MAROHOMBSAR V ALONTO G.R. No.

93711 February 25, 1991 FACTS: The Office of the Vice-President for External Studies of MSU was merged with the Office of the Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs and, as such, the functions of the former were to be exercised by the latter. The petitioner was appointed acting Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs on the same day. The Board of Regents of the MSU approved her appointment as acting Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs. Later, respondent Ahmad E. Alonto, MSU President, wrote the petitioner informing her that he has decided to tap the petitioner's talent for the MSU system as Vice-President for Academic Affairs, this was refused by petitioner. The respondent President designated Professor Macacuna Moslem as Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs but the latter did not accept the designation. The respondent President issued Special Order No. 158-P designating Professor Corazon Batara, the other respondent in this case, as Officer-in-Charge of the OVCAA. The petitioner now comes to this Court assailing her removal as Vice-Chancellor by the respondent President. The petitioner asserts that her appointment being permanent, she can be removed only after hearing and for cause. ISSUE: Can the petitioner who was given an acting appointment be removed without just cause? HELD: An acting appointment is essentially a temporary appointment which is revocable in character . It may be noted that the special order confirmed by the Board of Regents specifically designated the petitioner as Acting Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs. A bona fide appointment in an acting capacity is essentially temporary and revocable in character and the holder of such appointment may be removed anytime even without hearing or cause. (Austria v. Amante, 79 Phil. 780 [1948]; Castro v. Solidum, 97 Phil. 278 [1955]; Mendez v. Ganzon, 101 Phil. 48 [1957]; Valer v. Briones, 9 SCRA 596 [1963]; Abana v. Aguipo, 15 SCRA 604 [1965]; Hojilla v. Marilao, 13 SCRA 293 [1965]. A person who accepts an appointment in an acting capacity extended and received without any protest or reservation and who acts thereunder for a considerable time cannot later be heard to say that the appointment was, in reality, permanent and therefore there can be no removal except for cause. (See Cabiling v. Pabualan, 14 SCRA 274 [1965]) There are circumstances, however, which rule against the routine or blind application of the principle which governs acting appointments to this case. The essence of an acting appointment is its temporary nature. It is a stop gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until a permanent appointment is extended or a new appointee is chosen. (Austria v. Amante, supra; Castro v. Solidum, supra; and Valer v. Briones, supra) The nature of an acting appointment limits not only the claims of the appointee to a lengthy tenure but also defines the authority of the appointing power. A public officer appointed in an acting capacity cannot claim that the appointment shall in time ripen into a permanent one. However, neither can the appointing power use the principle of temporary appointments to evade or avoid the security of tenure principle in the Constitution and the Civil Service Law. This is similar to the rule that the head of an office cannot arbitrarily convert permanent positions to primarily confidential items so that he can more freely fire and hire or rehire subordinates at his personal discretion. It is the nature of the functions attached to a position, not the nomenclature or title given by the appointing authority which determines its primarily confidential nature. (Piero v. Hechanova, 18 SCRA 417 [1966]) Maturan v. Maglana 113 SCRA 268 FACTS: Maturan was appointed as patrolman of San Francisco S. Leyte, and then promoted as police sergeant, all appointment provisional which was renewed. Respondent Mayor Maglana then suspended petitioner because of two pending criminal cases against him, and instructed the latter to tender his resignation pursuant to a LOI (Letter of Ins.) No. 14 from the President, which resignation was approved Criminal charges against petitioner were dismissed and Napolcom chairman stated that the preventive suspension has been lifted and petitioner was directed to report for duty but Chief of Police Refused to accept petitioner Petitioner filed a claim for back salaries, but court said petitioners appointment was provisional and he can be removed at any time by the appointing power ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner shall be reinstated to his position as police sergeant HELD: Maturan cannot be resinstated to his former post - He was not qualified for the position nor was he possessed with any civil service eligibility for any position in the government. - Lack of civil service eligibility makes his appointment temporary and is dependent entirely upon the pleasure of the appointing power. - When petitioner received his appointment he had no eligibility and what is required is a new appointment, not merely a reinstatement - Mayor cannot be compelled to appoint him because such power of the Mayor is discretionary Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 104639 July 14, 1995 FACTS: Dato was appointed Assistant Provincial warden, the appointment being temporary since he did not possess the required eligibility. He then passed the CSC exam for supervising security guard, the required eligibility for his appointment. However, this was not immediately acted upon by the CSC pending validation. He was then indefinitely suspended after criminal charges were filed against him. When he was acquitted, he requested for reinstatement and backwages, claiming that his appointment was elevated to a permanent one since its validation was already confirmed by the CSC. The RTC and CA ruled in favor of Dato. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: WON Dato was a permanent employee at the time he was suspended HELD: NO. The fact the he subsequently obtain the required CSC eligibility does not ipso facto convert his appointment into a permanent one. There is a need for a new appointment since a permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment. His appointment being a mere temporary, he cannot request for reinstatement and backwages. Achacoso v. Flores G.R. No. 93023 March 13, 1991 FACTS: Tomas D. Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on October 16, 1987, and assumed office on October 27, 1987. On January 2, 1990, in compliance with a request addressed by the President of the Philippines to "all Department Heads, Undersecretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Bureau Heads," and other government officials, he filed a courtesy resignation. This was accepted by the President on April 3, 1990, "with deep regrets." On April 10, 1990, the Secretary of Labor requested him to turn over his office

to the Deputy Administrator as officer in-charge. In a letter dated April 19, 1990, he protested his replacement and declared he was not surrendering his office because his resignation was not voluntary but filed only in obedience to the President's directive. Achacoso contends that he is a member of the Career Service of the Civil Service and so enjoys security of tenure, which is one of the characteristics of the Career Service as distinguished from the Non-Career Service. Claiming to have the rank of undersecretary, he says he comes under Article IV, Section 5 of P.D. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree, which includes in the Career Service, the Solicitor General concedes that the office of POEA Administrator is a career executive service position but submits that the petitioner himself is not a career executive service official entitled to security of tenure. ISSUE: W/N the petitioner can invoke security of tenure against his claimed removal without legal cause. HELD: It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only "to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed." Achacoso did not. At best, therefore, his appointment could be regarded only as temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and "at a moment's notice," conformably to established jurisprudence. The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated. The petitioner contends that his appointment was really intended to be permanent because temporary appointments are not supposed to exceed twelve months and he was allowed to serve in his position for more than three years. This is unacceptable. Even if that intention were assumed, it would not by itself alone make his appointment permanent. Such an appointment did not confer on the petitioner the appropriate civil service eligibility he did not possess at the time he was appointed, nor did it vest him with the right to security of tenure that is available only to permanent appointees. Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC 248 SCRA 300 FACTS: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of Leyte First District. On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilio Montejo, also a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for disqualification of the petitioner with COMELEC on the ground that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an amended certificate of candidacy, changing the entry of seven months to since childhood in item no. 8 in said certificate. However, the amended certificate was not received since it was already past deadline. She claimed that she always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile and residence. The Second Division of the COMELEC with a vote of 2 to 1 came up with a resolution finding private respondents petition for disqualification meritorious. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Marcos. HELD: For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioners domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the fami ly to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. PLM v. IAC GR L-65439 Nov. 13 1985 FACTS: Respondent Hernani Esteban was given an ad interim appointed as vice president for administration by Dr. Blanco, President of Pamantasn ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM). Respondent Estebans appointment was extended several times by the Board of Regents of the school (PLM). Respondent was informed of this extension through a notification issued by the Secretary of the School wherein it was stated that his temporary appointment is extended. (Note: The word temporary was actually used in the notification) Eventually Dr. Blanco issued a memorandum terminating respondent Esteban. Respondent appealed before the Civil Service Commission for the protection of his tenure in the Pamantasan. The CSC ruled that his appointment was only temporary; hence, he can really be terminated. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and the CSC did reconsider and ruled that he has attained a permanent status so petitioner raised the issue before the RTC which ruled that respondent Esteban is only occupying a temporary position. The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed this decision stating that respondent occupies a permanent position. This prompted petitioner to raise this case before the SC. ISSUE: WON respondents ad interim appointment is temporary or permanent (if temporary he can be removed anytime since no security o f tenure and if permanent obviously he cannot be removed anytime) HELD: The SC declared that the ad interim appointment of respondent is of permanent nature. It is easy to see why the petitioner should experience difficulty in understanding the situation. Private respondent had been extended several "adinterim" appointments which petitioner mistakenly understood as appointments temporary in nature. Perhaps, it is the literal translation of the word "ad interim" which creates such belief. The term is defined by Black to mean "in the meantime" or for the time being, thus, an officer ad interim is one appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office during the absence or temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent (Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, 1978). But such is not the meaning nor the use intended in the context of Philippine law. In referring to Dr. Esteban's appointments, the term is not descriptive of the nature of the appointments given to him. Rather, it is used to denote the manner in which said appointments were made, that is, done by the President of the Pamantasan in the meantime, while the Board of Regents, which is originally vested by the University Charter with the power of appointment, is unable to act. Thus, we held in Summers v. Ozaeta (81 Phil. 760):

1. 1. 2. 1. 2. 1. 2.

... an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), section 10, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides that the President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.' lt is an appointment permanent in nature, and the circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. An ad interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course distinguishable from an 'acting' appointment which is merely temporary, good until another permanent appointment is issued In other words, if the Board of Regents is in session, the Pamantasan President merely nominates while the Board issues the appointment. But when the Board is not in session, the President is authorized to issue ad interim appointments. Such appointments are permanent but their terms are only until the Board disapproves them. If confirmed, the appointee's term is converted into the regular term inherent in the position. The fact that the Secretary of the School notified respondent using the word temporary does not make his ad interim appointment temporary. Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Appointments GR No. 83216 September 4, 1989 FACTS: The petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. Due to the opposition of some congressmen-members of the Commission on Appointments, who insisted that sectoral representatives must first be confirmed by the respondent Commission before they could take their oaths and/or assume office as members of the House of Representatives, Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. suspended the oathtaking of the four sectoral representatives which was scheduled at the Session Hall of Congress after the Order of Business. In view of this development, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. transmitted on April 25, 1988, a letter dated April 11, 1988 of the President addressed to the Commission on Appointments submitting for confirmation the appointments of the four sectoral representatives. Meanwhile, petitioner in a letter dated April 22, 1988 addressed to Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. (Annex V) appealed to the House of Representatives alleging, among others, that since no attempt was made to subject the sectoral representatives ** already sitting to the confirmation process, there is no necessity for such confirmation and subjection thereto of the present batch would certainly be discriminatory. On May 10, 1988, petitioner Deles received an invitation from the Commission on Appointments for the deliberation of her appointment as sectoral representative for women. Petitioner sent a reply dated May 11, 1988 explaining her position and questioning the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments over the appointment of sectoral representatives. In the May 12, 1988 meeting of the Committee of the Constitutional Commissions and Offices of the Commission on Appointments, chaired by Sen. Edgardo J. Angara, the Committee ruled against the position of petitioner Deles. ISSUE Does the Constitution require the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments? HELD: The petition is dismissed. The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the other officers w hose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution, referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison, supra). Petitioners appointment was furthermore made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 which gives the President the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. The records show that petitioners appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to her. Implicit in the invocation of paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII as authority for the appointment of petitioner is, the recognition by the President as appointing authority, that petitioners appointment requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. As a matter of fact, the President had expressly submitted petitioners appointment for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Considering that Congress ha d adjourned without respondent Commission on Appointments having acted on petitioners appointment, sai d appointment/nomination had become moot and academic pursuant to Section 23 of the Rules of respondent Commission and unless resubmitted shall not again be considered b y the Commission. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx This is a special civil action for prohibition and mandamus with injuction to cempel Commission on Appointments to allow Teresita Quintos-Deles to perform and discharge her duties as a member of HR representing the Womens Sector. Quintos-Deles, Lopez (Youth), Arteche (Peasant) and Teves (Urban Poor) have not taken their oaths due to the opposition of some congressmen members of Commission on Appointments. Arguments of Commission on Appointments: Sectoral representatives must be first confirmed by Commission on Appointments Solicitor Generals Argument: Since the President included a letter to the Commission on Appointments upon submission of the four sectoral representatives, thus confirmation is required. The appointment was acted during session Arguments of Petitioners: Sec 7, Article XVIII does not require confirmation Its nowhere in the constitution nor in EO No. 198 is mention the need for confirmation Rules of Court: Sectoral representatives are referred to the first sentence of Sec 16 Art VII Provisions of EO No. 198 do not deal with the manner of appointment of sectoral representatives. It just specify the sectors to be presented.

3. Deles appointment was issued not by virtue of EO No. 198 but pursuant to Art VII Sec 16 par 2 and Art XVIII Sec 7. Sarmiento v. Mison 146 SCRA 549 FACTS:Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Misons salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Misons ap pointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of Misons appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. The Supreme Court held that the President has the authority to appoint Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, and thus, the latter is entitled the full authority and functions of the office and receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and the petition in intervention, without costs. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment is valid. HELD: It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they be appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the CoA? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the CoA. Because of the conflicting extremes provided in the 2 previous Constitutions, the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a middle ground by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the CoA for the 1st group of appointments and leaving to the Pre sident, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the 2nd and 3rd groups as well as those in the 4th group, i.e., officers of lower rank. As to the 4th group of officers whom the President can appoint, it was pointed out by the intervener CoA that the 3r sentence in Sec. 16, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, this implies that, in the absence of such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the CoA; and, if this is so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows that higher-ranked officers should be appointed by the President, subject also to confirmation by the CoA. Ulpiano et al argued that the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7, merely declares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of the various departments, agencies, commissions, or boards in the government. No reason however is submitted for the use of the word alone in said third sentence The SC ruled that both arguments are not correct. After a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the use of the word alone after the word President in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 is, more than anything else, a slip or lapse in draftsmanship. In the 1987 Constitution the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the CoA, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 the word alone after the word President in providing that Congress may by law vest the app ointment of lowerranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the CoA, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article 7. Therefore, the 3rd sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 could have stated merely that, in the case of lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of various departments of the government. In short, the word alone in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import from the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7. And, this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7, are not subject to confirmation by the CoA. Misons and Caragues appointments are affirmed affirmed.