RAFAEL VS. EMBROIDERY SECTION 16 appointments and the appointing power Rafael operates a manufacturing bonded warehouse.

. RA 3137 was enacted creating the Embroidery and Apparel Board to control and inspect the tax free raw materials imported in the Phils) The law provides for the composition of the Board: o 1 rep from the Bureau of Customso 1 rep from the Central Bank o 1 rep from the DTI o 1 rep from the National Economic Council o 1 rep from the private sector which shall come from the Association of Embroidery and Apparel exporters of the Phils. Rafael assails the constitutionality of the law, specifically the composition of the Board. He argues that while Congress may create an office, it cannot specify who shall be appointed therein and that the members of the Board should be appointed by the President. He contends that the law infringes on the power of the President to make appointments. ISSUE: Is the law valid? SC: VALID. It will be noted that for the chairman and the members of the Board to qualify, they need only be designated by the respective department heads. THEY ALL SIT EX-OFFICIO, except the 1 rep from the private sector. In order to be designated they must already be holding positions in the office mentioned in the law. Thus, no new appointments are necessary. These first 4 offices perform functions which have direct relation to the importation of raw materials, the manufacture thereof and their exportation abroad. Thus, these representatives so designated merely perform duties in the Board in addition to those they already perform under their original appointments. There is no attempt to deprive the President of his power to make appointments. Thus, their tenure on the Board is merely ON DETAIL, SUBJECT TO RECALL BY THEIR RESPECTIVE CHIEFS. The law does not violate the rule that the appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the President which no limitations may be imposed by Congress. SECTION 13 Civil Liberties Union vs. ES prohibition against holding another office or employment Petitioners assail constitutionality of EO 284: allowing members of cabinet, Usecs, Asecs to hold other government offices in addition to their primary positions. They contend that

this runs counter to Sec 13 which provides that members of Cabinet, deputies, assistants, shall not hold any other office or employment during their tenure EO 284: allows these people to hold not more than 2 positions. Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor. Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position. Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary. The Secretary of Justice Ordonez, issued an opinion stating that the members of Cabinet may hold another position if allowed by the primary functions of their respective positions. (Thus, this is the legal basis relied upon in issuing EO 284) The petitioners further argue that the E0284 adds to the exceptions under Sec 13. They contend that the phrase unless otherwise provided by this constitution, should refer only to the following exceptions: o 1) the VP may be appointed as member of cabinet o 2) the Sec of DOJ is an ex-officio member of the JBC. Petitioners further argue that the exception under Article IX-B Sec 7(2) on the Civil Service Commission applies only to officers and employees of the civil service, and cannot extend to Article VII Sec 13 (the Cabinet, etc) ISSUE: Does the prohibition under Sec 13 (on the prohibition against Cabinet members) admit exceptions made for appointive officials under Article IX-B Sec 7(2) SC: NO. Although Article IX-B Sec 7(2) already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in government, the framers of the Constitution saw it fit to FORMULATE A SIMILAR PROVISION under Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, VP, members of Cabinet from holding any other office or employment during their tenure. Evidently, the intent was to IMPOSE A STRICTER PROHIBITION on the President and his official family. In fact, the wording of Sec 13 in Article VII is stricter. The disqualification is ABSOLUTE because there are no qualifications made. The prohibition under Article VII is allembracing and covers BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE office or employment.

Looking closer into Sec 13, second sentence again there is a sweeping, all-embracing prohibition imposed on the President and members of Cabinet, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials, nor members of Congress, nor members of civil service, AFP. This is another proof of the intent of the framers to treat the President and members of his official family A CLASS IN ITSELF. Commissioner Foz stated: We actually have to be stricter with the President and members of Cabinet because they exercise more powers, and therefore more checks and restraints on them are called for because there is more possiblilty of abuse. In short, Article IX-B Sec 7(2) lays the general rule applicable to both elective and appointive officals. Article VII Sec 13 on the other hand is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, VP, Members of Cabinet. BUT the prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices must not be construed as applying to posts occupied by these executive officials 1) WITHOUT ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION 2) IN AN EX-OFFICIO CAPACITY, 3) AS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW AND 4) AS REQUIRED BY TH PRIMARY FUNCTIONS OF SAID OFFICIALS OFFICE. (meaning they can hold another office) The reason is that these posts do not comprise any other office since they are MERELY AN IMPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS. For example, it would be absurd if the President cannot be the chairman of the NSC. The term ex-officio means from office or by virtue of office. It refers to an authority derived from official character, not expressly conferred upon the individual, but rather annexed to the official position. It also means any act done in official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment than that conferred by the office. Note also that the additional duties must not only be closely related to , but must be required by the officials primary functions. If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or alien to the primary function, then it would be prohibited. Because ex-officio position is really part of the principal office, then it follows that there would be no right to receive additional compensation. These services are already paid for and covered by the compensation from his principal office. (not entitled to per diem, honorarium, allowance, or any other euphemism)

LAW IS NULL AND VOID. DE CASTRO VS. JBC SECTION 15 conflict with Art. 8 SECTION 4(1) ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010 FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively. The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its insulation from political pressures, such

as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice. A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. HELD: Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict. The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof. GOVERNMENT vs. SPRINGER 50 Phil 259 Law on Public Officers Power to Appoint is Essentially Executive Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: The voting power shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the GovernorGeneral, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the government (President at that time was considered the head of state but does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate President and the House Speaker. However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the GovernorGeneral, still elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of NCC. ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly elect the Board Members of NCC. HELD: No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill the office.

Appointing persons to a public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative branch this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch. DATUS ABAS KIDA vs SENATE SECTION 16 Facts: - The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. - Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact an organic act for these autonomous regions to concretely carry into effect the granted autonomy. - August 1, 1989: Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. - The next legislative act passed by Congress was RA No. 9054 (entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended) - RA 9054] provided further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the original organic act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. - RA No. 9333 was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.

- Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite. - Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. - June 30, 2011: RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. - The early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a petition filed with this Court G.R. No. 196271 (instant case) assailing the constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756 (bills for RA 10153) , and challenging the validity of RA No. 9333 as well for non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement. - Thereafter, petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305 filed another petition also assailing the validity of RA No. 9333. - With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections. - The Court ordered the consolidation of all the petitions relating to the constitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153. - The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective. The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-reading requirement. Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the elective and representative character of the executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office. - Corrolarily, petitioners also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not there has been a violation of the 1987 Constitution for the passage and enactment of assailed laws. Held:

According to the Supreme Court, Republic Act 10153, in its totality, is constitutional. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution. In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent regular elections. Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification. There are only three options available on how to handle the elections of May 2012: 1. extend term for those in office (unconstitutional) 2. special elections by COMELEC (COMELEC has not authority to conduct special elections) 3. appointments by Presidents In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is by law i.e., by congressional policy and is pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local elections. As to the appointments made by the President, it is pursuant to Article VII, Section 16 of the Constitution: Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.

If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was for a very specific and limited purpose the synchronization of elections. It was a temporary means to a lasting end the synchronization of elections. Thus, RA No. 10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are likewise clear and specific, and cannot be transferred or applied to any other cause for the cancellation of elections. Any other localized cancellation of elections and call for special elections can occur only in accordance with the power already delegated by Congress to the COMELEC, as above discussed. A provision of the constitution should not be construed in isolation from the rest. Rather, the constitution must be interpreted as a whole, and apparently, conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that may give to all of them full force and effect. Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate the synchronization of national and local elections when it enacted RA No. 10153. This Court cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook this task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. PIMENTEL vs ERMITA Ad interim and Acting appointments The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. Facts: While Congress is in their regular session, President Arroyo, through Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. After the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.Petitioners senators filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued.

They assert that while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its consent. Respondent secretaries, on the other hand, maintain that the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session. Issue: Whether or not President Arroyos appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session is constitutional. Held: On the Mootness of the Petition The Solicitor General argues that the petition is moot because President Arroyo had extended to respondents ad interim appointments on 23 September 2004 immediately after the recess of Congress. As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done. However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review. In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution. The question of the constitutionality of the Presidents appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress is in session will arise in every such appointment. On the Nature of the Power to Appoint The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere.Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of the legislatures interference in the executives power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office. However, even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidential appointments. Thus:

xxx The Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Constitution. Although its membership is confined to members of Congress, said Commission is independent of Congress. The powers of the Commission do not come from Congress, but emanate directly from the Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent of Congress. In fact, the functions of the Commissioner are purely executive in nature. Constitutionality of President Arroyos issuance appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of

Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed respondents as acting secretaries because "in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary." Petitioners further assert that "while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its consent." The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be. The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee. Express provision of law allows President to make acting appointment Sec. 17, Chap. 5, Title I, Book III, EO 292 states that [t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not

yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent. But does Sec. 17 apply to appointments vested in the President by the Constitution? Petitioners assert that it only applies to appointments vested in the President by law. Petitioners forget that Congress is not the only source of law. Law refers to the Constitution, statutes or acts of Congress, municipal ordinances, implementing rules issued pursuant to law, and judicial decisions. Petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Ad-interim appointments vs. appointments in an acting capacity Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyos issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year. (Aquilino Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005) SARMIENTO III vs MISON Political Law Appointments This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of the Department of Budget. Their appointment was done without the concurrence of the CoA. Ulpiano, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment of the two sans confirmation by the CoA. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment is valid.

HELD: It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they be appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the CoA? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the CoA. Because of the conflicting extremes provided in the 2 previous Constitutions, the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a middle ground by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the CoA for the 1st group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the 2nd and 3rd groups as well as those in the 4th group, i.e., officers of lower rank. As to the 4th group of officers whom the President can appoint, it was pointed out by the intervener CoA that the 3r sentence in Sec. 16, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, this implies that, in the absence of such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the CoA; and, if this is so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows that higher-ranked officers should be appointed by the President, subject also to confirmation by the CoA. Ulpiano et al argued that the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7, merely declares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of the various departments, agencies, commissions, or boards in the government. No reason however is submitted for the use of the word alone in said third sentence

The SC ruled that both arguments are not correct. After a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the use of the word alone after the word President in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 is, more than anything else, a slip or lapse in draftsmanship. In the 1987 Constitution the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the CoA, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 the word alone after the word President in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the CoA, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article 7. Therefore, the 3rd sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 could have stated merely that, in the case of lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of various departments of the government. In short, the word alone in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import from the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7. And, this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7, are not subject to confirmation by the CoA. Misons and Caragues appointments are affirmed affirmed. BAUTISTA vs SALONGA Political Law Appointments CHR On 27 Aug 1987, Cory designated Bautista as the Acting Chairwoman of CHR. In December of the same year, Cory made the designation of Bautista permanent. The CoA, ignoring the decision in the Mison case, averred that Bautista cannot take her seat w/o their confirmation. Cory, through the Exec Sec, filed with the CoA communications about Bautistas appointment on 14 Jan 1989. Bautista refused to be placed under the CoAs review hence she filed a petition before the SC. On the other hand, Mallillin invoked EO 163-A stating that since CoA refused Bautistas appointment, Bautista should be removed. EO 163-A provides that the tenure of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR should be at the pleasure of the President. ISSUE: Whether or not Bautistas appointment is subject to CoAs confirmation.

HELD: Since the position of Chairman of the CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the CoA it follows that the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or participation of the CoA. To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the CSC, the CoE and the COA, whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the CoA. The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the CHR pursuant to the second sentence in Sec 16, Art. 7, that is, without the confirmation of the CoA because they are among the officers of government whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint. And Sec 2(c), EO 163 authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the CHR. Because of the fact that the president submitted to the CoA on 14 Jan 1989 the appointment of Bautista, the CoA argued that the president though she has the sole prerogative to make CHR appointments may from time to time ask confirmation with the CoA. This is untenable according to the SC. The Constitution has blocked off certain appointments for the President to make with the participation of the Commission on Appointments, so also has the Constitution mandated that the President can confer no power of participation in the Commission on Appointments over other appointments exclusively reserved for her by the Constitution. The exercise of political options that finds no support in the Constitution cannot be sustained. Further, EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT MAY VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS AN APPOINTMENT THAT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION SOLELY BELONGS TO HER, STILL, THERE WAS NO VACANCY TO WHICH AN APPOINTMENT COULD BE MADE ON 14 JANUARY 1989. There can be no ad interim appointments in the CHR for the appointment thereto is not subject to CoAs confirmation. Appointments to the CHr is always permanent in nature. The provisions of EO 163-A is unconstitutional and cannot be invoked by Mallillin. The Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the president for it is constitutionally guaranteed that they must have a term of office. Rufino vs. Endriga, G.R. No. 139554, July 21, 2006 Appointment Power of President Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President

by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lowerranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The present case involves the interpretation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with respect to the appointment of this fourth group of officers. The President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the second and third groups of officers without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board because the trustees fall under the third group of officers. Scope of Appointment Power of the Heads of Departments, Agencies, Commissions or Boards The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended that Congress could by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission explain this intent beyond any doubt. The framers of the 1987 Constitution changed the qualifying word inferior to the less disparaging phrase lower in rank purely for style. However, the clear intent remained that these inferior or lower in rank officers are the subordinates of the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards who are vested by law with the power to appoint. The express language of the Constitution and the clear intent of its framers point to only one conclusion the officers whom the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards may appoint must be of lower rank than those vested by law with the power to appoint. Congress may vest the authority to appoint only in the heads of the named offices Further, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes Congress to vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards the power to appoint lowerranked officers. xxx In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the Secretary. The law may not authorize the Undersecretary, acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive department. In an agency, the power

is vested in the head of the agency for it would be preposterous to vest it in the agency itself. In a commission, the head is the chairperson of the commission. In a board, the head is also the chairperson of the board. In the last three situations, the law may not also authorize officers other than the heads of the agency, commission, or board to appoint lower-ranked officers. The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards is a matter of legislative grace. Congress has the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. If it so grants, Congress may impose certain conditions for the exercise of such legislative delegation, like requiring the recommendation of subordinate officers or the concurrence of the other members of the commission or board. This is in contrast to the Presidents power to appoint which is a self-executing power vested by the Constitution itself and thus not subject to legislative limitations or conditions. The power to appoint conferred directly by the Constitution on the Supreme Court en banc and on the Constitutional Commissions is also self-executing and not subject to legislative limitations or conditions. The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked officers specifically in the heads of the specified offices, and in no other person. The word heads refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not to their members xxx. Presidents Power of Control The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government extends to all executive employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This constitutional power of the President is self-executing and does not require any implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the Presidents power of control over the Executive branch. xxx The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government. The CCP is also not one of the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasijudicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under the Executive branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency not placed by law or order creating them under any specific department falls under the Office of the President. Since the President exercises control over all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices, the President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the President shall have control of all executive x x x offices, Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office one performing executive functions outside of the independent

constitutional bodies from the Presidents power of control. There is no dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions. The Presidents power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is true whether such officers are appointed by the President or by heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The power of control means the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion. In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. There can be no instance under the Constitution where an officer of the Executive branch is outside the control of the President. The Executive branch is unitary since there is only one President vested with executive power exercising control over the entire Executive branch. Any office in the Executive branch that is not under the control of the President is a lost command whose existence is without any legal or constitutional basis. The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a government office in the Executive branch outside the control of the President in the guise of insulating that office from politics or making it independent. If the office is part of the Executive branch, it must remain subject to the control of the President. Otherwise, the Legislature can deprive the President of his constitutional power of control over all the executive x x x offices. If the Legislature can do this with the Executive branch, then the Legislature can also deal a similar blow to the Judicial branch by enacting a law putting decisions of certain lower courts beyond the review power of the Supreme Court. This will destroy the system of checks and balances finely structured in the 1987 Constitution among the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches. Of course, the Presidents power of control does not extend to quasi-judicial bodies whose proceedings and decisions are judicial in nature and subject to judicial review, even as such quasi-judicial bodies may be under the administrative supervision of the President. It also does not extend to local government units, which are merely under the general supervision of the President. ANG-ANGCO VS. CASTILLO Section 17 power of control and security of tenure Pepsi sent a letter to the Secretary of Commerce to request for a special permit to withdraw pepsi concentrates from the customs house. They were imported without any dollar allocation or forex remittance.

They also wrote the Secretary of Finance, the Central Bank Governor. The Import-Export Committee of the CB submitted to the Monetary Board a memorandum of Pepsis letter. The Monetary Board however failed to take up the matter because the transaction did not involve any dollar allocation or forex. Pepsi still had no authorization to withdraw the concentrates. So, Pespsi approached Angangco (the Collector of Customs) to secure the immediate release of the concentrates. However, since there was no CB certificate, Angangco told Pepsi to get one from the No-Dollar Import Office who had jurisdiction over the case. Later, the said Office also said that it was not within their jurisdiction. Thus, Angangco called up the Secretary of Finance (Hernandez) and the Secretary VERBALLY APPROVED THE RELEASE OF THE PEPSI PRODUCTS. Angangco thus authorized the release. The Commissioner of Customs Manahan however ordered the seizure of the goods. Manahan filed a case against Angangco for grave neglect of duty, prejudicial to the Bureau of Customs President Magsaysay wanted an investigation. Angangco was suspended from office but was reinstated by Secretary of Finance Hernandez. Magsaysay died.. But after 3 years Executive Secretary Castillo by authority of now President Garcia, rendered a decision finding Angangco GUILTY and CONSIDERED RESIGNED. Angangco assails this decision and argues that it deprives him of his office without due process. Castillo however claims that the President has the power of control over officers and employees in the executive department. ISSUE: Whether the President has the power to take direct action even if Angangco belongs to the classified service under Civil Service Act of 1959 SC: Angangco was deprived of due process!! Officers in the CLASSIFIED CIVIL SERVICE comes within the EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSION OF CIVIL SERVICE, except as otherwise provided for by law. So is there any other law empowering the President to remove officers in the classified civil service? The only law we can recall is the RAC which grants the power to remove officials conformably to law. It shows that the President does not have blanket authority to remove any officer or employee of the government, but that his power must still be subject to the law that may be passed. Here, there is such a law (Civil Service ACT) which governs officers and employees in the classified civil service. The President is bound to follow that law.

So, even granting for administrative purpose the President is considered the Department Head of the CSC, his power to remove is still subject to the Civil Service Act. Under said law, the proper forum would be the COMMISSIONER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE, OR THE CIVIL SERVICE APPEALS BOARD. As to the power of control, it is defined as the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The Presidents control over the executive department REFERS ONLY TO MATTERS OF GENERAL POLICY. Policy means any settled or definite course or method adopted and followed by a government or body. Here, the REMOVAL OF AN OFFICER (Angangco) cannot be said to come within the meaning of CONTROL OVER A SPECIFIC POLICY OF GOVERNMENT. The power of control of the President may indeed extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers who belong to the executive, under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint. However this applies only if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service. As to those officers who belong to the classified service that power cannot be exercised. The action of the Executive Secretary, without submitting the case to the Commissioner of Civil Service, is contrary to law. Angangco reinstated. Joson v. Torres, 290 SCRA 279 ARTICLE X Section 4: Supervision of the President Facts: This case is about the validity of the suspension of petitioner Eduardo Joson as governor of Nueva Ecija. Private respondent filed a letter of complaint to the office of the president charging Joson with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. According to respondents, in one of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan meeting, Joson barged into the hall in order to harass them into approving the loan 150m pesos from PNB. They did not approve the loan because there is still a pending obligation and they cant afford to enter into another. They were thus summoned by the DILG to a settlement but did not comply so they were asked to give answers with regards to the non-settlement where, Joson failed to do so and so was declared of waiving his right. Joson filed motion to dismiss alleging that the letter of complaint was not verified on the day it was filed and hat DILG had no jurisdiction over the case and no authority to require him to answer. Executive Secretary Torres issued an order, by

authority of President, placing petitioner Joson on a 60 days suspension pending investigation on the charges against him. Issue: Whether or not the DILG has investigating authority over the case. Held: Yes. There are 2 authorities in jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials, the Disciplining Authority (DA) President and the Investigating Authority(IA) The Secretary of Interior and Local Govt. The Sec of DILG is not an exclusive IA. The power of the President over admin. disciplinary cases against elective officials is derived from his power of general supervision over local govt. The power to discipline evidently includes investigation. However, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a special investigating committee as may be constituted DA which is not undue delegation. The Pres. remains the DA and what is delegated is the power to investigate. The power of DILG to investigate admin. complaints is based on the doctrine decision of executive officials is valid as if it is the decision of the Pres. The DILG was the one who asked Joson to file his answer. However, what happened is not fatal. Pres found complaint sufficient in form and substance to warrant further investigation. KILUSANG MAYO UNO, et al. v. THE DIRECTORGENERAL of the National Economic Development Authority, et al. G.R. No. 167798 and 167930, 19 April 2006, Carpio, J. (En Banc) Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. The same Sectionalso mandates the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. Certainly, under this constitutional power of control, the President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, toadopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The Presidents constitutional power of control is selfexecuting and does not need any implementing legislation. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 420 (E.O. 420), which requires all government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing identification (ID) systems. E.O. 420 seeks to consolidate the existing identification systems of different government agencies into one multipurpose I.D. thereby reducing inconvenience to the public in their transactions with the government.

The proposed uniform I.D. requires the following specific data: (1)name; (2)home address; (3)sex; (4)picture; (5)signature; (6)date of birth;(7)place of birth; (8)marital status; (9)name of parents; (10)height; (11)weight; (12)two index fingerprints and two thumbmarks; (13)any prominent feature, like a mole; and (14)Tax Identification Number (TIN). These consolidated petitions assail the constitutionality of E.O. 420 on the grounds that it is a usurpation of legislative powers by the Presidentand it infringes on the citizens right to privacy. ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not E.O. 420 is a usurpation of legislative powers by the President; and 2.) Whether or not E.O. 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy HELD: The petitions are DISMISSED. E.O. 420 is an exercise of Executive power the Presidents constitutional power of control over the Executive department and also compliance by the President of the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. E.O. 420 applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part of their functions under existing laws. These entities are required toadopt a uniform data collection and format for their IDs in order to reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility, and provide convenience to the people served by government entities. A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two ways. First, the heads of these existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of agreement making their systems uniform. If the government entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID format. This is purely an administrative matter, and does not involve the exercise of legislative power. Second, the President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Certainly, underthis constitutional power of control the Presidentcan direct all government entities, in the exerciseof their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achievesavings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The Presidents constitutional power of control is selfexecuting and does not need any implementing legislation. Of course, this is limited to the Executive branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, E.O. 420 does

not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC. This only shows that E.O. 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government. Sec. 17, Art. VII also mandates the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. There are several laws mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. The adoption of auniform ID data collection and format under E.O. 420 is designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing E.O. 420, the President is simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. In issuing E.O. 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal anylaw but merely implemented and executed existing laws. What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID card system: (1)when the implementation of an ID card system requires a special appropriation because there is no existing appropriation for such purpose; (2)when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of government, including the independent constitutional commissions, as well as compulsory on all citizens whether they have a use for the ID card or not; and (3)when the ID card system requires the collection and recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or usually required for such purpose, such that the citizens right to privacy is infringed. E.O. 420 does not require any special appropriation because the existing ID card systems of government entities covered by it have the proper appropriation or funding. E.O. 420 is not compulsory on all branches of government and is not compulsory on all citizens. E.O. 420 requires a very narrow and focused collection and recording of personal data while safeguarding the confidentiality of such data. The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities. All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth andother government entities covered by E.O. 420 have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of these government entities violate their right to privacy. There is even less basis to complain against the unified ID system under E.O. 420. The data collected and stored for the unified ID system willbe limited to only fourteen specific data, and the ID card itself will show only eight specific data. The data collection, recording and ID card system under E.O. 420 will even require less data collected, stored and revealed than under the disparate

systems prior to E.O. 420. E.O. 420 further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards. Ople v. Torresis not authority to hold that E.O. 420 violates the right to privacy because in that case the assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that the subject matter required legislation. The assailed executive issuance in that case sought to establish a National Computerized Identification Reference System, a national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system where none existed before.