian partners are consulted in order to prioritise the disbursements. At present there are only five funds in operation: Sudan, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR) and Somalia. In 2010 these funds attracted US$261 million from donors which equated to 2.4% of total humanitarian aid that year. Fund management Mjaproty www.devinit.org

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CHFs are overseen in-country by the humanitarian coordinator and managed on a daily basis by OCHA. Money received by donors and any disbursements made are administered by UNDP. Allocation rounds are typically undertaken two to three times a year, with the majority of CHF funds allocated at the beginning of the year. Allocation proposals are developed and submitted by agencies and organisations; these are then examined by a technical review board. Based on the outcome of the review the HC makes a final decision. An advisory board with donor, UN and NGO representation is on hand to advise the HC on policy issues and strategic direction of the fund. In general 10% of the CHF budget is reserved for emergency response allocation. Preparedness financing Typically CHFs fund planned humanitarian response according to needs identified and outlined in the countrys humanitarian action plan. Occasionally emergency preparedness activities are included in these plans. Below are examples of projects that have been funded.
CHF Somalia Somalia Somalia South Sudan South Sudan Implementing organisation Caritas UNPF WHO WHO WHO Year 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 US$ 611,999 500,000 151,679 200,000 1,675,000 Description Emergency response and preparedness in drought-affected Eastern Somaliland Emergency preparedness and response to pregnancy and childbirth complications in IDPs Health cluster coordination and emergency preparedness in Somalia Health cluster coordination, emergency preparedness and humanitarian action Strengthening epidemic preparedness and response capacity at all levels in Southern Sudan Strengthening leadership, preparedness and capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies Urgent stock reserves, capacity building and innovation in the shelter and non-food items (NFI) sector Pre-positioning contingency stock for shelter and NFI cluster in North Kivu Strengthening system-wide preparedness and technical capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies Shelter, infrastructure and emergency preparedness for IDPs in Khartoum State Health sector coordination, emergency preparedness and humanitarian action

Sudan

UNOPS

2011

40,000

DRC

UNICEF

2010

511,013

DRC Sudan

World Vision International UNICEF

2010 2010

285,930 250,000

Sudan Sudan

Catholic Relief Services WHO

2010 2010

106821 253312

Figure 59: Examples of preparedness activities funded by CHFs. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS

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Emergency response funds (ERF)


160 140 120 100 80 60 40 21 20 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 % total HA 2010 0.2% 0.0% 39 99 81 0.8% 0.6% 0.4% 150 1.6% 1.4% 1.2% 1.0%

Funding to ERFs

Figure 60: Donor contributions to the ERFs, 2006-2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS

The main aim of ERFs is to provide rapid and flexible funding to in-country actors to address unforeseen humanitarian needs. ERFs also provide governments and the private sector with an opportunity to pool their unearmarked contributions to a specific country to enable timely and reliable humanitarian assistance in response to emergencies. For those donors that do not have a presence in country or in-depth country knowledge, ERFs offer a platform through which they can channel their funding. In 2010 funding to ERFs reached US$150 million, which was mainly due to the support for the funds in Haiti and Pakistan. ERF funding is available to both NGOs and UN agencies for emergency response and occasionally emergency preparedness. There are limits set on the size of projects which vary between each fund and range from US$100,000-700,000. This means that project sizes are usually smaller when viewed alongside bilateral funding or projects supported by CHFs where they exist, and can attract more proposals from NGOs. Fund management OCHA manages the ERF in country. All project applications have to be approved by the HC before they can receive a grant from the fund. The financial administration is in most cases managed by UNDP.

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Project proposal
Ideas for a project are discussed with OCHA Organisation submits proposal to OCHA in-country office

Proposal review by Technical Review Commitee


A Technical Committee reviews project proposal and criteria is crosschecked Possible amendments needed by organisation to proposal

Approval and verification


The proposal is approved, grant agreement is completed by applicant The grant agreement is sent to Geneva for verification Grant agreement is returned and signed by applicant

Fund transfer
Signed by Humanitarian Coordinator A request is sent to Geneva to release funds

Preparedness financing In general ERFs fund lifesaving activities in response to a humanitarian emergency. However there have been some examples of ERFs funding preparedness activities.
ERF Yemen Zimbabwe Kenya Zimbabwe Somalia Implementing organisation Care International Mdecins du Monde France World Vision International UNHCR Norwegian Refugee Council Various Year 2011 2011 2010 2009 2009 US$ 225,000 92,129 80,000 70,000 500,000 Description Contingency / response plan for humanitarian assistance in Yemen Reinforcement of early warning systems and emergency obstetric care Flood preparedness to reduce the incidence of Rift Valley fever Prepositioning of kits and supplies in readiness for cholera epidemic Emergency preparedness and response to fires in Bossaso and provision of temporary shelter Flood preparedness

Somalia

2009

100,000

Figure 61: Examples of preparedness activities funded by ERFs. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS

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Disaster risk reduction (DRR) pooled funds


Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund (CPR-TTF)

2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 0 50 100 150 US$ million
Figure 62: Contributions to the CPR-TTF, 2001-2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNDP data

200

250

300

The CPR-TTF was established in 2000 by the UNDP. The aim of the fund is to provide UNDP with a flexible funding mechanism that it can use to respond in a timely manner following a natural disaster or complex emergency, to reduce disaster risk or prevent conflict. Since its inception, the fund has mobilised more than US$ 1.1 billion. There are five thematic windows of the CPR-TTF, one of which focuses on DRR and recovery. UNDPs goals on DRR are in line with the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) and include strengthening disaster preparedness for effective response. CPR-TTF contributions may be earmarked to target specific thematic areas or country programmes, or unearmarked which enables UNDP to respond more flexibly and quickly to country crisis prevention and recovery needs. The CPR-TTF: works closely with countries at risk of disasters involving natural hazards, assisting them in adopting new laws and policies and establishing new institutions addressing the need to anticipate and minimise the effects of disasters, prevent losses, and recover when disasters occur helps high-risk countries to build their ability to analyse, prevent and manage risks related to climate variability and change droughts, floods, sea level rise and extreme temperatures and define risk management solutions over the short and longer term facilitates the integration of climate risk management and DRR into broader national development and recovery plans implements community-level disaster preparedness and recovery activities such as contingency planning, early warning systems, and restoration of community infrastructure promotes the use of gender analysis to differentiate womens risks, impacts and needs from those of men and encourages womens participation and leadership in DRR

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is the coordinator of the UN system for recovery planning after disasters, collaborating with the World Bank and the European Commission in integrating tangible risk reduction commitments into post-disaster needs assessments and recovery frameworks.

Fund management UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) serves as the fund manager, responsible for both its fiduciary oversight and programmatic results. All projects requesting funding from the CPR-TTF that are unearmarked or earmarked for specific thematic areas are submitted to the BCPR Project Appraisal Committee (BPAC). The Committee meets monthly (or on an ad hoc basis in case of specific emergency situations) to review each project, based on the following criteria: alignment with the funding criteria of the fund, the Bureau Strategy, and the crisis prevention and recovery priorities of the region and country where the project will take place technical soundness of the project design, including gender equality, monitoring and evaluation, and knowledge management components implementation capacity of the sponsoring country office (based on a track record of successful delivery of crisis prevention and recovery projects), and an appropriate and reasonable budget that reflects a diversity of funding sources, including commitments from other partners and from the UNDP Country Office.

Once a project has the endorsement of the Committee, the BCPR Director approves the project for funding. Preparedness financing Expenditure is reported according to the five windows of the fund. It is not possible to extract the exact amount that is spent on preparedness within the DRR and recovery window. Information gathered from UNDP suggest that between 2004 and 2009 US$35.6 million was spent on preparedness projects, which accounted for 4.1% of the total spent on prevention and recovery. Of the five thematic windows, the disaster risk reduction and recovery window had the third highest expenditure between 2007 and 2010, US$51.2 million (12.3% of total).

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250 200 US$ million 150 100 50 0 Conflict Early recovery Disaster risk prevention and reduction and recovery recovery Policy and programme support Gender equality

2010 2009 2008 2007

Figure 63: Expenditure of the CPR-TTF according to the five windows of the fund 2007-2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNDP data

United Nations Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction (UN-TFDR)


35 30 25

US$ million

20 15 10 5 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Figure 64: Contributions to UN Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction. Source: Development Initiatives based on ISDR data

The UN-TFDR was set up in 2000 to finance the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) through voluntary contributions. The mandate of UNISDR is to serve as the focal point in the UN system for the coordination of DRR and to ensure synergies among the disaster reduction activities in development, humanitarian and environmental fields. The mission of ISDR is to be an effective coordinator and guide for all the ISDR partners, globally and regionally, and to: mobilise political and financial commitments to DRR and Hyogo Framework for Action 20052015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters (HFA); develop and sustain a robust, multi-stakeholder system

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provide relevant knowledge and guidance.

Donor contributions to the Trust Fund generally come from an humanitarian budget as this allows flexibility to support a global fund - development budgets can be restricted to providing resources for country programmes. Fund management The ISDR Secretariat which is overseen by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs (USG) and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for DRR provides overall guidance for the use of the Trust Fund. Preparedness funding It is difficult to ascertain exactly how much of the money disbursed by the fund is spent on preparedness, if any. Expenditure is reported in line with the four strategic objectives (SO) of ISDR.

7.13 32%

5.16 23%

SO1: Disaster reduction accepted and applied for climate change adaptation; SO2: Measurable increases in investments in disaster risk reduction; SO3: Disaster-resilient cities, schools and hospitals; SO4: Strengthened international system for disaster risk reduction

4.62 20%

5.65 25%

Figure 65: Expenditure of the UN Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction according to the strategic objectives of ISDR, 2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on ISDR data

Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) The GFDRR was launched in 2006. It is a partnership of 38 countries and seven international organisations that are committed to supporting the implementation of the HFA. The GFDRR operates through multiple donor funds to enable low- and middle-income countries that are at most risk to mainstream disaster reduction in national development strategies and plans. The work of the GFDRR is divided into three tracks, all of which have funds to provide resources for the programmes of work. Track I provides support to ISDR: through this track the World Bank provides financial support to the ISDR Secretariat to enhance global and regional advocacy, partnerships, and knowledge management.

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Track II supports countries to mainstream DRR: this track consists of donor contributions provided to various trust funds administered by the World Bank. It also supports strengthening of national institutions for disaster reduction and preparation of risk mitigation projects, and emergency preparedness.116 Track II has a two-category financial structure: core funds and non-core funds. Core funds are provided through a multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) for mainstreaming disaster risk reduction in country strategies. Donors: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, European Commission, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States and the World Bank. Non-core funds are earmarked by donors to specific themes, activities, countries, or regions and provided via single donor trust funds. Donors: Australia, Japan, and Spain. The recipients of Track II funds include country governments, United Nations agencies, International Financial Institutions (IFIs), regional intergovernmental organisations or research organisations. The South-South Cooperation grants: complement track II and aim to strengthen the leadership role of developing countries in finding effective and efficient risk reduction and climate change adaptation solutions. Donors: Italy and Norway. Track III - supports primarily low-income countries for accelerated disaster recovery: donor contributions are provided to trust funds administered by the World Bank that make up a Standby Recovery Financing Facility (SRFF). Like the UN Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction, donor contributions to GFDRR generally come from a humanitarian budget. Fund management The GFDRR is managed by the World Bank on behalf of the participating donor partners and other partnering stakeholders. Proposals for Track II are submitted by national authorities or ISDR system members and must go through the GFDRR Secretariat for vetting and approval. These activities should demonstrate commitment to increased investment in disaster reduction and emergency preparedness. Track II beneficiary countries are low- or middle-income countries that are prone to high disaster risks with more than 30% of their population and gross domestic product in areas of risk to one or more hazards, and

116

https://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/sites/gfdrr.org/files/publication/GFDRR_Partnership_Charter_2010.pdf

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require special attention due to adverse geo-economical settings, such as small-island and fragile states.117

Selection of these countries will be based on procedures approved by the Consultative Group, and the number of countries selected will depend on available financing. Proposals are assessed by the GFDRR Secretariat against the set of criteria which follows. Consistency with the GFDRR mission: all activities must be consistent with the GFDRRs overarching objective of mainstreaming DRR and assisting sustainable recovery to help eliminate poverty and achieve sustainable development. Government commitment: there must be clear evidence of country ownership of countryspecific activities. Donor coordination: the GFDRR activities must be undertaken in a way that promotes effective coordination with the activities of GFDRR partners. Co-financing: all proposals should include co-financing with a target of at least 10% financing from the proponent or the relevant low- or middle-income country government, as well as from other sources. Co-financing can be in the form of in-kind assistance.118

Preparedness financing The expenditures of GFDRR are broken down according to the priority areas of the HFA. Up until September 2010, US$13 million had been spent on priority area five, disaster preparedness. This accounted for 14.5% of the total. It is possible that preparedness activities were also funded under other priority areas.

HFA 5; 13.0; 15% HFA 4; 9.1; 10% HFA 3; 2.9; 3%

HFA 1; 44.6; 49%

HFA 2; 20.6; 23%

Figure 66: Expenditure of GFDRR according to HFA priority areas up until September 2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on GFDRR data

117 118

https://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/sites/gfdrr.org/files/publication/GFDRR_Partnership_Charter_2010.pdf https://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/sites/gfdrr.org/files/publication/GFDRR_Partnership_Charter_2010.pdf

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Climate change pooled funds


Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF) of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) The LDCF was established in 2001 under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as part of the GEF. The primary objective of this fund is to address the adaptation needs of the 49 least developed countries as identified by the UN119. These countries are deemed to be especially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change. A reduction in vulnerability is sought through the implementation of National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) which support the countries in becoming climate resilient. As of November 2010 45 countries had completed their NAPAs. Once the NAPAs have been completed the LDCF focuses on reducing vulnerability of those sectors and resources that are central to development and livelihoods such as water, agriculture and food security, health, disaster risk management and prevention, infrastructure and fragile ecosystems. Fund management Implementing partners of the LDCF are ten selected GEF agencies. Four of these are UN agencies and the remainder are international finance institutions. These agencies partner with eligible governments and NGOs in country in the development, implementation and management of LDCF projects. The overall management of the LDCF rests with the World Bank as trustee to the GEF. It is responsible for mobilising resources for the fund and the disbursements to the GEF agencies. The process for project approval is: 1. Council approval a project proposal is submitted by a GEF agency to the GEF Secretariat for review. This is provided within ten business days. It is circulated for comments among all GEF agencies. Once approved by the CEO the proposals are sent to the Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel (STAP) for screening. 2. Approval by GEF Council the GEF Council reviews a selection of project proposals that have been recently cleared by the GEF Secretariat. 3. Endorsement of the full project proposal by the GEF CEO (commitment of funds) the GEF Agency submits the full project documentation to the Secretariat along with a request for CEO endorsement. The Secretariat has ten business days to review and submit for endorsement. Revisions by the agencies may be necessary or the project preparation may be cancelled altogether. If the proposal meets conditions for endorsement it will be circulated among council members for a four-week review period. 4. Implementation supervision, monitoring and final evaluation implementation is carried out by the agency. The Secretariat will conduct annual monitoring reviews. Agencies are required to submit the final evaluation report to GEF evaluation office. Projects can be tracked using the GEF online project database. Preparedness financing

119

For a least of these countries please visit http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3641&lang=1

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The LDCF is mandated to fund climate change adaptation activities; these can include elements of preparedness.120
Country GEF agency LCDF grant US$ 3,160,000 Co-financing US$ 3,300,000 Description

Rwanda

UNEP

Reducing vulnerability to climate change by establishing early warning and disaster preparedness systems and support for integrated watershed management in flood-prone areas Effective governance for small-scale rural infrastructure and disaster preparedness in a changing climate Strengthening the capacity of vulnerable coastal communities to address the risk of climate change and extreme weather events Improvement of early warning systems to reduce impact of climate change, and capacity building to integrate climate change into development plans

Lao PDR

UNDP

4,700,000

25,927,478

Thailand

UNDP

869,091

2,000,000

Lesotho

UNEP

1,595,000

1,763,000

Figure 67: Examples of preparedness activities funded by LDCF. Source: Development Initiatives based on GEF data

According to the GEF, of the US$147.4 million that has been approved for projects up until March 2011, US$42.8 million has been allocated to disaster preparedness and risk management activities, which accounts for 29% and is the largest share of funding.
Infrastructure 2% Disaster preparedness and risk management 29%

Community level adaptation 15% Natural resources management 8% Health 1%

Agriculture/food security 26%

Water resources management 19%

Figure 68: Allocation of LDCF resources to approved projects, up to 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on GEF data

120

http://www.gefonline.org

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P a g e | 124 Strategic Climate Fund (SCF) The SCF was created in 2008 and is one of two trust funds operating within the Climate Investment Funds (CIF). Financing is allocated according to the three programmes of the fund: the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience; provides funding to multilateral development banks to pilot ways in which climate risk and resilience can be integrated into development planning and implementation building on National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) the Forest Investment Program; funding will aim to reduce deforestations and forest degradation and promote improved sustainable forest management, leading to emission reductions and the protection of carbon reservoirs the Program for Scaling-Up Renewable Energy in Low Income Countries; will demonstrate the economic, social and environmental viability of low carbon development pathways in the energy sector by creating new economic opportunities and increasing energy access through the use of renewable energy.121

Eligible countries are those that have a multilateral development bank programme in operation. Implementation is carried out by these banks using their core processes. Fund management An administrative unit for the SCF sits within the World Bank. Decision making rests with the SCF Trust Fund Committee and the Sub-Committees for each programme. The Fund Committee or SubCommittees decide on the programming priorities and financing modalities for the SCF, while the development and management of individual funded projects and programmes will be country-led. The Sub-Committee consists of the following. Up to six representatives from contributor countries to the SCF Program, identified through a consultation among such countries. At least one of these should be a member of the SCF Trust Fund Committee. A matching number of representatives from eligible recipient countries of the SCF programme. At least one of these should be a member of the SCF Trust Fund Committee. Such other representatives designated by the SCF Trust Fund Committee for this purpose.122 The functions of the Sub-Committee include approving programming priorities, operational criteria and financing modalities, approving financing for programmes and projects and ensuring cooperation between the SCF programme, the GEF and UN country activities to maximise synergies and avoid overlap. In addition to the SCF Trust Fund Committee and the SCF Sub-Committee(s), points to note about the governance and organisational structure of the SCF include:

The Partnership Forum: a broad-based meeting of stakeholders, including contributor and eligible recipient countries, multilateral development banks (MDBs), UN organisations, GEF, UNFCCC, the Adaptation Fund, bilateral development agencies, non-governmental organisations, private sector entities, and scientific and technical experts.

121 122

http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/strategic-climate-fund http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/strategic-climate-fund#TOC-Fund-Governance

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an MDB Committee: this facilitates collaboration, coordination and information exchange among the MDBs.

Preparedness funding Due to a lack of available data it has not been possible to ascertain whether any of the funds expenditure has gone towards preparedness. Adaptation fund Although the fund was proposed in 2001 during the seventh conference of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), it only became operational in 2009. The fund was established to provide financing for adaptation projects that contribute to reducing the adverse effects of climate change, for developing countries that are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. The Adaptation Fund supports the following activities:123 adaptation activities, where sufficient information is available to warrant such activities, in the areas of water resources management, land management, agriculture, health, infrastructure development, fragile ecosystems, including mountainous ecosystems, and integrated coastal zone management improving the monitoring of diseases and vectors affected by climate change, and related forecasting and early-warning systems, and in this context improving disease control and prevention supporting capacity building, including institutional capacity, for preventive measures, planning, preparedness and management of disasters relating to climate change, including contingency planning, in particular, for droughts and floods in areas prone to extreme weather events strengthening existing and, where needed, establishing national and regional centres and information networks for rapid response to extreme weather events, utilising information technology as much as possible.

Implementing organisations are comprised of national and multilateral agencies accredited by the fund. There are currently four accredited national entities and seven multilateral agencies. Contributions to the fund are comprised of a 2% share of certified emission reductions (CERs) issued for a clean development mechanism (CDM) project plus voluntary contributions from country governments. Fund management The Adaptation Fund is supervised and managed by the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB). The AFB is composed of 16 members and 16 alternates and meets at least twice a year. It has created a resultsbased management and evaluation framework to ensure coherence of the Funds projects.
123

http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/adaptation-fund

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The Global Environment Facility (GEF) provides secretariat services to the AFB and the World Bank serves as trustee of the fund. Preparedness funding The projects highlighted below have elements of preparedness in their detailed project outlines. It is not possible to extract the amount of money that would be spent on preparedness alone.
Country Ecuador Implementing agency WFP Amount approved 7,449,468 Amount disbursed 2,647,029 Description Enhancing resilience of communities to the adverse effects of climate change on food security, in Pichincha Province and the Jubones River basin Preparing the Lake Nassar Region In Southern Egypt as a Climate Adaptation Hub Enhancing resilience of coastal communities of Samoa to climate change

Egypt Samoa

WPF UNDP

Not yet approved Not yet approved

Figure 69: Examples of funding for preparedness through the Adaptation Fund. Source: Development Initiatives based on Adaptation Fund data

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Annex 4: Literature review


1. United Nations (UN), Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World: Guidelines for Natural Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation. This document is the output of the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction, held in Yokohama, Japan, from 23 to 27 May 1994. It provides guidelines for natural disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation. 2. UNISDR, The Hyogo Declaration and the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters. This document is an agreement by 168 governments with a distinctive goal of substantial reduction of disaster losses, in lives as well as the social, economic and environmental assets of communities and countries by 2015. The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) offers guiding principles, priorities for action and practical means for achieving disaster reliance for vulnerable communities. 3. UNISDR-OCHA, Disaster Preparedness for Effective Response: Guidance and Indicator Package for Implementing Priority Five of the Hyogo Framework. This Guidance and Indicator Tool is designed to provide guidance on how to meet the challenge of being prepared to respond as set out in Priority Five of the HFA. This tool aims primarily to assist governments, local authorities, and other stakeholders concerned with natural hazards in potentially vulnerable settings. 4. World Bank, Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters. This study looks at disasters primarily through an economic lens. The study provides useful analysis to increase resilience and minimise the impact of natural disasters. The report concludes with four main policy implications for governments and donors. 5. UNISDR, Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (2011). The 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction - revealing risk, redefining development contributes to achieving the HFA by monitoring risk patterns and progress in DRR. Additionally, it provides guidance and suggestions to governments and non-governmental actors alike, on how they can, together, reduce disaster risks. This landmark publication builds on and moves beyond the analysis provided by the inaugural report in 2009. 6. Harmer, Taylor, and Haver, Thematic CAP for National Disaster Preparedness: Feasibility Study. This report was commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to examine the feasibility of a thematic consolidated appeal process (CAP) for national disaster preparedness and response capacity. It ultimately concludes that a CAP is not the most appropriate mechanism. The research process highlighted some important systemic issues, however, and the report moves from its initial focus on the CAP to explore a range of options to improve the coherence and predictability of financing for disaster preparedness. It does so with the caveat that there was not sufficient scope in the study to examine the feasibility of each of these alternatives in significant detail. 7. UNISDR and Graduate School of Global Environmental Studies - Kyoto University, A Guide forImplementing the Hyogo Framework for Action by Local Stakeholders.The aim of this publication is to serve as a guide for HFA implementation for local governments and stakeholders by customising the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) publication Words Into Action: A Guide to Implementing the Hyogo Framework (2007) for local governments and stakeholders to support their HFA implementation to take comprehensive DRR actions. 8. UNISDR, Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (2009). The Report is the first biennial global assessment of DRR prepared in the context of the ISDR. The report urges a radical shift in development practices, and a major new emphasis on resilience and disaster planning. Its

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9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

primary focus is on the disaster risk and poverty nexus in a context of global climate change. UNISDR, Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction: Summary and Recommendations (2009). This summary presents the key findings and recommendations of the report, which identifies disaster risk, analyses its causes, shows that these causes can be addressed and recommends the means to do so. UNISDR, Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 Mid-Term Review. This report presents the findings of the Mid-Term Review of the HFA, and is aimed at critically analysing the extent to which HFA implementation has progressed and at helping countries and their institutional partners identify practical measures to increase commitment, resourcing, and efforts in its further implementation. Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Handbook for RCs and HCs on Emergency Preparedness and Response. This report outlines key actions resident coordinators (RCs) and humanitarian coordinator (HCs) should take to prepare and respond to humanitarian emergencies. Additionally, it provides a checklist for RCs and HCs on emergency preparedness and response. UNISDR, HFA Progress in Asia Pacific: Regional Synthesis Report 2009-2011. This document provides an insight into the HFA implementation progress in the Asia-Pacific region since 2005, with particular focus on the 2009-2011 period. It also captures the progress made against the declarations and outcomes of the four Asian Ministerial Conferences on DRR (AMCDRR) held in Beijing, New Delhi, Kuala Lumpur and Incheon. CNA and OXFAM, An Ounce of Prevention: Preparing for the Impact of a Changing Climate on US Humanitarian and Disaster Response. This report examines the likely impacts of a changing climate on the US Governments civilian and military humanitarian response systems. It analyses both humanitarian and security implications of climate change as well as how the US Government responds to overseas climate-related emergencies. UNOCHA, Emergency Preparedness Forum III Final Report.This document reports on the third annual Emergency Preparedness Forum (EPF III) to bring together OCHA colleagues dealing with preparedness in the field and headquarters, and was expanded to encompass preparedness partners. The report is organised around the six sessions of the forum, all linked to OCHA Strategic Framework objectives related to preparedness, with a view to identifying 'actionable outcomes' or tangible results. Under the main theme: 'Capacity Assessment and Development' it underscores the importance of this cross-cutting topic that touches upon many different preparedness issues. Benson, Twigg, and Rossetto, Tools for Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction.This report is a series of 14 guidance notes for use by development organisations in adapting programming, project appraisal and evaluation tools to mainstream DRR into their development work in hazardprone countries. This preliminary note outlines the rationale underlying the series, introduces the guidance notes and highlights critical factors contributing to the successful mainstreaming of DRR into development policy and practice. Tearfund, Turning Practice into Policy: Linking Good Practice CBDRM with Government Policy and Practice. This report is the result of a two-phased research project addressing the essential needs for a strong national policy framework to support and scale-up Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM). The report highlights the important role that institutional donors can play in creating a national political environment supportive of CBDRM. This document provides evidence for the NGO community to develop DRR advocacy initiatives that suit their own country and location context.

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17. DIFID and DEV, Disaster Risk Reduction: a Development Concern. A Scoping Study on Links between Disaster Risk Reduction, Poverty and Development. The document explores evidence on linkages between poverty alleviation, development and DRR, and seeks to establish why DRR is often not part of development policy and planning. It provides strong evidence supporting that poverty alleviation, development and disaster risk reduction are strongly interdependent. 18. World Health Organization (WHO), Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness: WHO Six-Year Strategy for the Health Sector and Community Capacity Development.This report provides an overview of the WHOs strategy on health sector risk reduction and emergency preparedness and community capacity development as well as implementation and monitoring and funding resources. 19. Moench and The DRR Study Team (ISET), From Risk to Resilience - Benefits and Costs of Disaster Risk Reduction. This is a series of nine papers that evaluate the benefits and costs of DRR across a series of case areas in India, Nepal and Pakistan. It develops methods and analytical cases that both illustrate how the benefits and costs of different risk reduction strategies can be evaluated under different climate scenarios and also generates analytical results for the risk reduction strategies evaluated. 20. Feinstein International Center (FIC) - Tufts University, Examining Linkages between Disaster Risk Reduction and Livelihoods: Literature Review. The purpose of this review is to establish baseline definitions and trends of DRR programming, review existing literature and suggest gaps in knowledge that will help to focus the content of the subsequent field case studies. The study concludes with seven recommendations on issues that should be given greater attention in the DRR literature, research and programming. 21. UNISDR, Linking Disaster Risk Reduction and Poverty Reduction: Good Practices and Lessons Learned. This publication outlines initiatives that have successfully linked poverty reduction and DRR in various parts of the world. It provides examples of several projects and initiatives showing how DRR can be integrated into poverty reduction (or vice versa) to help reduce the vulnerability of the poor and protect their livelihoods and development gains. 22. UNDP, Gender, Climate Change and Community-Based Adaptation. This publication serves as a guidebook for designing and implementing gender-sensitive community-based adaptation programmes and projects. The guidebook provides simple tools and practical advice on how to take a gender-sensitive approach to planning and implementing adaptation projects and programmes. It will be a useful reference for development practitioners and/or policymakers working in this field. 23. UNISDR, Risk Returns. This book was published for launch at the third Session of Global Platform for Disaster Reduction (GPDR) and it is the latest in a series of volumes addressing natural disasters, and how their impact can be reduced by effective capacity building and prevention strategies. The book presents a selection of examples and experiences of disaster reduction that respond to the need for identifying good practices and sharing experiences and information, identified by many - including governments - during the preparatory process for the GPDR.

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Bibliography
Benson, Charlotte, John Twigg, and Tiziana Rossetto. Tools for Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction, 2007. http://www.proventionconsortium.org/?pageid=32&projectid=1. CNA and OXFAM. An Ounce of Prevention: Preparing for the Impact of a Changing Climate on US Humanitarian and Disaster Response, 2011. http://www.oxfamamerica.org/files/an-ounce-ofprevention-screen.pdf. DIFID and DEV. Disaster Risk Reduction: a Development Concern. A Scoping Study on Links between Disaster Risk Reduction, Poverty and Development, 2004. http://www.preventionweb.net/files/1070_drrscopingstudy.pdf. Feinstein International Center (FIC) - Tufts University. Examining Linkages between Disaster Risk Reduction and Livelihoods: Literature Review, 2011. https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/download/attachments/42017596/DRR-litreview.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1298489232000. Harmer, Adele, Glyn Taylor, and Katherine Haver. Thematic CAP for National Disaster Preparedness: Feasibility Study, 2009. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/D8F061C8910907B14925771C001A16A 7-doc18001-contenido.pdf. Inter-Agency Standing Committee. Handbook for RCs and HCs on Emergency Preparedness and Response, 2010. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/9D3B0B984812AC688525785E00704BC A-Full_report.pdf. Moench, Marcus, and The DRR Study Team (ISET). From Risk to Resilience - Benefits and Costs of Disaster Risk Reduction, n.d. http://www.proventionconsortium.org/themes/default/pdfs/CBA/ISET_resilience.pdf. Tearfund. Turning Practice into Policy: Linking Good Practice CBDRM with Government Policy and Practice, 2007. http://www.preventionweb.net/files/2927_2927PracticeintoPolicyD5Tearfund.pdf. UNDP. Gender, Climate Change and Community-Based Adaptation, 2010. http://www.beta.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/womensempowerment/gender-climate-change-and-community-based-adaptation/Gender Climate Change and Community Based Adaptation (2).pdf. UNISDR. Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (2009), 2009. http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/report/index.php?id=9413. . Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (2011), 2011. http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/2011/en/home/index.html. . Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction: Summary and Recommendations (2009), 2009. http://www.preventionweb.net/files/9414_GARsummary.pdf.

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. HFA Progress in Asia Pacific: Regional Synthesis Report 2009-2011, 2011. http://www.preventionweb.net/files/21158_hfaprogressinasiapacific20092011.pdf. . Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 Mid-Term Review, 2011. http://www.preventionweb.net/files/18197_midterm.pdf. . Linking Disaster Risk Reduction and Poverty Reduction: Good Practices and Lessons Learned, 2008. http://www.preventionweb.net/files/3293_LinkingDisasterRiskReductionPovertyReduction.pdf . Risk Returns. Tudor Rose, 2011. http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/20253. . The Hyogo Declaration and the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters, 2007. http://www.unisdr.org/eng/hfa/docs/Hyogo-framework-for-action-english.pdf. UNISDR, and Graduate School of Global Environmental Studies - Kyoto University. A Guide for Implementing the Hyogo Framework for Action by Local Stakeholders, 2010. http://www.preventionweb.net/files/13101_ImplementingtheHFA.pdf. UNISDR-OCHA. Disaster Preparedness for Effective Response: Guidance and Indicator Package for Implementing Priority Five of the Hyogo Framework, 2008. http://www.preventionweb.net/files/2909_Disasterpreparednessforeffectiveresponse.pdf. UNOCHA. Emergency Preparedness Forum III Final Report, 2010. http://www.preventionweb.net/files/17781_100924epfiiireporta4formatwithoutph.pdf. United Nations (UN). Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World: Guidelines for Natural Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation. Mobilization. Yokohama, 1994. http://www.preventionweb.net/files/8241_doc6841contenido1.pdf. World Bank. Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters, 2010. http://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/sites/gfdrr.org/files/nhud/files/NHUD-Report_Full.pdf. World Health Organization (WHO). Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness: WHO Six-Year Strategy for the Health Sector and Community Capacity Development., 2007. http://www.preventionweb.net/files/2023_VL206720.pdf.

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Annex 5: List of people consulted/interviewed


Name Abdessalam Ould Ahmed Amy Horton Arman Aardal Organisation FAO Liaison Office, Geneva WFP Norway Position Director Deputy Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Response Senior Advisor, Humanitarian Affairs Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Administrator for the OECD-DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility Nepal Consortium Manager External Relations Senior Disaster Risk Management Specialist Humanitarian Affairs Officer Senior Donor Relations Officer First Secretary Manager Deputy Chief Preparedness and Response Branch Bhutan/Nepal desk Manager, Disaster Risk Reduction Counsellor Disaster Risk Management Analyst Director, Humanitarian Strategy and Initiatives Deputy Director First Secretary Programme Officer Coordinator, Risk Reduction & Emergency Preparedness Emergency Services Branch Policy Officer First Secretary, Human Rights and Good Governance CAP Section Chief of Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery Chair of Sub-working Group (SWG) on preparedness NRRC coordinator Senior Officer, Preparedness, Disaster Services Department

Asbjorn Wee Ben Reese Cinthia Diaz Herrera Daniel Kull Daniel Longhurst Denise Brown Eltje Aderhold Esther Kuisch Etienne Labande Giuseppe Angelini Grant Morrison Haakon GramJohannessen Hemang Karelia Isabel Gomes Jakob Hallgren Johan Carlsson John Harding Johnathan Abrahams Katarina Toll Kristin Hedstrom Lis Christensen Mateusz Buczek Maxx Dilley Michel LePechoux Moira Reddick Pankaj Mishra

OECD AusAID Nepal WHO GFDRR FAO Liaison Office, Geneva WFP German mission OCHA FTS WFP ECHO Nepal AusAID Permanent Mission of Norway in Geneva GFDRR World Vision International Sweden's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Permanent Mission of Sweden ISDR Secretariat WHO OCHA ECHO Embassy of Denmark in Nepal OCHA UNDP BCPR UNICEF UNDP IFRC

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Pascal Desbiens Patrick Dupont Per Byman

Permanent Mission of Canada, Geneva European Union Delegation in Geneva Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) DFID Nepal ECHO Nepal DFID UNDP OCHA OCHA UNHCR ECHO Nepal FAO Liaison Office, Geneva

Counsellor Humanitarian Affairs (First Secretary) Humanitarian Team Director

Philip Smith Piush Kayastha Robert MacIver Robert Piper Robert Smith Rudolf Muller Sajal Gupta Samuel Fanon Sandra Aviles

Team Leader, climate change and disaster risk Programme Officer Conflict humanitarian, and security department (CHASE) Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator in Nepal Chief CAP Section Emergency Services Branch Senior Donor Relations Officer Rapid Response Coordinator Chair, IASC Task Team Funding for Preparedness and Senior officer, FAO Geneva office First Secretary (Political Section) Disaster Risk Management Specialist Humanitarian Advisor

Satoko Toku Saurabh Dani Scott Gardiner

Permanent Mission of Japan in Geneva GFDRR Nepal DFID, Conflict, Humanitarian, and Security Department (CHASE) OCHA IASC Secretariat UN OCHA AusAID Nepal FAO DFID IFRC Nepal Embassy of Japan in Nepal IFRC Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC

Shoko Arakaki Simon Lawry White Steve OMalley Sunita Gurung Sylvie WabbesCondotti Tim Waites Victoria Bannon Yasuhiro Nomura Yvonne Klynman Edouard Jay

Chief of Funding Coordination Section Chief Chief of CERF Country Director Liaison and Operations Officer Conflict, Humanitarian, and Security Department (CHASE) IFRC representative in Nepal Second Secretary Senior Officer, Disaster Policy Programme Manager

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Annex 6: Definitions124:
Adaptation The adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities. Capacity development The process by which people, organisations and society systematically stimulate and develop their capacities over time to achieve social and economic goals, including through improvement of knowledge, skills, systems, and institutions. Climate change (a) The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines climate change as a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g., by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. Climate change may be due to natural internal processes or external forcings, or to persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or in land use. (b) The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) defines climate change as a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods. Contingency planning A management process that analyses specific potential events or emerging situations that might threaten society or the environment and establishes arrangements in advance to enable timely, effective and appropriate responses to such events and situations. Disaster A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources. Disaster risk The potential disaster losses, in lives, health status, livelihoods, assets and services, which could occur to a particular community or a society over some specified future time period. Disaster risk management The systematic process of using administrative directives, organisations, and operational skills and capacities to implement strategies, policies and improved coping capacities in order to lessen the adverse impacts of hazards and the possibility of disaster. Disaster risk reduction The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events. Early warning system The set of capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful warning information to enable individuals, communities and organisations threatened by a hazard to prepare and to act appropriately and in sufficient time to reduce the possibility of harm or loss.
124

This list is taken from that of ISDR, http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology.

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Hazard A dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage. Mitigation The lessening or limitation of the adverse impacts of hazards and related disasters. Natural hazard Natural process or phenomenon that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage. Preparedness The knowledge and capacities developed by governments, professional response and recovery organisations, communities and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from, the impacts of likely, imminent or current hazard events or conditions. Comment from ISDR: Preparedness action is carried out within the context of disaster risk management and aims to build the capacities needed to efficiently manage all types of emergencies and achieve orderly transitions from response through to sustained recovery. Preparedness is based on a sound analysis of disaster risks and good linkages with early warning systems, and includes such activities as contingency planning, stockpiling of equipment and supplies, the development of arrangements for coordination, evacuation and public information, and associated training and field exercises. These must be supported by formal institutional, legal and budgetary capacities. The related term readiness describes the ability to quickly and appropriately respond when required. Prevention The outright avoidance of adverse impacts of hazards and related disasters. Recovery The restoration, and improvement where appropriate, of facilities, livelihoods and living conditions of disaster-affected communities, including efforts to reduce disaster risk factors. Resilience The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions. Risk The combination of the probability of an event and its negative consequences. Risk assessment A methodology to determine the nature and extent of risk by analysing potential hazards and evaluating existing conditions of vulnerability that together could potentially harm exposed people, property, services, livelihoods and the environment on which they depend. Risk management The systematic approach and practice of managing uncertainty to minimise potential harm and loss.

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