. Polzer (Hrsg.) Religion und Wende in Ostmittel-und Sdosteuropa 1989-2009: Tagungsband zum gleichnamigen Symposion anlsslich des 20.

Jahrestags des Falls des Eisernen Vorhangs in Wien, im Oktober 2009 Innsbruck; Wien: Tyrolia-Verlag, 2010, 131-148.

Radmila Radi

The Serbian Orthodox Church The Sole Winner of the Transition in Serbia
The transition of a society does not refer only to a change in the political and economical systems; it represeni\ts changes in almost every part of society and its system of values.1 By the mid-20th century the Eastern European countries, following the same model, had finished crossing the path from capitalism to socialism, only to cross this path again at almost the exact same time half a century later but in the other direction once again following the same model. The fact that they underwent a complicated post-communist transformation process during the last decades of the 20th century means that they have had to resolve certain important problems concerning religion, such as the democratization of legal acts, accepting European standards, and creating a socio-political atmosphere of tolerance, freedom and pluralism.2 The transition process has been characterized by dissolution processes and dramatic changes such as a drastic fall in industrial production, a rise in unemployment, an increase in prices, poverty, the loss of investments, etc. For most countries this meant that before everything would start to get better, they needed to plunge below the levels of socialist times. Serbia is perhaps the only country where it is not easy to determine when the transition actually started. Despite a well-conceived program in 1989/1990, the transition in Serbia made its first significant progress (not considering the small rise in 1990 in the SFRY) following Miloevi's fall on October 5, 2000, with the termination of the "external wall" of sanctions and the normalization of relations with the international political, economic and financial organizations.
1

Sreten VUJOVI, Urbane promene u Srbiji, in: Silvano BOLI and Anelka MILI (Hg.), Srbija krajem milenijuma: Razaranje drutva, promene i svakodnevni ivot [Urban change in Serbia, Serbia at the end of the millennium: Destruction of society, changes and everyday life]. Belgrade 2002, 167-194, hier: 170. 2 Mirko BLAGOJEVI, Religija i crkva u transformacijama drutva [Religion and Church in the transformation of Society]. Beograd 2005, 117; Nonka BOGOMILOVA, The Religious Situation in Contemporary Bulgaria, and in Serbia and Montenegro. Differences and Similarities, in: Religion in Eastern Europe 25 (2005) 120.

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Nevertheless, after 2003 the transition process slowed down significantly.3 According to results obtained from a study in 2004, less than 2% of the population benefited directly from the transition, and 8% indirectly. At that time in Serbia, about 40% of the population was living on the verge of poverty.4 The average paycheck was under 200 Euros, and about 15% of the employed did not receive their salaries on time. The Serbian economy had shrunk to 50% and industry to 30% of their levels in 1989. Industry was in a particularly difficult position because of monetary policy and the privileges of the import lobby. The export trade deficit was around 5 billion dollars and foreign debt over 13.5 billion. At that time the transition in Serbia was marked by a grave downturn and unsuccessful privatization. It could not contribute to economic growth or a rise in employment. Over half a million workplaces were lost, and statistics showed that there were five times fewer employment positions opened than closed. Officially, 30% of the population capable of working were unemployed; the unofficial estimates counted 40%.5 Serbia was constantly fighting with inflation, a high export trade deficit and large foreign debt, to name a few things.6 The living standard of Serbian citizens is among the lowest in Europe. After eight years of transition Serbia has, according to most of the development indices, reached only one-third of the European average.7
Mladen LAZI, (Re)strukturisanje drutva u Srbiji tokom 90-ih [The (re)structuring of society in Serbia during the 90s], in: Srbija krajem milenijuma: Razaranje drutva, promene i svakodnevni ivot, 17-34, Boidar CEROVI, Srbija u tranziciji i krizi [Serbia in transition and crisisl, http://www.ekof.bg.ac.yu, (letzter Zugriff: 23.03.2010). Drago CVIJANOVI, Branko MIHAILOVI und Zoran SIMONOVI, Tranzicija u Srbiji. Efekti i ogranienja [Transition in Serbia: effects and limitations], hrcak.srce.hr/file/55884, (letzter Zugriff: 07.04.2010). 4 Milan MILOEVI, O eksperimentu i pacijentu [The experiment and the patient], Vreme 713, http://www.vreme.com, (letzter Zugriff: 02.09.2004). 5 MILOEVI, O eksperimentu (wie Anm. 4). 6 Ivana DOMAZET und Jovan ZUBOVI, Uticaj tranzicije na zaposlenost i zarade u Srbiji [The impact of transition on employment and wages in Serbia], http://www.ekof.bg.ac.yu, (letzter Zugriff: 23.03.2010). 7 Vesna JELII, Dugo putovanje u bolji ivot [A long journey to a better life], http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Tema-nedelje/, (letzter Zugriff: 20.08.2009), [International economic Chronicle - Transition in Serbia], http://glassrbije.org, (letzter Zugriff: 6.8.2009).
3

In other words, as a result of the decay of the Yugoslav federation, wars, sanctions, blockades and the transition process, Serbia's industry dilapidated and its rural regions are considered to be the biggest losers.8 The spheres of education, culture, science, and health are in poor shape, the level of unemployment is extremely high, and the population is aging. The population lives in poverty, and reforms in key sectors of the state system have not been completed.9 In most countries of Eastern Europe and the ex-Yugoslavia, the processes of globalization and societal transformation had to be undertaken within a short period of time, resulting in a series of undesirable side-effects for most of the population. These processes created changes in the value system, especially in the attitude of persons toward e.g. society, freedom and safety, ideology and pragmatism. In the case of the western mentality and culture these changes were promoted by the Protestant Church; in the Balkan states these changes were unaffected by ideology, which would make these states closer to religious cultures. The political elite in some Eastern European countries (in Serbia - somewhat later and only partially) mostly accepted the western and European orientation, so that the Orthodox Church remained the only institution which could assuage the fears and displeasure caused by the social changes. Although the causes for the reanimation of religion were similar, the influence of this trend was different in the Balkan states and in Russia.10 The Model of the Return of Religion and Church: The Case of the Serbian Orthodox Church In most countries of Eastern Europe long before the end of the eighties, voices could be heard which demanded the return of religion to its place in society. Public interest in religious questions and the public prestige of religion grew further after the removal of state control. Additionally, the fall of socialism left behind an ideological vacuum. In most countries the return happened without any significant commotion, and was instead accompanied
Najvei gubitnici tranzicije [The biggest losers of the transition], in: Danas, http://www.danas.rs/vesti/drustvo, (letzter Zugriff: 20.08.2009). 9 Iskuenja tranzicije [The temptations of transition], http://glassrbije.org, (letzter Zugriff: 11.06.2009). 10 BOGOMILOVA, Religious Situation (wie Anm. 2) 1-20.
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by a strong presence of the cultural matrix of the past and the rediscovering of the religious foundations of national cultures. Sociologists called this a process of re-traditionalization or "deprivatization".11 In most of the socialist countries, the importance of religion and faith grew while simultaneously falling rapidly in western countries. Churches started to take up new positions in state and society, and it was not rare for state organs to offer legal privileges that went far beyond what is common in western European countries.12 In almost all countries, first steps were taken toward the restitution of church property that had been confiscated during communist times, church presence in the media spread, and pressure was exerted to revive religious teaching in schools. In addition to the adoption of laws on religious communities, the freedom of conscience and religious organizations, many educational, cultural, and charity institutions were restored or opened. New churches were built and new theological schools and seminaries opened rapidly.13 Priests returned to the army and hospitals. The theological faculties, which were separated from the universities during the late 1940s and early 1950s, returned to the state universities. All church organizations or associations which were sponsored by the state during communist times were terminated. The growth of religiosity and the popularity of the Church have been widespread. Although statistics from Bulgaria and Romania from the beginning of 1990s revealed a growing percentage of Orthodox believers, only a small percentage of them were regular churchgoers.14 Forty years of communist rule left behind a legacy of deep religious ignorance. There were some exceptions, but in many cases believers had a poor understanding of the basics of their faith. They were unfamiliar with the basic teaching of the Church
Mirko BLAGOJEVI, Desecularization of Contemporary Serbian Society, in: Religion in Eastern Europe 28 (2008) 37-50. 12 Tomas BREMER, Crkva i civilno drutvo: pogled iz rimokatolike perspective, in: Hrianstvo i evropske integracije [Church and civil society: a view from a Catholic perspective, in: Christianity and European Integrationj. Beograd 2003, 115-125. 13 Antonela CAPELLE POGACEANU, Du 'Retour de l'Orthodoxie' dans la Romanie postcommuniste, in : L'autre Europe, no. 36-37,117-162. 14 Emil COHEN und Krassimir KANEV, Religious Freedom in Bulgaria, in: Journal of Ecumenical Studies 36 (1999) 243-264; Alina MUNGIU-PIPPIDI, The Ruler and the Patriarch. The Romanian Eastern Orthodox Church in Transition, in: East European Constitutional Review 7 (1998) 85-91.
11

and unable to behave in a proper manner when visiting churches. As some theologians wrote, after the long "exile" the reintegration of believers would be a long process with an insecure outcome.15 The fall of communism also paved the way for conflicts between different religious communities that had been smoldering under the surface for years. In many countries anti-Semitism was on the rise.16 At the same time the Orthodox Churches faced many internal problems such as schisms and internal ruptures. The Church's presence in everyday politics, its close connections with government institutions, and its position in society and the military created favourable conditions for the realization of strategic aims. In the past years church representatives could be seen alongside representatives of state at all important occasions. The Church became a constant public voice and a strong proponent of its own solutions to various social problems. The list of issues on which the Church has intervened is long, ranging from the campaign to introduce religious instruction; resistance to a planned papal visit and opposition to EU and NATO membership; to criticism of European organizations, which insisted that the Church stop condemning homosexuality;17 and asking the state for money for constructing gigantic cathedrals. Leftist intellectuals in many of these countries accused the Church of being the main opponent of progress and prosperity on the road to democracy or at least the most regressive actor.18 The Orthodox Church showed that it was afraid of the West, and that fear was not without reason. It reflects a historical feeling of inferiority and was an after-effect of the isolation the Church found itself in not so long ago. The Church was afraid of modernization, proselytism, Protestant sects, secularization in society, etc. Moreover, since the fall of communism the West has thought of the Orthodox population as being patriarchal and archaic, without
Sabrina P. RAMET, A Checklist of Issues to Track, in: East-West Church and Ministry Report 2 (1994) 2-3. 16 Ion BRIA, The Orthodox Church in post-communist Eastern Europe Turn to God Rejoice in Hope, in: Ecumenical Review, April 1998. 17 Constantin IORDACHI, Politics and Inter-Confessional Strife in post-1989 Romania. From Competition for Resources to the Redefinition of National Ideology, in: Balkanologie 3 (1999) 147-168. 18 Alina MUNGIU-PIPPIDI, The Ruler and the Patriarch. The Romanian Eastern Orthodox Church in Transition, in: East European Constitutional Review 7 (1998) 85-91.
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a social ethics and isolated from society. There are some experts who have opined that Orthodoxy does not belong to Europe. Politicians and historians have placed the Orthodox Church on the outskirts of Eastern Europe as an outsider and victim of the clash of civilizations.19 According to these interpretations, Catholicism and Protestantism shaped European culture and civilization, while the other centers are not part of the great Christian tradition in Europe. Statements like this have often evoked sharp reactions and manifestations of Orthodox fundamentalism (traditionalism).20 According to the first Constitution of the FNRY of 1946, the Church was separated from the school and state. Faith became the private matter of each individual. All religious communities were guaranteed freedom of confession but at the same time, due to various regulations, the Church was separated from its resources and properties. The Serbian Orthodox Church was excluded from public life, but it remained the final challenge for the Communist Party because it offered an alternative philosophy of life and for a long time represented the only opposition.21 Research by sociologists of religion from the 1960s until the early 1980s in different parts of exYugoslavia showed that the process of secularization expanded the most in regions where the Orthodox population prevailed.22 The official census of 1953 showed that only 12.6% were atheists, but at the end of 60s and the beginning of 70s that percentage slowly rose. For example, in Serbia in 1975 the percentage of atheists among the population was 25%. At the beginning of the 80s, a rise in the percentage of believers became increasingly noticeable.23 It was at this time that the social crisis, which was political at first and which would culminate in the following

years, began to manifest itself. The census of 1991 revealed that almost 80% of the citizens of the FRY declared themselves adherents of the Orthodox faith.24 This of course did not automatically mean that the number of religious citizens had increased; it was rather a sign that they could now reveal their confessional status more freely, that they identified themselves with the faith of their ancestors, and not necessarily a reflection of their personal religiosity.25 Until the early 1980s it was wrongly believed that the gods were mortal, that the Churches had reconciled themselves with their marginalized position, and that the process of secularization was unstoppable. However, the social crisis made it possible for the latent dissatisfaction of the citizens to manifest itself through their turning toward the Church and religion, giving the latter a kind of political commission. The chance for revival was readily accepted by the Churches.26 After World War II, a rapid and abrupt rupture with tradition and the traditional consciousness took place. This also affected everything that gave people the feeling of belonging to society: patriarchal morality, tradition, religion and national history, in which the Church and religion occupied a central position. New values were asserted, and religion and the Church became institutions which found themselves "outside the official social system but were legal, and therefore the most important keepers of past times and tradition". Therefore, with the fall of the socialist system and ideology a process of rehabilitating the past took place, and along with it the Church and religion.27 In the former Yugoslavia this process was followed by a broad wave of ethnocentrism and nationalism. Through its more or less official rehabilitation,

Samuel P. HUNTINGTON, The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order. New York 1996,158-162. 20 Ion BRIA, Evangelism, Proselytism, and Religious Freedom in Romania. An Orthodox Point of View, in: Journal of Ecumenical Studies 36 (1999) 163-183. 21 Radmila RADI, Srpska pravoslavna crkva u poratnim i ratnim godinama (1980 1995) Crkva i 'srpsko pitanje' [The Serbian Orthodox Church in the post-war and war years The Church and the 'Serbian questiora in: Republika Nr. 121 122/1995. 22 Dragoljub OREVI und Bogdan UROVI, Sekularizacija i pravoslavlje. Sluaj Srba [Secularization and the Church. The case of the Serbs], in: Gradina 10-12, Ni 1993) 219-224. 23 Mirko BLAGOJEVI, Religijska situacija u SR Jugoslaviji od kraja 80-tih do poetka novog veka [The religious situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from the late 80s until the beginning of the new century], in: Teme, vol. 3. Ni 2003, 412.
19

Popis '91, Stanovnitvo (Census '91, Population), vol. 2. Beograd 1993; Dragoljub B. OREVI, Opta socioreligijska i konfesionalna panorama stanovnitva u SFRJ, in: Religija i drutvo, Zbornik tekstova [A general socio religious and confessional panorama of the population of Yugoslavia], in: Religion and Society. Collected Papers. Beograd 1988. 25 BLAGOJEVI, Religijska situacija (wie Anm 23) 424. 26 Mirko BLAGOJEVI, Jugoslovenski kontekst. Sekularizacija i desekularizacija [The Yugoslav context: secularization and de-secularization], in: Gradina 10-12, Ni 1993,209-218. 27 Mirko BLAGOJEVI, Vezanost ljudi za religiju i crkvu na pravoslavno homogenim prostorima. Religija rat-mir (zbornik sa naunog skupa) [The people's attachment to religion and the church in homogeneous Orthodox spaces. Religion war-peace. (Proceedings of the Scientific Meeting)]. Ni 1994, 207-230.
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religion was confirmed in its traditional function as a framework of national life and as the true keeper of national traditions and values.28 From 1980 to 1995, the Serbian Orthodox Church and other churches and religious organizations slowly returned from the margins of society, where they had been for forty years, to the public and political scene. The basic transitional model for resolving religious issues was implemented several years later than in the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, due to wars in the ex-Yugoslavia. Still, it was basically identical. Changes within the Orthodox Church, which had been hidden by a traditional "conspiracy", came to light in Yugoslavia after the events in Kosovo. The Church was justifiably concerned with Kosovo because of its holy sites, as well as due to emigration and the declining number of adherents. Some bishops took advantage of Kosovo to use it as proof of their power and as a strategy for the future of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Political and economic troubles and the overall rise of nationalism contributed to filling the churches on major feast days, especially in cities. The question was asked (by some theologians as well as others) whether Orthodoxy would survive in a secularized world, and whether there would be an intensive religious renewal. At this time, the restoration of the Serbian Orthodox Church's former political position was considered.29 In 1984, the Serbian Orthodox Church acquired a license for building the Cathedral of St. Sava in Vracar and permission for building the complex of buildings of the new Theological Faculty.30 In the same year, the first Christmas greetings were sent to church believers and published in the media. The Church at this time became a sanctuary for a part of the political and cultural opposition, and gave legitimacy to some of the nationally oriented intelligentsia. Within the Church, continuity and the cult of national and religious giants were preserved. This also included national history, national literature, and traditional customs and values. With the deepening of the overall crisis and the breakup of the system, the credibility of traditional solutions to problems returned. Because of this, Orthodoxy gained importance with regard to the cultural and national distinctiveness of the Serbian people and contributed to the national and confessional homogenization and identifiSran VRCAN, Od krize religije k religiji krize [From the crisis of religion to the religion crisis]. Zagreb 1986,149. 29 Povratak bogova, specijalno izdanje lista Duga [The Return of the gods, a special edition of Duga], April 1986. 30 Povratak (wie Anm. 29).
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cation of the people. However, the conditions that fostered the renewal of religion also gave rise to the exploitation of the Church for nationalistic and other purposes. The Orthodox Church as a whole began to show its new face, embellished by theatrical elements and adapted on demand in a phenomenon called "City Orthodoxy". Large-scale events of believers were organized with increasing frequency, Orthodox theologians gradually entered the media, work with the youth gaining priority, new church magazines were started, the episcopacy was rejuvenated, contacts with foreign churches became regular, and the Church's role in the formation and preservation of the nation was declared everywhere. At the end of the 80s, the Serbian leadership took credit for the significant changes in the relationship between Serbian state structures and the tradition of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Still, a radical revision of policy toward the Church was demanded.31 The church press at that time claimed that Serbs had abandoned their culture, faith, history, language and Church, and that only if they returned to them, renewed cultural institutions, restored religious teaching to schools and the Theological Faculty to the University, made church holidays public, rebuilt the monasteries on Fruka Gora, implemented Orthodoxy as the basis of social life, made the Church the cultural, ideational and practical standardbearer, only then would they be on the right road to progress. In its relations with the state organs during the 90s, the Serbian Orthodox Church insisted on restoring its past rights and privileges, but Miloevi's regime ignored this most of the time.32 For the Church, nationalism was the last reference point for preserving its role of dominant religious factor in society. The democratization of society implied the promotion of other religious confessions, which would affect the privileged position of the Serbian Church. For this reason the Church was ready to support the state elite during periods when the "national project" was dominant.33 A stable trend of religious reconstruction was established in the 1990s. The number of believers rose from 92.7% in 1991 to 95% a decade later, and the number of those who declared that they were not believers fell by
Pravoslavlje, no. 555, 1990. Radmila RADI, Crkva u politici i politika u Crkvi, in: Srpska elita [The Church in Politics and Policy in the Church, The Serbian Elite]. Helsinke sveske. Beograd 2000, 39-83. 33 BOGOMILOVA, Religious Situation (wie Anm. 2) 1-20.
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140 Radmila Radi four times, or from 2.1 to 0.5%. The basic elements of religious behaviour were revitalized. These included e.g. prayer, attendance of the Liturgy (which rose from 6.8% in 1982 to 48% in 1999), and fasting. An opinion poll revealed that religiosity increased among the adult population of Serbia (excluding Kosovo) after 1990, and that the degree of confessional identification rose even more. The majority of Serbs believed in God, but only a small number of them regularly fulfilled their religious duties. Regardless of this, the typical believer from the 80s is much different from that of the 90s. In the 80s the believer was usually a woman, farmer, worker or elderly person who lived in the countryside, or was uneducated and belonged to socially marginalized groups. Today the typical believer can be from a village or city environment and be older or younger, uneducated or educated.34

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34

Dragana RADOSAVLjEVI-IPARIZOVIC, Religija i svakodnevni ivot: vezanost ljudi za religiju i crkvu u Srbiji krajem devedesetih, in: Srbija krajem milenijuma [Religion and daily life: the people's attachment to religion and the Church in Serbia at the end of nineties, in: Serbia at the end of the millennium: Destruction of society, changes and everyday life], 215-248; Angela ILI, Church and State Relations in presentday Serbia, in: Religion in Eastern Europe 24 (2004) 26-37; : , , , [Theme of the Week: How we are religious. In the church more because of tradition, less because of prayers, Children believe more than their fathers and mothers], in Politika vom 25.7.2009; Vjekoslav PERICA, Balkan Idols. Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav State. Oxford 2002, 132 und 220; Dragoljub B. ORDEVI, Nekoliko razmiljanja o naoj crkvi [A few thoughts on our Church], Peanik FM, knj. 3. Beograd 2005, 133; Miroslava MALEEVI, Pravoslavlje kao sr nacionalnog bia" postkomunistike Srbije [Orthodoxy as the Core of "national being" in post-communist Serbia]. Beograd, 99-121, http://www.etno-institut.co.yu, (letzter Zugriff: 23.03.2010); Svetlana PALI, Teolozi o srpskom nepotovanju posta [Theologians on the Serbian contempt for the Fast], http://www.vidovdan.org/arhiva/, (letzter Zugriff: 29.11.2005); Radmila LONAR, "Vesti" istrauju: koliko su graani Srbije verujui, aktuelno trite duhovnosti ["News" explores: How the citizens of Serbia are religious. The current market of spirituality], http://www.ceir.co.rs/, (letzter Zugriff: 06.01.2004); Miroslav AHTIK, Klerikalizacija Srbije [The Clericalization of Serbia], in: Republika 16 (2004) 340-341; Mirko BLAGOJEVI, Religija i crkva u transformacijama drutva [Religion and Church in the transformation of Society], 308; Mirko BLAGOJEVI, Savremene religijske promene u Srbiji i proces integracije u Evropu [Contemporary religious change in Serbia and the integration process in Europe], in: Filozofija i drutvo 17 (2006) 95-111; Mirko BLAGOJEVIC, Desecularization of Contemporary Serbian Society, in: Religion in Eastern Europe 28 (2008) 37-50; http://manastir-lepavina.org/, (letzter Zugriff: 23.03.2010).

After the changes of 5 October 2000, church and state relations rapidly changed. State officials had now become anti-communist politicians and declared themselves to be believers. The proclamation of President Ko tunica, who in his speech said that he would obey the laws of God and the people, as well as the visit by state officials to the Hilandar monastery ("a pilgrimage to the cradle of Serbian spirituality") several days later all pointed to the direction these changes had taken. 35 In November 2000 the federal government donated two million dollars to the Holy Synod in order to complete the construction of the Cathedral of Saint Sava, and six months later the Serbian government paid five million dinars for finishing a church in Valjevo, the second largest in the Republic. Approximately one year later, the executive board of the Municipality of Belgrade decided to give 30 million dinars for the restoration of nine Orthodox churches in broader Belgrade. 36 The new democratic government led by Zoran ini decided to include religious education in schools in 2001. Research showed that most citizens of Serbia, even those who did not consider themselves religious, welcomed religious education. 37 The percentage of students who attend religious education classes has fluctuated. According to official statistics, in the first year 50% of primary school pupils and 20-39% of high schools students attended this class. Already a year later, however, the percentage was much smaller (30% and 15% respectively). 38 Since fall 2004 teachers of religious schools and professors of the Theological Faculty have been paid from the budget of Serbia and receive health and pension insurance. The state also pays for health and pension insurance for monks and priests, and those who live in underdeveloped regions receive paychecks. The dormitory of the students of the Theological Faculty is subsidized by the state; students who go abroad receive scholarships; central and local organs of government have financial obligations toward the religious
MALEEVI , Pravoslavlje (wie Anm. 34) 99-121. AHTIK, Klerikalizacija (wie Anm. 34) 340f. 37 AHTIK, Klerikalizacija (wie Anm. 34) 340f. 38 Bojan ALEKSOV, Religious Education in Serbia, in: Religion, State & Society 32 (2004) 341-363; Stjepan GREDELJ, Slova i brojke oko veronauke [The letters and figures about religious training], in: Filozofija i drutvo, 2002 (19-20) 279-304; Dragana RADOSAVLjEVI-IPARIZOVI, Religija i svakodnevni ivot: vezanost ljudi za religiju i crkvu u Srbiji krajem devedesetih, in: Srbija krajem milenijuma, 215-248.
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schools and monasteries; and by decree of the Government of Serbia of 9 January 2004, the Theological Faculty was incorporated into Belgrade University. After the ratification of the Law on Church and Religious Organizations in 2006, they were allowed to engage in trade and form for-profit companies managed by them. They were also allowed to own TV and radio stations. Churches and religious communities can be fully or partially exempt from taxes and other obligations, in accordance with public revenue laws. The Church does not pay any taxes on property.39 In less than twenty years, Serbia went from being a highly secularized society to a country with a high percentage of people who declare themselves religious, and religion and the Church occupy an important place in public life. 40 The growth of religiosity can be connected to the growth of conservatism and traditionalism as answers to the social crisis, as well as to uncertainty, the implications of transition, and the large social changes which took place in Serbia. It was also an answer to the democratization of society, which allowed for the free declaration of one's religious belief; to new forms of ideologization of relations between official politics and religion; to attempts by the former to highlight its social qualifications; and finally to conformism. According to some research, attitudes toward religion in Serbian society are influenced more by the ideological-political situation than by deeper and sustained personal beliefs and values. 41 Although Serbia is a secular state, in which the principal of separation of Church and state is foreseen by the Constitution, and although it is comprised of a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional community in which almost one third of the population belong to minorities, representatives of the state atJovana GLIGORIJEVI und Zoran MAJDIN, Poslovi i prikljuenija vladika srpskih [Jobs and adventures of Serbian bishops], in: Vreme, nr. 937 vom 18.12.2008, http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=776516, (letzter Zugriff: 09.04.2010). 40 Mirko BLAGOJEVI, Religiozna Evropa, Rusija i Srbija jue i danas: Argumenti empirijske evidencije sluaj Srbije [Religious Europe, Russia and Serbia yesterday and today: Arguments of empirical evidence the case of Serbia], in: Filozofija i drutvo 37 (2008) 81-115. 41 The survey showed that the respondents' attitude towards religion does not depend only on the current social situation at the time of the survey, but also on the position and role of religion during the period of their early socialization. Sneana JOKSIMOVI, [Individual characteristics and religiosity among adolescents], in: , . 2, Beograd 2005.
39

tempt to demonstrate their respect toward the Orthodox Church through their presence at religious events (candle lighting, crossing themselves, kissing icons) and meetings between state and church leaders to exchange opinions on various matters, including those which do not belong to the competence of the Church (at least in secular states).42 Religion has gained an important place in electronic and other media, and the list of matters in which the Church is involved is long and includes some issues already mentioned above. It has criticized the European institutions and voiced its opinion on questions such as the situation' in Kosovo, the criminalization of homosexuality, and cooperation with the Hague tribunal. It has defended authentic Serbian values against the influx of corrupt western influence coming through the products of mass culture, issued critical statements on nongovernment organizations, and called for the creation of a cultural model which would "have its foundation in the Orthodox faith and the experience of the people".43 According to all polls of public opinion in Serbia, like in some other countries during the 90s, the Church is the institution in which the citizens and the army have the most faith. In the rush of new religiosity, icons, crosses, yule branches at Christmas time, the attendance of slavas, and the presence of priests at private and public occasions (e.g. the blessing of buildings, institutes and factories, the founding of new businesses, book publications) have all become an obligatory part of aesthetics and iconography. A special relationship between the Church and the army has been forged. With the reform of the defense system, tradition, morality, culture, and religion have acquired a new place, and recently the state of religiosity in the army has started to be evaluated during analyses of operational capabilities .44 Members of the Serbian Parliament, led by the President of the Parliament, begin and end some of their important assemblies and undertakings according to the church calendar. Presidential candidates begin their campaigns on one of the Orthodox holidays, and ministers celebrate their slavas. TV studios are decorated on major Orthodox feast days, public spaces and cities also Celebrate their slavas (in Belgrade, traffic is held up because of church procesMALEEVI, Pravoslavlje (wie Anm. 34) 99-121. MALEEVI, Pravoslavlje (wie Anm. 34) 99-121. 44 Istraivanje: U vojsci 58 odsto religioznih [Research: In the military, 58 percent are religious], in: Blic vom 05.09.2009.
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sions in the city' s center)45, political parties have their own slavas, as do health centers, schools, townships, local communities and organizations. One can hear with increasing frequency that bishops own houses and estates, although this should not be the case, that they build luxurious episcopal palaces, fly helicopters and drive luxury cars.46 Clergy and monks carry MP3 players and hands-free phones. Popular bands play music on religious topics. It is obvious that two completely different theoretical and practical processes have been in effect, and that Serbia was not alone in this respect. The liberal idea of building a civil society and European democracy demands complete religious neutrality, a new multi-cultural approach, and the refusal of any kind of ideological programming. At the same time, religion is seen as a fresh spiritual and emotional compensation for the disappearance of a part of the social system and system of values, and as a repository of cultural arguments, collective memory, and symbolic strength needed to build new national, group, and individual identities. Religious arguments, among others, were used as an instrument to build up the new Serbian nationalism. Leaders needed the Church as a source of legitimization and as a form of ideology. The state, aided by official ideology (religion), was seen as the only way to guarantee order in society. The convergence of state and Church was interpreted as a return to the tradition of symphony and was often criticized by liberals, who saw this as a threat of clericalism.47

Is the Church Really the Winner of the Transition? Is this picture of religiosity and religious life in Serbia really accurate? Priests themselves are cautious when it comes to the actual religious climate. They admit that certain improvements in this regard have been achieved, but at the same time they complain that modern believers are accepting God too mechanically, without any spiritual experience and preparation. They do not understand the significance of fasting and prayer, and many of them think that it is enough to buy prayer ropes and recite prayers. Believers who have never fasted initiate the most severe fasts lasting for several weeks, but fast only physically. There are also believers who eat macrobiotic foods and think that in doing so they are fasting constantly. Believers often have a superficial attitude toward the Holy Mysteries, demanding from the priest to be admitted to the sacrament with little or no preparation. Most people know absolutely nothing about repentance and asceticism. Sacraments, ceremonies, and prayers are approached as if they were magical incantations, with expectations that they will help a person's wishes come true instantly. 48 Visiting a well-known spiritual father is common practice, in order to receive advice and solutions to everyday problems, or to look for answers to the question of who among one's ancestors is responsible for the hard life of his or her descendants. Some believers have spiritual fathers who live further away, and the more famous the spiritual father is, the more spiritual he is thought to be. It is becoming more frequent to see neophytes who manifestly wear crosses as well as prayer ropes on their wrist. Women wear kerchiefs over their heads, often in combination with tight pants and other not-so-chaste clothing. Among the believers there is a competition for those who have been a believer the longest, and the most vocal believers are those who have a priest or monk among their ancestors or who never stop celebrating, although they may attend church once a year or only their own slava, so that the priest can cut their slava bread. The "best" believers are those who celebrate their slava the most lavishly, have the largest Christmas branch, have been to Jerusalem,
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MALEEVI, Pravoslavlje (wie Anm. 34) 99-121. GLIGORIJEVI, Poslovi (wie Anm. 39); Veselin PEI, Eparhija vranjska se ponovila. Vladika Pahomije kupio dip od 26.000 evra [The Vranjska Diocese is renewed. Bishop Pachomius bought a jeep for 26,000 euros], In: Blic, vom 05.09.2009. 47 Alexander AGADJANIAN, Public Religion and the Quest for National Ideology. Russia's Media Discourse, in: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 40 (2001) 351-365. Some recent research has shown that greater ideological freedom, measured by a greater social role of the church, does not affect the happiness of societies in transition. See Orsolya LELKES, Tasting freedom. Happiness, religion and economic transition, in: Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization 59 (2006) 173-194.
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Protojerej Dragomir UBIPARIPOVI, Nije dovoljno samo pokazivanje vjere neophodno je i ivljenje vjerom [It is not enough to show one's faith it is necessary to live one's faith], http://www.bogotrazitelj-srb.org/forum/index, (letzter Zugriff: 29.09.2009).

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Hilandar or Ostrog, take the largest amount of Holy Water on the day of Epiphany to drink at home and sprinkle it on meals, walls and closets. Although church tradition exactly regulates small and large prostrations, there is a kind of competition for the person who makes the most prostrations during church services, sings the loudest and most pleasant responses to the petitions in the litanies, or prays the best, so that participation in church services becomes a sort of religious gymnastics. The belief in miracles is widespread (weeping icons, oil lamps that move by themselves), as is faith in prophets and religious teachers who reveal the causes of suffering, give instruction, solve life problems, and often claim that they have the Church's blessing to do so although in reality they have absolutely no connection with it. Incidentally, the belief in superstitions has been strengthened by bioenergetics, magicians and astrologists. In view of all this, priests conclude that the inner life of many of modern believers is not much different from that of non-believers. Among today's believers there are many who are superstitious, who quarrel, are intolerant, gossip and judge others, who are dishonest, proud, egoistic, i mmoral and without love for their fellow humans. The current spiritual state demonstrates that the return to faith took place mostly through tradition and less through an inner revival. Because of this, priests warn that the tradition of Christian rituals (slavas, baptisms, prayer services, memorials) are only a d&or, that orie can not become Christian only by being baptized but that baptism is the foundation for further growth in faith, and that modern believers do not fulfill God's commandments and are lacking in repentance, honesty, life according to the Gospel, love for one's fellow humans, etc.49 Research has shown that there are a large number of people in Serbia who are not firm in their religiosity. Because Serbs do not associate religiosity with regular church attendance, only 6% of Serbian citizens regularly attend church, while a much larger number do so only on special occasions (on major religious holidays) or do not attend church at all. With church attendance at 7%, Serbia is at the bottom of the list of European countries. Christmas, on the other hand, was celebrated by 70% of its citizens. According to the same research, only 3% of those polled said that they fully observe the divine commandments, and 11% said that they do so most of the time. The rest did not even know what the commandments were, or said that they are impossible to observe. About 45% of those polled did not think that
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abortion is infanticide. Moreover, most Serbian citizens associated religion with belonging to a nation or tradition, and not with God. Although 81.5% thought that the Serbian Orthodox Church should have a more important role in the revival of society, only 2.5% of them wanted that role to be political. The respondents said that the Church should enlighten and fulfill humanitarian functions, although 45% had no concrete idea of which concrete role the Church should play. 63.5% of the respondents held that the active participation of priests in public meetings was improper.50 Epilogue During the past 20 years, which witnessed dramatic changes such as the fall of the communist system, civil wars, the destruction of the economy, the implementation of capitalism, and the appearance of widespread corruption and poverty in most of Serbian society, the Serbian Orthodox Church did its best.51 However, since this confession traditionally intervened little in society historical Eastern Christianity is a faith of ascetics, not missionaries theoretically the Church should have gone unnoticed in public life. Nevertheless, the religious revival which began in the 80s and gained strength after 2000 has made the Church a constant public voice and a powerful representative for religious solutions to different civil questions. Religion has once again become a constitutive element of Serbian nationalism, and the religious leadership has focused its activities on state politics, disregarding its duty as a shepherd of souls, just as it did during the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries. The Orthodox Church still occupies an unspecified position with regard to the state and political sphere, and although the state supports it as an institutional element of the still unstable state identity, at the same time it tries to
Slobodan RELJI, [Reconstructed religion], in: NIN, nr. 2574, 27.04.2000; Politika, Factor Plus, Boi se potuje i slavi u Srbiji [Christmas is celebrated and respected in Serbia], http://www.antic.org, (letzter Zugriff: 23.10.2010); Mirko BLAGOJEVI, O sociolokim kriterijumima religioznosti. Koliko ima (pravoslavnih) vernika danas? [The sociological criteria of religiosity. How many (Orthodox) believers are the re today?], in: Filozofija i drutvo 20 (2009) 9-36; on church attendance see: http://www.nationmaster.corn/country/yiserbia-and montenegro, (letzter Zugriff: 09.04.2010). 51 Vueti SLOBODAN, Stari i novi stubovi" Srbije [Old and new "pillars" of Serbia], in: Blic vom 15.05.2009.
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UBIPARIPOVI, Nije dovoljno (wie Anm. 48).

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limit the potential influence of the Church, which it views as a possible rival. The Church is financially dependent, which means that it is not autonomous with regard to the state.52 It is divided from the inside, shaken by canonical, political and clan disputes, and suffers from struggles for supremacy among the church hierarchy.53 The increased religiosity of Serbian citizens, which has been noted in research and official statistics, does not signify more than ethno-national identification: the "new religiosity remains mostly untouched by the Christian doctrine". Because of this laicist beliefs and values stubbornly persist, as the strong resistance in the civil sector and broader public to the Church's involvement in the public domain demonstrates.

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BOGOMILOVA, Religious situation (wie Anm. 2) 1-20. GLIGORIJEVI, Poslovi (wie Anm. 39).