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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

166715 August 14, 2008

ABAKADA GURO PART !"ST #$o%&'%() AAS*S+1 O,,"CERS-MEMBERS SAMSON S. A!CANTARA, ED ."NCENT S. A!BANO, ROMEO R. ROB"SO, RENE B. GOROSPE /01 ED2"N R. SANDO.A!, petitioners, vs. 3ON. CESAR .. PUR"S"MA, 40 54s 6/7/64t) /s S'6%'t/%) o$ ,40/06', 3ON. GU"!!ERMO !. PARA NO, *R., 40 54s 6/7/64t) /s Co&&4ss4o0'% o$ t5' Bu%'/u o$ "0t'%0/( R'8'0u', /01 3ON. A!BERTO D. !"NA, 40 54s C/7/64t) /s Co&&4ss4o0'% o$ Bu%'/u o$ Custo&s, respondents. DEC"S"ON CORONA, J.9 This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) !!"# (Attrition Act of #$$"). RA !!" %as enacted to optimi&e the revenue'generation capabilit( and collection of the )ureau of *nternal Revenue ()*R) and the )ureau of +ustoms (),+). The la% intends to encourage )*R and ),+ officials and emplo(ees to e-ceed their revenue targets b( providing a s(stem of re%ards and sanctions through the creation of a Re%ards and *ncentives .und (.und) and a Revenue Performance /valuation )oard ()oard).! *t covers all officials and emplo(ees of the )*R and the ),+ %ith at least si- months of service, regardless of emplo(ment status.0 The .und is sourced from the collection of the )*R and the ),+ in e-cess of their revenue targets for the (ear, as determined b( the 1evelopment )udget and +oordinating +ommittee (1)++). An( incentive or re%ard is taken from the fund and allocated to the )*R and the ),+ in proportion to their contribution in the e-cess collection of the targeted amount of ta- revenue." The )oards in the )*R and the ),+ are composed of the 2ecretar( of the 1epartment of .inance (1,.) or his3her 4ndersecretar(, the 2ecretar( of the 1epartment of )udget and Management (1)M) or his3her 4ndersecretar(, the

1irector 5eneral of the 6ational /conomic 1evelopment Authorit( (6/1A) or his3her 1eput( 1irector 5eneral, the +ommissioners of the )*R and the ),+ or their 1eput( +ommissioners, t%o representatives from the rank'and'file emplo(ees and a representative from the officials nominated b( their recogni&ed organi&ation.7 /ach )oard has the dut( to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the .und8 (#) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and emplo(ees %hose revenue collection falls short of the target8 (!) terminate personnel in accordance %ith the criteria adopted b( the )oard8 (0) prescribe a s(stem for performance evaluation8 (") perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (7) submit an annual report to +ongress.9 The 1,., 1)M, 6/1A, )*R, ),+ and the +ivil 2ervice +ommission (+2+) %ere tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA !!",: to be approved b( a ;oint +ongressional ,versight +ommittee created for such purpose. Petitioners, invoking their right as ta-pa(ers filed this petition challenging the constitutionalit( of RA !!", a ta- reform legislation. The( contend that, b( establishing a s(stem of re%ards and incentives, the la% <transform=s> the officials and emplo(ees of the )*R and the ),+ into mercenaries and bount( hunters< as the( %ill do their best onl( in consideration of such re%ards. Thus, the s(stem of re%ards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionall( mandated dut( of these officials and emplo(ees to serve the people %ith utmost responsibilit(, integrit(, lo(alt( and efficienc(. Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the s(stem of re%ards and incentives onl( to officials and emplo(ees of the )*R and the ),+ violates the constitutional guarantee of e?ual protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to %h( such a s(stem should not appl( to officials and emplo(ees of all other government agencies. *n addition, petitioners assert that the la% undul( delegates the po%er to firevenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. @hile 2ection 9(b) and (c) of RA !!" provides that )*R and ),+ officials ma( be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target b( at least 9."A, the la% does not, ho%ever, fi- the revenue targets to be achieved. *nstead, the fi-ing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President %ithout sufficient standards. *t %ill therefore be

eas( for the President to fi- an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss )*R or ),+ personnel. .inall(, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of po%ers. @hile the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the la%, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the la%. *n their comment, respondents, through the ,ffice of the 2olicitor 5eneral, ?uestion the petition for being premature as there is no actual case or controvers( (et. Petitioners have not asserted an( right or claim that %ill necessitate the e-ercise of this +ourtBs Curisdiction. 6evertheless, respondents ackno%ledge that public polic( re?uires the resolution of the constitutional issues involved in this case. The( assert that the allegation that the re%ard s(stem %ill breed mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the la%. 2een in conCunction %ith the declared obCective of RA !!", the la% validl( classifies the )*R and the ),+ because the functions the( perform are distinct from those of the other government agencies and instrumentalities. Moreover, the la% provides a sufficient standard that %ill guide the e-ecutive in the implementation of its provisions. Dastl(, the creation of the congressional oversight committee under the la% enhances, rather than violates, separation of po%ers. *t ensures the fulfillment of the legislative polic( and serves as a check to an( over'accumulation of po%er on the part of the e-ecutive and the implementing agencies. After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties, the +ourt finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionalit( in favor of RA !!", e-cept as shall hereafter be discussed. A6tu/( C/s' A01 R47'0'ss An actual case or controvers( involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of Cudicial adCudication.1$ A closel( related re?uirement is ripeness, that is, the ?uestion must be ripe for adCudication. And a constitutional ?uestion is ripe for adCudication %hen the governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.11 Thus, to be ripe for Cudicial adCudication, the petitioner must sho% a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an inCur( to himself that can be redressed b( a favorable decision of the +ourt.1#

*n this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a Cudicial controvers( b( the mere enactment of the la% even %ithout an( further overt act,1! petitioners fail either to assert an( specific and concrete legal claim or to demonstrate an( direct adverse effect of the la% on them. The( are unable to sho% a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an inCur( to themselves. ,n this account, their petition is procedurall( infirm. This not%ithstanding, public interest re?uires the resolution of the constitutional issues raised b( petitioners. The grave nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of constitutionalit( in favor of the la%. And %here an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have infringed the +onstitution, it becomes not onl( the right but in fact the dut( of the Cudiciar( to settle the dispute.10 A66ou0t/:4(4t) o$ Pu:(46 O$$46'%s 2ection 1, Article 11 of the +onstitution statesE 2ec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and emplo(ees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them %ith utmost responsibilit(, integrit(, lo(alt(, and efficienc(, act %ith patriotism, and Custice, and lead modest lives. Public office is a public trust. *t must be discharged b( its holder not for his o%n personal gain but for the benefit of the public for %hom he holds it in trust. )( demanding accountabilit( and service %ith responsibilit(, integrit(, lo(alt(, efficienc(, patriotism and Custice, all government officials and emplo(ees have the dut( to be responsive to the needs of the people the( are called upon to serve. Public officers enCo( the presumption of regularit( in the performance of their duties. This presumption necessaril( obtains in favor of )*R and ),+ officials and emplo(ees. RA !!" operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it b( providing a s(stem of re%ards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials and emplo(ees of the )*R and the ),+ to e-ceed their revenue targets and optimi&e their revenue'generation capabilit( and collection.1" The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrar( is re?uired to rebut it. *t cannot be overturned b( mere conCecture or denied in advance (as petitioners %ould have the +ourt do) speciall( in this case %here it is an underl(ing principle to advance a declared public polic(.

PetitionersB claim that the implementation of RA !!" %ill turn )*R and ),+ officials and emplo(ees into <bount( hunters and mercenaries< is not onl( %ithout an( factual and legal basis8 it is also purel( speculative. A la% enacted b( +ongress enCo(s the strong presumption of constitutionalit(. To Custif( its nullification, there must be a clear and une?uivocal breach of the +onstitution, not a doubtful and e?uivocal one.17 To invalidate RA !!" based on petitionersB baseless supposition is an affront to the %isdom not onl( of the legislature that passed it but also of the e-ecutive %hich approved it. Public service is its o%n re%ard. 6evertheless, public officers ma( b( la% be re%arded for e-emplar( and e-ceptional performance. A s(stem of incentives for e-ceeding the set e-pectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of public accountabilit(. *n fact, it recogni&es and reinforces dedication to dut(, industr(, efficienc( and lo(alt( to public service of deserving government personnel. *n United States v. Matthews,19 the 4.2. 2upreme +ourt validated a la% %hich a%ards to officers of the customs as %ell as other parties an amount not e-ceeding one'half of the net proceeds of forfeitures in violation of the la%s against smuggling. +iting Dorsheimer v. United States,1: the 4.2. 2upreme +ourt saidE The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to stimulate and re%ard their &eal and industr( in detecting fraudulent attempts to evade pa(ment of duties and ta-es. *n the same vein, emplo(ees of the )*R and the ),+ ma( b( la% be entitled to a re%ard %hen, as a conse?uence of their &eal in the enforcement of taand customs la%s, the( e-ceed their revenue targets. *n addition, RA !!" establishes safeguards to ensure that the re%ard %ill not be claimed if it %ill be either the fruit of <bount( hunting or mercenar( activit(< or the product of the irregular performance of official duties. ,ne of these precautionar( measures is embodied in 2ection : of the la%E 2/+. :. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the B ! and the BO". # The officials, e-aminers, and emplo(ees of the =)*R> and the =),+> %ho violate this Act or %ho are guilt( of negligence, abuses or acts of malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to e-ercise e-traordinar( diligence in the performance of their duties shall be held liable for an( loss or inCur( suffered b( an( business establishment or ta-pa(er as a

result of such violation, negligence, abuse, malfeasance, misfeasance or failure to e-ercise e-traordinar( diligence. E;u/( P%ot'6t4o0 /?ualit( guaranteed under the e?ual protection clause is e?ualit( under the same conditions and among persons similarl( situated8 it is e?ualit( among e?uals, not similarit( of treatment of persons %ho are classified based on substantial differences in relation to the obCect to be accomplished.1 @hen things or persons are different in fact or circumstance, the( ma( be treated in la% differentl(. *n $ictoriano v. Eli%alde !ope &or'ers( Union,#$ this +ourt declaredE The guarant( of e?ual protection of the la%s is not a guarant( of e?ualit( in the application of the la%s upon all citi&ens of the =2>tate. *t is not, therefore, a re?uirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against ine?ualit(, that ever( man, %oman and child should be affected alike b( a statute. /?ualit( of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merel( as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. *t guarantees e?ualit(, not identit( of rights. T5' Co0st4tut4o0 1o's 0ot %';u4%' t5/t t540gs <5465 /%' 14$$'%'0t 40 $/6t :' t%'/t'1 40 (/< /s t5oug5 t5') <'%' t5' s/&'. T5' ';u/( 7%ot'6t4o0 6(/us' 1o's 0ot $o%:41 14s6%4&40/t4o0 /s to t540gs t5/t /%' 14$$'%'0t. "t 1o's 0ot 7%o54:4t ('g4s(/t4o0 <5465 4s (4&4t'1 '4t5'% 40 t5' o:='6t to <5465 4t 4s 14%'6t'1 or b( the territor( %ithin %hich it is to operate. The e?ual protection of the la%s clause of the +onstitution allo%s classification. +lassification in la%, as in the other departments of kno%ledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because the( agree %ith one another in certain particulars. A la% is not invalid because of simple ine?ualit(. The ver( idea of classification is that of ine?ualit(, so that it goes %ithout sa(ing that the mere fact of ine?ualit( in no manner determines the matter of constitutionalit(. A(( t5/t 4s %';u4%'1 o$ / 8/(41 6(/ss4$46/t4o0 4s t5/t 4t :' %'/so0/:(', <5465 &'/0s t5/t t5' 6(/ss4$46/t4o0 s5ou(1 :' :/s'1 o0 su:st/0t4/( 14st406t4o0s <5465 &/>' $o% %'/( 14$$'%'06's, t5/t 4t &ust :' g'%&/0' to t5' 7u%7os' o$ t5' (/<? t5/t 4t &ust 0ot :' (4&4t'1 to '@4st40g 6o014t4o0s o0()? /01 t5/t 4t &ust /77() ';u/(() to '/65 &'&:'% o$ t5' 6(/ss. This +ourt has held that t5' st/01/%1 4s s/t4s$4'1 4$ t5' 6(/ss4$46/t4o0 o% 14st406t4o0 4s :/s'1 o0

/ %'/so0/:(' $ou01/t4o0 o% %/t4o0/( :/s4s /01 4s 0ot 7/(7/:() /%:4t%/%). *n the e-ercise of its po%er to make classifications for the purpose of enacting la%s over matters %ithin its Curisdiction, the state is recogni&ed as enCo(ing a %ide range of discretion. *t is not necessar( that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. 6either is it necessar( that the classification be made %ith mathematical nicet(. Fence, legislative classification ma( in man( cases properl( rest on narro% distinctions, for the e?ual protection guarant( does not preclude the legislature from recogni&ing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as the( ma( appear.#1 (emphasis supplied) The e?ual protection clause recogni&es a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrar(.## @ith respect to RA !!", its e-pressed public polic( is the optimi&ation of the revenue'generation capabilit( and collection of the )*R and the ),+.#! 2ince the subCect of the la% is the revenue' generation capabilit( and collection of the )*R and the ),+, the incentives and3or sanctions provided in the la% should logicall( pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the la% concerns onl( the )*R and the ),+ because the( have the common distinct primar( function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of ta-es, customs duties, fees and charges. The )*R performs the follo%ing functionsE 2ec. 1:. )he B*rea* of nternal !even*e. G The )ureau of *nternal Revenue, %hich shall be headed b( and subCect to the supervision and control of the +ommissioner of *nternal Revenue, %ho shall be appointed b( the President upon the recommendation of the 2ecretar( =of the 1,.>, shall have the follo%ing functionsE (1) Ass'ss /01 6o(('6t /(( t/@'s, $''s /01 65/%g's /01 /66ou0t $o% /(( %'8'0u's 6o(('6t'18 (#) /-ercise dul( delegated police po%ers for the proper performance of its functions and duties8 (!) Prevent and prosecute ta- evasions and all other illegal economic activities8

(0) /-ercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate units8 and (") Perform such other functions as ma( be provided b( la%.#0 ------- (emphasis supplied)

,n the other hand, the ),+ has the follo%ing functionsE 2ec. #!. )he B*rea* of "*stoms. G The )ureau of +ustoms %hich shall be headed and subCect to the management and control of the +ommissioner of +ustoms, %ho shall be appointed b( the President upon the recommendation of the 2ecretar(=of the 1,.> and hereinafter referred to as +ommissioner, shall have the follo%ing functionsE (1) Co(('6t 6usto& 1ut4's, t/@'s /01 t5' 6o%%'s7o0140g $''s, 65/%g's /01 7'0/(t4's8 (#) A66ou0t $o% /(( 6usto&s %'8'0u's 6o(('6t'18 (!) /-ercise police authorit( for the enforcement of tariff and customs la%s8 (0) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic frauds %ithin all ports of entr(8 (") 2upervise and control e-ports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance of vessels and aircrafts in all ports of entr(8 (7) Administer all legal re?uirements that are appropriate8 (9) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports under its Curisdiction8 (:) /-ercise supervision and control over its constituent units8 ( ) Perform such other functions as ma( be provided b( la%.#" ------- (emphasis supplied)

)oth the )*R and the ),+ are bureaus under the 1,.. The( principall( perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through %hich the 2tate e-ercises one of its great inherent functions G ta-ation. *ndubitabl(, such

substantial distinction is germane and intimatel( related to the purpose of the la%. Fence, the classification and treatment accorded to the )*R and the ),+ under RA !!" full( satisf( the demands of e?ual protection. U01u' D'('g/t4o0 T%o tests determine the validit( of delegation of legislative po%erE (1) the completeness test and (#) the sufficient standard test. A la% is complete %hen it sets forth therein the polic( to be e-ecuted, carried out or implemented b( the delegate.#7 *t la(s do%n a sufficient standard %hen it provides ade?uate guidelines or limitations in the la% to map out the boundaries of the delegateBs authorit( and prevent the delegation from running riot.#9 To be sufficient, the standard must specif( the limits of the delegateBs authorit(, announce the legislative polic( and identif( the conditions under %hich it is to be implemented.#: RA !!" ade?uatel( states the polic( and standards to guide the President in fi-ing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carr(ing out the provisions of the la%. 2ection # spells out the polic( of the la%E 2/+. #. Declaration of +olicy. G *t is the polic( of the 2tate to optimi&e the revenue'generation capabilit( and collection of the )ureau of *nternal Revenue ()*R) and the )ureau of +ustoms (),+) b( providing for a s(stem of re%ards and sanctions through the creation of a Re%ards and *ncentives .und and a Revenue Performance /valuation )oard in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their officials and emplo(ees to e-ceed their revenue targets. 2ection 0 <canali&ed %ithin banks that keep it from overflo%ing<# the delegated po%er to the President to fi- revenue targetsE 2/+. 0. !ewards and ncentives ,*nd. G A Re%ards and *ncentives .und, hereinafter referred to as the .und, is hereb( created, to be sourced from the collection of the )*R and the ),+ in e-cess of t5'4% %'s7'6t48' %'8'0u' t/%g'ts o$ t5' )'/%, /s 1't'%&40'1 :) t5' D'8'(o7&'0t Bu1g't /01 Coo%140/t40g Co&&4tt'' #DBCC+, in the follo%ing percentagesE
Excess of Collection of the Excess the Revenue Targets 30% or belo $ore than 30% Percent (%) of the Excess Collection to Accrue to the Fund ! "#% ! "#% of the first 30% %lus &0% of the

re'aining excess

The .und shall be deemed automaticall( appropriated the (ear immediatel( follo%ing the (ear %hen the revenue collection target %as e-ceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal (ear. R'8'0u' t/%g'ts s5/(( %'$'% to t5' o%4g40/( 'st4&/t'1 %'8'0u' 6o(('6t4o0 '@7'6t'1 o$ t5' B"R /01 t5' BOC $o% / g48'0 $4s6/( )'/% /s st/t'1 40 t5' Bu1g't o$ E@7'014tu%'s /01 Sou%6's o$ ,40/0640g #BES,+ su:&4tt'1 :) t5' P%'s41'0t to Co0g%'ss. The )*R and the ),+ shall submit to the 1)++ the distribution of the agenciesB revenue targets as allocated among its revenue districts in the case of the )*R, and the collection districts in the case of the ),+. ------- (emphasis supplied)

Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection e-pected respectivel( of the )*R and the ),+ for a given fiscal (ear as approved b( the 1)++ and stated in the )/2. submitted b( the President to +ongress.!$ Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solel( on the President as it also undergoes the scrutin( of the 1)++. ,n the other hand, 2ection 9 specifies the limits of the )oardBs authorit( and identifies the conditions under %hich officials and emplo(ees %hose revenue collection falls short of the target b( at least 9."A ma( be removed from the serviceE 2/+. 9. +owers and ,*nctions of the Board. # The )oard in the agenc( shall have the follo%ing po%ers and functionsE -------

(b) To set the criteria and procedures for %'&o840g $%o& s'%846' o$$464/(s /01 '&7(o)''s <5os' %'8'0u' 6o(('6t4o0 $/((s s5o%t o$ t5' t/%g't :) /t ('/st s'8'0 /01 / 5/($ 7'%6'0t #7.5A+, <4t5 1u' 6o0s41'%/t4o0 o$ /(( %'('8/0t $/6to%s /$$'6t40g t5' ('8'( o$ 6o(('6t4o0 as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under this Act, su:='6t to 6484( s'%846' (/<s, %u('s /01 %'gu(/t4o0s /01 6o&7(4/06' <4t5 su:st/0t48' /01 7%o6'1u%/( 1u' 7%o6'ssE Provided, That the follo%ing e-emptions shall appl(E

1. @here the district or area of responsibilit( is ne%l('created, not e-ceeding t%o (ears in operation, as has no historical record of collection performance that can be used as basis for evaluation8 and #. @here the revenue or customs official or emplo(ee is a recent transferee in the middle of the period under consideration unless the transfer %as due to nonperformance of revenue targets or potential nonperformance of revenue targetsE Provided, ho%ever, That %hen the district or area of responsibilit( covered b( revenue or customs officials or emplo(ees has suffered from economic difficulties brought about b( natural calamities or force ma-e*re or economic causes as ma( be determined b( the )oard, termination shall be considered onl( after careful and proper revie% b( the )oard. (c) To terminate personnel in accordance %ith the criteria adopted in the preceding paragraphE Provided, That such decision shall be immediatel( e-ecutor(E Provided, further, That t5' /77(46/t4o0 o$ t5' 6%4t'%4/ $o% t5' s'7/%/t4o0 o$ /0 o$$464/( o% '&7(o)'' $%o& s'%846' u01'% t54s A6t s5/(( :' <4t5out 7%'=u146' to t5' /77(46/t4o0 o$ ot5'% %'('8/0t (/<s o0 /66ou0t/:4(4t) o$ 7u:(46 o$$46'%s /01 '&7(o)''s, su65 /s t5' Co1' o$ Co01u6t /01 Et546/( St/01/%1s o$ Pu:(46 O$$46'%s /01 E&7(o)''s /01 t5' A0t4BG%/$t /01 Co%%u7t P%/6t46's A6t8 ------- (emphasis supplied)

+learl(, RA !!" in no %a( violates the securit( of tenure of officials and emplo(ees of the )*R and the ),+. The guarantee of securit( of tenure onl( means that an emplo(ee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other than those provided b( la% and onl( after due process is accorded the emplo(ee.!1 *n the case of RA !!", it la(s do%n a reasonable (ardstick for removal (%hen the revenue collection falls short of the target b( at least 9."A) %ith due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficienc( and incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinar( action under civil service la%s.!# The action for removal is also subCect to civil service la%s, rules and regulations and compliance %ith substantive and procedural due process. At an( rate, this +ourt has recogni&ed the follo%ing as sufficient standardsE <public interest,< <Custice and e?uit(,< <public convenience and %elfare< and <simplicit(, econom( and %elfare.<!! *n this case, the declared polic( of

optimi&ation of the revenue'generation capabilit( and collection of the )*R and the ),+ is infused %ith public interest. S'7/%/t4o0 O$ Po<'%s 2ection 1# of RA !!" providesE 2/+. 1#. .oint "on/ressional Oversi/ht "ommittee. G There is hereb( created a ;oint +ongressional ,versight +ommittee composed of seven Members from the 2enate and seven Members from the Fouse of Representatives. The Members from the 2enate shall be appointed b( the 2enate President, %ith at least t%o senators representing the minorit(. The Members from the Fouse of Representatives shall be appointed b( the 2peaker %ith at least t%o members representing the minorit(. After the ,versight +ommittee %ill have approved the implementing rules and regulations (*RR) it shall thereafter become f*nct*s officio and therefore cease to e-ist. The ;oint +ongressional ,versight +ommittee in RA !!" %as created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (*RR) formulated b( the 1,., 1)M, 6/1A, )*R, ),+ and +2+. ,n Ma( ##, #$$7, it approved the said *RR. .rom then on, it became f*nct*s officio and ceased to e-ist. Fence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the e-ecutive function of implementing and enforcing the la% ma( be considered moot and academic. This not%ithstanding, this might be as good a time as an( for the +ourt to confront the issue of the constitutionalit( of the ;oint +ongressional ,versight +ommittee created under RA !!" (or other similar la%s for that matter). The scholarl( discourse of Mr. ;ustice (no% +hief ;ustice) Puno on the concept of congressional oversight in Macalintal v. "ommission on Elections!0 is illuminatingE "oncept and bases of con/ressional oversi/ht )roadl( defined, t5' 7o<'% o$ o8'%s4g5t '&:%/6's /(( /6t484t4's u01'%t/>'0 :) Co0g%'ss to '05/06' 4ts u01'%st/0140g o$ /01 40$(u'06' o8'% t5' implementation o$ ('g4s(/t4o0 4t 5/s '0/6t'1. C('/%(), o8'%s4g5t 6o06'%0s post-enactment &'/su%'s u01'%t/>'0 :) Co0g%'ss9 #/+ to &o04to% :u%'/u6%/t46 6o&7(4/06' <4t5 7%og%/& o:='6t48's, #:+ to 1't'%&40' <5't5'% /g'064's /%' 7%o7'%() /1&404st'%'1, #6+ to '(4&40/t' '@'6ut48' </st' /01 14s5o0'st), #1+

to 7%'8'0t '@'6ut48' usu%7/t4o0 o$ ('g4s(/t48' /ut5o%4t), /01 #1+ to /ss'ss '@'6ut48' 6o0$o%&4t) <4t5 t5' 6o0g%'ss4o0/( 7'%6'7t4o0 o$ 7u:(46 40t'%'st. The po%er of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative po%er itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic s(stem of government. - - - - - - - - ,ver the (ears, +ongress has invoked its oversight po%er %ith increased fre?uenc( to check the perceived <e-ponential accumulation of po%er< b( the e-ecutive branch. )( the beginning of the #$th centur(, +ongress has delegated an enormous amount of legislative authorit( to the e-ecutive branch and the administrative agencies. +ongress, thus, uses its oversight po%er to make sure that the administrative agencies perform their functions %ithin the authorit( delegated to them. - - - - - --"ate/ories of con/ressional oversi/ht f*nctions The acts done b( +ongress purportedl( in the e-ercise of its oversight po%ers ma( be divided intothree categories, namel(E scr*tiny, investi/ation and s*pervision. a. Scr*tiny +ongressional scr*tiny implies a lesser intensit( and continuit( of attention to administrative operations. *ts primar( purpose is to determine econom( and efficienc( of the operation of government activities. *n the e-ercise of legislative scrutin(, +ongress ma( re?uest information and report from the other branches of government. *t can give recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agenc( involved. --b. "on/ressional investi/ation @hile congressional scrutin( is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts that are readil( available, con/ressional investi/ation involves a more intense di//in/ of facts. The po%er of +ongress to conduct investigation is recogni&ed b( the 1 :9 +onstitution under section #1, Article H*, -----------

c. Le/islative s*pervision The third and most encompassin/ form b( %hich +ongress e-ercises its oversight po%er is thru legislative supervision. <2upervision< connotes a continuing and informed a%areness on the part of a congressional committee regarding exec*tive operations in a given administrative area. @hile both congressional scrutin( and investigation involve in?uir( into past exec*tive branch actions in order to influence future e-ecutive branch performance, con/ressional s*pervision allows "on/ress to scr*tini%e the exercise of dele/ated law0ma'in/ a*thority, and permits "on/ress to retain part of that dele/ated a*thority. "on/ress exercises s*pervision over the exec*tive a/encies thro*/h its veto power. t typically *tili%es veto provisions when /rantin/ the +resident or an exec*tive a/ency the power to prom*l/ate re/*lations with the force of law. )hese provisions re1*ire the +resident or an a/ency to present the proposed re/*lations to "on/ress, which retains a 2ri/ht2 to approve or disapprove any re/*lation before it ta'es effect. 2uch legislative veto provisions usuall( provide that a proposed regulation %ill become a la% after the e-piration of a certain period of time, onl( if +ongress does not affirmativel( disapprove of the regulation in the meantime. Dess fre?uentl(, the statute provides that a proposed regulation %ill become la% if +ongress affirmativel( approves it. S*pporters of le/islative veto stress that it is necessar( to maintain the balance of po%er bet%een the legislative and the e-ecutive branches of government as it offers la%makers a %a( to delegate vast po%er to the e-ecutive branch or to independent agencies %hile retaining the option to cancel particular e-ercise of such po%er %ithout having to pass ne% legislation or to repeal e-isting la%. The( contend that this arrangement promotes democratic accountabilit( as it provides legislative check on the activities of unelected administrative agencies. ,ne proponent thus e-plainsE *t is too late to debate the merits of this delegation polic(E the polic( is too deepl( embedded in our la% and practice. *t suffices to sa( that the comple-ities of modern government have often led +ongress'%hether b( actual or perceived necessit(' to legislate b( declaring broad polic( goals and general statutor( standards, leaving the choice of polic( options to the discretion of an e-ecutive officer. +ongress articulates legislative aims, but leaves their implementation to the Cudgment of parties %ho ma( or ma(

not have participated in or agreed %ith the development of those aims. +onse?uentl(, absent safeguards, in man( instances the reverse of our constitutional scheme could be effectedE +ongress proposes, the /-ecutive disposes. ,ne safeguard, of course, is the legislative po%er to enact ne% legislation or to change e-isting la%. )ut %ithout some means of overseeing post enactment activities of the e-ecutive branch, +ongress %ould be unable to determine %hether its policies have been implemented in accordance %ith legislative intent and thus %hether legislative intervention is appropriate. *ts opponents, ho%ever, critici%e the le/islative veto as u01u' '06%o/65&'0t u7o0 t5' '@'6ut48' 7%'%og/t48's. The( urge that /0) 7ostB'0/6t&'0t &'/su%'s u01'%t/>'0 :) t5' ('g4s(/t48' :%/065 s5ou(1 :' (4&4t'1 to s6%ut40) /01 408'st4g/t4o0? /0) &'/su%' :')o01 t5/t <ou(1 u01'%&40' t5' s'7/%/t4o0 o$ 7o<'%s gu/%/0t''1 :) t5' Co0st4tut4o0. The( contend that legislative veto constitutes an impermissible evasion of the PresidentBs veto authorit( and intrusion into the po%ers vested in the e-ecutive or Cudicial branches of government. Proponents counter that legislative veto enhances separation of po%ers as it prevents the e-ecutive branch and independent agencies from accumulating too much po%er. The( submit that reporting re?uirements and congressional committee investigations allo% +ongress to scrutini&e onl( the e-ercise of delegated la%'making authorit(. The( do not allo% +ongress to revie% e-ecutive proposals before the( take effect and the( do not afford the opportunit( for ongoing and binding e-pressions of congressional intent. *n contrast, legislative veto permits +ongress to participate prospectivel( in the approval or disapproval of <s*bordinate law< or those enacted b( the e-ecutive branch pursuant to a delegation of authorit( b( +ongress. The( further argue that legislative veto <is a necessar( response b( +ongress to the accretion of polic( control b( forces outside its chambers.< *n an era of delegated authorit(, the( point out that legislative veto <is the most efficient means +ongress has (et devised to retain control over the evolution and implementation of its polic( as declared b( statute.< *n mmi/ration and 3at*rali%ation Service v. "hadha, t5' U.S. Su7%'&' Cou%t %'so(8'1 t5' 8/(414t) o$ ('g4s(/t48' 8'to 7%o84s4o0s . The case arose from the order of the immigration Cudge suspending the deportation of +hadha pursuant to I #00(c)(1) of the *mmigration and

6ationalit( Act. The 4nited 2tates Fouse of Representatives passed a resolution vetoing the suspension pursuant to I #00(c)(#) authori&ing either Fouse of +ongress, b( resolution, to invalidate the decision of the e-ecutive branch to allo% a particular deportable alien to remain in the 4nited 2tates. The immigration Cudge reopened the deportation proceedings to implement the Fouse order and the alien %as ordered deported. The )oard of *mmigration Appeals dismissed the alienBs appeal, holding that it had no po%er to declare unconstitutional an act of +ongress. The 4nited 2tates +ourt of Appeals for 6inth +ircuit held that the Fouse %as %ithout constitutional authorit( to order the alienBs deportation and that I #00(c)(#) violated the constitutional doctrine on separation of po%ers. ,n appeal, the 4.2. 2upreme +ourt declared I #00(c)(#) unconstitutional. But t5' Cou%t s54'1 /</) $%o& t5' 4ssu' o$ s'7/%/t4o0 o$ 7o<'%s and instead held that the provision violates the presentment clause and bicameralism. *t held that the one'house veto %as essentiall( legislative in purpose and effect. As such, it is subCect to the procedures set out in Article * of the +onstitution re?uiring the passage b( a maCorit( of both Fouses and presentment to the President. - - - - - - - - T%o %eeks after the "hadha decision, the +ourt upheld, in memorandum decision, t%o lo%er court decisions invalidating the legislative veto provisions in the 6atural 5as Polic( Act of 1 9: and the .ederal Trade +ommission *mprovement Act of 1 :$. .ollo%ing this precedence, lo%er courts invalidated statutes containing legislative veto provisions although some of these provisions re?uired the approval of both Fouses of +ongress and thus met the bicameralism re?uirement of Article *. *ndeed, some of these veto provisions %ere not even e-ercised.!" (emphasis supplied) *n Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the po%er of congressional oversight and considering the nature and po%ers of a constitutional bod( like the +ommission on /lections, the +ourt struck do%n the provision in RA 1: (The ,verseas Absentee Hoting Act of #$$!) creating a ;oint +ongressional +ommittee. The committee %as tasked not onl( to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the said la% but also to revie%, revise, amend and approve the *RR promulgated b( the +ommission on /lections. The +ourt held that these functions infringed on the constitutional independence of the +ommission on /lections.!7

@ith this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessaril( constitutes an encroachment on the e-ecutive po%er to implement la%s nor undermines the constitutional separation of po%ers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic s(stem of government. *t ma( in fact even enhance the separation of po%ers as it prevents the over'accumulation of po%er in the e-ecutive branch. Fo%ever, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment <be(ond the legislative sphere,< the +onstitution imposes t%o basic and related constraints on +ongress.!9 *t ma( not vest itself, an( of its committees or its members %ith either e-ecutive or Cudicial po%er.!: And, %hen it e-ercises its legislative po%er, it must follo% the <single, finel( %rought and e-haustivel( considered, procedures< specified under the +onstitution,! including the procedure for enactment of la%s and presentment. Thus, an( post'enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutin( and investigation. *n particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the follo%ingE (1) scrutin( based primaril( on +ongressB po%er of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection %ith it, its po%er to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard b( either of its Fouses on an( matter pertaining to their departments and its po%er of confirmation0$ and (#) investigation and monitoring01 of the implementation of la%s pursuant to the po%er of +ongress to conduct in?uiries in aid of legislation.0# An( action or step be(ond that %ill undermine the separation of po%ers guaranteed b( the +onstitution. Degislative vetoes fall in this class. Degislative veto is a statutor( provision re?uiring the President or an administrative agenc( to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a la% to +ongress %hich, b( itself or through a committee formed b( it, retains a <right< or <po%er< to approve or disapprove such regulations before the( take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an in%ard'turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutin( and investigation) to an agenc( to %hich +ongress has b( la% initiall( delegated broad po%ers.0!*t radicall( changes the design or structure of the

+onstitutionBs diagram of po%er as it entrusts to +ongress a direct role in enforcing, appl(ing or implementing its o%n la%s.00 +ongress has t%o options %hen enacting legislation to define national polic( %ithin the broad hori&ons of its legislative competence.0" *t can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the e-ecutive branch the responsibilit( for making necessar( managerial decisions in conformit( %ith those standards.07 *n the latter case, the la% must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions %hen it leaves the hands of the legislature.09 Thus, %hat is left for the e-ecutive branch or the concerned administrative agenc( %hen it formulates rules and regulations implementing the la% is to fill up details (supplementar( rule'making) or ascertain facts necessar( to bring the la% into actual operation (contingent rule'making).0: Administrative regulations enacted b( administrative agencies to implement and interpret the la% %hich the( are entrusted to enforce have the force of la% and are entitled to respect.0 2uch rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute"$ and are Cust as binding as if the( have been %ritten in the statute itself. As such, the( have the force and effect of la% and enCo( the presumption of constitutionalit( and legalit( until the( are set aside %ith finalit( in an appropriate case b( a competent court."1 +ongress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, ma( not pass upon their legalit( b( subCecting them to its stamp of approval %ithout disturbing the calculated balance of po%ers established b( the +onstitution. *n e-ercising discretion to approve or disapprove the *RR based on a determination of %hether or not the( conformed %ith the provisions of RA !!", +ongress arrogated Cudicial po%er unto itself, a po%er e-clusivel( vested in this +ourt b( the +onstitution. Co0s41'%'1 O7404o0 o$ M%. *ust46' D/0t' O. T40g/ Moreover, the re?uirement that the implementing rules of a la% be subCected to approval b( +ongress as a condition for their effectivit( violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment."# 2ection 1, Article H* of the +onstitution statesE 2ection 1. T5' ('g4s(/t48' 7o<'% s5/(( :' 8'st'1 40 t5' Co0g%'ss o$ t5' P54(47740's <5465 s5/(( 6o0s4st o$ / S'0/t' /01 / 3ous' o$ R'7%'s'0t/t48's, e-cept to the e-tent reserved to the people b( the provision on initiative and referendum. (emphasis supplied)

Degislative po%er (or the po%er to propose, enact, amend and repeal la%s)"! is vested in +ongress %hich consists of t%o chambers, the 2enate and the Fouse of Representatives. A valid e-ercise of legislative po%er re?uires the act of both chambers. +orrollaril(, it can be e-ercised neither solel( b( one of the t%o chambers nor b( a committee of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validit( of a legislative veto, both a single'chamber legislative veto and a congressional committee legislative veto are invalid. Additionall(, 2ection #9(1), Article H* of the +onstitution providesE 2ection #9. (1) E8'%) :4(( 7/ss'1 :) t5' Co0g%'ss s5/((, :'$o%' 4t :'6o&'s / (/<, :' 7%'s'0t'1 to t5' P%'s41'0t. *f he approves the same, he shall sign it, other%ise, he shall veto it and return the same %ith his obCections to the Fouse %here it originated, %hich shall enter the obCections at large in its ;ournal and proceed to reconsider it. *f, after such reconsideration, t%o'thirds of all the Members of such Fouse shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together %ith the obCections, to the other Fouse b( %hich it shall like%ise be reconsidered, and if approved b( t%o'thirds of all the Members of that Fouse, it shall become a la%. *n all such cases, the votes of each Fouse shall be determined b( yeas or nays, and the names of the members voting for or against shall be entered in its ;ournal. The President shall communicate his veto of an( bill to the Fouse %here it originated %ithin thirt( da(s after the date of receipt thereof8 other%ise, it shall become a la% as if he had signed it. (emphasis supplied) /ver( bill passed b( +ongress must be presented to the President for approval or veto. *n the absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed b( +ongress can become a la%. *n this sense, la%'making under the +onstitution is a Coint act of the Degislature and of the /-ecutive. Assuming that legislative veto is a valid legislative act %ith the force of la%, it cannot take effect %ithout such presentment even if approved b( both chambers of +ongress. *n sum, t%o steps are re?uired before a bill becomes a la%. .irst, it must be approved b( both Fouses of +ongress."0 2econd, it must be presented to and approved b( the President."" As summari&ed b( ;ustice *sagani +ru&"7 and .r. ;oa?uin 5. )ernas, 2.;."9, the follo%ing is the procedure for the approval of billsE

A bill is introduced b( an( member of the Fouse of Representatives or the 2enate e-cept for some measures that must originate onl( in the former chamber. The first reading involves onl( a reading of the number and title of the measure and its referral b( the 2enate President or the 2peaker to the proper committee for stud(. The bill ma( be <killed< in the committee or it ma( be recommended for approval, %ith or %ithout amendments, sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon. *f there are other bills of the same nature or purpose, the( ma( all be consolidated into one bill under common authorship or as a committee bill. ,nce reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. *t is at this stage that the bill is read in its entiret(, scrutini&ed, debated upon and amended %hen desired. The second reading is the most important stage in the passage of a bill. The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof are distributed at least three da(s before the third reading. ,n the third reading, the members merel( register their votes and e-plain them if the( are allo%ed b( the rules. 6o further debate is allo%ed. ,nce the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, %here it %ill also undergo the three readings. *f there are differences bet%een the versions approved b( the t%o chambers, a conference committee": representing both Fouses %ill draft a compromise measure that if ratified b( the 2enate and the Fouse of Representatives %ill then be submitted to the President for his consideration. The bill is enrolled %hen printed as finall( approved b( the +ongress, thereafter authenticated %ith the signatures of the 2enate President, the 2peaker, and the 2ecretaries of their respective chambersJ" )he +resident(s role in law0ma'in/. The final step is submission to the President for approval. ,nce approved, it takes effect as la% after the re?uired publication.7$

@here +ongress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the la% it has enacted pursuant to sufficient standards established in the said la%, the la% must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions %hen it leaves the hands of the legislature. And it ma( be deemed to have left the hands of the legislature %hen it becomes effective because it is onl( upon effectivit( of the statute that legal rights and obligations become available to those entitled b( the language of the statute. 2ubCect to the indispensable re?uisite of publication under the due process clause,71 the determination as to %hen a la% takes effect is %holl( the prerogative of +ongress.7# As such, it is onl( upon its effectivit( that a la% ma( be e-ecuted and the e-ecutive branch ac?uires the duties and po%ers to e-ecute the said la%. )efore that point, the role of the e-ecutive branch, particularl( of the President, is limited to approving or vetoing the la%.7! .rom the moment the la% becomes effective, an( provision of la% that empo%ers +ongress or an( of its members to pla( an( role in the implementation or enforcement of the la% violates the principle of separation of po%ers and is thus unconstitutional. 4nder this principle, a provision that re?uires +ongress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a la% after it has alread( taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allo%s +ongress or its members to overturn an( directive or ruling made b( the members of the e-ecutive branch charged %ith the implementation of the la%. .ollo%ing this rationale, 2ection 1# of RA !!" should be struck do%n as unconstitutional. @hile there ma( be similar provisions of other la%s that ma( be invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the +ourt refrains from invalidating them %holesale but %ill do so at the proper time %hen an appropriate case assailing those provisions is brought before us.70 The ne-t ?uestion to be resolved isE %hat is the effect of the unconstitutionalit( of 2ection 1# of RA !!" on the other provisions of the la%K @ill it render the entire la% unconstitutionalK 6o. 2ection 1! of RA !!" providesE 2/+. 1!. Separability "la*se. G *f an( provision of this Act is declared invalid b( a competent court, the remainder of this Act or an( provision not affected b( such declaration of invalidit( shall remain in force and effect.

*n )atad v. Secretary of the Department of Ener/y,7" the +ourt laid do%n the follo%ing rulesE The /eneral r*le is that %here part of a statute is void as repugnant to the +onstitution, %hile another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, ma( stand and be enforced. The presence of a separabilit( clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separabilit(, rather than complete nullit( of the statute. To Custif( this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature %ould have enacted it b( itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionall( enact the other. /nough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid statute, %hich carries out the legislative intent. - - The exception to the /eneral r*le is that %hen the parts of a statute are so mutuall( dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to %arrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a %hole, the nullit( of one part %ill vitiate the rest. *n making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected %ith one another, the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a %hole and %ould not have enacted it if one part is void, in %hich case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall %ith them. The separabilit( clause of RA !!" reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate and detach an( invalid provision from the other provisions so that the latter ma( continue in force and effect. The valid portions can stand independentl( of the invalid section. @ithout 2ection 1#, the remaining provisions still constitute a complete, intelligible and valid la% %hich carries out the legislative intent to optimi&e the revenue'generation capabilit( and collection of the )*R and the ),+ b( providing for a s(stem of re%ards and sanctions through the Re%ards and *ncentives .und and a Revenue Performance /valuation )oard. To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if their purpose is to enforce or implement e-isting la% pursuant to a valid delegation. The *RR of RA !!" %ere published on Ma( !$, #$$7 in t%o ne%spapers of general circulation77 and became effective 1" da(s thereafter.79 4ntil and unless the contrar( is sho%n, the *RR are presumed valid and effective even %ithout the approval of the ;oint +ongressional ,versight +ommittee.

23ERE,ORE, the petition is hereb( PART"A!! GRANTED. 2ection 1# of RA !!" creating a ;oint +ongressional ,versight +ommittee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the la% is declared UNCONST"TUT"ONA! and therefore NU!! and .O"D. The constitutionalit( of the remaining provisions of RA !!" is UP3E!D. Pursuant to 2ection 1! of RA !!", the rest of the provisions remain in force and effect. SO ORDERED. +*no, "..., 4*is*mbin/, 5nares0Santia/o, "arpio, 6*stria0Martine%, "orona, "arpio0Morales, 6%c*na, )in/a, "hico03a%ario, $elasco, .r., 3ach*ra, !eyes, Leonardo0de0"astro, Brion, ..., concur.

,oot0ot's
L

Advocates and Adherents of 2ocial ;ustice for 2chool Teachers and Allied @orkers.
1

4nder Rule 7" of the Rules of +ourt.

An Act to *mprove Revenue +ollection Performance of the )ureau of *nternal Revenue ()*R) and the )ureau of +ustoms (),+) Through the +reation of a Re%ards and *ncentives .und and of a Revenue Performance /valuation )oard and for ,ther Purposes.
!

2ection #, RA !!". 2ection !, id. 2ection 0, id. 2ection 7, id. 2ection 9, id. 2ection 11, id. 2ection 1#, id.

"

1$

+ru&, *sagani, Philippine +onstitutional Da%, 1

" edition, p. #!.

11

)ernas, ;oa?uin, The 1 :9 +onstitution of the Republic of the PhilippinesE A +ommentar(, 1 7 edition, pp. :0:':0 .
1#

"r*% v. Secretary of Environment and 3at*ral !eso*rces, 0$$ Phil. $0 (#$$$). (Hitug, ;., separate opinion)

1!

See La B*/al0B(Laan )ribal 6ssociation, nc. v. !amos, 5.R. 6o. 1#9::#, $1 1ecember #$$0, 00" 2+RA 1.
10

)a7ada v. 6n/ara, !!: Phil. "07 (1 2ection #, id.

9).

1"

17

"entral Ban' Employees 6ssociation, nc. v. Ban/'o Sentral n/ +ilipinas, 5.R. 6o. 10:#$:, 1" 1ecember #$$0, 007 2+RA # .
19

19! 4.2. !:1 (1:

).

1:

90 4.2. 177 (1:7:). )lackBs Da% 1ictionar(, 2pecial 1e Du-e "th /dition, @est, p. 0:1. 1": Phil. 7$ (1 90). *d. +itations omitted.

#$

#1

##

6mbros v. "ommission on 6*dit, 5.R. 6o. 1" 9$$, !$ ;une #$$", 07# 2+RA "9#.
#!

2ection #, RA !!". 2ection 1:, +hapter 0, Title **, )ook *H, Administrative +ode of 1 :9. 2ection #!, id. +elae% v. 6*ditor 8eneral, 1## Phil. 7" (1 7").

#0

#"

#7

#9

Eastern Shippin/ Lines, nc. v. +OE6, 5.R. 6o. D'977!!, 1: ,ctober 1 ::, 177 2+RA "!!.
#:

+ru&, *sagani, Philippine Political Da%, 1

1 edition, p. 9.

+anama !efinin/ "o. v. !yan, # ! 4.2. !:: (1 !"), (+ardo&o, ;., dissenting).
!$

2ection ", Rule **, *mplementing Rules and Regulations of RA !!". De 8*%man, .r. v. "ommission on Elections, ! 1 Phil. 9$ (#$$$).

!1

!#

See 2ection 07(b)(:), +hapter 7, Title *, 2ubtitle A, )ook H, Administrative +ode of 1 :9.
!!

E1*i06sia +lacement, nc. v. Department of ,orei/n 6ffairs, 5.R. 6o. 1"##10, 1 2eptember #$$7, "$# 2+RA # ".
!0

0"! Phil. ":7 (#$$!). Mr. ;ustice (no% +hief ;ustice) PunoBs separate opinion %as adopted as part of the ponencia in this case insofar as it related to the creation of and the po%ers given to the ;oint +ongressional ,versight +ommittee.
!"

*d. (italics in the original) *d.

!7

!9

Metropolitan &ashin/ton 6irports 6*thority v. "iti%ens for the 6batement of 6ircraft 3oise, "$1 4.2. #"# (1 1).
!:

*d. *d.

0$

See Mr. ;ustice (no% +hief ;ustice) PunoBs separate opinion in Macalintal.
01

E./., b( re?uiring the regular submission of reports.

0#

See Mr. ;ustice (no% +hief ;ustice) PunoBs separate opinion in Macalintal.
0!

See Tribe, Da%rence, * American +onstitutional Da% 1!1 (#$$$). *d. *d. at 101.

00

0"

07

Metropolitan &ashin/ton 6irports 6*thority v. "iti%ens for the 6batement of 6irport 3oise,s*pra.
09

Ed* v. Ericta, 107 Phil. 07 (1 9$).

0:

)ernas, ;oa?uin, The 1 :9 +onstitution of the Republic of the PhilippinesE A +ommentar(, #$$! edition, p. 770 citing &ayman v. So*thward, 1$ @heat 1 (1:"#) and )he Bri/ 6*rora, 9 +r. !:# (1:1!)).
0

Eslao v. "ommission on 6*dit, 5.R. 6o. 1$:!1$, $1 2eptember 1 #!7 2+RA 1718 Sierra Madre )r*st v. Secretary of 6/ric*lt*re and 3at*ral !eso*rces, #$7 Phil. !1$ (1 :!).
"$

0,

+eople v. Maceren, 17 Phil. 0!9 (1 99). 2ee Eslao v. "ommission on 6*dit, s*pra.

"1

"#

*t is also for these reasons that the 4nited 2tates 2upreme +ourt struck do%n legislative vetoes as unconstitutional in mmi/ration and 3at*rali%ation Service v. "hadha (07# 4.2. 1 =1 :!>).
"!

6achura, Antonio )., ,utline Revie%er in Political Da%, #$$7 edition, p. #!7.
"0

2ection #7, Article H* of the +onstitution providesE 2ection #7. (1) /ver( bill passed b( the +ongress shall embrace onl( one subCect %hich shall be e-pressed in the title thereof. (#) 6o bill passed b( either Fouse shall become a la% unless it has passed three readings on separate da(s, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three da(s before its passage, e-cept %hen the President certifies to the necessit( of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamit( or emergenc(. 4pon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allo%ed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediatel( thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the ;ournal.

""

See )ernas, s*pra note 0:, p. 97#.

"7

Philippine Political Da%, #$$# edition, +entral Da%book Publishing +o., *nc., pp. 1"#'1"!.
"9

The Philippine +onstitution for Dadies, 5entlemen And ,thers, #$$9 edition, Re- )ookstore, *nc., pp. 11:'11 .
":

The conference committee consists of members nominated b( both Fouses. The task of the conference committee, ho%ever, is not strictl( limited to reconciling differences. ;urisprudence also allo%s the committee to insert ne% provision=s> not found in either original provided these are germane to the subCect of the bill. 6e-t, the reconciled version must be presented to both Fouses for ratification. (*d.)
"

S*pra note "7. S*pra note "9.

7$

71

2ee 2ection 1, Article *** of the +onstitution. *n )a7ada v. )*vera (#!$ Phil. "#:), the +ourt also cited 2ection 7, Article *** %hich recogni&es <the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.<
7#

As much is recogni&ed in Article # of the +ivil +ode %hich states that <Da%s shall take effect after fifteen da(s follo%ing the completion of their publication either in the ,fficial 5a&ette, or in a ne%spaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is other%ise provided.< )a7adarecogni&ed that <unless it is other%ise provided< referred to the date of effectivit(. 2impl( put, a la% %hich is silent as to its effectivit( date takes effect fifteen da(s follo%ing publication, though there is no impediment for +ongress to provide for a different effectivit( date.
7!

*t has been suggested b( Mr. ;ustice Antonio T. +arpio that 2ection 1# of RA !!" is like%ise unconstitutional because it violates the principle of separation of po%ers, particularl( %ith respect to the e-ecutive and the legislative branches. *mplicit in this claim is the proposition that the abilit( of the President to promulgate implementing rules to legislation is inherent in the e-ecutive branch. There has long been a trend to%ards the delegation of po%ers, especiall( of legislative po%ers, even if not e-pressl( permitted b( the +onstitution. (*. +ortes, Administrative Da%, at 1#'1!.) 1elegation of legislative po%ers is permissible unless the delegation amounts to a

surrender or abdication of po%ers. (*d.) Recent instances of delegated legislative po%ers upheld b( the +ourt include the po%er of the 1epartments of ;ustice and Fealth to promulgate rules and regulations on lethal inCection (Eche/aray v. Secretary of .*stice, !": Phil. 01$ =1 :>)8 the po%er of the 2ecretar( of Fealth to phase out blood banks (Beltran v. Secretary of 9ealth, 5.R. 6o. 1!!70$, 1!!771, M 1! 109, #" 6ovember #$$", 097 2+RA 17:)8 and the po%er of the 1epartments of .inance and Dabor to promulgate *mplementing Rules to the Migrant @orkers and ,verseas .ilipinos Act. (E1*i06sia +lacement v.D,6, 5.R. 6o. 1"##10, 1 2eptember #$$7, "$# 2+RA # ".) The delegation to the e-ecutive branch of the po%er to formulate and enact implementing rules falls %ithin the class of permissible delegation of legislative po%ers. Most recentl(, in Exec*tive Secretary v. So*thwin/ 9eavy nd*stries (5.R. 6os. 170191, 17019# M17:901, #$ .ebruar( #$$7, 0:# 2+RA 79!), %e characteri&ed such delegation as <confer=ring> upon the President ?uasi'legislative po%er %hich ma( be defined as the /ut5o%4t) 1'('g/t'1 :) t5' (/<B&/>40g :o1) to t5' /1&404st%/t48' :o1) to /1o7t %u('s /01 %'gu(/t4o0s intended to carr( out the provisions of the la% and implement legislative polic(.< (*d., at 7:7, citing +ru&, Philippine Administrative Da%, #$$! /dition, at #0.) Da% book authors are like%ise virtuall( unanimous that the po%er of the e-ecutive branch to promulgate implementing rules arises from legislative delegation. ;ustice 6achura defines the nature of the rule' making po%er of administrative bodies in the e-ecutive branch as <t5' '@'%64s' o$ 1'('g/t'1 ('g4s(/t48' 7o<'%, involving no discretion as to %hat the la% shall be, but merel( the authorit( to fi- the details in the e-ecution or enforcement of a polic( set out in the la% itself.< (A./. 6achura, ,utline Revie%er in Political Da% =#$$$ ed.>, at #9#.) Fe further e-plains that rules and regulations that <fi- the details in the e-ecution and enforcement of a polic( set out in the la%< are called <supplementar( or detailed legislation<. (*d., at #9!.) ,ther commentators such as .r. )ernas ()ernas, supra note 0:, at 711), 1e Deon and 1e Deon (F. 1e Deon M F. 1e Deon, ;r., Administrative Da%E Te-t and +ases (1 : ed), at 9 ':$8 citing 1 Am. ;ur. #d : 1) and +arlos +ru& (+. +ru&, Philippine Administrative Da% (1 : ed), at 1 '#$, ##, #!) have similar vie%s. The +ongress ma( delegate the po%er to craft implementing rules to the President in his capacit( as the head of the e-ecutive branch, %hich is tasked under the +onstitution to e-ecute the la%. *n effecting this

delegation, and as %ith an( other delegation of legislative po%ers, +ongress ma( impose conditions or limitations %hich the e-ecutive branch is bound to observe. A usual e-ample is the designation b( +ongress of %hich particular members of the e-ecutive branch should participate in the drafting of the implementing rules. This set'up does not offend the separation of po%ers bet%een the branches as it is sanctioned b( the delegation principle. Apart from %hatever rule'making po%er that +ongress ma( delegate to the President, the latter has inherent ordinance po%ers covering the e-ecutive branch as part of the po%er of e-ecutive control (<The President shall have control of all the e-ecutive departments, bureaus and officesJ< 2ection 19, Article H**, +onstitution.). )( its nature, this ordinance po%er does not re?uire or entail delegation from +ongress. 2uch facult( must be distinguished from the authorit( to issue implementing rules to legislation %hich does not inhere in the presidenc( but instead, as e-plained earlier, is delegated b( +ongress. The marked distinction bet%een the PresidentBs po%er to issue intrabranch orders and instructions or internal rules for the e-ecutive branch, on one hand, and the PresidentBs authorit( b( virtue of legislative delegation to issue implementing rules to legislation, on the other, is embodied in the rules on publication, as e-plained in )a7ada v. )*vera (5.R. 6o. D'7! 1", # 1ecember 1 :7, 107 2+RA 007). The +ourt held therein that internal regulations applicable to members of the e-ecutive branch, <that is, regulating onl( the personnel of the administrative agenc( and not the public, need not be published. 6either is publication re?uired of the so'called letters of instructions issued b( administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be follo%ed b( their subordinates in the performance of their duties.< ( d., at 0"0) The dispensation %ith publication in such instances is rooted in the ver( nature of the issuances, i.e., the( are not binding on the public. The( neither create rights nor impose obligations %hich are enforceable in court. 2ince the( are issued pursuant to the po%er of e-ecutive control, and are directed onl( at members of the e-ecutive branch, there is no constitutional need for their publication. Fo%ever, %hen the presidential issuance does create rights and obligations affecting the public at large, as implementing rules certainl( do, then publication is mandator(. *n e-plaining %h( this is so, the +ourt %ent as far as to note that such rules and regulations are designed <to

enforce or implement e-isting la% 7u%su/0t to / 8/(41 1'('g/t4o0.C (*d., at #"0.) T5' Cou%t <ou(1 0ot 5/8' s7o>'0 o$ C8/(41 1'('g/t4o0C 4$ 401''1 t5' 7o<'% to 4ssu' su65 %u('s </s 405'%'0t 40 t5' 7%'s41'06). Moreover, the creation of legal rights and obligations is legislative in character, and the President in %hom legislative po%er does not reside cannot confer legal rights or impose obligations on the people absent the proper empo%ering statute. Thus, an( presidential issuance %hich purports to bear such legal effect on the public, such as implementing rules to legislation, can onl( emanate from a legislative delegation to the President. The prevalent practice in the ,ffice of the President is to issue orders or instructions to officials of the e-ecutive branch regarding the enforcement or carr(ing out of the la%. This practice is valid conformabl( %ith the PresidentBs po%er of e-ecutive control. The facult( to issue such orders or instructions is distinct from the po%er to promulgate implementing rules to legislation. The latter originates from a different legal foundation G the delegation of legislative po%er to the President. ;ustice +arpio cites an unconventional interpretation of the ordinance po%er of the President, particularl( the po%er to issue e-ecutive orders, as set forth in the Administrative +ode of 1 :9. Net, b( practice, implementing rules are never contained in e-ecutive orders. The( are, instead, contained in a segregate promulgation, usuall( entitled <*mplementing Rules and Regulations,< %hich derives not from the Administrative +ode, but rather from the specific grants in the legislation itself sought to be implemented. Fis position does not find te-tual support in the Administrative +ode itself. 2ection #, +hapter #, Title 1, )ook *** of the +ode, %hich defines </-ecutive orders< as <=a>cts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character 40 t5' 4&7('&'0t/t4o0 o% '@'6ut4o0 o$ 6o0st4tut4o0/( o% st/tuto%) 7o<'%s<. /-ecutive orders are not the vehicles for rules of a general or permanent character in the 4&7('&'0t/t4o0 o% '@'6ut4o0 o$ (/<s. The( are the vehicle for rules of a general or permanent character in the 4&7('&'0t/t4o0 o% '@'6ut4o0 o$ t5' 6o0st4tut4o0/( o% st/tuto%) 7o<'%s o$ t5' P%'s41'0t himself. 2ince b( definition, the statutor( po%ers of the President consist of a specific delegation b( +ongress, it necessaril( follo%s that the facult( to issue e-ecutive orders to implement such

delegated authorit( emanates not from an( inherent e-ecutive po%er but from the authorit( delegated b( +ongress. *t is not correct, as ;ustice +arpio posits, that %ithout implementing rules, legislation cannot be faithfull( e-ecuted b( the e-ecutive branch. Man( of our ke( la%s, including the +ivil +ode, the Revised Penal +ode, the +orporation +ode, the Dand Registration Act and the Propert( Registration 1ecree, do not have *mplementing Rules. *t has never been suggested that the enforcement of these la%s is unavailing, or that the absence of implementing rules to these la%s indicates insufficient statutor( details that should preclude their enforcement. (2ee DBM v.:olonwel )radin/, 5.R. 6os. 19"7$:, 19"717 M 19"7" , : ;une #$$9, "#0 2+RA " 1, 7$!.) *n reCecting the theor( that the po%er to craft implementing rules is e-ecutive in character and reaffirming instead that such po%er arises from a legislative grant, the +ourt asserts that +ongress retains the po%er to impose statutor( conditions in the drafting of implementing rules, provided that such conditions do not take on the character of a legislative veto. +ongress can designate %hich officers or entities should participate in the drafting of implementing rules. *t ma( impose statutor( restraints on the participants in the drafting of implementing rules, and the President is obliged to observe such restraints on the e-ecutive officials, even if he thinks the( are unnecessar( or foolhard(. The unconstitutional nature of the legislative veto does not ho%ever bar +ongress from imposing conditions %hich the President must compl( %ith in the e-ecution of the la%. After all, the President has the constitutional dut( to faithfull( e-ecute the la%s.
70

This stance is called for b( Cudicial restraint as %ell as the presumption of constitutionalit( accorded to la%s enacted b( +ongress, a co'e?ual branch. *t is also finds support in +elae% v. 6*ditor 8eneral (1## Phil. 7" =1 7">).
7"

!07 Phil. !#1 (1

9). /mphasis in the original.

77

*n particular, the Philippine 2tar and the Manila 2tandard. 2ection !7, *RR of RA !!".

79