48-52 Motion - Compel Initial Disclosures - CONFORMED - 070924

Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 48 Filed 09/24/2007 Page 1 of 2
1 Eugene D. Lee SB# 236812

LAW OFFICE OF EUGENE LEE
2 555 West Fifth Street, Suite 3100
Los Angeles, California 90013
3 Telephone: (213) 992-3299
Facsimile: (213) 596-0487
4 Email: elee@LOEL.com
5
Joan Herrington, SB# 178988
6 BAY AREA EMPLOYMENT LAW OFFICE
5032 Woodminster Lane
7 Oakland, CA 94602-2614
Telephone: (510) 530-4078
8 Facsimile: (510) 530-4725
Email: jh@baelo.com
9 Of Counsel to LAW OFFICE OF EUGENE LEE
10 Attorneys for Plaintiff
DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O.
11
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
12
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
13
14
DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O., Case No. 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG
15
Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL
16 INITIAL DISCLOSURES FROM
v. DEFENDANTS; REQUEST FOR
17 SANCTIONS OF $2,700
18 COUNTY OF KERN; et al. [F.R.C.P. RULES 26(a)(1) AND 37(a)]
19 Defendants. Date: November 5, 2007
Time: 9:30 a.m.
20 Place: U.S. District Court, Bankruptcy Courtroom
1300 18th St., Bakersfield, CA
21
Date Action Filed: January 6, 2007
22 Date Set for Trial: August 26, 2008
23
24 PLAINTIFF HAS ALREADY CONFIRMED THE MOTION HEARING DATE WITH
25 THE DEPUTY CLERK OF THE COURT.
26
27 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT at 9:30 a.m. on November 5, 2007 or as soon thereafter as may
28 be heard by the Honorable U.S. Magistrate Judge Theresa A. Goldner, in the Bankruptcy Courtroom of
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL INITIAL DISCLOSURES AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS 1

1 the above-captioned court located at U.S. District Court, 1300 18th Street, Bakersfield, CA, Plaintiff
2 David F. Jadwin, D.O. will move the Court for an order pursuant to Rule 37(a) compelling Defendants
3 County of Kern, Peter Bryan, Eugene Kercher, Irwin Harris, Scott Ragland, Jennifer Abraham, William
4 Roy and Toni Smith to serve complete Initial Disclosures which comply with Federal Rules of Civil
5 Procedure, Rule 26(a)(1), and further request an award against Defendants and/or their counsel of fees
6 and expenses incurred by Plaintiff in bringing this motion and such other relief as the Court deems
7 appropriate.
8 This motion is based on this notice, the moving papers, and any opposition and reply papers filed
9 and served herewith; the records on file in this case, and oral arguments of counsel at hearing.
10
11 Respectfully submitted on September 24, 2007.
12
13 /s/ Eugene D. Lee SB# 236812
15 Telephone: (213) 992-3299
Facsimile: (213) 596-0487
17 /s/ Joan Herrington, SB# 178988 (as authorized on 9/24/07)
BAY AREA EMPLOYMENT LAW OFFICE
18 5032 Woodminster Lane
Oakland, CA 94602-2614
19 Telephone: (510) 530-4078
Facsimile: (510) 530-4725
20 Email: jh@baelo.com
Of Counsel to LAW OFFICE OF EUGENE LEE
21
Attorneys for Plaintiff DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL INITIAL DISCLOSURES AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS 2


3 Telephone: (213) 992-3299
Facsimile: (213) 596-0487
5 Joan Herrington, SB# 178988
7 Telephone: (510) 530-4078
Facsimile: (510) 530-4725
9
Attorneys for Plaintiff
10 DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O.
11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
12 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
13
14 DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O., Case No. 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG
15 Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
16 v. MOTION TO COMPEL COMPLETE
INITIAL DISCLOSURES FROM
17 COUNTY OF KERN; et al. DEFENDANTS; REQUEST FOR
SANCTIONS
18 Defendants.
[F.R.C.P. RULES 26(a)(1) AND 37(a)]
19
Date: November 5, 2007
20 Time: 9:30 a.m.
Place: U.S. District Court, Bankruptcy Courtroom
21 1300 18th St., Bakersfield, CA
22 Date Action Filed: January 6, 2007
Date Set for Trial: August 26, 2008
23
24
Plaintiff David F. Jadwin, D.O., F.C.A.P., hereby submits this memorandum in support of its
25
motion to compel Defendants County of Kern, Peter Bryan, Eugene Kercher, Irwin Harris, Scott
26
Ragland, Jennifer Abraham, William Roy and Toni Smith to serve complete Initial Disclosures which
27
comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26(a)(1), and of its request for an award against
28
PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

MOTION TO COMPEL INITIAL DISCLOSURES AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS 1
1 Defendants and/or their counsel of fees and expenses incurred by Plaintiff in bringing this motion and
2 such other relief as the Court deems appropriate, pursuant to Rule 37(a).
3
I. CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH ATTEMPTS TO MEET AND CONFER
4
Plaintiff hereby certifies that he has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with
5
Defendants in an effort to secure the required disclosure without court action. Despite meet and confers
6
occurring from August 10 to September 20, 2007, Defendants have refused to sign or even negotiate a
7
written stipulation with Plaintiff which would have resolved this dispute. On September 20, Plaintiff
8
made this final plea:
9
For the last time, please reconsider Defendants’ unreasonable refusal to reduce its
10 agreement to the required stipulation and order required by the rules cited above.
Plaintiff has repeatedly provided Defendants with the proposed stipulation and requested
11 them to either sign or propose amendments.
12 Defendants refused, stating “perhaps we should litigate” this matter. Plaintiff has been left no
13 choice but to bring this motion to compel seeking fees and costs.
14
II. BACKGROUND
15
Plaintiff David F. Jadwin, D.O., F.C.A.P., former Chair of Pathology at Kern Medical Center
16
(“KMC”) and senior pathologist since 2000, filed a Complaint on January 6, 2007. The Complaint
17
alleges, among other things, that Defendants engaged in the following illegal acts: whistleblower
18
retaliation, disability discrimination, medical leave interference and retaliation, demotion and pay
19
reduction without due process, and Fair Labor Standard Act violations. When Plaintiff began reporting
20
several patient care quality issues at KMC starting in 2001, Defendants responded by singling out and
21
targeting Plaintiff for harassment, retaliation and humiliation over the course of the next six years. In
22
2005, Defendants’ conduct finally caused Plaintiff to suffer clinical depression. When Plaintiff began
23
reduced work schedule sick leave in 2006 to treat his depression, Defendants responded by demoting
24
him and retaliating against him further, effectively ending Plaintiff’s pathology career.
25
On August 6, 2007, the parties served Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures on each other.
26
On August 10, Plaintiff sent a meet and confer email to Defendants informing them that
27
Defendants’ Initial Disclosures (“Disclosure 1”) were deficient in several respects. Later that day,
28

1 Defendants re-served corrected Initial Disclosures on Plaintiff (“Disclosure 2”).

2 On August 14, Plaintiff sent a meet and confer email to Defendants informing them that
3 Disclosure 2 was still deficient in several respects, including that Defendants had failed to provide home
4 contact information for numerous disclosed witnesses, instead simply stating “Kern Medical Center”.
5 The email requested Defendants serve corrected Initial Disclosures by August 20.
6 Later that day, Defendants sent an email to Plaintiff demanding legal authority in support of his
7 position. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff and Defendants further exchanged emails.
8 On August 20, Defendants failed to serve corrected Initial Disclosures on Plaintiff.
9 On September 5, Plaintiff faxed and mailed a meet and confer letter to Defendants which re-
10 stated the numerous deficiencies contained in Disclosure 2 and provided extensive legal authority in
11 support of its position. As a compromise, Plaintiff attached a draft proposed stipulation (“Stipulation”)
12 which permitted Defendants to withhold home contact information for current Kern County employees
13 subject to certain conditions, such as stipulating to provide Plaintiff with the home contact information
14 of any current Kern County employee within 10 days of termination of their employment. The letter
15 requested Defendants serve corrected Initial Disclosures and/or the executed Stipulation by September
16 20.
17 On September 10, Defendants sent an email to Plaintiff questioning why it was “okay” for
18 Plaintiff’s to indicate “KMC” as an address for witnesses who are Kern County employees but “not
19 okay” for Defendants to do it.
20 Later that day, Plaintiff sent a meet and confer email to Defendants, explaining that Plaintiff had
21 indicated “KMC” because, unlike Kern County, Plaintiff did not have contact information for Kern
22 County employees, and that this was precisely why Plaintiff was requesting Defendants disclose this
23 information to him.
24 On September 13, Defendants served the “Supplement to Defendants’ Rule 26(a)(1) Initial
25 Disclosures” (“Disclosure 3”) on Plaintiff.
26 On September 18, Plaintiff sent a meet and confer email to Defendants informing them that

1 Attached to the email was the draft Stipulation. The email requested Defendants serve the signed
2 Stipulation and corrected Initial Disclosures by September 20.
3 On September 19, Defendants sent two replies to Plaintiff’s email of September 18, stating
4 Defendants’ refusal to sign or even negotiate the Stipulation, and instead offering an informal assurance
5 that Defendants would provide “contact information for all former employees”. Later that day, Plaintiff
6 sent a meet and confer email to Defendants stating “I think the name-calling is unnecessary” and asking
7 Defendants to re-consider the Stipulation given the vagueness of Defendants’ informal assurance.
8 Defendants responded by citing “representations” they had made recently and in emails dating back to
9 “at least April, if not March.” They noted, “I am not going to take the time to look for them because this
10 whole exercise is a waste of time. If the County at anytime refuses to make someone it controls available
11 to you, you can deal with it then.” Defendants at one point stated “if that is not good enough, bring your
12 motion. Your contentiousness is tiring.”
13 On September 20, Defendants sent an email to Plaintiff stating “[t]he Stipulation you have sent
14 me is not necessary and nothing in the rules you cite is applicable. I know you enjoy disagreements but I
15 cannot find one here. Remind me what the disagreement is. And what it is that needs to be compelled.”
16 Later that day, Plaintiff sent a meet and confer email to Defendants stating “I’ll ask you, not for
17 the first time (and probably not the last), please leave the personal insults out of our interactions.” The
18 email then explained at length why USDC EDCA Local Rule 83-143 and FRCP Rule 29 require
19 agreements between counsel which vary discovery procedures and deadlines be memorialized in a
20 written stipulation and order signed by the Court. Attached to the email was the draft Stipulation. The
21 email stated that the deadline of September 20 remained and that Defendants should serve the signed
22 Stipulation and corrected Initial Disclosures by the close of business hours that day.
23 Plaintiff and Defendants went on to exchange three more meet and confer emails throughout the
24 day. Finally, Plaintiff stated:
25 For the last time, please reconsider Defendants’ unreasonable refusal to reduce its
agreement to the required stipulation and order required by the rules cited above.
26 Plaintiff has repeatedly provided Defendants with the proposed stipulation and requested
them to either sign or propose amendments.
27
Attached to the email was the draft Stipulation. Defendants, however, refused to sign or negotiate the
28

1 Stipulation, stating “[i]f it is your position that there can be no agreements between counsel that are not
2 reduced to formal stipulation and order, then, perhaps we should litigate that.”
3 As of the close of business hours on September 20, Defendants had served neither the signed
4 Stipulation nor complete Amended Initial Disclosures on Plaintiff.
5
III. ARGUMENT
6
A. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO THE HOME CONTACT INFORMATION FOR ALL
7 WITNESSES DISCLOSED IN DEFENDANTS’ INITIAL DISCLOSURES
8 Rule 26(a)(1)(A) of the FRCP provides that a party must, without awaiting a discovery request,
9 provide to other parties: “the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual
10 likely to have discoverable information that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or
11 defenses, unless solely for impeachment, identifying the subjects of the information.”
12 In their Initial Disclosures, Defendants have indicated only the address for Kern Medical Center
13 (and in some cases, the work phone number) as the contact information for those witnesses who are
14 currently employees of Defendant Kern County (“Witnesses”). Plaintiff has requested the Witnesses’
15 home address and phone number, but Defendants have refused, contending that Rule 26 contains no
16 such requirement.
17 The disclosure requirement contained in Rule 26(a)(1)(A) serves several important purposes. As
18 the court noted in Biltrite Corp. v. World Rd. Markings, Inc:
19 The obvious purpose of the disclosure requirement of Rule 26(a)(1)(A), Fed. R. Civ. P.,
is to give the opposing party information as to the identification and location of persons
20 with knowledge so that they can be contacted in connection with the litigation, either for
purposes of serving a proposed amended complaint (as occurred in this case) or for
21 being interviewed or for being deposed or for doing background investigation.
202 F.R.D. 359, 362 (D. Mass. 2001)
22
To facilitate such purposes, Rule 26(a)(1)(A) mandates disclosure of the home address and
23
phone number of witnesses. As Moore’s Federal Practice states: “Furthermore, if some or all of the
24
identified individuals are employees of the disclosing party, their home addresses and telephone
25
numbers must be disclosed. The disclosing party does not satisfy its initial disclosure obligation by
26
providing only its business address and telephone number, even for current employees with
27
managerial responsibilities, unless the disclosing party knows of no other address or telephone number.”
28

1 6-26 Moore’s Federal Practice - Civil § 26.22 (emphasis added).

2 Likewise, in Dixon v. CertainTeed Corp., the court expressly held that disclosure of only
3 business addresses for witnesses does not satisfy the obligation under Rule 26(a)(1). 164 F.R.D. 685,
4 688 - 689 (D. Kan. 1996). Defendants have contended in meet and confers that Dixon is distinguishable
5 because the employer had refused to produce its employees, thereby compelling plaintiff to seek their
6 home addresses so he could directly contact them. In contrast, Defendants claim they are offering to
7 produce all employees upon Plaintiff’s request as well as provide contact information for employees
8 who may leave.
9 In focusing on an insignificant facet of the fact pattern, Defendants misinterpret the Dixon
10 court’s holding. In reaching its holding, the Dixon court recited the relevant facts as follows:
11 CertainTeed initially identified 31 individuals likely to have discoverable information. It
has subsequently identified other such individuals. It has not disclosed, however, the
12 addresses or telephone numbers of current employees. It contends that Rule 26(a) does
not require such disclosure. In a novel approach it cites correspondence between counsel
13 for the parties as support for such proposition. The cited “authority” consists only of a
collection of letters between counsel. They contain no legal citation for the proposition
14 plaintiff asserts.
Id at 688.
15
Absent from the court’s recitation is any reference to the employer’s willingness or unwillingness to
16
produce employees to the plaintiff. In the very next sentences, the court immediately went on to hold:
17
Identification of individuals pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) includes providing their
18 addresses and telephone numbers, if known. The rule expressly states as much. Pursuant
to Rule 26(a)(1), therefore, CertainTeed shall disclose the addresses and telephone
19 numbers of all the identified employees. It may not satisfy this obligation by
disclosing its business address and phone number, unless it knows of no other
20 address and number.
164 F.R.D. 685, 688 - 689 (D. Kan. 1996) (emphasis added).
21
In short, FRCP Rule 26(a)(1)(A) entitles Plaintiff to the home addresses and phone numbers of
22
the Witnesses. Doing so facilitates Plaintiff’s investigation of such Witnesses, service of documents
23
upon them, informal interviews of them, etc. Defendants’ willingness to produce such Witnesses does
24
not, and should not, bear on Plaintiff’s right to such home contact information.
25
26 B. ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF IS WILLING TO ENTER INTO A STIPULATION,
DEFENDANTS REFUSE TO SIGN, OR EVEN NEGOTIATE, A WRITTEN
27 STIPULATION AND ORDER AS IS REQUIRED BY THE FRCP AND LOCAL
RULES
28

1 1. Despite Plaintiff’s Right to Obtain the Home Contact Information for the Witnesses,
Plaintiff Proposed a Written Stipulation so as to Avert this Motion
2
Although Plaintiff has a right to obtain the home contact information for the Witnesses, Plaintiff
3
attempted compromise by proposing the draft Stipulation early on to Defendants. The Stipulation
4
required Defendants to produce home contact information for Witnesses only when they leave
5
employment with Defendant Kern County. In exchange, Defendants would be obligated to produce
6
Witnesses for deposition and/or trial upon Plaintiff’s request.
7
Defendants agreed in principle by the conclusion of the meet and confer process but refused
8
Plaintiff’s numerous requests to sign or negotiate the written Stipulation, asserting “it is unnecessary”.
9
10 2. Under the Rules, Written Stipulations and Signed Orders are Necessary when Regarding
Discovery Procedures
11
However, the rules state otherwise. Rule 29 of the FRCP (“Stipulations Regarding Discovery
12
Procedure”) provides:
13
Unless otherwise directed by the court, the parties may by written stipulation (1)
14 provide that depositions may be taken before any person, at any time or place, upon
any notice, and in any manner and when so taken may be used like other depositions,
15 and (2) modify other procedures governing or limitations placed upon discovery,
except that stipulations extending the time provided in Rules 33, 34, and 36 for
16 responses to discovery may, if they would interfere with any time set for completion of
discovery, for hearing of a motion, or for trial, be made only with the approval of the
17 court.
(Emphasis added).
18
Defendants argued in meet and confers that Rule 29 does not apply because the parties are not
19
varying discovery procedures. However, this is not correct.
20
Rule 30(a) states in relevant part: “The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by subpoena
21
as provided in Rule 45.” Rule 45(b) states in relevant part: “Service of a subpoena shall be made by
22
delivering a copy thereof to such person . . . .”. Defendants’ offer to accept service of deposition
23
subpoenas on behalf of the Witnesses and to compel their attendance at depositions varies the deposition
24
subpoena service procedures set forth in Rules 30(a) and 45(b). Therefore such offer falls under the
25
ambit of Rule 29.
26
Defendants further argued in meet and confers that Rule 29 is permissive rather than mandatory,
27
focusing on the word “may”. However, the Advisory Committee Notes for Rule 29 suggest otherwise:
28

1 “[i]t is common practice for parties to agree on such variations, and the amendment recognizes such
2 agreements and provides a formal mechanism in the rules for giving them effect.” Advisory Com. com.,
3 U.S.C.S. Fed. Rules Civ Proc. Rule 29.
4 Moreover, at least one leading treatise has stated: “Although counsel may honor oral stipulations,
5 discovery procedures and deadlines can be modified only by a stipulation in writing. [FRCP 29].”
6 Hittner, Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial (2007) § 11: 1198
7 (emphasis added).
8 The local rules of this Court also govern this discussion. In particular the local rule regarding
9 stipulations states in relevant part:
10 Except stipulations entered into during the course of a deposition and set forth in the
transcript thereof, stipulations shall be (1) in writing, signed by all attorneys or parties
11 in propria persona who have appeared in the action and are affected by the stipulation,
except as otherwise required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1), and filed, or (2) made in open
12 court and noted by the courtroom deputy clerk upon the minutes or by the court reporter
in the notes, or (3) recited in a pretrial or other court order. Stipulations not in
13 conformity with these requirements will not be recognized unless necessary to
prevent manifest injustice.
14 U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. Cal., Local Rules, rule 83-143.
15 Local rule 83-143 goes on to state that stipulations must be approved by Court or they “are not
16 effective”.
17 In short, because the parties have proposed a variation in discovery procedure – i.e., the method
18 of service of deposition subpoenas on the Witnesses – Rule 29 requires the parties enter into a written
19 stipulation. Local rule 83-143 similarly requires stipulations to be in writing and further requires the
20 parties to convert the stipulation into a signed court order.
21
C. DEFENDANTS AND/OR THEIR COUNSEL SHOULD PAY PLAINTIFF’S
22 ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
23 F.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1) makes sanctions mandatory where a party has failed to make initial
24 disclosures:
25 A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by
Rule 26(a) . . . is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at a
26 trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not so disclosed. In addition
to or in lieu of this sanction, the court, on motion and after affording an opportunity to
27 be heard, may impose other appropriate sanctions. In addition to requiring payment of
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, these sanctions
28 may include any of the sanctions authorized under Rule 37(b)(2)(A), (B), and (C) and

1 may include informing the jury of the failure to make the disclosure.
2 Moreover, the party who prevails on a motion to compel is entitled to reasonable attorney fees
3 and costs, unless the losing party was substantially justified in making or opposing the motion or other
4 circumstances make such an award unjust. Hittner, Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, Federal Civil
5 Procedure Before Trial (2007) § 11: 2380, citing FRCP 37(a)(4); H. K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Goodyear Tire
6 & Rubber Co. 536 F2d 1115, 1124–1125 (6th Cir. 1976).
7 “Willfulness” or “improper intent” need not be shown in awarding sanctions; rather the standard
8 is whether there was “substantial justification” for the losing party's conduct. FRCP 37(a)(4); Reygo
9 Pac. Corp. v. Johnston Pump Co. 680 F2d 647, 649 (9th Cir. 1982); Sheppard v. River Valley Fitness
10 One, L.P. 428 F3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2005). The party facing the sanctions has the burden of proving his
11 failure to comply was “substantially justified” or “harmless.” Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor
12 Corp. 259 F. 3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.2001); see also Wilson v. Bradlees of New England, Inc. 250 F.3d
13 10, 21 (1st Cir. 2001)). Absent such proof, the court should impose sanctions. This “provides a strong
14 inducement for disclosure of material that the disclosing party would expect to use as evidence.” Adv.
15 Comm. Notes on Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1993) 146 FRD 401, 691.
16 This motion would not have been necessary had Defendants simply been willing to negotiate and
17 sign the written Stipulation with Plaintiff. Plaintiff can only speculate as to why Defendants were so
18 categorically opposed to memorializing agreements in a written stipulation.
19 This dispute began with Plaintiff’s offer to enter into a written stipulation. Several times during
20 the meet and confer process, Plaintiff sent Defendants the draft written Stipulation for their review and
21 signature. Defendants, however, refused to negotiate or sign the Stipulation. Defendants instead issued
22 ultimatums, stating their unilateral intention to produce current employees upon Plaintiff’s request but
23 refusing to commit to anything beyond that.
24 By the same token, Plaintiff has good reason not to rely on Defendants’ unilateral
25 “representations”. Since even the beginning of this action, Defendants have continued to bully, ridicule
26 and retaliate against Plaintiff, and have repeatedly failed to honor his work-related requests. For
27 instance, on July 4, 2007, after Defendants had informed Plaintiff that Defendant Kern County did not
28 intend to renew his employment contract (due to expire on October 4, 2007), Plaintiff requested

1 permission to retrieve his personal belongings, including valuable medical books, which had
2 accumulated in his office during the last seven years. After almost 3 months of repeated emails, letters
3 and entreaties by Plaintiff, Defendants continue to withhold Plaintiff’s personal belongings from him.
4 Worst of all, Defendants have refused to give Plaintiff any explanations, despite his numerous requests
5 for one.
6 It is in this context that Plaintiff’s unwillingness to rely on Defendants’ “representations” should
7 be understood. Defendants’ repeated ultimatums and take-it-or-leave-it offers are just the latest
8 examples of the harassing and retaliatory behavior Defendants have inflicted on Plaintiff.
9 Plaintiff requests the Court sanction Defendants and/or their counsel and award Plaintiff attorney
10 fees in the amount of $2,700 in compensation of (a) 1 of the hours Mr. Eugene Lee and 1 of the hours
11 Ms. Joan Herrington spent meeting and conferring to avoid bringing this motion; and (b) 2 of the hours
12 Mr. Lee and 2 of the hours Ms. Herrington spent or anticipate spending in bringing this motion. Ms.
13 Herrington’s and Mr. Lee’s regular rates for such services are $500 and $400 per hour, respectively. Lee
14 Decl. at ¶ 16; Herrington Decl. at ¶ 3.
15
IV. CONCLUSION
16
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court (i) compel Defendants to
17
serve complete Amended Initial Disclosures which disclose the home addresses and phone numbers of
18
all witnesses identified therein pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1)(A), and (ii) order Defendants and/or their
19
counsel to pay Plaintiff $2,700 for attorney fees and costs reasonably incurred in bringing this motion,
20
pursuant to Rule 37(a).
21
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1 Respectfully submitted on September 24, 2007.

2
3 /s/ Eugene D. Lee SB# 236812
5 Telephone: (213) 992-3299
Facsimile: (213) 596-0487
7 /s/ Joan Herrington, SB# 178988 (as authorized on 9/24/07)
9 Telephone: (510) 530-4078
Facsimile: (510) 530-4725
11 Attorneys for Plaintiff DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O.
12
13
14
15
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17
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3 Telephone: (213) 992-3299
Facsimile: (213) 596-0487
5
7 Oakland, CA 94602-2614
Telephone: (510) 530-4078
8 Facsimile: (510) 530-4725
Email: jh@baelo.com
11
12
13
14
15
Plaintiff, DECLARATION OF EUGENE D. LEE IN
16 SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
v. COMPEL INITIAL DISCLOSURES;
17 REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS
18 COUNTY OF KERN; et al. Date: November 5, 2007
Time: 9:30 a.m.
19 Defendants. Place: U.S. District Court, Bankruptcy Courtroom
20
22
23
I, the undersigned, declare and say, as follows:
24
1. I am an attorney at law duly licensed to practice before the Federal and State Courts of
25
California and admitted to practice before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
26
California. I am one of the attorneys of record representing Plaintiff David F. Jadwin in this matter.
27
2. I am making this declaration in support of Plaintiff Dr. Jadwin’s Motion to Compel Initial
28
DECLARATION OF EUGENE D. LEE IN SUPPORT OF

1 Disclosures and Request for Sanctions. The facts stated herein are personally known to me and if called
2 as a witness, I could and would competently testify to the truth of the facts set forth in this declaration.
3 3. I have in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with Defendants in an effort to
4 secure the required disclosure without court action. Despite meet and confers occurring from August 10
5 to September 20, 2007, Defendants have refused to sign or even negotiate the written Stipulation with
6 me which would have resolved this dispute. I have been left no choice but to bring this motion to compel
7 seeking fees and costs.
8 4. On August 6, 2007, the parties served Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures on each other.
9 5. On August 10, I sent a meet and confer email to Mark Wasser, counsel of record for
10 Defendants (“Mr. Wasser”) informing him that Defendants’ Initial Disclosures (“Disclosure 1”) were
11 deficient in several respects. A true and correct copy of the email is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
12 6. Later that day, Mr. Wasser re-served corrected Initial Disclosures on me (“Disclosure
13 2”). A true and correct copy of the corrected Initial Disclosures is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
14 7. On August 14, I sent a meet and confer email to Mr. Wasser informing him that
17 The email requested Defendants serve corrected Initial Disclosures by August 20. A true and correct
18 copy of the email is attached hereto as Exhibit 3.
19 8. Later that day, Mr. Wasser sent an email to me demanding legal authority in support of
20 my position. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff and Defendants further exchanged emails. A true and correct
21 copy of the emails is attached hereto as Exhibit 4.
22 9. On August 20, Defendants failed to serve corrected Initial Disclosures on me.
23 10. On September 5, I faxed and mailed a meet and confer letter to Mr. Wasser which re-
24 stated the numerous deficiencies contained in Disclosure 2 and provided extensive legal authority in
25 support of its position. As a compromise, I attached a draft proposed stipulation which permitted
26 Defendants to withhold home contact information for current Kern County employees subject to certain
27 conditions. The letter requested Defendants serve corrected Initial Disclosures and/or the executed
28 stipulation by September 20. A true and correct copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 5.

1 11. On September 10, Mr. Wasser sent an email to me questioning why it was “okay” for
2 Plaintiff to indicate “KMC” as an address for witnesses who are Kern County employees but “not okay”
3 for Defendants to do it. Later that day, I sent a meet and confer email to Mr. Wasser, explaining that
4 Plaintiff had indicated “KMC” because he did not have contact information for Kern County employees,
5 and that this was precisely why I was requesting Defendants disclose it to him. A true and correct copy
6 of the emails is attached hereto as Exhibit 6.
7 12. On September 13, Mr. Wasser served the “Supplement to Defendants’ Rule 26(a)(1)
8 Initial Disclosures” (“Disclosure 3”) on me. A true and correct copy of the Supplement is attached
9 hereto as Exhibit 7.
10 13. On September 18, I sent a meet and confer email to Mr. Wasser informing him that
13 Attached to the email was the draft stipulation. The email requested Defendants serve the signed
14 stipulation and corrected Initial Disclosures by September 20. A true and correct copy of the email is
15 attached hereto as Exhibit 8.
16 14. On September 19, Mr. Wasser sent two replies to my email of September 18, stating his
17 refusal to sign or even negotiate the Stipulation, and instead giving an informal assurance that
18 Defendants would provide “contact information for all former employees”. Later that day, I sent a meet
19 and confer email to Mr. Wasser stating “I think the name-calling is unnecessary” and asking Defendants
20 to re-consider the Stipulation given the vagueness of Defendants’ informal assurance. Mr. Wasser
21 responded by citing “representations” he had made recently and in emails dating back to “at least April,
22 if not March.” He noted, “I am not going to take the time to look for them because this whole exercise is
23 a waste of time. If the County at anytime refuses to make someone it controls available to you, you can
24 deal with it then.” Mr. Wasser at one point stated “if that is not good enough, bring your motion. Your
25 contentiousness is tiring.” A true and correct copy of the emails is attached hereto as Exhibit 9.
26 15. On September 20, Mr. Wasser sent an email to me stating “[t]he Stipulation you have
27 sent me is not necessary and nothing in the rules you cite is applicable. I know you enjoy disagreements
28 but I cannot find one here. Remind me what the disagreement is. And what it is that needs to be

1 compelled.” Later that day, I sent a meet and confer email to Mr. Wasser stating “I’ll ask you, not for the
2 first time (and probably not the last), please leave the personal insults out of our interactions.” The email
3 then explained at length why USDC EDCA Local Rule 83-143 and FRCP Rule 29 require agreements
4 between counsel to vary discovery procedures and deadlines must be memorialized in a written
5 stipulation and order signed by the Court. Attached to the email was the draft Stipulation. The email
6 stated that the deadline of September 20 remained and that Defendants should serve the signed
7 Stipulation and corrected Initial Disclosures by the close of business hours that day. Mr. Wasser and I
8 went on to exchange three more meet and confer emails throughout the day, wherein Mr. Wasser
9 rejected my arguments. A true and correct copy of the emails is attached hereto as Exhibit 10.
10 16. As of the close of business hours on September 20, Defendants had served neither the
11 signed Stipulation nor complete Amended Initial Disclosures on Plaintiff.
12 17. On July 4, 2007, after Mr. Wasser had informed me that Defendant Kern County did not
13 intend to renew Plaintiff’s contract (due to expire on October 4, 2007), I conveyed to Mr. Wasser
14 Plaintiff’s request for permission to retrieve almost a decade’s worth of valuable personal items which
15 had accumulated in his office. After 3 months of repeated emails, letters and entreaties, Plaintiff’s
16 personal belongings still have yet to be returned to him. When I emailed Mr. Wasser several times
17 asking for an explanation, he simply ignored me. There have been other examples of retaliation and
18 bullying. It is in this context that Plaintiff’s hesitance to accept Defendants’ “representations” should be
19 understood.
20 18. I have spent substantially in excess of 1 hour meeting and conferring with Mr. Wasser by
21 phone, fax, letter and email, and substantially in excess of 2 hours researching and drafting these moving
22 papers. My regular rate for such services is $400 per hour.
23 19. My rate is consistent with those charged in the Los Angeles area by attorneys of similar
24 skill and experience. I received my B.A. with honors from Harvard University in 1991 and my J.D. with
25 honors from the University of Michigan Law School in 1995. I was admitted to the New York State Bar
26 in 1996 and worked as an associate in the New York office of Shearman & Sterling from 1995 to 1996. I
27 worked as an associate in the New York office of Sullivan & Cromwell from 1996 to 1997. After a brief
28 leave of absence from practicing law from 1997 to 1999, I returned to active practice as the General

1 Counsel of Tcom America, Inc., a technology venture in Silicon Valley from 1999 to 2002. From 2002
2 to 2004, I worked as a senior associate for Kim & Chang, a law firm located in Seoul, Korea. In 2005, I
3 was admitted to the California Bar. I have been the principal of Law Office of Eugene Lee since 2005.
4 20. I attempted several times to secure local counsel to prosecute Plaintiff’s suit but was
5 ultimately unsuccessful.
6 21. On September 18, 2006, I sent an email to over 600 members of the California
7 Employment Lawyers Association seeking co-counsel. No attorneys from Fresno responded.
8 22. On February 28, 2007, I called Andrew Jones, Esq. in Fresno, CA, requesting his
9 involvement as local counsel in this action. Mr. Jones declined.
10
11 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the
12 foregoing is true and correct.
13
14 Executed on September 24, 2007, at Los Angeles, California.
15
16
________________________________________
17 Eugene D. Lee
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

EXHIBITS TO DECLARATION OF EUGENE D. LEE
EXHIBIT 1. Meet and confer email from Plaintiff’s attorney to Defendants’

attorney, dated 8/10/07
EXHIBIT 2. Defendants’ corrected Initial Disclosures, dated 8/10/07
EXHIBIT 4. Meet and confer email correspondence between Plaintiff’s attorney and
Defendants’ attorney, dated 8/14/07
EXHIBIT 5. Meet and confer letter faxed by Plaintiff’s attorney to Defendants’
attorney, dated 9/5/07, with draft stipulation attached
EXHIBIT 7. Supplement to Defendants’ Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures, dated
9/13/07

Page 1 of 1
Eugene D. Lee
From: Eugene D. Lee [elee@LOEL.com]

Sent: Friday, August 10, 2007 2:29 PM
To: 'mwasser@markwasser.com'
Cc: 'Joan Herrington'
Subject: Jadwin/KC: Def Initial Disclosures
Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Completed
Mark,
We are in receipt of Defendants’ Initial Disclosures. Although Joan and I are still reviewing them, we thought we
would immediately alert you to several aspects in which the Initial Disclosures fail to comply with Rule 26.
First, the Initial Disclosures are not certified by counsel’s signature.
Second, the Initial Disclosures fail to comply with the last clause of Rule 26(a)(1)(A) which requires Defendants to
disclose “the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have
discoverable information that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless solely for
impeachment, identifying the subjects of the information”. The Initial Disclosures fail to disclose the subjects
of information for each witness. Moreover, production of a “Partial Witness List” as Defendants have chosen to
entitle it, does not comply with Rule 26. The list must be complete as of the date of production.
Please deliver to us Initial Disclosures which comply with Rule 26 within 10 days, i.e., no later than August 20,
2007.
If Defendants fail to do the foregoing, Plaintiff will ask Magistrate Judge Goldner to schedule an informal CMC to
try to resolve these differences. If Defendants comply, Plaintiff will withdraw the informal CMC request.
If neither our meet and confer efforts nor the informal CMC resolve this issue, then Plaintiff intends to file a motion
to compel compliant Initial Disclosures that seeks monetary and evidentiary sanctions.
It is unfortunate that this action is yet again delayed due to the need for Plaintiff to engage in the meet and confer
process with Defendants. Plaintiff looks forward to Defendants’ immediate response.
Sincerely,
Gene Lee / Joan Herrington
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
L A W O F F I C E O F E U G E N E L E E
E M P L O Y M E N T L A W
555 WEST FIFTH ST., STE. 3100
LOS ANGELES, CA 90013
Tel: (213)992-3299
Fax: (213)596-0487
E - m a i l : elee@LOEL.com
W e b s i t e : www.LOEL.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This message is sent by a law firm and may contain information that is privileged or confidential. If you received
this transmission in error, please notify the sender by reply e-mail and delete the message and any attachments.
9/20/2007
EXHIBIT 2. Defendants’ corrected Initial Disclosures, dated 8/10/07

Aug 10 07 05:14p Mark Wasser 916-444-6405 p.1
The Law Offices of Mark A. Wasser

400 Capitol Mall, Suite 1100
Sacramento. California 95814
Office: 916-444-6400
Fax: 916-444-6405
Fax
To' Eugene Lee From: Mark A Wasser
Fax: (213) 596-0487 Pages: 10 including cover
Phone: (213) 992-3299 Date: 8/10/2007
Re: Jadwin v. County of Kern, et al cc,
o Urgent o For Review o Please Comment D Please Reply o Please Recycle
• Comments, See Defendants' Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures.

Aug
Aug 10
10 07
07 05:14p
05:14p Mark Wasser 916-444-6405
916-444-6405 p.2
p.2
Mark A. Wasser CA SB #060160

Mark
LAW OFFICES OF MARK A. WASSER
LAW
22 400
Sacramento,
Sacramento, CA 95814
33 Phone:
Phone: (916) 444-6400
Fax: (916) 444-6405
Fax:
44 E-mail:
E-mail: mwasser(al.markwasser.com
55 Bernard
Bernard C. Barmann, Sr.
KERN
KERN COUNTY COUNSEL
66 Mark
Mark Nations, Chief Deputy
1115
1115 Truxton Avenue, Fourth Floor
77 Bakersfield,
Bakersfield, CA 93301
Phone:
Phone: (661) 868-3800
88 Fax: (661) 868-3805
E-mail:
E-mail: mnations@co.kern.ca.us
99
10
10 Attorneys
Attorneys for Defendants County of Kern,
Peter
Peter Bryan, Irwin Harris, Eugene Kercher,
II
II Jennifer
Jennifer Abraham, Scott Ragland, Toni Smith
and
and William Roy
12
12
13
14
14 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
15
15
16
16 DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O. ) Case No.: 1:07-cv-00026-0WW-TAG
)
~
17
17 Plaintiff, DEFENDANTS' RULE 26(a)(I) INITIAL
DISCLOSURES
~
18
18 vs.
Date Action Filed: January 6,2007
19
19 COUNTY OF KERN, et aI.,
COUNTY ) Trial Date: August 26, 2008
20
20 Defendants. ~)
21
21
j
~)
22
22
23
23
24
24 I. INDIVIDUALS LIKELY TO RAVE DISCOVERABLE INFORMAnON IRA
DEFENDANTS' MAY l:SE TO SUPPORT THEIR DEFENSES
25
25
26
26 See Appendix 1 attached hereto.
27
27
28
28
DEFENDANTS' RULE 26(")(1) 1NITIAL DISCLOSURES

DISCLOSURES
I
n.
COPIES OF ALL DOCUl\iIENTS
ll. DOCUMENTS THAT ARE IN THE POSSESSION
CUSTODY, OR CONTROL OF THE PARTY AND THAT THE DEFENDANTS' MA
2 USE TO SUPPORT THEIR DEFENSES
3
See documents
docwnents produced on August 6, 2007.
4
5
Dated: August 10, 2007 LAW
LA OFfiCES OF MARK A. WASSER
1JyT OFFiCES \VASSER
6
8
Mark A. Wasser
9 Attorney for Defendants, County of Kem, et al.
10
11
12
13
14
15
IS
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
DEFENDANTS' RULE 26(a)(l) INITIAL DISCLOSURES

2
Aug 10 07 05:15p Mark Wasser 916-444-6405 pA
Appendix 1
Aug
Aug 10
10 07
07 05:15p
05:15p Mark Wasser 916-444-6405
916-444-6405 p.5
p.5
POTEl'\TIAL WITNESS LIST
NAME & AVAILABLE CONTACT INFORMATION SUBJECT OF INFORMAnON

Leonard Perez, MD Generallmowledge of issues
Kern Yledical Center
1830 Flower Street
Telephone: (661) 326-2236
Sergio Perticucci, MD Unknown
No contact information available
Adam Lang, MD General knowledge of issues
10506 Finchley Drive
Ball.erstield, CA 9331 I
Telephone: (661) 205-2869
Elsa Ang, MD General knowledge of issues
4200 Sill Place
Fangluo Lin,
Fanglno Liu, MD General knowledge of iss~les
iss~les
107 I0 Harpenden Avenue
Telephone: (661) 303-9117
Ellen Bnnyi-Teopengco,
Bunyi-Teopengco, MD General knowledge of issues
10518 Ascot Crossing Street
Bakerstle1d, CA 93311
Telephone: (661) 204-5682
Savita Shertukde, MD General knowledge of issues
ofissncs
Kern Medical Center
Telephone: (661) 326-2595
Gilbert Martinez General knowledge of issues
Kern Medical Center
Telephone: (661) 326-246B
Royce Johnson, MD General knowledge of issues
Kern Medical Center
Irwin E. Harris, MD I G,,;neral knowledge ofissucs
Kern Medical Center
Antoinette (Toni) Smith, MSN, RN,C General knowledge of issues

Kern Medical Cemer
Telephone: (661) 326-2688
David K. Culberson General knowledge of issues
The Camden Group
100 N. Sepulveda Blvd., Ste. 600
EI Segundo, CA 90245
Susie Price, RN Cnknown
Kaiser Permauente Medical Group
Bakersfield, CA
Evaugeline "Vangie" Gallegos (aka Tolentino) Unknown
Kern Medical Center
Yolauda Figueroa Unknown
Kern "1edical Center
Telephone: (661) 326-2448
Tracy Lindsey Unknown
Kern Medical Center
Telephone: (661) 326-2256
Katrina Mauuel Unknown
Kern Medical Center
Denise Rhynes Unknown
Kern Medical Center
Tracy Subriar Unknown
Kern Medical Center
Carol Wedding Unkno'wn
Kern Medical Center
Rae McDonald Unknown
Kern Medical Center
Arlene Ramos-Aninion Unknown
Kern Medical Center
Jaue Thornton General knowledge ofissnes
Kern Medical Center
Telephone: (661) 326-2906
Kathy Griffith General knowledge of issues
Kern Medical Center
Telephone: (661) 326-2441
2
Michael Costa, MD Unknown

1451 W. Willow Street
Stockton, CA 95203
Juan Felix, :MD Limited knowledge of diagnosis
LAC-USC Medical Center
Director of Surgical Pathology,
Women's and Children's Hospital
Parakrama Chandrasoma, MD Limited knowledge of diagnosis
LAC+USC Medical Center
Los Angeles, CA 90033
Telephone: 323-226-4600
David Hill Unknown
7404 Arleta Avenue
Bernard C. Barmann, Sr., County Counsel General knowledge of issues
Office of County Counsel
IllS Truxtun Ave., 4th Floor
Bakersfield, CA 9330 I
Telephone: (661) 868-3800
,
Ravi Patel, MD General knowledge ofissues
Comprehensive Blood and Cancer Center
6501 Truxtun Avenue
David Lieu, MD Unknown
UCLA Medical Center
Marvin Kolb, MD General knowledge of issues
10708 North Essex Court
Mequon, Wisconsin 53092
Nitin Athavale, ::VlD General knowledge of issues
19620 Scotland Drive
Saratoga, CA 95070
Vivek Bhargava, MD Unknown
lSI Garcia Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94127 I I
3
Margo A. Raison Unknmvn

County ofKem County Counsel
Chief Deputy County Counsel
Administrative Center
th
IllS Truxtun Ave., 4 Floor
Direct: (661) 86&-3876
Jennifer J. Abraham, MD General knowledge of issues
Kern Medical Center
Telephone: (661) 873-7370
Eugene E. Kercher, MD General knowledge of issues
Kern Medic:al Center
Telephone: (661) 326-2159
A. Scott Ragland, DO General knowledge of issues
Kern Medical Center
Telephone: (661) &72-8559
Jose Perez, MD General knowledge of issues
Houston, Texas
Peter K. Bryan General knowledge of issues
. 6424 S. Abilene Street
Centennial, Colorado 80111
William Roy, J\,ID General knowledge of issues
Mobile, Alabama
Edward (Bill) Taylor, MD General knowledge of issues
Kern Medical Center
Telephone: (661) 326-2275
Michelle Burris General knowledge of issues
Kern Medical Center
Telephone: (661) 326-2464
Stacy Lynne Garry, J\,ID Unknown
1500 Cornmanche Drive
Las Vegas, Nevada &9109
Javad Naderi, MD . General knowledge of issues
Kern Medical Center
Pager: (661) 307-2119
Maureen Martin, MD General knowledge of issues
Kem Medical Center
Telephone: (661) 326-2275
..-
4
Navin Amin, MD General knowledge of issues

Kern Medical Center
Telephone: (661) 326-5052
Chester Lau, MD General knowledge of issues
1061 Dakin Avenue
Menlo Park, CA 94025
Steve O'Connor General knowledge of issues
Kern Medical Center
RenitaNmm General knowledge of issues
, Kern Medical Center
Albert McBride, MD General knowledge of issues
Kern Medical Center
Telephone: (661) 326-2286
Alice Hevle General knowledge of issues
Kern Medical Center
Telephone: (661) 326-2012
Dianne McConnehey, RN General knowledge of issues
Kern Medical Center
Philip Dun, MD General knowledge of issues
Kern Medical Center
Telephone: (661) 326-2256
Mary Cortez Unknown
Kern Medical Center
Telephone: (661) 326-2161
Karen S, Barnes, Chief Deputy General knowledge of issues
Office of County Counsel
IllS Truxtun Ave., 4th Floor
Telephone: (661) 326-2029
Ronald M. Errera General knowledge of issues
County Administrative Officer
1115 T ruxtun Ave, 4th Floor
Jordan Kaufman Unknov..'ll
Assistant Treasurer
1115 Truxtun Ave., 4th floor
BalwrsfieJd,
Bal<ersfieJd, CA 93301
5
Jack King Unknown

Kern Medical Center
Cindy Lighthill Limited knowledge of
Kern Medical Center compensation
rai Yoo, MD Unknown
Kern Medical Center
Erin Baldwin, MD Knowledge ofLau incident
Former KMC Medical Student (2003)
18 Lassen Drive
Santa Barbara, CA 93111
Linda Nipper Unknown
Kern County Superior Court
Bonnie Quinonez Unknown
3434 South Sterling Road
Patricia Parada Unknown
Kern Medical Center
Serena Sepulveda-Rini Unknown
Kern Medical Center
David Kanamori, MD Unknown
Comprehensive Blood and Cancer Center
6501 Truxtun Avenue
Jodi Hartsfield Knowledge of compensation
Medrium, Inc. issues
4900 California Ave., Ste. 170-B
Carol Gates . General knowledge of issues
Kern Medical Center
Telephone: (661) 326-2657
Martin Lipschultz, MD Unknown
. 716 Meadow Lane South
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55416
Denise Long , General knowledge of issues
Kern Medical Center
Telephone: (661) 868-3162
6

Page 2 of 2
Mark
From: Eugene D. Lee [mailto:elee@LOEL.com]

Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2007 12:42 PM
To: mwasser@markwasser.com
Subject: Jadwin/KC: Def Initial Disclosures
Mark,
Thank you for sending the Defendants’ Initial Disclosures to me on August 10. As you know, I had earlier written
you about the various ways in which the Initial Disclosures had been noncompliant with Rule 26. The “Potential
Witness List” contained in the Initial Disclosures remains noncompliant in the following ways:
- Indication that a witness’s subject of information is “General Knowledge of issues”: this is insufficient
disclosure as it fails to put Plaintiff on sufficient notice as to what information the witness possesses. Just
as an example, Dr. Elsa Ang can’t possibly have percipient knowledge about Plaintiff’s sick leaves,
demotion, involuntary administrative leave, non-renewal of his contract, etc.
- Indication that a witness’s subject of information is “Unknown”: If the subject of information is unknown to
Defendants, the witness must be removed from the list.
- Contact information for certain witnesses denoted simply as “Kern Medical Center”: The last known
home address of must be provided for each witness.
Again, it is unfortunate that this action continues to be delayed by Defendants’ continuing failure to comply with
Rule 26. We look forward to receiving fully compliant Initial Disclosures by no later than August 20, 2007.
Otherwise, Plaintiff will consider requesting an informal CMC and/or filing a motion to compel.
Sincerely,
Gene Lee
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Tel: (213)992-3299
Fax: (213)596-0487
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
9/20/2007
Page 1 of 2
Eugene D. Lee
From: Mark Wasser [mwasser@markwasser.com]

To: elee@LOEL.com
Subject: RE: Jadwin/KC: Def Initial Disclosures
Gene,
I am not refusing to modify the witness list. I simply asked you if you have any authority for your position.
Mark

Mark,
I’ll look for authority and you’re welcome to do the same. But I take it from your email that you are refusing to
modify the witness list. We will proceed accordingly.
Sincerely,
Gene
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Tel: (213)992-3299
Fax: (213)596-0487
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From: Mark Wasser [mailto:mwasser@markwasser.com]

To: elee@LOEL.com
Gene,
Do you have any authority that a business address is not adequate for a witness?
Same question regarding the reference to “General Knowledge.” What is your authority for that?
9/20/2007
EXHIBIT 5. Meet and confer letter faxed by Plaintiff’s attorney to Defendants’

To: 213-596-0487 From: Law OFFice of Eugene Lee Pg 1/ 6 09/05/07 2:27 pm

ELEE@LOEL.COM
(213) 992-3299
TELEPHONE
LAW OFFICE OF EMAIL
E U G ENE L E E
(213) 596-0487 555 WEST FIFTH STREET SUITE 3100 WWW.LOEL.COM
FACSIMILE Los ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 9001 3-1 01 0 WEBSITE
FAX
To: From: Law Office of Eugene Lee
Fax Number: 2135960487 Date: 09/05/2007
Pages: 6 (including cover page)
Re: Jadwin/KC: Meet & Confer re Initial Disclosures
Comments:
Mark:
Transmitted herewith is a meet and confer letter regarding Defendants'

defective Initial Disclosures as well as a proposed stipulation.
We look forward to hearing from you shortly.
Sincerely.
(213) 992-3299
TELEPH ON E
LAW OFFICE o F E LE E@LOEL.COM
E-MAIL
EUGENE LEE
(Z 1 3) 596-0487 555 WEST FIFTH STREET, SUITE 3 1 0 0 WWW.LOEL.COM
FACSIMILE LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90013-1010 WEBSITE
EUGENE D. LEE, ESQ JOAN E. HERRINGTON, ESQ

PRINCIPAL OF COUNSEL
September 5, 2007
VIA FACSIMILE & US MAIL
Mark Wasser 100011.001

Law Offices of Mark Wasser
400 Capitol Mall Ste II 00
Re: Defendants' Initial Disclosures

Jadwin / County of Kern, et al. (USDC EDCA No. 1:07-cv-00026-0WW/TAG)
Dear Mr. Wasser:
On August 14, 2007, we sent you an email notifying Defendants of the following deficiencies in
the witness disclosure portion of their Initial Disclosures:
Indication that a witness's subject of information is "General Knowledge of

issues": Fails to sufficiently identify the subjects of information the witness
possesses, particularly when some of these witnesses left KMC many years ago.
Indication that a witness's subject of information is "Unknown": If the subject of

information is unknown to Defendants, the witness must be removed from the list.
Contact information for certain witnesses denoted simply as "Kern Medical

Center": The last known home address and phone number of each witness must be
disclosed.
Later that day, you had replied via email requesting Plaintiff provide case authority supporting
the first and third points (presumably, Defendants did not contest the validity of Plaintiffs
second point and therefore acknowledge it). No case authority is needed when Defendant clearly
has not complied with the plain language of the statute:
F.R.C.P. Rule 26(a)(1)(A) requires disclosure of: "the name and, if known, the address
and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information that the
disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment,
identifying the subjects of the information."
Defendants Must Provide the Topics of Knowledge for Each Witness
The purpose of discovery is to make trial "less a game of blind man's bluff and more a fair
contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent possible," United
States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677,683, 78 S.Ct. 983,987, 2 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958), and to
narrow and clarify the issues in dispute, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501, 67 S.Ct. 385,
388, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947). Initial disclosures are intended to streamline discovery and make it
more efficient. Disclosure of "the subjects of information" possessed by each disclosed witness
is essential in this case to meet this purpose.
A blanket list (of disclosed witnesses), with no identifying information, is close to useless
and would require a vast expenditure of resources on the part of TEl to make the
disclosure meaningful. EI Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. Traylor Bros., Inc. F.Supp.2d, 2006
WL 191960 E.D.Cal., 2006.
Defendant's disclosure that a witness has "general knowledge of the issues" is insufficient to
allow Plaintiff to select from among the many, many witnesses so designated only those who
possess sufficient pertinent information to warrant deposing. This is particularly true when
Defendants have used this all-encompassing designation to describe the subjects of information
possessed by witnesses such as Dr. Elsa Ang, who has not been employed by KMC for many
years, so must necessarily have a limited scope of knowledge ofthe subject matter of this
lawsuit.
Defendants Must Provide the Last Known Home Address and Phone Numbers for Each
Witness
As the court stated in Bell v. Swift & Co., "[Rule 26], governing the scope of the interrogatories,
provides expressly that discovery may be had concerning 'the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of relevant facts'. One of the purposes of this provision is to allow all parties
equal access to the relevant facts." 283 F.2d 407, 409 (5th Cir. 1960) (emphasis added).
In Biltrite Corp. v. World Rd. Markings, Inc., the court noted that there are several specific
purposes underlying the requirement that parties disclose the identification and location of
witnesses:
The obvious purpose of the disclosure requirement of Rule 26(a)(1)(A), Fed. R.

Civ. P., is to give the opposing party information as to the identification and
location of persons with knowledge so that they can be contacted in connection
with the litigation, either for purposes of serving a proposed amended complaint
(as occurred in this case) or for being interviewed or for being deposed or for
doing background investigation.
202 F.R.D. 359,362 (D. Mass. 2001)
Finally, in Dixon v. Certainteed Corp., the court expressly noted that disclosing only business
addresses for witnesses does not satisfy the obligation under Rule 26:
[Defendant] has not disclosed, however, the addresses or telephone numbers of

current employees. It contends that Rule 26(a) does not require such disclosure [..
. .] Identification of individuals pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) includes
providing their addresses and telephone numbers, if known. The rule expressly
states as much. Pursuant to Rule 26(a)(I), therefore, CertainTeed shall disclose
2
the addresses and telephone numbers of all the identified employees. It may not
satisfy this obligation by disclosing its business address and phone number,
unless it knows of no other address and number.
164 F.R.D. 685,689 (D. Kan. 1996) (emphasis added).
In their Initial Disclosures, Defendants state "Kern Medical Center" - and nothing more - as the
contact information for numerous witnesses. This does not constitute a "business address" let
alone sufficient disclosure. Defendants fail to provide Plaintiff with the last known home address
and phone numbers for each witness, the work number, email address or any other pertinent
contact information.
Defendants Must Produce Relevant Insurance Policies
In addition, we would like to point out another deficiency in Defendants' Initial Disclosures.
Rule 26(a)(I)(D) requires Defendants to provide to Plaintiff "for inspection and copying as under
Rule 34 any insurance agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance business may
be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify
or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment." As the court in Excelsior College v.
Frye noted:
A plain reading of Rule 26(a)(l)(D), indicates it is clearly designed for parties to

produce documentation of any insurance policies that give rise to an insurer's
obligation to indemnify or hold its insured harmless for a judgment. Likewise, the
legislative history supports this interpretation.
233 F.R.D. 583, 586 (D. Cal. 2006)
Defendants' Initial Disclosures contained no such insurance agreements.
Although Plaintiff had requested Defendants' re-serve the Initial Disclosures so as to correct the
above deficiencies by no later than August 20, Defendants have failed to do so. It is unfortunate
that this action continues to be delayed by Defendants' continuing failure to comply with the
rules.
Enclosed is a proposed stipulation for your signature. In any event, we look forward to receiving
compliant Initial Disclosures by no later than September 20,2007. Otherwise, Plaintiff will be
forced to consider requesting an informal CMC and/or filing a motion to order Defendants to re-
submit their Initial Disclosures.
cc: Joan Herrington, Esq.

enc: Proposed Stipulation
3
1 LAW OFFICE OF EUGENE LEE

Eugene D. Lee (SB#: 236812)
3 Phone: (213) 992-3299
Fax: (213) 596-0487
4 email: elee@LOEL.com

7 Telephone: (510) 530-4078
Facsimile: (510) 530-4725
9
11
12 400 Capitol Mall, Suite 11 00
13 Phone: (916) 444-6400
Fax: (916) 444-6405
14 Email: mwasser@markwasser.com
15 Bernard C. Barmann, Sr.

KERN COUNTY COUNSEL
16 Mark Nations, Chief Deputy
17 Bakersfield, CA 93301
Phone: (661) 868-3800
18 Fax: (661) 868-3805
Email: mnations@co.kern.ca.us
19
Attorneys for Defendants County of Kern, Peter Bryan, Irwin Harris, Eugene Kercher, Jennifer
20 Abraham, Scott Ragland,Toni Smith, and William Roy.
23 FRESNO DIVISION
24 DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O., Civil Action No. 1:07-cv-00026 OWW TAG
25 Plaintiff, STIPULATION RE HOME ADDRESSES OF

v. DISCLOSED KERN COUNTY EMPLOYEES.
26
COUNTY OF KERN, et aI., Complaint Filed: January 5, 2007
27 Trial Date: August 26,2008
Defendants.
28
USDC, ED Case No. 1:07-cv-00026 OWW TAG
STIPULATION RE ADDRESSES OF DISCLOSED WITNESSES 1
1 In order to avoid a Motion to Compel Initial Disclosures that comply with Rule 26, Defendants
2 hereby stipulate that:
3 1. Defendants shall disclose to Plaintiff David F. Jadwin, D.O. the last known address 0
4 any and all Conner employees of Defendant County of Kern that Defendants listed as
5 witnesses in their Initial and Supplemental Disclosures by September 20, 2007.
6 2. Defendants shall disclose to Plaintiff David F. Jadwin, D.O. the last known address 0
7 any and all current employees of Defendant County of Kern that Defendants listed as
8 witnesses in their Initial and any Supplemental Disclosures within ten working days
9 of any termination of their employment with the County of Kern.
10 3. Defense counsel shall accept service by facsimile of Plaintiff's deposition subpoenas
11 and Rule 45 subpoenas on behalf of any and all current employees of Defendant
12 County of Kern, and Defendant County of Kern shall take all necessary steps to
13 compel compliance with either or both ofthese.

14 4. Defendants shall re-serve their Initial Disclosures by September 20, 2007 so as to
15 provide a more precise and substantive description of the "subject of information" of
16 each witness.
17 5. Defendants shall re-serve their Initial Disclosures by no later than September 20,
18 2007 so as to produce insurance agreements as required under Rule 26(a)(l)(D).
19 Dated: September_, 2007
20
21 Eugene D. Lee
Attorney for Plaintiff
Dated: September _, 2007
23
24
Mark A. Wasser,
25 Attorney for Defendants
COUNTY OF KERN, PETER BRYAN, IRWIN
26 HARRIS, EUGENE KERCHER, JENNIFER
ABRAHAM, SCOTT RAGLAND,TONI SMITH,
27 AND WILLIAM ROY
28
Page 1 of 3
Eugene D. Lee

Sent: Monday, September 10, 2007 10:27 PM
Subject: Jadwin/KC: MNC re Initial Disclosures
Mark,
We wrote “KMC” because we don’t have the contact information for those witnesses. If we did, we would not now
be asking the County to provide it to us. Those witnesses are present or past employees of the County so the
County should have their contact information, not Dr. Jadwin.
We look forward to receiving fully compliant Initial Disclosures from the defendants on September 20, 2007. It
would be a patent waste of the Court’s time to hear a motion to compel on a matter such as this, but the
Defendants’ dilatory tactics will have left us no choice. If we are not in such receipt by the close of business that
day, WE WILL IMMEDIATELY FILE A MOTION TO COMPEL.
Please feel free to give me a call at my cellphone at 213-453-1781 if you have any additional questions.
I sincerely hope we can reach a reasonable and amicable resolution of this issue without having to resort to a
Court hearing.
Sincerely,
Gene Lee
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Tel: (213)992-3299
Fax: (213)596-0487
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Sent: Monday, September 10, 2007 4:03 PM
To: elee@LOEL.com
Subject: RE: Jadwin's personal property
Gene,
With regard to our respective initial disclosures and your letter of September 5, explain to me why it is okay for
you to indicate “KMC” as an address for witnesses on your list but not okay for me to indicate “Kern Medical
Center” as an address for witnesses on mine.
Mark
9/20/2007
EXHIBIT 7. Supplement to Defendants’ Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures, dated

9/13/07
Law Offices of
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 50
Filed 09/24/2007 Page 34 of 87
MARK A. WASSER
Sacramento, California 95814
Office: 916-444-6400 Fax: 916-444-6405
mwasser@markwasser.com
September 13, 2007
VIA FIRST CLASS MAIL
Eugene Lee
Law Offices of Eugene Lee
555 West Fifth Street, Suite 3100
Los Angeles, California 90013-1010
Re: Jadwin v. County ofKern, et ale
Dear Mr. Lee:
We have revised the witness list we enclosed as part of our initial disclosure so
that it describes the subjects of information the various witnesses are believed to have in
more detaiL When our own investigation is complete, we may know more about the
witnesses' knowledge but these descriptions fairly summarize what we presently know.
We deleted the names of witnesses for whom we have no specific subjectinformation,
even though doing so seems contrary to Dr. Jadwin's interests. My intent in giving you
the names in the first place was to be inclusive but, if you want less, we will give you
less. I have always subscribed to the view that it is better to have a witnesses' name than
to not have it but I have no interest in convincing you of that. Your suggestion that our
initial disclosure was deficient or that we "acknowledge" the baseless position you have
taken does not warrant further comment.
We are not providing home addresses for any persons who are employed by the
County. Unlike Dixon v. Certainteed Corporation, which you cite, the County has not
and will not resist making its employees available to you for deposition or informal
interview. As I have told you from the outset, (I believe I first represented this to you in
March) I will accept service of all papers on behalf of the Defendants and all County
employees and will make arrangements to produce any employees you want. Thus,
employment addresses afford you complete access to all employees.
Also, because of Dr. Jadwin's threatening and intimidating behavior towards his
co-workers at Kern Medical Center, many.employees are afraid of him and are unwilling
to let him know where they live.
Admitted to Practice in California and Nevada

Eugene Lee
September 13, 2007
Page 2
Even though Dr. Jadwin knows the street address of Kern Medical Center, having
worked there for several years (and having referred to it as simply "KMC" in his own
witness list) we have included it for you.
Finally, we are providing a copy of a memorandum of coverage with the CSAC

Excess Insurance Authority. It was not included in our first disclosure because the
County had not been able to verify its coverage. As you will note, the County has a $2
million self-insured retention before any insurance is available.
Very Truly Yours,
Mark A. Wasser
cc: Karen Barnes

Joan Herrington
1 Mark A. Wasser CA SB #060160

2 400 Capitol Mall, Suite 1100
3 Phone: (916) 444-6400
Fax: (916) 444-6405
4 E-mail: mwasser@markwasser.com
5 Bernard C. Bannann, Sr.
KERN COUNTY COUNSEL
6 Mark Nations, Chief Deputy .
Phone: (661) 868-3800
8 Fax: (661) 868-3805
E-mail: mnations@co.kem.ca.us
9
10 Attorneys for Defendants. County of Kern,
Peter Bryan, Irwin Harris, Eugene Kercher,
11 J~nnifer Abraham, Scott Ragland, Toni Smith
and William Roy
12
15 .
16 DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O. ) Case No.: 1:07-cv-00026-0WW-TAG

)
17 Plaintiff, ) SUPPLEMENT TO DEFENDANTS' RUL
) 26(a)(I) INITIAL DISCLOSURES
18 vs. )
) Date Action Filed: January 6, 2007
19 COUNTY OF KERN, et aI., ) Trial Date: August 26, 2008
)
20 Defendants. )
)
21 )
)
22 )
)
23 ----------)
24 I. INDIVIDUALS LIKELY TO HAVE DISCOVERABLE INFORMATION THA
DEFENDANTS' MAY USE TO SUPPORT THEIR DEFENSES.
25

27
28
SUPPLEMENTAL TO DEFENDANTS' RULE 26(a)(l

INITIAL DISCLOSURE
1
1 III. COPIES OF ANY INSURANCE AGREEMENTS THAT MAY APPLY.

3
·44
Dated: September 13, 2007 LAW OFFICES OF MARK A. WASSER
5
6
By: /J~~~~
7
Mark A. Wasser
8 Attorney for Defendants, County ofKern,
of Kem, et al.
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
SUPPLEMENTAL TO DEFENDANTS' RULE 26(a)(l

26(a)(1
INITIAL DISCLOSURE
2
1 Re: David F. Jadwin, D. O. v. County ofKern, et ale

Case No. 1:07-cv-00026-0WW-TAG
2
PROOF OF SERVICE
3
I, Amy Remly, declare:
4
I am a resident of the State of California and over the a~e of eighteen years and not a party to
SUIte 1100, Sacrament~ CA 95814. On
5 the within action; my business address is 400 Capitol Mall, SUite
September 13,2007, I served the within documents: SUPPLEMENT TO DEFENDANTS' RULE
6 26(a)(I) INITIAL DISCLOSURES
7 o
D· by transmitting via facsimile from (916) 444-6405 the above listed document(s)
without error to the fax number(s) set forth below on this date before 5:00 p.m. A copy
8 of the transmittal/confirmation sheet is attached, and
9
by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully
10 prepaid, in the United States mail at Sacramento, California addressed as set forth
.below.
below.
11
Eugene Lee
12 Law Offices of Eugene Lee
555 West Fifth Street, Suite 3100
13 Los Angeles, California 90013-1010
14 Joan Herrington
Bay Area Employment Law Office
15
5032 Woodminister Lane
16 Oakland, California 94602-2614
17 o by causing personal delivery by of the document(s) listed above to the

person(s) .at
at the address (es) set forth below.
18
o .by
by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed Overnight Delivery
19 envelope and affixing a pre-paid air bill, and causing the envelope to be delivered to a
Overnight Delivery agent for delivery. .
20
I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for
21 mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with
postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party
22 served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one
23 day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.
24
24 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true
and correct.
25
Executed on Sep~ember 13, 2007, at Sacramento, C~ifornia.
26 i ). .
\ ~/\:vv
27 AMY REM
28
PROOF OF SERVICE
.· .~.
APPENDIX 1
POTENTIAL WITNESS LIST
NAME & AVAILABLE CONTACT INFORMATION SUBJECT OF INFORMATION

Leonard Perez, MD Operation and management of
Kern Medical Center Kern Medical Center and
1830 Flower Street communications and interactions.
Bakersfield, CA 93305 between hospital staff.
Telephone: (661) 326-2236
Adam Lang, MD Operation and management of
10506 Finchley Drive pathology department,
Bakersfield, CA 93311 communications and interactions
Telephone: (661) 205-2869 between hospital staff and
diagnosis issues.
ElsaAng, MD Operation and management of
4200 Sill Place pathology department,
between hospital staff,
certification tests and diagnosis
issues.
Fangluo "Liu, MD Operation and management of
1071 0 Harpende~ Avenue pathology department,
Telephone: (661) 303-9117
issues.
Ellen Bunyi-Teopengco, MD Operation and management of
10518 Ascot Crossing Street pathology department,
Telephone: (661) 204-5682
Issues.
Savita Shertukde, MD Operation and management of
Kern Medical Center pathology department,
1830 Flower Street communications and interactions
Telephone: (661) 326-2595 issues.
1
Gilbert Martinez Operation and management of

Kern Medical Center pathology department and
Bakersfield, CA 93305 between hospital staff.
Telephone: (661) 326-2468
Royce Johnson, MD Operation and management of
Bakersfield, CA 93305 between staff.
Irwin E. Harris, MD Operation and management of

Antoinette (Toni) Smith, MSN, RN,C Blood usage policies and

Kern Medical Center operation and management of
1830 Flower Street Kern Medical Center.
Telephone: (661) 326-2688
David K. Culberson Operation and management of
Kern Medical Center and
communications and interactions
between staff.
Jane Thornton Plaintiffs management of the
with staff and practices.
Telephone: (661) 326-2906
Kathy Griffith Plaintiff s management of the
with hospital staff, blood usage
and practices.
Telephone: (661) 326-2441
Juan Felix, MD Pathology
LAC-USC Medical Center
Bernard C. Barmann, Sr., County Counsel Meetings with plaintiff and
Office of County Counsel operation and management of
1115 Truxtun Ave., 4th Floor Kern Medical Center and
communications and interactions
between staff.
Telephone: (661) 868-3800
2
Nitin Athavale, MD Tie-pulling incident

19620 Scotland Drive
S8!atoga, CA 95070
Jennifer J. Abraham, MD Operation and management of
.
Telephone: '(661) 873-7370
Eugene E. Kercher, MD Operation and management of
Kern Medical Center Kern Medical Center,
Bakersfield, CA 93305 between staff and diagnosis
Issues.
Telephone: (661) 326-2159
A. Scott Ragland, DO Operation and management of
Kern Medical Center Kern Medical Center
Bakersfield, CA 93305 between staff and diagnosis
issues.
Telephone: (661) 872-8559
Peter K. Bryan Operation and management of
6424 S. Abilene Street Kern Medical Center,
Centennial, Colorado 80111 communications and interactions
between staff and leaves and
leave policies.
William Roy, MD Communications and
Mobile, Alabama interactions between the parties.
Diagnosis issues.
Edward (Bill) Taylor, MD Operation and management of
1830 Flower Street
Telephone: (661) 326-2275
Michelle Burris Plaintiff s management of the
between hospital staff, and blood
usage policies.
Telephone: (661) 326-2464
3
Javad Naderi, MD Plaintiffs management of the

Bakersfield, CA 93305 between hospital staff and
practices.
Pager: (661) 307-2119
Maureen Martin, MD Operation and management of
Telephone: (661) 326-2275
Navin Amin, MD Plaintiff s management of the
Bakersfield, CA 93305 between hospital staff and
practices.
Telephone: (661) 326-5052
Chester Lau, MD Tie pulling incident and
1061 Dakin Avenue communications and interactions
Menlo Park, CA 94025 between hospital staff
Steve 0' Connor Human resources issues, leaves
Kern Medical Center and leave policies
1830 Flower Street
Albert McBride, MD Plaintiff s management of the
between hospital staff and
practices.
Telephone: (661) 326-2286
Alice Hevle Plaintiff s management of the
between hospital staff, blood
usage and practices.
Telephone: (661) 326-2012
Philip Dutt, MD Operation and management of
1830 Flower Street communications aild interactions
between hospital staff, diagnosis
issues, leaves and leave policies..
Telephone: (661) 326-2256
4
. Karen S. Barnes, Chief Deputy Operation and management of

Office of County COUlisel Kern Medical Center,
1115 Truxtun Ave., 4th Floor communications and
Bakersfield, CA 93301 interactions between hospital
staff and meetings with plajntiff.
Telephone: (661) 326-2029
Ronald M. Errera Operation and management of
County Administrative Officer Kern Medical Center .
1115 Truxtun Ave., 4th Floor
Cindy Lighthill Physician compensation
Kern Medical· Center
1830 Flower Street
Erin Baldwin, MD Tie-pulling incident
Former KMC Medical Student (2003)
18 Lassen.Drive
Santa Barbara, CA 93111
Carol Gates Plaintiff s management of the
with hospital staff, practices and
certification tests.
Telephone: ,(661) 326-2657
Denise Long Plaintiff s management of the
with hospital staff and practices.
Telephone: (661) 868-3162
5
APPEND.IX2
~~ CSAC EXCESS INSURANCE "AUTHORITY

AUTHORITY (CSAC EIA)
MEMORANDUM OF LIABILITY COVERAGE FOR PUBLIC ENTITIES
DECLARATIONS
EIA 06 GL2-13
ITEM 1: MEMBER: Kern County
ITEM 2: MEMORANDUM PERIOD: 1, 2006 to October 1,2007, 12:01 a.m. local

From October 1,2006
time of the Member as stated herein.
ITEM 3: MEMBER'S RETAINED LIMIT: $2,000,000

Ultimate net loss as the result of anyone occurrence because of personal injury or property
damage or anyone wrongful act because of public officials errors and omissions or unfair
employment practices, or any combination thereof.
ITEM 4: AUTHORITY'S LIMITS OF LIABILITY:
a..
a. Mega Fund Layer: . $3,487,838
Ultimate net loss excess of the Member's retained limit as the result of anyone occurrence
because of personal injury or property damage or anyone wrongful act because of public
officials errors and omissions or unfair employment practices, or any combination,
combination thereof.
Ultimate net loss excess of the Member's retained limit as the result of all occurrences
because of pers'onal
personal injury or property damage and all wrongful acts because of public
officials errors and omissions or unfair employment practices, or any combination thereof
for all program members combined.
b. Excess Reinsurance Layer: $13,000,000

Ultimate' net loss excess of the Member's retained limit and Mega Fund Layer as the result of
anyone occurrence because of personal injury or property damage or anyone wrongful
act because of public officials errors and omissions or unfair employment practices, or
any combination thereof. However, if the Mega Fund Layer is exhausted, this layer will apply in
excess of the Member's retained limit.
As respects completed operations hazard, ultimate net loss excess of the Member's· Member's
retained limit and Mega Fund Layer is limited to $13,000,000 as a result of anyone occurrence
and as a result of all occurrences occurring during the Memorandum Period. However, if the
Mega Fund Layer is exhausted, this layer will apply in excess of the Member's retained limit.
ITEM 5: RISK PREMIUM: $461,181
ITEM 6: FORMS AND ENDORSEMENTS ATIACHED

ATTACHED AT INCEPTION: EIA GLII
GLiI MOC 10/1/2006,
Endorsement No. U-1, 1,2
1, 2
Countersigned by: Date: March 29, 2007

CSAC EXCESS INSURANCE AUTHORITY

GENERAL LIABILITY II PROGRAM MEMORANDUM OF COVERAGE
In-consideration of the payment of the premium, if paid, in reliance upon the statements in
the Declarations made a part hereof and ~ubject to all of the terms of this General Liability
II Program Memorandum of Coverage (Memorandum), the CSAC Excess" Insurance
"Authority (Authority) agrees with the Member as follows:
COVERAGE AGREEMENT
The Authority will reimburse the covered party for ultimate net loss in excess of the
retained limit hereinafter stated which the covered party" shall become legally obligated
to pay as damages by reason of liability" imposed by law or liability assumed by contract
because of: .
Coverage A. Personal injury or
Coverage B. Property" damage
to which this Memorandum applies, caused by an occurrence or
Coverage C. Public officials errors and omissions liability or
Coverage D. Unfair employment practices liability
to which this Memorandum applies, caused by a wrongful act.
DEFENSE AND SETTLEMENT COSTS
After the amount of the covered party's retained limit has been exhausted by payment of.
judgments, settlements and/or defense costs, the Authority will reimburse the covered
party for excess defense costs the covered party incurs on covered losses. The
Authority's liability for excess defense costs is subject to, and not in addition to, the limit
of the Authority's liability.
The Authority, at its own expense, shall have the right to associate itself with the covered
party in the control, investigation, defense or appeal of any claim or proceeding which, in
the opinion of the Authority, is or may be covered by the Memorandum. The covered
party shall fully cooperate in all matters pertaining to such claim or proceeding.
No claim shall be settled for an amount in excess of the covered party's retained limit
without the prior written consent of the Authority.
EIA GLII MOC 10/1/2006

RETAINED LIMIT - THE AUTHORITY'S LIMIT OF LIABILITY
Regardless of the number of (1) covered parties under this Memorandum, (2) persons or
organizations who sustain injury or damage, (3) claims made, or (4) suits brought on
account of personal injury, property damage, public officials errors and omissions
or unfair employment practices liability, the Authority's liability is limited as follows:
A. With respect to persona.1 injury, property damage, public officials errors and-
omissions, and unfair employment practices liability, or any combination thereof,
the Authority's liability shall be only for the ultimate net loss in excess of the covered
party's retained limit as specified in the Limits of Liability section of the Declarations
as the result of anyone occurrence or wrongful act, and then for an amount not
exceeding the amount specified in the Limits of Liability section of the Declarations as
the result of anyone occurrence or wrongful act.
B. There is no limit of the number of occurrences during the Memorandum Period for
which claims may be made, except that the liability of the Authority arising out of the
Completed Operation Hazard because of all occurrences shall not exceed the
amount 'specified in the Limits of Liability section of the Declarations for each twelve
months, commencing with the first day of the Memorandum Period.
c. Public officials errors and omissions or unfair employment practices taking

place over more than one Memorandum Period shall be deemed to have taken place
during the last Memorandum Period and only that limit shall apply.
MEMORANDUM PERIOD, TERRITORY
This Memorandum applies to personal injury, property damage, public officials

errors and omissions' or unfair employment practices which occur anywhere in the
world during the Memorandum Period.
COVERED PARTY, COVERED PERSONS OR ENTITIES
A. The Member;
B. Those individuals who were or are now elected or appointed officials of the Member,
whether or not compensated (including volunteers), including members of ·'the
. Member's governing body or any other committees, boards, commissions or specia'i
districts of the Member, while acting for or on behalf of the Member;
C. All special districts governed directly by the Member's governing board and other
districts or agencies which are named on the Memorandum;
EtA GUt MOC 10/1/2.006
2
D. Past or present employees of the Member or other covered entity, whether or not
compensated, (including volunt~ers), while acting for or on behalf of the Member or
other covered entity;
E. Notwithstanding sub-paragraphs A through 0 above with respect to who is a covered

party, the determination and findings made in good faith by the Member pursuant to
California Government Code Section 995.2 or any other provision of law shall be .
conclusive and binding on the Authority and all other persons for the purposes of
coverage under the Memorandum;
F. 1937 Act Retirement Association of the Member;
As respects the above covered party, this Memorandum does not cover the breach
of fiduciary duty which means: .
1. Violation of any of the responsibilities, obligations or duties imposed upon

fiduciaries by:
a) The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) or

amendments thereto; or
b) The common or statutory law of the United States of America, or any state or
other jurisdiction therein; and
2. Negligent acts, errors, omissions in administration.
Administration as used herein shall mean:
a) Giving counsel to participants and beneficiaries with respect to a Plan;
b) I~terpreting a Plan;
c) Providing or failing to provide benefits under a Plan;
d) Handling the records connected with a Plan;
e) Effecting enrollment, termination or cancellation of participants under a Plan.
Planas used herein shall mean the written instrument which sets forth specific
benefits and eligibility under a named trust.
EXCLUSIONS
As respects ultimate net loss, this Memorandum does not apply:
EIA'GLlI Moe 10/1/2006
3
A. To any obligation for which any covered party or any carrier as its insurer may be
held liable under any workers' compensation, unemployment compensation or
disability benefits law, or under any similar law;
B. To bodily injury to any employee of any covered party arising out of and in the course
of his/her employment by such covered party; but this exclusion does not apply to
liability assumed by the covered party under any written contract;
c. To injury to or destruction of (1) property owned by a covered party, or (2) property

rented to or leased to the covered party where the covered party has assumed
liability for damage to or destruction of such property unless the covered party would .
have been liable in the absence of such assumption of liability, or (3) aircraft or
watercraft in the care, custody or control of any covered party;
D. As respects liability assumed by the covered party under any contract:
1. To any claim, judgment or agreement from any arbitration proceeding wherein the
Authority is not entitled to exercise with· the covered party, the covered party's
rights in the choice of arbitrato~s, and in the conduct of such proceedings;
2. To any obligation for the rendering or failure to render professional services for the
covered party, if the indemnitee of the covered party is an architect, engineer or
surveyor, arising out of:
a) The preparation or approval of contracts, maps, plans, drawings, opinions,

reports, tests, surveys, change orders, designs or specifications;
b) The giving or the failure to give directions pr instructions by the indemnitee, the
indemnitee's agents or employees, provided such giving or failure to give is the
primary cause of personal injury or property damage;
E. To bodily injury and property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance,
loading or unloading, use or operation of any:
1. Aircraft;
2. Airfields;
3. Runways;
4. Hangars;
5. Buildings or other properties in connection with aviation activities.
This exclusion shall not apply, however, (1) to liability arising out of the ownership,
operation, rental, or loan of vehicles licensed for highway use while being operated
EIA GLiI MOC 10/1/2006
4
away from the premises of any airfield owned o~ operated by the covered party; or
(2) to Non-Owned Aircraft operated by or on behalf of the covered party.
Non-Owned Aircraft means any Aircraft other than:
1. Aircraft owned in whole or in part by or registered in the name of the covered

party;
2. Aircraft having a seating capacity in excess of forty-five (45) passenger seats;

or
3. Aircraft which are the subject of a lease or service agreement with the covered
party for a period in excess of thirty (30) days;
F. To liability arising out of or in connection with the operation of any hO'spitals, clinics, or
established health care facilities owned or operated by the Member due to:
1. The rendering of or failure to render:
a) Medical, surgical, dental, x-ray or nursing service treatment or the furnishing of

food or beverages in connection therewith;
b) Any service or treatment related to physical or mental health or of a

professional nature; or
c) Any cosmetic or tonsorial service or treatment;
2. The furnishing of or dispensing of drugs or medical, dental or surgical supplies or

appliances;
This exclusion shall not apply, however, to any professional activities arising out of
the performance of occupation physical examinations, paramedics, emergency
first aid, or preventative health services related to: alcoholism; drug abuse; well.
child healthcare; California children services; immunizations; sexually transmitted
diseases; tuberculosis; and family planning.
Notwithstanding such exceptions to this exclusion as are set forth immediately

above, however, if any collectible insurance or other coverage, including but not
limited to coverage' afforded by any other CSAC Excess Insurance Authority
program, is available to the covered party, for liability for loss, damage or injury
arising from the operation of any clinic or other established health care facility
(whether on a primary, excess or contingent basis), any coverage afforded
hereunder shall apply in excess of,'and shall not contribute with, such insurance or
other coverage; provided that this clause does not apply with respect to excess
insurance purchased specifically to be in excess of this Memorandum, or to
insurance or reinsurance which is intended to provide the rem~inder of the Limit of
EIA GLII Moe 10/1/2006
5
Liability stated in the Declarations of this Memorandum when the coverage

afforded under this Memorandum provides less than 100 percent of the limit set
forth in the Declarations·.
G. To liability arising out of or in connection with the principles of eminent domain,

condemnation proceedings by whatever name called, and whether or not liability
accrues directly against the covered party or by virtue of any agreement entered into
by or on behalf of the covered party;
This exclusion shall not apply, however, to any inverse condemnation where any suits
or claims for inverse condemnation are a result of negligence proven on the part of a
covered party;
H. To liability arising out of the failure to supply or provide an adequate supply of fuel or
water or electricity when such failure is a result of the inadequacy of the covered
party's facilities to supply or produce sufficient fuel or water or electricity to meet the
demand;
I. To property damage arising out of subsidence, however, subject to the following

special limits of liability, this exclusion shall not apply. As respects property damage
arising out of subsidence, the Authority's special limits of liability shall be
$10,000,000 ultimate net loss as the result of anyone occurrence and $10,000,000
ultimate net loss 'as the result of all occurrences during each Memorandum Period.
The aggregate limit for this coverage is reinstated at each anniversary of the
Memorandum Period shown on the Declarations; ,
J. To liability arising out of any transit authority, transit system or public transportation
system owned or operated by any covered party; however, this exclusion shall not
apply to transit or public transportation systems operating over non-fixed routes such
as dial-a-ride, senior citizen transportation, or handicapped persons transportation;
K. To liability arising out of the hazardous properties of nuclear material;
'L. To liability imposed upon a covered party (or which is imputed to a covered party)
under the "Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974" and any law
amendatory thereof;
M. To liability arising out of the rupture·, bursting, overtopping, .accidental discharge or

partial or compete failure of any dam(s);
'N. To any liability for property damage, personal injury, sickness, disease,
occupational disease, disability, shock, death, mental anguish and mental injury, or
defense costs or other expenses related thereto, at any time arising out of the
manufacture of, mining of, use of, sales of, installation of, removal of, distribution of,
or exposure to asbestos, asbestos products, asbestos fibers or asbestos dust, or to
any obligation of the covered party to indemnify any party because of damages
EIA GLII Moe 10/1/2006
6
arising out of such property damage, bodily inj~ry, sickness, disease, occupational
disease, disability, shock, death, mental anguish or mental injury at anytime as a
result of the manufacture of, mining of, use of, sales of, installation of, removal of,
distribution of, or exposure to asbestos, asbestos products, asbestos fibers or
asbestos dust;
o. 1. To liability arising out of the actual or threatene.d discharge, dispersal, seepage,

migration, release or escape of pollutants'anywhere in the world; .
2. To ultimate net loss arising out of any governmental direction or request that the
Authority, the covered party or any other person or organization test for, monitor,
clean-up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify, neutralize or assess the effects of
pollutants; or
3. To ultimate net loss, including but not limited to costs of investigation or

attorneys' fees, incurred by a governmental unit or any other person or
organization to test for, monitor, clean-up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify or
neutralize pollutants;
As used in this exclusion, pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal
irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals
and waste material. Waste material includes materials which are intended to be or
. have been recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed. However, this exclusion does not
apply to water, whether recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.
However, this exclusion does not apply to liability arising out of:
1. Any discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape directly or

indirectly caused by fire, explosion, lightning, windstorm~ vandalism or malicious
mischief, riot and civil commotion, flood, collision, or upset of a motor vehicle,
railroad vehicle, mobile equipment, automatic sprinkler leakage or aircraft;
2. The completed operations hazard; or
3. Any discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants that

meets all of the following conditions;
a) It was accidental and neither expected nor intended by the covered party.
This condition would not serve to deny coverage for a specific incident where
such discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants
was a result of an attempt by the covered party to mitigate or avoid a
situation where substantial third party bodily injury, property damage or
personal injury could occur; and
b) It was demonstrated as having commenced on a specific date during the term

of this Memorandum; and
EIAGLII MOC 10/1/2006
7
c) Its commencement became known to the covered ·party within seven (7)
calendar days and was furt~er reported to the person responsible for risk
management at the Member ~ithin a reasonable time frame; and
d) Its commencement was reported in writing to the Authority within twenty-one

(21) calendar days of becoming known to the person responsible for risk
management at the Member; and
e) Reasonable effort was expended by the covered party to terminate the

situation as soon as conditions permitted;
However, nothing contained in this provision 3, shall operate to provide any

coverage with respect to:
a) Any site or location principally used by the covered party or by others on the
covered party's behalf, for the handling, storage, disposal, dumping,
processing or treatment of waste material;
b) Any fines or penalties;
c) Any clean up costs order~d by the Superfund program, or any. federal, state or
local governmental Authority. However, this specific exclusion c) shall not
serve to deny coverage for third party clean up costs otherwise covered by this
Memorandum simply because of the involvement of a governmental Authority;
d) Acid rain;
e) Clean up, removal, containment, treatment, detoxification or neutralization of

pollutants situated on premises the covered party owns, rents or occupies at
the time of the actual discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or
escape of said pollutants; or
f) Water pollution caused by oil or its derivatives.
It is further agreed that in the event of a disagreement as to the interpretation of

this exclusion, the disagreement shall be submitted to binding arbitration before a
panel of three (3) arbitrators. Within thirty (30) days of a written request for
arbitration by either the covered party or the Authority, each party will choose an
arbitrator. If the two arbitrators are unable to agree within one (1) month upon the
third arbitrator, such arbitrator shall at the request of either party be selected by
the American Arbitration Association in accordance with its rules and procedures.
The parties shall submit their cases to the panel by written and oral evidence at a
hearing time and place selected by the third arbitrator. The panel shall be relieved
of all judicial formality, shall not be obligated to adhere to the strict rules of law or
EIAGLII Moe 10/1/2006
8
of evidence, shall seek to enforce the intent of the parties hereto and may refer to,
but are not limited to relevant legal principles~ The decision of at least two (2) of
the three (3) panel members shall be binding and final and not subject to appeal
except for grounds of fraud and gross misconduct by the arbitrators. The award
will be issued within thirty (30) days of the close of the hearings. Each party shall
bear the expenses of its designated arbitrator and shall Jointly and equally share
with the other the expense of the third arbitrator and of the arbitration.
The arbitration proceedings shall take place in or in the vicinity of Sacramento,

California. The procedural rules applicable to this arbitration shall, except as
provided otherwise herein, be in accordance with the commercial arbitration rules
of the American Arbitration Association;
P. To liability arising out of the operation or use of any off highway vehicle park or
area;
Q. To any liability arising out of or in connection with those caus.es of actj<;>n or counts i.n
any suit for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, writ of mandate, or which do not contain'
demands or prayers for monetary damage;
R. Under Coverage C, Public Officials Errors and Omissions Liability to:
1. Personal injury or property damage or unfair employment practices as

defined in the Memorandum;
2. The refund of taxes, fees or assessments;
3. a) Liability of a covered party arising in whole or in part, out of any covered

party obtaining remuneration or financial gain to which the cov·eredparty was
not legally entitled;
b) Liability arising out of the willful violation of a penal statute, code or ordinance
committed by or with the knowledge or consent of any covered party; except.
that any act for which a covered party is responsible shall not be imputed to
any other covered party for purposes of this subpart R.3.;
4. Liability of any covered party arising out of estimates of probable costs or cost
estimates being exceeded or for faulty preparation of bid specifications or plans 'or
failure to award contracts in accordance with statute or ordinance which under ~aw
must be submitted for bids;
5. Injury to, destruction or disappearance of any tangible property (including money)

or the loss of use thereof;
6. Failure to perform or breach of, a contractual obligation;
EIA GLiI Moe 10/1/2006
9
Nothing contained in this exclusion shall limit the, covered party's rights of
recovery, where applicable, under coverages A, B, and D of this Memorandum;
S. To benefits payable under an employee benefit plan (whether the plan is voluntarily
established by the covered party or mandated by statute) because of unlawful
discrimination;
T. To any .liability arising out of or in connection with any claim for punitive, exemplary or.
multiples of damages; ,
U. To lia'bility arising out of or by reason of:
1. The purchase, or sale, or offer of sale, or solicitation of any security, debt, bank
deposit or financial interest or instrument;
2. Any representation made at any time in relation to the price or value. of any
security, debt, bank deposit or financial interest or instrument;
3. Any depreciation or decline in price or value of any security, debt, bank deposit or
financia,l interest or instrument;
It is further agreed that the Authority has no obligations to defend or pay for the
defense of any claim that may allege any of the foregoing;
v. Under Coverage D, unfair employment practices liability, for:'
1. Strikes and lockouts. This Memorandum does not apply to any claim or claims for
loss arising out of a lockout, strike, picket line, replacement or similar actions in
connection with labor disputes or labor negotiations;
2. W.A.R.N. Act. This Memorandum does not apply to any claim or claims for loss
arising' out 'of the Workers Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, Public Law
100-379 (1988), or any amendment thereto, or any similar federal, state or local
law; .
3. Any cost incurred by the covered party to modify any building or property in order
to make said building or property more accessible or accommodating to any
disabled person;
W. To liability arising out of (1) the ownership, maintenance, operation, use, loading, or
unloading of any mobile equipment or vehicle while being used in any prearranged or
organized racing, speed or demolition contest or in any stunting 'activity or in' practice in
preparation for any such contest or activity, or (2) the operation or use, of any
snowmobile or trailer designed for use herewith when used for recreational, stunting or
racing activities.
10
DEFINITIONS,
The following definitions shall govern the meaning of the defined terms for the purposes
of. this Memorandum. The defined terms are set forth in bold face type where used
herein.
"Aircraft" means a vehicle designed for the transport of persons or property principally in
'the air.
"Completed operations hazard" includes personal injury and property damage

arising out of operations ,or reliance upon a representation or warranty made at any time
with respect thereto, but only if the personal injury or property damage occurs after
such operations have been completed or abandoned and occurs away from' premises '
owned by or rented to the covered party. "Operations" include materials, parts or
equipment furnished in connection therewith. Operations shall be deemed completed at
the earliest of the following times:
1. When all operations to be performed by or on behalf of the covered party under the
contract have been completed, or
2. When all operations to be performed by or on behalf of the covered party at the site
of the operations have been completed, or
3. When the portion of the work out of which the injury or damage arises has been put to
its intended· use by any person or organization other than another contractor or
subcontractor engaged in performing operations for a principal as a part of the same
project.
Operations which may require further service or maintenance work,or correction, repair
or replacement because of any defect or deficiency, but which are otherwise complete
shall be deemed completed.
The completed operations hazard does not include liability arising out of:
1. Operations in connection with the transportation of property unless the liability arises
out of a condition in or on a vehicle created by the loading or unloading thereof;
2. The existence of tools, uninstalled equipment or abandoned or unused materials.
"Covered party" means any person or organization qualifying as a covered party under
the Covered Party, Covered Persons or Entities section of this Memorandum. The
coverage afforded applies separately to each covered party against whom claim is made
or suit is brought, except with respect to the limits of the Authority's liability.
"Dam" means any artificial barrier together with appurtenant works which:
'EIAGlil Moe 10/1/2006
11
1. Is 25 feet or more in height from the foot of a natural bed of stream or watercourse; or
2. Has water impounding capacity of 50 acre feet or more.
Except that no structure specifi~ally exempted from jurisdiction by the State of California
Department of Water Resources, Division of Safety of Dams shall be considered a dam,
unless such structure is under the jurisdiction of any agency of the federal government.
"Damages" means monetary compensation: (a) for death 'and for care and loss of
services resulting from persona'i injury; (b) for loss of use of property resulting from
property damage; (c) resulting from public officials errors and omissions" or (d)
unfair employment practices.
"Defense costs" means reasonable fees charged by an attorney, including expenses of a

claims servicing organization the covered party has engaged, and all other reasonable
fees, costs including third-party attorney's fees and costs as authorized by law or un'der
contract and 'expenses attributable to the investigation, defense or appeal of a claim
within the scope of coverage afforded by this Memorandum. Defense costs shall include
any allocated claims expenses incurred by attorneys who are employees of the covered
party.
"Excess defense costs" means defense costs incurred by the covered party with the
written consent of the Authority after the self-insured retention has been exhausted by
payment of judgments, settlements and defense costs.
"Governed ~irectly" means the special district is governed by the Member's governing
board.
"Nuclear material" means source material, special nuclear material, or byproduct

material; "source material", "special nuclear material", and "byproduct material" have the
meanings given them in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 or in any law amendatory thereof.
"Occurrence" means an accident 'or event, including injurious exposure to conditions,

which results, during the Memorandum Period, in personal injury or property damage,
neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the covered party. As respects
Coverages A and B, "occurrence" shall apply separately to each Member of the
Authority named in this Memorandum.
"Off highway vehicle park or area" means any off highway park or area specifically
designated for the recreational or sport activities of off road vehicles. Recreational or
sport activity is not meant to include access or egress to park areas.
"Personal injury" means (a) bodily injury, death, sickness, disease, disability, shock,
emotional distress, mental anguish and mental injury resulting from bodily injury; (b) false
arrest, detention or imprisonment or malicious prosecution; (c) the publication or
utterance of libel or slander, including disparaging statements concerning the condition,
EIA GLiI MOC 10/1/2006
12
value, quality or use of real or personal property, or publication or utterance in violation of

rights of privacy; (d) wrongful entry or eviction, or other invasion of the right of private
occupancy; (e) assault and battery, not committed by, at the direction of or with the
consent of the covered party, unless committed or directed for the purpose of protecting
persons or property from injury or death; (1) discrimination based upon race, religion,
nationality, national origin, color, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, employment, or
disability, but excluding unlawful discrimination intentionally committed by, at the direction
of, or with co~sent of the covered. party.
"'Property damage" means (1) physical injury to or destruction of tangible property which
occurs during the Memorandum Period, including the loss of use thereof at any time
resulting therefrom; or (2) loss of use of tangible property which has not been physically
injured or destroyed provided such loss 'of use is caused by an occurrence during the
Memorandum Period.
"Public officials errors and omissions" shall mean any actual or alleged error or
misstatement·" or act of omission or neglect or breach of duty including misfeasance,
malfeasance or nonfeasance by the .covered parties in the discharge of their duties with
the public entity individually or collectively, or any matter claimed against them solely by
reason of their .being or having been covered parties.
"Subsidence" means any property damage directly or indirectly arising out of, caused
by, resulting from, contributed to or aggravated by the settling, sinking, slipping, falling
away, caving in, shifting, eroding, mud flow, rising, tilting, or any other movement of land
or earth.
"Ultimate net loss" means the total sum which the covered party becomes legally liable
to pay as damages by reason of judgments or by reason of settlements made with the
written consent of the covered party and the Authority, and shall also include defense
costs and excess defense costs which are paid as a consequence of any occurrence
covered hereunder.
"Unfair employment practices" means any circumstance relating to a past, present, or

prospective employee of the covered party (and the spouse, child, parent, brother or
sister of that person as a consequence of unfair employment practices that person at
whom any of the employment-related practices described below is directed) for or arising
out of any actual or alleged wrongful dismissal, discharge, or termination, either actual or
constructive, of employment, employment related misrepresentation, wrongful failure or
refusal to employ or promote, wrongful deprivation of career opportunity or reassignment,
wrongful discipline, failure to grant tenure or negligent employee evaluation; or sexual or
workplace harassment or humiliation of any kind, including, but not limited to, the alleged
operation of a harassing workplace environment, or unlawful discrimination, whether
direct, indirect, intentional or unintentional, or failure to provide adequate employee
policies and procedures.
13
Unfair employment practices shall include actions brought under state, local, or federal
law, whether common or statutory, and shall include, but not limited to allegations of
violations of the following federal laws, as amended, including regulations promulgated
thereunder:
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1992 (ADA);
2. Civil Rights Act of 1991 ;
3. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), including the older workers
benefit protection act of 1990;
4. Title VII of the Civil Rights Law of 1964, as amended (1983), including the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978;
5. Civil Rights Act of 1866, section 1981; and
6. Fifth and Fourteenth amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
"Watercraft" means a vehicle designed for the transport of persons or property principally
on water.
"Wrongful Act" means any actual or alleged negligent act, error or omission arising out
of conduct or performance of the covered party in the performance of his or her or their
duties or any actual or alleged act in connection with any person's prospective
employment, actual employment or termination of employment by a covered party. All
damages arising out of a single act, error or omission or a series of related acts, errors
. or omissions shall be treated as arising from a single wrongful act. As respects
coverages C and D, wrongful act shall apply separately to each Member of the
Authority named in this Memorandum.
CONDITIONS
1. INSPECTION
The Authority shall be permitted but not obligated to inspect the covered party's
property and operations at any time. Neither the Authority's right to make inspections
nor the making thereof nor any report thereon shall constitute an undertaking, on
behalf of or for the benefit of the covered party or others, to determine or warrant that
such property or operations are safe. The Authority may examine the' covered
party's books and records at any time during the Memorandum Period and
extensions thereof and within three years after the final termination of this
Memorandum, as far as they relate to the subject matter of this coverage.
EIA GUI Moe 10/1/2006
14
2. CLAIMS REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
It is agreed that with respect to claim reporting, the covered party, in addition to the
terms set forth in this Memorandum of coverage, must report an occurrence of any
injury, death or disease, or wrongful act, paid or reserved, for 50% or more of their
individual retained limit. Immediate written notice shall be given by or on behalf of the
covered party to the Authority. Immediate notice shall also be given to the Authority
for any claims in which this Authority is named as a defendant.
3. COVERED PARTY'S DUTIES IN THE EVENT OF OCCURRENCE, CLAIM OR SUIT
a. In the event of an occurrence or wrongful act reasonably likely to involve the

Authority, written notice containing particulars sufficient to ide'ntify the covered
party and also reasonably obtainable information with respect to the time, place
and circumstances thereof, and the names and addresses of the injured and of
available witnesses, shall be given by or for the covered party to the Authority or
any of 'its authorized agents as soon as practicable, after the individual responsible
for the coverage at the covered party, or his/her designee, has knOWledge of the
occurrence or wrongful act.
b. If claim is made or suit is brought against the covered party which appears likely
to involve the Authority, the covered party shall forward to the Authority every
demand, notice, summons or other process received by him/her or his/her
representative, immediately or within a reasonable amount of time after the
individual responsible for coverage at the covered party or his/her designee has
knowl,edge'of the claim or ~uit.
c. The covered party shall cooperate with the Authority and upon its request, assist
in making settlements, in the conduct of suits and in enforcing any right to
subrogation, contribution or indemnity against any person or organization who
, may be liable to the covered party because of liability with respect to which
coverage is afforded under this Memorandum, and the covered party shall attend
hearings and trials and assist in securing and giving evidence and obtaining the
attendance of witnesses. The covered party shall not, except at its own costs,
voluntarily make any payment, assume any obligation or incur any expense;
however, in the event that the amount of ul~imate net loss becomes certain either
through trial court judgment, arbitration award, or agreement among the covered
party, the claimant and the Authority then the covered party may· pay the amount
of ultimate net loss to the claimant to effect settlement and, upon submission of
due proof thereof, the Authority shall indemnify the covered party for that part of
such payment which is in excess of the retained limit, or shall, upon request of the
covered party, timely' make such payment to the claimant on behalf of the
covered party. .
d. The Authority, at its option, shall have the right at its own expense to investigate
any claim and/or negotiate the settlement thereof, as it deems expedient, but the
EIA-GLII Moe 10/1/2006
15
Authority shall not commit the covered p~rty to any settlement without the
covered party's consent. Should the claimant or plaintiff, as the case might be,
tender a bona-fide, good faith, settlement demand which when added to the
incurred defense costs is in excess of the covered party's retention, the
payment of which would result in the full and final disposition of said claim or suit,
then if such settlement demand is acceptable to either (1) the covered party, or
(2) the Authority (but not both), then with regard tq that settlem.ent demand:
i. If such settlement demand is not acceptable to the Authority and the covered
party tenders to the Authority an amount equal to the covered party's
retention less incurred defense costs, if any, the Authority shall then
reimburse the covered party all sums which the covered party shall be
legally obligated to pay as damages, including without limitation, the covered
party's retention, plus future investigation, adjustment, appraisal, appeal, post
judgment interest and defense costs. However, in no event shall the
Authority's agreement to reimburse the covered party exceed the Limit of
Liability as stated in the Declarations in addition to such investigation,
adjustment, appraisal, appeal, post-judgment interest and defense costs.·
Should the full and final disposition of the claim, including judgments,
settlements, investigation, adjustment, appraisal, appeal, post-judgment
interest and defense costs be less than the amount tendered by the covered
party, the unused portion of the tendered amount shall be returned to the.
covered party by the Authority.
ii. If such settlement demand is not acceptable to the covered party and the
Authority tenders to the covered party an amount equal to the· difference
between the covered party's retention, less incurred defense costs, and said
settlement demand, or the applicable amount specified in the Limits of Liability
section of the Declarations, whichever is less, then the Authority's agreement
to reimburse the covered party for the ultimate net loss hereunder shall be
discharged and terminated and the Authority shall have no further obligations
with respect thereto.
4. APPEALS
When a lawsuit has proceeded to trial court judgment and neither the covered party
nor the Authority have invoked the provisions of condition 3.d.i. or ii. above and the
covered party elects ·not to appeal a judgment in excess of the retained limit, the
Authority may elect to do so at its own expense, but in no event shall the liability of the
Authority for ultimate net loss exceed the applicable amount specified in the Limits of
Liability section of the Declarations inclusive of all defense costs necessary and
incident to such appeal.
16
5. ACTION AGAINST THE AUTHORITY
No action shall lie against the Authority with respect to anyone occurrence unless,
as a condition precedent thereto, the covered party shall have fully complied with all
the terms of this Memorandum, nor until the amount of the covered party's obligation
to pay an amount of ultimate net loss in excess of the retained limit shall have been
finally determined either by judgment against the covered party after actual trial,
arbitration award, or by written agreement of the covered party, the claimant and the-
Authority.' Any person or organization or the legal representative thereof who has
secured such judgment or written "agreement shall thereafter be entitled to recover "
under, this Memorandum the extent of the coverage afforded by this Memorandum.
Nothing contained in this Memorandum shall give any person or organization, any right
to join the Authority as a co-defendant in any action against the' covered party to
determine the covered party's liability.
Bankruptcy or insolvency of the covered party shall not relieve the Authority of any of
its obligations ,hereunder.
6. OTHER COVERAGE
If collectible insurance with an insurer is available to the covered party covering a

loss also covered hereunder (whether on a primary, excess or contingent basis), the
coverage hereunder shall be in excess of, and shall not contribute with, such
insurance; provided that this clause does not apply with respect to excess insurance
purchased specifically to be in excess of this Memorandum, or to insurance or
reinsurance which is intended to provide the remainder of the Limit of Liability stated
in the Declarations of this Memorandum when the coverage afforded under this
Memorandum provides less than 100 percent of the limit set forth in the Declarations.
If other valid and collectible coverage through any insurer or other pooling
arrangement is available to the Member for a loss also covered by the Member's
retained Umit and this Memorandum, such other valid and collectible coverage shall
apply in lieu of the Member's retained limit.
Notwithstanding the foregoing paragraph, if, because of liability arising out of. or in
connection with the operation of any clinic or established health care facility, coverage
for damages is available under this Memorandum and under a Hospital Professional
Liability and General Liability Memorandum of Coverage ("Medical Malpractice
M~morandum") also issued by the Authority, it shall be conclusively presumed that the
coverage afforded under the Medical Malpractice Memorandum shall be primary "and
any coverage available under this Memorandum shall be excess only. For claims to
which this provision applies, the exhaustion of the Authority's Limit of Liability under
the Medical Malpractice Memorandum will satisfy the covered party's Retained Limit
under this Memorandum of Coverage. .
17
7. SUBROGATION
The Authority shall be subrogated to the extent of any payment hereunder to all the
covered party's rights of recovery therefore; and the covered party ~hall .do nothing
after loss to prejudice such rights and shall do everything necessary to secure such
rights. Any amount so recovered shall be apportioned as follows:
Any interest (including the covered party's) having paid an amount in excess of the
retained limit plus the limit of liability hereunder shall be reimbursed first to the extent
of actual payment. The Authority shall be reimbursed next to the extent of its actual
payment hereunder. If any balance then remains unpaid, it shall be applied to
reimburse the covered party. The expenses of all such recovery proceedings shall
be apportioned in the ratio of respective recoveries. If there' is no recovery in
proceedings conducted solely by the Authority, it shall bear the expenses thereof.
8. CHANGES
Notice to the Authority or. any agent of the Authority or knowledge possessed by the
Authority or any agent of the Authority or by any other person shall not effect a waiver
or change in any part· of this Memorandum or stop the Authority from asserting any
right under the terms of this Memorandum, nor shall the terms of this Memorandum
be waived or changed, except by endorsement issued to form a part of this
Memorandum.
9. ASSIGNMENT
Assignment of interest under this Memorandum shall not bind the Authority until its
consent is endorsed hereon; if, how.ever, the covered party shall die, such coverage
as is afforded by this Memorandum shall apply (a) to the covered party's legal
representative, as the covered party, but only while, acting within the scope of his/her
duties as such, and (b) With respect to the property of the covered party, to the
person having proper temporary custody thereof, as covered party, but only until the
appointment and qualification of the legal representative.
10. CANCELLATION
This Memorandum may be cancelled by the Authority in accordance with Article 21 of

the Joint Powers Agreement creating the CSAC Excess Insurance Authority.
11. MEMBER
The Member named in the Declarations is authorized to act on behalf of all covered
parties with respect to the giving and receiving of notice of cancellation and receiving
any return premium that may become payable under this Memorandum. The Member
named in the Declarations is responsible for the payment of all premiums but the
other covered parties jointly and severally agree to make such premium payments in
18
full if the Member fails to· pay the amount due within thirty days after the Authority
gives a written demand for payment to the Member.
12. SEVERABILITY OF INTERESTS
The term covered party is used severally and not collectively, but the inclusion herein
of more than one covered party shall not operate to increase the limits of the
Authority'~ liability.
13. NON-RENEWAL
In the event of non-renewal by the Authority, notice shall be given to the Member not
less than sixty days prior to expiration.
clAGLII Moe 10/1/2-006
19
ENDORSEMENT NO. U-1

EXCESS LIABILITY
ADDITIONAL COVERED PARTY AMENDATORY ENDORSEMENT
It .is agreed that the "Covered Party, Covered Persons or Entities" section of the
Memorandum is amended to include the person or organization named on the
Certificate of Coverage, but only with respect to liability arising out of premises owned
by or rented to the Member, or operations performed by or on behalf of the Member or
such person or organization so designated.
Coverage provided under this endorsement is limited to the lesser of the limits stated on
the Certificate of Coverage or the minimum limits required by contract.
Additional Covered Party:
NAME OF PERSON-OR ORGANIZATION SCHEDULED PER ATTACHED

CERTIFICATE OF COVERAGE
As Respects:
PER ATTACHED CERTIFICATE OF COVERAGE
It is further agreed that nothing herein shall act to increase the Authority's Limit of
Liability.
This endorsement is part of the Memorandum of Coverage and takes effect on the
effective date of the Memorandum of Coverage unless another effective date is shown -
below. All other terms and conditions remain unchanged.
Effective Date: Memorandum No.: EIA 06 GL2-00
Issued to: All Members
Issue Date: March 29, 2007

ENDORSEMENT NO.1

. EXCESS LIABILITY
AMENDATORY ENDORSEMENT
It is understood and agreed that ITEM 1: MEMBER of the Declarations is amended to

read:
Kern County
It is further agreed that nothing herein shall act to increase the Authority's Limit of Liability.
This endorsement is part of the Memorandum and takes effect on the effective date of the
Memorandum unless another effective date is shown below. All other terms and
conditions remain unchanged.
Issued to: Kern County

ENDORSEMENT
.
NO.2
'--
EXCESS LIABILITY
It is agreed that exclusion (F) is hereby deleted and the following coverage applies:
Except as otherwise noted herein, coverage provided by our Memorandum will follow
form coverage provided by the Medical Malpractice Memorandum of Coverage listed in
the schedule of underlying insurance. Such coverage is provided to all Members
covered under our Memorandum of Coverage, regardless of whether the Member is
covered by the Medical Malpractice policy listed in the schedule of underly.ing insurance.
The Authority's limit of liability for coverage provided under this endorsement 'is
$10,000,000 per event and $10,000,000 Annual Aggregate.
The minimum retained limit is $10,000,000 per Occurrence. In any event, the coverage
provided by our Memorandum will not be broader than the insurance coverage provided
by the policy listed in the schedule of underlying insurance.
Schedule of underlying insurance:

None on file
It is further agreed" if a Covered Party is a participant in the Authority's Medical

Malpractice Program, the retroactive date applicable to that Covered Party in the Medical
Malpractice Program will apply hereunder.
If a Covered Party is not a participant in the Authority's Medical Malpractice· Program, an

October 1, 2002 retroactive date will apply hereunder.
Memorandum unless another effective date is shown below. All other terms and
conditions remain unchanged.

~~ CSAC EXCESS INSURANCE AUTHORITY (CSAC EIA)
MEMORANDUM OF SPECIFIC EXCESS WORKERS' COMPENSATION

INDEMNITY AGREEMENT
DECLARATIONS
EIA 06 GL2 EWC-13
1:.MEMBER:
ITEM 1: MEMBER: Kern County
ITEM 2: MEMORANDUM PERIOD: From October 1, 2006 to October 1, 2007, 12:01

a.m. local time of the Memberas
Member as stated herein.
ITEM 3: MEMBER'S RETAINED LIMIT: See Endorsement No.2

NO.2
ITEM 4: AUTHORITY'S LIMITS OF LIABILITY:
a. Excess Workers' Compensation

$10,000,000 Each accident
$10,000,000 Each employee
b. Excess Employers' Liability

$10,000,000 Each accident
$10,000,000 Each employee
ITEM 5: RISK P"REMIUM:

PREMIUM: Included in GUI
GLII Risk Premium
ITEM 6: Terms and Conditions:
a. ·Per
Per underlying coverage document on file with CSAC Excess ·Insurance Authority.
b. Limits and retentions apply per participating member.
ITEM 7: FORMS AND ENDORSEMENTS ATTACHED AT INCEPTION: Endorsement No.1, 2
Countersigned by: _4U.

__;L --+_~~ Date: March 29,
29. 2007
Authorized Repr sentati e
CSAC Excess Insu e Authority
ENDORSEMENT NO.1

SPECIFIC EXCESS WORKERS' COMPENSATION
. It is understood and agreed that ITEM 1: MEMBER of the Declarations is amended to

read:
Kern County
It is further agreed that nothing herein sh'all act to increase the Authority's Limit of Liability.
Memorandum unless another effective date is shown below. All other 'terms and
conditions remain uncha.nged.
Effective Date: Memorandum No.: EIA 06 GL2 EWC-13

) Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 50 Filed 09/24/2007 Page 71 of 87
ENDORSEMENT NO. 2

SPECIFIC EXCESS WORKERS' COMPENSATION
UNDERLYING COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT
It is understood and agreed that ITEM 1: MEMBER of the Declarations is amended to read:
COVERAGE UNDERLYING
Workers' Compensation Limit $200,000,000 Each Accident

$200,000,000 Each Employee
Employers' Liability Limit $5,000,000 Each Accident

$5,000,000 Each Employee
Memorandum unless another effective date is shown below. All other terms and conditions
remain unchanged~
Effective Date: Memorandum No.: EIA 06 GL2 EWC-13


Page 1 of 2
Eugene D. Lee

Sent: Tuesday, September 18, 2007 2:01 PM
Subject: Jadwin/KC: Initial Disclosures
Attachments: Corr OP - Stipulation re Initial Disclosures_070905.doc
Mark
We are in receipt of Defendants’ Amended Initial Disclosures. We appreciate the numerous amendments
Defendants have made.
However, we also note that Kern County remains unwilling to disclose the home contact information for its current
employees whom it has listed as witnesses. We do not believe this will generally present any problems, given
your stated willingness to accept service on their behalf and to produce them for deposition and/or trial.
HOWEVER, the situation may arise whereby current employees later are fired or resign, thereby becoming former
employees of the County. Under these circumstances, you will no longer be in a position to accept service on
their behalf or compel their attendance at deposition and/or trial.
Please review and execute the attached stipulation which provides that, among other things, the County will give
Plaintiff the home contact information for current employees who later leave the employ of the County and will do
so in a timely manner after such termination of the employment relationship so as to ensure Plaintiff has a
reasonable opportunity to compel their attendance at deposition and/or trial. We have attached the Stipulation in
MS Word form so that you may make any necessary revisions directly to the document and send it back to us.
We also note that there is no contact information provided for David Culberson. Please provide the home contact
information for him.
We also note that you are entitling the document “Supplement to Defendants’ Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures”.
However, this is a misnomer, the document is an amendment that supersedes and replaces the Initial Disclosures
Defendants’ had previously served, it does not “supplement” it in an additive manner. Therefore, please re-serve
the document with the reference to “Supplement” removed.
Regarding your colloquoy contained in your cover letter that we seek “less” information, not “more”, you are
misconstruing our intentions. We are simply interested in full and fair Initial Disclosures that comply with Rule 26.
A disclosure that lists a witness’ subject of information as “Unknown” is neither full nor fair and does not comply
with the FRCP.
Given that the above are matters which require relatively simple action, please re-serve compliant Initial
Disclosures and the executed Stipulation by no later than September 20.
Sincerely,
Gene Lee
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
9/21/2007
Page 2 of 2

Tel: (213)992-3299
Fax: (213)596-0487
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
9/21/2007
1 LAW OFFICE OF EUGENE LEE

Eugene D. Lee (SB#: 236812)
3 Phone: (213) 992-3299
Fax: (213) 596-0487
4 email: elee@LOEL.com
7 Telephone: (510) 530-4078
Facsimile: (510) 530-4725
9
11
12 400 Capitol Mall, Suite 1100
13 Phone: (916) 444-6400
Fax: (916) 444-6405
14 Email: mwasser@markwasser.com
15 Bernard C. Barmann, Sr.
KERN COUNTY COUNSEL
16 Mark Nations, Chief Deputy
Phone: (661) 868-3800
18 Fax: (661) 868-3805
Email: mnations@co.kern.ca.us
19
Attorneys for Defendants County of Kern, Peter Bryan, Irwin Harris, Eugene Kercher, Jennifer
20 Abraham, Scott Ragland,Toni Smith, and William Roy.
23 FRESNO DIVISION
24 DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O., Civil Action No. 1:07-cv-00026 OWW TAG
25 Plaintiff, STIPULATION RE HOME CONTACT
v. INFORMATION OF DISCLOSED KERN
26 COUNTY EMPLOYEES.
COUNTY OF KERN, et al.,
27 Complaint Filed: January 5, 2007
Defendants. Trial Date: August 26, 2008
28
1 In order to avoid a Motion to Compel Initial Disclosures that comply with Rule 26, Defendants
2 hereby stipulate that:
3 1. Defendants shall disclose to Plaintiff David F. Jadwin, D.O. the last known address
4 and phone number of any and all former employees of Defendant County of Kern
5 that Defendants list as witnesses in their Initial and any Supplemental Disclosures.
6 2. Defendants shall disclose to Plaintiff David F. Jadwin, D.O. the last known address
7 and phone number of any and all current employees of Defendant County of Kern
8 that Defendants list as witnesses in their Initial and any Supplemental Disclosures
9 within five days of any termination of their employment with the County of Kern,
10 or such shorter time as is necessary so as to reasonably permit Plaintiff to compel
11 their attendance at depositions and/or trial.
12 3. Defense counsel shall accept service by facsimile of Plaintiff’s deposition subpoenas
13 and Rule 45 subpoenas on behalf of any and all current employees of Defendant
14 County of Kern, and Defendant County of Kern shall take all necessary steps to
15 compel compliance with either or both of these.
16 Dated: September___, 2007
17
__________________________________________
18 Eugene D. Lee
Attorney for Plaintiff
Dated: September __, 2007
20
21 __________________________________________
Mark A. Wasser,
22 Attorney for Defendants
COUNTY OF KERN, PETER BRYAN, IRWIN
23 HARRIS, EUGENE KERCHER, JENNIFER
ABRAHAM, SCOTT RAGLAND,TONI SMITH,
24 AND WILLIAM ROY
25
26
27
28
Page 1 of 2
Eugene D. Lee

Sent: Wednesday, September 19, 2007 5:30 PM
To: elee@LOEL.com
Subject: RE: Jadwin/KC: Initial Disclosures
Gene,
You love to threaten motions and sanctions. I do not respond to threats.
Rule 29 states the parties “may” stipulate. If you actually want to stipulate, then propose something we have
actually agreed to. I have never worked with a lawyer who finds disagreement everywhere. The fact is, we are in
complete agreement on this issue as far as I can determine. You want witnesses and I have promised to provide
them. What is the issue? Why are we even meeting and conferring on an issue about which there is no
disagreement. I do not understand.
As far as your latest threat, what do you propose sanctions for? That we have agreed to produce witnesses? I
am truly lost as to what the issue is.
Mark

Mark,
It is a shame that each time we attempt to meet and confer with you and comply with basic court rules and
regulations, you derail the discussion into personal attacks and insults. This is truly regrettable and demonstrative
of all that is wrong with the justice system today.
Given your emails, I am not sure that you are familiar with USDC EDCA local rule 83-143 and FRPC 29.
Hopefully after you have had a chance to familiarize yourself with these rules, you will understand why we insist
on having a written stipulation and are unwilling to rely on simply your “word”. The fact that your “word” has
changed with every communication only demonstrates why these rules exist in the first place.
Your have staunchly and inexplicably refused to execute, or even negotiate, a valid written stipulation with us
despite our best efforts and intentions. We therefore have no choice but to bring a motion to compel seeking
sanctions. This is unfortunate and does not bode well for our ability to work with each other as this litigation
proceeds.
Sincerely,
Gene
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Tel: (213)992-3299
Fax: (213)596-0487
9/21/2007
Page 2 of 2

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

To: elee@LOEL.com
Gene,
If I trusted you at all, it would make this easier but you have demonstrated repeatedly that you cannot be trusted.
Your last e-mail reaffirms my lack of trust: telling me I have somehow agreed to your stipulation when I have not.
You may practice law this way with someone else but not with me. Your stipulation contains terms we have never
discussed, like 5 days for this and that. I reject your stipulation. I hope that is clear.
When you want an employee, let me know. We will produce them.
Mark
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Tel: (213)992-3299
Fax: (213)596-0487
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
9/21/2007
Page 1 of 5
Eugene D. Lee

To: elee@LOEL.com
Gene,
You may characterize things however you want. Our position has been and remains consistent. The County will
produce any employees Dr. Jadwin wants and will keep you advised of contact information on former employees.
That is it.
That has been our position since you and I first spoke on the telephone over 6 months ago.
It has never changed. You want to embellish our representation with additional terms we have not agreed to and
blame me for rejecting them.
That is contentiousness.
Mark

Mark,
I think the issue is that you keep changing what this “stipulation” says with each email to whatever is convenient
for you at any given moment. You also like to engage in personal attacks, as you are doing now. You’ve exhibited
these tendencies throughout this litigation (particularly when we’ve spoken on the phone).
Given the unprofessional tone you insist on using, it is obvious that this meet and confer has become
unproductive and should end now.
Sincerely,
Gene Lee
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Tel: (213)992-3299
Fax: (213)596-0487
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
9/20/2007
Page 2 of 5

To: elee@LOEL.com
Gene,
When I say you are contentious, this would be an example.
I am not agreeing to your stipulation. If I was, I would sign it. I am representing to you that the County will make
available to you, upon reasonable request to me, any employee and that we will keep you current on contact
information for former employees.
That’s it.
Mark

Mark,
Your representation that the proposed written stipulation memorializes our extant oral stipulation (and so it is
unnecessary for you to sign it) will do just fine.
Sincerely,
Gene
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Tel: (213)992-3299
Fax: (213)596-0487
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

To: elee@LOEL.com
Gene,
The most recent written record of my representations to you would be today’s e-mails and the letter that
9/20/2007
Page 3 of 5

accompanied our supplemental initial disclosures last week. I believe there are similar representations contained
in e-mails that date back to at least April, if not March. I am not going to take the time to look for them because
this whole exercise is a waste of time. If the County at anytime refuses to make someone it controls available to
you, you can deal with it then.
Mark

Mark,
I think the name-calling is unnecessary. No one’s trying to be contentious.
I have to admit I don’t understand your refusal to sign the stipulation we’ve proposed. You mention a vague
remembrance of an oral stipulation made long ago that was never formalized in writing and the precise contents
of which no one is certain. Why not memorialize the understanding in writing so there’s no confusion or question?
If you can point to a written record of this stipulation you keep referencing, I would appreciate it and would feel
more comfortable relying on it.
We look forward to receiving the contact information for Mr. Culberson.
Sincerely,
Gene
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Tel: (213)992-3299
Fax: (213)596-0487
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Sent: Wednesday, September 19, 2007 9:45 AM
To: elee@LOEL.com
Gene,
I do not expect we will sign the stipulation you have forwarded because it is unnecessary. As you have seen, we
have provided contact information for all former employees. I have made consistent representations to you, since
our first telephone conversation over 6 months ago, and have stood by them. If that is not good enough, bring
your motion. Your contentiousness is tiring.
As far as David Culberson is concerned, he was never a County employee. He was an independent contractor
9/20/2007
Page 4 of 5

working on a consulting basis. To my knowledge, no one at the County has ever had his personal contact
information. I will obtain the contact information for the company that employs him and forward that to you. That
is the only contact information we have access to.
Mark

Sent: Tuesday, September 18, 2007 2:01 PM
Subject: Jadwin/KC: Initial Disclosures
Mark
We are in receipt of Defendants’ Amended Initial Disclosures. We appreciate the numerous amendments
Defendants have made.
However, we also note that Kern County remains unwilling to disclose the home contact information for its current
employees whom it has listed as witnesses. We do not believe this will generally present any problems, given
your stated willingness to accept service on their behalf and to produce them for deposition and/or trial.
HOWEVER, the situation may arise whereby current employees later are fired or resign, thereby becoming former
employees of the County. Under these circumstances, you will no longer be in a position to accept service on
their behalf or compel their attendance at deposition and/or trial.
Please review and execute the attached stipulation which provides that, among other things, the County will give
Plaintiff the home contact information for current employees who later leave the employ of the County and will do
so in a timely manner after such termination of the employment relationship so as to ensure Plaintiff has a
reasonable opportunity to compel their attendance at deposition and/or trial. We have attached the Stipulation in
MS Word form so that you may make any necessary revisions directly to the document and send it back to us.
We also note that there is no contact information provided for David Culberson. Please provide the home contact
information for him.
We also note that you are entitling the document “Supplement to Defendants’ Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures”.
However, this is a misnomer, the document is an amendment that supersedes and replaces the Initial Disclosures
Defendants’ had previously served, it does not “supplement” it in an additive manner. Therefore, please re-serve
the document with the reference to “Supplement” removed.
Regarding your colloquoy contained in your cover letter that we seek “less” information, not “more”, you are
misconstruing our intentions. We are simply interested in full and fair Initial Disclosures that comply with Rule 26.
A disclosure that lists a witness’ subject of information as “Unknown” is neither full nor fair and does not comply
with the FRCP.
Given that the above are matters which require relatively simple action, please re-serve compliant Initial
Disclosures and the executed Stipulation by no later than September 20.
Sincerely,
Gene Lee
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Tel: (213)992-3299
Fax: (213)596-0487
9/20/2007
Page 1 of 4
Eugene D. Lee

Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2007 11:48 AM
To: elee@LOEL.com
Gene,
First, here is the address for The Camden Group, David Culberson’s employer: The Camden Group, 100 N.
Sepulveda Blvd., Ste. 600, El Segundo, California 90245.
I have been told that David Culberson is in Minnesota on an assignment but have not verified it.
Second, I assumed you understood that the witness list we served with the supplemental disclosures was a new
list that replaced the previous list. If you were not clear about that, this should clarify it. Why else would we
send a new list? I do not understand your confusion or why that would be an issue. I am not reserving the
initial disclosures. We covered that yesterday or the day before, I forget.
Third, I am honestly lost on this one. You say you are “entitled to contact information for all witnesses”. We
agree 100% and we gave you contact information on all witnesses. We even accompanied that with our written
representation that we will make all employees available to you on request. We have fully complied with both the
spirit and letter of all rules and offered the additional courtesy of providing contact information for any employees
that may leave County employment during the pendency of this case. How you can extract a dispute from this is
beyond me. No rule requires that all agreements between counsel be reduced to stipulation. In my 30+ years of
federal court practice, no opposing attorney has ever suggested they must be. Rule 29 clearly states that the
parties “may” prepare stipulations. Having said that, I am not adverse to stipulations but I am not willing to sign
the one you sent because it goes beyond what we have discussed and would impose time limits that I find
unreasonable. It is also one-sided. The Plaintiff is not the only party who will need discovery. Our agreement is
fine the way it is. If you believe it must be reduced to a stipulation, then you will have to explain why and we will
have to discuss the terms. I am open to that but don’t send me documents and tell me to sign them by such-and-
such date on threat of sanctions.
You opened your e-mail with a request that I “leave the personal insults out of our interactions” but proceed to
accuse me of “playing hardball”, being “abusive” and being “ridiculous” (among other things) in an overall tone
that is snotty and condescending. If you want the tone of our communications to improve, it will require
reciprocity. Your communications invariably come from a position of take-it-or-leave-it that is arrogant and
unhelpful. Lighten up. What will you do when we get to issues that actually matter?
If you can tell me how we have failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 26(a)(1), please do so. Otherwise, I
suggest we move on to the next issue, whatever that will be. This is the most extreme case of form over
substance I have encountered in memory.
Mark

Mark,
No one here enjoys disagreements, least of all me. I’ll ask you, not for the first time (and probably not the last),
9/20/2007
Page 2 of 4

please leave the personal insults out of our interactions.
Our disagreements are these:
1. Yesterday, you had written: “I do not expect we will sign the stipulation you have forwarded because it is
unnecessary. As you have seen, we have provided contact information for all former employees. I have
made consistent representations to you, since our first telephone conversation over 6 months ago, and
have stood by them. If that is not good enough, bring your motion. Your contentiousness is tiring.” As you
know, Plaintiff is entitled to contact information for all witnesses, BUT as an accommodation to the County,
we proposed a written stipulation that would require the County to give us contact information for
employees only if they are no longer employed by the County (former or “future former” employees). You
refuse to sign or even negotiate the written stipulation. Instead you’re playing hardball with us, stating that
you have given us your “word”, though your “word” keeps changing from email to email, and that should be
enough for us. I directed you to USDC EDCA local rule 83-143 and FRPC 29, establishing that vague
assurances by counsel do not constitute binding stipulations. Apparently, you still do not understand and
continue to hurl personal insults and accusations at me. I wonder whether you really read USDC EDCA
local rule 83-143, which states: “Stipulations not in conformity with these requirements will not be
recognized unless necessary to prevent manifest injustice.” We need a formal written stipulation signed by
the Court OR Defendants should give us the contact information for all of the witnesses. We are attempting
to compromise to avert a motion and you have responded by absolutely refusing to even negotiate, let
alone sign, the proposed written stipulation drafts we have sent you. To top it off, you’ve used this process
as an opportunity to insult and malign me continuously, as you have done since the beginning of this
litigation. You’ve been abusive and refuse to be reasonable. You leave us no choice but to motion the
Court for the contact information for all Defendants’ witnesses. This is unfortunate because a stipulation
would have served our purposes while being less burdensome for Defendants. I find it amazing that you
are so unreasonably averse to written stipulations that you’re forcing us to engage in this ridiculous meet
and confer and, now, file a motion.
2. This raises another issue. Because of Defendants’ insistence on calling the last Initial Disclosure a
“supplement”, Plaintiff is not sure which witnesses Defendants have included in the Initial Disclosures. A
“supplement” adds to or changes a disclosure based on information that only became available to the
disclosing party after the initial disclosure was made. A supplement is therefore APPENDED to the
previous disclosure. An “amendment” adds to or changes an initial disclosure based on information that
was available to the disclosing party at the time of the initial disclosure but failed to be disclosed for
whatever reason. An amendment therefore SUPERSEDES AND REPLACES the previous disclosure.
Plaintiff wants to know: which is it?
I expect to be in receipt of a signed stipulation and re-served Initial Disclosures (entitled “Amended”, not
“Supplemental”) by end of business hours today, the original deadline (please fax or email them to me). If you
chose not to sign the stipulation, then please include the home contact info for all witnesses disclosed in
Defendants’ Initial Disclosures (Amended, Supplemental or otherwise).
If I am not in such receipt, then I believe we have already met and conferred at length to no avail and further
attempts will only descend into more abusive personal attacks by you. No one needs that. We will motion the
Court and seek sanctions.
Sincerely,
Gene Lee
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Tel: (213)992-3299
Fax: (213)596-0487
9/20/2007
Page 3 of 4
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

To: elee@LOEL.com
Gene,
I will be out of the office a lot today and tomorrow. I do not know where this stands and, as I wrote last night, do
not even know what the issue is. Could you remind me what we are disagreeing about?
This recent exchange started with your demand that we rename and reserve the supplemental initial disclosures.
I declined your request to do that. The topic then transitioned to providing employees on request, as I recall, and I
agreed as I have in the past. Our position on that has never changed. What is the current dispute?
The stipulation you have sent me is not necessary and nothing in the rules you cite is applicable. I know you
enjoy disagreements but I cannot find one here. Remind me what the disagreement is. And what it is that needs
to be compelled.
Is this whole tempest simply that you want a stipulation for something we have already agreed to?
Also, as I wrote last night, send me whatever CME expenses Dr. Jadwin believes are outstanding. I cannot find
any record of them in my files or e-mail.
Mark

Mark,
It is a shame that each time we attempt to meet and confer with you and comply with basic court rules and
regulations, you derail the discussion into personal attacks and insults. This is truly regrettable and demonstrative
of all that is wrong with the justice system today.
Given your emails, I am not sure that you are familiar with USDC EDCA local rule 83-143 and FRPC 29.
Hopefully after you have had a chance to familiarize yourself with these rules, you will understand why we insist
on having a written stipulation and are unwilling to rely on simply your “word”. The fact that your “word” has
changed with every communication only demonstrates why these rules exist in the first place.
Your have staunchly and inexplicably refused to execute, or even negotiate, a valid written stipulation with us
despite our best efforts and intentions. We therefore have no choice but to bring a motion to compel seeking
sanctions. This is unfortunate and does not bode well for our ability to work with each other as this litigation
proceeds.
Sincerely,
Gene
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
9/20/2007

3 Telephone: (213) 992-3299
Facsimile: (213) 596-0487
5
7 Oakland, CA 94602-2614
Telephone: (510) 530-4078
8 Facsimile: (510) 530-4725
Email: jh@baelo.com
11
12
13
14
15
Plaintiff, DECLARATION OF JOAN E.
16 HERRINGTON IN SUPPORT OF
v. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL
17 INITIAL DISCLOSURES; REQUEST FOR
SANCTIONS
18 COUNTY OF KERN; et al.
Date: November 5, 2007
19 Defendants. Time: 9:30 a.m.
Place: U.S. District Court, Bankruptcy Courtroom
20 1300 18th St., Bakersfield, CA
21 Date Action Filed: January 6, 2007
Date Set for Trial: August 26, 2008
22
23
I, the undersigned, declare and say, as follows:
24
1. I am an attorney at law duly licensed to practice before the Federal and State Courts of
25
California and admitted to practice before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
26
California. I am one of the attorneys of record representing Plaintiff David F. Jadwin in this matter.
27
2. I am making this amended declaration in support of Plaintiff Dr. Jadwin’s Motion to
28
DECLARATION OF JOAN E. HERRINGTON IN SUPPORT OF
1 Strike the Fifth Affirmative Defense of the Defendants. The facts stated herein are personally known to
2 me and if called as a witness, I could and would competently testify to the truth of the facts set forth in
3 this declaration.
4 3. On September 20, I sent an email to Mark Wasser, counsel of record for the Defendants,
5 stating: “[f]or the last time, please reconsider Defendants’ unreasonable refusal to reduce its agreement
6 to the required stipulation and order required by the rules cited above. Plaintiff has repeatedly provided
7 Defendants with the proposed stipulation and requested them to either sign or propose amendments.”
8 Attached to the email was the draft Stipulation. In his reply, Mr. Wasser maintained his refusal to sign or
9 even negotiate the stipulation, stating “[i]f it is your position that there can be no agreements between
10 counsel that are not reduced to formal stipulation and order, then, perhaps we should litigate that.” A
11 true and correct copy of the emails are attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
12 4. I have spent substantially in excess of 1 hour meeting and conferring with Mr. Wasser by
13 phone, fax, letter and email, and substantially in excess of 2 hours researching and drafting these moving
14 papers. My regular rate for such services is $500 per hour.
15 5. My rate is consistent with those charged in the San Francisco/Bay Area by attorneys of
16 similar skill and experience. I received my B.A. the University of Auckland in 1974 and my J.D. from
17 the Golden Gate University School of Law in 1995. I was admitted to the California Bar in 1996 and
18 worked as an associate in the Law Office of Cary J. Silberman in 1996; and established my own law
19 practice thereafter.
20 6. I taught Disability Rights at Golden Gate University of Law in Spring of 2003, speak at
21 law seminars and conferences too often to enumerate them all here, and I am frequently consulted by
22 other attorneys regarding disability and medical leave laws. I routinely volunteer to teach Trial
23 Advocacy Skills at Stanford University School of Law and Appellate Advocacy of Golden Gate
24 University School of Law. I wrote “Your Right to a Smoke-Free Workplace in California Under
25 Disability Laws” published by the Public Health Institute in 2001; and a comprehensive practice guide
26 on “Enforcing an Employee’s Right to a Smoke-Free Workplace” for internal use by the American Lung
27 Association in 2003. I am currently helping to edit Chapter 12 on ‘Leaves of Absence’ in The Rutter
28
1 Group, Employment Litigation Practice Guide. In recognition of my skills and expertise, I was elected
2 as a “SuperLawyer” by my peers for the last two years.
3 7. I attempted several times to secure local counsel, including William Smith, Esq., to
4 prosecute Plaintiff’s suit but was ultimately unsuccessful.
5 8. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1, and incorporated by reference herein, is a true and correct
6 copy of the “Laffey Matrix” which appears on the website of the United States Attorney General’s
7 Office for the District of Columbia and which has been relied on by courts in the Bay Area to establish
8 prevailing rates for civil rights cases. On July 11, 2006, at 2:56 p.m., I opened up my internet browser
9 (Mozilla Firefox), and navigated to “http://www.laffeymatrix.com/see.html”. I then produced an Adobe
10 Acrobat PDF copy of the page that was displayed at that address using Adobe Acrobat Professional 8.0.
11 When I created the PDF, the date and time of creation appeared on the PDF in the lower right-hand
12 corner of the PDF. The web address from which I printed the page appeared on the PDF in the upper
13 right-hand corner of the PDF.
14 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the
15 foregoing is true and correct.
16
17 Executed on September 24, 2007, at Los Angeles, California.
18
19 /s/ Joan Herrington, SB# 178988
(as authorized on 9/24/07)
20
________________________________________
21 Joan Herrington
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Page 1 of 2
Eugene D. Lee

Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2007 2:55 PM
To: 'Joan Herrington'
Cc: 'Gene Lee'
Subject: RE: 070920 Wasser re JadwinKC Initial Disclosures
Joan,

We are not trying to evade anything. I am flabbergasted at this dispute.

As I wrote in an e-mail several days ago, the Certainteed case is distinguishable because, there, the employer
was refusing to produce its employees so the plaintiff needed home addresses so he could get the employees
directly. Here, we are offering to produce all employees upon request as well as provide contact information for
employees who may leave. (By the way, that last piece is not new, contrary to what you write. It was first offered
well over a week ago.) And, as I wrote earlier, the employees are afraid of Dr. Jadwin and do not want him to
know where they live. Nothing in Rule 26 requires production of home addresses. The rule requires name and
address, if known. It does not say “home” address. Any contact information that permits production of the
witness is sufficient. We have proposed a completely acceptable resolution.

To my knowledge, we are not varying the rules of discovery but, even if we were, that is not what Rule 29 says. It
says the parties “may by written stipulation” do certain things. I am not aware that we are doing any of the things
Rule 29 addresses. Gene’s proposed stipulation would vary the rules on notice and so forth but I object to that.
The normal provisions on notice are fine. Hence, I do not think Rule 29 has any application.

Apparently, the current dispute revolves around the legitimacy of agreements between counsel. I have relied on
agreements between counsel for over 30 years and find no authority that prohibits them. If it is your position that
there can be no agreements between counsel that are not reduced to formal stipulation and order, then, perhaps
we should litigate that. I doubt any court will hold that counsel of record cannot have any agreements between
them that are not reduced to formal stipulation and order. Such a holding would revolutionize practice. There is
certainly no authority that says that now.

The semantic debate between “amended” and “supplemental” is not useful. We may have amended the witness
list but we supplemented the information on insurance. I explained that several days ago. Had I chosen to label
the new disclosures “amended,” I imagine Gene would have objected that they were really “supplemental.” I will
not engage in a debate over the title of the document. The substance should prevail. Substantively, it contained
a new witness list that replaced the former list and new information about insurance.

As with many disputes, I suggest the real issue here is something else. Perhaps, if we could get to that we could
resolve this. What is your real concern?

This does not warrant the time we are spending on it.

I am going to a meeting out of the office at 3:00 that will last the rest of the day but will be here tomorrow.

Mark

From: Joan Herrington [mailto:jh@baelo.com]
9/20/2007
Page 2 of 2
Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2007 2:17 PM

To: Mark Wasser
Cc: Gene Lee
Subject: 070920 Wasser re JadwinKC Initial Disclosures

Plaintiff has previously provided you with legal authority showing the following:
1. Rule 26 requires parties to provide the home contact information of each disclosed witness. See, e.g.,
Dickson v. Certain‐Teed Corp. 164 FRD 685, 689 (1996)
2. Rule 29 require parties to enter into formal stipulations to vary rules of discovery, etc. including those
regarding service of subpoenas on witnesses.
3. Local Rule 83‐143 requires parties to convert such stipulations into a court order.

Defendants have offered to accept service of subpoenas on any current county employees, in exchange for
plaintiff waiving his right to discovery of their home contact information, but refuse to reduce this agreement to
a binding stipulation and order as required by the rules cited above.

Today, for the first time, Defendants have also offered to provide the home contact information of any current
county employee whose employment with the county may cease prior to deposition or trial; but object to the 5‐
10 day period between the employee’s departure and production of the home contact information to plaintiff
that was proposed by Plaintiff. Yet Defendants make no counter‐proposal of what period other than 5‐10 days
is reasonable. Further, Defendants refuse to reduce this agreement to a stipulation and order as required by the
rules cited above.

Defendants assert that their so‐called “Supplemental Initial Disclosures” are in fact “Amended Initial
Disclosures” but are unwilling to re‐serve them with a corrected caption that accurately reflects this. I propose
that the stipulation be amended to include that parties agree that Defendants “Supplemental Initial Disclosures”
dated September __, 2007 replace and supercede its Initial Disclosures dated __, 2007.”

If Defendants continue to evade compliance with the rules cited above, then Plaintiff will be forced to move to
compel Defendants’ compliance with them, and request sanctions. For the last time, please reconsider
Defendants’ unreasonable refusal to reduce its agreement to the required stipulation and order required by the
rules cited above. Plaintiff has repeatedly provided Defendants with the proposed stipulation and requested
them to either sign or propose amendments.

This dispute arose because Defendants failed to comply with Rule 26 in its Initial Disclosures. The only current
dispute appears to be that Defendants are unwilling to reduce its assertions to the required stipulation and
order. We have less than three hours to resolve this dispute.

Joan Herrington
Bay Area Employment Law Office
Oakland, CA 94602‐2614
(510) 530‐4078 ext 109
jh@baelo.com

9/20/2007

3 Telephone: (213) 992-3299
Facsimile: (213) 596-0487
5
7 Oakland, CA 94602-2614
Telephone: (510) 530-4078
8 Facsimile: (510) 530-4725
Email: jh@baelo.com
11
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15
Plaintiff, [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING
16 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL
v. INITIAL DISCLOSURES; REQUEST FOR
17 SANCTIONS
18 COUNTY OF KERN; et al. [F.R.C.P. RULES 26(a)(1) AND 37(a)]
19 Defendants. Date: November 5, 2007
Time: 9:30 a.m.
20 Place: U.S. District Court, Bankruptcy Courtroom
21
23
24 This matter came on regularly for hearing before this Court at 9:30 a.m. on November 5, 2007, in
25 the Bakersfield Division of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.
26 Counsel for each party appeared and the matter was heard. The Court has reviewed the motion,
27 declarations and memoranda of the parties.
28 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Compel Initial Disclosures and Request for
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

TO COMPEL INITIAL DISCLOSURES AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS 1
1 Sanctions, brought by Plaintiff DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O., is GRANTED.

2 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall serve complete Amended Initial Disclosures,
3 including the home addresses and phone numbers of all witnesses disclosed therein, on Plaintiff no later
4 than ____ days from the signing of this Order.
5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants and/or Defendants’ counsel of record shall be
6 sanctioned, jointly and severally, in the amount of $___________, to be remitted to Plaintiff no later
7 than ____ days from the signing of this Order.
8
9 Date: _____________, 2007
10
11 By: ______________________________________
The Honorable Theresa A. Goldner
12 Magistrate Judge of the United States District Court
Eastern District of California
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[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

TO COMPEL INITIAL DISCLOSURES AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS 2

48-52 Motion - Compel Initial Disclosures - CONFORMED - 070924

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Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 48 Filed 09/24/2007 Page 1 of 2

1 Eugene D. Lee SB# 236812

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL INITIAL DISCLOSURES AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS 1

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL INITIAL DISCLOSURES AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS 2

1 Eugene D. Lee SB# 236812

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

1 Defendants re-served corrected Initial Disclosures on Plaintiff (“Disclosure 2”).

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

1 6-26 Moore’s Federal Practice - Civil § 26.22 (emphasis added).

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

1 Respectfully submitted on September 24, 2007.

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

1 Eugene D. Lee SB# 236812

DECLARATION OF EUGENE D. LEE IN SUPPORT OF

DECLARATION OF EUGENE D. LEE IN SUPPORT OF

DECLARATION OF EUGENE D. LEE IN SUPPORT OF

DECLARATION OF EUGENE D. LEE IN SUPPORT OF

DECLARATION OF EUGENE D. LEE IN SUPPORT OF

EXHIBITS TO DECLARATION OF EUGENE D. LEE

EXHIBIT 1. Meet and confer email from Plaintiff’s attorney to Defendants’

EXHIBIT 1. Meet and confer email from Plaintiff’s attorney to Defendants’

Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 50 Filed 09/24/2007 Page 8 of 87

From: Eugene D. Lee [elee@LOEL.com]

First, the Initial Disclosures are not certified by counsel’s signature.

Gene Lee / Joan Herrington

EXHIBIT 2. Defendants’ corrected Initial Disclosures, dated 8/10/07

Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 50 Filed 09/24/2007 Page 10 of 87

The Law Offices of Mark A. Wasser

Fax: (213) 596-0487 Pages: 10 including cover

Phone: (213) 992-3299 Date: 8/10/2007

Re: Jadwin v. County of Kern, et al cc,

o Urgent o For Review o Please Comment D Please Reply o Please Recycle

• Comments, See Defendants' Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures.

Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 50 Filed 09/24/2007 Page 11 of 87

Mark A. Wasser CA SB #060160

DEFENDANTS' RULE 26(")(1) 1NITIAL DISCLOSURES

Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 50 Filed 09/24/2007 Page 12 of 87

DEFENDANTS' RULE 26(a)(l) INITIAL DISCLOSURES

Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 50 Filed 09/24/2007 Page 13 of 87

Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 50 Filed 09/24/2007 Page 14 of 87

POTEl'\TIAL WITNESS LIST

NAME & AVAILABLE CONTACT INFORMATION SUBJECT OF INFORMAnON

Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 50 Filed 09/24/2007 Page 15 of 87

Antoinette (Toni) Smith, MSN, RN,C General knowledge of issues

Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 50 Filed 09/24/2007 Page 16 of 87

Michael Costa, MD Unknown

Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 50 Filed 09/24/2007 Page 17 of 87

Margo A. Raison Unknmvn

Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 50 Filed 09/24/2007 Page 18 of 87

Navin Amin, MD General knowledge of issues

Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 50 Filed 09/24/2007 Page 19 of 87

Jack King Unknown

EXHIBIT 3. Meet and confer email from Plaintiff’s attorney to Defendants’

Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 50 Filed 09/24/2007 Page 21 of 87

From: Eugene D. Lee [mailto:elee@LOEL.com]