Rational Investing in Irrational Markets

Disclosures

The analyses and conclusions of Broyhill Asset Management, LLC (BAM") contained in this presentation are based on publicly available information. BAM recognizes that there may be confidential information in the possession of the companies discussed in the presentation that could lead these companies to disagree with BAMs conclusions. This presentation and the information contained herein is not a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any securities. The analyses provided may include certain statements, estimates and projections prepared with respect to, among other things, the historical and anticipated operating performance of the companies, access to capital markets and the values of assets and liabilities. Such statements, estimates, and projections reflect various assumptions by BAM concerning anticipated results that are inherently subject to significant economic, competitive, and other uncertainties and contingencies and have been included solely for illustrative purposes. No representations, express or implied, are made as to the accuracy or completeness of such statements, estimates or projections or with respect to any other materials herein. Actual results may vary materially from the estimates and projected results contained herein. Accordingly, no party should purchase or sell securities on the basis of the information contained in this presentation. BAM expressly disclaims liability on account of any partys reliance on the information contained herein with respect to any such purchases or sales. Accounts managed by BAM and its affiliates have invested in the equity of Cedar Fair, LP (FUN). It is possible that there will be developments in the future that cause BAM to change its position regarding the companies discussed in this presentation. BAM may buy, sell, cover or otherwise change the form of its investment regarding such companies for any reason. BAM hereby disclaims any duty to provide any updates or changes to the analyses contained here including, without limitation, the manner or type of any BAM investment.

Disclosures | 2

Agenda

The Macro Sound Advice Find Your Niche Knowing Where To Fish Looking For A Cheap Thrill? Bottom Line: Putting It All Together

Agenda | 3

Macro Backdrop

Profit Recovery Slightly Exceeding Job Recovery

Source: Zero Hedge

Macro Backdrop | 5

Are You Smarter Than a Fifth Grader?

Source: Zero Hedge

Macro Backdrop | 6

The Definition of Insanity

Source: Zero Hedge

Macro Backdrop | 7

The Feds Dilemma

BRIDGEWATER ASSOCIATES DAILY OBSERVATIONS

In the old days central banks moved interest rates to run monetary policy. By watching the flows, we could see how lowering interest rates stimulated the economy by 1) reducing debt service burdens which improved cash flows and spending, 2) making it easier to buy items marked on credit because the monthly payments declined, which raised demand and 3) producing a positive wealth effect because the lower interest rate would raise the present value of most investment . All that changed when interest rates hit 0%; "printing money" (QE) replaced interest-rate changes. Because central banks can only buy financial assets, quantitative easing drove up the prices of financial assets and did not have as broad of an effect on the economy. The marginal effects of wealth increases on economic activity have been declining significantly. The Fed's dilemma is that its policy is creating a financial market bubble that is large relative to the pickup in the economy that it is producing. If it were targeting asset prices, it would tighten monetary policy to curtail the emerging bubble, whereas if it were targeting economic conditions, it would have a slight easing bias. In other words, 1) the Fed is faced with a difficult choice, and 2) it is losing its effectiveness. We expect this limit to worsen. As the Fed pushes asset prices higher and prospective asset returns lower, and cash yields can't decline, the spread between the prospective returns of risky assets and those of safe assets will shrink at the same time as the riskiness of risky assets will not decline, changing the reward-to-risk ratio in a way that will make it more difficult to push asset prices higher and create a wealth effect. Said differently, at higher prices and lower expected returns the compensation for taking risk will be too small to get investors to bid prices up and drive prospective returns down further. If that were to happen, it would become difficult for the Fed to produce much more of a wealth effect. If that were the case at the same time as the trickling down of the wealth effect to spending continues to diminish, which seems likely, the Fed's power to affect the economy would be greatly reduced.
Source: Zero Hedge
Macro Backdrop | 8

Were Worried About Whether Theres Much Gas Left

BRIDGEWATER ASSOCIATES DAILY OBSERVATIONS

We think that US monetary policy is nearing a new test that will require wisdom and creativity along the lines of that which was required to deal with those problems. The basic issue is that quantitative easing is a much less effective tool when asset prices are high and thus have low expected returns than it is for managing financial crises. That's because QE stimulates the economy by (1) offsetting a panic by providing cash to the financial system when there's a need for cash, and (2) by raising asset prices, and driving money from the assets they buy into demand and investment, creating a higher level of future economic activity. So, the policy was particularly wise and most effective (in the sense of impact per dollar) at the height of the financial crisis when there was both a desperate need for cash and when extremely depressed asset prices were heavily weighing on demand and investment. Now, there is a flood of liquidity and asset prices are high relative to underlying fundamentals. So the impact of additional asset price increases on demand is much less. Quantitative easing today is driving asset prices to unsustainable levels, without stimulating much additional activity. That leaves a much clearer tradeoff between driving up asset prices today and lowering future returns. The dilemma the Fed faces now is that the tools currently at its disposal are pretty much used up, in that interest rates are at zero and US asset prices have been driven up to levels that imply very low levels of returns relative to the risk, so there is very little ability to stimulate from here if needed. So the Fed will either need to accept that outcome, or come up with new ideas to stimulate conditions. We think the question around the effectiveness of continued QE (and not the tapering, which gets all the headlines) is the big deal. Given the way the Fed has said it will act, any tapering will be in response to changes in US conditions, and any deterioration that occurs because of the Fed pulling back would just be met by a reacceleration of that stimulation. So the degree and pace of tapering will for the most part be a reflection and not a driver of conditions, and won't matter that much. What will matter much more is the efficacy of Fed stimulation going forward. In other words, we're not worried about whether the Fed is going to hit or release the gas pedal, we're worried about whether there's much gas left in the tank and what will happen if there isn't.
Source: Zero Hedge
Macro Backdrop | 9

Interest Rates Are Near All Time Lows

LONG TERM TEN-YEAR TREASURY RATE

Source: Robert Shiller

Macro Backdrop | 10

Yields Have Collapsed Across Asset Classes

LONG TERM DIVIDEND YIELD

Source: Robert Shiller

Macro Backdrop | 11

While Equity Valuations Are Near All Time Highs

LONG TERM GRAHAM & DODD PRICE-TO-EARNINGS MULTIPLE

Source: Robert Shiller

Macro Backdrop | 12

Investors Are Not Being Compensated To Take Risk

Source: Mebane Faber

Macro Backdrop | 13

Sound Advice

Sound Advice

Sound Advice | 15

Theres More Than one Way To Skin A Cat

Sound Advice | 16

Macro Thinkers

Sound Advice | 17

Short Sellers

Sound Advice | 18

Agitators

Sound Advice | 19

Value Guys

Sound Advice | 20

Cheaters?

Sound Advice | 21

Find Your Niche

Sound Advice | 22

Our Niche

Sex Sells

Our Niche | 24

But Boring Is Better

Our Niche | 25

Slow & Steady Wins The Race

Our Niche | 26

Last Year We Estimated OAK Was Worth $56

$25
15x 2013 Estimated Fee-related Earnings of $1.69

$7
Current Accrued Incentives Discounted 20%

$7
Current Investment In LPs Discounted 20%

$17
6x 2013 Estimated Incentive Income

$56
Potential Return: 38%

Downside Protection: $39

Source: Broyhill Asset Management Estimates

Our Niche | 27

This Year, The Business Performed As Expected

OAKTREE CAPITAL GROUP LLC (OAK) STOCK PRICE

$65

Now What?

$60

$55

Presentation to Bowden Group

$50

$45

$40

$35

$30

Source: Bloomberg
Our Niche | 28

Now What?

Our Niche | 29

Knowing Where To Fish

Knowing Where To Fish

Free Fall | 31

Fish Where Others Arent Looking

YOU TOO CAN BE A STOCK MARKET GENIUS

The corner of the investment world filled with companies at some stage of the bankruptcy process is filled with opportunities. Many times, profitable, attractive businesses are forced into bankruptcy because of excessive leverage taken on as a result of a merger or leveraged buyout. In some cases, the business was too cyclical to make debt payments. In others, over-optimistic projections and too much debt combined to bankrupt an otherwise good company. It is these attractive, but overleveraged situations that create the most interesting investment opportunities. One way to stay out of trouble is to follow Buffetts lead and stick to good businesses. A good place to start is the category of companies that went bankrupt because they were overleveraged due to a takeover or leveraged buyout. Maybe the operating performance of a good business suffered due to a short term problem and the company was too leveraged to stay out of bankruptcy. Maybe the earnings of a company involved in a failed leveraged buyout grew, but not as fast as initially hoped, forcing the bankruptcy. Sometimes companies that have made large acquisitions end in bankruptcy simply because they wildly overpaid to acquire a trophy property. The new stock of a formerly bankrupt company may be relatively undervalued because analysts dont yet cover it, because institutions dont know about it, or simply because the company still retains a certain stigma from the bankruptcy process. In other instances, investors may find the new capital structure, while improved, still too risky. Smaller situations may not attract vulture investors because these investors cant establish big enough positions in the companys debt to justify the time and effort involved in doing the necessary research. The same logic applies to research analysts and institutional investors. These situations are truly orphaned and may trade cheaply for some time before they are discovered. In the end, however, most investors would be best advised to stick to the few companies coming out of bankruptcy that have the attributes of a good business a strong market niche, brand name, franchise, or industry position. It makes eminent sense to apply Buffetts investment concepts to a group of orphan stocks not closely followed by Wall Street.
Source: Joel Greenblatt
Free Fall | 32

Attractive, But Overleveraged Stocks Create Opportunities

SIX FLAGS UNDERPERFORMED THE MARKET FOR THE ENTIRETY OF ITS HISTORY UNTIL

Free Fall | 33

Sad, But True

Free Fall | 34

Rest In Peace

Free Fall | 35

Fear Of Default Spread Across The Industry

CEDAR FAIRS LONG TERM STOCK PERFORMANCE

Free Fall | 36

Too Much Debt Can Turn A Good Investment Bad

Free Fall | 37

Despite Consistent Performance Through Recessions

CEDAR FAIRS REVENUES WERE HISTORICALLY INCREDIBLY RESILIENT

600,000,000

500,000,000

400,000,000

300,000,000

200,000,000

100,000,000

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Source: Company Filings

Free Fall | 38

A Short Term Orientation Can Drive Very Bad Decisions

CEDAR FAIRS REVENUES DECLINED A WHOPPING 8% DURING THE CRISIS

1,020,000,000

1,000,000,000

980,000,000

960,000,000

940,000,000

920,000,000

900,000,000

880,000,000

860,000,000

2008
Source: Company Filings

2009
Free Fall | 39

Stalking Horse?

Source: New York Times, Dealbook, December 2009

Free Fall | 40

Investors Speak Up

Source: New York Times, Dealbook, April 2010

Free Fall | 41

Was This Time Different?

Free Fall | 42

Revenue Miraculously Recovers

CEDAR FAIRS REVENUES POST CRISIS

1,100,000,000

1,050,000,000

1,000,000,000

950,000,000

900,000,000

850,000,000

800,000,000 2009 2010 2011 2012

Source: Company Filings

Free Fall | 43

Good Call Q! Did We Miss The Boat?

FUN STOCK PRICE

$25

$21.50
$20

$15

$10

$5

$0 Jan-09

Apr-09

Jul-09

Oct-09

Jan-10

Apr-10

Jul-10

Oct-10

Jan-11

Apr-11

Jul-11

Oct-11

Source: Bloomberg
Free Fall | 44

Cheap Thrill?

Uncovering Value

From the June 30, 2013 issue of Value Investor Insight, reprinted with permission of Value Investor Media, Inc.
Cheap Thrill? | 46

Investors? Possibly You!

Source: YouTube
Cheap Thrill? | 47

Prestige Investments

CEDAR FAIR HAS A NUMBER OF GOOD THINGS GOING FOR IT

Attractive Business Under Temporary Pressure Structurally Defensive Economics High & Stable Barriers to Entry Improving Pricing Power Strengthening Balance Sheet Consistent & Growing Cash Flow

Cheap Thrill? | 48

Short Term Headwinds Create Long Term Opportunity

Cheap Thrill? | 49

A Mature Industry With High Barriers To Entry

US AMUSEMENT PARK SUPPLY HAS BEEN STAGNANT

Cheap Thrill? | 50

Resilient Performance Through Recession

OPERATING PERFORMANCE IS INCREDIBLY STABLE AND RECOVERS RAPIDLY FROM DECLINES

Source: Cedar Fair Investor Presentation, May 2013

Cheap Thrill? | 51

Rationale Players With Considerable Pricing Power

A VISIT TO A REGIONAL AMUSEMENT PARK COSTS JUST $5 PER HOUR

Cheap Thrill? | 52

Driven By Several Key Initiatives

Cheap Thrill? | 53

Increasing Attendance & Per Capita Spending

RECENT GROWTH IN PER CAPITA SPENDING HAS EXCEEDED GROWTH IN ATTENDANCE

Source: Cedar Fair Investor Presentation, May 2013

Cheap Thrill? | 54

Easy Credit: Leverage Works Both Ways

LEVERAGE RATIOS AT CEDAR FAIR HAVE CONSISTENTLY DECLINED POST CRISIS

6.0x $500 $450

5.0x
$400 $350 4.0x $300 3.0x $250 $200 2.0x $150 $100 1.0x $50 0.0x 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014e* 2015e* 2016e* $-

Leverage Ratio (left axis)

Adjusted EBITDA (right axis)

Source: Company Filings, Broyhill Asset Management Estimates

Cheap Thrill? | 55

Lower Rates Offer Potential For Step-Up In Distribution

So from a bond perspective, we do continue to monitor the markets and will look to take those 9-1/8% cost bonds out as soon as it makes financial and economic sense. I dont know that you would see us do a one-time distribution. I dont think wed see a lot of value on that, but more so think about a step-function opportunity much like you saw a year ago. - Brian C. Witherow, CFO, Third Quarter 2013 Earnings Call

Cheap Thrill? | 56

Growing Cash Flow Drives Greater Distributions

DISTRIBUTIONS CAN GROW FASTER THAN EBITDA GROWTH

$480

$460

Step-up in Distribution Driven by 2014 Refinancing? Step-up in Distribution Driven by Decrease in Leverage Ratios

$4.00

$3.50

$440

$3.00

$420

$2.50

$400 $2.00 $380 $1.50 $360 $1.00

$340
$0.50

$320

$300 Sep-10 Dec-10 Mar-11 Jun-11 Sep-11 Dec-11 Mar-12 Jun-12 Sep-12 Dec-12 Mar-13 Jun-13 Sep-13 Dec-13 2014e* 2015e* 2016e*

$-

Distribution per Share (right axis)

Adjusted EBITDA (left axis)

Source: Company Filings, Broyhill Asset Management Estimates

Cheap Thrill? | 57

Greater Distribution Drives Higher Stock Price

FUN CAPITAL ALLOCATION: THE FOUNDATION OF OUR INVESTMENT THESIS

$50 $45 $40 $35 $30 $25 $2.00 $20 $1.90 $1.50

Step-Up In Distribution?
$4.00

Six Flags Bankruptcy Jun-09

Step-Up In Distribution

$3.50

Apollo Offer Dec-09

$2.50

$2.80

$3.00

$2.50

$15
$10 $5 $2007 2008 2009 2010 FUN Stock Price (right axis)

$1.60 $1.00 $0.99 $0.50 $0.25

Offer Terminated Apr-10

2011 2012 2013 Distribution per Unit (left axis)

$-

Source: Bloomberg, Company filings

Cheap Thrill? | 58

Whats it Worth?

WE SEE LITTLE RISK ON A THREE-YEAR HORIZON WITH ATTRACTIVE UPSIDE POTENTIAL

IF FUN CAN GENERATE SALES GROWTH OF 2% - 4%, WE EXPECT ADJUSTED EBITDA TO REACH $450 - $490 MILLION BY 2016 ASSUMING LITTLE MARGIN EXPANSION

Bear 2016 Adjusted EBITDA Target Multiple Value per Unit $450 8x $40

Base $470 9x $50

Bull $490 10x $65

Plus: 2014-2016 Distributions Total Value per Unit Premium to Current Price

$10 $50 5%

$10 $60 30%

$11 $75 60%

Source: Broyhill Asset Management Estimates

Cheap Thrill? | 59

Valuation Is An Imprecise Science

VALUING FUN BASED ON GROWING DISTRIBUTIONS - YIELDS SIMILAR RESULTS

IF MANAGEMENT PAYS OUT 90% OF CASH FLOW NET OF FIXED CHARGES, WE EXPECT DISTRIBUTIONS TO RANGE FROM $3.50 TO $4.00 BY 2016

Bear Distributable Cash Flow Distribution per Unit Target Yield 220 $3.50 8%

Base 235 $3.80 7%

Bull 250 $4.00 6%

Value per Unit

Plus: 2014-2016 Distributions Total Value per Unit Premium to Current Price

$45
$10 $55 15%

$55
$10 $65 35%

$65
$11 $75 65%

Source: Broyhill Asset Management Estimates

Cheap Thrill? | 60

Putting It All Together

A Value-Oriented, Disciplined Focus On Quality

TOP TEN POSITIONS ACCOUNTED FOR 76% OF ASSETS AT SEPTEMBER QUARTER-END

Security Cash & Equivalents Vodafone Group Cedar Fair Hospira Western Union Microsoft Nestle Apple Oaktree Capital Group Nuveen Municipal Value Total for Top 10

% of Assets 28.9% 6.9% 5.6% 5.5% 5.3% 5.1% 5.1% 5.0% 4.6% 4.5% 75.5%

Putting It All Together | 62

Reduces The Risk Of Large Drawdowns

BROYHILL HIGH QUALITY EQUITY DRAWDOWN ANALYSIS SINCE INCEPTION

3%

2%

1% 0.4% 0% -0.2% -1% -0.8% -0.8% -0.6% 0.4%

0.8% 0.5%

-2% -2.3% -3% -3.1% -4% Oct-12 Feb-13 May-13 High Quality Portfolio MSCI All World Jun-13 Aug-13

1Past

performance is not indicative of future results.

Putting It All Together | 63

While Participating During Good Times

4.0%

BROYHILL HIGH QUALITY EQUITY UP/DOWN CAPTURE SINCE INCEPTION

3.2%

3.0% 2.6%

2.0%

Down Capture: -19.0%

1.0% 0.3% 0.0%

Up Capture: 81.9%

-1.0% -1.4% -2.0% High Quality Portfolio MSCI All World

1Past

performance is not indicative of future results.

Putting It All Together | 64

Driving Long Term Outperformance

Monthly Performance1

Performance History

Jan
2013 2012 6.7% -

Feb Mar
0.4% 3.2% -

Apr May
-

Jun
-

Jul
3.3% -

Aug
0.5% -

Sep
3.2% 1.4%

Oct
3.2%

Nov

Dec
2.8%

Year
24.6% 2.2%
YTD: One Year: Since Inception2:

BAM HQ

MSCI AW

0.6% 0.4% 0.8%

24.6% 16.9% 26.5% 20.7% 27.3% 23.3%

-0.8% -1.2%

Growth of $10,000 Since Inception2

$13,000

$12,729 $12,328

$12,500

$12,000

$11,500

$11,000

$10,500

$10,000

$9,500 Aug-12

Sep-12

Oct-12

Nov-12

Dec-12

Jan-13

Feb-13

Mar-13

Apr-13

May-13

Jun-13

Jul-13

Aug-13

Sep-13

Oct-13

High Quality Portfolio

1Past 2Since

MSCI World

performance is not indicative of future results. Inception is August 31, 2012. All periods greater than one year are annualized.

Putting It All Together | 65

Sound Advice

Putting It All Together | 66

The New Normal

Putting It All Together | 67

Any Questions?

Putting It All Together | 68

Contact Information

Broyhill Asset Management, LLC

800 Golfview Park Post Office Box 500 Lenoir, NC 28645 Phone: Fax: 828 758 6100 828 758 8919

Subscribe to our mailing list:

Contact Information | 69

Disclaimer
PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. This material has been prepared solely for the purposes of illustration and discussion. Broyhill Asset Management is the marketing name for the investment management business conducted by Broyhill Asset Management, LLC. and its affiliates. Broyhill Asset Management, LLC is an SEC Registered Investment Advisor. Under no circumstances should the information contained herein be used or considered as an offer to sell, or solicitation of an offer to buy any security. Any security offering is subject to certain investor eligibility criteria as detailed in the applicable offering documents. The information contained herein is confidential and may not be reproduced or circulated in whole or in part. The information is in summary form for convenience of presentation, it is not complete and should not be relied upon as such. Any information, data, statement, opinions, or projections made herein may contain certain forward looking statements, projections, and information that are based on the beliefs of Broyhill Asset Management as well as assumptions made by, and information currently available to, Broyhill Asset Management. Such statements reflect the view of Broyhill Asset Management with respect to future events and are subject to certain risks, uncertainties and assumptions (including, but not limited to, changes in general economic and business conditions, interest rate and securities market fluctuations, competition from within and without the investment industry, new products and services in the investment industry, changes in customer profiles, and changes in laws and regulations applicable to Broyhill Asset Management). Should one or more of these other risks or uncertainties materialize, or should underlying assumptions prove incorrect, actual results may vary materially from those described herein. All information, including performance information, has been prepared in good faith; there are no representations or warranty expressed or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness, of the information, and nothing herein shall be relied upon as a promise or representation as to the past or future performance. This material may include information that is based, in part or in full, on hypothetical assumptions, models, and/or other analysis (which may not necessarily be described herein). No representations or warranty are made as to the reasonableness of any such assumptions, models, or analysis. The information set forth herein was gathered from various sources which are believed, but not guaranteed, to be reliable. Unless stated otherwise, any opinions expressed herein are current as of the date hereof and are subject to change at any time. Accordingly, neither Broyhill Asset Management nor its principals or affiliates make any representations as to the timeliness of any information in this presentation.

Disclaimer | 70