Cases On Relations

[G.R. No. 112497. August 4, 1994.] HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his c ! cit" s #$%R$&AR' OF ()#&I%$, Petitioner, *.
MA'OR ALFR$DO #. LIM, +I%$,MA'OR (O#$ L. A&I$N-A, %I&' &R$A#)R$R AN&HON' A%$+$DO, #ANGG)NIANG .ANGL)N#OD AND &H$ %I&' OF MANILA, Respondents. The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code reading as follows:
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rocedure !or "pproval "nd #ffectivity $f Ta% $rdinances "nd &evenue 'easures( 'andatory ublic )earings* + The procedure for approval of local ta% ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: rovided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof( rovided, further, That any -uestion on the constitutionality or legality of ta% ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty ./01 days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of 2ustice who shall render a decision within si%ty .301 days from the date of receipt of the appeal: rovided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the ta%, fee, or charge levied therein: rovided, finally, That within thirty ./01 days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the si%ty4day period without the Secretary of 2ustice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent 5urisdiction* ursuant thereto, the Secretary of 2ustice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a ta%payer, declared $rdinance 6o* 7778, otherwise 9nown as the 'anila &evenue Code, null and void for non4compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of ta% ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy* 1 :n a petition for certiorari filed by the City of 'anila, the &egional Trial Court of 'anila revo9ed the Secretary;s resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural re-uirements had been observed* 'ore importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of 2ustice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the resident of the hilippines only the power of supervision over local governments* The present petition would have us reverse that decision* The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural re-uirements for the enactment of ta% ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code has indeed not been observed* arenthetically, this petition was originally dismissed by the Court for non4compliance with Circular 1488, the Solicitor General having failed to submit a certified true copy of the challenged decision* / )owever, on motion for reconsideration with the re-uired certified true copy of the decision attached, the petition was reinstated in view of the importance of the issues raised therein* <e stress at the outset that the lower court had 5urisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general definition of the 5udicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law* Specifically, = 1>7 vests in the regional trial courts 5urisdiction over all civil cases in which the sub5ect of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, 8 even as the accused in a criminal action has the right to -uestion in his defense the co institutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings ta9en against him, particularly as they contravene the =ill of &ights* 'oreover, "rticle
?, Section @.>1, of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate 5urisdiction over final 5udgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or e%ecutive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in -uestion*
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:n the e%ercise of this 5urisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the conse-uences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers* "s the -uestioned act is usually the handiwor9 of the legislative or the e%ecutive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher 5udgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the ma5ority of those who participated in its discussion* @ :t is also emphasiAed that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the e%ecutive and the legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved* To doubt is to sustain* The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the re-uipped ma5ority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struc9 down*
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:n the case before us, 2udge &odolfo C* alattao declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of 2ustice to review ta% ordinances and, inferentially, to annul them* )e cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being Bthe power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the 5udgment of the former for the latter,B while the second is Bthe power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions is accordance with law*B 3 )is conclusion was that the challenged section gave to the Secretary the power of control and not of supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the resident of the hilippines* This was, in his view, a violation not only of "rticle ?, specifically Section 8 thereof, 7 and of Section @ on the ta%ing powers of local governments, 8 and the policy of local autonomy in general* <e do not share that view* The lower court was rather hasty in invalidating the provision* Section 187 authoriAes the Secretary of 2ustice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the ta% ordinance and, if warranted, to revo9e it on either or both of these grounds* <hen he alters or modifies or sets aside a ta% ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own 5udgment for the 5udgment of the local government that enacted the measure* Secretary Crilon did set aside the 'anila &evenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be* )e did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment* )e did not say that in his 5udgment it was a bad law* <hat he found only was that it was illegal* "ll he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions is accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of ta% ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code* "s we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision*
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"n officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act* :t they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re4done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself* Supervision does not cover such authority* The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them* :f the rules are not observed, he may order the wor9 done or re4done but only to conform to the prescribed rules* )e may not prescribe
his own manner for the doing of the act* )e has no 5udgment on this matter e%cept to see to it that the rules are followed* :n the opinion of the Court, Secretary Crilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision* The case of Taule v* Santos 7 cited in the decision has no application here because the 5urisdiction claimed by the Secretary of Local Governments over election contests in the Datipunan ng 'ga =arangay was held to belong to the Commission on #lections by constitutional provision* The conflict was over 5urisdiction, not supervision or control*
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Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local "utonomy "ct, which provided in its Section > as follows:
" ta% ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage, unless the ordinance shall provide otherwise: rovided, however, That the Secretary of !inance shall have authority to suspend the effectivity of any ordinance within one hundred and twenty days after receipt by him of a copy thereof, if, in his opinion, the ta% or fee therein levied or imposed is un5ust, e%cessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, or when it is contrary to declared national economy policy, and when the said Secretary e%ercises this authority the effectivity of such ordinance shall suspended, either in part or as a whole, for a period of thirty days within which period the local legislative body may either modify the ta% ordinance to meet the ob5ections thereto, or file an appeal with a court of competent 5urisdiction( otherwise, the ta% ordinance or the part or parts thereof declared suspended, shall be considered as revo9ed* Thereafter, the local legislative body may not reimposed the same ta% or fee until such time as the grounds for the suspension thereof shall have ceased to e%ist* That section allowed the Secretary of !inance to suspend the effectivity of a ta% ordinance if, in his opinion, the ta% or fee levied was un5ust, e%cessive, oppressive or confiscatory* Cetermination of these flaws would involve the e%ercise of 5udgment or discretion and not merely an e%amination of whether or not the re-uirements or limitations of the law had been observed( hence, it would smac9 of control rather than mere supervision* That power was never -uestioned before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of 2ustice is not given the same latitude under Section 187* "ll he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the ta% measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is un5ust, e%cessive, oppressive or confiscatory* )e has no discretion on this matter* :n fact, Secretary Crilon set aside the 'anila &evenue Code only on two grounds, to wit, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non4compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment* These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness of the ta% measure*
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The issue of non4compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the 'anila &evenue Code is another matter* :n his resolution, Secretary Crilon declared that there were no written notices of public hearings on the proposed 'anila &evenue Code that were sent to interested parties as re-uired by "rt* >73.b1 of the :mplementing &ules of the Local Government Code nor were copies of the proposed ordinance published in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to "rt* >73.a1* 6o minutes were submitted to show that the obligatory public hearings had been held* 6either were copies of the measure as approved posted in prominent places in the city in accordance with Sec* @11.a1 of the Local Government Code* !inally, the 'anila &evenue Code was not translated into ilipino or Tagalog and disseminated among the people for their information and guidance, conformably to Sec* @7.b1 of the Code*
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2udge alattao found otherwise* )e declared that all the procedural re-uirements had been observed in the enactment
of the 'anila &evenue Code and that the City of 'anila had not been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only five days within which to gather and present to him all the evidence .consisting of >@ e%hibits1 later submitted to the trial court* To get to the bottom of his -uestion, the Court acceded to the motion of the respondents and called for the elevation to it of the said e%hibits* <e have carefully e%amined every one of these e%hibits and agree with the trial court that the procedural re-uirements have indeed been observed* 6otices of the public hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced by #%hibits G41 to 17* The minutes of the hearings are found in #%hibits ', '41, '4>, and '4/* #%hibits = and C show that the proposed ordinances were published in the =alita and the 'anila Standard on "pril >1 and >@, 177/, respectively, and the approved ordinance was published in the 2uly /, 8, @ 177/ issues of the 'anila Standard and in the 2uly 3, 177/ issue of =alita, as shown by #%hibits E, E41, E4>, and E4/*
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The only e%ceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process* :t has also not been shown that the te%t of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this re-uirement applies to the approval of local development plans and public investment programs of the local government unit and not to ta% ordinances* <e ma9e no ruling on the substantive provisions of the 'anila &evenue Code as their validity has not been raised in issue in the present petition* <)#&#!$&#, the 5udgment is hereby rendered &#F#&S:6G the challenged decision of the &egional Trial Court insofar as it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional but "!!:&':6G its finding that the procedural re-uirements in the enactment of the 'anila &evenue Code have been observed* 6o pronouncement as to costs*
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[G.R. No. 9/202. August 0, 1991.] RODOLFO &. GAN-ON, Petitioner, *. &H$ HONORA1L$ %O)R& OF A..$AL#, c ! cit" n2 L)I# &. #AN&O#, in his s th3 #3c43t 4" o5 th3 D3! 4t63nt o5 Loc 7 Go*34n63nt, Respondents. #'LLA1)# 1* C$6ST:TGT:$6"L L"<( 1787 C$6ST:TGT:$6( L$C"L "GT$6$'H, 6"TG&# $!( L$C"L $!!:C:"LS &#'":6 "CC$G6T"=L# T$ C#6T&"L G$F#&6'#6T* + Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentraliAation of administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide* "utonomy does not contemplate ma9ing mini4states out of local government units* "utonomy, in the constitutional sense, is sub5ect to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution + and as the Bsupervision clauseB itself suggests + is to wean local government units from overdependence on the central government* :t is noteworthy that under the Charter , Blocal autonomyB is not instantly self e%ecuting, but sub5ect to, among other things, the passage of a local government code, a local ta% law, income distribution legislation, and a national representation law, and measures designed to realiAe autonomy at the local level* :t is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local governments under the general supervision of the #%ecutive* :t is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggests that Congress may e%ercise removal powers, and as the e%isting Local Government Code has done, delegate its e%ercise to the resident* >* :C*( :C*( :C*( 6#< C$6ST:TGT:$6 C$#S 6$T &#SC&:=# !#C#&"L:S'* + "s the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means Ba more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentraliAation*B The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more that to brea9 up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to Bliberate the local governments from the imperialism of 'anila*B "utonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism* The Charter has not ta9en such a radical step* Local governments, under the Constitution, are sub5ect to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit parado%ically, to enhance self4 government* /* :C*( :C*( :C*( C)"6G#C SG #&F:S:$6 CL"GS# C$#S 6$T #?#' T L$C"L G$F#&6'#6TS !&$' L#G:SL"T:F# &#GGL"T:$6* + The 1787 Constitution provides in "rt* ?, Sec* 8 thatB ITJhe resident of the hilippines shall e%ercise general supervision over local governments*B :t modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 17/@ Constitution, "rt* F::, Sec* 10.11, stating thatB ITJhe resident shall * * * e%ercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law*B :t is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the Charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right + or the resident of her prerogative as conferred by e%isting legislation + to provide administrative sanctions against local officials* :t is our opinion that the omission .of Bas may be provided by lawB1 signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments; autonomy from Congress and to brea9 Congress; BcontrolB over local government affairs* The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sa9e of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline* The change in constitutional language did not e%empt local governments from legislative regulation provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy* 8* :C*( :C*( :C*( 6"T:$6"L "GT)$&:TH C"6 C:SC: L:6# L$C"L $!!:C:"LS* + Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary
action against local officials* :n the case at bar, the Secretary of Local Government, the resident;s alter ego, in consonance with the specific legal provisions of =atas =lg* //7, the e%isting Local Government Code, can suspend petitioner 'ayor of :loilo City .G*&* 6os* 7/>@> and 7@>8@1 and petitioner member of the Sangguniang anglunsod .G*&* 6o* 7/7831* @* :C*( :C*( :C*( :C*( BSG #&F:S:$6B 6$T :6C$' "T:=L# <:T) C:SC: L:6"&H "GT)$&:TH* + BSupervisionB is not incompatible with disciplinary authority* "s this Court held in GanAon v* Cayanan, 108 hil* 888, Bin administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties* :f the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may ta9e such action or step as prescribed by law to ma9e them perform their duties*B
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respondent Secretary of :nterior, as alter ego of the resident, under the e%isting Local Government Code, has the ower to suspend the petitioner :loilo City 'ayor, such power cannot be e%ercised oppressively* Ten administrative cases have been successively filed against the City 'ayor* The 'ayor has been made to serve a total of 1>0 days of suspension for the first two cases and the respondent Secretary has issued another order preventively suspending the former for another 30 days, the third time in twenty months* <e are allowing the 'ayor to suffer the duration of his third suspension* :nsofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Cepartment of Local Government, upon finality of this decision, to underta9e steps to e%pedite the same, sub5ect to the 'ayor;s usual remedies of appeal, 5udicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence* The petitioners ta9e common issue on the power of the resident .acting through the Secretary of Local Government1, to suspend andKor remove local officials* The petitioners are the 'ayor of :loilo City .G*&* 6os* 7/>@> and 7@>8@1 and a member of the Sangguniang anglunsod thereof .G*&* 6o* 7/7831, respectively*
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The petitions of 'ayor GanAon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1788, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention* 1 The personalities involved are 2oceleehn Cabaluna, a cler9 at the city health office( Salvador Cabaluna, her husband( Cr* !elicidad $rtigoAa, "ssistant City )ealth $fficer( 'ansueto 'alabor, Fice4'ayor( &olando Cabao, Can Calido, German GonAales, Larry $ng, and #duardo eLa &edondo, members of the Sangguniang anglunsod( and ancho #rbite, a barangay tanod* The complaints against the 'ayor are set forth in the opinion of the respondent Court of "ppeals* > <e -uote:
:n her verified complaint ."nne% "1, 'rs* Cabaluna, a cler9 assigned to the City )ealth, $ffice of :loilo City charged that due to political reasons, having supported the rival candidate, 'rs* &osa $* Caram, the petitioner City 'ayor, using as an e%cuse the e%igency of the service and the interest of the public, pulled her out from rightful office where her -ualification are best suited and assigned her to e wor9 that should be the function of a non4career service employee* To ma9e matters worse, a utility wor9er in the office of the ublic Services, whose duties are alien to the complainant;s duties and functions, has been detailed to ta9e her place* The petitioner;s act are pure harassments aimed at luring her away from her permanent position or force her to resign* :n the case of Cra* !elicidad $rtigoAa, she claims that the petitioner handpic9ed her to perform tas9 not befitting her
position as "ssistant City )ealth $fficer of :loilo City( that her office was padloc9ed without any e%planation or 5ustification( that her salary was withheld without cause since "pril 1, 1788( that when she filed her vacation leave, she was given the run4around treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance with Cr* &odolfo Fillegas and that she was the ob5ect of a well4engineered trumped4up charge in an administrative complaint filed by Cr* &odolfo Fillegas ."nne% =1* $n the other hand, 'ansuelo 'alabor is the duty elected Fice 'ayor of :loilo City and complainants &olando Cabao, Can Calido, German GonAales, Larry $ng and #duardo eLa &edondo are members of the Sangguniang anglunsod of the City of :loilo* Their complaint arose out from the case where Councilor Larry $ng, whose 9ey to his office was unceremoniously and without previous notice, ta9en by petitioner* <ithout an office, Councilor $ng had to hold office at laAa Libertad* The Fice4'ayor and the other complainants sympathiAed with him and decided to do the same* )owever, the petitioner, together with his fully4armed security men, forcefully drove them away from laAa Libertad* Councilor $ng denounced the petitioner;s actuations the following day in the radio station and decided to hold office at the !reedom Grandstand at :loilo City and there were so many people who gathered to witness the incident* )owever, before the group could reach the area, the petitioner, together with his security men, led the firemen using a firetruc9 in doAing water to the people and the bystanders* "nother administrative case was filed by ancho #rbite, a barangay tanod, appointed by former mayor &osa $* Caram* $n 'arch 1/, 1788, without the benefit of chargeM filed against him and no warrant of arrest was issued, #rbite was arrested and detained at the City 2ail of :loilo City upon orders of petitioner* :n 5ail, he was allegedly mauled by other detainees thereby causing in5uries* )e was released only the following day* / The 'ayor thereafter answered, 8 and the cases were set for hearing* The opinion of the Court of "ppeals also set forth the succeeding events:
The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and $rtigoAa cases were set for hearing on 2une >04>1, 1788 at the &egional $ffice of the Cepartment of Local Government in :loilo City* 6otices, through telegrams, were sent to the parties ."nne% L1 and the parties received them, including the petitioner* The petitioner as9ed for a postponement before the scheduled date of hearing and was represented by counsel, "tty* Samuel Castro* The hearing officers, "tty* Salvador Euebral and "tty* 'arino =ermudeA had to come all the way from 'anila for the two4day hearings but was actually held only on 2une >0, 1788 in view of the inability and unpreparedness of petitioner;s counsel* The ne%t hearings were re4set to 2uly >@, >3, >7, 1788 in the same venue + :loilo City* "gain, the petitioner attempted to delay the proceedings and moved for a postponement under the e%cuse that he had 5ust hired his counsel* 6onetheless, the hearing officers denied the motion to postpone, in view of the fact that the parties were notified by telegrams of the scheduled hearings ."nne% '1* :n the said hearings, petitioner;s counsel cross4e%amined the complainants and their witnesses* !inding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension order on "ugust 11, 1788 to last until $ctober 11, 1788 for a period of si%ty .301 days* Then the ne%t investigation was set on September >1, 1788 and the petitioner again as9ed for a postponement to September >3, 1788* $n September >3, 1788, the complainants and petitioner were present, together with their respective counsel* The petitioner sought for a postponement which was denied* :n these hearings which were held in 'anila, the petitioner testified in "dm* Case 6o* C410>78 and 10>77*
The investigation was continued regarding the 'alabor case and the complainants testified including their witnesses* $n $ctober 10, 1788, petitioner;s counsel, "tty* $nginal moved for a postponement of the $ctober >8, 1788 hearing to 6ovember 7 to 11, 1788 which was granted* )owever, the motion for change of venue was denied due to lac9 of funds* "t the hearing on 6ovember 7, 1788, the parties and counsel were present* etitioner reiterated his motion to change venue and moved for postponement anew* The counsel discussed a proposal to ta9e the deposition of witnesses in :loilo City so the hearing was indefinitely postponed* )owever, the parties failed to come to terms and after the parties were notified of the hearing, the investigation was set to Cecember 1/ to 1@, 1788* The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his witnesses were sic9 or cannot attend the investigation due to lac9 of transportation* The motion was denied and the petitioner was given up to Cecember 18, 1788 to present his evidence*
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$n Cecember 18, 1788, petitioner;s counsel insisted on his motion for postponement and the hearing officers gave petitioner up to Cecember 1@, 1788 to present his evidence* $n Cecember 1@, 1788, the petitioner failed to present evidence and the cases were considered submitted for resolution* :n the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to e%ist in the arbitrary detention case filed by ancho #rbite so the respondent ordered the petitioner;s second preventive suspension dated $ctober 11, 1788 for another si%ty .301 days* The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary in5unction in the &egional Trial Court, =ranch // of :loilo City* The second preventive suspension was not enforced* @ "midst the two successive suspensions, 'ayor GanAon instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent Secretary of Local Government .now, :nterior1 in the &egional Trial Court, :loilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary in5unction* resently, he instituted C"4G*&* S 6o* 13817, an action for prohibition, in the respondent Court of "ppeals* 'eanwhile, on 'ay /, 1770, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending 'ayor GanAon for another si%ty days, the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime Fice4'ayor 'ansueto 'alabor as acting mayor* Gndaunted, 'ayor GanAon commenced C"4G*&* S 6o* >07/3 of the Court of "ppeals, a petition for prohibition, 3 .'alabor, it is to be noted, is one of the complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeing 'ayor GanAon ousted*1 $n September 7, 1787, the Court of "ppeals rendered 5udgment, dismissing C"4G*&* S 6o* 13817* $n 2uly @, 1770, it li9ewise promulgated a decision, dismissing C"4G*&* S 6o* >07/3* :n a &esolution dated 2anuary >8, 1770, it issued a &esolution certifying the petition of 'ary "nn "rtieda, who had been similary charged by the respondent Secretary, to this Court* $n 2une >3, 1770, we issued a Temporary &estraining $rder, barring the respondent Secretary from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of the Court of "ppeals; two decisions* :n our &esolution of 6ovember >7, 1770, we consolidated all three cases* :n our &esolutions of 2anuary 1@, 1771, we gave due course thereto* 'ayor GanAon claims as a preliminary .G*&* 6o* 7/>@>1, that the Cepartment of Local Government in hearing the ten cases against him, had denied him due process of law and that the respondent Secretary had been Bbiased, pre5udicial
and hostileB towards him 7 arising from his .'ayor GanAon;s1 alleged refusal to 5oin the Laban ng Cemo9rati9ong ilipino party 8 and the running political rivalry they maintained in the last congressional and local elections( 7 and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in :loilo City* 10 )e also alleges that he re-uested the Secretary to life his suspension since it had come ninety days prior to an election .the barangay elections of 6ovember 18, 17881, 11 notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the hearing + and meted out two more suspension orders + of the aforementioned cases* 1> )e li9ewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to :loilo City .they were held in 'anila1 in order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary re5ected his re-uest* 1/ )e states that he as9ed for postponement on Nvalid and 5ustifiableB 18 grounds, among them, that he was suffering from a heart ailment which re-uired confinement( that his BvitalB 1@ witness was also hospitaliAed 13 but that the latter unduly denied his re-uest* 'ayor GanAon;s primary argument .G*&* 6os* 7/>@> and 7@>8@1 is that the Secretary of Local Government is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner 'ary "nn &ivera "rtieda .G*&* 6o* 7/7831* "s to 'ayor GanAon;s charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very clearly in what manner the 'ayor might have been deprived of his rights by the respondent Secretary* )is claims that he and Secretary Luis Santos were .are1 political rivals and that his BpersecutionB was politically motivated are pure speculation and although the latter does not appear to have denied these contentions .as he, 'ayor GanAon, claims1, we can not ta9e his word for it the way we would have under less political circumstances, considering furthermore that Bpolitical feudB has often been a good e%cuse in contesting complaints* The 'ayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say4so;s that Secretary Santos had attempted to seduce him to 5oin the administration party and to operate a lottery in :loilo City* "gain, although the Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we can not accept them at face value, much more, as 5udicial admissions as he would have us accept them, 18 for the same reasons above4stated and furthermore, because his say4so;s were never corroborated by independent testimonies* "s a responsible public official, Secretary Santos, in pursuing an official function, is presumed to be performing his duties regularly and in the absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed to him* "s to 'ayor GanAon;s contention that he had re-uested the respondent Secretary to defer the hearing on account of the ninety4day ban prescribed by Section 3> of =atas =lg* //7, the Court finds the -uestion to be moot and academic since we have in fact restrained the Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the petitioners* 17 "s to his re-uest, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given any compelling reason why we should overturn the Court of "ppeals, which found no convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his re-uests* =esides, postponements are a matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based on 'ayor GanAon;s above story, we are not convinced that the Secretary has been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion* The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos; actuations deprived 'ayor GanAon of due process of law* <e come to the core -uestion: <hether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the resident;s alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials* :t is the petitioners; argument that the 1787 Constitution >0 no longer allows the resident, as the 17/@ and 177/
Constitutions did, to e%ercise the power of suspension andKor removal over local officials* "ccording to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self4rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase Bas may be provided by law,B >1 to strip the resident of the power of control over local governments* :t is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission* The provision in -uestion reads as follows:
S#CT:$6 8* The resident of the hilippines shall e%ercise general supervision over local governments* rovinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions* >> :t modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 17/@ Constitution, which we -uote:
S#CT:$6 10* The resident shall have control of all the e%ecutive departments, bureaus, or offices, e%ercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and ta9e care that the laws be faithfully e%ecuted* >/ The petitioners submit that the deletion .of Bas may be provided by lawB1 is significant, as their argument goes, since: .11 the power of the resident is Bprovided by lawB and .>1 hence, no law may provide for it any longer*
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:t is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under -uestion, the Secretary of Local Government acted in consonance with the specific legal provisions of =atas =lg* //7, the Local Government Code, we -uote:
S#CT:$6 3>* 6otice of )earing* + <ithin seven days after the complaint is filed, the 'inister of Local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall re-uire the respondent to submit his verified answer within seven days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of such answer of the Respondent* 6o investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately prior to an election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed within the said period* :f preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive suspension shall be lifted* >8 S#CT:$6 3/* reventive Suspension* + .11 reventive suspension may be imposed by the 'inister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official* .>1 reventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are 5oined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence* :n all cases, preventive suspension shall not e%tend beyond si%ty days after the start of said suspension* ./1 "t the e%piration of si%ty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without pre5udice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until its termination* )owever, if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect or re-uest, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension*>@
cralaw:red
The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three -uestions: .11 Cid the 1787 Constitution, in deleting the
phrase Bas may be provided by lawB intend to divest the resident of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and or remove local officialsO .>1 )as the Constitution repealed Sections 3> and 3/ of the Local Government CodeO ./1 <hat is the significance of the change in the constitutional languageO :t is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right + or the resident of her prerogative as conferred by e%isting legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials* :t is our opinion that the omission .of Bas may be provided by lawB1 signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments; autonomy from congress and to brea9 Congress; BcontrolB over local government affairs* The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sa9e of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline* "utonomy does not, after all, contemplate ma9ing mini4states out of local government units, as in the federal governments of the Gnited States of "merica .or =raAil or Germany1, although 2efferson is said to have compared municipal corporations euphemistically to Bsmall republics*B >3 "utonomy, in the constitutional sense, is sub5ect to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution + and as the Bsupervision clauseB itself suggest + is to wean local government units from over dependence on the central government* :t is noteworthy that under the Charter, Blocal autonomyB is not instantly self4e%ecuting, but sub5ect to, among other things, the passage of a local government code, >7 a local ta% law, >8 income distribution legislation, >7 and a national representation law, /0 and measures /1 designed to realiAe autonomy at the local level* :t is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the #%ecutive* :t is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may e%ercise removal powers, and as the e%isting Local Government Code has done, delegate its e%ercise to the resident* Thus:
S#CT:$6 /* The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentraliAation with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the -ualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organiAation and operation of the local units* /> "s hereinabove indicated, the deletion of Bas may be provided by lawB was meant to stress, sub silencio, the ob5ective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of "ppeals, li9e the power of local legislation* // The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as e%isting legislation authoriAes the resident .through the Secretary of Local Government1 to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition* The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the resident mere supervisory powers, which supposedly e%cludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority* :t is a mista9en impression because legally, BsupervisionB is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court has held, /8 thus:
:t is true that in the case of 'ondano v* Silvosa, @1 $ff* GaA*, 6o* 3 p* >888, this Court had occasion to discuss this scope and e%tent of the power of supervision by the resident over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over e%ecutive officials of our government wherein it was emphasiAed that the two terms,
control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and e%tent* Thus in that case the Court has made the following digression: B:n administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties* :f the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may ta9e such action or step as prescribed by law to ma9e them perform their duties* Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the 5udgment of the former for that of the latter*B =ut from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the resident over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so re-uires, as postulated in Section 38.c1 of the &evised "dministrative Code* BControlB has been defined as Bthe power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the 5udgment of the former for test of the latter*B /3 BSupervisionB on the other hand means Boverseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties*B /7 "s we held, /8 however, BinvestigatingB is not inconsistent with BoverseeingB, although it is a lesser power than Baltering*B The impression is apparently e%acerbated by the Court;s pronouncements in at least three cases, Lacson v* &o-ue, /7 )ebron v* &eyes, 80 and 'ondano v* Silvosa, 81 and possibly, a fourth one, elaeA v* "uditor General* 8> :n Lacson, this Court said that the resident en5oyed no control powers but only supervision Bas may be provided by law,B 8/ a rule we reiterated in )ebron, and 'ondano* :n elaeA, we stated that the resident Bmay not * * * suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or ta9e any disciplinary action against him, e%cept on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board*B 88 )owever, neither Lacson nor )ebron nor 'ondano categorically banned the Chief #%ecutive from e%ercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not e%ercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to e%ercise disciplinary authority* Thus, according to Lacson:
The contention that the resident has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers is without doubt not well ta9en* &emoval and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction sub5ect to constitutional limitations* 8@ :n )ebron, we stated:
"ccordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of e%press or clear provision to the contrary + which does not e%ist with respect to municipal officers* :n 'ondano, the Court held:
* * * The Congress has e%pressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authoriAed to Breceive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of mal administration of office, and conviction by final 5udgment of any crime involving moral turpitude*B "nd if the charges are serious, Bhe shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer .not being the municipal treasurer1 pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge by one effecting the official integrity of the officer in -uestion*B Section 83 of the &evised "dministration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be e%ercised by the Cepartment )ead over the administration of * * * municipalities* * * * :f it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same
authority as that vested in the Cepartment )ead by section 77.c1 of the &evised "dministrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by Section 110.11, "rticle F::, of the Constitution*B :n elaeA, we stated that the resident can not impose disciplinary measures on local officials e%cept on appeal from the provincial board pursuant to the "dministrative Code* Thus, in those case that this Court denied the resident the power .to suspend remove1 it was not because we did not thin9 that the resident can not e%ercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere* =ut in those cases in which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in GanAon v* Dayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him* The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional Commission to defeat the resident;s powers* The Court believes that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner 2ose 6olledo would e%clude the power of removal from the resident, @0 Commissioner =las $ple would not* The Court is conse-uently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code, =atas =lg* /7* "s we said, BsupervisionB and BremovalB are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger e%pression of local autonomy under the new Charter* <e have indeed held that in spite of the approval of the Charter, =atas =lg* //7 is still in force and effect* @> "s the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means Ba more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentraliAation*B @/ The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to brea9 up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to Bliberate the local governments from the imperialism of 'anila*B "utonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism* The Charter has not ta9en such a radical step* Local governments, under the Constitution, are sub5ect to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit parado%ically, to enhance self4government* "s we observed in one case, @8 decentraliAation means devolution of national administration + but not power + to the local levels* Thus:
6ow, autonomy is either decentraliAation of administration or decentraliAation of power* There is decentraliAation of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to ma9e local governments Bmore responsive and accountable,B and Bensure their fullest development as self4reliant communities and ma9e them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress*B "t the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns* The resident e%ercises Bgeneral supervisionB over them, but only to Bensure that local affairs are administered according to law*B )e has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their 5udgments with his own* CecentraliAation of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, :n that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities* "ccording to a constitutional author, decentraliAation of power amounts to Bself4immolation,B since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its contituency* @@
The successive si%ty4day suspensions imposed on 'ayor &odolfo GanAon is albeit another matter* <hat bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the 'ayor is facing ten administrative charges, the 'ayor is in fact facing the possibility of 300 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings* The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office .assuming that 'ayor GanAon is guilty of misfeasance1 but it is certainly another -uestion to ma9e him serve 300 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office* "s we held: >* etitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur* )is term of office does not e%pire until 1783* <ere it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the "nti4Graft and Corrupt ractices "ct, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor* )e was elected precisely to do so* "s of $ctober >3, 178/, he has been unable to* :t is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice* !or misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally* :n either case, his culpability must be established* 'oreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence* " preventive suspension may be 5ustified* :ts continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process -uestion* !or even if thereafter he were ac-uitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified* Clearly, there would be in such a case an in5ustice suffered by him* 6or is he the only victim* There is in5ustice inflicted li9ewise on the people of Lianga* They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor* :n that sense, to paraphrase 2ustice CardoAo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bonds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression* " denial of due process is thus -uite manifest* :t is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted* The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons, @8 and so also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government* The sole ob5ective of a suspension, as we have held, @7 is simply Bto prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnessesB 30 or to 9eep him off Bthe records and other evidence*B 31 :t is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official* Gnder the Local Government Code, it can not e%ceed si%ty days, 3> which is to say that it need not be e%actly si%ty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span* Suspension is not a penalty and is not unli9e preventive imprisonment in which the accused is held to insure his presence at the trial* :n both cases, the accused .the respondent1 en5oys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty* Suspension finally is temporary, and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than si%ty days* "s we held, 3/ a longer suspension is un5ust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny* "s we observed earlier, imposing 300 days of suspension + which is not a remote possibility + on 'ayor GanAon is to all intents and purposes, to ma9e him spend the rest of his term in inactivity* :t is also to ma9e, to all intents and purposes, his suspension permanent* :t is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the 'ayor;s guilt has not been proven* <orse, any absolution will be for naught because needless to say, the length of his suspension would have, by the time he is
reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably* The Court is not to be mista9en for obstructing the efforts of the respondent Secretary to see that 5ustice is done in :loilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on 'ayor GanAon successive suspensions when apparently, the respondent Secretary has had sufficient time to gather the necessary evidence to build a case against the 'ayor + without suspending him a day longer* <hat is intriguing is that the respondent Secretary has been crac9ing down, so to spea9, on the 'ayor piecemeal + apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent Secretary, could have pursued a consolidated effort* <e reiterate that we are not precluding the resident, through the Secretary of :nterior from e%ercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of :nterior is e%ercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion* The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under -uestions, and that any tal9 of future suspensions is in fact premature* The fact remains, however, that 'ayor GanAon has been made to serve a total of 1>0 days of suspension and the possibility of si%ty days more is arguably around the corner .which amounts to a violation of the Local Government Code1 + which brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend the 'ayor the rest of his natural tenure* The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a concerted effort of the State to perpetuate an arbitrary act* "s we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs* <e are therefore allowing 'ayor &odolfo GanAon to suffer the duration of his third suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary &estraining $rder earlier issued* :nsofar as the sever pertaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Cepartment of Local Government, upon the finality of this Cecision, to underta9e steps to e%pedite the same, sub5ect to 'ayor GanAon;s usual remedies of appeal, 5udicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence* :n resumP, the Court is laying down the following rules:
1* Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentraliAation of administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide( >* The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism( /* The change in constitutional language .with respect to the supervision clause1 was meant but to deny legislative control over local governments( it did not e%empt the latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy( 8* Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials( @* BSupervisionB and BinvestigationB are not inconsistent terms( BinvestigationB does not signify BcontrolB .which the resident does not have1( 3* The petitioner, 'ayor &odolfo GanAon, may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally( provided:
a1 that delays in the investigation of those charges Bdue to his fault, neglect or re-uest, .the time of the delay1 shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension*B ISupra, sec* 3/./1J
b1 that if during, or after the e%piration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper charges are fled against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if warranted under subpar* .>1, Section 3/ of the Local Government Code* <)#&#!$&#, premises considered, the petitions are C:S':SS#C* The Temporary &estraining $rder issued is L:!T#C* The suspensions of the petitioners are "!!:&'#C, provided that the petitioner, 'ayor &odolfo GanAon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior to "ugust 11, 1788* The Secretary of :nterior is $&C#&#C to consolidate all such administrative cases pending against 'ayor GanAon*
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The si%ty4day suspension against the petitioner, 'ary "nn &ivera "rtieda, is "!!:&'#C* 6o costs*
[G.R. No. 182792. D3c36:34 11, 1991.] &H$ #OLI%I&OR G$N$RAL, RODOLFO A. MALA.IRA, #&$.H$N A. MON#AN&O, DAR. %ALD$RON, GRAND' N. &RI$#&$, Petitioners, *. &H$ M$&RO.OLI&AN MANILA A)&HORI&' MANDAL)'ONG #'LLA1)# 1* &#'#C:"L L"<( &$C#CG&"L &GL#S( '"H =# &#L"?#C $& SGS #6C#C :6 T)# :6T#&#ST $! SG=ST"6T:"L 2GST:C#* + Gn-uestionably, the Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the e%ercise of its inherent power, as e%pressly recogniAed in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning Bpleading, practice and procedure in all courts*B :n proper cases, procedural rules may be rela%ed or suspended in the interest of substantial 5ustice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic adherence to such rules* The Court has ta9en this step in a number of such cases, notably "raneta v* Cinglasan, 88 hil* /38, where 2ustice Tuason 5ustified the deviation on the ground that Bthe transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure*B
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>* C$6ST:TGT:$6"L L"<( C#L#G"T:$6 $! L#G:SL"T:F# $<#&( )#LC F"L:C :6 C"S# "T ="&* + The 'etro 'anila "uthority sustains $rdinance 6o* 114Series of 1771, under the specific authority conferred upon it by #$ /7>, while $rdinance 6o* 7, Series of 1788, is 5ustified on the basis of the General <elfare Clause embodies in the Local Government Code* :t is not disputed that both measures were enacted to promote the comfort and convenience of the public and to alleviate the worsening traffic problems in 'etropolitan 'anila due in large part to violations of traffic rules* The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the re-uisites of such delegation are present* These re-uisites are: 11 the completeness of the statute ma9ing the delegation( and >1 the presence of a sufficient standard* /* :C*( :C*( :C*( + Gnder the first re-uirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such that all the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it* <hat only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced* This has been done in the case at bar* "s a second re-uirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard, the function of which is to map out the boundaries of the delegate;s authority and thus Bprevent the delegation from running riot*B This re-uirement has also been met* :t is settled that the Bconvenience and welfareB of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate;s authority* 8* :C*( :C*( EG#ST:$6 $S#C :S T)# F"L:C:TH $! T)# #?#&C:S# $! SGC) C#L#G"T#C $<#&( T#ST T$ C#T#&':6# F"L:C:TH $! 'G6:C: "L $&C:6"6C#* + The measures in -uestion are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature* 6ecessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal* To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular re-uisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations* "ccording to #lliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 11 must not contravene the Constitution or any statute( >1 must not be unfair or oppressive( /1 must not be partial or discriminatory( 81 must not prohibit but may regulate trade( @1 must not be unreasonable( and 31 must be general and consistent with public policy* @* :C*( :C*( :C*( 'G6:C: "L $&C:6"6C# C$#S 6$T C$6!$&' T$ #?:ST:6G L"<* + " careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to e%isting law* The pertinent law is C 130@* C 130@ does not allow either the removal of license plates or the
confiscation of driver;s licenses for traffic violations committed in 'etropolitan 'anila* There is nothing in the provisions of Secs* 1, /, @ and 8 of the decree authoriAing the 'etropolitan 'anila Commission .and now the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority1 to impose such sanctions* :n fact, the said provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in 'etropolitan 'anila* The Commission was allowed to Bimpose fines and otherwise disciplineB traffic violators only Bin such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed,B that is, by the decree itself* 6owhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission* 6otably, Section @ thereof e%pressly provides that Bin case of traffic violations, the driver;s license shall not be confiscated*B These restrictions are applicable to the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority and all other local political subdivisions comprising 'etropolitan 'anila, including the 'unicipality of 'andaluyong* 3* :C*( :C*( :C*( C"S# "T ="&* + The re-uirement that the municipal enactment must not violate e%isting law e%plains itself* Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature .e%cept only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy ta%es is conferred by the Constitution itself1* They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation* "s delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal* :n the case before us, the enactments in -uestion, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute* The self4serving language of Section > of the challenged ordinance is worth nothing* Curiously, it is the measure itself, which was enacted by the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority, that authoriAes the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority to impose the -uestioned sanction* The measures in -uestion do not merely add to the re-uirement of C 130@ but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits* :n so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law* 7* :C*( :C*( :C*( C 130@ " L:#S $6LH T$ '#T&$ $L:T"6 '"6:L" "&#" "6C "6 #?C# T:$6 T$ T)# G#6#&"L
"GT)$&:TH C$6!#&&#C =H &# G=L:C "CT* 81/3 $6 T)# C$'':SS:$6#& $! L"6C T&"6S $&T"T:$6* + <e here emphasiAe the ruling in the Gonong Case that C 130@ applies only to the 'etropolitan 'anila area* :t is an e%ception to the general authority conferred by &*"* 6o* 81/3 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanctions therein prescribed, including those here -uestion* The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in 'etropolitan 'anila through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators* "t the same time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of such sanctions, including the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong decision* "t any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for + and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against + the imposition of such penalties in the 'etropolitan 'anila area* 8* :C*( :C*( :T :S !$& C$6G&#SS T$ #?#&C:S# :TS C:SC&#T:$6 T$ C#T#&':6# <)#T)#& $& 6$T T$ :' $S# T)# EG#ST:$6#C S"6CT:$6S* + :t is for Congress to determine, in the e%ercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in 'etropolitan 'anila* <ithout such action, C 130@ remains effective and continues to prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles .e%cept under the conditions prescribed in L$: 8/1 and of driver;s licenses as well for traffic violations in 'etropolitan 'anila* :n 'etropolitan Traffic Command, <est Traffic Cistrict v* )on* "rsenio '* Gonong, G*&* 6o* 710>/, promulgated on 2uly 1/, 1770, 1 the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the 'etro 'anila Commission under C 130@ and was permitted only under the conditions laid down by L$: 8/ in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets* :t was there also observed that even the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by
the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission* 6o motion for reconsideration of that decision was submitted* The 5udgment became final and e%ecutory on "ugust 3, 1770, and it was duly entered in the =oo9 of #ntries of 2udgments on 2uly 1/, 1770* Subse-uently, the following developments transpired:
:n a letter dated $ctober 17, 1770, &odolfo "* 'alapira complained to the Court that when he was stopped for an alleged traffic violation, his driver;s license was confiscated by Traffic #nforcer "ngel de los &eyes in EueAon City* $n Cecember 18, 1770, the Caloocan4'anila Crivers and $perators "ssociation sent a letter to the Court as9ing who should enforce the decision in the above4mentioned case, whether they could see9 damages for confiscation of their driver;s licenses, and where they should file their complaints* "nother letter was received by the Court on !ebruary 18, 1771, from Stephen L* 'onsanto, complaining against the confiscation of his driver;s license by Traffic #nforcer "*C* 'artineA for an alleged traffic violation in 'andaluyong* This was followed by a letter4complaint filed on 'arch 7, 1771, from Can &* Calderon, a lawyer, also for confiscation of his driver;s license by at* &*2* Tano4an of the 'a9ati olice !orce*
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Still another complaint was received by the Court dated "pril >7, 1771, this time from Grandy 6* Trieste, another lawyer, who also protested the removal of his front license plate by #* &amos of the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority4 Traffic $perations Center and the confiscation of his driver;s license by at* "*F* #mmanuel of the 'etropolitan olice Command4<estern olice Cistrict* &e-uired to submit a Comment on the complaint against him, "llan C* 'artineA invo9ed $rdinance 6o* 7, Series of 1788, of 'andaluyong, authoriAing the confiscation of driver;s licenses and the removal of license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations* !or his part, "*F* #mmanuel said he confiscated Trieste;s driver;s license pursuant to a memorandum dated !ebruary >7, 1771, from the Cistrict Commander of the <estern Traffic Cistrict of the hilippine 6ational olice, authoriAing such sanction under certain conditions* Cirector General Cesar * 6aAareno of the hilippine 6ational olice assured the Court in his own Comment that his office had never authoriAed the removal of the license plates of illegally par9ed vehicles and that he had in fact directed full compliance with the above4mentioned decision in a memorandum, copy of which he attached, entitled &emoval of 'otor Fehicle License lates and dated !ebruary >8, 1771*
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at* &*2* Tano4an, on the other hand, argued that the Gonong decision prohibited only the removal of license plates and not the confiscation of driver;s licenses* $n 'ay >8, 1770, the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority issued $rdinance 6o* 11, Series of 1771, authoriAing itself Bto detach the license plateKtow and impound attendedKunattendedKabandoned motor vehicles illegally par9ed or obstructing the flow of traffic in 'etro 'anila*B
$n 2uly >, 1771, the Court issued the following resolution:
The attention of the Court has been called to the enactment by the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority of $rdinance 6o* 11, Series of 1771, providing inter alia that:
S#CT:$6 >* "uthority to Cetach late K Tow and :mpound* + The 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority, thru the Traffic $perations Center, is authoriAed to detach the license plateKtow and impound attended unattended abandoned motor vehicles illegally par9ed or obstructing the flow of traffic in 'etro 'anila*
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The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case at bar .as reported in 187 SC&" 8/>1, where it was held that the license plates of motor vehicles may not be detached e%cept only under the conditions prescribed in L$: 8/* "dditionally, the Court has received several complaints against the confiscation by police authorities of driver;s licenses for alleged traffic violations, which sanction is, according to the said decision, not among those that may be imposed under C 130@* To clarify these matters for the proper guidance of law4enforcement officers and motorists, the Court &esolved to re-uire the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority and the Solicitor General to submit, within ten .101 days from notice hereof, separate C$''#6TS on such sanctions in light of the said decision* :n its Comment, the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by #$ /7>* :t particularly cited Section > thereof vesting in the Council .its governing body1 the responsibility among others of:
1* !ormulation of policies on the delivery of basic services re-uiring coordination or consolidation for the "uthority( and >* romulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide application, approval of a code of basic services re-uiring coordination, and e%ercise of its rule4ma9ing powers* . Emphasis supplied1 The "uthority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter* :t stressed that the decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why $rdinance 6o* 11 was enacted* The "uthority also pointed out that the ordinance could not be attac9ed collaterally but only in a direct action challenging its validity* !or his part, the Solicitor General e%pressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an invalid e%ercise of a delegated legislative power* The fee in the measure was that it violated e%isting law, specifically C 130@, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver;s licenses for traffic violations in 'etropolitan 'anila* )e made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety of e%amining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity*
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$n $ctober >8, 1771, the $ffice of the Solicitor General submitted a motion for the early resolution of the -uestioned sanctions, to remove once and for all the uncertainty of their validity* " similar motion was filed by the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority, which reiterated its contention that the incidents in -uestion should be dismissed because there was no actual case or controversy before the Court* The 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority is correct in invo9ing the doctrine that the validity of a law or act can be challenged only in a direct action and not collaterally* That is indeed the settled principle* )owever, that rule is not infle%ible and may be rela%ed by the Court under e%ceptional circumstances, such as those in the present controversy*
The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of have created a great deal of confusion among motorists about the state of the law on the -uestioned sanctions* 'ore importantly, he maintains that these sanctions are illegal, being violative of law and the Gonong decision, and should therefore be stopped* <e also note the disturbing report that one policeman who confiscated a driver;s license dismissed the Gonong decision as BwrongB and said the police would not stop their BhabitB unless they received orders Bfrom the top*B &egrettably, not one of the complainants has filed a formal challenge to the ordinances, including 'onsanto and Trieste, who are lawyers and could have been more assertive of their rights* Given these considerations, the Court feels it must address the problem s-uarely presented to it and decide it as categorically rather than dismiss the complaints on the basis of the technical ob5ection raised and thus, through its inaction, allow them to fester* The step we now ta9e is not without legal authority or 5udicial precedent* Gn-uestionably, the Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the e%ercise of its inherent power, as e%pressly recogniAed in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning Bpleading, practice and procedure in all courts*B > :n proper cases, procedural rules may be rela%ed or suspended in the interest of substantial 5ustice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic adherence to such rules* The Court has ta9en this step in a number of such cases, notably "raneta v* Cinglasan, / where 2ustice Tuason 5ustified the donation on the ground that Bthe transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure*B <e have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:
=e it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of 5ustice* Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial 5ustice, must always be avoided* ."Anar ::: v* =ernad, G*&* 6o* 81170, 'ay 7, 1788, 131 SC&" >73*1 Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and e%cepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of 5ustice so re-uire* :n the instant petition, we forego a lengthy dis-uisition of the proper procedure that should have been ta9en by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case* . icAon v* Court of "ppeals, 170 SC&" /11
Three of the cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued separately on other dates* :nasmuch as all of them present the same fundamental -uestion which, in our view, is decisive, they will be disposed of 5ointly* !or the same reason we will pass up the ob5ection to the personality or sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G*&* 6o* L4/0@8 and case G*&* 6o* L /0@3 and the -uestion whether prohibition lies in cases G*&* 6os* L4>088 and L>7@3* 6o practical benefit can be gained from a discussion of these procedural matters, since the decision in the cases wherein the petitioners; cause of action or the propriety of the procedure followed is not in dispute, will be controlling authority on the others* "bove all, the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure* ."velino v* Cuenco, G*&* 6o* L4>8>1 cited in "raneta v* Cinglasan, 88 hil* /38*1 "ccordingly, the Court will consider the motion to resolve filed by the Solicitor General a petition for prohibition against the enforcement of $rdinance 6o* 11 4Series of 1771, of the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority, and $rdinance 6o* 7, Series of 1788, of the 'unicipality of 'andaluyong* Stephen "* 'onsanto, &odolfo "* 'alapira, Can &* Calderon, and Grandy 6* Trieste are considered co4petitioners and the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority and the 'unicipality of
'andaluyong are hereby impleaded as respondents* This petition is doc9eted as G*&* 6o* 10>78>* The comments already submitted are duly noted and shall be ta9en into account by the Court in the resolution of the substantive issues raised* :t is stressed that this action is not intended to disparage procedural rules, which the Court has recogniAed often enough as necessary to the orderly administration of 5ustice* :f we are rela%ing them in this particular case, it is because of the failure of the proper parties to file the appropriate proceeding against the acts complained of, and the necessity of resolving, in the interest of the public, the important substantive issues raised* 6ow to the merits* The 'etro 'anila "uthority sustains $rdinance 6o* 114Series of 1771, under the specific authority conferred upon it by #$ /7>, while $rdinance 6o* 7, Series of 1788, is 5ustified on the basis of the General <elfare Clause embodied in the Local Government Code* 8 :t is not disputed that both measures were enacted to promote the comfort and convenience of the public and to alleviate the worsening traffic problems in 'etropolitan 'anila due in large part to violations of traffic rules*
The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the re-uisites of such delegation are present* These re-uisites are: 11 the completeness of the statute ma9ing the delegation( and >1 the presence of a sufficient standard* @ Gnder the first re-uirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such that all the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it* <hat only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced* This has been done in the case at bar* "s a second re-uirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard, the function of which is to map out the boundaries of the delegate;s authority and thus Bprevent the delegation from running riot*B This re-uirement has also been met* :t is settled that the Bconvenience and welfareB of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate;s authority* 3 =ut the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power* The -uestion we must resolve is the validity of the e%ercise of such delegated power*
The measures in -uestion are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature* 6ecessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal* To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular re-uisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations* "ccording to #lliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 11 must not contravene the Constitution or any statute( >1 must not be unfair or oppressive( /1 must not be partial or discriminatory( 81 must not prohibit but may regulate trade( @1 must not be unreasonable( and 31 must be general and consistent with public policy* 7 " careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to e%isting law* The pertinent law is C 130@* C 130@ does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver;s licenses for traffic violations committed in 'etropolitan 'anila* There is
nothing in the following provisions of the decree authoriAing the 'etropolitan 'anila Commission .and now the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority1 to impose such sanctions:
S#CT:$6 1* The 'etropolitan 'anila Commission shall have the power to impose fines and otherwise discipline drivers and operators of motor vehicles for violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations in 'etropolitan 'anila in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed* !or this purpose, the powers of the Land Transportation Commission and the =oard of Transportation under e%isting laws over such violations and punishment thereof are hereby transferred to the 'etropolitan 'anila Commission* <hen the proper penalty to be imposed is suspension or revocation of driver;s license or certificate of public convenience, the 'etropolitan 'anila Commission or its representatives shall suspend or revo9e such license or certificate* The suspended or revo9ed driver;s license or the report of suspension or revocation of the certificate of public convenience shall be sent to the Land Transportation Commission or the =oard of Transportation, as the case may be, for their records update* S#CT:$6 /* Fiolations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations, committed with a twelve4month period, rec9oned from the date of birth of the licensee, shall sub5ect the violator to graduated fines as follows: 10*00 for the first offense, >0*00 for the second offense, @0*00 for the third offense, a one4year suspension of driver;s license for the fourth offense, and a revocation of the driver;s license for the fifth offense: rovided, That the 'etropolitan 'anila Commission may impose higher penalties as it may deem proper for violations of its ordinances prohibiting or regulating the use of certain public roads, streets and thoroughfares in 'etropolitan 'anila* S#CT:$6 @* :n case of traffic violations, the drivers license shall not be confiscated but the erring driver shall be immediately issued a traffic citation tic9et prescribed by the 'etropolitan 'anila Commission which shall state the violation committed, the amount of fine imposed for the violation and an advice that he can ma9e payment to the city or municipal treasurer where the violation was committed or to the hilippine 6ational =an9 or hilippine Feterans =an9 or their branches within seven days from the date of issuance of the citation tic9et* :f the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period herein prescribed, the 'etropolitan 'anila Commission or the law enforcement agency concerned shall endorse the case to the proper fiscal for appropriate proceedings preparatory to the filing of the case with the competent traffic court, city or municipal court*
:f at the time a driver renews his driver;s license and records show that he has an unpaid fine, his driver;s license shall not be renewed until he has paid the fine and corresponding surcharges* x x x
S#CT:$6 8* :nsofar as the 'etropolitan manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly* . Emphasis supplied1* :n fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in 'etropolitan 'anila* The Commission was allowed to Bimpose fines and otherwise disciplineB traffic violators only Bin such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed,B that is, by the decree itself* 6owhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission* 6otably, Section @ thereof e%pressly provides that Bin case of traffic violations, the driver;s license shall not be confiscated*B These restrictions are applicable to the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority and all other local political subdivisions comprising 'etropolitan 'anila, including the 'unicipality of 'andaluyong*
The re-uirement that the municipal enactment must not violate e%isting law e%plains itself* Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature .e%cept only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy ta%es is conferred by the Constitution itself*1 8 They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation* "s delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal* :n the case before us, the enactments in -uestion, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute* The self4serving language of Section > of the challenged ordinance is worth noting* Curiously, it is the measure itself, which was enacted by the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority, that authoriAes the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority to impose the -uestioned sanction*
:n Fillacorta v* =ernardo, 7 the Court nullified an ordinance enacted by the 'unicipal =oard of Cagupan City for being violative of the Land &egistration "ct* The decision held in part:
:n declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a -uo declared:
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B!rom the above4recited re-uirements, there is no showing that would 5ustify the enactment of the -uestioned ordinance* Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 88 of "ct 873, because the latter law does not re-uire subdivision plans to be submitted to the City #ngineer before the same is submitted for approval to and verification by the General Land &egistration $ffice or by the Cirector of Lands as provided for in Section @8 of said "ct* Section > of the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section 88 of "ct 873, the latter being silent on a service fee of 0*0/ per s-uare meter of every lot sub5ect of such subdivision application( Section / of the ordinance in -uestion also conflicts with Section 88 of "ct 873, because the latter law does not mention of a certification to be made by the City #ngineer before the &egister of Ceeds allows registration of the subdivision plan( and the last section of said ordinance imposes a penalty for its violation, which Section 88 of "ct 873 does not impose* :n other words, $rdinance >> of the City of Cagupan imposes upon a subdivision owner additional conditions* x x x
BThe Court ta9es note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in bringing to a halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the government* =ut as already intimated above, the powers of the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be held valid when it shall impede the e%ercise of rights granted in a general law andKor ma9e a general law subordinated to a local ordinance*B <e affirm* To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them* Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional re-uirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy( the registration of vehicles, to minimiAe carnapping( the e%ecution of contracts, to forestall fraud( the validation of passports, to deter imposture( the e%ercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder( and so on* The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires*
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The measures in -uestion do not merely add to the re-uirement of C 130@ but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow end in fact actually prohibits* :n so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law*
<e here emphasiAe the ruling in the Gonong Case that C 130@ applies only to the 'etropolitan 'anila area* :t is an e%ception to the general authority conferred by &*"* 6o* 81/3 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanctions therein prescribed, including those here -uestioned* The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in 'etropolitan 'anila through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators* "t the same time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of such sanctions, including the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong decision* "t any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for + and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against + the imposition of such penalties in the 'etropolitan 'anila area* )ence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be imposed by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers*
:t is for Congress to determine, in the e%ercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in metropolitan 'anila* <ithout such action, C 130@ remains effective and continues to prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles .e%cept under the conditions prescribed in L$: 8/1 and of driver;s licenses as well for traffic violations in 'etropolitan 'anila* <)#&#!$&#, 5udgment is hereby rendered:
.11 declaring $rdinance 6o* 11, Series of 1771, of the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority and $rdinance 6o* 7, Series of 1788, of the 'unicipality of 'andaluyong, 6GLL and F$:C( and .>1 en5oining all law4enforcement authorities in 'etropolitan 'anila from removing the license plates of motor vehicles .e%cept when authoriAed under L$: 8/1 and confiscating driver;s licenses for traffic violations within the said area*
[G.R. No. 9;489. F3:4u 4" 14, 1992.] %I&I-$N (. AN&ONIO M. %AR.IO, Petitioner, *. &H$ $<$%)&I+$ #$%R$&AR', &H$ #$%R$&AR' OF LO%AL GO+$RNM$N&#, &H$ #$%R$&AR' OF NA&IONAL D$F$N#$, #'LLA1)# 1* $L:T:C"L L"<( ST"TGT#S( &# G=L:C "CT 6$* 377@( C"T# $! #!!#CT:F:TH* + <ith the afore-uoted provision in mind, Congress passed &epublic "ct 6o* 377@ entitled B"6 "CT #ST"=L:S):6G T)# ):L: :6# 6"T:$6"L $L:C# G6C#& " &#$&G"6:R#C C# "&T'#6T $! T)# :6T#&:$& "6C L$C"L G$F#&6'#6T, "6C !$& $T)#& G& $S#SB as the consolidated version of )ouse =ill 6o* >/318 and Senate =ill 6o* 83/* The "ct too9 effect after fifteen days following its publication, or on 2anuary 1, 1771* >* C$6ST:TGT:$6"L L"<( T)# &#S:C#6T )"S C$6T&$L $<#&S $F#& T)# #?#CGT:F# =&"6C) $! T)# G$F#&6'#6T( C$CT&:6# $! EG"L:!:#C $L:T:C"L "G#6CH "S C$&$LL"&H &GL# T)#&#T$* + :t is a fundamentally accepted principle in Constitutional Law that the resident has control of all e%ecutive departments, bureaus, and offices* #-ually well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the resident, is the BCoctrine of Eualified olitical "gency*B "s the resident cannot be e%pected to e%ercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members, who in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective 5urisdictions in the e%ecutive department* /* :C*( :C*( T)# &#S:C#6T, "S C$''"6C#&4:64C):#!, :S 6$T " '#'=#& $! T)# "&'#C !$&C#S* + The resident, as Commander4in4Chief, is not a member of the "rmed !orces* )e remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander4in4Chief provision Brepresent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him* "ll his other functions are clearly civil in nature*B )is position as a civilian Commander4in4Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that Bcivilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military*B ."rticle ::, Section /, 1787 Constitution*1 8* $L:T:C"L L"<( L"C#'#6T $! 6" $LC$' "6C ):L: :6# 6"T:$6"L $L:C# . 6 1 G6C#& T)# C# "&T'#6T n2 &H$ NA&IONAL &R$A#)R$R, Respondents.
$! T)# :6T#&:$& "6C L$C"L G$F#&6'#6T, '#&#LH "6 "C':6:ST&"T:F# &#"L:G6'#6T* + The circumstance that the 6" $LC$' and the 6 are placed under the reorganiAed Cepartment of the :nterior and Local Government is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citiAenry, local e%ecutives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed "ct, the funding of the 6 being in large part subsidiAed by the national government* @* :C*( 6"T:$6"L $L:C# !$&C#( "C':6:ST#&#C "6C C$6T&$LL#C =H 6"T:$6"L $L:C# C$'':SS:$6( L$C"L #?#CGT:F#S "CT $6LH "S &# &#S#6T"T:F#S $! 6" $LC$'* + The national police force shall be administered and controlled by a national police commission as at any rate, and in fact, the "ct in -uestion ade-uately provides for administration and control at the commission level* <e agree, that Bthere is no usurpation of the power of control of the 6" $LC$' under Section @1 because under this very same provision, it is clear that the local e%ecutives are only acting as representatives of the 6" $LC$'* "s such deputies, they are answerable to the 6" $LC$' for their actions in the e%ercise of their functions under that section* Thus, unless countermanded by the 6" $LC$', their acts are valid and binding as acts of the 6" $LC$'*B :t is significant to note that the local officials, as 6" $LC$' representatives, will choose the officers concerned from a list of eligibles .those who meet the general -ualifications for appointment to the 6 1 to be recommended by 6 officials* The same holding is true with respect to the contention on the operational supervision and control e%ercised by the local officials* These officials would simply be acting as representatives of the Commission*
3* :C*( :C*( :6F$LF#'#6T $! C:F:L S#&F:C# C$'':SS:$6 G6C#&SC$&#S :TS C:F:L:"6 C)"&"CT#&* + "s regards the assertion involving the Civil Service Commission, suffice it to say that the -uestioned provisions, which read: BSec* /1* "ppointment of 6 $fficers and 'embers* The "ppointment of the officers and members of the 6 shall be effected in the following manner: a*1 olice $fficer : to Senior olice $fficer :F* "ppointed by the 6 regional director for regional personnel or by the Chief of the 6 for national head-uarters personnel and attested by the Civil Service Commission( b*1 :nspector to Superintendent + "ppointed by the Chief of the 6 , as recommended by their immediate superiors, and attested by the Civil Service Commission( c*1 Senior Superintendent to Ceputy Cirector4 General + "ppointed by the resident upon recommendation of the Chief of the 6 , with proper endorsement by the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission * * * * Sec* />* #%aminations for olicemen* The Civil Service Commission shall administer the -ualifying entrance e%aminations for policemen on the basis of the standards set by the 6" $LC$'*B precisely underscore the civilian character of the national police force, and will undoubtedly professionaliAe the same* 7* :C*( :C*( C$#S 6$T !"LL G6C#& T)# C$''"6C#&4:64C):#! $<#&S $! T)# &#S:C#6T( &#"S$6 "6C C$6S#EG#6C# T)#&#$!* + :t thus becomes all too apparent then that the provision herein assailed precisely gives muscle to and enforces the proposition that the national police force does not fall under the Commander4in4Chief powers of the resident* This is necessarily so since the police force, not being integrated with the military, is not a part of the "rmed !orces of the hilippines* "s a civilian agency of the government, it properly comes within, and is sub5ect to, the e%ercise by the resident of the power of e%ecutive control* Conse-uently, Section 1> does not constitute abdication of commander4in4chief powers* :t simply provides for the transition period or process during which the national police would gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the internal security of the State* Gnder this instance, the resident, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers* 8* :C*( 6"T:$6"L $L:C# C$'':SS:$6 .6" $LC$'1( #?#&C:S#S " " #LL"T# 2G&:SC:CT:$6 T)&G &#G:$6"L
#LL"T# =$"&CS* + ursuant to the "ct, the Commission e%ercises appellate 5urisdiction, thru the regional
appellate boards, over decisions of both the L#= and the said mayors* This is so under Section >0.c1* !urthermore, it is the Commission which shall issue the implementing guidelines and procedures to be adopted by the L#= for the conduct of its hearings, and it may assign 6" $LC$' hearing officers to act as legal consultants of the L#=s .Section 8/4d8, d@1* 7* :C*( C$6ST:TGT:$6"L C$6ST&GCT:$6( #F#&H &#SG' T:$6 :6CGLG#C :6 !"F$& $! C$6ST:TGT:$6"L:TH* + <e find light in the principle of constitutional construction that every presumption should be indulged in favor of constitutionality and the court in considering the validity of the statute in -uestion should give it such reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it within the fundamental law*B
10* :C*( #$ L#;S L"< #6!$&C#'#6T =$"&CS . L#=1( G& $S# !$& :TS C&#"T:$6* + "s a disciplinary board primarily created to hear and decide citiAen;s complaints against erring officers and members of the 6 , the establishment of L#=s in every city and municipality would all the more help professionaliAe the police force* 11* :C*( S #C:"L $F#&S:G)T C$'':TT##( S$L# !G6CT:$6 T)#&#$!* + The Special $versight Committee is simply an ad hoc or transitory body, established and tas9ed solely with planning and overseeing the immediate Btransfer, merger andKor absorptionB into the Cepartment of the :nterior and Local Governments of the Binvolved agencies*B This it will underta9e in accordance with the phases of implementation already laid down in Section 8@ of the "ct and once this is carried out, its functions as well as the committee itself would cease altogether* "s an ad hoc body, its creation and the functions it e%ercises, decidedly do not constitute an encroachment and in diminution of the power of control which properly belongs to the resident* <hat is more, no e%ecutive department, bureau or office is placed under the
control or authority of the committee* 1>* C$6ST:TGT:$6"L L"<( :6C# #6C#6T C$6ST:TGT:$6"L C$'':SS:$6S( 6$T G6C#& T)# C$6T&$L $! T)# C):#! #?#CGT:F#* + Gnder the Constitution, there are the so4called independent Constitutional Commissions, namely: The Civil Service Commission, Commission on "udit, and the Commission on #lections* ."rticle :?4", Section 11* "s These Commissions perform vital governmental functions, they have to be protected from e%ternal influences and political pressures* )ence, they were made constitutional bodies, independent of and not under any department of the government* Certainly, they are not under the control of the resident* The Constitution also created an independent office called the BCommission on )uman &ights*B ."rticle ?:::, Section 17I1J1* )owever, this Commission is not on the same level as the Constitutional Commissions under "rticle :?, although it is independent li9e the latter Commissions* :t still had to be constituted thru #%ecutive $rder 6o* 13/ .dated 'ay @, 17871* :n contrast, "rticle ?F:, Section 3 thereof, merely mandates the statutory creation of a national police commission that will administer and control the national police force to be established thereunder* This commission is, for obvious reasons, not in the same category as the independent Constitutional Commissions of "rticle :? and the other constitutionally created independent $ffice, namely, the Commission on )uman &ights* "t the very outset, it should be well to set forth the constitutional provision that is at the core of the controversy now confronting us, thus:
"rticle ?F:, Section 3:
BThe State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission* The authority of local e%ecutives over the police units in their 5urisdiction shall be provided by law*B 1 <ith the afore-uoted provision in mind, Congress passed &epublic "ct 6o* 377@ entitled B"6 "CT #ST"=L:S):6G T)# ):L: :6# 6"T:$6"L $L:C# G6C#& " &#$&G"6:R#C C# "&T'#6T $! T)# :6T#&:$& "6C L$C"L G$F#&6'#6T,
"6C !$& $T)#& G& $S#SB as the consolidated version of )ouse =ill 6o* >/318 and Senate =ill 6o* 83/*
!ollowing the said "ct;s approval by resident CoraAon C* "-uino on Cecember 1/, 1770, it was published on Cecember 17, 1770* > resently, however, petitioner as citiAen, ta%payer and member of the hilippine =ar sworn to defend the Constitution, filed the petition now at bar on Cecember >0, 1770, see9ing this Court;s declaration of unconstitutionality of &" 377@ with prayer for temporary restraining order*
=ut in an en banc resolution dated Cecember >7, 1770, <e simply re-uired the public respondents to file their Comment, without however giving due course to the petition and the prayer therein* )ence, the "ct too9 effect after fifteen days following its publication, or on 2anuary 1, 1771* / =efore we settle down on the merits of the petition, it would li9ewise be well to discuss albeit briefly the history of our police force and the reasons for the ordination of Section 3, "rticle ?F: in our present Constitution* Curing the Commonwealth period, we had the hilippine Constabulary as the nucleus of the hilippine Ground !orce . G!1, now the "rmed !orces of the hilippines ."! 1* The C was made part of the G! but its administrative, supervisory and directional control was handled by the then Cepartment of the :nterior* "fter the war, it remained as the B6ational oliceB under the Cepartment of 6ational Cefense, as a ma5or service component of the "! * 8
Later, the :ntegration "ct of 177@ @ created the :ntegrated 6ational olice .:6 1 under the $ffice of the resident, with the C as the nucleus, and the local police forces as the civilian components* The C4:6 was headed by the C Chief who, as concurrent Cirector4General of the :6 , e%ercised command functions over the :6 * 3 The 6ational olice Commission 7 .6" $LC$'1 e%ercised administrative control and supervision while the local e%ecutives e%ercised operational supervision and direction over the :6 units assigned within their respective localities* 8 The set4up whereby the :6 was placed under the command of the military component, which is the C, severely eroded the :6 ;s civilian character and the multiplicity in the governance of the C4:6 resulted in inefficient police service* 7 'oreover, the integration of the national police forces with the C also resulted in ine-uities since the military component had superior benefits and privileges* 10 The Constitutional Commission of 1783 was fully aware of the structural errors that beset the system* Thus, Com* Teodulo C* 6atividad e%plained that:
B'&* 6"T:F:C"C* * * * The basic tenet of a modern police organiAation is to remove it from the military* 11 )ere in our draft Constitution, we have already made a constitutional postulate that the military cannot occupy any civil service position Iin Section 3 of the "rticle on the Civil Service 1> J* Therefore, in 9eeping with this and because of the universal acceptance that a police force is a civilian function, a public service, and should not be performed by military force, one of the basic reforms we are presenting here is that it should be separated from the military force which is the C* 1/ !urthermore:
* * * the civilian police cannot blossom into full profession because most of the 9ey positions are being occupied by the military* So, it is up to this Commission to remove the police from such a situation so that it can develop into a truly professional civilian police * * *B )ence, the Bone police force, national in scope, and civilian in characterB provision that is now "rticle ?F:, Section 3 of the 1787 Constitution* "nd so we now come to the merits of the petition at hand* :n the main, petitioner herein respectfully advances the view that &" 377@ emasculated the 6ational olice Commission by limiting its power Bto administrative controlB over the hilippine 6ational olice . 6 1, thus, BcontrolB remained with the Cepartment Secretary under whom both the 6ational olice Commission and the 6 were placed* <e do not share this view* To begin with, one need only refer to the fundamentally accepted principle in Constitutional Law that the resident has control of all e%ecutive departments, bureaus, and offices 13 to lay at rest petitioner;s contention on the matter* This presidential power of control over the e%ecutive branch of government e%tends over all e%ecutive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest cler9 17 and has been held by us, in the landmar9 case of 'ondano v* Silvosa, 18 to mean Bthe power of Ithe residentJ to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the 5udgment of the former with that of the latter*B :t is said to be at the very Bheart of the meaning of Chief #%ecutive*B 17 #-ually well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the resident, is the BCoctrine of Eualified olitical "gency*B "s the resident cannot be e%pected to e%ercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, >0 he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members* Gnder this doctrine, which recogniAes the establishment of a single e%ecutive, >1 Ball e%ecutive and administrative organiAations are ad5uncts of the #%ecutive Cepartment, the heads of the various e%ecutive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief #%ecutive, and, e%cept in cases where the Chief #%ecutive is re-uired by the Constitution or law to act in person on the e%igencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious e%ecutive and administrative functions of the Chief #%ecutive are performed by and through the e%ecutive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief #%ecutive presumptively the acts of the Chief #%ecutive*B >> .Emphasis ours1* Thus, and in short, Bthe resident;s power of control is directly e%ercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective 5urisdictions in the e%ecutive department*B "dditionally, the circumstance that the 6" $LC$' and the 6 are placed under the reorganiAed Cepartment of the :nterior and Local Government is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citiAenry, local e%ecutives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed "ct, >8 the funding of the 6 being in large part subsidiAed by the national government*
c
Such organiAational set4up does not detract from the mandate of the Constitution that the national police force shall be administered and controlled by a national police commission as at any rate, and in fact, the "ct in -uestion ade-uately provides for administration and control at the commission level, as shown in the following provisions, to wit:
BSec* 18* owers and !unctions of the Commission* + The Commission shall e%ercise the following powers and functions:
.i1 "pprove or modify plans and programs on education and training, logistical re-uirements, communications, records, information systems, crime laboratory, crime prevention and crime reporting( .51 "ffirm, reverse or modify, through the 6ational "ppellate =oard, personnel disciplinary actions involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed upon members of the hilippine 6ational olice by the Chief of the 6 ( .91 #%ercise appellate 5urisdiction through the regional appellate boards over administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for police benefits( Sec* >3* The Command and direction of the 6 shall be vested in the Chief of the 6 * * * * Such command and direction of the Chief of the 6 may be delegated to subordinate officials with respect to the units under their respective commands, in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the Commission* * * * *
Sec* /@* * * * To enhance police operational efficiency and effectiveness, the Chief of the 6 may constitute such other support units as may be necessary sub5ect to the approval of the Commission * * * Sec* /7* * * * There shall be established a performance evaluation system which shall be administered in accordance with the rules, regulations and standards, and a code of conduct promulgated by the Commission for members of the 6 * etitioner further asserts that in manifest derogation of the power of control of the 6" $LC$' over the 6 , &" 377@ vested the power to choose the 6 rovincial Cirector and the Chiefs of olice in the Governors and 'ayors, respectively( the power of Boperational supervision and controlB over police units in city and municipal mayors( in the Civil Service Commission, participation in appointments to the positions of Senior Superintendent to Ceputy Cirector4 General as well as the administration of -ualifying entrance e%aminations( disciplinary powers over 6 members in the B eople;s Law #nforcement =oardsB and in city and municipal mayors* $nce more, we find no real controversy upon the foregoing assertions* :t is true that when the Constitutional Commissioners of 1783 provided that the authority of local e%ecutives over the police units in their 5urisdiction shall be provided by law, they intended that the day4to4day functions of police wor9 li9e crime investigation, crime prevention activities, traffic control, etc*, would be under the operational control of the local e%ecutives as it would not be advisable to give full control of the police to the local e%ecutives* >3 They reasoned that in the past, this gave rise to warlordism, bossism, and sanctuaries for vices and abuses* :t would appear then that by vesting in the local e%ecutives the power to choose the officers in -uestion, the "ct went beyond the bounds of the Constitution;s intent* 6ot so* <e find light in the principle of constitutional construction that every presumption should be indulged in favor of constitutionality and the court in considering the validity of the statute in -uestion should give it such reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it within the fundamental law* B Gnder the -uestioned provisions, which read as follows:
cralaw:red
5gc:chanrobles*
BC* "&T:C: "T:$6 $! L$C"L #?#CGT:F#S :6 T)# "C':6:ST&"T:$6 $! T)# 6 * Sec* @1* owers of Local Government $fficials over the 6 Gnits or !orces* Governors and mayors shall be deputiAed as representatives of the Commission in their respective territorial 5urisdictions* "s such, the local e%ecutives shall discharge the following functions: a*1 rovincial Governor + .11 * * * * The provincial governor shall choose the provincial director from a list of three ./1 eligibles recommended by the 6 &egional Cirector* 81 * * * City and municipal mayors shall have the following authority over the 6 units in their respective 5urisdictions:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
i*1 "uthority to choose the chief of police from a list of five .@1 eligibles recommended by the rovincial olice Cirector*
!ull control remains with the 6ational olice Commission* <e agree, and so hold, with the view of the Solicitor General that Bthere is no usurpation of the power of control of the 6" $LC$' under Section @1 because under this very same provision, it is clear that the local e%ecutives are only acting as representatives of the 6" $LC$'* * * * "s such deputies, they are answerable to the 6" $LC$' for their actions in the e%ercise of their functions under that section* Thus, unless countermanded by the 6" $LC$', their acts are valid and binding as acts of the 6" $LC$'*B >7 :t is significant to note that the local officials, as 6" $LC$' representatives, will choose the officers concerned from a list of eligibles .those who meet the general -ualifications for appointment to the 6 1 /0 to be recommended by 6 officials* The same holding is true with respect to the contention on the operational supervision and control e%ercised by the local officials* These officials would simply be acting as representatives of the Commission* "s regards the assertion involving the Civil Service Commission, suffice it to say that the -uestioned provisions, which read: BSec* /1* "ppointment of 6 $fficers and 'embers* + The "ppointment of the officers and members of the 6 shall be effected in the following manner:
a*1 olice $fficer : to Senior olice $fficer :F* "ppointed by the 6 regional director for regional personnel or by the Chief of the 6 for national head-uarters personnel and attested by the Civil Service Commission( b*1 :nspector to Superintendent + "ppointed by the Chief of the 6 , as recommended by their immediate superiors, and attested by the Civil Service Commission( c*1 Senior Superintendent to Ceputy Cirector4General + "ppointed by the resident upon recommendation of the Chief of the 6 , with proper endorsement by the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission * * * Sec* />* #%aminations for olicemen* + The Civil Service Commission shall administer the -ualifying entrance e%aminations for policemen on the basis of the standards set by the 6" $LC$'*B
precisely underscore the civilian character of the national police force, and will undoubtedly professionaliAe the same* The grant of disciplinary powers over 6 members to the B eople;s Law #nforcement =oardsB .or the L#=1 and city and municipal mayors is also not in derogation of the Commission;s power of control over the 6 * ursuant to the "ct, the Commission e%ercises appellate 5urisdiction, thru the regional appellate boards, over decisions of both the L#= and the said mayors* This is so under Section >0.c1* !urthermore, it is the Commission which shall issue the implementing guidelines and procedures to be adopted by the L#= for the conduct of its hearings, and it may assign 6" $LC$' hearing officers to act as legal consultants of the L#=s .Section 8/4d8, d@1* "s a disciplinary board primarily created to hear and decide citiAen;s complaints against erring officers and members of the 6 , the establishment of L#=s in every city and municipality would all the more help professionaliAe the
chanrobl
police force* etitioner would li9ewise have this Court imagine that Section 1> of the -uestioned "ct, the pertinent portion of which reads: BSection 1>* &elationship of the Cepartment with the Cepartment of 6ational Cefense* + Curing a period of twenty4 four .>81 months from the effectivity of this "ct, the "rmed !orces of the hilippines ."! 1 shall continue its present role of preserving the internal and e%ternal security of the State: rovided, that said period may be e%tended by the resident, if he finds it 5ustifiable, for another period not e%ceeding twenty4four .>81 months, after which, the Cepartment shall automatically ta9e over from the "! the primary role of preserving internal security, leaving to the "! its primary role of preserving e%ternal security*B
constitutes an Bencroachment upon, interference with, and an abdication by the resident of, e%ecutive control and commander4in4chief powers*B
That <e are not disposed to do for such is not the case at all here* " re5ection thus of petitioner;s submission anent Section 1> of the "ct should be in order in the light of the following e%changes during the C$6C$' deliberations of <ednesday, $ctober 1, 1783:
B'&* &$C&:G$* 2ust a few -uestions* The resident of the hilippines is the Commander4in4Chief of all the armed forces* '&* 6"T:F:C"C*Hes, 'adam resident* '&* &$C&:G$* Since the national police is not integrated with the armed forces, : do not suppose they come under the Commander4in4Chief powers of the resident of the hilippines* hilippines* '&* &$C&:G$* Hes, but the resident is not the Commander4in4Chief of the national police* '&* 6"T:F:C"C* )e is the resident* '&* &$C&:G$* Hes, the #%ecutive* =ut they do not come under that specific provision that the resident is Commander4in4Chief of all the armed forces* '&* 6"T:F:C"C* 6o, not under the Commander4in4Chief provision* '&* &$C&:G$* There are two other powers of the resident* The resident has control over departments, bureaus and offices, and supervision over local governments* Gnder which does the police fall, under control or under supervisionO '&* 6"T:F:C"C* =oth, 'adam resident* '&* &$C&:G$*Control and Supervision* '&* 6"T:F:C"C*Hes, in fact, the 6ational olice Commission is under the $ffice of the resident*B :t thus becomes all too apparent then that the provision herein assailed precisely gives muscle to and enforces the proposition that the national police force does not fall under the Commander4in4Chief powers of the resident* This is necessarily so since the police force, not being integrated with the military, is not a part of the "rmed !orces of the hilippines* "s a civilian agency of the government, it properly comes within, and is sub5ect to, the e%ercise by the resident of the power of e%ecutive control* Conse-uently, Section 1> does not constitute abdication of commander4in4chief powers* :t simply provides for the transition period or process during which the national police would gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the internal security of the State* Gnder this instance, the resident, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers* :t would bear to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant view, that the resident, as Commander4 in4Chief, is not a member of the "rmed !orces* )e remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander4in4Chief
'&* 6"T:F:C"C* They do, 'adam resident* =y law they are under the supervision and control of the resident of the
provision Brepresent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him* "ll his other functions are clearly civil in nature*B /1 )is position as a civilian Commander4in4Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that Bcivilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military*B ."rticle ::, Section /, 1787 Constitution*1* !inally, petitioner submits that the creation of a BSpecial $versight CommitteeB under Section 88 of the "ct, especially the inclusion therein of some legislators as members .namely: the respective Chairman of the Committee on Local Government and the Committee on 6ational Cefense and Security in the Senate, and the respective Chairman of the Committee on ublic $rder and Security and the Committee on 6ational Cefense in the )ouse of &epresentatives1 is an Bunconstitutional encroachment upon and a diminution of, the resident;s power of control over all e%ecutive departments, bureaus and offices*B
=ut there is not the least interference with the resident;s power of control under Section 88* The Special $versight Committee is simply an ad hoc or transitory body, established and tas9ed solely with planning and overseeing the immediate Btransfer, merger andKor absorptionB into the Cepartment of the :nterior and Local Governments of the Binvolved agencies*B This it will underta9e in accordance with the phases of implementation already laid down in Section 8@ of the "ct and once this is carried out, its functions as well as the committee itself would cease altogether* /> "s an ad hoc body, its creation and the functions it e%ercises, decidedly do not constitute an encroachment and in diminution of the power of control which properly belongs to the resident* <hat is more, no e%ecutive department, bureau or office is placed under the control or authority of the committee* "s a last word, it would not be amiss to point out here that under the Constitution, there are the so4called independent Constitutional Commissions, namely: The Civil Service Commission, Commission on "udit, and the Commission on #lections* ."rticle :?4", Section 11* "s These Commissions perform vital governmental functions, they have to be protected from e%ternal influences and political pressures* )ence, they were made constitutional bodies, independent of and not under any department of the government* /8 Certainly, they are not under the control of the resident* The Constitution also created an independent office called the BCommission on )uman &ights*B ."rticle ?:::, Section 17I1J1* )owever, this Commission is not on the same level as the Constitutional Commissions under "rticle :?, although it is independent li9e the latter Commissions* /@ :t still had to be constituted thru #%ecutive $rder 6o* 13/ .dated 'ay @, 17871* :n contrast, "rticle ?F:, Section 3 thereof, merely mandates the statutory creation of a national police commission that will administer and control the national police force to be established thereunder* This commission is, for obvious reasons, not in the same category as the independent Constitutional Commissions of "rticle :? and the other constitutionally created independent $ffice, namely, the Commission on )uman &ights* =y way of resume, the three Constitutional Commissions .Civil Service, "udit, #lections1 and the additional commission created by the Constitution .)uman &ights1 are all independent of the #%ecutive( but the 6ational olice Commission is not* /3 :n fact, it was stressed during the C$6C$' deliberations that this commission would be under the resident, and hence may be controlled by the resident, thru his or her alter ego, the Secretary of the :nterior and Local Government* <)#&#!$&#, having in view all of the foregoing holdings, the instant petition is hereby C:S':SS#C for lac9 of merit*
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[G.R. No. 112497. August 4, 1994.] HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his c ! cit" s #$%R$&AR' OF ()#&I%$, Petitioner, *.

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$n 2uly >, 1771, the Court issued the following resolution:

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"rticle ?F:, Section 3:

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