1 G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998 TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, i !

i" #$p$#it% $" Omb&'"m$ ( HON. )ES*S F. G*ERRERO, i !i" #$p$#it% $" Dep&t% Omb&'"m$ +or ,&-o ( $ ' NESTOR .. AG*STIN, respondents. REGA,ADO, J.: Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the "Joint Order" issued by public respondents on June 1 , 1!!" in O#$%&dm. Case 'o. (%!5%(411 )hich *ranted the motion for reconsideration of and absolved private respondent from administrative char*es for inter alia *rave misconduct committed by him as then &ssistant Re*ional +irector, Re*ion ,-%&, +epartment of Public .or/s and 0i*h)ays 1+P.02. , ,t appears from the statement and counter%statement of facts of the parties that petitioner 3eresita 4. 5abian )as the ma6or stoc/holder and president of PRO#&3 Construction +evelopment Corporation 1PRO#&32 )hich )as en*a*ed in the construction business. Private respondent 'estor -. &*ustin )as the incumbent +istrict 7n*ineer of the 5irst #etro #anila 7n*ineerin* +istrict 15#7+2 )hen he alle*edly committed the offenses for )hich he )as administratively char*ed in the Office of the Ombudsman. PRO#&3 participated in the biddin* for *overnment construction pro6ects includin* those under the 5#7+, and private respondent, reportedly ta/in* advanta*e of his official position, invei*led petitioner into an amorous relationship. 3heir affair lasted for some time, in the course of )hich private respondent *ifted PRO#&3 )ith public )or/s contracts and interceded for it in problems concernin* the same in his office. 8ater, misunderstandin*s and unpleasant incidents developed bet)een the parties and )hen petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the e9tent of employin* acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. :he eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case a*ainst him in a letter%complaint dated July ;4, 1!!5. 3he said complaint sou*ht the dismissal of private respondent for violation of :ection 1!, Republic &ct 'o. <""( 1Ombudsman &ct of 1! !2 and :ection =< of Presidential +ecree 'o. (" 1Civil :ervice +ecree2, )ith an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. 5or purposes of this case, the char*es referred to may be subsumed under the cate*ory of oppression, misconduct, and dis*raceful or immoral conduct. On January =1, 1!!<, 4raft ,nvesti*ator 7duardo R. $enite> issued a resolution findin* private respondent *uilty of *rave misconduct and orderin* his dismissal from the service )ith forfeiture of all benefits under the la). 0is resolution bore the approval of +irector 'apoleon $aldrias and &ssistant Ombudsman &belardo &portadera of their office. 0erein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated 5ebruary ;<, 1!!<, approved the aforesaid resolution )ith modifications, by findin* private respondent *uilty of misconduct and metin* out the penalty of suspension )ithout pay for one year. &fter private respondent moved for reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered that the former?s ne) counsel had been his "classmate and close associate" hence he inhibited himself. 3he case )as transferred to respondent +eputy Ombudsman Jesus 5. 4uerrero )ho, in the no) challen*ed Joint Order of June 1 , 1!!", set aside the 5ebruary ;<, 1!!" Order of respondent Ombudsman and e9onerated private respondent from the administrative char*es. ,, ,n the present appeal, petitioner ar*ues that :ection ;" of Republic &ct 'o. <""( 1Ombudsman &ct of 1! !2 1 pertinently provides that @ ,n all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the :upreme Court by filin* a petition for certiorari )ithin ten 11(2 days from receipt of the )ritten notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court 17mphasis supplied2 0o)ever, she points out that under :ection ", Rule ,,, of &dministrative Order 'o. (" 1Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman2, 2 )hen a respondent is absolved of the char*es in an administrative proceedin* the decision of the Ombudsman is final and unappealable. :he accordin*ly submits that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority under the la) to restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the ri*ht of appeal allo)ed by Republic &ct 'o. <""(, nor to limit the po)er of revie) of this Court. $ecause of the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that she found it "necessary to ta/e an alternative recourse under Rule <5 of the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it creates on the availability of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Respondents filed their respective comments and re6oined that the Office of the Ombudsman is empo)ered by the Constitution and the la) to promul*ate its o)n rules of procedure. :ection 1=1 2, &rticle A, of the 1! " Constitution provides, amon* others, that the Office of the Ombudsman can "1p2romul*ate its rules of procedure and e9ercise such other po)ers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by la)." Republic &ct 'o. <""( duly implements the Constitutional mandate )ith these relevant provisionsB :ec. 14. Restrictions. @ . . . 'o court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy a*ainst the decision or findin*s of the Ombudsman e9cept the :upreme Court on pure Cuestions of la). 999 999 999

2 :ec. 1 . Rules of Procedure. @ 112 3he Office of the Ombudsman shall promul*ate its o)n rules of procedure for the effective e9ercise or performance of its po)ers, functions, and duties. 999 999 999 :ec. ;=. 5ormal ,nvesti*ation. @ 112 &dministrative investi*ations by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance )ith its rules of procedure and consistent )ith due process. . . . . 999 999 999 :ec. ;". 7ffectivity and 5inality of +ecisions. @ &ll previsionary orders at the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and e9ecutory. & motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed )ithin five 152 days after receipt of )ritten notice and shall be entertained only on any of the follo)in* *roundsB 999 999 999 5indin*s of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman )hen supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. &ny order, directive or decision imposin* the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary shall be final and unappealable. ,n all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the :upreme Court by filin* a petition for certiorari )ithin ten 11(2 days from receipt of the )ritten notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance )ith Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 3he above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of 6ustice may reCuire. Respondents conseCuently contend that, on the fore*oin* constitutional and statutory authority, petitioner cannot assail the validity of the rules of procedure formulated by the Office of the Ombudsman *overnin* the conduct of proceedin*s before it, includin* those rules )ith respect to the availability or non%availability of appeal in administrative cases, such as :ection ", Rule ,,, of &dministrative Order 'o. (". Respondents also Cuestion the propriety of petitioner?s proposition that, althou*h she definitely prefaced her petition by cate*ori>in* the same as "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court," she ma/es the aforeCuoted ambivalent statement )hich in effect as/s that, should the remedy under Rule 45 be unavailable, her petition be treated in the alternative as an ori*inal action for certiorari under Rule <5. 3he parties thereafter en*a*e in a discussion of the differences bet)een a petition for revie) on certiorari under Rule 45 and a special civil action of certiorari under Rule <5. Dltimately, they also attempt to revie) and rationali>e the decisions of this Court applyin* :ection ;" of Republic &ct. 'o. <""( vis-a-vis :ection ", Rule ,,, of &dministrative Order 'o. (". &s correctly pointed out by public respondent, Ocampo IV vs. Ombudsman, et al. / and Youn vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al. 4 )ere ori*inal actions for certiorari under Rule <5.Yabut vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al. 0 )as commenced by a petition for revie) on certiorari under Rule 45. 3hen came Cru!, "r. vs. #eople, et al., 6 Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., 7 Olivare! vs. $andi anba%an, et al., 8 and"ao, et al. vs. Vas&ue!, 9 )hich )ere for certiorari, prohibition andEor mandamus under Rule <5. 'lba vs. (itorreda, et al. 11)as initiated by a pleadin* unli/ely denominated as an "&ppealEPetition for Certiorari andEor Prohibition," )ith a prayer for ancillary remedies, and ultimately follo)ed by Constantino vs. )on. Ombudsman 'niano *esierto, et al. 11 )hich )as a special civil action for certiorari. Considerin*, ho)ever, the vie) that this Court no) ta/es of the case at bar and the issues therein )hich )ill shortly be e9plained, it refrains from preemptively resolvin* the controverted points raised by the parties on the nature and propriety of application of the )rit of certiorari )hen used as a mode of appeal or as the basis of a special ori*inal action, and )hether or not they may be resorted to concurrently or alternatively, obvious thou*h the ans)ers thereto appear to be. $esides, some seemin*ly obiter statements in Yabut and 'lba could bear ree9amination and clarification. 0ence, )e )ill merely observe and lay do)n the rule at this 6uncture that :ection ;" of Republic &ct 'o. <""( is involved only )henever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is ta/en from a decision in an administrative disciplinary action. ,t cannot be ta/en into account )here an ori*inal action for certiorari under Rule <5 is resorted to as a remedy for 6udicial revie), such as from an incident in a criminal action. ,,, &fter respondents? separate comments had been filed, the Court )as intri*ued by the fact, )hich does not appear to have been seriously considered before, that the administrative liability of a public official could fall under the 6urisdiction of both the Civil :ervice Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. 3hus, the offenses imputed to herein private respondent )ere based on both :ection 1! of Republic &ct 'o. <""( and :ection =< of Presidential +ecree 'o. (". Fet, pursuant to the amendment of :ection !, $atas Pambansa $l*. 1;! by Republic &ct 'o. "!(;, all ad6udications by the Civil :ervice Commission in administrative disciplinary cases )ere made appealable to the Court of &ppeals effective #arch 1 , 1!!5, )hile those of the Office of the Ombudsman are appealable to this Court. ,t could thus be possible that in the same administrative case involvin* t)o respondents, the proceedin*s a*ainst one could eventually have been elevated to the Court of &ppeals, )hile the other may have found its )ay to the Ombudsman from )hich it is sou*ht to be brou*ht to this Court. Fet systematic and efficient case mana*ement )ould dictate the consolidation of those cases in the Court of &ppeals, both for e9pediency and to avoid possible conflictin* decisions.

3 3hen there is the consideration that :ection =(, &rticle -, of the 1! " Constitution provides that "1n2o la) shall be passed increasin* the appellate 6urisdiction of the :upreme Court as provided in this Constitution )ithout its advice and consent," and that Republic &ct 'o. <""(, )ith its challen*ed :ection ;", too/ effect on 'ovember 1", 1! !, obviously in spite of that constitutional prohibition. 3he conventional rule, ho)ever, is that a challen*e on constitutional *rounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of )hom did so in this case, but that is not an infle9ible rule, as )e shall e9plain. :ince the constitution is intended for the observance of the 6udiciary and other departments of the *overnment and the 6ud*es are s)orn to support its provisionsG the courts are not at liberty to overloo/ or disre*ard its commands or countenance evasions thereof. .hen it is clear that a statute trans*resses the authority vested in a le*islative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute, *overns in a case before them for 6ud*ment. 12 3hus, )hile courts )ill not ordinarily pass upon constitutional Cuestions )hich are not raised in the pleadin*s, 1/ the rule has been reco*ni>ed to admit of certain e9ceptions. ,t does not preclude a court from inCuirin* into its o)n 6urisdiction or compel it to enter a 6ud*ment that it lac/s 6urisdiction to enter. ,f a statute on )hich a court?s 6urisdiction in a proceedin* depends is unconstitutional, the court has no 6urisdiction in the proceedin*, and since it may determine )hether or not it has 6urisdiction, it necessarily follo)s that it may inCuire into the constitutionality of the statute. 14 Constitutional Cuestions, not raised in the re*ular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily re6ected unless the 6urisdiction of the court belo) or that of the appellate court is involved in )hich case it may be raised at any time or on the court?s o)n motion. 10 3he Court e+ mero motu may ta/e co*ni>ance of lac/ of 6urisdiction at any point in the case )here that fact is developed. 16 3he court has a clearly reco*ni>ed ri*ht to determine its o)n 6urisdiction in any proceedin*. 17 3he fore*oin* authorities not)ithstandin*, the Court believed that the parties hereto should be further heard on this constitutional Cuestion. Correspondin*ly, the follo)in* resolution )as issued on #ay 14, 1!! , the material parts statin* as follo)sB 3he Court observes that the present petition, from the very alle*ations thereof, is "an appeal bycertiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the "Joint Order 1ReB #otion for Reconsideration2" issued in O#$%&dm. Case 'o. (%!5%(411, entitled "3eresita 4. 5abian vs. 7n*r. 'estor -. &*ustin, &sst. Re*ional +irector, Re*ion ,-%&, 7+:&, Hue>on City," )hich absolved the latter from the administrative char*es for *rave misconduct, amon* others. ,t is further averred therein that the present appeal to this Court is allo)ed under :ection ;" of the Ombudsman &ct of 1! " 1R.&. 'o. <""(2 and, pursuant thereto, the Office of the Ombudsman issued its Rules of Procedure, :ection " )hereof is assailed by petitioner in this proceedin*. ,t )ill be recalled that R.&. 'o. <""( )as enacted on 'ovember 1", 1! !, )ith :ection ;" thereof pertinently providin* that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to this Court in accordance )ith Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 3he Court notes, ho)ever, that neither the petition nor the t)o comments thereon too/ into account or discussed the validity of the aforestated :ection ;" of R.&. 'o. ""( in li*ht of the provisions of :ection =(, &rticle -, of the 1! " Constitution that "1n2o la) shall be passed increasin* the appellate 6urisdiction of the :upreme Court as provided in this Constitution )ithout its advice and consent." 3he Court also invites the attention of the parties to its relevant rulin* in ,irst -epanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. .he Court of 'ppeals, et al. 14.R. 'o. 11(5"1, October ", 1!!4, ;=" :CR& 51!2 and the provisions of its former Circular 'o. 1%!1 and Revised &dministrative Circular 'o. 1%!5, as no) substantially reproduced in Rule 4= of the 1!!" revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure. ,n vie) of the fact that the appellate 6urisdiction of the Court is invo/ed and involved in this case, and the fore*oin* le*al considerations appear to impu*n the constitutionality and validity of the *rant of said appellate 6urisdiction to it, the Court deems it necessary that the parties be heard thereon and the issue be first resolved before conductin* further proceedin*s in this appellate revie). &CCOR+,'48F, the Court Resolved to reCuire the parties to :D$#,3 their position and ar*uments on the matter sub6ect of this resolution by filin* their correspondin* pleadin*s )ithin ten 11(2 days from notice hereof. ,3he records do not sho) that the Office of the :olicitor 4eneral has complied )ith such reCuirement, hence the Court dispenses )ith any submission it should have presented. On the other hand, petitioner espouses the theory that the provision in :ection ;" of Republic &ct 'o. <""( )hich authori>es an appeal by certiorari to this Court of the aforementioned ad6udications of the Office of the Ombudsman is not violative of :ection =(, &rticle -, of the Constitution. :he claims that )hat is proscribed is the passa*e of a la) "increasin*" the appellate 6urisdiction of this Court "as provided in this Constitution," and such appellate 6urisdiction includes "all cases in )hich only an error or Cuestion of la) is involved." :ince :ection 51;21e2, &rticle -,,, of the Constitution authori>es this Court to revie), revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari the aforesaid final 6ud*ment or orders "as the la) or the Rules of Court may provide," said :ection ;" does not increase this Court?s appellate 6urisdiction since, by providin* that the mode of appeal shall be by petition for certiorari under Rule 45, then )hat may be raised therein are only Cuestions of la) of )hich this Court already has 6urisdiction. .e are not impressed by this discourse. ,t overloo/s the fact that by 6urisprudential developments over the years, this Court has allo)ed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in a substantial number of cases and instances even if Cuestions of fact are directly involved and have to be resolved by the appellate court. 18 &lso, the very provision cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate 6urisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is to be e9ercised over "final 6ud*ments and orders of lo)er courts," that is, the courts composin* the inte*rated 6udicial system. ,t does not include the Cuasi%6udicial bodies or a*encies, hence )henever the le*islature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the Cuasi%6udicial a*ency shall be revie)able by the :upreme Court or the Court of &ppeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in the la) creatin* that Cuasi%6udicial a*ency and, for that matter, any special statutory court. 'o such provision on appellate procedure is reCuired for the re*ular courts of the inte*rated 6udicial system because they are )hat are referred to and already provided for, in :ection 5, &rticle -,,, of the Constitution.

4 &propos to the fore*oin*, and as correctly observed by private respondent, the revised Rules of Civil Procedure 19 preclude appeals from Cuasi%6udicial a*encies to the :upreme Court via a petition for revie) on certiorari under Rule 45. ,n the 1!!" Rules of Civil Procedure, :ection 1 of Rule 45, on "&ppeal by Certiorari to the :upreme Court," e9plicitly statesB :ec. 1. ,ilin of petition with $upreme Court. @ & person desirin* to appeal by certiorari from a 6ud*ment or final order or resolution of the Court of 'ppeals, the $andi anba%an, the Re ional .rial Court or other courts whenever authori!ed b% law , may file )ith the :upreme Court a verified petition for revie) on certiorari. 3he petition shall raise only Cuestions of la) )hich must be distinctly set forth. 17mphasis ours2. 3his differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1!<4 Rules of Court )hich made mention only of the Court of &ppeals, and had to be adopted in statutes creatin* and providin* for appeals from certain administrative or Cuasi%6udicial a*encies, )henever the purpose )as to restrict the scope of the appeal to Cuestions of la). 3hat intended limitation on appellate revie), as )e have 6ust discussed, )as not fully subserved by recourse to the former Rule 45 but, then, at that time there )as no uniform rule on appeals from Cuasi%6udicial a*encies. Dnder the present Rule 45, appeals may be brou*ht throu*h a petition for revie) on certiorari but only from 6ud*ments and final orders of the courts enumerated in :ection 1 thereof. &ppeals from 6ud*ments and final orders of &uasi-/udicial a encies21 are no) reCuired to be brou*ht to the Court of &ppeals on a verified petition for revie), under the reCuirements and conditions in Rule 4= )hich )as precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for Cuasi%6udicial a*encies. 21 ,t is su**ested, ho)ever, that the provisions of Rule 4= should apply only to "ordinary" Cuasi%6udicial a*encies, but not to the Office of the Ombudsman )hich is a "hi*h constitutional body." .e see no reason for this distinction for, if hierarchical ran/ should be a criterion, that proposition thereby disre*ards the fact that Rule 4= even includes the Office of the President and the Civil :ervice Commission, althou*h the latter is even an independent constitutional commission, unli/e the Office of the Ombudsman )hich is a constitutionally%mandated but statutorily created body. Re*ardin* the mis*ivin* that the revie) of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman by the Court of &ppeals )ould cover Cuestions of la), of fact or of both, )e do not perceive that as an ob6ectionable feature. &fter all, factual controversies are usually involved in administrative disciplinary actions, 6ust li/e those comin* from the Civil :ervice Commission, and the Court of &ppeals as a trier of fact is better prepared than this Court to resolve the same. On the other hand, )e cannot have this situation covered by Rule 45 since it no) applies only to appeals from the re*ular courts. 'either can )e place it under Rule <5 since the revie) therein is limited to 6urisdictional Cuestions. 2 3he submission that because this Court has ta/en co*ni>ance of cases involvin* :ection ;" of Republic &ct 'o. <""(, that fact may be vie)ed as "acCuiescence" or "acceptance" by it of the appellate 6urisdiction contemplated in said :ection ;", is unfortunately too tenuous. 3he 6urisdiction of a court is not a Cuestion of acCuiescence as a matter of fact but an issue of conferment as a matter of la). $esides, )e have already discussed the cases referred to, includin* the inaccuracies of some statements therein, and )e have pointed out the instances )hen Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by :ection ;" of Republic &ct 'o. <""( no) under discussion, and )hen that provision )ould not apply if it is a 6udicial revie) under Rule <5. Private respondent invo/es the rule that courts *enerally avoid havin* to decide a constitutional Cuestion, especially )hen the case can be decided on other *rounds. &s a *eneral proposition that is correct. 0ere, ho)ever, there is an actual case susceptible of 6udicial determination. &lso, the constitutional Cuestion, at the instance of this Court, )as raised by the proper parties, althou*h there )as even no need for that because the Court can rule on the matter sua sponte )hen its appellate 6urisdiction is involved. 3he constitutional Cuestion )as timely raised, althou*h it could even be raised any time li/e)ise by reason of the 6urisdictional issue confrontin* the Court. 5inally, the resolution of the constitutional issue here is obviously necessary for the resolution of the present case. 22 ,t is, ho)ever, su**ested that this case could also be decided on other *rounds, short of passin* upon the constitutional Cuestion. .e appreciate the ratiocination of private respondent but re*ret that )e must re6ect the same. 3hat private respondent could be absolved of the char*e because the decision e9oneratin* him is final and unappealable assumes that :ection ", Rule ,,, of &dministrative Order 'o. (" is valid, but that is precisely one of the issues here. 3he prevailin* rule that the Court should not interfere )ith the discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecutin* or dismissin* a complaint is not applicable in this administrative case, as earlier e9plained. 3hat t)o decisions rendered by this Court supposedly imply the validity of the aforementioned :ection " of Rule ,,, is precisely under revie) here because of some statements therein some)hat at odds )ith settled rules and the decisions of this Court on the same issues, hence to invo/e the same )ould be to be* the Cuestion. 3a/in* all the fore*oin* circumstances in their true le*al roles and effects, therefore, :ection ;" of Republic &ct 'o. <""( cannot validly authori>e an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. ,t conseCuently violates the proscription in :ection =(, &rticle -, of the Constitution a*ainst a la) )hich increases the appellate 6urisdiction of this Court. 'o countervailin* ar*ument has been co*ently presented to 6ustify such disre*ard of the constitutional prohibition )hich, as correctly e9plained in ,irst -epanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. .he Court of 'ppeals, et al. 2/)as intended to *ive this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate 6urisdiction. Other)ise, the indiscriminate enactment of le*islation enlar*in* its appellate 6urisdiction )ould unnecessarily burden the Court. 24 .e perforce have to li/e)ise re6ect the supposed inconsistency of the rulin* in ,irst -epanto Ceramics and some statements in Yabut and 'lba, not only because of the difference in the factual settin*s, but also because those isolated cryptic statements in Yabut and 'lba should best be clarified in the ad6udication on the merits of this case. $y )ay of anticipation, that )ill have to be underta/en by the proper court of competent 6urisdiction. 5urthermore, in addition to our precedin* discussion on )hether :ection ;" of Republic &ct 'o. <""( e9panded the 6urisdiction of this Court )ithout its advice and consent, private respondent?s position paper correctly yields the le*islative bac/*round of Republic &ct 'o. <""(. On :eptember ;<, 1! !, the Conference Committee Report on :.$. 'o. 45= and 0.$. 'o. 1=<4<, settin* forth the ne) version of )hat )ould later be Republic &ct 'o. <""(, )as approved on second readin* by the 0ouse of Representatives. 20 3he :enate )as informed of the approval of the final version of the &ct on October ;, 1! !26 and the same )as thereafter enacted into la) by President &Cuino on 'ovember 1", 1! !.

5 :ubmitted )ith said position paper is an e9cerpt sho)in* that the :enate, in the deliberations on the procedure for appeal from the Office of the Ombudsman to this Court, )as a)are of the provisions of :ection =(, &rticle ,,, of the Constitution. ,t also reveals that :enator 7d*ardo &n*ara, as a co% author and the principal sponsor of :.$. 'o. 54= admitted that the said provision )ill e9pand this Court?s 6urisdiction, and that the Committee on Justice and 0uman Ri*hts had not consulted this Court on the matter, thusB ,'37RP788&3,O' O5 :7'&3OR :0&0&', 999 999 999 3hereafter, )ith reference to :ection ;;142 )hich provides that the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the :upreme Court, in reply to :enator :hahani?s Cuery )hether the :upreme Court )ould a*ree to such provision in the li*ht of :ection =(, &rticle -, of the Constitution )hich reCuires its advice and concurrence in la)s increasin* its appellate 6urisdiction, :enator &n*ara informed that the Committee has not yet consulted the :upreme Court re*ardin* the matter. 0e a*reed that the provision )ill e9pand the :upreme Court?s 6urisdiction by allo)in* appeals throu*h petitions for revie), addin* that they should be appeals on certiorari. 27 3here is no sho)in* that even up to its enactment, Republic &ct 'o. <""( )as ever referred to this Court for its advice and consent. -, &s a conseCuence of our ratiocination that :ection ;" of Republic &ct 'o. <""( should be struc/ do)n as unconstitutional, and in line )ith the re*ulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from Cuasi%6udicial a*encies in the 1!!" Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be ta/en to the Court of &ppeals under the provisions of Rule 4=. 3here is an intimation in the pleadin*s, ho)ever, that said :ection ;" refers to appellate 6urisdiction )hich, bein* substantive in nature, cannot be disre*arded by this Court under its rule%ma/in* po)er, especially if it results in a diminution, increase or modification of substantive ri*hts. Obviously, ho)ever, )here the la) is procedural in essence and purpose, the fore*oin* consideration )ould not pose a proscriptive issue a*ainst the e9ercise of the rule%ma/in* po)er of this Court. 3his brin*s to fore the Cuestion of )hether :ection ;" of Republic &ct 'o. <""( is substantive or procedural. ,t )ill be noted that no definitive line can be dra)n bet)een those rules or statutes )hich are procedural, hence )ithin the scope of this Court?s rule% ma/in* po)er, and those )hich are substantive. ,n fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one conte9t and substantive in another. 29 ,t is admitted that )hat is procedural and )hat is substantive is freCuently a Cuestion of *reat difficulty. /1 ,t is not, ho)ever, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pra*matic approach is ta/en )ithin the conte9t of our o)n procedural and 6urisdictional system. ,n determinin* )hether a rule prescribed by the :upreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lo)er courts, abrid*es, enlar*es, or modifies any substantive ri*ht, the test is )hether the rule really re*ulates procedure, that is, the /udicial process for enforcin ri hts and duties reco ni!ed b% substantive law and for 6ustly administerin* remedy and redress for a disre*ard or infraction of them. /1 ,f the rule ta/es a)ay a vested ri*ht, it is noG procedural. ,f the rule creates a ri*ht such as the ri*ht to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matterG but if it operates as a means of implementin an e+istin ri ht then the rule deals merel% with procedure. /2 ,n the situation under consideration, a transfer by the :upreme Court, in the e9ercise of its rule%ma/in* po)er, of pendin* cases involvin* a revie) of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of &ppeals )hich shall no) be vested )ith e9clusive appellate 6urisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only. // 3his is so because it is not the ri*ht to appeal of an a**rieved party )hich is affected by the la). 3hat ri ht has been preserved. Only the procedure by )hich the appeal is to be made or decided has been chan*ed. 3he rationale for this is that no liti*ant has a vested ri*ht in a particular remedy, )hich may be chan*ed by substitution )ithout impairin* vested ri*hts, hence he can have none in rules of procedure )hich relate to the remedy. /4 5urthermore, it cannot be said that the transfer of appellate 6urisdiction to the Court of &ppeals in this case is an act of creatin* a ne) ri*ht of appeal because such po)er of the :upreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural and not a substantive po)er. 'either can )e consider such transfer as impairin* a vested ri*ht because the parties have still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to administer that remedy. /0 3hus, it has been *enerally held that rules or statutes involvin* a transfer of cases from one court to another, are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicable to actions pendin* at the time the statute )ent into effect /6 or, in the case at bar, )hen its invalidity )as declared. &ccordin*ly, even from the standpoint of 6urisdiction e+ h%pothesi, the validity of the transfer of appeals in said cases to the Court of &ppeals can be sustained. .07R75OR7, :ection ;" of Republic &ct 'o. <""( 1Ombudsman &ct of 1! !2, to*ether )ith :ection ", Rule ,,, of &dministrative Order 'o. (" 1Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman2, and any other provision of la) or issuance implementin* the aforesaid &ct and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the :upreme Court, are hereby declared ,'-&8,+ and of no further force and effect. 3he instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of &ppeals for final disposition, )ith said petition to be considered by the Court of &ppeals pro hoc vice as a petition for revie) under Rule 4=, )ithout pre6udice to its reCuirin* the parties to submit such amended or supplemental pleadin*s and additional documents or records as it may deem necessary and proper. :O OR+7R7+.
28

6 G.R. No. 1/2611 )$ &$r% 19, 1999 ,EO E3HEGARA4, petitioner, vs. SE3RETAR4 OF )*STI3E, ET AL., respondents. 5*NO, J.: 5or resolution are public respondents? Dr*ent #otion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1!!( temporarily restrainin* the e9ecution of petitioner and :upplemental #otion to Dr*ent #otion for Reconsideration. ,t is the submission of public respondents thatB 1. ;. =. 3he +ecision in this case havin* become final and e9ecutory, its e9ecution enters the e9clusive ambit of authority of the e9ecutive authority. 3he issuance of the 3RO may be construed as trenchin* on that sphere of e9ecutive authorityG 3he issuance of the temporary restrainin* order . . . creates dan*erous precedent as there )ill never be an end to liti*ation because there is al)ays a possibility that Con*ress may repeal a la). Con*ress had earlier deliberated e9tensively on the death penalty bill. 3o be certain, )hatever Cuestion may no) be raised on the +eath Penalty 8a) before the present Con*ress )ithin the <%month period *iven by this 0onorable Court had in all probability been fully debated upon . . . Dnder the time honored ma+im le+ futuro, /ude+ praeterito, the la) loo/s for)ard )hile the 6ud*e loo/s at the past, . . . the 0onorable Court in issuin* the 3RO has transcended its po)er of 6udicial revie). &t this moment, certain circumstancesEsupervenin* events transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of the la) imposin* death penalty has become nil, to )itB a. b. c. 3he public pronouncement of President 7strada that he )ill veto any la) imposin* the death penalty involvin* heinous crimes. 3he resolution of Con*ressman 4ole>, et al., that they are a*ainst the repeal of the la)G 3he fact that :enator Roco?s resolution to repeal the la) only bears his si*nature and that of :enator Pimentel.

4. 5.

,n their :upplemental #otion to Dr*ent #otion for Reconsideration, public respondents attached a copy of 0ouse Resolution 'o. <;! introduced by Con*ressman 4ole> entitled "Resolution e9pressin* the sense of the 0ouse of Representative to re6ect any move to revie) Republic &ct 'o. "<5! )hich provided for the re%imposition of death penalty, notifyin* the :enate, the Judiciary and the 79ecutive +epartment of the position of the 0ouse of Representative on this matter, and ur*in* the President to e9haust all means under the la) to immediately implement the death penalty la)." 3he Resolution )as concurred in by one hundred thirteen 111=2 con*ressman. ,n their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contendsB 112 the stay order. . . is )ithin the scope of 6udicial po)er and duty and does not trench on e9ecutive po)ers nor on con*ressional prero*ativesG 1;2 the e9ercise by this Court of its po)er to stay e9ecution )as reasonableG 1=2 the Court did not lose 6urisdiction to address incidental matters involved or arisin* from the petitionG 142 public respondents are estopped from challen*in* the Court?s 6urisdictionG and 152 there is no certainty that the la) on capital punishment )ill not be repealed or modified until Con*ress convenes and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed before it. Prefatorily, the Court li/es to emphasi>e that the instant motions concern matters that are not incidents in 4.R. 'o. 11"4";, )here the death penalty )as imposed on petitioner on automatic revie) of his conviction by this Court. 3he instant motions )ere filed in this case, 4.R. 'o. 1=;<(1, )here the constitutionality of R.&. 'o. 1"" 18ethal ,n6ection 8a)2 and its implementin* rules and re*ulations )as assailed by petitioner. 5or this reason, the Court in its Resolution of January 4, 1!!! merely noted the #otion to :et &side of Rodessa "$aby" R. 7che*aray dated January ", 1!!! and 7ntry of &ppearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1!!!. Clearly, she has no le*al standin* to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the :tate is properly represented by the :olicitor 4eneral. .e shall no) resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents. , 5irst. .e do not a*ree )ith the s)eepin* submission of the public respondents that this Court lost its 6urisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no lon*er restrain the e9ecution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents are invo/in* the rule that final 6ud*ments can no lon*er be altered in accord )ith the principle that "it is 6ust as important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to be*in liti*ation." 1 3o start )ith, the Court is not chan*in* even a comma of its final +ecision. ,t is appropriate to e9amine )ith precision the metes and bounds of the +ecision of this Court that became final. 3hese metes and bounds are clearly spelled out in the 7ntry of Jud*ment in this case, vi!B 7'3RF O5 JD+4#7'3 3his is to certify that on October 01, 0223 a decision rendered in the above%entitled case )as filed in this Office, the dispositive part of )hich reads as follo)sB .07R75OR7, the petition is +7',7+ insofar as petitioner see/s to declare the assailed statute 1Republic &ct 'o. 1""2 as unconstitutionalG but 4R&'37+ insofar as :ections 1" and 1! of the Rules and Re*ulations to ,mplement Republic &ct 'o. 1"" are concerned, )hich are hereby declared ,'-&8,+ because 1a2 :ection 1" contravenes &rticle = of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by :ection ;5 of Republic &ct 'o. "<5!G and 1b2 :ection 1! fails to provide for revie) and approval of the 8ethal ,n6ection #anual by the :ecretary of Justice, and un6ustifiably ma/es the manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties includin* the accusedEconvict

7 and counsel. Respondents are hereby en6oined from enforcin* and implementin* Republic &ct 'o. 1"" until the aforesaid :ections 1" and 1! of the Rules and Re*ulations to ,mplement Republic &ct 'o. 1"" are appropriately amended, revised andEor corrected in accordance )ith this +ecision. :O OR+7R7+. and that the same has, on (ovember <, 0233 become final and e9ecutory and is hereby recorded in the $oo/ of 7ntries of Jud*ment. #anila, Philippine. Cler/ of Court $yB 1:4+2 37R7:,3& 4. +,#&,:,P &ctin* Chief Judicial Records Office 3he records )ill sho) that before the 7ntry of Jud*ment, the :ecretary of Justice, the 0onorable :erafin Cuevas, filed )ith this Court on October ;1, 1!! a Compliance )here he submitted the &mended Rules and Re*ulations implementin* R.&. 'o. 1"" in compliance )ith our +ecision. On October ; , 1!! , :ecretary Cuevas submitted a #anifestation informin* the Court that he has caused the publication of the said &mended Rules and Re*ulations as reCuired by the &dministrative Code. ,t is crystalline that the +ecision of this Court that became final and unalterable mandatedB 112 that R.&. 'o. 1"" is not unconstitutionalG 1;2 that sections 1" and 1! of the Rules and Re*ulations to ,mplement R.&. 'o. 1"" are invalid, and 1=2 R.&. 'o. 1"" cannot be enforced and implemented until sections 1" and 1! of the Rules and Re*ulations to ,mplement R.&. 'o. 1"" are amended. ,t is also dayli*ht clear that this +ecision )as not altered a )hit by this Court. Contrary to the submission of the :olicitor 4eneral, the rule on finality of 6ud*ment cannot divest this Court of its 6urisdiction to e9ecute and enforce the same 6ud*ment. Retired Justice Camilo Huiason synthesi>ed the )ell established 6urisprudence on this issue as follo)sB 2 999 999 999 the finality of a 6ud*ment does not mean that the Court has lost all its po)ers nor the case. $y the finality of the 6ud*ment, )hat the court loses is its 6urisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. 7ven after the 6ud*ment has become final the court retains its 6urisdiction to e9ecute and enforce it. / 3here is a difference bet)een the 6urisdiction of the court to e9ecute its 6ud*ment and its 6urisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. 3he former continues even after the 6ud*ment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of 6ud*mentG the latter terminates )hen the 6ud*ment becomes final. 4 . . . 5or after the 6ud*ment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire )hich can render the e9ecution un6ust or impossible. 0 ,n truth, the ar*uments of the :olicitor 4eneral has lon* been re6ected by this Court. &s aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1!15, this Court has uneCuivocably ruled in the case of *irector of #risons v. "ud e of ,irst Instance, 6 vi!B 3his :upreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, )hich constitute 6urisprudence on the sub6ect, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopenin* the same cannot chan*e or alter its 6ud*ment, as its 6urisdiction has terminated . . . .hen in cases of appeal or revie) the cause has been returned thereto for e9ecution, in the event that the 6ud*ment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuin* the proper order. $ut it does not follo) from this cessation of functions on the part of the court )ith reference to the endin* of the cause that the 6udicial authority terminates by havin* then passed completely to the 79ecutive. 3he particulars of the e9ecution itself, )hich are certainly not al)ays included in the 6ud*ment and )rit of e9ecution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the 6udicial authority, )hile the e9ecutive has no po)er over the person of the convict e9cept to provide for carryin* out of the penalty and to pardon. 4ettin* do)n to the solution of the Cuestion in the case at bar, )hich is that of e9ecution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be reCuested. 3here can be no dispute on this point. ,t is a )ell%/no)n principle that not)ithstandin* the order of e9ecution and the e9ecutory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Dnder the common la) this postponement can be ordered in three )aysB 112 $y command of the Iin*G 1;2 by discretion 1arbitrio2 of the courtG and 1=2 by mandate of the la). ,t is sufficient to state this principle of the common la) to render impossible that assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in 6ail the trial court can not reopen the case to investi*ate the facts that sho) the need for postponement. ,f one of the )ays is by direction of the court, it is ac/no)led*ed that even after the date of the e9ecution has been fi9ed, and not)ithstandin* the *eneral rule that after the 1court2 has performed its ministerial duty of orderin* the e9ecution . . . and its part is ended, if ho)ever a circumstance arises that ou*ht to delay the e9ecution, and there is an imperative duty to investi*ate the emer*ency and to order a postponement. 3hen the Cuestion arises as to )hom the application for postponin* the e9ecution ou*ht to be addressed )hile the circumstances is under investi*ation and so to )ho has 6urisdiction to ma/e the investi*ation. 3he po)er to control the e9ecution of its decision is an essential aspect of 6urisdiction. ,t cannot be the sub6ect of substantial subtraction for our Constitution 7 vests the entirety of 6udicial po)er in one :upreme Court and in such lo)er courts as may be established by la). 3o be sure, the important part of a liti*ation, )hether civil or criminal, is the process of e9ecution of decisions )here supervenin* events may chan*e the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and ad6ust the ri*hts of the liti*ants to prevent unfairness. ,t is because of these unforseen, supervenin* contin*encies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary po)er of control of its processes and orders to ma/e them conformable to la) and 6ustice. 8 5or this purpose, :ection < of Rule 1=5 provides that ")hen by la) 6urisdiction is conferred on a court or 6udicial officer, all au9iliary )rits,

8 processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be follo)ed in the e9ercise of such 6urisdiction is not specifically pointed out by la) or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceedin* may be adopted )hich appears conformable to the spirit of said la) or rules." ,t bears repeatin* that )hat the Court restrained temporarily is the e9ecution of its o)n +ecision to *ive it reasonable time to chec/ its fairness in li*ht of supervenin* events in Con*ress as alle*ed by petitioner. 3he Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a la) enacted by Con*ress.04wphi0.n5t 3he more disCuietin* dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has no 6urisdiction to restrain the e9ecution of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the 6udiciary. :ince the implant of republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded the 6urisdiction to enforce their final decisions. ,n accord )ith this unCuestioned 6urisdiction, this Court promul*ated rules concernin* pleadin*, practice and procedure )hich, amon* others, spelled out the rules on e9ecution of 6ud*ments. 3hese rules are all predicated on the assumption that courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental po)er to control and supervise the process of e9ecution of their decisions. Rule =! *overns e9ecution, satisfaction and effects of 6ud*ments in civil cases. Rule 1;( *overns 6ud*ments in criminal cases. ,t should be stressed that the po)er to promul*ate rules of pleadin*, practice and procedure )as *ranted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the )ords of Justice ,sa*ani Cru> ")ithout independence and inte*rity, courts )ill lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vi*or as champions of 6ustice." 9 0ence, our Constitutions continuously vested this po)er to this Court for it enhances its independence. Dnder the 1!=5 Constitution, the po)er of this Court to promul*ate rules concernin* pleadin*, practice and procedure )as *ranted but it appeared to be co%e9istent )ith le*islative po)er for it )as sub6ect to the po)er of Con*ress to repeal, alter or supplement. 3hus, its :ection 1=, &rticle -,,, providesB :ec.1=. 3he :upreme Court shall have the po)er to promul*ate rules concernin* pleadin*, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of la). :aid rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same *rade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive ri*hts. 3he e9istin* la)s on pleadin*, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, sub6ect to the po)er of the :upreme Court to alter and modify the same. 3he Con*ress have the po)er to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concernin* pleadin*, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of la) in the Philippines. 3he said po)er of Con*ress, ho)ever, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. ,n ,n re Cunanan 11Con*ress in the e9ercise of its po)er to amend rules of the :upreme Court re*ardin* admission to the practice of la), enacted the $ar 5lun/ers &ct of 1!5= 11 )hich considered as a passin* *rade, the avera*e of "(J in the bar e9aminations after July 4, 1!4< up to &u*ust 1!51 and "1J in the 1!5; bar e9aminations. 3his Court struc/ do)n the la) as unconstitutional. ,n his ponencia, #r. Justice +io/no held that " . . . the disputed la) is not a le*islationG it is a 6ud*ment @ a 6ud*ment promul*ated by this Court durin* the aforecited years affectin* the bar candidates concernedG and althou*h this Court certainly can revo/e these 6ud*ments even no), for 6ustifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the le*islative nor e9ecutive department, that may do so. &ny attempt on the part of these department )ould be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case )ith the la) in Cuestion." 123he venerable 6urist further ruledB ",t is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate po)er to *rant license for the practice of la) belon*s e9clusively to this Court, and the la) passed by Con*ress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fi9 the minimum conditions for the license." $y its rulin*, this Court Cualified the absolutist tone of the po)er of Con*ress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concernin* pleadin*, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of la) in the Philippines. 3he rulin* of this Court in ,n re Cunanan )as not chan*ed by the 1!"= Constitution. 5or the 1!"= Constitution reiterated the po)er of this Court "to promul*ate rules concernin* pleadin*, practice and procedure in all courts, . . . )hich, ho)ever, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the $atasan* Pambansa . . . ." #ore completely, :ection 51;25 of its &rticle A providedB 999 999 999 :ec.5. 3he :upreme Court shall have the follo)in* po)ers. 999 999 999 152 Promul*ate rules concernin* pleadin*, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of la), and the inte*ration of the $ar, )hich, ho)ever, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the $atasan* Pambansa. :uch rules shall provide a simplified and ine9pensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same *rade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive ri*hts. .ell )orth notin* is that the 1!"= Constitution further stren*thened the independence of the 6udiciary by *ivin* to it the additional po)er to promul*ate rules *overnin* the inte*ration of the $ar. 1/ 3he 1! " Constitution molded an even stron*er and more independent 6udiciary. &mon* others, it enhanced the rule ma/in* po)er of this Court. ,ts :ection 5152, &rticle -,,, providesB 999 999 999 :ec. 5. 3he :upreme Court shall have the follo)in* po)ersB 999 999 999 152 Promul*ate rules concernin* the protection and enforcement of constitutional ri*hts, pleadin*, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of la), the ,nte*rated $ar, and le*al assistance to the underprivile*ed. :uch rules shall provide a simplified and ine9pensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same *rade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive

9 ri*hts. Rules of procedure of special courts and Cuasi%6udicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the :upreme Court. 3he rule ma/in* po)er of this Court )as e9panded. 3his Court for the first time )as *iven the po)er to promul*ate rules concernin* the protection and enforcement of constitutional ri*hts. 3he Court )as also *ranted for the first time the po)er to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and Cuasi% 6udicial bodies. $ut most importantly, the 1! " Constitution too/ a)ay the po)er of Con*ress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concernin* pleadin*, practice and procedure. ,n fine, the po)er to promul*ate rules of pleadin*, practice and procedure is no lon*er shared by this Court )ith Con*ress, more so )ith the 79ecutive. ,f the manifest intent of the 1! " Constitution is to stren*then the independence of the 6udiciary, it is inutile to ur*e, as public respondents do, that this Court has no 6urisdiction to control the process of e9ecution of its decisions, a po)er conceded to it and )hich it has e9ercised since time immemorial. 3o be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the 6urisdiction of this Court to control and supervise the implementation of its decision in the case at bar. &s aforestated, our +ecision became final and e9ecutory on 'ovember <, 1!! . 3he records reveal that after 'ovember <, 1!! , or on +ecember , 1!! , no less than the :ecretary of Justice reco*ni>ed the 6urisdiction of this Court by filin* a #anifestation and Dr*ent #otion to compel the trial 6ud*e, the 0onorable 3helma &. Ponferrada, R3C, $r. 1(4, Hue>on City to provide him ". . . a certified true copy of the .arrant of 79ecution dated 'ovember 1", 1!! bearin* the desi*nated e9ecution day of death convict 8eo 7che*aray and allo) 1him2 to reveal or announce the contents thereof, particularly the e9ecution date fi9ed by such trial court to the public )hen reCuested." 3he relevant portions of the #anifestation and Dr*ent #otion filed by the :ecretary of Justice beseechin* this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" stateB 999 999 999 5. ,nstead of filin* a comment on Jud*e Ponferrada?s #anifestation ho)ever, herein respondent is submittin* the instant #anifestation and #otion 1a2 to stress, inter alia, that the non%disclosure of the date of e9ecution deprives herein respondent of vital information necessary for the e9ercise of his statutory po)ers, as )ell as renders nu*atory the constitutional *uarantee that reco*ni>es the people?s ri*ht to information of public concern, and 1b2 to as/ this 0onorable Court to provide the appropriate relief. <. 3he non%disclosure of the date of e9ecution deprives herein respondent of vital information necessary for the e9ercise of his po)er of supervision and control over the $ureau of Corrections pursuant to :ection =!, Chapter , $oo/ ,- of the &dministrative Code of 1! ", in relation to 3itle ,,,, $oo/ ,- of such &dministrative Code, insofar as the enforcement of Republic &ct 'o. 1"" and the &mended Rules and Re*ulations to ,mplement Republic &ct 'o. 1"" is concerned and for the dischar*e of the mandate of seein* to it that la)s and rules relative to the e9ecution of sentence are faithfully observed. ". On the other hand, the )illful omission to reveal the information about the precise day of e9ecution limits the e9ercise by the President of e9ecutive clemency po)ers pursuant to :ection 1!, &rticle -,, 179ecutive +epartment2 of the 1! " Philippine Constitution and &rticle 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, )hich provides that the death sentence shall be carried out ")ithout pre6udice to the e9ercise by the President of his e9ecutive po)ers at all times." 17mphasis supplied2 5or instance, the President cannot *rant reprieve, i.e., postpone the e9ecution of a sentence to a day certain 1People v. -era, <5 Phil. 5<, 11( K1!="L2 in the absence of a precise date to rec/on )ith. 3he e9ercise of such clemency po)er, at this time, mi*ht even )or/ to the pre6udice of the convict and defeat the purpose of the Constitution and the applicable statute as )hen the date at e9ecution set by the President )ould be earlier than that desi*nated by the court. . #oreover, the deliberate non%disclosure of information about the date of e9ecution to herein respondent and the public violates :ection ", &rticle ,,, 1$ill of Ri*hts2 and :ection ; , &rticle ,, 1+eclaration of Principles and :tate Policies2 of the 1! " Philippine Constitution )hich readB :ec. ". 3he ri*ht of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be reco*ni>ed. &ccess to official records, and to documents and papers pertainin* to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as )ell as to *overnment research data used as basis for policy development shall, be afforded the citi>en, sub6ect to such limitations as may be provided by la). :ec. ; . :ub6ect to reasonable conditions prescribed by la), the :tate adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involvin* public interest. !. 3he "ri*ht to information" provision is self%e9ecutin*. ,t supplies "the rules by means of )hich the ri*ht to information may be en6oyed 1Cooley, & 3reatise on the Constitutional 8imitations, 1<" K1!";L2 by *uaranteein* the ri*ht and mandatin* the duty to afford access to sources of information. 0ence, the fundamental ri*ht therein reco*ni>ed may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the Constitution )ithout need for any ancillary act of the 8e*islature 1Id., at p. 1<52 .hat may be provided for by the 8e*islature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded )hich must, of necessity, be consistent )ith the declared :tate policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involvin* public interest 1Constitution, &rt. ,,, :ec. ; 2. 0o)ever, it cannot be overemphasi>ed that )hatever limitation may be prescribed by the 8e*islature, the ri*ht and the duty under &rt. ,,,, :ec. " have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the 'e) Charter." 1+ecision of the :upreme Court 6n 7anc in 8e*aspi v. Civil :ervice Commission, 15( :CR& 5=(, 5=4%5=5 K1! "L. 3he same motion to compel Jud*e Ponferrada to reveal the date of e9ecution of petitioner 7che*aray )as filed by his counsel, &tty. 3heodore 3e, on +ecember ", 1!! . 0e invo/ed his client?s ri*ht to due process and the public?s ri*ht to information. 3he :olicitor 4eneral, as counsel for public respondents, did not oppose petitioner?s motion on the *round that this Court has no more 6urisdiction over the process of e9ecution of 7che*aray. 3his Court *ranted the relief prayed for by the :ecretary of Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of +ecember 15, 1!! . 3here )as not

10 a )himper of protest from the public respondents and they are no) estopped from contendin* that this Court has lost its 6urisdiction to *rant said relief. 3he 6urisdiction of this Court does not depend on the convenience of liti*ants. ,, :econd. .e li/e)ise re6ect the public respondents? contention that the "decision in this case havin* become final and e9ecutory, its e9ecution enters the e9clusive ambit of authority of the e9ecutive department . . .. $y *rantin* the 3RO, the 0onorable Court has in effect *ranted reprieve )hich is an e9ecutive function." 14 Public respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, :ection 1!, &rticle -,, of the Constitution )hich readsB 79cept in cases of impeachment, or as other)ise provided in this Constitution, the President may *rant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final 6ud*ment. 0e shall also have the po)er to *rant amnesty )ith the concurrence of a ma6ority of all the members of the Con*ress. 3he te9t and tone of this provision )ill not yield to the interpretation su**ested by the public respondents. 3he provision is simply the source of po)er of the President to *rant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final 6ud*ment. ,t also provides the authority for the President to *rant amnesty )ith the concurrence of a ma6ority of all the members of the Con*ress. 3he provision, ho)ever, cannot be interpreted as denyin* the po)er of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. ,n truth, an accused )ho has been convicted by final 6ud*ment still possesses collateral ri*hts and these ri*hts can be claimed in the appropriate courts. 5or instance, a death convict )ho become insane after his final conviction cannot be e9ecuted )hile in a state of insanity. 10 &s observed by &ntieau, "today, it is *enerally assumed that due process of la) )ill prevent the *overnment from e9ecutin* the death sentence upon a person )ho is insane at the time of e9ecution." 16 3he suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an e9ercise of 6udicial po)er. ,t is not a usurpation of the presidential po)er of reprieve thou*h its effects is the same @ the temporary suspension of the e9ecution of the death convict. ,n the same vein, it cannot be denied that Con*ress can at any time amend R.&. 'o. "<5! by reducin* the penalty of death to life imprisonment. 3he effect of such an amendment is li/e that of commutation of sentence. $ut by no stretch of the ima*ination can the e9ercise by Con*ress of its plenary po)er to amend la)s be considered as a violation of the po)er of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. 3he po)ers of the 79ecutive, the 8e*islative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not e9clude each other for the simple reason that there is no hi*her ri*ht than the ri*ht to life. ,ndeed, in various :tates in the Dnited :tates, la)s have even been enacted e9pressly *rantin* courts the po)er to suspend e9ecution of convicts and their constitutionality has been upheld over ar*uments that they infrin*e upon the po)er of the President to *rant reprieves. 5or the public respondents therefore to contend that only the 79ecutive can protect the ri*ht to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co%eCual and coordinate po)ers of the three branches of our *overnment. ,,, 3hird. 3he Court?s resolution temporarily restrainin* the e9ecution of petitioner must be put in its proper perspective as it has been *rievously distorted especially by those )ho ma/e a livin* by vilifyin* courts. Petitioner filed his -ery Dr*ent #otion for ,ssuance of 3RO on +ecember ; , 1!! at about 11B=( p.m. 0e invo/ed several *rounds, vi!B 112 that his e9ecution has been set on January 4, the first )or/in* day of 1!!!G 1b2 that members of Con*ress had either sou*ht for his e9ecutive clemency andEor revie) or repeal of the la) authori>in* capital punishmentG 1b.12 that :enator &Cuilino Pimentel?s resolution as/in* that clemency be *ranted to the petitioner and that capital punishment be revie)ed has been concurred by thirteen 11=2 other senatorsG 1b.;2 :enate President #arcelo 5ernan and :enator #iriam :. +efensor have publicly declared they )ould see/ a revie) of the death penalty la)G 1b.=2 :enator Paul Roco has also sou*ht the repeal of capital punishment, and 1b.42 Con*ressman :alacrib $aterina, Jr., and thirty five 1=52 other con*ressmen are demandin* revie) of the same la). .hen the -ery Dr*ent #otion )as filed, the Court )as already in its traditional recess and )ould only resume session on January 1 , 1!!!. 7ven then, Chief Justice 0ilario +avide, Jr. called the Court to a :pecial :ession on January 4, 1!!1 17 at 1(. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner?s -ery Dr*ent #otion. 3he Court hardly had five 152 hours to resolve petitioner?s motion as he )as due to be e9ecuted at = p.m. 3hus, the Court had the difficult problem of resolvin* )hether petitioner?s alle*ations about the moves in Con*ress to repeal or amend the +eath Penalty 8a) are mere speculations or not. 3o the Court?s ma6ority, there )ere *ood reasons )hy the Court should not immediately dismiss petitioner?s alle*ations as mere speculations and surmises. 3hey noted that petitioner?s alle*ations )ere made in a pleadin* under oath and )ere )idely publici>ed in the print and broadcast media. ,t )as also of 6udicial notice that the 11th Con*ress is a ne) Con*ress and has no less than one hundred thirty 11=(2 ne) members )hose vie)s on capital punishment are still une9pressed. 3he present Con*ress is therefore different from the Con*ress that enacted the +eath Penalty 8a) 1R.&. 'o. "<5!2 and the 8ethal ,n6ection 8a) 1R.&. 'o. 1""2. ,n contrast, the Court?s minority felt that petitioner?s alle*ations lac/ed clear factual bases. 3here )as hardly a time to verify petitioner?s alle*ations as his e9ecution )as set at = p.m. &nd verification from Con*ress )as impossible as Con*ress )as not in session. 4iven these constraints, the Court?s ma6ority did not rush to 6ud*ment but too/ an e9tremely cautious stance by temporarily restrainin* the e9ecution of petitioner. 3he suspension )as temporary @ "until June 15, 1!!!, coeval )ith the constitutional duration of the present re*ular session of Con*ress, unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the la) is *oin* to be made." 3he e9treme caution ta/en by the Court )as compelled, amon* others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not stoppin* the e9ecution of the petitioner )ill preclude any further relief for all ri*hts stop at the *raveyard. &s life )as at, sta/e, the Court refused to constitutionali>e haste and the hysteria of some partisans. 3he Court?s ma6ority felt it needed the certainty that the le*islature )ill not petitioner as alle*ed by his counsel. ,t )as believed that la) and eCuitable considerations demand no less before allo)in* the :tate to ta/e the life of one its citi>ens. 3he temporary restrainin* order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystalli>ation of the issue )hether Con*ress is disposed to revie) capital punishment. 3he public respondents, thru the :olicitor 4eneral, cite posterior events that ne*ate beyond doubt the possibility that Con*ress )ill repeal or amend the death penalty la). 0e names these supervenin* events as follo)sB 999 999 999 a. b. c. 3he public pronouncement of President 7strada that he )ill veto any la) imposin* the death penalty involvin* heinous crimes. 3he resolution of Con*ressman 4ole>, et al., that they are a*ainst the repeal of the la)G 3he fact that :enator Roco?s resolution to repeal the la) only bears his si*nature and that of :enator Pimentel. 18

,n their :upplemental #otion to Dr*ent #otion for Reconsideration, the :olicitor 4eneral cited 0ouse Resolution 'o. <;! introduced by Con*ressman 4ole> entitled "Resolution e9pressin* the sense of the 0ouse of Representatives to re6ect any move to revie) R.&. 'o. "<5! )hich provided for the

11 reimposition of death penalty, notifyin* the :enate, the Judiciary and the 79ecutive +epartment of the position of the 0ouse of Representative on this matter and ur*in* the President to e9haust all means under the la) to immediately implement the death penalty la)." 3he 4ole> resolution )as si*ned by 11= con*ressman as of January 11, 1!!!. ,n a marathon session yesterday that e9tended up = o?cloc/ in the mornin*, the 0ouse of Representative )ith minor, the 0ouse of Representative )ith minor amendments formally adopted the 4ole> resolution by an over)helmin* vote. 0ouse Resolution 'o. ;5 e9pressed the sentiment that the 0ouse ". . . does not desire at this time to revie) Republic &ct "<5!." ,n addition, the President has stated that he )ill not reCuest Con*ress to ratify the :econd Protocol in revie) of the prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. ,n li*ht of these developments, the Court?s 3RO should no) be lifted as it has served its le*al and humanitarian purpose. & last note. ,n 1!;;, the famous Clarence +arro) predicted that ". . . the Cuestion of capital punishment had been the sub6ect of endless discussion and )ill probably never be settled so lon* as men believe in punishment." 19 ,n our clime and time )hen heinous crimes continue to be unchec/ed, the debate on the le*al and moral predicates of capital punishment has been re*rettably blurred by emotionalism because of the unfalterin* faith of the pro and anti% death partisans on the ri*ht and ri*hteousness of their postulates. 3o be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than an e9chan*e of epithets is healthy in a democracy. $ut )hen the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of )ords that )ound, )hen an*er threatens to turn the ma6ority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the *uarantees of the $ill of Ri*hts to the minority fully hold. &s Justice $rennan reminds us ". . . it is the very purpose of the Constitution @ and particularly the $ill of Ri*hts @ to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political ma6orities." 21 #an has yet to invent a better hatchery of 6ustice than the courts. ,t is a hatchery )here 6ustice )ill bloom only )hen )e can prevent the roots of reason to be blo)n a)ay by the )inds of ra*e. 3he flame of the rule of la) cannot be i*nited by ra*e, especially the ra*e of the mob )hich is the mother of unfairness. 3he business of courts in renderin* 6ustice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only )hen they can be fair to him )ho is momentarily the most hated by society. 21 ,' -,7. .07R7O5, the Court *rants the public respondents? Dr*ent #otion for Reconsideration and :upplemental #otion to Dr*ent #otion for Reconsideration and lifts the 3emporary Restrainin* Order issued in its Resolution of January 4, 1!!!. 3he Court also orders respondent trial court 6ud*e 10on. 3helma &. Ponferrada, Re*ional 3rial Court, Hue>on City, $ranch 1(42 to set ane) the date for e9ecution of the convictEpetitioner in accordance )ith applicable provisions of la) and the Rules of Court, )ithout further delay. :O OR+7R7+. G.R. No. 141024 September 14, 2110 DO6INGO NE45ES, ,*7 FA*STINO, ROGE,IO FA*STINO, ,O,ITO .I3TORIANO, )A3OB OBANIA AND DO6INGO 3ABA3*NGAN, Petitioners, vs. HON. 3O*RT OF A55EA,S, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DE, 6*NDO, $me8%9 FE, 3ORA7ON, )OSEFA, SA,.ADOR $ ' 3AR6EN, $88 "&r $me' DE, 6*NDO, ,AND BAN: OF THE 5HI,I55INES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSA,ES, 5re"i'i ; )&';e, Br$ #! 4/, Re;io $8 Tri$8 3o&rt, Ro<$", Orie t$8 6i 'oro,Respondent. 3ORONA, J.9 Petitioners +omin*o 'eypes, 8u> 5austino, Ro*elio 5austino, 8olito -ictoriano, Jacob Obania and +omin*o Cabacun*an filed an action for annulment of 6ud*ment and titles of land andEor reconveyance andEor reversion )ith preliminary in6unction before the Re*ional 3rial Court, $ranch 4=, of Ro9as, Oriental #indoro, a*ainst the $ureau of 5orest +evelopment, $ureau of 8ands, 8and $an/ of the Philippines and the heirs of $ernardo del #undo, namely, 5e, Cora>on, Josefa, :alvador and Carmen. ,n the course of the proceedin*s, the parties 1both petitioners and respondents2 filed various motions )ith the trial court. &mon* these )ereB 112 the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the $ureau of 8ands and the $ureau of 5orest +evelopment in default and 1;2 the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the 8and $an/ of the Philippines, respectively. ,n an order dated #ay 1<, 1!!", the trial court, presided by public respondent Jud*e &ntonio '. Rosales, resolved the fore*oin* motions as follo)sB 112 the petitionersM motion to declare respondents $ureau of 8ands and $ureau of 5orest +evelopment in default )as *ranted for their failure to file an ans)er, but denied as a*ainst the respondent heirs of del #undo because the substituted service of summons on them )as improperG 1;2 the 8and $an/Ms motion to dismiss for lac/ of cause of action )as denied because there )ere hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial, and 1=2 the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del #undo, based on prescription, )as also denied because there )ere factual matters that could be determined only after trial.1 3he respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denyin* their motion to dismiss on the *round that the trial court could very )ell resolve the issue of prescription from the bare alle*ations of the complaint itself )ithout )aitin* for the trial proper. ,n an order; dated 5ebruary 1;, 1!! , the trial court dismissed petitionersM complaint on the *round that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners alle*edly received a copy of the order of dismissal on #arch =, 1!! and, on the 15th day thereafter or on #arch 1 , 1!! , filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1!! , the trial court issued another order dismissin* the motion for reconsideration = )hich petitioners received on July ;;, 1!! . 5ive days later, on July ;", 1!! , petitioners filed a notice of appeal4 and paid the appeal fees on &u*ust =, 1!! . On &u*ust 4, 1!! , the court a &uo denied the notice of appeal, holdin* that it )as filed ei*ht days late.5 3his )as received by petitioners on July =1, 1!! . Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too )as denied in an order dated :eptember =, 1!! . < -ia a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule <5 of the 1!!" Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of &ppeals.

12 ,n the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. 3hey ar*ued that the 15%day re*lementary period to appeal started to run only on July ;;, 1!! since this )as the day they received the final order of the trial court denyin* their motion for reconsideration. .hen they filed their notice of appeal on July ;", 1!! , only five days had elapsed and they )ere )ell )ithin the re*lementary period for appeal. " On :eptember 1<, 1!!!, the Court of &ppeals 1C&2 dismissed the petition. ,t ruled that the 15%day period to appeal should have been rec/oned from #arch =, 1!! or the day they received the 5ebruary 1;, 1!! order dismissin* their complaint. &ccordin* to the appellate court, the order )as the "final order" appealable under the Rules. ,t held furtherB Perforce the petitionersM tardy appeal )as correctly dismissed for the 1P2erfection of an appeal )ithin the re*lementary period and in the manner prescribed by la) is 6urisdictional and non%compliance )ith such le*al reCuirement is fatal and effectively renders the 6ud*ment final and e9ecutory. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. 3his )as denied by the Court of &ppeals on January <, ;(((. ,n this present petition for revie) under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners ascribe the follo)in* errors alle*edly committed by the appellate courtB , 307 0O'OR&$87 CODR3 O5 &PP7&8: 7RR7+ ,' +,:#,::,'4 307 P73,3,O'7R:M P73,3,O' 5OR C7R3,OR&R, &'+ #&'+&#D: &'+ ,' &55,R#,'4 307 OR+7R O5 307 0O'. JD+47 &'3O',O '. RO:&87: .0,C0 +,:#,::7+ 307 P73,3,O'7R:M &PP7&8 ,' C,-,8 C&:7 'O. C%=< O5 307 R74,O'&8 3R,&8 CODR3, $R&'C0 4=, ROA&:, OR,7'3&8 #,'+ORO, 7-7' &537R 307 P73,3,O'7R: 0&+ P&,+ 307 &PP7&8 +OCI73 577:. ,, 307 0O'OR&$87 CODR3 O5 &PP7&8: 8,I7.,:7 7RR7+ ,' RD8,'4 &'+ &55,R#,'4 307 +7C,:,O' OR OR+7R O5 307 R7:PO'+7'3 0O'. &'3O',O #. RO:&87: 30&3 P73,3,O'7R:M &PP7&8 .&: 5,87+ OD3 O5 3,#7 .07' P73,3,O'7R: R7C7,-7+ 307 8&:3 OR 5,'&8 OR+7R O5 307 CODR3 O' JD8F ;;, 1!! &'+ 5,87+ 307,R 'O3,C7 O5 &PP7&8 O' JD8F ;", 1!! &'+ P&,+ 307 &PP7&8 +OCI73 577 O' &D4D:3 =, 1!! . ,,, 307 0O'OR&$87 CODR3 O5 &PP7&8: 5DR307R 7RR7+ ,' RD8,'4 30&3 307 .OR+: "5,'&8 OR+7R" ,' :7C3,O' =, RD87 41, O5 307 1!!" RD87: O5 C,-,8 PROC7+DR7 .,88 R757R 3O 307 K5,R:3L OR+7R O5 R7:PO'+7'3 JD+47 0O'. &'3O',O #. #OR&87: +&37+ 57$RD&RF 1;, 1!! ,':37&+ O5 307 8&:3 &'+ 5,'&8 OR+7R +&37+ JD8F 1, 1!! COPF O5 .0,C0 .&: R7C7,-7+ $F P73,3,O'7R: 30ROD40 COD':78 O' JD8F ;;, 1!! . ,-. 307 0O'OR&$87 CODR3 O5 &PP7&8: 5,'&88F 7RR7+ ,' 5,'+,'4 30&3 307 +7C,:,O' ,' 307 C&:7 O5 +7':O, ,'C. -. ,&C, 14 :CR& ; (, ,: &PP8,C&$87 ,' 307 ,':3&'3 C&:7 307R7$F ,4'OR,'4 307 P7CD8,&R 5&C3: &'+ C,RCD#:3&'C7: O5 30,: C&:7 &'+ 307 5&C3 30&3 307 :&,+ +7C,:,O' .&: R7'+7R7+ PR,OR 3O 307 7'&C3#7'3 O5 307 1!!" RD87: O5 C,-,8 PROC7+DR7. ! 3he fore*oin* issues essentially revolve around the period )ithin )hich petitioners should have filed their notice of appeal. 5irst and foremost, the ri*ht to appeal is neither a natural ri*ht nor a part of due process. ,t is merely a statutory privile*e and may be e9ercised only in the manner and in accordance )ith the provisions of la). 3hus, one )ho see/s to avail of the ri*ht to appeal must comply )ith the reCuirements of the Rules. 5ailure to do so often leads to the loss of the ri*ht to appeal.1( 3he period to appeal is fi9ed by both statute and procedural rules. $P 1;!,11 as amended, providesB :ec. =!. &ppeals. N 3he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, a)ards, 6ud*ments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen 1152 days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, a)ard, 6ud*ment, or decision appealed from. Provided, ho)ever, that in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be 14 2 forty%ei*ht hours from the notice of 6ud*ment appealed from. 9 9 9 Rule 41, :ection = of the 1!!" Rules of Civil Procedure statesB :7C. =. Period of ordinary appeal. O T!e $ppe$8 "!$88 be t$=e >it!i +i+tee ?10@ '$%" +rom t!e oti#e o+ t!e A&';me t or +i $8 or'er $ppe$8e' +rom. .here a record on appeal is reCuired, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal )ithin thirty 1=(2 days from the notice of 6ud*ment or final order. 3he period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for ne) trial or reconsideration. 'o motion for e9tension of time to file a motion for ne) trial or reconsideration shall be allo)ed. 1emphasis supplied2 $ased on the fore*oin*, an appeal should be ta/en )ithin 15 days from the notice of 6ud*ment or final order appealed from. & final 6ud*ment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leavin* nothin* more for the court to do )ith respect to it. ,t is an ad6udication on the merits )hich, considerin* the evidence presented at the trial, declares cate*orically )hat the ri*hts and obli*ations of the parties areG or it may be an order or 6ud*ment that dismisses an action.1;

13 &s already mentioned, petitioners ar*ue that the order of July 1, 1!! denyin* their motion for reconsideration should be construed as the "final order," not the 5ebruary 1;, 1!! order )hich dismissed their complaint. :ince they received their copy of the denial of their motion for reconsideration only on July ;;, 1!! , the 15%day re*lementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed )hen they filed their notice of appeal on July ;", 1!! . .hat therefore should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of )hich tri**ers the start of the 15%day re*lementary period to appeal P the 5ebruary 1;, 1!! order dismissin* the complaint or the July 1, 1!! order dismissin* the #RQ ,n the recent case of 8uelnan v. V), #hilippines, Inc.,1= the trial court declared petitioner 8uelnan non%suited and accordin*ly dismissed his complaint. Dpon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. .hen the omnibus motion )as filed, 1; days of the 15%day period to appeal the order had lapsed. 0e later on received another order, this time dismissin* his omnibus motion. 0e then filed his notice of appeal. $ut this )as li/e)ise dismissed O for havin* been filed out of time. 3he court a &uo ruled that petitioner should have appealed )ithin 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this )as the final order that )as appealable under the Rules. .e reversed the trial court and declared that it )as the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint )hich constituted the final order as it )as )hat ended the issues raised there. 3his pronouncement )as reiterated in the more recent case of 'pu%an v. )aldeman et al.14 )here )e a*ain considered the order denyin* petitioner &puyanMs motion for reconsideration as the final order )hich finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. $ased on the aforementioned cases, )e sustain petitionersM vie) that the order dated "ul% 0, 0223 den%in their motion for reconsideration )as the final order contemplated in the Rules. .e no) come to the ne9t CuestionB if July 1, 1!! )as the start of the 15%day re*lementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on timeQ Dnder Rule 41, :ection =, petitioners had 05 da%s from notice of /ud ment or final order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the ori*inal appeal period 1#arch 1 , 1!! 2, petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration. &ccordin* to the trial court, the #R only interrupted the runnin* of the 15%day appeal period.15 ,t ruled that petitioners, havin* filed their #R on the last day of the 15%day re*lementary period to appeal, had only one 112 day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their #R. Petitioners, ho)ever, ar*ue that they )ere entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 05 da%s from receipt of the 9final order9 or the order dismissin their motion for reconsideration. ,n 8uelnan and 'pu%an, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. .e ruled there that they only had the remainin* time of the 15%day appeal period to file the notice of appeal. .e consistently applied this rule in similar cases, 1< premised on the lon*%settled doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and )ithin the period permitted by la) is not only mandatory but also 6urisdictional. 1" 3he rule is also founded on deep%seated considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at ris/ of occasional error, the 6ud*ments and a)ards of courts must become final at some definite time fi9ed by la).1 Prior to the passa*e of $P 1;!, Rule 41, :ection = of the 1!<4 Revised Rules of Court readB :ec. =. 0o) appeal is ta/en. @ Appe$8 m$%be t$=e b% "erBi ; &po t!e $'Ber"e p$rt% $ ' +i8i ; >it! t!e tri$8 #o&rt >it!i t!irt% ?/1@ '$%" +rom oti#e o+ or'er or A&';me t, $ oti#e o+ $ppe$8, $ $ppe$8 bo ', $ ' $ re#or' o $ppe$8. 3he time durin* )hich a motion to set aside the 6ud*ment or order or for ne) trial has been pendin* shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the reCuirements of Rule =". $ut )here such motion has been filed durin* office hours of the last day of the period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected )ithin the day follo)in* that in )hich the party appealin* received notice of the denial of said motion.1! 1emphasis supplied2 &ccordin* to the fore*oin* provision, the appeal period previously consisted of =( days. $P 1;!, ho)ever, reduced this appeal period to 15 days. ,n the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial Reor*ani>ation;( that drafted $P 1;!, the raison d: etre behind the amendment )as to shorten the period of appeal;1 and enhance the efficiency and dispensation of 6ustice. .e have since reCuired strict observance of this re*lementary period of appeal. :eldom have )e condoned late filin* of notices of appeal,;; and only in very e9ceptional instances to better serve the ends of 6ustice. ,n (ational ;aterwor<s and $ewera e 'uthorit% and 'uthorit% v. =unicipalit% of -ibmanan ,;= ho)ever, )e declared that appeal is an essential part of our 6udicial system and the rules of procedure should not be applied ri*idly. 3his Court has on occasion advised the lo)er courts to be cautious about not deprivin* a party of the ri*ht to appeal and that every party liti*ant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and 6ust disposition of his cause, free from the constraint of technicalities. ,n de la Rosa v. Court of 'ppeals,;4 )e stated that, as a rule, periods )hich reCuire liti*ants to do certain acts must be follo)ed unless, under e9ceptional circumstances, a delay in the filin* of an appeal may be e9cused on *rounds of substantial 6ustice. 3here, )e condoned the delay incurred by the appealin* party due to stron* considerations of fairness and 6ustice. ,n settin* aside technical infirmities and thereby *ivin* due course to tardy appeals, )e have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the e9traordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. ,n those situations )here technicalities )ere dispensed )ith, our decisions )ere not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by la). $ut )e hasten to add that in those rare cases )here procedural rules )ere not strin*ently applied, there al)ays e9isted a clear need to prevent the commission of a *rave in6ustice. Our 6udicial system and the courts have al)ays tried to maintain a healthy balance bet)een the strict enforcement of procedural la)s and the *uarantee that every liti*ant be *iven the full opportunity for the 6ust and proper disposition of his cause.;5

14 3he :upreme Court may promul*ate procedural rules in all courts.;< ,t has the sole prero*ative to amend, repeal or even establish ne) rules for a more simplified and ine9pensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. ,n the rules *overnin* appeals to it and to the Court of &ppeals, particularly Rules 4;,;" 4=; and 45,;! the Court allo)s e9tensions of time, based on 6ustifiable and compellin* reasons, for parties to file their appeals. 3hese e9tensions may consist of 15 days or more. 3o standardi>e the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford liti*ants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allo) a fresh period of 15 days )ithin )hich to file the notice of appeal in the Re*ional 3rial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissin* a motion for a ne) trial or motion for reconsideration. =( 0enceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 4( *overnin* appeals from the #unicipal 3rial Courts to the Re*ional 3rial CourtsG Rule 4; on petitions for revie) from the Re*ional 3rial Courts to the Court of &ppealsG Rule 4= on appeals from Cuasi%6udicial a*encies =1 to the Court of &ppeals and Rule 45 *overnin* appeals by certiorari to the :upreme Court.=; 3he ne) rule aims to re*iment or ma/e the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denyin* the motion for ne) trial, motion for reconsideration 1)hether full or partial2 or any final order or resolution. .e thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal )ithin the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July ;;, 1!! 1the date of receipt of notice denyin* their motion for reconsideration2. 3his pronouncement is not inconsistent )ith Rule 41, :ection = of the Rules )hich states that the appeal shall be ta/en )ithin 15 days from notice of 6ud*ment or final order appealed from. 3he use of the dis6unctive )ord "or" si*nifies disassociation and independence of one thin* from another. ,t should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in )hich it ordinarily implies. == 0ence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed )ithin 15 days from the notice of 6ud*ment or )ithin 15 days from notice of the "final order," )hich )e already determined to refer to the July 1, 1!! order denyin* the motion for a ne) trial or reconsideration. 'either does this ne) rule run counter to the spirit of :ection =! of $P 1;! )hich shortened the appeal period from =( days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. 3he ori*inal period of appeal 1in this case #arch =%1 , 1!! 2 remains and the reCuirement for strict compliance still applies. .he fresh period of 05 da%s becomes si nificant onl% when a part% opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. ,n this manner, the trial court )hich rendered the assailed decision is *iven another opportunity to revie) the case and, in the process, minimi>e andEor rectify any error of 6ud*ment. .hile )e aim to resolve cases )ith dispatch and to have 6ud*ments of courts become final at some definite time, )e li/e)ise aspire to deliver 6ustice fairly. ,n this case, the ne) period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to )hen the 15%day appeal period should be counted N from receipt of notice of 6ud*ment 1#arch =, 1!! 2 or from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from 1July ;;, 1!! 2. 3o recapitulate, a party liti*ant may either file his notice of appeal )ithin 15 days from receipt of the Re*ional 3rial CourtMs decision or file it )ithin 15 days from receipt of the order 1the "final order"2 denyin* his motion for ne) trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the ne) 15%day period may be availed of onl% if either motion is filedG other)ise, the decision becomes final and e9ecutory after the lapse of the ori*inal appeal period provided in Rule 41, :ection =. Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July ;", 1!! or five days from receipt of the order denyin* their motion for reconsideration on July ;;, 1!! . 0ence, the notice of appeal )as )ell )ithin the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed. =4 .e deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of *enso >#hilippines?, Inc. v. I'C=5 since the Court of &ppeals never even referred to it in its assailed decision. CHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of &ppeals RE.ERSEDand SET ASIDE. &ccordin*ly, let the records of this case be remanded to the Court of &ppeals for further proceedin*s. 'o costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 10909/ O#tober 12, 2116

3O66ISSIONER OF INTERNA, RE.EN*E, petitioner, vs. 6IRANT1 5AGBI,AO 3OR5ORATION ?+ormer8% SO*THERN ENERG4 D*E7ON, IN3.@, respondent. 3HI3OENA7ARIO, J.9 $efore this Court is a Petition for Revie); under Rule 45 of the 1!!" Rules of Civil Procedure assailin* the +ecision,= dated =( July ;((=, of the Court of &ppeals in C&%4.R. :P 'o. <(" =, )hich affirmed in toto the +ecision,4 dated 11 July ;(((, of the Court of 3a9 &ppeals 1C3&2 in C3& Case 'o. 5<5 . 3he C3& partially *ranted the claim of herein respondent #irant Pa*bilao Corporation 1#PC2 for the refund of the input -alue &dded 3a9 1-&32 on its purchase of capital *oods and services for the period 1 &pril 1!!< to =1 +ecember 1!!<, and ordered herein petitioner Commissioner of the $ureau of ,nternal Revenue 1$,R2 to issue a ta9 credit certificate in the amount of P; ,"44,<;<.!5. 3here is no dispute as to the follo)in* facts that *ave rise to the claim for refund of #PC, as found by the C3& 5 N K#PCL is a domestic corporation duly or*ani>ed and e9istin* under and by virtue of the la)s of the Philippines )ith principal office address in Pa*bilao 4rande ,sland, Pa*bilao, Hue>on. ,t is licensed by the :ecurities and 79chan*e Commission to principally en*a*e in the business of po)er *eneration and subseCuent sale thereof 179h. &2. ,t is re*istered )ith the $ureau of ,nternal Revenue as a -&3 re*istered entity )ith Certificate of Re*istration bearin* R+O Control 'o. !<%<((%((;4! , dated January ;<, 1!!<.

15 5or the period &pril 1, 1!!< to +ecember =1, 1!!<, K#PCL seasonably filed its Huarterly -&3 Returns reflectin* an 1sic2 accumulated input ta9es in the amount of P=!,==(,5((. 5 179hs. $, C, and +2. 3hese input ta9es )ere alle*edly paid by K#PCL to the suppliers of capital *oods and services for the construction and development of the po)er *eneratin* plant and other related facilities in Pa*bilao, Hue>on 13:', 'ovember 1<, 1!! , p. 112. Pursuant to the procedures prescribed under Revenue Re*ulations 'o. "%!5, as amended, K#PCL filed on June =(, 1!! , an application for ta9 credit or refund of the aforementioned unutili>ed -&3 paid on capital *oods 179hibit "7"2. .ithout )aitin* for an ans)er from the K$,R CommissionerL, K#PCL filed the instant petition for revie) on July 1(, 1!! , in order to toll the runnin* of the t)o%year prescriptive period for claimin* a refund under the la). ,n ans)er to the Petition, Kthe $,R CommissionerL advanced as special and affirmative defenses that "K#PCL?s claim for refund is still pendin* investi*ation and consideration before the office of Kthe $,R CommissionerL accordin*ly, the filin* of the present petition is prematureG )ell% settled is the doctrine that provisions in ta9 refund and credit are construed strictly a*ainst the ta9payer as they are in the nature of a ta9 e9emptionG in an action for refund or ta9 credit, the ta9payer has the burden to sho) that the ta9es paid )ere erroneously or ille*ally paid and failure to sustain the said burden is fatal to the action for refundG it is incumbent upon K#PCL to sho) that the claim for ta9 credit has been filed )ithin the prescriptive period under the 3a9 CodeG and the ta9es alle*edly paid by K#PCL are presumed to have been collected and received in accordance )ith la) and revenue re*ulations.K"L On July 14, 1!! , )hile the case )as pendin* trial, Revenue Officer, Rosemarie #. -itto, )as assi*ned by Revenue +istrict Officer, #a. 'imfa Penalosa%&sensi, of Revenue +istrict 'o. <( to investi*ate K#PCL?s application for ta9 credit or refund of input ta9es 179hs. 1 and 1%a2. &s a result, a memorandum report, dated &u*ust ;", 1!! , )as submitted recommendin* a favorable action but in a reduced amount of P4!,<1<.4( representin* unapplied input ta9es on capital *oods. 179hs. ;, ;%a, =, and =%a2. K#PCL, due to the voluminous nature of evidence to be presented, availed of the services of an independent Certified Public &ccountant pursuant to C3& Circular 'o. 1%!5, as amended. &s a conseCuence, #r. Ruben R. Rubio, Partner of :4- R Company, )as commissioned to verify the accuracy of K#PCL?s summary of input ta9es 13:', October 15, 1!! , pp. =%52. & report, dated #arch , 1!!!, )as presented statin* the audit procedures performed and the findin* that out of the total claimed input ta9es of P=!,==(,5((. 5, only the sum of P; ,"45,5(;.4( )as properly supported by valid invoices andEor official receipts 179h. 4G see also 3:', #arch =, 1!!!, p. 1;2. 3he C3& ruled in favor of #PC, and declared that #PC had over)helmin*ly proved, throu*h the -&3 invoices and official receipts it had presented, that its purchases of *oods and services )ere necessary in the construction of po)er plant facilities )hich it used in its business of po)er *eneration and sale. 3he ta9 court, ho)ever, reduced the amount of refund to )hich #PC )as entitled, in accordance )ith the follo)in* computation N 3otal amount of the claim for refund 8essB +isallo)ances a. Per independent auditor b. Per C3&?s e9amination P=!,==(,5((. 5 P1(,5 4,!! .45 "5.45

1(,5 5, "=.!( P; ,"44,<;<.!5<

3hus, the dispositive portion of the C3& +ecision," dated 11 July ;(((, reads % CHEREFORE, in vie) of the fore*oin*, K#PCL?s claim for refund is hereby partially GRANTED. K3he $,R CommissionerL is ORDERED to ISS*E & 3&A CR7+,3 C7R3,5,C&37 in the amount of P; ,"44,<;<.!5 representin* input ta9es paid on capital *oods for the period &pril 1, 1!!< to +ecember =1, 1!!<. 3he C3& subseCuently denied the $,R Commissioner?s #otion for Reconsideration in a Resolution, dated =1 &u*ust ;((1. &**rieved, the $,R Commissioner filed )ith the Court of &ppeals a Petition for Revie) ! of the fore*oin* +ecision, dated 11 July ;(((, and Resolution, dated =1 &u*ust ;((1, of the C3&. 'otably, the $,R Commissioner identified and discussed as *rounds 1( for its Petition ar*uments that )ere totally ne) and )ere never raised before the C3&, to )it N 1. R7:PO'+7'3 $7,'4 &' 787C3R,C D3,8,3F, ,3 ,: :D$J7C3 3O 5R&'C0,:7 3&A D'+7R 307' :7C3,O' 11" 1'O. :7C3,O' 11!2 O5 307 3&A CO+7 &'+ 'O3 3O -&8D7 &++7+ 3&A 1-&32. ;. :,'C7 R7:PO'+7'3 ,: 7A7#P3 5RO# -&3, ,3 ,: 'O3 7'3,387+ 3O 307 R75D'+ O5 ,'PD3 -&3 PDR:D&'3 3O :7C3,O' 4.1(=% 1 O5 R7-7'D7 R74D8&3,O': 'O. "%!5. 3he Court of &ppeals found no merit in the $,R Commissioner?s Petition, and in its +ecision, dated =( July ;((=, it pronounced thatB 112 3he $,R Commissioner cannot validly chan*e his theory of the case on appealG 1;2 3he #PC is not a public utility )ithin the contemplation of la)G 1=2 3he sale by #PC of its *enerated po)er to the 'ational Po)er Corporation 1'&POCOR2 is sub6ect to -&3 at >ero percent rateG and 142 3he #PC, as a -&3% re*istered ta9payer, may apply for ta9 credit. &ccordin*ly, the decretal portion of the said +ecision 11 reads as follo)s N CHEREFORE, premises considered, the #etition is DIS6ISSED for lac/ of merit and the assailed 11 July ;((( *ecision of respondent Court in C3& Case 'o. 5<5 is hereby AFFIR6ED in toto. 'o costs. Refusin* to *ive up his cause, the $,R Commissioner filed the present Petition before this Court on the *round that the Court of &ppeals committed reversible error in affirmin* the +ecision of the C3& holdin* respondent entitled to the refund of the amount of P; ,"44,<;<.!5, alle*edly representin*

16 input -&3 on capital *oods and services for the period 1 &pril 1!!< to =1 +ecember 1!!<. 0e ar*ues that 112 3he observance of procedural rules may be rela9ed considerin* that technicalities are not ends in themselves but e9ist to protect and promote the substantive ri*hts of the partiesG and 1;2 & ta9 refund is in the nature of a ta9 e9emption )hich must be construed strictly a*ainst the ta9payer. 0e reiterates his position before the Court of &ppeals that #PC, as a public utility, is e9empt from -&3, sub6ect instead to franchise ta9 and, thus, not entitled to a refund of input -&3 on its purchase of capital *oods and services. 3his Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar. , The general rule is that a party cannot change his theory of the case on appeal. 3o recall, the $,R Commissioner raised in its &ns)er1; before the C3& the follo)in* special and affirmative defenses N =. K#PCL?s claim for refund is still pendin* investi*ation and consideration before the office of Kthe $,R CommissionerL. &ccordin*ly, the present petition is prematureG 4. .ell%settled is the doctrine that provisions in ta9 refund and credit are construed strictly a*ainst the ta9payer as they are in the nature of a ta9 e9emptionG 5. ,n an action for refund or ta9 credit, the ta9payer has the burden to sho) that the ta9es paid )ere erroneously or ille*ally paid and failure to sustain the said burden is fatal to the action for refundG <. ,t is incumbent upon K#PCL to sho) that the claim for ta9 credit has been filed )ithin the prescriptive period under the ta9 codeG ". 3he ta9es alle*edly paid by K#PCL are presumed to have been collected and received in accordance )ith la) and revenue re*ulations. 3hese appear to be *eneral and standard ar*uments used by the $,R to oppose any claim by a ta9payer for refund. 3he &ns)er did not posit any alle*ation or contention that )ould defeat the particular claim for refund of #PC. 3rial proper ensued before the C3&, durin* )hich the #PC presented evidence of its entitlement to the refund and in ne*ation of the afore%cited defenses of the $,R Commissioner. ,t )as only after the C3& promul*ated its +ecision on 11 July ;(((, )hich )as favorable to #PC and adverse to the $,R Commissioner, that the latter filed his Petition for Revie) before the Court of &ppeals on 4 October ;(((, averrin*, for the very first time, that #PC )as a public utility, sub6ect to franchise ta9 and not -&3G and since it )as not payin* -&3, it could not claim the refund of input -&3 on its purchase of capital *oods and services. 3here is a palpable shift in the $,R Commissioner?s defense a*ainst the claim for refund of #PC and an evident chan*e of theory. $efore the C3&, the $,R Commissioner admitted that the #PC is a -&3%re*istered ta9payer, but char*ed it )ith the burden of provin* its entitlement to refund. 0o)ever, before the Court of &ppeals, the $,R Commissioner, in effect denied that the #PC is sub6ect to -&3, ma/in* an affirmative alle*ation that it is a public utility liable, instead, for franchise ta9. ,rrefra*ably, the $,R Commissioner raised for the first time on appeal Cuestions of both fact and la) not ta/en up before the ta9 court, an actuality )hich the $,R Commissioner himself does not deny, but he ar*ues that he should be allo)ed to do so as an e9ception to the technical rules of procedure and in the interest of substantial 6ustice. ,t is already )ell%settled in this 6urisdiction that a party may not chan*e his theory of the case on appeal. 1= :uch a rule has been e9pressly adopted in Rule 44, :ection 15 of the 1!!" Rules of Civil Procedure, )hich provides N :7C. 15. 8uestions that ma% be raised on appeal. N .hether or not the appellant has filed a motion for ne) trial in the court belo), he may include in his assi*nment of errors any Cuestion of la) or fact that has been raised in the court belo) and )hich is )ithin the issues framed by the parties. 3hus, in Carantes v. Court of 'ppeals,14 this Court emphasi>ed that N 3he settled rule is that defenses not pleaded in the ans)er may not be raised for the first time on appeal. & party cannot, on appeal, chan*e fundamentally the nature of the issue in the case. .hen a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the court belo), he )ill not be permitted to chan*e the same on appeal, because to permit him to do so )ould be unfair to the adverse party. ,n the more recent case of =on v. Court of 'ppeals,15 this Court a*ain pronounced that, in this 6urisdiction, the settled rule is that a party cannot chan*e his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal. ,t affirms that "courts of 6ustice have no 6urisdiction or po)er to decide a Cuestion not in issue." 3hus, a 6ud*ment that *oes beyond the issues and purports to ad6udicate somethin* on )hich the court did not hear the parties, is not only irre*ular but also e9tra6udicial and invalid. 3he rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play. 3he $,R Commissioner pleads )ith this Court not to apply the fore*oin* rule to the instant case, for a rule on technicality should not defeat substantive 6ustice. 3he $,R Commissioner apparently for*ets that there are specific reasons )hy technical or procedural rules are imposed upon the courts, and that compliance )ith these rules, should still be the *eneral course of action. 0ence, this Court has e9pounded that N Procedural rules, )e must stress, should be treated )ith utmost respect and due re*ard since they are desi*ned to facilitate the ad6udication of cases to remedy the )orsenin* problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of 6ustice. 3he reCuirement is in pursuance to the bill of ri*hts inscribed in the Constitution )hich *uarantees that "all persons shall have a ri*ht to the speedy disposition of their cases before all 6udicial, Cuasi%6udicial and administrative bodies." 3he ad6udicatory bodies and the parties to a case are thus en6oined to abide strictly by the rules. .hile it is true that a liti*ation is not a *ame of technicalities, it is eCually true that every case must be prosecuted in

17 accordance )ith the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of 6ustice. 3here have been some instances )herein this Court allo)ed a rela9ation in the application of the rules, but this fle9ibility )as "never intended to for*e a bastion for errin* liti*ants to violate the rules )ith impunity." & liberal interpretation and application of the rules of procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases and under 6ustifiable causes and circumstances.1< 3he courts have the po)er to rela9 or suspend technical or procedural rules or to e9cept a case from their operation )hen compellin* reasons so )arrant or )hen the purpose of 6ustice reCuires it. .hat constitutes *ood and sufficient cause that )ould merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the courts.1" ,n his Petition and #emorandum before this Court, the $,R Commissioner made no attempt to provide reasonable e9planation for his failure to raise before the C3& the issue of #PC bein* a public utility sub6ect to franchise ta9 rather than -&3. 3he $,R Commissioner ar*ues, in a sin*ular para*raph in his Petition,1 subseCuently reproduced in his #emorandum,1! that the Court of &ppeals should have ta/en co*ni>ance of the said issue, althou*h it )as raised for the first time on appeal, entirely on the basis of this Court?s rulin* in $% v. Court of 'ppeals.;( 0e contends that N 3he submission fails to ta/e into account that althou*h this 0onorable Court has repeatedly ruled that liti*ants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this )ould contravene the basic rules of 6ustice and fair play, the observance of procedural rules may be rela9ed, notin* that technicalities are not ends in themselves but e9ist to protect and promote the substantive ri*hts of the liti*ants 1 S% B. 3o&rt o+ Appe$8",==( :CR& 5"( K;(((L2. 3his Court is unconvinced. 3here is no sufficient cause to )arrant the rela9ation of technical or procedural rules in the instant case. 3he *eneral rules of procedure still apply and the $,R Commissioner cannot be allo)ed to raise an issue for the first time on appeal. ,t should be emphasi>ed that the $,R Commissioner is invo/in* a suspension of the *eneral rules of procedure or an e9ception thereto, thus, it is incumbent upon him to present sufficient cause or 6ustifiable circumstance that )ould Cualify his case for such a suspension or e9ception. 3hat this Court had previously allo)ed in another case such suspension of or e9ception to technical or procedural rules does not necessarily mean that the same shall also be allo)ed in the present case. 3he $,R Commissioner has the burden of persuadin* this Court that the same causes or circumstances that 6ustified the suspension of or e9ception to the technical or procedural rules in the other case are also present in the case at bar. 3he $% case, on )hich the $,R Commissioner fully anchored his claim for suspension of or e9ception to the technical or procedural rules, is not even on all fours )ith his case. ,t involves a petition for declaration of nullity of marria*e instituted by the therein petitioner 5ilipina :y before the Re*ional 3rial Court 1R3C2 on the basis of the alle*ed psycholo*ical incapacity of her husband, 5ernando :y. 0er petition )as denied by the R3C because it found that 5ernando?s acts did not constitute psycholo*ical incapacity, a findin* later affirmed by the Court of &ppeals. ,n an appeal by certiorari before this Court, 5ilipina raised the issue that her marria*e to 5ernando )as void from the very be*innin* for lac/ of a marria*e license at the time of the ceremony. 3his Court too/ co*ni>ance of the said issue, reversed the R3C and the Court of &ppeals, and ruled in favor of 5ilipina. ,ts ratiocination on the matter is reproduced in full belo) N Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marria*e bein* void for lac/ of a valid marria*e license at the time of its celebration. ,t appears that, accordin* to her, the date of the actual celebration of their marria*e and the date of issuance of their marria*e certificate and marria*e license are different and incon*ruous. &lthou*h )e have repeatedly ruled that liti*ants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this )ould contravene the basic rules of fair play and 6ustice, in a number of instances, )e have rela9ed observance of procedural rules, notin* that technicalities are not ends in themselves but e9ist to protect and promote substantive ri*hts of liti*ants. .e said that certain rules ou*ht not to be applied )ith severity and ri*idity if by so doin*, the very reason for their e9istence )ould be defeated. 0ence, )hen substantial 6ustice plainly reCuires, e9emptin* a particular case from the operation of technicalities should not be sub6ect to cavil. ,n our vie), the case at bar reCuires that )e address the issue of the validity of the marria*e bet)een 5ilipina and 5ernando )hich petitioner claims is void from the be*innin* for lac/ of a marria*e license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent conflict between the parties. ote, however, that here the pertinent facts are not disputed! and what is re"uired now is a declaration of their effects according to e#isting law. ;1 K7mphasis supplied.L ,n the instant case, the conflict bet)een the #PC and the $,R Commissioner could be hardly described as "deeply seated and violent," it remainin* on a professional level. #oreover, this Court pointed out in the $% case that the pertinent facts, i.e., the dates of actual celebration of the marria*e, issuance of the marria*e certificate, and issuance of the marria*e license, )ere undisputed. 3he same cannot be said in the case at bar. 3hat #PC is a public utility is not an undisputed factG on the contrary, the determination thereof *ives rise to a multitude of other Cuestions of fact and la). ,t is a mere deduction on the part of the $,R Commissioner that since the #PC is en*a*ed in the *eneration of po)er, it is a public utility. 3he #PC contests this ar*uin* that it is not a public utility because it sells its *enerated po)er to '&POCOR e9clusively, and not to the *eneral public. ,t asserts that it is sub6ect to -&3 and that its sale of *enerated electricity to '&POCOR is sub6ect to >ero%rated -&3. :ubstantial 6ustice, in such a case, reCuires not the allo)ance of issues raised for the first time on appeal, but that the issue of )hether #PC is a public utility, and the correlated issue of )hether #PC is sub6ect to -&3 or franchise ta9, be raised and threshed out in the first opportunity before the C3& so that either party )ould have fully presented its evidence and le*al ar*uments in support of its position and to contravene or rebut those of the opposin* party. ,n 'tlas Consolidated =inin @ *evelopment Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,;; this Court held that it )as too late for the $,R Commissioner to raise an issue of fact of payment for the first time in his memorandum in the C3& and in his appeal to this Court. ,f raised earlier, the matter ou*ht to have been seriously delved into by the C3&. On this *round, this Court )as of the opinion that under all the attendant circumstances of the case, substantial 6ustice )ould be served if the $,R Commissioner be held as precluded from attemptin* to raise the issue at this sta*e. 5ailure to assert a Cuestion )ithin a reasonable time )arrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.

18 3herefore, the Court of &ppeals correctly refused to consider the issues raised by the $,R Commissioner for the first time on appeal. ,ts discussion on )hether the #PC is a public utility and )hether it is sub6ect to -&3 or franchise ta9 is nothin* more than obiter dictum. ,t is best not at all to discuss these issues for they do not simply involve Cuestions of la), but also closely%related Cuestions of fact;= )hich neither the Court of &ppeals nor this Court could presume or *arner from the evidence on record. ,, $nput %AT on capital goods and services may be the subject of a claim for refund. 3he #PC bases its claim for refund of its input -&3 on :ection 1(<1b2 of the 3a9 Code of 1! <, as amended by Republic &ct 'o. ""1<, ;4 )hich provides N :ec. 1(<. Refunds or ta+ credits of creditable input ta+. N 9999 1b2 Capital oods. % & -&3%re*istered person may apply for the issuance of a ta9 credit certificate or refund of input ta9es paid on capital *oods imported or locally purchased, to the e9tent that such input ta9es have not been applied a*ainst output ta9es. 3he application may be made only )ithin t)o 1;2 years, after the close of the ta9able Cuarter )hen the importation or purchase )as made. Capital *oods or properties, as defined in Revenue Re*ulations 'o. "%!5, the implementin* rules on -&3, are "*oods and properties )ith estimated useful life *reater than one year and )hich are treated as depreciable assets under :ection ;!1f2, used directly or indirectly in the production or sale of ta9able *oods or services.";5 Contrary to the ar*ument of the $,R Commissioner, input -&3 on capital *oods is amon* those e9pressly reco*ni>ed as creditable input ta9 by :ection 1(41a2 of the 3a9 Code of 1! <, as amended by Rep. &ct 'o. ""1<,;< to )it N :ec. 1(4. .a+ Credits. % 1a2 Creditable input ta+. % &ny input ta9 evidenced by a -&3 invoice or official receipt issued in accordance )ith :ection 1( hereof on the follo)in* transactions shall be creditable a*ainst the output ta9B 112 Purchase or importation of *oodsB 1&2 5or saleG or 1$2 5or conversion into or intended to form part of a finished product for sale includin* pac/in* materialsG or 1C2 5or use as supplies in the course of businessG or 1+2 5or use as materials supplied in the sale of serviceG or 172 &or use in trade or business for which deduction for depreciation or amorti'ation is allowed under this (ode, e#cept automobiles, aircraft and yachts. K7mphasis supplied.L 3hus, *oods and properties used by the ta9payer in its -&3%ta9able business, sub6ect to depreciation or amorti>ation in accordance )ith the 3a9 Code, are considered capital *oods. ,nput -&3 on the purchase of such capital *oods is creditable a*ainst the ta9payer?s output -&3. 3he ta9payer is further *iven the option, under :ection 1(<1b2 of the 3a9 Code of 1! <, as amended by Republic &ct 'o. ""1<, to claim refund of the input -&3 on its capital *oods, but only to the e9tent that the said input -&3 has not been applied to its output -&3. 3his Court, li/e)ise, )ill not *ive credence to the $,R Commissioner?s contention that the claim for refund of input -&3 on capital *oods by the #PC should be denied for the latter?s failure to comply )ith the reCuirements for the refund of input -&3 credits on >ero%rated sales provided in :ection 1< of Revenue Re*ulations 'o. 5% ", as amended by Revenue Re*ulations 'o. =% . 3he $,R Commissioner is apparently confused. #PC is claimin* refund of the input -&3 it has paid on the purchase of capital goods, it is not claimin* refund of its input -&3 credits attributable to its 'ero)rated sales. 3hese are t)o different input -&3 credits, arisin* from distinct transactions, althou*h both may be the sub6ect of claims for refund by the ta9payer. ;" ,ndeed, the very same re*ulation invo/ed by the $,R Commissioner, Revenue Re*ulations 'o. 5% ", as amended, distin*uishes bet)een these t)o refundable input -&3 credits and discusses them in t)o separate para*raphsB :ection 1<1a2 on >ero%rated sales of *oods and services, and :ection 1<1b2 on capital *oods. ,t is also )orth notin* that Revenue Re*ulations 'o. "%!5, issued on ! +ecember 1!!5, )hich consolidated all -&3 re*ulations, already superseded Revenue Re*ulations 'o. 5% ". :till, Revenue Re*ulations 'o. "%!5 maintains the distinction bet)een these t)o input -&3 credits, discussin* the >ero%rated sales of *oods or properties or services in :ection 4.1(<%11a2, and capital *oods in :ection 4.1(<%11b2. 0ence, the present claim for refund of input -&3 on capital *oods filed by #PC need not comply )ith the reCuirements for refund of input -&3 attributable to >ero%rated sales. ,,, There is no reason for this (ourt to disturb the findings of fact of the (TA, as affirmed by the (ourt of Appeals.

19 .hile it is true, as the $,R Commissioner alle*es, that the #PC has the burden of provin* that it is entitled to the refund it is claimin* for, both the C3& and Court of &ppeals had ruled that the #PC presented substantial evidence to support its claim for refund of its input -&3 on capital *oods and services in the amount ofP; ,"44,<;<.!5. 3he C3& found that #PC is re*istered as a -&3%ta9payer, as evidenced by its Certificate of Re*istration, issued by the $,R Revenue +istrict Office 1R+O2 'o. <(, on ;< January 1!!<. 3he $,R Commissioner does not contest this fact, and does not offer any e9planation as to )hy the $,R R+O had approved the re*istration of #PC as a -&3%ta9payer )hen, as the $,R Commissioner is no) assertin*, the #PC is not sub6ect to -&3 but to franchise ta9. 3he #PC had been filin* its -&3 Huarterly Returns, includin* those for the period covered by its claim for refund, 1 &pril 1!!< to =1 +ecember 1!!<, reportin* and reflectin* therein the input -&3 it had paid on its purchase of capital *oods and services. 3hese capital *oods and services )ere necessary in the construction of the po)er plant facilities used by #PC in electric po)er *eneration. 3he -&3 invoices and receipts submitted by #PC, in support of its claim for refund, had been e9amined and evaluated by an independent auditor, as )ell as by the C3& itself. 3hus, from the ori*inal amount ofP=!,==(,5((. 5 claimed by #PC for refund, the independent auditor, :4- R Co., found only the sum ofP; ,"45,5(;.4( sufficiently supported by valid invoices andEor official receipts. 5ollo)in* its o)n e9amination and evaluation of the evidence submitted, the C3& further reduced the amount refundable to P; ,"44,<;<.!5 after disallo)in* the input -&3 on the purchase of "9ero9 and office supplies )hich cannot be capitali>ed and not necessary in the construction of po)er plant facilities." ; ,t is )orth notin* that the fore*oin* findin*s by the C3& )ere affirmed in totality by the Court of &ppeals. 8i/e)ise, this Court finds no reason to disturb the fore*oin* findin*s of the ta9 court. &nother )ell%settled principle in this 6urisdiction is that this Court is bound by the findin*s of fact of the C3&. Only errors of la), and not rulin*s on the )ei*ht of evidence, are revie)able by this Court. 5indin*s of fact of the C3& are not to be disturbed unless clearly sho)n to be unsupported by substantial evidence.;! Huite the reverse, the claim of #PC for refund of input -&3 on its purchase of capital *oods and services in the present case is found to be supported by substantial evidence, not 6ust by the C3&, but also by the Court of &ppeals. 3he $,R Commissioner failed to convince this Court other)ise. ,The *$+ should seriously study and consider each and every application for claim for refund pending before it. &s a final point, this Court )ould li/e to call the attention of the $,R Commissioner, as )ell as the responsible $,R officers, to seriously study and consider each and every application for claim for refund filed before their office. ,t is very obvious to this Court that the &ns)er filed by the $,R Commissioner before the Court of &ppeals, )hich it essentially reproduced as its #emorandum before the same court, presented *eneral and pro forma ar*uments. 3he $,R Commissioner only raised belatedly before the Court of &ppeals the issues of )hether #PC is a public utility and )hether it is sub6ect to franchise ta9 and not -&3. 7ven then, his Petition for Revie) before the appellate court, numberin* only si9 pa*es, )ith only one pa*e devoted to a discussion of the merits of his Petition, left much to be desired and )ould hardly persuade any court. :ince he represents the interest of the *overnment in ta9 cases, the $,R Commissioner should e9ert more effort and e9ercise more dili*ence in preparin* his pleadin*s before any courtG he should not )ait to do so only upon appeal of his case to the hi*her court. 3his Court may not al)ays be inclined to allo) him to remedy his past la9ity. IN .IEC OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. 3he +ecision, dated =( July ;((=, of the Court of &ppeals in C&%4.R. :P 'o. <(" =, )hich affirmed in toto the +ecision, dated 11 July ;(((, of the C3& in C3& Case 'o. 5<5 , is hereby AFFIR6ED. 3he $,R Commissioner is hereby ORDERED to issue in favor of #PC a ta9 credit certificate in the amount of P; ,"44,<;<.!5 representin* input -&3 paid on capital *oods and services for the period of 1 &pril 1!!< to =1 +ecember 1!!<. 'o pronouncement as to costs. :O OR+7R7+. G.R. No. 167471 Febr&$r% 0, 2117

G,I3ERIA SAR6IENTO, Petitioner, vs. E6ERITA 7ARATAN, Respondent. 3HI3OENA7ARIO, J.: 3his petition for Revie) on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court see/s to nullify the Court of &ppeals +ecision 1 in C&%4.R. :P 'o. "!((1 entitled, "7merita Saratan v. 0on. Ramon &. Cru>, as Presidin* Jud*e of R3C, Hue>on City, $ranch ;;=, and 4liceria :armiento," dated 1" &u*ust ;((4, )hich reversed and set side the Orders dated 1! June ;((= and =1 July ;((= of the Re*ional 3rial Court 1R3C2 of Hue>on City in Civil Case 'o. H%(=% 4!4=", dismissin* respondentMs appeal for failure to file the memorandum )ithin the period provided for by la). On ; :eptember ;((;, petitioner 4liceria :armiento filed an e6ectment case; a*ainst respondent 7merita Saratan, in the #etropolitan 3rial Court 1#e3C2 of Hue>on City, $ranch =<, doc/eted as Civil Case 'o. ;!1(!. On =1 #arch ;((=, the #e3C rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of )hich readsB .07R75OR7, the Court finds that plaintiff has sufficiently established her causes a*ainst the defendant and hereby order the defendant and all persons claimin* ri*hts under herB 1. to pay plaintiff the monthly rentals of P=,5((.(( for the said premises from &u*ust 1, ;((; until defendant vacates the premisesG ;. to pay plaintiff the sum of P;(,(((.(( plus P1,5((.(( per appearance of counsel in court, as and for attorneyMs feesG and

20 to pay the cost of suit.= Respondent filed her notice of appeal.4 3hereafter, the case )as raffled to the R3C of Hue>on City, $ranch ;;=, doc/eted as Civil Case 'o. H%(=%4!4=". ,n the 'otice of &ppealed Case,5 the R3C directed respondent to submit her memorandum in accordance )ith the provisions of :ection "1b2 of Rule 4( of the Rules of Court and petitioner to file a reply memorandum )ithin 15 days from receipt. RespondentMs counsel havin* received the notice on 1! #ay ;((=, he had until = June ;((= )ithin )hich to file the reCuisite memorandum. $ut on = June ;((=, he filed a #otion for 79tension of 3ime of five days due to his failure to finish the draft of the said #emorandum. 0e cited as reasons for the delay of filin* his illness for one )ee/, lac/ of staff to do the )or/ due to storm and flood compounded by the *roundin* of the computers because the )irin*s *ot )et.< $ut the motion remained unacted. On ! June ;((=, respondent filed her #emorandum. On 1! June ;((=, the R3C dismissed the appeal as follo)sB Record sho)s that defendant%appellant received the 'otice of &ppealed Case, throu*h counsel, on #ay 1!, ;((= 1Re*istry Return Receipt dated #ay 1;, ;((=, Record, bac/ of p. ;! 2. 3hus, under :ection "1b2, Rule 4( of the 1!!" Rules of Civil Procedure, she had fifteen 1152 days or until June =, ;((= )ithin )hich to submit a memorandum on appeal. &s further appears on record, ho)ever, the reCuired #emorandum )as filed by defendant%appellant only on June !, ;((= 1Record, p. <;=2, or si9 1<2 days beyond the e9piration of the aforesaid fifteen day period. ,t should be stressed that )hile the rules should be liberally construed, the provisions on re*lemenatry periods are strictly applied as they are "deemed indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and necessary to the orderly and speedy dischar*e of 6udicial business" 18e*aspi%:antos vs. Court of &ppeals, 4.R. 'o. <(5"", October 11, 1! =2 and strict compliance there)ith is mandatory and imperative 15JR 4arments ,ndustries vs. Court of &ppeals, 4.R. 'o. 8%4!=;!, June ;!, 1! 42. 3he same is true )ith respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfectin* appeals 14utierre> vs. Court of &ppeals, 8%;5!";, 'ovember ;<, 1!< 2. Premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby +,:#,::7+. 3his renders academic defendant%appellantMs application for a )rit of preliminary in6unction." 0awphi0.net On the basis of the above%Cuoted Order, petitioner filed a #otion for ,mmediate 79ecution, )hile respondent moved for the Reconsideration.! $oth motions )ere denied by the R3C on =1 July ;((=. 3he Order in part readsB ,n the main, defendant%appellants #otion for Reconsideration is premised on the ar*ument that she filed a timely "#otion for 79tension of 3ime 3o 5ile #emorandum," dated and filed on June =, ;((=, but that her motion )as not acted upon by this Court. :he adds that her appeal memorandum )as filed )ell )ithin the period sou*ht by her in her "#otion for 79tension of 3ime to 5ile #emorandum" so that her appeal should not have been dismissed. 3he ar*ument is )ithout merit. 3his Court did not ta/e co*ni>ance of defendant%appellantMs "#otion for 79tension of 3ime to 5ile #emorandum," and ri*htly so, because it did not contain a notice of hearin* as reCuired by :ections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, an omission for )hich it could offer no e9planation. &s declared in the case of 4o>on, et al. v. court of &ppeals 14.R. 'o. 1(5" 1, June 1", 1!!=2G 999 ,t is )ell%entrenched in this 6urisdiction that a motion does not meet the reCuirements of :ections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a )orthless piece of paper )hich the cler/ has no ri*ht to receive, and the court has no authority to act upon. 999 #oreover, parties and counsel should not assume that courts are bound to *rant the time they pray for. & motion that is not acted upon in due time is deemed denied 1Orosa vs. Court of &ppeals, ;<1 :CR& ="< K1!!<L2. 3hus, defendant%appellantMs appeal )as properly dismissed on account of her failure to file an appeal memorandum )ithin the fifteen 1152 day period provided under :ection "1b2, Rule 4( of the 1!!" Rules of Civil Procedure. .ith re*ard to the "#otion for ,mmediate 79ecution," dated June ;=, ;((=, filed by plaintiff%appellee, the rule is e9plicit that the e9ecution of a 6ud*ment in an e6ectment case, must be sou*ht )ith the inferior court )hich rendered the same. 3he appellate court )hich affirms a decision brou*ht before it on appeal cannot decree its e9ecution in the *uise of an e9ecution of the affirmin* decision. 3he only e9ception is )hen said appellate court *rants an e9ecution pendin* appeal, )hich is not the case herein 1City of #anila vs. Court of &ppeals, ;(4 :CR& =<;G :y vs. Romero, ;14 :CR& 1 "2. 1( Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said Order, )hile respondent sou*ht clarification on )hether the =1 July ;((= Order dismissin* the appeal )as anchored on :ection 1b2, Rule 4( or :ection "1c2 of the same Rule. On ;" &u*ust ;((=, the R3C reconsidered its previous Order by *rantin* petitionerMs motion for ,mmediate 79ecution, but denied respondentMs #otion for Clarification, in this )iseB :ection ;1, Rule "( of the Rules of Court provides that "the 6ud*ment of the Re*ional 3rial Court a*ainst the defendant shall be immediately e9ecutory, )ithout pre6udice to a further appeal that may be ta/en therefrom. Pursuant to this Rule and ta/in* into account the ar*uments of the plaintiff in her "Dr*ent #otion for Reconsideration," the Court is inclined to *rant the same. &s further correctly ar*ued by the plaintiff, throu*h counsel, durin* the hearin* on her motion on &u*ust 15, ;((=, the cases of City of #anila v. Court of &ppeals 1;(4 :CR& =<;2 and :y vs. Romero 1;14 :CR& 1 "2 cited in the July =1, ;((= Order refer to e6ectment cases )hich has 1sic2 been decided )ith finality and hence, inapplicable to this case )here a further appeal is still available to the defendant. ,t should li/e)ise be noted that )hile the :upreme Court ruled in these cases that e9ecution of a 6ud*ment in an e6ectment

21 case must be sou*ht )ith the inferior court )hich rendered the same, it li/e)ise provided that for an e9ception to this rule, that is, in cases )here the appellate court *rants an e9ecution pendin* appeal, as the case herein. .ith re*ard to defendantMs #otion for Clarification, contained in her Opposition, the Court notes that the issues raised therein have already been sCuarely dealt )ith in the July =1, ;((= Order. 3he same must, therefore, be denied.11 &**rieved, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of &ppeals, )hich )as *ranted in a decision dated 1" &u*ust ;((4. 3he appellate court nullified and set aside the 1! June ;((= and =1 July ;((= Orders of the R3C and ordered the reinstatement of respondentMs appeal. ConseCuently, respondentMs appeal memorandum )as admitted and the case remanded to the R3C for further proceedin*s.1; Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration1= on 1= :eptember ;((4, follo)ed by a #otion for ,nhibition14 of the members of the 7i*hth +ivision of the Court of &ppeals on ;( :eptember ;((4. $oth motions )ere denied for lac/ of merit on 1( #arch ;((5.15 0ence, this appeal by petitioner posin* the follo)in* issues,1< thusB 1. .hether respondentMs petition for certiorari should have been dismissed in the first placeG ;. .hether the trial court committed *rave abuse of discretion in denyin* respondentMs motion for e9tensionG =. .hether it is :ection 1! of Rule " that applies, and not :ection ;1G and 4. .hether the Court of &ppeals Justices should have inhibited themselves from further proceedin* )ith the sub6ect case. :tated other)ise, the main issue for resolution is )hether the Court of &ppeals committed a reversible error of la) in *rantin* the .rit of Certiorari. ,n *rantin* the petition, the Court of &ppeals ruled that the R3C erred in dismissin* respondentMs appeal for failure to file the reCuired #emorandum )ithin the period provided by la) and in *rantin* petitionerMs #otion for ,mmediate 79ecution of the #e3C decision. $efore resolvin* the substantive issues raised by petitioner, the Court )ill first address the procedural infirmities ascribed by petitioner. Petitioner assails the correctness and propriety of the remedy resorted to by respondent by filin* a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of &ppeals. &ccordin* to petitioner, certiorari is not appropriate and unavailin* as the proper remedy is an appeal. ,t must be noted that respondentMs appeal in the R3C )as dismissed for failure to file the reCuired memorandum )ithin the period allo)ed by la), as the #otion for 79tension of 3ime to file #emorandum )as not acted upon for failure to attach a notice of hearin*. 5rom the said dismissal, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of &ppeals. Respondent correctly filed said petition pursuant to :ection 41 of the Rules of Court, )hich providesB :ection 1. :ub6ect of appeal. &n appeal may be ta/en from a 6ud*ment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein )hen declared by these Rules to be appealable. 'o appeal may be ta/enB 9999 1d2 &n order disallo)in* or dismissin* an appealG 9999 ,n all the above instances )here the 6ud*ment or final order is not appealable, the a**rieved party may file an appropriate civil action under Rule <5. 1Dnderscorin* supplied.2 Petitioner also contends that the Petition for Certiorari filed in the Court of &ppeals should be dismissed as the certification of non%forum shoppin* )as defective. 3he verification in part readsB ,, 7#7R,3& S&R&3&', of le*al a*e, after havin* been duly s)orn to, accordin* to la), depose and sayB 3hat ,, 7merita Saratan is one of the respondent 1sic2 in the above entitled case, hereby declare, that , have caused the preparation and filin* of the fore*oin* Comment on the PetitionG that , have read all the alle*ations therein, )hich are true and correct to the best of my o)n /no)led*e. 3hat as respondent, , further certify that , have not commenced any other action or proceedin* involvin* the same issues in the fore*oin* Petition in the Court of &ppeals, the :upreme Court, or different +ivisions thereof, respectively, or any tribunal, or a*encyG and should it be /no)n that a similar action or proceedin* has been filed or is pendin* in any of the abovementioned Courts or different +ivisions thereof, the petitioner shall notify the 0onorable Court to )hich this certification is filed, )ithin five 152 days from such notice. 1Dnderscorin* ours.2

22 Petitioner avers that respondent by statin* in the above%Cuoted certification that she )as the respondent, )hile in truth she )as the petitioner and by statin* that respondent caused the preparation of the comment on the petition, instead of the petition itself, indicate that respondent did not understand )hat she )as si*nin*. 3he defect of the verification all renders the petition in the Court of &ppeals )ithout le*al effect and constitutes *round for its dismissal. 3he contention is baseless. 3he purpose of reCuirin* a verification is to secure an assurance that the alle*ations of the petition have been made in *ood faith, or are true and correct, not merely speculative. 3his reCuirement is simply a condition affectin* the form of pleadin*s and non%compliance there)ith does not necessarily render it fatally defective.1" Perusal of the verification in Cuestion sho)s there )as sufficient compliance )ith the reCuirements of the Rules and the alle*ed defects are not so material as to 6ustify the dismissal of the petition in the Court of &ppeals. 3he defects are mere typo*raphical errors. 3here appears to be no intention to circumvent the need for proper verification and certification, )hich are intended to assure the truthfulness and correctness of the alle*ations in the petition and to discoura*e forum shoppin*.1 'o), the substantial issues. Corollary to the dismissal of the appeal by the R3C is the Cuestion of )hether the lac/ of notice of hearin* in the #otion for 79tension of 3ime to file #emorandum on &ppeal is fatal, such that the filin* of the motion is a )orthless piece of paper. Petitioner avers that, because of the failure of respondent to include a 'otice of 0earin* in her #otion for 79tension of 3ime to file #emorandum on &ppeal in the R3C, the latterMs motion is a )orthless piece of paper )ith no le*al effect. ,t is not disputed that respondent perfected her appeal on 4 &pril ;((= )ith the filin* of her 'otice of &ppeal and payment of the reCuired doc/et fees. 0o)ever, before the e9piration of time to file the #emorandum, she filed a #otion for 79tension of 3ime see/in* an additional period of five days )ithin )hich to file her #emorandum, )hich motion lac/ed the 'otice of 0earin* reCuired by :ection 4, Rule 15 of the 1!!" Rules of Court )hich providesB :7C. 4. 0earin* of #otion. % 79cept for motions )hich the court may act upon )ithout pre6udicin* the ri*hts of the adverse party, every )ritten motion shall be set for hearin* by the applicant. 7very )ritten motion reCuired to be heard and the notice of the hearin* thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three 1=2 days before the date of hearin*, unless the court for *ood cause sets the hearin* on shorter notice. &s may be *leaned above and as held time and a*ain, the notice reCuirement in a motion is mandatory. &s a rule, a motion )ithout a 'otice of 0earin* is considered pro forma and does not affect the re*lementary period for the appeal or the filin* of the reCuisite pleadin*. 1! &s a *eneral rule, notice of motion is reCuired )here a party has a ri*ht to resist the relief sou*ht by the motion and principles of natural 6ustice demand that his ri*ht be not affected )ithout an opportunity to be heard.;( 3he three%day notice reCuired by la) is intended not for the benefit of the movant but to avoid surprises upon the adverse party and to *ive the latter time to study and meet the ar*uments of the motion.;1 Principles of natural 6ustice demand that the ri*ht of a party should not be affected )ithout *ivin* it an opportunity to be heard.;; 3he test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as )ell as to have time to study the motion and meanin*fully oppose or controvert the *rounds upon )hich it is based.;= Considerin* the circumstances of the present case, )e believe that procedural due process )as substantially complied )ith. 3here are, indeed, reasons )hich )ould )arrant the suspension of the RulesB 1a2 the e9istence of special or compellin* circumstances, b2 the merits of the case, 1c2 a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or ne*li*ence of the party favored by the suspension of rules, 1d2 a lac/ of any sho)in* that the revie) sou*ht is merely frivolous and dilatory, and 1e2 the other party )ill not be un6ustly pre6udiced thereby. ;4 7lements or circumstances 1c2, 1d2 and 1e2 e9ist in the present case. 3he suspension of the Rules is )arranted in this case. 3he motion in Cuestion does not affect the substantive ri*hts of petitioner as it merely see/s to e9tend the period to file #emorandum. 3he reCuired e9tension )as due to respondentMs counselMs illness, lac/ of staff to do the )or/ due to storm and flood, compounded by the *roundin* of the computers. 3here is no claim li/e)ise that said motion )as interposed to delay the appeal. ;5 &s it appears, respondent sou*ht e9tension prior to the e9piration of the time to do so and the memorandum )as subseCuently filed )ithin the reCuested e9tended period. Dnder the circumstances, substantial 6ustice reCuires that )e *o into the merits of the case to resolve the issue of )ho is entitled to the possession of the land in Cuestion. 5urther, it has been held that a "motion for e9tension of time 9 9 9 is not a liti*ated motion )here notice to the adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application, but an e9 parte motion made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the parties to the action, in the absence and usually )ithout the /no)led*e of the other party or parties." &s a *eneral rule, notice of motion is reCuired )here a party has a ri*ht to resist the relief sou*ht by the motion and principles of natural 6ustice demand that his ri*hts be not affected )ithout an opportunity to be heard. ,t has been said that "e9 parte motions are freCuently permissible in procedural matters, and also in situations and under circumstances of emer*encyG and an e9ception to a rule reCuirin* notice is sometimes made )here notice or the resultin* delay mi*ht tend to defeat the ob6ective of the motion." ;< ,t is )ell to remember that this Court, in not a fe) cases, has consistently held that cases shall be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defense, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. ,n so doin*, the ends of 6ustice )ould be better served.;" 5urthermore, this Court emphasi>ed its policy that technical rules should accede to the demands of substantial 6ustice because there is no vested ri*ht in technicalities. 8iti*ations, should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicality. +ismissal of appeals purely on technical *rounds is fro)ned upon, and the rules of procedure ou*ht not to be applied in a very ri*id, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial 6ustice, and thereby defeat their very aims. &s has been the constant rulin*s of this Court, every party%liti*ant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and 6ust disposition of his cause, free from constraints of technicalities. ; ,ndeed, rules of procedure are mere tools

23 desi*ned to e9pedite the resolution of cases and other matters pendin* in court. & strict and ri*id application of the rules that )ould result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote 6ustice must be avoided.;! 3he visible emer*in* trend is to afford every party%liti*ant the amplest opportunity for the proper and 6ust determination of his cause, free from constraints and technicalities. Parenthetically, it must be noted also that )hen the appeal )as dismissed on 1! June ;((=, the memorandum )as already filed in court on ! June ;((=. On the issue of immediate e9ecution of 6ud*ment. 3he applicable provision is :ection 1!, Rule "( of the Rules of Court, )hich readsB :7C. 1!. ,mmediate 79ecution of 6ud*mentG ho) to stay the same.% ,f 6ud*ment is rendered a*ainst the defendant, e9ecution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay e9ecution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the #unicipal 3rial Court and e9ecuted in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, dama*es, and costs accruin* do)n to the time of the 6ud*ment appealed from, and unless, durin* the pendency of the appeal, he deposits )ith the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the 6ud*ment of the #unicipal 3rial Court. 9 9 9. 3o stay the immediate e9ecution of 6ud*ment in e6ectment proceedin*s, :ection 1! reCuires that the defendant%appellant must 1a2 perfect his appeal, 1b2 file a supersedeas bond, and 1c2 periodically deposit the rentals fallin* due durin* the pendency of the appeal. &s correctly observed by the Court of &ppeals, e9ecution pendin* appeal )as premature as respondent had already filed a supersedeas bond and the monthly rental for the current month of the premises in Cuestion.=( 3he invocation of petitioner of the provisions of :ection ;1, Rule "( of the Rules of Court, )hich runsB :ec. ;1. ,mmediate e9ecution on appeal to Court of &ppeals or :upreme Court.% 3he 6ud*ment of the Re*ional 3rial Court a*ainst the defendant shall be immediately e9ecutory, )ithout pre6udice to a further appeal that may be ta/en therefrom. to 6ustify the issuance of the )rit of e9ecution pendin* appeal in this case is misplaced. & closer e9amination of the above%Cuoted provision reveals that said provision applies to decision of the R3C rendered in its appellate 6urisdiction, affirmin* the decision of the #e3C. ,n the case at bar, the R3C order )as an order dismissin* respondentMs appeal based on technicality. ,t did not resolve substantive matters delvin* on the merits of the partiesM claim in the e6ectment case. 3hus, the case brou*ht to the Court of &ppeals )as the dismissal of the appeal for failure to file the reCuired memorandum )ithin the period provided by la), and not on the merits of the e6ectment case. 8astly, petitioner posited the vie) that the Court of &ppealsM 6ustices should have inhibited themselves because of bias and partiality for decidin* the case )ithin ei*ht months and for bein* very selective in discussin* the issues. .e re6ect the proposition. ,nhibition must be for 6ust and valid causes. 3he mere imputation of bias and partiality is not enou*h *round for 6ud*es to inhibit, especially )hen the char*e is )ithout basis. 3his Court has to be sho)n acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or pre6udice before it can brand them )ith the sti*ma of bias and partiality.=1 3his Court has invariably held that for bias and pre6udice to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of 6ud*es, mere suspicion is not enou*h. $are alle*ations of their partiality )ill not suffice "in the absence of clear and convincin* evidence to overcome the presumption that the 6ud*e )ill underta/e his noble role to dispense 6ustice accordin* to la) and evidence and )ithout fear and favor." =; 3here is no factual support to petitionerMs char*e of bias and partiality. & perusal of the records of the case fails to reveal that any bias or pre6udice motivated the Court of &ppeals in *rantin* respondentMs petition. 'either did this Court find any Cuestionable or suspicious circumstances leadin* to the issuance of the Cuestioned decision, as su**ested by petitioner. 3he fact alone that the Court of &ppeals decided the case )ithin ei*ht months does not in any )ay indicate bias and partiality a*ainst petitioner. ,t is )ithin the constitutional mandate to decide the case )ithin 1; months.== &s to petitionerMs alle*ation that the Court of &ppeals )as selective in choosin* )hat issues to resolve, it bears to stress a*ain that "a 6ud*eMs appreciation or misappreciation of the sufficiency of evidence 9 9 9 adduced by the parties, 9 9 9, )ithout proof of malice on the part of respondent 6ud*e, is not sufficient to sho) bias and partiality."=4 .e also emphasi>ed that "repeated rulin*s a*ainst a liti*ant, no matter ho) erroneously, vi*orously and consistently e9pressed, do not amount to bias and pre6udice )hich can be bases for the disCualification of a 6ud*e."=5 ,' &88, petitioner utterly failed to sho) that the appellate court erred in issuin* the assailed decision. On the contrary, it acted prudently in accordance )ith la) and 6urisprudence. .07R75OR7, the instant petition is hereby +7',7+ for lac/ of merit. 3he +ecision dated 1" &u*ust ;((4 and the Resolution dated 1( #arch ;((5 of the Court of &ppeals in C&%4.R. :P 'o. "!((1 are hereby &55,R#7+. 'o costs. :O OR+7R7+.

24 G.R. No. 1/9096 )$ &$r% 24, 2116

3HAR,ES 3*E*N)IENG, Petitioner, vs. HON. 3O*RT OF A55EA,S $ ' *NI1N BAN: OF THE 5HI,I55INES, Respondents. GAR3IA, J.: $y this petition for revie) on certiorari, petitioner Charles Cu%Dn6ien* see/s the reversal of the follo)in* issuances of the Court of &ppeals 1C&2 in C&% 4.R. C- 'o. 1""%$%D+I, entitled Charles Cu-An/ien , plaintiff-appellant vs. Anion 7an< of the #hilippines, et al., defendants-appellees , to )itB 1. Re"o8&tio 1 '$te' 6$% 11,1999, dismissin*, for non%payment of doc/et and other la)ful fees, petitionerMs appeal from an earlier decision of the Re*ional 3rial Court at #alolos, $ulacan )hich dismissed his complaint for specific performance and dama*es a*ainst respondent Dnion $an/ of the Philippines and othersG and ;. Re"o8&tio attached. 3he factsB Respondent Dnion $an/ of the Philippines 1D$P2 is the o)ner of a parcel of a*ricultural land )ith an area of ;1 ,"<! sCuare meters situated in $aran*ay :ta. #aria, :an #i*uel, $ulacan and re*istered in its name under 3ransfer Certificate of 3itle 13C32 'o. 3C%1(<; of the Re*istry of +eeds of $ulacan. :ometime in January 1!!4, D$P caused the postin* on the bulletin boards of its branch offices of a three%pa*e list of acCuired realty assets available for sale to interested parties. ,ncluded in said list )as the aforementioned parcel of land, offered to be sold for P;,;((,(((.((. Petitioner, throu*h a letter= dated &pril 11, 1!!4 and addressed to Joselito P. -alera, mana*er of D$PMs &cCuired &ssets +epartment, offered to buy the sub6ect property for a lesser amount of P;,(" ,=(5.5(, payable as follo)sB 5(J as do)n payment )ith the balance to be paid in eCual monthly installments over a period of t)o 1;2 years. Petitioner e9plained that his offer for an amount lesser than D$PMs as/in* price )as on account of five 152 tenants occupyin* the sub6ect land )ho )ere alle*edly demandin* P5((,(((.(( to voluntarily vacate the same. &s proof of his interest to buy the property, petitioner tendered PC,$ Chec/ 'o. 5<5 ;" for P1(=,!15.;", purportedly representin* 1(J of the 5(J do)n payment as earnest money or deposit. D$P ac/no)led*ed receipt thereof by )ay of Dnion $an/ Receipt 'o. 4!5( 1 dated &pril 11, 1!!4. On &u*ust =(, 1!!4, petitioner )rote a follo)%up letter to D$P inCuirin* on the status of his offer to buy the sub6ect premises. 4 Via a reply%letter dated &u*ust =1, 1!!4, the mana*er of D$PMs &cCuired &ssets +epartment advised petitioner that his offer to purchase is yet to be acted upon because the ban/ )as still a)aitin* the opinion of its le*al division re*ardin* the sale of "C&RPable" a*ricultural assets acCuired by the ban/. 5 &s it turned out, D$P re6ected petitionerMs offer as sho)n by the fact that in another letter < dated +ecember 1!, 1!!4, the ban/ informed petitioner that his offer could not be favorably acted upon on account of the le*al divisionMs opinion that sales of lands covered by the Comprehensive &*rarian Reform 8a) )ithout prior +epartment of &*rarian Reform 1+&R2 approval are considered null and void. &ccordin*ly, D$P advised petitioner to pic/ up the refund of his P1(=,!15.;" "earnest money" at the ban/Ms disbursin* unit. Dnable to accept D$PMs re6ection of his offer, petitioner, throu*h counsel, made a formal demand " for the ban/ to comply )ith its obli*ation to transfer and deliver the title of the sub6ect property to him by e9ecutin* the proper deed of conveyance, under the terms and conditions set forth in his &pril 11, 1!!4 offer. Respondin* thereto, D$P, thru its counsel, &tty. 8u>ano, in a letter dated July 1!, 1!!5, reiterated the ban/Ms re6ection of petitionerMs offer as "the land bein* #$rp$b8e could only be disposed of by the ban/ either thru -oluntary Offer to :ell 1-O:2 or compulsory acCuisition, the procedure of )hich is outlined in :ec. 1<" of Republic &ct 1R&2 'o. <<5". ,t )as a*ainst the fore*oin* bac/drop of events that, on 5ebruary <, 1!!", in the Re*ional 3rial Court 1R3C2 at #alolos, $ulacan, petitioner filed his complaint! in this case for $pecific #erformance and *ama es a*ainst D$P, impleadin* as co%defendant in the suit the Re*ister of +eeds of $ulacan. +oc/eted as Civil Case 'o. (%#%!" and raffled to $ranch ! of the court, the complaint principally sou*ht D$PMs compliance )ith an alle*ed perfected contract of sale bet)een it and petitioner relative to the parcel of land in Cuestion. #ore specifically, the complaint prays for a 6ud*ment orderin* D$P toB a2 accept payments from the plaintiff KpetitionerL for the sale of the Property in accordance )ith the terms and conditions of the letter dated 11 &pril 1!!4G b2 e9ecute a +eed of &bsolute :ale over the Property covered by 3C3 'o. 3C 1(<; of the Re*istry of +eeds of the Province of $ulacan upon the plaintiffMs full payment of the amount of .wo =illion $event% 6i ht .housand .hree )undred ,ive @ 5BC0BB >#1,BD3,EB5.5B?, failin* in )hich, the deputy sheriff should be ordered to e9ecute such deed and the Re*istry of +eeds to cancel the title of the $an/ and issue a ne) one in favor of the plaintiffG c2 pay plaintiff the sum of ,ive )undred .housand #esos >#5BB,BBB.BB? as moral dama*esG d2 pay plaintiff the sum of ,ive )undred .housand #esos >#5BB,BBB.BB? as e9emplary dama*esG
;

'$te' )&8% /1, 1999 )hich denied petitionerMs #otion for Reconsideration and ordered e9pun*ed the appeal brief thereto

25 e2 pay plaintiff the sum of ,our )undred .housand #esos >#4BB,BBB.BB? as attorneyMs feesG and f2 pay the costs of the suit. Other reliefs, 6ust and eCuitable under the premises, are li/e)ise respectfully prayed for. &fter due proceedin*s, the trial court, in a decision dated :eptember 1, 1!! ,1( upon a findin* that no perfected contract of sale transpired bet)een the parties, dismissed petitionerMs complaint for lac/ of sufficient cause of action, thusB .07R75OR7, on the basis of the evidence adduced and the la)sE6urisprudence applicable thereon, 6ud*ment is hereby rendered +,:#,::,'4 the complaint in the above entitled case for )ant of sufficient cause of action as )ell as the defendantMs counterclaim for dama*es and attorneyMs fees for lac/ of proof to )arrant the same. 0o)ever, defendant Dnion $an/ of the Philippines is ordered to reimburse plaintiff Charles Cu%Dn6ien* the amount of P1(=,!15.;" representin* the face value of PC,$an/ Chec/ 'o. 5<5 ;" tendered by the latter to the former as purported "earnest money", )ith interest thereon at the prevailin* rates of interest periodically besto)ed by D$P to its savin*s depositors from &pril 11, 1!!4, throu*h the succeedin* years, and until the full amount thereof shall have been delivered to the plaintiff. 'o pronouncement as to costs. :O OR+7R7+. .ith his motion for reconsideration havin* been denied, petitioner filed )ith the trial court a (otice of 'ppeal11therein ma/in* /no)n that he is ta/in* an appeal from the adverse decision to the C&. &ctin* thereon, the trial court issued an Order 1; directin* the elevation of the records of the case to the C&, )hereat petitionerMs appeal )as doc/eted as C'-F.R. CV (o. 30DD-7-A*G. &s thin*s )ould have it, in the herein first assailed Re"o8&tio '$te' 6$% 11, 1999, the C& dismissed petitionerMs appeal for nonpayment of the reCuired doc/et and other la)ful appeal fees, to )itB 5or failure of the appellant KpetitionerL to pay the doc/et and other la)ful fees 1:ec. 4, Rule 41, 1!!" Rules of Civil Procedure2, the Court Resolved to +,:#,:: the appeal pursuant to :ec. 11c2, Rule 5( of the same Rule. :O OR+7R7+.1= Petitioner filed a =otion for Reconsideration, attachin* thereto his appellantMs brief. 0o)ever, in a subseCuentRe"o8&tio '$te' )&8% /1, 1999,14 the appellate court denied the motion and even e9pun*ed from the record the appellantMs brief thereto attachedB &ctin* on the motion of the plaintiff%appellant KpetitionerL for a reconsideration of the Resolution of #ay 1(, 1!!!, )hich dismissed the appeal for the reason stated therein, and considerin* the opposition interposed thereto by defendant%appellee KrespondentL Dnion $an/ of the Philippines and it appearin* that the filin* of the notice of appeal of 'ovember 5, 1! , )as not accompanied by the full and correct payment of the correspondin* appellate court doc/et and other la)ful fees, and for such tardiness of more than four 142 months, the Court resolved to DEN4 the motion for reconsideration and the attached brief thereto ordered EF5*NGED. ,n Pedrosa vs. 0ill, ;5" :CR& ="=, the :upreme Court, citin* Rodillas vs. Commission on 7lections 1;45 :CR& "(; aptly saidB 999 the mere filin* of the notice of appeal )as not enou*h. ,t should be accompanied by the payment of the correct amount of appeal fee. ,n other )ords, the payment of the full amount of the doc/et fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. ,n both ori*inal and appellate cases, the court acCuires 6urisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed doc/et fees. .ell%rooted is the principle that perfection of an appeal )ithin the statutory or re*lementary period is not only mandatory but also 6urisdictional and failure to do so renders the Cuestioned decision final and e9ecutory, and deprives the appellate court or body of 6urisdiction to alter the final 6ud*ment much less to entertain the appeal. 3his reCuirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere technicality of la) or procedure. ,t is an essential reCuirement )ithout )hich the decision appealed from )ould become final and e9ecutory, as if no appeal )as filed at all. :O OR+7R7+. Dndaunted, petitioner is no) )ith us via the present recourse see/in* a rela9ation of procedural rules and ultimately the reversal and settin* aside of the assailed t)in resolutions of the appellate court. Petitioner )ould have the Court vie) his failure to pay the appeal doc/et fees on time as a non%fatal lapse, or a non%6urisdictional defect )hich the C& should have i*nored in order to attain substantial 6ustice. 5urther, petitioner passes the blame to the R3C cler/ of court )ho alle*edly made the erroneous computation of doc/et fees. .e are not persuaded. +octrinally entrenched is the pronouncement that the ri*ht to appeal is merely statutory and a party see/in* to avail of that ri*ht must comply )ith the statute or rules.15

26 Rule 41, :ection 4, of the 1!!" Rules of Civil Procedure providesB :7C. 4. 'ppellate court doc<et and other lawful fees. N .ithin the period for ta/in* an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the cler/ of the court )hich rendered the 6ud*ment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court doc/et and other la)ful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court to*ether )ith the ori*inal record or the record on appeal. .ell%settled is the rule that payment of the doc/et and other le*al fees )ithin the prescribed period is both mandatory and 6urisdictional, 1< noncompliance )ith )hich is fatal to an appeal. 5or, to stress, appeal is not a matter of ri*ht, but a mere statutory privile*e. 1" &n ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the R3C to the C& must be made )ithin fifteen 1152 days from notice. 1 &nd )ithin this period, the full amount of the appellate court doc/et and other la)ful fees must be paid to the cler/ of the court )hich rendered the 6ud*ment or final order appealed from. 3ime and a*ain, this Court has consistently held that full payment of doc/et fees )ithin the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. .ithout such payment, the appeal is not perfected and the appellate court does not acCuire 6urisdiction to entertain the appeal, thereby renderin* the decision sou*ht to be appealed final and e9ecutory.1! 5or sure, nonpayment of the appellate court doc/et and other la)ful fees )ithin the re*lementary period as provided under :ection 4, Rule 41, supra, is a *round for the dismissal of an appeal under :ection 11c2 of Rule 5(, to )itB :7C3,O' 1. Frounds for dismissal of appeal.% &n appeal may be dismissed by the Court of &ppeals, on its o)n motion or on that of the appellee, on the follo)in* *roundsB 999 999 999 c. 5ailure of the appellant to pay the doc/et and other la)ful fees as provided in section 4 of Rule 41G 999 3his Court has invariably sustained the C&Ms dismissal on technical *rounds under the aforeCuoted provision unless considerations of eCuity and substantial 6ustice present co*ent reasons to hold other)ise. 3rue, the rules may be rela9ed but only for persuasive and )ei*hty reasons, to relieve a liti*ant of an in6ustice commensurate )ith his failure to comply )ith the prescribed procedure.;( :o it is that in -a $alette Colle e vs. Victor #ilotin,;1 )e heldB 'ot)ithstandin* the mandatory nature of the reCuirement of payment of appellate doc/et fees, )e also reco*ni>e that its strict application is Cualified by the follo)in*B first, failure to pay those fees )ithin the re*lementary period allo)s only discretionary, not automatic, dismissalG second, such po)er should be used by the court in con6unction )ith its e9ercise of sound discretion in accordance )ith the tenets of 6ustice and fair play, as )ell as )ith a *reat deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances 3hen, too, in =actan Cebu International 'irport 'uthorit% >=CI''? vs. =an ubat,;; )e held that late payment of doc/et fees may be admitted )hen the party sho)ed )illin*ness to abide by the Rules by immediately payin* the reCuired fees. =actan, ho)ever, cannot be a source of comfort for herein petitioner. 5or there, the appellate doc/et fees )ere paid si9 1<2 days after the timely filin* of the notice of appeal. Dnli/e in =actan, payment of the appellate doc/et fees in this case )as effected by petitioner only after four 142 months follo)in* the e9piration of the re*lementary period to ta/e an appeal. .ith the reality obtainin* in this case that payment of the appellate doc/et fees )as belatedly made four 142 months after the lapse of the period for appeal, it appears clear to us that the C& did not acCuire 6urisdiction over petitionerMs appeal e9cept to order its dismissal, ;= as it ri*htfully did. 3hus, the :eptember 1, 1!! decision of the R3C has passed to the realm of finality and became e9ecutory by operation of la). .e must emphasi>e that invocation of substantial 6ustice is not a ma*ical incantation that )ill automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Rules of procedure are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non%observance may have resulted in pre6udice to a partyMs substantive ri*hts. 8i/e all rules, they are reCuired to be follo)ed. :o it must be here. CHEREFORE, petition is DENIED and the assailed resolutions dated #ay 1(,1!!! and July =(, 1!!! of the Court of &ppeals AFFIR6ED. Costs a*ainst petitioner. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 171488 De#ember 11, 2112

36T3 INTERNATIONA, 6AR:ETING 3OR5ORATION, Petitioner, vs. BHAGIS INTERNATIONA, TRADING 3OR5ORATION, Respondents. 5ERA,TA, J.: $efore this Court is a Petition for Revie) on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailin* the Resolutions dated &u*ust 1!, ;((51 and 'ovember 15, ;((5; of the 5ormer :pecial 3)elfth +ivision of the Court of &ppeals in C&%4.R. C- 'o. 4"4;.

27 3he facts of the case follo). Petitioner instituted a Complaint for Dnfair Competition andEor Copyri*ht ,nfrin*ement and Claim for +ama*es )ith Prayer for 3emporary Restrainin* Order and .rit of Preliminary ,n6unction a*ainst respondent before the Re*ional 3rial Court of #a/ati 1trial court2.= On 5ebruary 14, ;((5, the trial court rendered a +ecision4 dismissin* the complaint filed by petitioner. 3he fallo of said +ecision readsB .07R75OR7, premises considered, the Complaint for Dnfair Competition andEor Copyri*ht ,nfrin*ement and Claim for +ama*es is hereby +,:#,::7+ )ithout pronouncement as to cost. :O OR+7R7+.5 &fter receivin* a copy of the trial courtMs +ecision, petitioner seasonably filed a 'otice of &ppeal before the Court of &ppeals 1 appellate court2 on #arch 4, ;((5.< 3hereafter, the appellate court issued a 'otice to 5ile the &ppellantMs $rief on #ay ;(, ;((5, )hich )as received by the la) office representin* petitioner on #ay =(, ;((5, statin* as follo)sB Pursuant to Rule 44, :ec. " of the 1!!" Rules of Civil Procedure you are hereby reCuired to file )ith this Court )ithin forty%five 1452 days from receipt of this notice, :7-7' 1"2 le*ibly type)ritten, mimeo*raphed or printed copies of the &ppellantMs $rief )ith le*ible copies of the assailed decision of the 3rial Court and proof of service of t)o copies upon the appelleeEs." 0o)ever, despite said notice, petitioner failed to file its appellantMs brief timely. 0ence, on &u*ust 1!, ;((5, the appellate court issued a Resolution dismissin* the appeal filed by petitioner. 3he full te9t of said Resolution readsB Considerin* the report of the Judicial Records +ivision dated 1" &u*ust ;((5 statin* that no appellantMs brief has been filed as per doc/et boo/ entry, the Court R7:O8-7: to consider the appeal as havin* been &$&'+O'7+ and conseCuently +,:#,:: the same pursuant to :ec. 11e2, Rule 5( of the 1!!" Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Dpon receipt of the order of dismissal, petitioner filed its #otion for Reconsideration )ith #otion to &dmit &ppellantMs $rief, ! )hich )as filed forty%t)o 14;2 days late from the date of its e9piration on July 15, ;((5. On 'ovember 15, ;((5, the appellate court denied petitionerMs #otion for Reconsideration )ith #otion to &dmit &ppellantMs $rief. ,t ruled that one of the *rounds by )hich the Court of &ppeals may, on its o)n motion or that of the appellee, dismiss the appeal is the failure on the part of the appellant to serve and file the reCuired number of copies of his brief )ithin the time prescribed by the Rules of Court, vi!.B 5or this Court to admit the appellantMs brief after such )anton disre*ard of the Rules )ould put a strain on the orderly administration of 6ustice. &s held in the case of :t. 8ouis Dniversity vs. Cordero, 4=4 :CR& 5"5, 5 ", citin* +on 8ino 4utierres R :ons, ,nc. v. Court of &ppeals, <1 :CR& "B ",t is necessary to impress upon liti*ants and their la)yers the necessity of strict compliance )ith the periods for performin* certain acts incident to the appeal and the trans*ressions thereof, as a rule, )ould not be toleratedG other)ise, those periods could be evaded by subterfu*es and manufactured e9cuses and )ould ultimately become inutile. .07R75OR7, the fore*oin* premises considered, the #otion for Reconsideration )ith #otion to &dmit &ppellantMs $rief is perforce +7',7+. :O OR+7R7+.1( &ccordin*ly, petitioner filed a petition for revie) on certiorari before this Court Cuestionin* the &u*ust 1!, ;((5 and 'ovember 15, ;((5 Resolutions of the appellate court. 3hus, petitioner presents the follo)in* *rounds to support its petitionB &. 307 CODR3 O5 &PP7&8: 4R,7-OD:8F CO##,337+ & R7-7R:,$87 7RROR .07' ,3 :&CR,5,C7+ :D$:3&'3,-7 JD:3,C7 ,' 5&-OR O5 PROC7+DR&8 37C0',C&8,3,7: .,30 ,3: +,:#,::&8 O5 P73,3,O'7RM: &PP7&8 5OR 5&,8DR7 3O 5,87 307 &PP788&'3M: $R,75 O' 3,#7 .,30OD3 CO':,+7R,'4 &3 &88 .07307R OR 'O3 P73,3,O'7RM: &PP7&8 +7:7R-7+ 5D88 CO':,+7R&3,O' O' 307 #7R,3:. $. ,' 307 ,'37R7:3 O5 :D$:3&'3,-7 JD:3,C7, P73,3,O'7RM: &PP7&8 :0OD8+ $7 R7,':3&37+ CO':,+7R,'4 30&3 307 7RROR: O5 307 3R,&8 CODR3 ,' R7'+7R,'4 ,3: &PP7&87+ +7C,:,O' &R7 7-,+7'3 O' 307 5&C7 O5 307 :&,+ +7C,:,O' &'+ #OR7 :O &537R &' 7A&#,'&3,O' O5 307 7-,+7'C7 O' R7COR+. 1. 3he trial courtMs rulin* that petitioner should have established actual confusion in the minds of buyers is contrary to 6urisprudence.

28 ;. 3he trial court did not state the facts upon )hich it based its conclusion that petitionerMs trademar/ is stri/in*ly different and distinct from that of defendantMs. =. Respondent labeled its products in a manner confusin*ly similar to that of petitionerMs. 4. 3he trial court erred in findin* that respondent did not pass off its products as that of petitionerMs.11 :imply, the issue to be resolved is the propriety of the dismissal of petitionerMs appeal for its failure to file the appellantMs brief )ithin the re*lementary period. Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred in dismissin* its appeal, since dismissal of appeals on purely technical *rounds is fro)ned upon and the rules of procedure ou*ht not to be applied in a very technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure substantial 6ustice. 5or its part, respondent maintains that the appellate court did not err in dismissin* petitionerMs appeal for its failure to file the reCuired appellantMs brief )ithin the re*lementary period. ,t stresses that in the absence of persuasive reason to deviate therefrom, rules of procedure must be faithfully follo)ed for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and e9peditious dispatch of 6udicial business. .e find merit in the instant petition. 3ime and a*ain, this Court has emphasi>ed that procedural rules should be treated )ith utmost respect and due re*ard, since they are desi*ned to facilitate the ad6udication of cases to remedy the )orsenin* problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of 6ustice. 5rom time to time, ho)ever, )e have reco*ni>ed e9ceptions to the Rules, but only for the most compellin* reasons )here stubborn obedience to the Rules )ould defeat rather than serve the ends of 6ustice.1; ,n Obut v. Court of 'ppeals,1= this Court reiterated that it "cannot loo/ )ith favor on a course of action )hich )ould place the administration of 6ustice in a strai*ht6ac/et, for then the result )ould be a poor /ind of 6ustice if there )ould be 6ustice at all. -erily, 6udicial orders are issued to be obeyed, nonetheless a non%compliance is to be dealt )ith as the circumstances attendin* the case may )arrant. .hat should *uide 6udicial action is the principle that a party% liti*ant if to be *iven the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint of defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities." 3he same principle )as hi*hli*hted in #hilippine (ational 7an< and *evelopment 7an< of the #hilippines v. #hilippine =illin Compan%, Incorporated, et al.H14 )here the Court ruled that even if an appellant failed to file a motion for e9tension of time to file his brief on or before the e9piration of the re*lementary period, the Court of &ppeals does not necessarily lose 6urisdiction to hear and decide the appealed case, and that the Court of &ppeals has discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss appellantMs appeal, )hich discretion must be a sound one to be e9ercised in accordance )ith the tenets of 6ustice and fair play havin* in mind the circumstances obtainin* in each case. 7r*o, )here stron* considerations of substantive 6ustice are manifest in the petition, the strict application of the rules of procedure may be rela9ed, in the e9ercise of its eCuity 6urisdiction.15 3hus, a ri*id application of the rules of procedure )ill not be entertained if it )ill obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of 6ustice in the li*ht of the prevailin* circumstances in the case under consideration. ,n the instant case, it is apparent that there is a stron* desire to file an appellantMs brief on petitionerMs part. .hen petitioner filed its motion attachin* there)ith its appellantMs brief, there )as a clear intention on the part of petitioner not to abandon his appeal. &s a matter of fact, )ere it not for its counselMs act of inadvertently misplacin* the 'otice to 5ile $rief in another file, petitioner could have seasonably filed its appellantMs brief as its counsel had already prepared the same even )ay before the receipt of the 'otice to 5ile $rief. ,t bears stressin* at this point then that the rule, )hich states that the mista/es of counsel binds the client, may not be strictly follo)ed )here observance of it )ould result in outri*ht deprivation of the clientMs liberty or property, or )here the interest of 6ustice so reCuires. ,n renderin* 6ustice, procedural infirmities ta/e a bac/seat a*ainst substantive ri*hts of liti*ants. Corollarily, if the strict application of the rules )ould tend to frustrate rather than promote 6ustice, this Court is not )ithout po)er to e9ercise its 6udicial discretion in rela9in* the rules of procedure. 1<L &lso, it must be stressed that petitioner had no participatory ne*li*ence in the dismissal of its appeal. 04wphi0 0ence, the ensuin* dismissal of its appeal )as completely attributable to the *ross ne*li*ence of its counsel. 5or said reason, the Court is not averse to suspendin* its o)n rules in the pursuit of 6ustice. .here rec/less or *ross ne*li*ence of counsel deprives the client of due process of la), or )hen the interests of 6ustice so reCuire, relief is accorded to the client )ho suffered by reason of the la)yerMs *ross or palpable mista/e or ne*li*ence. 1" &ll told, petitioner should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and 6ust determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. 'evertheless, considerin* that this Court is not a trier of facts, the appropriate action to ta/e is to remand the case to the appellate court for further proceedin*s, for it to thorou*hly e9amine the factual and le*al issues that still need to be threshed out. CHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED, insofar as this case is RE6ANDED to the Court of &ppeals for further proceedin*s, sub6ect to the payment of the correspondin* doc/et fees )ithin fifteen 1152 days from notice of this +ecision. 8et the records and the C& rollo of this case be transmitted accordin*ly. :O OR+7R7+.

29 G.R. No. 142122 September 7, 2110 6INDANAO SA.INGS ANDD ,OAN ASSO3IATION, IN3., Petitioners, vs. .I3ENTA .DA. DE F,ORES, $ ' HEIRS OF F,OREN3IO F,ORES, SR., $me8%, EDNA F,ORES EISEIDE,, BE,INDA F,ORES, F,OREN3IO T. F,ORES, )R., ROBERTO T. F,ORES, S4,.IA F,ORES SI3AT $ ' ,ORNA F,ORES FERNANDE7, Respondent. GAR3IA, J.9 Dnder consideration is this petition for revie) on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the t)in resolutions dated October ;", 1!!!1 and 5ebruary 15, ;((;; of the Court of &ppeals )hich respectively dismissed petitionerMs appeal from an earlier decision of the Re*ional 3rial Court at #alaybalay, $u/idnon for failure to file its appellantMs brief on time, and denied petitionerMs motion for reconsideration of the dismissal resolution. Records reveal the essential follo)in* factsB +urin* his lifetime, or more specifically on +ecember !, 1! ;, 5lorencio 5lores, :r., husband of respondent -icenta -da. +e 5lores and predecessor%in% interest of the other respondents, entered into a "oint Venture ' reement )ith +: 0omes, ,nc. 1+:0,2 for the development and commercial utili>ation of the 5lores spousesM t)o 1;2 ad6oinin* lots located at the center of the to)n of #alaybalay, $u/idnon. Pursuant to the "oint Venture ' reement, 5lores, :r., as capitalist partner, secured a loan of P1.5# from petitioner #indanao :avin*s and 8oan &ssociation, ,nc. 1#:8&,2 usin* as collaterals therefor the t)o 1;2 aforementioned lots. Dnder the same a*reement, +:0,, as industrial partner, shall have the full and complete authority to pursue the development pro6ect and the mana*ement thereof thereafter. ,n time, out of the loan secured by 5lores, :r. from petitioner, a commercial buildin* /no)n as the ,lores 7uildin )as constructed on the lots in Cuestion. $usiness operations of the 6oint venture commenced in &u*ust, 1! 4. & portion of the first floor of the buildin* )as leased by +:0, to petitioner )hich used the space as office of its branch at #alaybalay, $u/idnon, )hile the rest of the same floor )ere occupied by a fastfood establishment, a dru*store and a *rocery. 3he second floor of the buildin* )as used as a function room and the third floor as lod*in* inn. ,n 1! <, the 6oint venture suffered severe business reversals on account of )hich +:0, discontinued the mana*ement of the ,lores 7uildin , promptin* respondents to ta/e over its operations. #ean)hile, on &u*ust =1, 1!!(, petitioner #:8&,, then operatin* under the name "+avao :avin*s and 8oan &ssociation", )as placed by the #onetary $oard of the Central $an/ under receivership of the Philippine +eposit ,nsurance Corporation 1P+,C2 )hich )as later desi*nated by the #onetary $oard as liCuidator of the already insolvent #:8&,. On 'ovember 1(, 1!!;, respondents received from P+,C a demand letter for the payment of an outstandin* obli*ation in the sta**erin* amount of P;=,"5<,4"".<1 as of October =1, 1!!;. Dnable to believe that the ori*inal loan of P1.5# obtained by their predecessor could have reached that much, respondents then filed )ith the Re*ional 3rial Court at $u/idnon a complaint for 'ccountin and -i&uidation of "oint Venture, 'nnulment of -oan @ =ort a es and *ama es thereat doc/eted as Civil Case (o. 10E3. ,mpleaded as defendants in the case )ere, amon* others, +:0,, petitioner #:8&, and one 5rancisco +. -illamor and other officers of +:0,. &lbeit not a party to the "oint Venture ' reement, petitioner #:8&, )as impleaded as a party%defendant, it bein* respondentsM alle*ation that petitioner and +:0, )ere practically one and the same, as in fact defendant 5rancisco -illamor )as the *eneral mana*er of both corporate entities and that althou*h the t)o 1+:0, and #:8&,2 are separate and distinct corporations, they acted as one in the implementation and e9ecution of the "oint Venture' reement under the effective direction and control of 5rancisco -illamor )ho )as the movin* force in the manipulations of the loans and dissipation of the funds of the 6oint venture. ,n its ans)er, petitioner maintained that it is a separate and distinct corporation from +:0,, addin* that respondents have no cause of action a*ainst it as it is never a party to the "oint Venture ' reement bet)een +:0, and respondentsM predecessor%in%interest. ,n a decision dated January ;<, 1!! ,= the trial court, upon a findin* that K.Lhe sum total of the fore oin evidence abundantl% demonstrates further the unit% of the corporate defendants and how the% manipulated the loan and the funds of the /oint venture , about )hich petitioner #:8&, failed to refute plaintiffs: e+tensive evidence ma<in out a stron case of piercin the veil of corporate fiction a ainst it and +0:,, rendered 6ud*ment for the respondents, thusB .07R75OR7, 6ud*ment is hereby enteredB 1. +eclarin* that the accountin* andEor liCuidation of the Joint -enture &*reement entered into by the late +r. 5lorencio 5lores, :r., and the +avao 0omes, ,nc., dated +ecember !, 1! ;, to be already deemed made and terminated. &ccordin*ly, no party or parties shall receive any a)ard of incomeEshare. ;. &ll income *enerated by the 5lores buildin* be*innin* 1! < shall henceforth e9clusively belon* to plaintiffs. =. &nnullin* and declarin* null and void the said Joint -enture &*reement.

30 4. +eclarin* the 5lores buildin* )hich )as built under the Joint -enture a*reement, aforementioned, in the e9clusive o)nership of plaintiffs, free from all aliens and encumbrances. 5. &nnullin* and declarin* -O,+ the contract of loan, to*ether )ith the correspondin* promissory notes 1mar/ed 79hibit "1" to "1%1("2, and the real mort*a*e 1mar/ed 79hibits "JM to "J%="2 e9ecuted by +r. 5lorencio 5lores and -icenta 5lores, as principal borro)er, in favor of defendant $an/ 1#indanao :avin*s and 8oan &ssociation2 as creditor. <. 'o party is entitled to any a)ard of dama*es includin* costs. :O OR+7R7+. On 5ebruary 4, 1!! , petitioner #:8&, filed )ith the trial court a (otice of 'ppeal by reason of )hich the records of the case )ere elevated to the Court of &ppeals. On 5ebruary ;!, 1!!!, the appellate court issued a notice to the parties reCuirin* them to file their respective briefs )ithin 45 days from receipt thereof. On June ;1, 1!!!, the office of the Chief 8e*al Counsel of the P+,C, as counsel for petitioner #:8&,, entered its appearance in the appellate court and filed a motion for a 45%day e9tension of time to file appellantMs brief. ,n its Resolution of &u*ust 11, 1!!!, the appellate court favorably acted on petitionerMs motion and accordin*ly *ranted petitioner forty%five 1452 days from "une 10 or until 'u ust 5, 0222, within which to file its appellant:s brief. Come &u*ust 5, 1!!!, but no appellantMs brief )as filed by petitioner. ,nstead, on 'u ust 15, 0222, or )ay beyond the period *iven by the appellate court, petitioner filed a =otion to 'dmit, therein prayin* that the appellantMs brief thereto attached be admitted. ,n its challen*ed Resolution dated October ;", 1!!!, the appellate court denied admission of the proffered &ppellantMs $rief for bein filed twent% >1B? da%s late, and conseCuently dismissed petitionerMs appeal. ,ts motion for reconsideration havin* been denied by the appellate court in its subseCuent Resolution of 5ebruary 15, ;(((, petitioner is no) )ith us via the instant recourse on the follo)in* assi*ned errors, )hich perple9in*ly, are actually an assault a*ainst the decision of the trial court and not the challen*ed resolutions of the Court of &ppeals. .e Cuote the assi*ned errorsB 307 8O.7R CODR3 7RR7+ ,' &''D88,'4 &'+ +7C8&R,'4 -O,+ 307 CO'3R&C3 O5 8O&' &'+ 307 R7&8 7:3&37 #OR34&47: 7A7CD37+ $F :POD:7: +R. 58OR7'C,O 58OR7: &'+ -,C7'3& 58OR7:. 307 8O.7R CODR3 7RR7+ ,' P,7RC,'4 307 -7,8 O5 CORPOR&37 5,C3,O' O5 #:8&, &'+ +:0,. 307 8O.7R CODR3 7RR7+ ,' &''D88,'4 307 JO,'3 -7'3DR7 &4R77#7'3 &'+ +7C8&R,'4 R7:PO'+7'3: &: 307 7AC8D:,-7 O.'7R O5 307 58OR7: $D,8+,'4 5R77 5RO# &88 8,7': &'+ 7'CD#$R&'C7:. 4 &t the outset, let it be made clear that in petitions for revie) on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the "errors" )hich are revie)able by this Court are only those committed by the Court of &ppeals and not directly those of the trial court. ,t is thus unfortunate that the Office of the Chief 8e*al Counsel of the P+,C, as petitionerMs counsel in this case, is evidently una)are of ho) appellate proceedin*s before this Court *o. &s )e see it, the sole Cuestion before us is the propriety of the appellate courtMs resolution dismissin* petitionerMs appeal on account of petitionerMs failure to file its appellantMs brief on time, and not the desired rela9ation of procedural rules re*ardin* re*lementary periods. .e must emphasi>e that revie) is not a matter of ri*ht. &ccordin*ly, there should be strict adherence to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, :ection < of )hich delineates the *rounds for the allo)ance of revie) to avoid delays in the enforcement of final 6ud*ments and orders of lo)er courts, to )itB SE3. 6. +eview discretionary. % & revie) is not a matter of ri*ht, but of sound 6udicial discretion, and )ill be *ranted only )hen there are special and important reasons therefor. 3he follo)in*, )hile neither controllin* nor fully measurin* the courtMs discretion, indicate the character of the reasons )hich )ill be consideredB 1a2 .hen the court a &uo has decided a Cuestion of substance, not theretofore determined by the :upreme Court, or has decided it in a )ay probably not in accord )ith la) or )ith the applicable decisions of the :upreme CourtG or 1b2 .hen the court a &uo has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of 6udicial proceedin*s, or so far sanctioned such departure by a lo)er court, as to call for an e9ercise of the po)er of supervision. Petitioner attempts to 6ustify its tardiness by claimin* that its handlin* counsel )ho resi*ned from P+,C on July =(, 1!!! failed to turn over the sub6ect case to another la)yer for re%assi*nment. 3his e9cuse is not only flimsy but utterly lame.

31 ,t bears emphasi>in* that petitioner is represented by no less than the Office of the Chief 8e*al Counsel of the P+,C )hich has, at its helm and command, a battery of la)yers. &s pointed out by respondents, on July ", 1!!!, the handlin* counsel tendered his resi*nation from P+,C effective on July =(, 1!!!.5 Petitioner, therefore, had ;! days from July ", 1!!!, or until &u*ust 5, 1!!!, the last day for filin* the sub6ect brief. +urin* those ;! days, petitioner had the lu9ury of time to file its appellantMs brief, or, at the very least, as/ for another e9tension from the appellate court. ,t did not. Petitioner ou*ht to be reminded that procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non%observance may have resulted in pre6udice to the partiesM substantive ri*hts. 8i/e all rules, they are reCuired to be follo)ed e9cept only for the most persuasive of reasons as )hen "transcendental matters" of life, liberty or state security are involved. 3rue, liti*ation is not a *ame of technicalities. ,t is eCually true, ho)ever, that every case must be presented in accordance )ith the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of 6ustice.< +oubtless, and 6ud*in* from the very nature of petitionerMs assi*ned errors, the instant petition )as resorted to as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. 3his cannot be allo)ed, more so )hen, as here, such loss is occasioned by petitionerMs o)n ne*lect. CHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. Costs a*ainst petitioner. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 101170 6$r#! 11, 2116

ER,INDA 5I,A5I,, HEIRS OF DONATA ORTI7 BRIONES, $me8%9 ESTE,A, ERIBERTO AND .IRGI,IO SANTOS, ANA SANTOS 3*,T*RA, E,.IRA SANTOS INO3ENTES, ERNESTO 6ENDO7A, RI7A,INA SANTOS, ADO,FO 6ENDO7A $ ' 5A3ITA 6ENDO7A, Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF 6AFI6INO R. BRIONES, $me8%9 SI,.ERIO S. BRIONES, 5ETRA BRIONES, BONIFA3IO 3ABAH*G, )R., ANITA TRAS6ONTE, 3IRI,ITA FORT*NA, 3RESEN3IA BRIONES, F*G*RA3ION 6EDA,,E $ ' 6ER3EDES ,AGBAS, Respondents. 3HI3OENA7ARIO, J.: 3his is a Petition for Revie) on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, see/in* the annulment and the settin* aside of the +ecision of the Court of &ppeals in C&%4R C- 'o. 551!4, dated =1 &u*ust ;((1,1affirmin* the decision of the Cebu City Re*ional 3rial Court 1R3C2, $ranch 1", in Civil Case 'o. C7$%5"!4, dated ; :eptember 1! <.; Petitioners are the heirs of the late +onata Orti>%$riones 1+onata2, consistin* of her survivin* sister, Ri>alina Orti>%&*uila 1Ri>alina2G Ri>alinaMs dau*hter, 7rlinda Pilapil 17rlinda2G and the other nephe)s and nieces of +onata, in representation of her t)o other sisters )ho had also passed a)ay. Respondents, on the other hand, are the heirs of the late #a9imino $riones 1#a9imino2, composed of his nephe)s and nieces, and *randnephe)s and *randnieces, in representation of the deceased siblin*s of #a9imino. 3he facts that *ave rise to the petition at bar are recounted as follo)s. #a9imino )as married to +onata but their union did not produce any children. .hen #a9imino died on 1 #ay 1!5;, +onata instituted intestate proceedin*s to settle her husbandMs estate )ith the Cebu City Court of 5irst ,nstance 1C5,2, 14th Judicial +istrict, desi*nated as :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !; %R. On July 1!5;, the C5, issued 8etters of &dministration= appointin* +onata as the administratri9 of #a9iminoMs estate. :he submitted an ,nventory4 of #a9iminoMs properties, )hich included, amon* other thin*s, the follo)in* parcels of land N 1. 3ransfer Certificate of 3itle 13C32 'o. R3%5!!, acCuired by #a9imino prior to his marria*e 1no) covered by 3C3 'o. ;154<2G 5 ;. 3C3 'o. R3%<((, acCuired by #a9imino prior to his marria*e 1no) covered by 3C3 'o. ;15452G< =. 3C3 'o. ;;(, acCuired by #a9imino durin* the marria*e 1no) covered by 3C3 'o. ;154=2G" 4. 3C3 'o. ;;1, acCuired by #a9imino durin* the marria*e 1no) covered by 3C3 'o. ;15442G and 5. 3C3 'o. "(;, acCuired by #a9imino durin* the marria*e 1no) covered by 3C3 'o. ;154;2.! 3he C5, )ould subseCuently issue an Order, dated ; October 1!5;, a)ardin* o)nership of the aforementioned real properties to +onata. On ;" June 1!<(, +onata had the said C5, Order recorded in the Primary 7ntry $oo/ of the Re*ister of +eeds,1( and by virtue thereof, received ne) 3C3s, coverin* the said properties, no) in her name. +onata died on 1 'ovember 1!"". 7rlinda, one of +onataMs nieces, instituted )ith the R3C a petition for the administration of the intestate estate of +onata. 7rlinda and her husband, 4re*orio, )ere appointed by the R3C as administrators of +onataMs intestate estate. Controversy arose amon* +onataMs heirs )hen 7rlinda claimed e9clusive o)nership of three parcels of land, covered by 3C3s 'o. ;154;, ;1545, and 5 < 4, based on t)o +eeds of +onation, both dated 15 :eptember 1!"",11 alle*edly e9ecuted in her favor by her aunt +onata. 3he other heirs of +onata opposed 7rlindaMs claim. 3his Court, ho)ever, )as no lon*er informed of the subseCuent development in the intestate proceedin*s of the estate of +onataG and as far as this Petition is concerned, all the heirs of +onata, includin* 7rlinda, appear to be on the same side.

32 On ;1 January 1! 5, :ilverio $riones 1:ilverio2, a nephe) of #a9imino, filed a Petition 1; )ith the R3C for 8etters of &dministration1= for the intestate estate of #a9imino, )hich )as initially *ranted by the R3C. 3he R3C also issued an Order, dated 5 +ecember 1! 5, allo)in* :ilverio to collect rentals from #a9iminoMs properties. $ut then, 4re*orio filed )ith the R3C a #otion to :et &side the Order, dated 5 +ecember 1! 5, claimin* that the said properties )ere already under his and his )ifeMs administration as part of the intestate estate of +onata. 14:ilverioMs 8etters of &dministration for the intestate estate of #a9imino )as subseCuently set aside by the R3C.15 On = #arch 1! ", the heirs of #a9imino filed a Complaint1< )ith the R3C a*ainst the heirs of +onata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real property, doc/eted as Civil Case 'o. C7$%5"!4. 3hey later filed an &mended Complaint, 1" on 11 +ecember 1!!;. 3hey alle*ed that +onata, as administratri9 of the estate of #a9imino, throu*h fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and )ithout the /no)led*e of the other heirs, succeeded in re*isterin* in her name the real properties belon*in* to the intestate estate of #a9imino. ,n their &ns)er1 to the Complaint in Civil Case 'o. C7$%5"!4, the heirs of +onata raised, as affirmative and special defenses, the follo)in* N 1. 3he complaint does not state a sufficient cause of action a*ainst the defendantsG ;. 3hat the titles to the lots in Cuestion )ere le*ally transferred to the name of the late +onata Orti> $riones since 1!5; )hen the survivin* heirs of #a9imino $riones sold their ri*hts over the said properties to the late +onata Orti> $rionesG =. 3hat even *rantin* ar*uendo that plaintiffs have the ri*ht to Cuestion the transfer to the name of the late +onata Orti> $riones the titles of the said lots any action of that effect has definitely prescribed for more than =( years have already occurred )hen the titles to said lots )ere transferred to the name of the late +onata Orti> $rionesG 4. 3hat moreover, even *rantin* ar*uendo that there is an implied trust, an implied trust prescribed in 1( years from the day titles to said lots have been transferred to the name of the late +onata Orti> $riones. ConseCuently, the plaintiffMs action to enforce an implied trust has definitely prescribedG 5. $e that as it may, plaintiffs )hose claim is merely in a representative capacity acCuires no better ri*ht or title than that of their predecessor%in% interest. &fter trial in due course, the R3C rendered its +ecision, dated belo) N &pril 1! <, in favor of the heirs of #a9imino, 1!pertinent portions thereof are reproduced

.hen +onata Orti> $riones filed :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !; %R she )as fully a)are of the e9istence of the hereditary ri*hts of the brothers and sisters of her husband #a9imino :. $riones and their survivin* heirs and it )as her duty to have informed the Court of such fact instead of as/in* the Court to have her declared as the sole heir of her deceased husband in the alle*ed order mentioned by the defendants )hich )as never presented at the trial but )as made the basis of the transfer of all the titles of the real properties left by #a9imino :. $riones to the name of +onata Orti> $riones to the pre6udice of the heirs of the brothers and sisters of #a9imino :. $riones. 9999 $y havin* the immovable properties of the deceased #a9imino :. $riones transferred in her name as the sole heir of the said deceased despite her /no)led*e of the e9istence of other co%heirs li/e the plaintiffs, +onata Orti> $rionesMs alle*ed o)nership and possession of the sub6ect properties in Cuestion )as that of a trustee in an implied trust under &rticle 1451 of the 'e) Civil Code 9 9 9. 9999 ,n the absence of partition of the estate of #a9imino :. $riones all the properties left upon his death remained o)ned in common by his heirs consistin* of his survivin* spouse and the heirs of his deceased brothers and sisters the herein plaintiffs. +onata Orti> $rionesMs possession and transfer of the title in her name of her late husbandMs properties )as no more than that of a co%o)ner and no prescription shall run in favor of a co%o)ner or co%heir a*ainst his co%o)ners or co%heirs so lon* as he e9pressly or impliedly reco*ni>es the co%o)nership 18ast para*raph, &rt. 4!4, 'e) Civil Code2. :uch titles cannot be used as a shield to perpetrate fraud. 9999 :ince the inventory filed by +onata Orti> $riones 179hibit $2 has been adopted as 79hibit = by defendants 7rlinda Pilapil, Ri>alina Orti> &*uila and the #endo>as, said defendants are bound by the contents thereof. +efendants, ho)ever, failed to sho) the order of the Court of 5irst ,nstance of Cebu dated October ;, 1!5; mentioned in the primary entry boo/ 179hibit 42 and mar/ed as 79hibit 4%C, an omission )hich amounts to suppression of evidence )hich is presumed adverse to the defendantMs interest )hen produced. 3his supposed declaration of heirs declarin* the late +onata O. $riones as the sole, absolute and e9clusive heir of the late #a9imino :. $riones entered in the primary entry boo/ in the office of the Re*ister of +eeds of Cebu City has been made thru +onata O. $rionesMs misrepresentation to the Court as &dministratri9 of the estate of her husband #a9imino :. $riones by failin* to honestly disclose to the Court that the decedent )as survived not only by his )ido) but also by his brothers and sisters andEor their children by ri*ht of representation )hich fact )as /no)n to her at the time of her husbandMs death. 0ence, the R3C declared that the heirs of #a9imino )ere entitled to T of the real properties covered by 3C3s 'o. ;154;, ;154=, ;1544, ;1545, ;154<, and 5 < 4. ,t also ordered 7rlinda to reconvey to the heirs of #a9imino the said properties and to render an accountin* of the fruits thereof. 3he heirs of +onata appealed the R3C +ecision, dated &pril 1! <, to the Court of &ppeals. 3he Court of &ppeals, in its +ecision, ;( promul*ated on =1 &u*ust ;((1, affirmed the R3C +ecision, ratiocinatin* thus N

33 3he contentions of defendants%appellants are devoid of merit. &t the outset, the proceedin* for the issuance of letters of administration )as invalid. 5irstly, +onata did not include in her petition for letters of administration the names, a*es and residences of the heirs as reCuired by Rule "!, :ection ;1b2 of the Rules of Court. :econdly, the court failed to *ive notice to the /no)n heirs that a petition has been filed, and the time and place for hearin* thereof as provided in :ection = of the same rule, to *ive them ample opportunity to oppose it, if )arranted. 3hirdly, the court failed to do its specific duty to reCuire proof, at the hearin* of the petition, that the aforementioned notice has been *iven to the heirs in accordance )ith :ection 5 of the same rule. ConseCuently, the Order declarin* +onata as the sole and e9clusive heir )ould not be bindin* a*ainst herein plaintiffs%appellees. 9999 ,t should be noted that plaintiffs%appelleesM cause of action )as not based merely on fraud but )as primarily anchored on their ri*ht to inheritance and to have a partition of the same, both of )hich are imprescriptible as a *eneral rule. .ith mar/ed relevance is the fact that their Complaint is for #artition, 'nnulment and Recover% of #ossession of Real #ropert%. .ith respect to the ar*ument on implied trust, .e subscribe to the vie) that there e9isted an impliedEconstructive trust )here, throu*h fraudulent representations or by pretendin* to be the sole heir of the deceased, an heir succeeded in havin* the ori*inal title of a land in the name of the deceased cancelled and a ne) one issued in his name thereby enablin* him to possess the land and *et its produce. K$aysa vs. $aysa, KC&L 5= O.4. "; ;, October 1!5"L 3his bein* so, the trustee may claim title by prescription founded on adverse possession )here it appears thatB 1a2 he has performed open and uneCuivocal acts of repudiation amountin* to an ouster of the other co%o)nersG 1b2 such positive acts of repudiation have been made /no)n to the other co%o)nersG and 1c2 the evidence thereon should be clear and convincin*G and 1d2 the period fi9ed by la) has prescribed. K+e 8eon, Partnership, &*ency and 3rusts, 4th 7dition, 1!!<L 3hese conditions )ere not complied )ith in the case at bench. &ssumin* ar*uendo that the issuance of the 3C3 )ould constitute an open and clear repudiation of the trust, it is )ell to note ho)ever that the reCuired period has not yet elapsed. &rticle 11=" K'e) Civil CodeL provides that, " ownership and other real ri hts over immovables also prescribe throu h uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirt% %ears, without need of title or of ood faith ." 3his period should be counted from the date the adverse title )as asserted, that is, from the re*istration of the title. 3he 3C3s coverin* the property in Cuestion )ere re*istered in 1!<( or ;" years at the time of the filin* of the Complaint in 1! ". #oreover, there is neither an adverse possession to spea/ of since +onata and the 0eirs of $riones are deemed co%o)ners of the property in Cuestion in accordance )ith &rticle 1(" . K'e) Civil CodeL 0ence, mere actual possession by +onata )ill not *ive rise to the inference that the possession )as adverse. 3his is because +onata after all is entitled to possession of the property as a co%o)ner. 9999 5urthermore, it is a )ell%entrenched 6urisprudential rule that a co%o)ner may not acCuire e9clusive o)nership of common property thru prescription. KCastillo vs. Court of &ppeals, 8%1 (4<, #arch =1, 1!<4L 9999 ,n determinin* )hether a delay in see/in* to enforce a ri*ht constitutes laches, the e9istence of a confidential relationship bet)een the parties is an important circumstance for consideration. 3he doctrine of laches is not strictly applied bet)een near relatives, and the fact that parties are connected by ties of blood or marria*e tends to e9cuse an other)ise unreasonable delay. K4allardo vs. ,ntermediate &ppellate Court, 4.R. 'o. <""4;, ;! October 1! "L Dnsatisfied )ith the afore%Cuoted +ecision of the Court of &ppeals, the heirs of +onata filed the present Petition, ;1raisin* the follo)in* errorsB ,. 30&3 307 CODR3 O5 &PP7&8: 7RR7+ ,' 'O3 5,'+,'4 307 C&:7 &: 0&-,'4 $77' $&RR7+ $F PR7:CR,P3,O'G ,,. 30&3 307 CODR3 O5 &PP7&8: 7RR7+ ,' 'O3 5,'+,'4 307 C&:7 &: 0&-,'4 $77' $&RR7+ $F 8&C07:G &'+ ,,,. 30&3 307 CODR3 O5 &PP7&8: 7RR7+ ,' RD8,'4 30&3 &88 307 PROP7R3,7:, .07307R C&P,3&8 PROP7R3,7: O5 #&A,#,'O OR CO'JD4&8 PROP7R3,7: O5 #&A,#,'O &'+ +O'&3& $R,O'7:, $7 +,-,+7+ 7HD&88F $73.77' P73,3,O'7R: &'+ R7:PO'+7'3:. Contrary to the conclusions of the Court of &ppeals and the R3C in their respective +ecisions, this Court finds the Petition at bar meritorious and dismisses the Complaint for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real property filed before the R3C by the heirs of #a9imino in Civil Case 'o. C7$%5"!4. 'ot only is the Complaint barred by prior 6ud*ment, the complainants therein, the heirs of #a9imino, failed to satisfactorily establish their ri*ht to the remedies prayed for therein. #a9imino left no )ill at the time of his death, on 1 #ay 1!5;, and his estate )as to be settled in accordance )ith the rules on le*al or intestate succession. 3he heirs of #a9imino, respondents in the Petition at bar, claimed the ri*ht to inherit, to*ether )ith +onata, from the estate of #a9imino, based on the &rticles !!5 and 1((1 of the 'e) Civil Code, )hich read N

34 &R3. !!5. ,n the absence of le*itimate descendants and ascendants, and ille*itimate children and their descendants, )hether le*itimate or ille*itimate, the survivin* spouse shall inherit the entire estate, )ithout pre6udice to the ri*hts of brothers and sisters, nephe)s and nieces, should there be any, under article 1((1. &R3. 1((1. :hould brothers and sisters or their children survive )ith the )ido) or )ido)er, the latter shall be entitled to one%half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. 3he heirs of #a9imino asserted that +onata had fraudulently e9cluded them from the intestate proceedin*s of the estate of #a9imino before the C5, . 3hey )ere not *iven notice of the institution of :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !; %R and the scheduled hearin*s therein. .hen +onata )as declared the "sole, absolute, and e9clusive heir" of #a9imino in the C5, Order, dated ; October 1!5;, and )hen she mana*ed to have the real properties of #a9imino re*istered in her o)n name on the basis of the fore*oin* C5, Order, she should be deemed to have held the said properties in trust for her other co%heirs. 3he R3C in its +ecision, dated &pril 1! <, 6ustified its findin* of implied trust on &rticle 1451 of the 'e) Civil Code, )hich provides that, ".hen land passes by succession to any person and he causes the le*al title to be put in the name of another, a trust is established by implication of la) for the benefit of the true o)ner." 3his Court, thou*h, believes that &rticle 1451 is not applicable to the instant Petition considerin* that it refers to a situation )herein the heir himself causes the re*istration of his le*al title under the name of anotherG the heir, by his voluntary action, establishes the implied trust and constitutes himself as the trustee. ,n contrast, in the Petition herein, +onata mana*ed to have the real properties belon*in* to the estate of #a9imino re*istered under her o)n name to the supposed e9clusion of all other le*al heirs of her deceased husband. ,n such a case, implied trust may be more appropriately in accordance )ith &rticle 145< of the 'e) Civil Code, )hich declares that, ",f the property is acCuired throu*h mista/e or fraud, the person obtainin* it is, by force of la), considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from )hom the property comes." 'o) the foremost Cuestion that needs to be ans)ered is )hether an implied trust under &rticle 145< of the 'e) Civil Code had been sufficiently established in the instant Petition. 3his Court ans)ers in the ne*ative. :ince it )as the respondents, heirs of #a9imino, )ho claimed the e9istence of an implied trust, they bear the burden of provin* that +onata re*istered in her o)n name the real properties belon*in* to the estate of #a9imino either by fraud or mista/e, pursuant to &rticle 145< of the 'e) Civil Code. 3he heirs of #a9imino never contended that +onata may have re*istered the real properties in her name by mista/e, but repeatedly maintain that she did so by fraud. $oth the Court of &ppeals and the R3C, in their respective +ecisions, found that +onata secured the C5, Order, dated (; October 1!5;, and the ne) 3C3s coverin* the real properties in her name fraudulently. .hile it is true that findin*s of fact of the Court of &ppeals and the R3C are bindin* and conclusive upon this Court, such is not absolute, and there are reco*ni>ed e9ceptions thereto. 3his Court 6ustifies its departure from the *eneral rule and the conduct of its o)n revie) of the evidence and other records in the Petition at bar, *iven that 112 the factual conclusions of the Court of &ppeals and the R3C are *rounded entirely on speculation, surmise and con6ectureG 1;2 the inference made )ere manifestly mista/enG and 1=2 the findin*s of fact of the Court of &ppeals and the R3C are conclusions )ithout citation of specific evidence on )hich they are based.;; &t the onset, it should be emphasi>ed that +onata )as able to secure the 3C3s coverin* the real properties belon*in* to the estate of #a9imino by virtue of a C5, Order, dated ; October 1!5;. ,t is undisputed that the said C5, Order )as issued by the C5, in :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !; %R, instituted by +onata herself, to settle the intestate estate of #a9imino. 3he petitioners, heirs of +onata, )ere unable to present a copy of the C5, Order, but this is not surprisin* considerin* that it )as issued =5 years prior to the filin* by the heirs of #a9imino of their Complaint in Civil Case 'o. C7$%5"!4 on = #arch 1! ". 3he e9istence of such C5, Order, nonetheless, cannot be denied. ,t )as recorded in the Primary 7ntry $oo/ of the Re*ister of +eeds on ;" June 1!<(, at 1B1( p.m., as 7ntry 'o. 1"14.;= ,t )as annotated on the 3C3s coverin* the real properties as havin* declared +onata the sole, absolute, and e9clusive heir of #a9imino. 3he non%presentation of the actual C5, Order )as not fatal to the cause of the heirs of +onata considerin* that its authenticity and contents )ere never Cuestioned. 3he alle*ation of fraud by the heirs of #a9imino did not pertain to the C5, Order, but to the manner or procedure by )hich it )as issued in favor of +onata. #oreover, the non%presentation of the C5, Order, contrary to the declaration by the R3C, does not amount to a )illful suppression of evidence that )ould *ive rise to the presumption that it )ould be adverse to the heirs of +onata if produced. ;4 &s this Court already e9pounded in the case of #eople v. "umamo%;5 N 9 9 9 .e reiterate the rule that the adverse presumption from a suppression of evidence is not applicable )hen 112 the suppression is not )illfulG 1;2 the evidence suppressed or )ithheld is merely corroborative or cumulativeG 1,- the evidence is at the disposal of both partiesG and 142 the suppression is an e9ercise of a privile*e. #oreover, if the accused believed that the failure to present the other )itnesses )as because their testimonies )ould be unfavorable to the prosecution, he should have compelled their appearance, by compulsory process, to testify as his o)n )itnesses or even as hostile )itnesses. ,f there is indeed a survivin* copy of the C5, Order, dated ; October 1!5;, then there is no reason to believe that it )ould be e9clusively available only to the heirs of +onata and not to the heirs of #a9imino. ,t is important to note that t)o of the documents relatin* to :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !; %R, namely, 112 the 8etters of &dministration issued in favor of +onata by the C5,, and 1;2 the ,nventory submitted by +onata to the C5,, )ere actually produced before the R3C in Civil Case 'o. C7$%5"!4 by the heirs of #a9imino. ,t only *oes to sho) that the heirs of #a9imino did have access to the records of :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !; %R in )hich the C5, Order, dated ; October 1!5;, )as issued. ,f there )as still a copy of the C5, Order, dated ; October 1!5;, in the records of :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !; %R, and the contents of such Order )ere truly adverse to the heirs of +onata, then it )ould have been more compellin* for the heirs of #a9imino to present it before the R3C in Civil Case 'o. C7$%5"!4, )ith the aid of the appropriate court processes if necessary. 3he C5, Order, dated ; October 1!5;, issued in :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !; %R, effectively settled the intestate estate of #a9imino by declarin* +onata as the sole, absolute, and e9clusive heir of her deceased husband. 3he issuance by the C5, of the said Order, as )ell as its conduct of the entire :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !; %R, en6oy the presumption of validity pursuant to the :ection =1m2 and 1n2 of Rule 1=1 of the Revised Rules of Court, reproduced belo) N SE3. /. *isputable presumptions. N 3he follo)in* presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidenceB

35 9999 1m2 3hat official duty has been re*ularly performedG 1n2 3hat a court, or 6ud*e actin* as such, )hether in the Philippines or else)here, )as actin* in the la)ful e9ercise of 6urisdiction. $y reason of the fore*oin* provisions, this Court must presume, in the absence of any clear and convincin* proof to the contrary, that the C5, in :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !; %R had 6urisdiction of the sub6ect matter and the parties, and to have rendered a 6ud*ment valid in every respectG ;< and it could not *ive credence to the follo)in* statements made by the Court of &ppeals in its +ecision ;" N &t the outset, the proceedin* for the issuance of letters of administration )as invalid. 5irstly, +onata did not include in her petition for letters of administration the names, a*es and residences of the heirs as reCuired by Rule "!, :ection ;1b2 of the Rules of Court. :econdly, the court failed to *ive notice to the /no)n heirs that a petition has been filed, and the time and place for hearin* thereof as provided in :ection = of the same rule, to *ive them ample opportunity to oppose it, if )arranted. 3hirdly, the court failed to do its specific duty to reCuire proof, at the hearin* of the petition, that the aforementioned notice has been *iven to the heirs in accordance )ith :ection 5 of the same rule. 3here )as totally no evidentiary basis for the fore*oin* pronouncements. 5irst of all, the Petition filed by +onata for 8etters of &dministration in :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !; %R before the C5, )as not even referred to nor presented durin* the course of the trial of Civil Case 'o. C7$%5"!4 before the R3C. 0o) then could the Court of &ppeals ma/e a findin* that +onata )illfully e9cluded from the said Petition the names, a*es, and residences of the other heirs of #a9iminoQ :econd, there )as also no evidence sho)in* that the C5, actually failed to send notices of :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !; %R to the heirs of #a9imino or that it did not reCuire presentation of proof of service of such notices. ,t should be remembered that there stands a presumption that the C5, Jud*e had re*ularly performed his duties in :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !; %R, )hich included sendin* out of notices and reCuirin* the presentation of proof of service of such noticesG and, the heirs of #a9imino did not propound sufficient evidence to debun/ such presumption. 3hey only made a *eneral denial of /no)led*e of :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !; %R, at least until 1! 5. 3here )as no testimony or document presented in )hich the heirs of #a9imino cate*orically denied receipt of notice from the C5, of the pendency of :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !; %R. 3he only evidence on record in reference to the absence of notice of such proceedin*s )as the testimony of &urelia $riones 1&urelia2, ; one of the heirs of #a9imino, to )it N H .hen the husband of defendant 7rlinda Pilapil )as presented before this Court he testified that )hen the late +onata Orti> filed a petition to be declared sole heir accordin* to him the brothers and sisters of the late #a9imino $riones )ere notified of the said hearin*. .hat can you say about this, #s. .itnessQ & 'o, , donMt thin/ they )ere notified. 3hey )ould have contested their ri*ht to inherit their brotherMs property because he had no issue )ith his )ife. H 8i/e)ise the same )itness testified that at the time the petition )as *ranted there )as no opposition from the heirs. .hat can you say about this, #s. .itnessQ & , donMt thin/ they )ere notified because , /no) they )ill contest that declaration. &ureliaMs testimony deserves scant credit considerin* that she )as not testifyin* on matters )ithin her personal /no)led*e. 3he phrase ", donMt thin/" is a clear indication that she is merely voicin* out her opinion on ho) she believed her uncles and aunts )ould have acted had they received notice of :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !; %R. ,n further support of their contention of fraud by +onata, the heirs of #a9imino even emphasi>ed that +onata lived alon* the same street as some of the siblin*s of #a9imino and, yet, she failed to inform them of the C5, Order, dated ; October 1!5;, in :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !; %R, and the issuance in her name of ne) 3C3s coverin* the real properties )hich belon*ed to the estate of #a9imino. 3his Court, ho)ever, appreciates such information differently. ,t actually )or/s a*ainst the heirs of #a9imino. :ince they only lived nearby, #a9iminoMs siblin*s had ample opportunity to inCuire or discuss )ith +onata the status of the estate of their deceased brother. :ome of the real properties, )hich belon*ed to the estate of #a9imino, )ere also located )ithin the same area as their residences in Cebu City, and #a9iminoMs siblin*s could have re*ularly observed the actions and behavior of +onata )ith re*ard to the said real properties. ,t is uncontested that from the time of #a9iminoMs death on 1 #ay 1!5;, +onata had possession of the real properties. :he mana*ed the real properties and even collected rental fees on some of them until her o)n death on 1 'ovember 1!"". &fter +onataMs death, 7rlinda too/ possession of the real properties, and continued to mana*e the same and collect the rental fees thereon. +onata and, subseCuently, 7rlinda, )ere so obviously e9ercisin* ri*hts of o)nership over the real properties, in e9clusion of all others, )hich must have already put the heirs of #a9imino on *uard if they truly believed that they still had ri*hts thereto. 3he heirs of #a9imino /ne) he died on 1 #ay 1!5;. 3hey even attended his )a/e. 3hey did not offer any e9planation as to )hy they had )aited == years from #a9iminoMs death before one of them, :ilverio, filed a Petition for 8etters of &dministration for the intestate estate of #a9imino on ;1 January 1! 5. &fter learnin* that the intestate estate of #a9imino )as already settled in :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !; %R, they )aited another t)o years, before institutin*, on = #arch 1! ", Civil Case 'o. C7$%5"!4, the Complaint for partition, annulment and recovery of the real property belon*in* to the estate of #a9imino. 3he heirs of #a9imino put off actin* on their ri*hts to the estate of #a9imino for so lon* that )hen they finally did, attributin* fraud to #a9iminoMs )ife, +onata, the latter had already passed a)ay, on 1 'ovember 1!"", and )as no lon*er around to e9plain and defend herself. 3he delay of the heirs of #a9imino is not )ithout conseCuence, as this Court e9plained in Ramos v. Ramos;! N Parenthetically, it may be noted that the filin* of the instant case lon* after the death of Jose Ramos and other persons involved in the intestate proceedin* renders it difficult to determine with certitude whether the plaintiffs had really been defrauded % .hat Justice :treet said in :inco vs. 8on*a, 51 Phil. 5(", 51 %! is relevant to this caseB "$n passing upon controversies of this character e#perience teaches the danger of accepting lightly charges of fraud made many years after the transaction in "uestion was accomplished, when death may have sealed the lips of the principal actors and changes effected by time may have given a totally different color to the cause of controversy. ,n the case before us the *uardian, 7milio 3eve>, is dead. 3he same is true of 3rinidad +ia*o, mother of the defendant &*ueda 8on*aG )hile &*apito 8on*a is no) livin* in :pain. ,t )ill be borne in mind also that, insofar as oral proof

36 is concerned, the char*e of fraud rests principally on the testimony of a sin*le )itness )ho, if fraud )as committed, )as a participant therein and )ho naturally )ould no) be an9ious, so far as practicable, to put the blame on others. ,n this connection it is )ell to bear in mind the follo)in* impressive lan*ua*e of #r. Justice :toryB "9 9 9 *ut length of time necessarily obscures all human evidence! and as it thus removes from the parties all the immediate means to verify the nature of the original transactions, it operates by way of presumption, in favor of innocence, and against imputation of fraud. ,t )ould be unreasonable, after a *reat len*th of time, to reCuire e9act proof of all the minute circumstances of any transaction, or to e9pect a satisfactory e9planation of every difficulty, real or apparent, )ith )hich it may be encumbered. 3he most that can fairly be e9pected, in such cases, if the parties are livin*, from the frailty of memory, and human infirmity, is, that the material facts can be *iven )ith certainty to a common intentG and, if the parties are dead, and the cases rest in confidence, and in parol a*reements, the most that )e can hope is to arrive at probable con6ectures, and to substitute *eneral presumptions of la), for e9act /no)led*e. &raud, or breach of trust, ought not lightly to be imputed to the living! for, the legal presumption is the other way! as to the dead, who are not here to answer for themselves, it would be the height of injustice and cruelty, to disturb their ashes, and violate the sanctity of the grave, unless the evidence of fraud be clear, beyond a reasonable doubt 1Prevost vs. 4rat>, < .heat. KD.:.L, 4 1, 4! 2." ,t is *ranted that the heirs of #a9imino had ri*hts to his intestate estate upon his death on 1 #ay 1!5;, by virtue of &rticles !!5 and 1((5 of the 'e) Civil Code. 'onetheless, the C5,, in :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !; %R, had declared +onata as the sole, absolute, and e9clusive heir of #a9imino in its Order, dated ; October 1!5;. 3his Court, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, can only presume that :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !; %R )as fair and re*ular, )hich )ould conseCuently mean that the C5, complied )ith the procedural reCuirements for intestate proceedin*s such as publication and notice to interested parties, and that the C5, had carefully revie)ed and studied the claims of creditors, as )ell as the ri*hts of heirs to the estate, before issuin* the Order, dated ; October 1!5;. 3here is no sho)in* that the Order, dated ; October 1!5;, had been appealed and had, therefore, lon* attained finality, )hich even this Court )ould be bound to respect. .ithout doubt, if the action for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession instituted by the heirs of #a9imino in Civil Case 'o. C7$%5"!4 succeeds, then, it )ould be a circumvention of the finality of the C5, Order, dated ; October 1!5;, in :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !; %R, because, necessarily, a reco*nition of the ri*hts of the other heirs to the estate of #a9imino )ould violate the sole, absolute, and e9clusive ri*ht of +onata to the same estate previously determined by the C5,. &s this Court had discussed in Ramos v. Ortu!ar=( N ,f )e are to assume that Richard 0ill and #arvin 0ill did not formally intervene, still they )ould be concluded by the result of the proceedin*s, not only as to their civil status but as the distribution of the estate as )ell. &s this Court has held in #anolo vs. Paredes, 4" Phil. != , .The proceeding for probate is one in rem /01 (yc., 2345- and the court ac"uires jurisdiction over all persons interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed by sec. 4,1 (. 6. (.! and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of them..1:ee also in re 7state of Johnson, =! Phil. 15<2 "& final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees." 1:antos vs. Roman Catholic $ishop of 'ueva Caceres, 45 Phil. !52 There is no reason why, by analogy, these salutory doctrines should not apply to intestate proceedings. 3he only instance that )e can thin/ of in )hich a party interested in a probate proceedin* may have a final liCuidation set aside is )hen he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or throu*h mista/e or inadvertence not imputable to ne*li*ence. 7ven then, the better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and e#ecuted and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of. ,n summary, the heirs of #a9imino failed to prove by clear and convincin* evidence that +onata mana*ed, throu*h fraud, to have the real properties, belon*in* to the intestate estate of #a9imino, re*istered in her name. ,n the absence of fraud, no implied trust )as established bet)een +onata and the heirs of #a9imino under &rticle 145< of the 'e) Civil Code. +onata )as able to re*ister the real properties in her name, not throu*h fraud or mista/e, but pursuant to an Order, dated ; October 1!5;, issued by the C5, in :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !; %R. 3he C5, Order, presumed to be fairly and re*ularly issued, declared +onata as the sole, absolute, and e9clusive heir of #a9iminoG hence, ma/in* +onata the sin*ular o)ner of the entire estate of #a9imino, includin* the real properties, and not merely a co%o)ner )ith the other heirs of her deceased husband. 3here bein* no basis for the Complaint of the heirs of #a9imino in Civil Case 'o. C7$%5"!4, the same should have been dismissed. ,' -,7. O5 307 5OR74O,'4, the assailed +ecision of the Court of &ppeals in C&%4R C- 'o. 551!4, dated =1 &u*ust ;((1, affirmin* the +ecision of the Cebu City R3C in Civil Case 'o. C7$%5"!4, dated ; :eptember 1! <, is hereby R7-7R:7+ and :73 &:,+7G and the Complaint for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession filed by the heirs of #a9imino in Civil Case 'o. C7$%5"!4 is hereby +,:#,::7+. :O OR+7R7+. G.R. No. 142670. )&8% 22, 2110 .I3ENTE AGOTE 4 6ATO,, Petitioners, vs. HON. 6AN*E, F. ,OREN7O, 5re"i'i ; )&';e, RT3, Br$ #! 4/, 6$ i8$ $ ' 5EO5,E OF THE 5HI,I55INES,Respondents. GAR3IA, J.9 ,n this appeal by )ay of a petition for revie) on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner .i#e te A;ote % 6$to8 see/s to annul and set aside the follo)in* resolutions of the Court of &ppeals in 3AEG.R. S5 No. 2991E*D:, to )itB 1. Re"o8&tio '$te' September 14, 1999,1 dismissin* the Petition for Certiorari )ith Prayer for the ,ssuance of a 3emporary Restrainin* Order filed by the petitioner a*ainst the 0onorable #anuel 5. 8oren>o, Presidin* Jud*e, Re*ional 3rial Court, #anila, $ranch 4= for refusin* to retroactively apply in his favor Republic &ct 'o. ;!4;G and, ;. Re"o8&tio '$te' Febr&$r% 8, 2111,= denyin* petitionerMs motion for reconsideration.

37 &s culled from the pleadin*s on record, the follo)in* are the undisputed factual antecedentsB Petitioner -icente &*ote y #atol )as earlier char*ed before the sala of respondent 6ud*e )ith ,lle*al Possession of 5irearms under Presidential +ecree 'o. 1 <<4 and violation of CO#787C Resolution 'o. ; ;<5 14un $an2, doc/eted as Criminal Cases 'o. !<%14! ;( and !<%14! ;1, respectively, alle*edly committed, as follo)sB CR,#,'&8 C&:7 'O. !<%14! ;( 3hat on or about &pril ;", 1!!< in the City of #anila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there )illfully, unla)fully, /no)in*ly have in possession and under his custody and control, One 112 .= cal. Rev. )ithout serial no. )ith four 142 live bullets. .ithout first havin* secured from the proper authorities the necessary license therefor. CO'3R&RF 3O 8&.. CR,#,'&8 C&:7 'O. !<%14! ;1 3hat on or about &pril ;", 1!!<, in the City of #anila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there, )illfully, unla)fully and /no)in*ly have in his possession and under his custody and control one 112 .= cal. Rev. )ithout serial number, )ith four 142 live ammunitionEbullets in the chamber, by then and there carryin* the same alon* -. #apa 79t. :ta. #esa, this City, )hich is a public place on the aforesaid date )hich is covered by an election period, )ithout first securin* the )ritten authority from the CO#787C, as provided for by the CO#787C Resolution 'o. ; ; , in relation to R& 'o. "1<< 14un $an2. CO'3R&RF 3O 8&.. On arrai*nment, petitioner pleaded "'ot 4uilty" to both char*es. 3hereafter, the t)o 1;2 cases )ere tried 6ointly. 7ventually, in a decision dated #ay 1 , 1!!!, the trial court rendered a 6ud*ment of conviction in both cases, separately sentencin* petitioner to an indeterminate penalty of ten 11(2 years and one 112 day of prision ma%or, as minimum, to ei*hteen 11 2 years ei*ht 1 2 months and one 112 day of reclusion temporal, as ma9imum, in accordance )ith P+. 'o. 1 << in 3rim. 3$"e No. 96E149821 1ille*al possession of firearm2, and to a prison term of one 112 year in 3rim. 3$"e No. 96E149821 1violation of the CO#787C Resolution on *un ban2. #ean)hile, on June <, 1!!", Republic &ct 'o. ;!4< )as approved into la). Pointin* out, amon* others, that the penalty for ille*al possession of firearms under P.+. 'o. 1 << has already been reduced by the subseCuent enactment of Rep. &ct 'o. ;!4, hence, the latter la), bein* favorable to him, should be the one applied in determinin* his penalty for ille*al possession of firearms, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the #ay 1 , 1!!! decision of the trial court. ,n its order dated July 15, 1!!!," ho)ever, the trial court denied petitionerMs motion, sayin*B .hile the la) 1R.&. ;!42 is indeed favorable to the accused and therefore should be made retroactive )e are also *uided by &rt. 4 of the Civil Code )hich states that la)s shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. Republic &ct ;!4 did not so provide that it shall have a retroactive effect. 3he :upreme Court li/e)ise in the case of Padilla vs. C& declaredB U3he trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply the *overnin* la) at the time of the appellantMs commission of the offense for it is a rule that la)s are repealed only by subseCuent ones. ,ndeed, it is the duty of 6udicial officers to respect and apply the la) as it stands. 3herefrom, petitioner )ent to the Court of &ppeals on a petition for certiorari )ith prayer for a temporary restrainin* order, thereat doc/eted as 3AEG.R. S5 No. 2991E*D:. ,n the herein assailed re"o8&tio '$te' September 14, 1999, the appellate court dismissed petitionerMs recourse on t)o 1;2 *rounds, to )itB 1a2 the remedy of certiorari availed of by petitioner is improper since he should have appealed from the July 15, 1!!! order of the trial courtG and 1b2 lac/ of 6urisdiction, as the issue involved is a pure Cuestion of la) co*ni>able by the :upreme Court. .ith his motion for reconsideration havin* been denied by the appellate court in its subseCuent re"o8&tio o+ Febr&$r% 8, 2111,! petitioner is no) )ith us, submittin* for resolution the follo)in* issuesB 112 )hether the Court of &ppeals erred in dismissin* his petition for certiorariG and 1;2 )hether the courts belo) erred in not *ivin* Rep. &ct 'o. ;!4 a retroactive application. 3he petition is partly meritorious. &t the outset, it must be stressed that petitioner never put in issue the factual findin*s of the trial court. .hat he Cuestions is said courtMs le*al conclusion that Rep. &ct 'o. ;!4 cannot be retroactively applied to him. DnCuestionably, the issue raised is one purely of la). &s )e have said in =acawiwili Fold =inin and *evelopment Co., Inc. v. Court of 'ppealsI1( 5or a Cuestion to be one of la), the same must not involve an e9amination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the liti*ants or any one of them. &nd the distinction is )ell%/no)nB there is a Cuestion of la) in a *iven case )hen the doubt or difference arises as to )hat the la) is on a certain state of factsG there is a Cuestion of fact )hen the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of the facts alle*ed.

38 Considerin* that 9/ud ments of re ional trial courts in the e+ercise of their ori inal /urisdiction are to be elevated to the Court of 'ppeals in cases when appellant raises &uestions of fact or mi+ed &uestions of fact and law9, )hile9appeals from /ud ments of the Hsame courtsJ in the e+ercise of their ori inal /urisdiction must be brou ht directl% to the $upreme Court in cases where the appellant raises onl% &uestions of law9 11, petitioner should have appealed the trial courtMs rulin* to this Court by )ay of a petition for revie) on certiorari in accordance )ith Rule 45 of the 1!!" Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,1; pursuant to Rule 41, :ection ; 1c2 of the same Rules, vi!B :7C. ;. #odes of appeal. N 1a2 999 999 999 1b2 999 999 999 1c2 &ppeal by certiorari. N ,n all cases )here only Cuestions of la) are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the :upreme Court by petition for revie) on certiorari in accordance )ith Rule 45. $y reason, then, of the availability to petitioner of the remedy of a petition for revie) under Rule 45, his ri*ht to resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule <5 )as effectively foreclosed, precisely because one of the reCuirements for the availment of the latter remedy is that " there should be no appeal, or an% plain, speed% and ade&uate remed% in the ordinar% course of law",1= the remedies of appeal and certiorari bein* mutually e9clusive and not alternative or successive.14 &s correctly observed by the Court of &ppeals, )hat petitioner should have done )as to ta/e an appeal from the trial courtMs order of July 15, 1!!! )hich denied his motion for reconsideration of the #ay 1 , 1!!! 6ud*ment of conviction. PetitionerMs case is )orse compounded by the fact that even his period for appeal had already prescribed )hen he filed )ith the Court of &ppeals his certiorari petition in C&%4.R. :P 'o. ;!!1%D+I. 3he Rollo of said case reveals that petitioner received his copy of the trial courtMs order denyin* his motion for reconsideration on )&8% 21, 1999.&s the same Rollo sho)s, it )as only on A&;&"t 2/, 1999, or after more than fifteen 1152 days )hen petitioner filed his )ron* remedy of certiorari )ith the appellate court. $e that as it may, the Court feels that it must sCuarely address the issue raised in this case re*ardin* the retroactivity of Rep. &ct 'o. ;!4, )hat )ith the reality that the provisions thereof are undoubtedly favorable to petitioner. 5or this purpose, then, )e shall e9ercise our prero*ative to set aside technicalities in the Rules and "hold the bull by its horns", so to spea/. &fter all, the po)er of this Court to suspend its o)n rules )henever the interest of 6ustice reCuires is not )ithout le*al authority or precedent. ,n $olicitor Feneral, et. al. vs. .he =etropolitan =anila 'uthorit%,15 )e heldB DnCuestionably, the Court has the po)er to suspend procedural rules in the e9ercise of its inherent po)er, as e9pressly reco*ni>ed in the Constitution, to promul*ate rules concernin* Upleadin*, practice and procedure in all courts.M ,n proper cases, procedural rules may be rela9ed or suspended in the interest of substantial 6ustice, )hich other)ise may be miscarried because of a ri*id and formalistic adherence to such rules. 999 999 999 999 .e have made similar rulin*s in other cases, thusB $e it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools desi*ned to facilitate the attainment of 6ustice. 3heir strict and ri*id application, )hich )ould result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial 6ustice, must al)ays be avoided. 999 3ime and a*ain, this Court has suspended its o)n rules and e9cepted a particular case from their operation )henever the hi*her interests of 6ustice so reCuire. .e shall no) proceed to determine )hether the provisions of Rep. &ct 'o. ;!4 amendin* P.+. 'o. 1 << can be retroactively applied to this case. 0ere, the t)o 1;2 crimes for )hich petitioner )as convicted by the trial court, i.e., 112 ille*al possession of firearms under P.+. 'o. 1 << and 1;2 violation of CO#787C Resolution 'o. ; ;< on *un ban, )ere both committed by the petitioner on &pril ;", 1!!<. 5or the crime of ille*al possession of firearms in Crim. Case 'o. !<%14! ;(, he )as sentenced to suffer a prison term ran*in* from ten 11(2 years and one 112 day of prision ma%or, as minimum, to 11 2 ei*hteen years, ei*ht 1 2 months and one 112 day of reclusion temporal, as ma9imum, in accordance )ith P.+. 'o. 1 <<, :ection 1 of )hich readsB :7C3,O' 1. Dnla)ful #anufacture, :ale, &cCuisition, +isposition or Possession of 5irearms or &mmunition or ,nstruments Dsed or ,ntended to be Dsed in the #anufacture of 5irearms of &mmunition. @ T!e pe $8t% o+ re#8&"io tempor$8 i it" m$<im&m perio' to re#8&"io perpet&$ "!$88 be impo"e' upon any person )ho shall unla)fully manufacture, deal in, acCuire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition. 17mphasis supplied2 .hen Rep. &ct 'o. ;!4 too/ effect on July <, 1!!",1< the penalty for ille*al possession of firearms )as lo)ered, dependin* on the class of firearm possessed, vi!B :7C3,O' 1. :ection 1 of Presidential +ecree 'o. 1 <<, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follo)sB U:7C3,O' 1. Dnla)ful #anufacture, :ale, &cCuisition, +isposition or Possession of 5irearms or &mmunition or ,nstruments Dsed or ,ntended to be Dsed in the #anufacture of 5irearms or &mmunition. @ T!e pe $8t% o+ pri"io #orre##io $8 i it" m$<im&m perio' and a fine of not less than 5ifteen thousand pesos 1P15,(((2 shall be imposed upon any person )ho shall unla)fully manufacture, deal in, acCuire, dispose, or possess any lo) po)ered firearm, such as rimfire hand*un, .= ( or .=; and other firearm of similar firepo)er, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunitionB 5roBi'e', T!$t o ot!er #rime >$" #ommitte'.

39 3he penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of 3hirty thousand pesos 1P=(,(((2 shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as hi*h po)ered firearm )hich includes those )ith bores bi**er in diameter than .= caliber and ! millimeter such as caliber .4(, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered po)erful such as caliber .=5" and caliber .;; center%fire ma*num and other firearms )ith firin* capability of full automatic and by burst of t)o or threeB 5roBi'e', !o>eBer, T!$t o ot!er #rime >$" #ommitte' b% t!e per"o $rre"te'. 17mphasis supplied2 $ased on the fore*oin*, petitioner contends that the reduced penalty under Rep. &ct 'o. ;!4 should be the one imposed on him. :i*nificantly, in its 6$ i+e"t$tio I ,ie& o+ 3omme t,1" the Office of the :olicitor 4eneral a*rees )ith the petitioner, positin* further that the statement made by this Court in #eople vs. "a%son1 to the effect that the provisions for a li*hter penalty under Rep. &ct 'o. ;!4 does not apply if another crime has been committed, should not be applied to this case because the proviso in :ection 1 of said la) that "no other crime was committed9 must refer only to those crimes committed )ith the &"e of an unlicensed firearm and not )hen the other crime is not related to the use thereof or )here the la) violated merely criminali>es the possession of the same, li/e in the case of election *un ban, as here. &s early as &u*ust 1!!", the month after Rep. &ct 'o. ;!4 too/ effect,1! this Court has pronounced in Fon!ales vs. Court of 'ppeals;( that said la) must be *iven retroactive effect in favor of those accused under P.+. 'o. 1 <<. :ince then, this Court had consistently adhered to the Fon!ales rulin*.;1 5or sure, in #eople vs. Valde!,;; )here the accused )as char*ed )ith the comple9 crime of multiple murder )ith double frustrated murder and ille*al possession of firearms and ammunitions under t)o separate informations, this Court even too/ a bolder stance by applyin* Rep. &ct 'o. ;!4 retroactively so that the accused therein may not be convicted of the separate crime of ille*al possession of firearms, but refused to apply the same retroactively so as to a**ravate the crime of murder. 3he Valde! rulin* had been applied in a host of subseCuent cases.;= Fet, in other cases,;4 althou*h the Court had *iven Rep. &ct 'o. ;!4 retroactive effect so as to prevent the conviction of an accused of the separate crime of ille*al possession of firearm )hen the said unlicensed firearm )as G&"e'G to commit the crime of murder or homicide, the Court did not appreciate this "use" of such unlicensed firearm as an a**ravatin* circumstance as provided therein, )hen the "use" of an unlicensed firearm )as not specifically alle*ed in the information, as reCuired by the Rules on Criminal Procedure. ,n the li*ht of the e9istin* rulin*s and 6urisprudence on the matter, the present case ta/es center sta*e presentin*, this time, another t)ist, so to spea/. Petitioner, )ho )as char*ed of ille*al possession of firearms )as also char*ed of another offenseB -iolation of CO#787C Resolution 'o. ; ;< 14un $an2, but the unlicensed firearm )as not "used" or dischar*ed in this case. 3he Cuestion then )hich appears to be of first impression, is )hether or not the unlicensed firearm should be actually "used" and dischar*ed in the course of committin* the other crime in order that :ec. 1, Rep. &ct 'o. ;!4 )ill apply so that no separate crime of ille*al possession of firearms may be char*ed. 8et us ta/e a loo/ at the 6urisprudence once a*ain. ,n Cupcupin vs. #eople,;5 the accused )as char*ed and convicted for t)o 1;2 separate crimes of ille*al possession of firearms, and ille*al possession of prohibited dru*s. ,n the more recent case of #eople vs. 'lmeida,;< ho)ever, althou*h the accused )as acCuitted of the separate char*e of ille*al possession of firearm for lac/ of evidence, the Court nevertheless made the follo)in* clear pronouncementB 5urthermore, in any event, the Court has ruled in previous cases that in vie) of the enactment of Republic &ct 'o. ;!4, t!ere #$ be o "ep$r$te o++e "e o+ i88e;$8 po""e""io o+ +ire$rm" $ ' $mm& itio i+ t!ere i" $ ot!er #rime #ommitte' "&#! $", i t!i" #$"e, t!$t o+ i88e;$8 po""e""io o+ '$ ;ero&" 'r&;".17mphasis supplied2 ,n 'lmeida, it should be noted that the unlicensed firearm )as merely found lyin* around, to*ether )ith the prohibited dru*s, and therefore, )as not bein* "used" in the commission of an offense. 4iven this CourtMs aforeCuoted pronouncement in 'lmeida, can the accused in the present case still be separately convicted of t)o 1;2 offenses of ille*al possession of firearms and violation of *un ban, more so because as in'lmeida, the unlicensed firearm )as not actually "used" or dischar*ed in committin* the other offenseQ ,n #eople vs. ;alpan =. -ad/aalam,;" this Court, interpretin* the sub6ect proviso in :ection 1 of Rep. &ct 'o. ;!4, applied the basic principles in criminal la), and cate*orically heldB 999 A "imp8e re$'i ; t!ereo+ "!o>" t!$t i+ $ & 8i#e "e' +ire$rm i" &"e' i t!e #ommi""io o+ $ % #rime, t!ere #$ be o "ep$r$te o++e "e o+ "imp8e i88e;$8 po""e""io o+ +ire$rm". 0ence, if the Uother crimeM is murder or homicide, ille*al possession of firearms becomes merely an a**ravatin* circumstance, not a separate offense. :ince direct assault )ith multiple attempted homicide )as committed in this case, appellant can no lon*er be held liable for ille*al possession of firearms. #oreover, penal la)s are construed liberally in favor of the accused. ,n this case, the plain meanin* of R& ;!4Ms simple lan*ua*e is most favorable to herein appellant. -erily, no other interpretation is 6ustified, for the lan*ua*e of the ne) la) demonstrates the le*islative intent to favor the accused. &ccordin*ly, appellant cannot be convicted of t)o separate offenses of ille*al possession of firearms and direct assault )ith attempted homicide. 999 +++ +++ +++ +++ The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that 7no other crime was committed by the person arrested8. If the intention of the law in the second para raph were to refer onl% to homicide and murder, it should have e+pressl% said so, as it did in the third para raph. Veril%, where the law does not distin uish, neither should we.>6mphasis supplied?. 3he aforementioned rulin* )as reiterated and applied in the subseCuent cases of #eople vs. Farcia,; )here the 6ud*ment of conviction of the accused% appellants for ille*al possession of firearms )as set aside there bein* another crime N /idnappin* for ransom N )hich they )ere perpetratin* at the same timeG #eople vs. 7ernal,;!)here the Court retroactively applied Rep. &ct 'o. ;!4 in accused%appellantMs favor because it )ould mean his acCuittal from the separate offense of ille*al possession of firearmsG and #eople vs. 7ustamante,=( )here, in refusin* to convict the accused%appellant of the separate

40 offense of ille*al possession of firearms, the Court declared that insofar as it is favorable to the appellant, the provisions of Rep. &ct 'o. ;!4 should be applied liberally and retroactively in that appellant must be acCuitted of the char*e of ille*al possession of firearms. 4uided by the fore*oin*, the Court cannot but set aside petitionerMs conviction in Criminal Case 'o. !<%14! ;( for ille*al possession of firearm since another crime )as committed at the same time, i.e., violation of CO#787C Resolution 'o. ; ;< or the 4un $an. &dmittedly, this rulin* is not )ithout mis*ivin*s considerin* that it )ould mean petitionerMs acCuittal of the more serious offense of ille*al possession of firearms )hich carries a much heavier penalty than violation of the CO#787C *un%ban resolution. 0o)ever, as )e have rationali>ed in -ad/aalamI=1 999 ,ndeed, the accused may evade conviction for ille*al possession of firearms by usin* such )eapons in committin* an even li*hter offense, li/e alarm and scandal or sli*ht physical in6uries, both of )hich are punishable by arresto menor. 3his conseCuence, ho)ever, necessarily arises from the lan*ua*e of R& ;!4, )hose )isdom is not sub6ect to the CourtMs revie). &ny perception that the result reached here appears un)ise should be addressed to Con*ress. ,ndeed, the Court has no discretion to *ive statutes a ne) meanin* detached from the manifest intendment and lan*ua*e of the le*islature. Our tas/ is constitutionally confined only to applyin* the la) and 6urisprudence to the proven facts, and )e have done so in this case. 3he solemn po)er and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the la) does not include the po)er to correct by readin* into the la) )hat is not )ritten therein. .hile )e understand respondent #eople:s contention that the "use" of the firearm seemed to have been the main consideration durin* the deliberations of the sub6ect provision of Rep. &ct 'o. ;!4, the fact remains that the )ord "use" never found its )ay into the final version of the bill )hich eventually became Rep. &ct 'o. ;!4. 3he CourtMs hands are no) tied and it cannot supply the perceived deficiency in the final version )ithout contravenin* the most basic principles in the interpretation of penal la)s )hich had al)ays leaned in favor of the accused. Dnder our system of *overnment )here po)ers are allocated to the three 1=2 *reat branches, only the 8e*islature can remedy such deficiency, if any, by proper amendment of :ec. 1 of Rep. &ct 'o. ;!4. &s )ritten, :ec. 1, Rep. &ct 'o. ;!4 restrains the Court from convictin* petitioner of the separate crime of ille*al possession of firearm despite the fact that, as in 'lmeida, the unlicensed firearm )as not actually "used". 5or sure, there is, in this case, closer relation bet)een possession of unlicensed firearm and violation of the CO#787C *un%ban than the ille*al possession of unlicensed firearm to the crime of ille*al possession of prohibited dru*s in'lmeida. CHEREFORE, Criminal Case 'o. !<%14! ;( for ille*al possession of firearms is hereby +,:#,::7+ )hile the 6ud*ment of conviction in Criminal Case 'o. !<%14! ;1 for violation of CO#787C Resolution 'o. ; ;< in relation to Rep. &ct 'o. "1<< 14un $an2, is &55,R#7+. :ince petitioner has already served more than the penalty imposed upon him by the trial court in Criminal Case 'o. !<%14! ;1, his immediate release from custody is hereby OR+7R7+ unless detained for some other la)ful cause. :O OR+7R7+. G.R. No. 168241 Febr&$r% 9, 2111

A*RORA B. GO, Petitioner, vs. E,6ER S*NBAN*N,V GEORGIE S. TAN, DORIS S*NBAN*N $ ' RI3HARD S*NBAN*N, Respondents. DE, 3ASTI,,O, J.: .hen a procedural rule is amended for the benefit of liti*ants for the furtherance of the administration of 6ustice, it shall be retroactively applied to li/e)ise favor actions then pendin*, as eCuity deli*hts in eCuality. 5or non%compliance )ith the formal reCuirements of a petition, the Court of &ppeals 1C&2 dismissed the certiorari petition filed by herein petitioner &urora 4o 1&urora2, promptin* her to file before us this petition for revie) on certiorari. &urora no) calls for liberality in the application of the procedural rules in the hope that she )ould eventually be *iven a chance to be heard by the C& after the trial court denied her prayer for an e9tension of time to file a notice of appeal. 5actual &ntecedents ,n 'ovember ;(((, respondents filed a suit for dama*es a*ainst &urora, her husband Fiu .ai :an* 1:an*2, and Fiu%4o 7mployment &*ency 1hereinafter collectively referred to as defendants2, doc/eted as Civil Case 'o. C7$%;5"" , before the Re*ional 3rial Court 1R3C2 of Cebu, $ranch 5 . 1 3he respondents claimed that the spouses occupied the *round floor portion of their house in < %5 4eneral JunCuera :treet, Cebu City under a one%year lease contract and had used the premises as the business office of Fiu%4o 7mployment &*ency. 3his alle*edly increased the ris/ of loss by fire, and thus a breach of )arranty in the fire insurance policies that the respondents made )hich described the property as residential type. ; Only &urora filed her &ns)er )ith &ffirmative +efenses and Counter%Claim.= ,n her ans)er, &urora averred that they already left the premises sometime in ;((1and that durin* the entirety of their stay, they used the leased floor as a private residence and as a lod*in* house. :he denied that their employment a*ency held office there. :he also pointed out that the lease contract )as terminated )hen the one%year term e9pired in July 1!!<, and that she )as not privy to the contracts of insurance since she )as not informed of the contractsM e9istence. 3o her, )hether the house )as used as a business office or as a lod*in* house )as immaterial as there )as no increased ris/ of fire either )ay. &urora demanded actual dama*es as she claimed that she )or/s in 0on* Ion* on a no%)or/%no%pay basis and the suit )ould result in spendin* airfare and lost earnin*s. &fter the respondents concluded their presentation of evidence, &urora moved on October ; , ;((; that her testimony be ta/en by deposition upon )ritten interro*atories, as she )as unsure as to )hen she could come home to the Philippines considerin* that her )or/ schedule as a court interpreter in 0on* Ion* is erratic. :he averred that arran*ements have already been made )ith the Philippine consulate in 0on* Ion* to ta/e her deposition. 4 Over

41 the ob6ection of the respondents, the R3C *ranted &uroraMs motion on 'ovember ;1, ;((;.50o)ever, &uroraMs deposition )as ta/en only on January ; , ;((4< after her follo)%up letter dated 'ovember ", ;((= to the Philippine consulate. " $efore this deposition )as ta/en, the R3C in its +ecember 1, ;((= Order already deemed the defendants to have )aived their ri*ht to present their evidence and considered the case submitted for resolution since more than a year had elapsed from the date the R3C *ranted &uroraMs motion to have her testimony be ta/en by deposition. &*ain, only &urora moved for reconsideration ! and prayed that the +ecember 1, ;((= Order be recalled and instead admit the deposition. :he attributed the delay of her deposition%ta/in* to the consulateMs fault, as she )as passed from one officer to another or no officer )as available. On January ;<, ;((4, the R3C rendered 6ud*ment1( findin* only &urora liable and orderin* her to pay moral dama*es, attorneyMs fees, liti*ation e9penses and costs.11 3he trial court disre*arded her t)o%pa*e transcript of deposition )hen it received the same on #arch 5, ;((4. 1; &uroraMs former counsel of record, &tty. Jude 0enrit> R. Fcon* 1&tty. Fcon*2, belatedly discovered about this adverse 6ud*ment )hen he received from respondentsM counsel a #otion to +irect ,ssuance of 7ntry of Jud*ment and .rit of 79ecution 1= on #arch 1<, ;((4. ,t turned out that althou*h he had already previously informed the court of his ne) office address, the court mista/enly sent the January ;<, ;((4 +ecision to his former office address. 14 0e raised this in his opposition to the motion filed by the respondents.15 5indin* this point meritorious, the court denied respondentsM motion, rulin* that the 6ud*ment a*ainst &urora has not yet attained finality as the 15%day period to appeal, counted from #arch 1<, ;((4, has not yet lapsed. 1< &urora filed her #otion for Reconsideration1" on #arch =1, ;((4, the last day to file her appeal. 3he court in its &pril ;", ;((4 Order1 denied said motion. &tty. Fcon* received the notice of denial on #ay <, ;((4, thus *ivin* his client a day left to file her appeal. 79plainin* that &urora has been busy campai*nin* for the local elections as she )as runnin* for the position of to)n mayor in Calubian, 8eyte 1! and that he and his client have yet to discuss the pros and cons of appealin* the case, &tty. Fcon* sou*ht for the rela9ation of the procedural rules by filin* an e9tension of 15 days to file &uroraMs notice of appeal.;( &tty. Fcon* thereafter filed the 'otice of &ppeal on #ay 11, ;((4. Rulin* of the Re*ional 3rial Court ,n its #ay 1;, ;((4 Order, the R3C denied the notice of appeal, vi>B .hile there are rulin*s of the :upreme Court declarin* that the period to appeal is not e9tendible, there are also instances )hen it allo)ed appeals to be perfected despite their filin* out of time. 9 9 9 ,n the instant case, the delay is due to defendant%4oMs runnin* for an elective post. :uch is no e9cuse. ,n other )ords, contrary to the belief of this court that &urora 4o had been and is out of the country, she in fact is in the Philippines. ConseCuently, she could have the time to confer )ith her counsels in order to prepare for her appeal. &ccordin*ly, the #otion for 79tension of 3ime to 5ile 'otice of &ppeal is +7',7+ for lac/ of merit and the 'otice of &ppeal is hereby declared filed out of time. :O OR+7R7+.;1 &urora sou*ht for reconsideration but it )as denied by the R3C on June 1(, ;((4.;; Rulin* of the Court of &ppeals 5ilin* her petition for certiorari )ith the C& by )ay of re*istered mail on &u*ust 1=, ;((4,;= &urora claimed that the R3C *ravely abused its discretion in refusin* to rela9 the period for filin* the notice of appeal. :he contended that her situation is enou*h reason to *rant her prayer. :he averred that she could not 6ust leave the campai*n trail 6ust to discuss matters )ith her la)yer about her case as she )as busy in 8eyte at the homestretch of the campai*n period. 0o)ever, the C& on +ecember , ;((4, dismissed the petition 1doc/eted as C&%4.R. :P 'o. 5 !"2 for bein* procedurally fla)ed, vi>B 12 3he -erificationECertification of 'on%5orum :hoppin* is si*ned by only one petitioner )ithout a :pecial Po)er of &ttorneyE:ecretaryMs Certificate authori>in* her to represent the t)o 1;2 other petitionersG ;2 3he &ffidavit of :ervice sho)s that respondents )ere personally served copies of the petition but lac/s e9planation )hy service of the petition )ith this Court )as not done personally 1:ection 11, Rule 1= of the Revised Rules of Court2G =2 Counsel for petitioners failed to indicate his P3R and ,$P numbersG 42 Certified true KsicL copies of the assailed decision dated January ;<, ;((4 attached to the petition is a mere photocopy of a certified true copyG

42 52 3he follo)in* copies of pleadin*s and other relevant documents referred to in the petition )hich )ould support the alle*ations therein are not attachedB a2 ComplaintG and, b2 &ns)er.;4 ,nvo/in* the liberal construction of procedural rules, petitioner &urora as/ed for reconsideration ;5 )ith the follo)in* 6ustificationsB 12 & certificationEverification of one of a number of principal parties is sufficient compliance. &lthou*h her certiorari petition named her, her spouse, and Fiu%4o 7mployment &*ency, as Upetitioners,M her co%defendants )ere not held liable in the lo)er court. ,t is only she )ho is interested in filin* the certiorari petition for her to be able to appeal, hence her lone si*nature. ;2 &nent the lac/ of e9planation of )hy personal service to the C& )as not resorted to, &urora averred that it )as redundant to e9plain )hy re*istered mail )as used considerin* the distance bet)een Cebu, )here she is based, and the C& in #anila. =2 3he professional ta9 receipt 1P3R2 and ,nte*rated $ar of the Philippines 1,$P2 receipt numbers )ere inadvertently overloo/ed. 0o)ever, the defect )as cured )hen &tty. Fcon* included the numbers )hen he subseCuently filed on October 14, ;((4 his 'otice of Chan*e of &ddress;< )ith the C&. 42 Huestioned in the certiorari are the #ay 1; and June 1(, ;((4 Orders that denied &uroraMs prayer for an e9tension of time to file her notice of appeal. ReCuirin* her to additionally append to the C& petition the certified true copies of the January ;<, ;((4 R3C +ecision 1i.e., the decision on the merits of the case2, the complaint, and the ans)er )as not necessary as these documents are not relevant and material to the issue to be resolved. 5indin* &uroraMs reasonin* unacceptable, the C& insisted on a strict observance of the rules in its &pril , ;((5 ResolutionB &s to the first *round, petitioners merely disa*ree )ith the deficiency )hich occasioned the outri*ht dismissal of their petition )ithout even curin* the said defect. :uffice it to say here that the petition itself contains more than one petitioner. 'o less than the :upreme Court pronounced in 8oCuias vs. Office of the Ombudsman that )here there are t)o or more plaintiffs or petitioners, a complaint or petition si*ned by only KsicL of the parties is defective unless heEshe is authori>ed by his co%parties. 9 9 9 9999 3he reason )hy petitionersM petition )as dismissed based on the second defect )as because the said petitionlac/s e9planation )hy service of the petition )ith this Court )as not done personally, not much for havin* filed the same by re*istered mail. ,n other )ords, the dismissal )as not due to the fact that the petition )as filed by re*istered mail, but because of the failure to e9plain )hy the personal service )as not resorted to. 3hen a*ain, petitioners did not even bother to cure such defect. &nent the third *round, counsel for petitioners posits that his failure to indicate in the petition for certiorari his P3R and ,$P numbers )as cured by his succeedin* 'otice of Chan*e &ddress filed )ith this Court. 0o)ever, a closer of KsicL e9amination of the same reveals that the same )as only filed on October 14, ;((4 or some t)o 1;2 months after the petition for certiorari )as filed on &u*ust 1=, ;((4. ,f it )as really the intention of counsel for petitioners to cure such defect, he could have done it immediately after filin* the petition. 0ad it not been due to the filin* of the notice of chan*e of address, .e doubt if petitioners )ould have cured such defect. Considerin* the fore*oin*, .e deem it unnecessary to discuss the other *rounds raised by petitioners. 9 9 9 9;" 3he PartiesM Respective &r*uments $elievin* that her case should not have been dismissed for procedural defects, &urora assails the +ecember , ;((4 and &pril , ;((5 Resolutions of the C&, reiteratin* to this Court that she deserves to be accorded the chance to prove to the C& that the R3C had unfairly denied her motion for e9tension of time to file her notice of appeal. On the other hand, respondents defend the stance of the C&, insistin* that perfection of an appeal is 6urisdictional and mandatoryG and that the circumstances do not 6ustify *rantin* &urora leniency in the application of the procedural rules. #oreover, ever since she filed her motion for reconsideration on the R3CMs January ;<, ;((4 +ecision, she had in the interim sufficient time to thin/ about the ne9t le*al action to ta/e before the trial court issued its order of denial on &pril ;", ;((4. ,ssue 3he sole Cuestion to resolve is )hether the formal deficiencies in the petition before the C& may be rela9ed in the interest of 6ustice. Our Rulin*

43 3he si*naturesEauthori>ations of :an* and Fiu%4o 7mployment &*ency in the verification and certification on non%forum shoppin* are not necessary. ,n filin* a certiorari petition, one a**rieved by a courtMs 6ud*ment, order or resolution must verify hisEher petition and must also attach a s)orn certification of non%forum shoppin*.; ,n dismissin* &uroraMs petition, the C& cited as one of its *rounds the lac/ of si*natures or authori>ations of :an* and Fiu%4o 7mployment &*ency in the verification and certification of non%forum shoppin*. :uch si*natures, ho)ever, may be dispensed )ith as these parties are not involved in the petition. &lthou*h the caption in &uroraMs petition before the C& erroneously included :an* and Fiu%4o 7mployment &*ency as petitioners, its contents reveal that it is solely &urora )ho is the Uperson a**rieved,M as she is the one )ho assailed before the C& the R3CMs Order that denied her notice of appeal and, hence, she should be the one )ho should si*n the petition. 'otably, &urora is the only one held liable by the trial court for dama*es and thus is the one interested in filin* an appeal and in elevatin* the case to the C&. #oreover, only &urora filed her ans)er before the R3C )hile :an* and Fiu%4o 7mployment &*ency did not file any. 'on%submission of certified true copy of the January ;<, ;((4 +ecision and copies of the Complaint and &ns)er not fatal. &nother *round cited by the C& )as the non%submission of the certified true copy of the January ;<, ;((4 +ecision as )ell as the failure to attach copies of the complaint and ans)er in &uroraMs petition. 3he second para*raph of :ection 1 of Rule <5 reCuires the submission of a certified true copy of the 6ud*ment, order or resolution sub6ect of the petition as )ell as the submission of copies of all pleadin*s and documents relevant to the petition. "3he initial determination of )hat pleadin*s, documents or order are relevant and pertinent to the petition rests on the petitioner. K:hould the C& opine that additional documents must be submitted to*ether )ith the petition, it mayL 1a2 dismiss the petition under the last para*raph of K:ection =,L Rule 4< of the Rules of CourtG 1b2 order the petitioner to submit the reCuired additional pleadin*s, documents, or order )ithin a specific period of timeG or 1c2 order the petitioner to file an amended petition appendin* thereto the reCuired pleadin*s, documents or order )ithin a fi9ed period.";! .e emphasi>e that not all pleadin*s and parts of case records are reCuired to be attached, but only those )hich are material and pertinent that they may provide the basis for a determination of a prima facie case for abuse of discretion.=( 3hus, )e a*ree )ith the petitioner that the C& reCuired pleadin*s immaterial to the issue presented before it. 3he Cuestioned sub6ect of certiorari does not touch upon the substantive merits of the suit for dama*es a*ainst &urora but actually involves the refusal of the trial court to entertain her notice of appeal due to late filin*. 3he complaint and ans)er are not indispensable at all in the resolution of this issue, the contents of )hich are already summari>ed in the January ;<, ;((4 +ecision attached to the petition. 5urthermore, since &uroraMs petition assails the #ay 1; and June 1(, ;((4 Orders of the R3C, it is the certified true copies of these orders that are reCuired to be attached to the petition. On the other hand, photocopy of the January ;<, ;((4 +ecision )ill suffice, as this document is material and pertinent to the petition. 5ailure to indicate P3R and ,$P Official Receipt 'umbers not fatal. 3he failure of petitionerMs former counsel, &tty. Fcon*, to indicate in the petition before the C& his P3R and ,$P numbers for the year ;((4 )as obviously an oversi*ht. & perusal of the records of the case )ould sho) that counsel had duly paid the reCuired dues for that year and that his P3R and ,$P receipt numbers are indicated in the pleadin*s he had filed )ith the R3C. =1 &lthou*h he omitted to indicate the numbers on &uroraMs C& petition, the same numbers )ere nevertheless stated on his 'otice of Chan*e of &ddress, around t)o months before the appellate court issued the Cuestioned +ecember , ;((4 Resolution. Rules on perfectin* appeals must be strictly complied )ithG liberal application available only under e9ceptional circumstances. .henever practicable, personal service and personal filin* of pleadin*s are al)ays the preferred modes of service. Dnder :ection 11, Rule 1= of the Rules of Court, should one deviate from the *eneral rule, it is mandatory for himEher to submit a )ritten e9planation )hy the pleadin* )as not personally filedEserved. Other)ise, the court has the discretion to consider the paper as not filed. Petitioner should be a)are that a court, in reasonably e9ercisin* discretionary po)er to dismiss a petition that violated the rule on )ritten e9planation for resortin* to modes other than personal service, also has to ta/e into account another factor, i.e., the prima facie merit of the pleadin* sou*ht to be e9pun*ed for violation of :ection 11. =; 5or this reason, )e do not find any *rave abuse on the part of the C& in e9ercisin* its discretion to dismiss &uroraMs petition. ,ndeed, 6udicial notice may be ta/en that personal service is impracticable considerin* the distance bet)een Cebu and #anila, and that #usa v. &mor== supports &uroraMs ar*ument that a )ritten e9planation )hy service )as not done personally mi*ht have been superfluous considerin* the evident distance bet)een the appellate court and the place )here the petition )as posted. ,t must be emphasi>ed, ho)ever, that provisions )ith respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfectin* appeals are strictly applied and are only rela9ed in very e9ceptional circumstances on eCuitable considerations.=4 ,n the case at bar, the reason behind the filin* of an e9tension of time to file her notice of appeal )as not per se, a compellin* and a hi*hly e9ceptional one. Just as it is the la)yerMs duty to safe*uard her clientMs interest, it is the responsibility of the client to ma/e herself available to her counsel and open the lines of communication, even durin* the busy election period, for their discussions of le*al options. :he is obli*ed to be vi*ilant in fi*htin* for her cause and in protectin* her ri*hts. ,t is &urora?s duty, "as a client, to be in touch )ith KherL counsel so as to be constantly posted about the case. K:heL is mandated to inCuire from KherL counsel about the status and pro*ress of the case from time to time and cannot e9pect that all KsheL has to do is sit bac/, rela9 and a)ait the outcome of the case."=5 &dditionally, "motions for e9tension are not *ranted as a matter of ri*ht but in the sound discretion of the court, and la)yers should never presume that their motions for e9tension or postponement )ill be *ranted or that they )ill be *ranted the len*th of time they pray for."=< ,n spite of petitionerMs error, the Ufresh period ruleM amendment as held in 'eypes v. Court of &ppeals )ill be applied to her benefit &urora had almost lost her statutory privile*e to appeal, but in vie) of our rulin* on 'eypes v. Court of &ppeals, =")e shall *rant &uroraMs petition.0avvphi0 ,n 'eypes )e held that a liti*ant is *iven another fresh period of 15 days to perfect an appeal after receipt of the order of denial of hisEher motion for reconsiderationEne) trial before the R3C. .e saidB

44 3o standardi>e the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford liti*ants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allo) a fresh period of 15 days )ithin )hich to file the notice of appeal in the Re*ional 3rial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissin* a motion for a ne) trial or motion for reconsideration. 0enceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 4( *overnin* appeals from the #unicipal 3rial Courts to the Re*ional 3rial CourtsG Rule 4; on petitions for revie) from the Re*ional 3rial Courts to the Court of &ppealsG Rule 4= on appeals from Cuasi%6udicial a*encies to the Court of &ppeals and Rule 45 *overnin* appeals by certiorari to the :upreme Court. 3he ne) rule aims to re*iment or ma/e the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denyin* the motion for ne) trial, motion for reconsideration 1)hether full or partial2 or any final order or resolution. = 17mphasis supplied.2 "KPLrocedural la)s may be *iven retroactive effect to actions pendin* and undetermined at the time of their passa*e, there bein* no vested ri*hts in the rules of procedure."=! 'eypes, )hich )e rendered in :eptember ;((5, has been applied retroactively to a number of cases4( )herein the ori*inal period to appeal had already lapsed subseCuent to the denial of the motion for reconsideration. &uroraMs situation is no e9ception, and thus she is entitled to benefit from the amendment of the procedural rules. 3he denial of &uroraMs #otion for Reconsideration of the trial courtMs January ;<, ;((4 decision )as received by her former counsel on #ay <, ;((4. :ans her motion for e9tension to file a notice of appeal, )ith the fresh period rule under 'eypes, she still has until #ay ;1, ;((4 to file her notice of appeal and thus, had timely filed her notice of appeal on #ay 11, ;((4. .07R75OR7, the petition is 4R&'37+. 3he challen*ed Resolutions of the Court of &ppeals in C&%4.R. :P 'o. 5 !" dated +ecember , ;((4 and &pril , ;((5 are R7-7R:7+ and :73 &:,+7G the Orders of the Re*ional 3rial Court of Cebu, $ranch 5 , dated #ay 1; and June 1(, ;((4 that denied &urora 4oMs notice of appeal are li/e)ise R7-7R:7+ and :73 &:,+7. 3he Re*ional 3rial Court of Cebu, $ranch 5 is hereby +,R7C37+ to *ive due course to petitionerMs 'otice of &ppeal dated #ay 11, ;((4. :O OR+7R7+. G.R. No. 107047 Febr&$r% 2/, 2111

HEIRS OF ED*ARDO SI6ON, Petitioners, vs. E,.INV 3HAN AND THE 3O*RT OF A55EA,S, Respondent. BERSA6IN, J.: 3here is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arisin* from the issuance of an unfunded chec/ prohibited and punished under $atas Pambansa $ilan* ;; 1$P ;;2. &ntecedents On July 11, 1!!", the Office of the City Prosecutor of #anila filed in the #etropolitan 3rial Court of #anila 1#e3C2 an information char*in* the late 7duardo :imon 1:imon2 )ith a violation of $P ;;, doc/eted as Criminal Case 'o. ;"5= 1 entitled People v. 7duardo :imon. 3he accusatory portion readsB 3hat sometime in +ecember 1!!< in the City of #anila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there )illfully, unla)fully and feloniously ma/e or dra) and issue to 7lvin Chan to apply on account or for value 8andban/ Chec/ 'o. ((("; ( dated +ecember ;<, 1!!< payable to cash in the amount of P==<,(((.(( said accused )ell /no)in* that at the time of issue sheEheEthey did not have sufficient funds in or credit )ith the dra)ee ban/ for payment of such chec/ in full upon its presentment, )hich chec/ )hen presented for payment )ithin ninety 1!(2 days from the date thereof )as subseCuently dishonored by the dra)ee ban/ for &ccount Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said 7lvin Chan the amount of the chec/ or to ma/e arran*ement for full payment of the same )ithin five 152 ban/in* days after receivin* said notice. CO'3R&RF 3O 8&.. 1 #ore than three years later, or on &u*ust =, ;(((, respondent 7lvin Chan commenced in the #e3C in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the principal amount of P==<,(((.((, coupled )ith an application for a )rit of preliminary attachment 1doc/eted as Civil Case 'o. !15%((2. ; 0e alle*ed in his complaint the follo)in*B 999 ;. :ometime in +ecember 1!!< defendant employin* fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation encashed a chec/ dated +ecember ;<, 1!!< in the amount of P==<,(((.(( to the plaintiff assurin* the latter that the chec/ is duly funded and that he had an e9istin* account )ith the 8and $an/ of the Philippines, 9ero9 copy of the said chec/ is hereto attached as &nne9 "&"G =. 0o)ever, )hen said chec/ )as presented for payment the same )as dishonored on the *round that the account of the defendant )ith the 8and $an/ of the Philippines has been closed contrary to his representation that he has an e9istin* account )ith the said ban/ and that the said chec/ )as duly funded and )ill be honored )hen presented for paymentG 4. +emands had been made to the defendant for him to ma/e *ood the payment of the value of the chec/, 9ero9 copy of the letter of demand is hereto attached as &nne9 "$", but despite such demand defendant refused and continues to refuse to comply )ith plaintiffMs valid demandG

45 5. +ue to the unla)ful failure of the defendant to comply )ith the plaintiffMs valid demands, plaintiff has been compelled to retain the services of counsel for )hich he a*reed to pay as reasonable attorneyMs fees the amount of P5(,(((.(( plus additional amount of P;,(((.(( per appearance. &8874&3,O' ,' :DPPOR3 O5 PR&F7R 5OR PR78,#,'&RF &33&C0#7'3 <. 3he defendant as previously alle*ed has been *uilty of fraud in contractin* the obli*ation upon )hich this action is brou*ht and that there is no sufficient security for the claims sou*ht in this action )hich fraud consist in the misrepresentation by the defendant that he has an e9istin* account and sufficient funds to cover the chec/ )hen in fact his account )as already closed at the time he issued a chec/G ". 3hat the plaintiff has a sufficient cause of action and this action is one )hich falls under :ection 1, sub%para*raph 1d2, Rule 5" of the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines and the amount due the plaintiff is as much as the sum for )hich the plaintiff see/s the )rit of preliminary attachmentG . 3hat the plaintiff is )illin* and able to post a bond conditioned upon the payment of dama*es should it be finally found out that the plaintiff is not entitled to the issuance of a )rit of preliminary attachment.= On &u*ust !, ;(((, the #e3C in Pasay City issued a )rit of preliminary attachment, )hich )as implemented on &u*ust 1", ;((( throu*h the sheriff attachin* a 'issan vehicle of :imon.4 On &u*ust 1", ;(((, :imon filed an ur*ent motion to dismiss )ith application to char*e plaintiffMs attachment bond for dama*es, 5 pertinently averrin*B 999 On the *round of litis pendentia, that is, as a conseCuence of the pendency of another action bet)een the instant parties for the same cause before the #etropolitan 3rial Court of #anila, $ranch A 11(2 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. 7duardo :imon", doc/eted thereat as Criminal Case 'o. ;"5= 1% CR, the instant action is dismissable under :ection 1, 1e2, Rule 1<, 1!!" Rules of Civil Procedure, 999 999 .hile the instant case is civil in nature and character as contradistin*uished from the said Criminal Case 'o. !15%(( in the #etropolitan 3rial Court of #anila, $ranch A 11(2, the basis of the instant civil action is the herein plaintiffMs criminal complaint a*ainst defendant arisin* from a char*e of violation of $atas Pambansa $l*. ;; as a conseCuence of the alle*ed dishonor in plaintiffMs hands upon presentment for payment )ith dra)ee ban/ a 8and $an/ Chec/ 'o. ((("; ( dated +ecember ;<, 1!!< in the amount of P==<,(((% dra)n alle*edly issued to plaintiff by defendant )ho is the accused in said case, a photocopy of the Criminal information filed by the &ssistant City Prosecutor of #anila on June 11, 1!!" hereto attached and made inte*ral part hereof as &nne9 "1". ,t is our understandin* of the la) and the rules, that, ")hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arisin* from the offense char*ed is impliedly instituted )ith the criminal action, unless the offended party e9pressly )aives the civil action or reserves his ri*ht to institute it separately 999. On &u*ust ;!, ;(((, Chan opposed :imonMs ur*ent motion to dismiss )ith application to char*e plaintiffMs attachment bond for dama*es, statin*B 1. 3he sole *round upon )hich defendant see/s to dismiss plaintiffMs complaint is the alle*ed pendency of another action bet)een the same parties for the same cause, contendin* amon* others that the pendency of Criminal Case 'o. ;"5= 1%CR entitled "People of the Philippines vs. 7duardo :imon" renders this case dismissableG ;. 3he defendant further contends that under :ection 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, the filin* of the criminal action, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arisin* from the offense char*ed is impliedly instituted )ith the criminal action )hich the plaintiff does not contestG ho)ever, it is the submission of the plaintiff that an implied reservation of the ri*ht to file a civil action has already been made, first, by the fact that the information for violation of $.P. ;; in Criminal Case 'o. ;"5= 41 does not at all ma/e any alle*ation of dama*es suffered by the plaintiff nor is there any claim for recovery of dama*esG on top of this the plaintiff as private complainant in the criminal case, durin* the presentation of the prosecution evidence )as not represented at all by a private prosecutor such that no evidence has been adduced by the prosecution on the criminal case to prove dama*esG all of these )e respectfully submit demonstrate an effective implied reservation of the ri*ht of the plaintiff to file a separate civil action for dama*esG =. 3he defendant relies on :ection = sub%para*raph 1a2 Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court )hich mandates that after a criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final 6ud*ment has been rendered in the criminal actionG ho)ever, the defendant overloo/s and conveniently failed to consider that under :ection ;, Rule 111 )hich provides as follo)sB ,n the cases provided for in &rticles =1, =;, ==, =4 and ;1"" of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brou*ht by the in6ured party durin* the pendency of criminal case provided the ri*ht is reserved as reCuired in the precedin* section. :uch civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall reCuire only a preponderance of evidence. ,n as much as the case is one that falls under &rt. == of the Civil Code of the Philippines as it is based on fraud, this action therefore may be prosecuted independently of the criminal actionG

46 4. ,n fact )e )ould even venture to state that even )ithout any reservation at all of the ri*ht to file a separate civil action still the plaintiff is authori>ed to file this instant case because the plaintiff see/s to enforce an obli*ation )hich the defendant o)es to the plaintiff by virtue of the ne*otiable instruments la). 3he plaintiff in this case sued the defendant to enforce his liability as dra)er in favor of the plaintiff as payee of the chec/. &ssumin* the alle*ation of the defendant of the alle*ed circumstances relative to the issuance of the chec/, still )hen he delivered the chec/ payable to bearer to that certain Pedro +omin*o, as it )as payable to cash, the same may be ne*otiated by delivery by )ho ever )as the bearer of the chec/ and such ne*otiation )as valid and effective a*ainst the dra)erG 5. ,ndeed, assumin* as true the alle*ations of the defendant re*ardin* the circumstances relative to the issuance of the chec/ it )ould be entirely impossible for the plaintiff to have been a)are that such chec/ )as intended only for a definite person and )as not ne*otiable considerin* that the said chec/ )as payable to bearer and )as not even crossedG <. .e contend that )hat cannot be prosecuted separate and apart from the criminal case )ithout a reservation is a civil action arisin* from the criminal offense char*ed. 0o)ever, in this instant case since the liability of the defendant are imposed and the ri*hts of the plaintiff are created by the ne*otiable instruments la), even )ithout any reservation at all this instant action may still be prosecutedG ". 0avin* this sho)n, the merits of plaintiffMs complaint the application for dama*es a*ainst the bond is totally )ithout any le*al support and perforce should be dismissed outri*ht.< On October ;=, ;(((, the #e3C in Pasay City *ranted :imonMs ur*ent motion to dismiss )ith application to char*e plaintiffMs attachment bond for dama*es," dismissin* the complaint of Chan becauseB 999 &fter study of the ar*uments of the parties, the court resolves to 4R&'3 the #otion to +ismiss and the application to char*e plaintiffMs bond for dama*es. 5or "litis pendentia" to be a *round for the dismissal of an action, the follo)in* reCuisites must concurB 1a2 identity of parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actionsG 1b2 identity of ri*hts asserted and relief prayed for, the relief bein* founded on the same actsG and 1c2 the identity in the t)o 1;2 cases should be such that the 6ud*ment, )hich may be rendered in one )ould, re*ardless of )hich party is successful, amount to res 6udicata in the other. 999 & close perusal of the herein complaint denominated as ":um of #oney" and the criminal case for violation of $P $l*. ;; )ould readily sho) that the parties are not only identical but also the cause of action bein* asserted, )hich is the recovery of the value of 8andban/ Chec/ 'o. ((("; ( in the amount of P==<,(((.((. ,n both civil and criminal cases, the ri*hts asserted and relief prayed for, the reliefs bein* founded on the same facts, are identical. PlaintiffMs claim that there is an effective implied )aiver of his ri*ht to pursue this civil case o)in* to the fact that there )as no alle*ation of dama*es in $P $l*. ;; case and that there )as no private prosecutor durin* the presentation of prosecution evidence is unmeritorious. ,t is basic that )hen a complaint or criminal ,nformation is filed, even )ithout any alle*ation of dama*es and the intention to prove and claim them, the offended party has the ri*ht to prove and claim for them, unless a )aiver or reservation is made or unless in the meantime, the offended party has instituted a separate civil action. 999 3he over%all import of the said provision conveys that the )aiver )hich includes indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and dama*es arisin* under &rticles =;, ==, and =4 of the Civil Code must be both clear and e9press. &nd this must be lo*ically so as the primordial ob6ective of the Rule is to prevent the offended party from recoverin* dama*es t)ice for the same act or omission of the accused. ,ndeed, the evidence discloses that the plaintiff did not )aive or made a reservation as to his ri*ht to pursue the civil branch of the criminal case for violation of $P $l*. ;; a*ainst the defendant herein. 3o the considered vie) of this court, the filin* of the instant complaint for sum of money is indeed le*ally barred. 3he ri*ht to institute a separate civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affordin* the offended party a reasonable opportunity to ma/e such reservation. 999 7ven assumin* the correctness of the plaintiffMs submission that the herein case for sum of money is one based on fraud and hence fallin* under &rticle == of the Civil Code, still prior reservation is reCuired by the Rules, to )itB ",n the cases provided for in &rticles =1, =;, ==, =4 and ;1"" of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brou*ht by the in6ured party durin* the pendency of criminal case provided the ri*ht is reserved as reCuired in the precedin* section. :uch civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall reCuire only a preponderance of evidence." 999 .07R75OR7, premises considered, the court resolves toB 1. +ismiss the instant complaint on the *round of "litis pendentia"G ;. +issolveE8ift the .rit of &ttachment issued by this court on &u*ust 14, ;(((G =. Char*e the plaintiffMs bond the amount of P==<,(((.(( in favor of the defendant for the dama*es sustained by the latter by virtue of the implementation of the )rit of attachmentG 4. +irect the $ranch :heriff of this Court to R7:3OR7 )ith utmost dispatch to the defendantMs physical possession the vehicle sei>ed from him on &u*ust 1<, ;(((G and

47 5. +irect the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P5,(((.(( by )ay of attorneyMs fees. :O OR+7R7+. ChanMs motion for reconsideration )as denied on +ecember ;(, ;(((, vi>B Considerin* that the plaintiffMs ar*uments appear to be a mere repetition of his previous submissions, and )hich submissions this court have already passed uponG and ta/in* into account the inapplicability of the ratio decidendi in the 3actaCuin vs. Palileo case )hich the plaintiff cited as clearly in that case, the plaintiff therein e9pressly made a reservation to file a separate civil action, the #otion for Reconsideration is +7',7+ for lac/ of merit. :O OR+7R7+. On July =1, ;((1, the Re*ional 3rial Court 1R3C2 in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of ChanMs complaint, disposin*B ! .07R75OR7, findin* no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby &55,R#7+ in toto. :O OR+7R7+. On :eptember ;<, ;((1, Chan appealed to the Court of &ppeals 1C&2 by petition for revie),1( challen*in* the propriety of the dismissal of his complaint on the *round of litis pendentia. ,n his comment, 11 :imon countered that Chan )as *uilty of bad faith and malice in prosecutin* his alle*ed civil claim t)ice in a manner that caused him 1:imon2 utter embarrassment and emotional sufferin*sG and that the dismissal of the civil case because of the valid *round of litis pendentia based on :ection 1 1e2, Rule 1< of the 1!!" Rules of Civil Procedure )as )arranted. On June ;5, ;((;, the C& promul*ated its assailed decision,1; overturnin* the R3C, vi>B 999 &s a *eneral rule, an offense causes t)o 1;2 classes of in6uries. 3he first is the social in6ury produced by the criminal act )hich is sou*ht to be repaired throu*h the imposition of the correspondin* penalty, and the second is the personal in6ury caused to the victim of the crime )hich in6ury is sou*ht to be compensated throu*h indemnity )hich is also civil in nature. 3hus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." 3he offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arisin* from the commission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either deemed instituted )ith the criminal action or is separately instituted. Rule 111, :ection 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, )hich became effective on +ecember 1, ;(((, provides thatB 1a2 .hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arisin* from the offense char*ed shall be deemed instituted )ith the criminal action unless the offended party )aives the civil action, reserves the ri*ht to institute it separately or institute the civil action prior to the criminal action. Rule 111, :ection ; further statesB &fter the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arisin* therefrom cannot be instituted until final 6ud*ment has been entered in the criminal action. 0o)ever, )ith respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under &rticles =;, ==, =4 and ;1"< of the Civil Code arisin* from the same act or omission, the rule has been chan*ed. ,n +#P, 7mployees Credit &ssociation vs. -ele>, the :upreme Court pronounced that only the civil liability arisin* from the offense char*ed is deemed instituted )ith the criminal action unless the offended party )aives the civil action, reserves his ri*ht to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. :pea/in* throu*h Justice Pardo, the :upreme Court heldB "3here is no more need for a reservation of the ri*ht to file the independent civil action under &rticles =;, ==, =4 and ;1"< of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 3he reservation and )aiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arisin* from the offense char*ed. 3his does not include recovery of civil liability under &rticles =;, ==, =4, and ;1"< of the Civil Code of the Philippines arisin* from the same act or omission )hich may be prosecuted separately )ithout a reservation". Rule 111, :ection = readsB :ec. =. .hen civil action may proceed independently. ,n the cases provided in &rticles =;, ==, =4, and ;1"< of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brou*ht by the offended party. ,t shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall reCuire only a preponderance of evidence. ,n no case, ho)ever, may the offended party recover dama*es t)ice for the same act or omission char*ed in the criminal action.

48 3he chan*es in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertainin* to independent civil actions )hich became effective on +ecember 1, ;((( are applicable to this case. Procedural la)s may be *iven retroactive effect to actions pendin* and undetermined at the time of their passa*e. 3here are no vested ri*hts in the rules of procedure. 999 3hus, Civil Case 'o. C-%!4%1;4, an independent civil action for dama*es on account of the fraud committed a*ainst respondent -ille*as under &rticle == of the Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there )as no reservation as to its filin*." ,t must be pointed that the abovecited case is similar )ith the instant suit. 3he complaint )as also brou*ht on alle*ation of fraud under &rticle == of the Civil Code and committed by the respondent in the issuance of the chec/ )hich later bounced. ,t )as filed before the trial court, despite the pendency of the criminal case for violation of $P ;; a*ainst the respondent. .hile it may be true that the chan*es in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertainin* to independent civil action became effective on +ecember 1, ;(((, the same may be *iven retroactive application and may be made to apply to the case at bench, since procedural rules may be *iven retroactive application. 3here are no vested ri*hts in the rules of procedure. ,n vie) of the rulin* on the first assi*ned error, it is therefore an error to ad6ud*e dama*es in favor of the petitioner. .07R75OR7, the petition is hereby 4R&'37+. 3he +ecision dated July 1=, ;((1 rendered by the Re*ional 3rial Court of Pasay City, $ranch 1( affirmin* the dismissal of the complaint filed by petitioner is hereby R7-7R:7+ and :73 &:,+7. 3he case is hereby R7#&'+7+ to the trial court for further proceedin*s. :O OR+7R7+. On #arch 14, ;((=, the C& denied :imonMs motion for reconsideration.1= 0ence, this appeal, in )hich the petitioners submit that the C& erroneously premised its decision on the assessment that the civil case )as an independent civil action under &rticles =;, ==, =4, and ;1"< of the Civil CodeG that the C&Ms reliance on the rulin* in +#P, 7mployees Credit Cooperative ,nc. v. -ele>14 stretched the meanin* and intent of the rulin*, and )as contrary to :ections 1 and ; of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal ProcedureG that this case )as a simple collection suit for a sum of money, precludin* the application of :ection = of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 15 ,n his comment,1< Chan counters that the petition for revie) should be denied because the petitioners used the )ron* mode of appealG that his cause of action, bein* based on fraud, )as an independent civil actionG and that the appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case did not preclude the filin* of his separate civil action. ,ssue 3he lone issue is )hether or not ChanMs civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded chec/ 1Civil Case 'o. !15%((2 )as an independent civil action. Rulin* 3he petition is meritorious. & &pplicable 8a) and Jurisprudence on the Propriety of filin* a separate civil action based on $P ;; 3he :upreme Court has settled the issue of )hether or not a violation of $P ;; can *ive rise to civil liability in $anal v. Jud*e 3adeo, Jr., 1" holdin*B 999 &rticle ;( of the 'e) Civil Code providesB 7very person )ho, contrary to la), )ilfully or ne*li*ently causes dama*e to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Re*ardless, therefore, of )hether or not a special la) so provides, indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the dama*e, loss or in6ury directly suffered as a conseCuence of the )ron*ful act of another. 3he indemnity )hich a person is sentenced to pay forms an inte*ral part of the penalty imposed by la) for the commission of a crime 1Huemel v. Court of &ppeals, ;; :CR& 44, citin* $a*tas v. +irector of Prisons, 4 Phil <!;2. 7very crime *ives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the *uilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thin*, repair of the dama*e, and indemnification for the losses 1Dnited :tates v. $ernardo, 1! Phil ;<52. 999

49 Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. 3he payee of the chec/ is entitled to receive the payment of money for )hich the )orthless chec/ )as issued. 0avin* been caused the dama*e, she is entitled to recompense. :urely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of $atas Pambansa $l*. ;; to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty%handed by e9cludin* the civil liability of the offender, *ivin* her only the remedy, )hich in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of havin* to file a separate civil suit. 3o do so may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value of the chec/ due her, thereby un6ustly enrichin* the errant dra)er at the e9pense of the payee. 3he protection )hich the la) see/s to provide )ould, therefore, be brou*ht to nau*ht. 999 0o)ever, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncin* chec/ issued in contravention of $P ;;. 3his is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective +ecember 1, ;(((, )hich relevantly providesB :ection 1. ,nstitution of criminal and civil actions. % 1a2 .hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arisin* from the offense char*ed shall be deemed instituted )ith the criminal action unless the offended party )aives the civil action, reserves the ri*ht to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. 3he reservation of the ri*ht to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presentin* its evidence and under circumstances affordin* the offended party a reasonable opportunity to ma/e such reservation. .hen the offended party see/s to enforce civil liability a*ainst the accused by )ay of moral, nominal, temperate, or e9emplary dama*es )ithout specifyin* the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filin* fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the 6ud*ment a)ardin* such dama*es. .here the amount of dama*es, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the correspondin* filin* fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filin* thereof in court. 79cept as other)ise provided in these Rules, no filin* fees shall be reCuired for actual dama*es. 'o counterclaim, cross%claim or third%party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action )hich could have been the sub6ect thereof may be liti*ated in a separate civil action. 11a2 1b2 3he criminal action for violation of $atas Pambansa $l*. ;; shall be deemed to include the correspondin* civil action. 'o reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allo)ed.1 Dpon filin* of the aforesaid 6oint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filin* fees based on the amount of the chec/ involved, )hich shall be considered as the actual dama*es claimed. .here the complaint or information also see/s to recover liCuidated, moral, nominal, temperate or e9emplary dama*es, the offended party shall pay the filin* fees based on the amounts alle*ed therein. ,f the amounts are not so alle*ed but any of these dama*es are subseCuently a)arded by the court, the filin* fees based on the amount a)arded shall constitute a first lien on the 6ud*ment. .here the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated )ith the criminal action upon application )ith the court tryin* the latter case. ,f the application is *ranted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance )ith section ; of the Rule *overnin* consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. :ection =. .hen civil action may proceed independently. N ,n the cases provided in &rticles =;, ==, =4 and ;1"< of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brou*ht by the offended party. ,t shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall reCuire only a preponderance of evidence. ,n no case, ho)ever, may the offended party recover dama*es t)ice for the same act or omission char*ed in the criminal action. 3he aforeCuoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect )hen Chan commenced Civil Case 'o. !15%(( on &u*ust =, ;(((, are nonetheless applicable. ,t is a9iomatic that the retroactive application of procedural la)s does not violate any ri*ht of a person )ho may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally ob6ectionable. 3he reason is simply that, as a *eneral rule, no vested ri*ht may attach to, or arise from, procedural la)s.1! &ny ne) rules may validly be made to apply to cases pendin* at the time of their promul*ation, considerin* that no party to an action has a vested ri*ht in the rules of procedure,;( e9cept that in criminal cases, the chan*es do not retroactively apply if they permit or reCuire a lesser Cuantum of evidence to convict than )hat is reCuired at the time of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity )ould be unconstitutional for bein* e+ post facto under the Constitution.;1 #oreover, the application of the rule )ould not be precluded by the violation of any assumed vested ri*ht, because the ne) rule )as adopted from :upreme Court Circular 5"%!" that too/ effect on 'ovember 1, 1!!". :upreme Court Circular 5"%!" statesB &ny provision of la) or Rules of Court to the contrary not)ithstandin*, the follo)in* rules and *uidelines shall henceforth be observed in the filin* and prosecution of all criminal cases under $atas Pambansa $l*. ;; )hich penali>es the ma/in* or dra)in* and issuance of a chec/ )ithout funds or creditB 1. 3he criminal action for violation of $atas Pambansa $l*. ;; shall be deemed to necessarily include the correspondin* civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allo)ed or reco*ni>ed.;;

50 ;. Dpon the filin* of the aforesaid 6oint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filin* fees based upon the amount of the chec/ involved )hich shall be considered as the actual dama*es claimed, in accordance )ith the schedule of fees in :ection " 1a2 and :ection 1a2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as last amended by &dministrative Circular 'o. 11%!4 effective &u*ust 1, 1!!4. .here the offended party further see/s to enforce a*ainst the accused civil liability by )ay of liCuidated, moral, nominal, temperate or e9emplary dama*es, he shall pay the correspondin* filin* fees therefor based on the amounts thereof as alle*ed either in the complaint or information. ,f not so alle*ed but any of these dama*es are subseCuently a)arded by the court, the amount of such fees shall constitute a first lien on the 6ud*ment. =. .here the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated )ith the criminal action upon application )ith the court tryin* the latter case. ,f the application is *ranted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance )ith the pertinent procedure outlined in :ection ; 1a2 of Rule 111 *overnin* the proceedin*s in the actions as thus consolidated. 4. 3his Circular shall be published in t)o 1;2 ne)spapers of *eneral circulation and shall ta/e effect on 'ovember 1, 1!!". 3he reasons for issuin* Circular 5"%!" )ere amply e9plained in )%att Industrial =anufacturin Corporation v. 'sia *%namic 6lectri+ Corporation,;= thusB 999 .e a*ree )ith the rulin* of the Court of &ppeals that upon filin* of the criminal cases for violation of $.P. ;;, the civil action for the recovery of the amount of the chec/s )as also impliedly instituted under :ection 11b2 of Rule 111 of the ;((( Rules on Criminal Procedure. Dnder the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of $.P. ;; shall be deemed to include the correspondin* civil action. 3he reservation to file a separate civil action is no lon*er needed. 3he Rules provideB :ection 1. ,nstitution of criminal and civil actions. @ 1a2 9 9 9 1b2 3he criminal action for violation of $atas Pambansa $l*. ;; shall be deemed to include the correspondin* civil action. 'o reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allo)ed. Dpon filin* of the aforesaid 6oint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filin* fees based on the amount of the chec/ involved, )hich shall be considered as the actual dama*es claimed. .here the complaint or information also see/s to recover liCuidated, moral, nominal, temperate or e9emplary dama*es, the offended party shall pay additional filin* fees based on the amounts alle*ed therein. ,f the amounts are not so alle*ed but any of these dama*es are subseCuently a)arded by the court, the filin* fees based on the amount a)arded shall constitute a first lien on the 6ud*ment. .here the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated )ith the criminal action upon application )ith the court tryin* the latter case. ,f the application is *ranted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance )ith section ; of this Rule *overnin* consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.0avvphi0 3he fore*oin* rule )as adopted from Circular 'o. 5"%!" of this Court. ,t specifically states that the criminal action for violation of $.P. ;; shall be deemed to include the correspondin* civil action. ,t also reCuires the complainant to pay in full the filin* fees based on the amount of the chec/ involved. 4enerally, no filin* fees are reCuired for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action in complaints for violation of $.P. ;;, the Rules reCuire the payment of doc/et fees upon the filin* of the complaint. 3his rule )as enacted to help declo* court doc/ets )hich are filled )ith $.P. ;; cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. $ecause ordinarily no filin* fee is char*ed in criminal cases for actual dama*es, the payee uses the intimidatin* effect of a criminal char*e to collect his credit *ratis and sometimes, upon bein* paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. 3he inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is e9pected to si*nificantly lo)er the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored chec/s. ,t is also e9pected to e9pedite the disposition of these cases. ,nstead of institutin* t)o separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a sin*le suit shall be filed and tried. ,t should be stressed that the policy laid do)n by the Rules is to discoura*e the separate filin* of the civil action. 3he Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, )hich means that one can no lon*er file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. 3he only instance )hen separate proceedin*s are allo)ed is )hen the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. 7ven then, the Rules encoura*e the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. .e have previously observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of recoverin* the amount of the dishonored chec/s )ould only prove to be costly, burdensome and time%consumin* for both parties and )ould further delay the final disposition of the case. 3his multiplicity of suits must be avoided. .here petitionersM ri*hts may be fully ad6udicated in the proceedin*s before the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly un)arranted. ,n vie) of this special rule *overnin* actions for violation of $.P. ;;, &rticle =1 of the Civil Code cited by the trial court )ill not apply to the case at bar.;4 3he C&Ms reliance on +#P, 7mployees Credit &ssociation v. -ele>;5 to *ive due course to the civil action of Chan independently and separately of Criminal Case 'o. ;"5= 1 )as un)arranted. +#P, 7mployees, )hich involved a prosecution for estafa, is not on all fours )ith this case, )hich is a prosecution for a violation of $P ;;. &lthou*h the Court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncin* chec/ may result in t)o separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of $P ;;,;< the procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities arisin* from these t)o distinct crimes are different and non% interchan*eable. ,n prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his ri*ht to file a separate civil action, or may institute an independent action based on fraud pursuant to &rticle == of the Civil Code,;" as +#P, 7mployees has allo)ed. ,n prosecutions of violations of $P ;;, ho)ever, the Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil liability arisin* from the issuance of the bouncin* chec/ upon the reasons delineated in )%att Industrial =anufacturin Corporation, supra. 3o repeat, ChanMs separate civil action to recover the amount of the chec/ involved in the prosecution for the violation of $P ;; could not be independently maintained under both :upreme Court Circular 5"%!" and the aforeCuoted provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, not)ithstandin* the alle*ations of fraud and deceit. $

51 &ptness of the dismissal of the civil action on the *round of litis pendentia +id the pendency of the civil action in the #e3C in #anila 1as the civil aspect in Criminal Case 'o. ;"5= 12 bar the filin* of Civil Case 'o. !15%(( in the #e3C in Pasay City on the *round of litis pendentiaQ 5or litis pendentia to be successfully invo/ed as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the follo)in* reCuisites is necessary, namelyB 1a2 there must be identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actionsG 1b2 there must be identity of ri*hts asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs bein* founded on the same factsG and, 1c2 the identity in the t)o cases should be such that the 6ud*ment that may be rendered in one )ould, re*ardless of )hich party is successful, amount to res 6udicata in respect of the other. &bsent the first t)o reCuisites, the possibility of the e9istence of the third becomes nil.; & perusal of Civil Case 'o. (1%((== and Criminal Case 'o. ;"5= 1 ineluctably sho)s that all the elements of litis pendentia are attendant. 5irst of all, the parties in the civil action involved in Criminal Case 'o. ;"5= 1 and in Civil Case 'o. !15%((, that is, Chan and :imon, are the same. :econdly, the information in Criminal Case 'o. ;"5= 1 and the complaint in Civil Case 'o. !15%(( both alle*ed that :imon had issued 8andban/ Chec/ 'o. ((("; ( )orth P==<,(((.(( payable to "cash," thereby indicatin* that the ri*hts asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as )ell as the facts upon )hich the reliefs sou*ht )ere founded, )ere identical in all respects. &nd, thirdly, any 6ud*ment rendered in one case )ould necessarily bar the other by res 6udicataG other)ise, Chan )ould be recoverin* t)ice upon the same claim. ,t is clear, therefore, that the #e3C in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case 'o. !15%(( on the *round of litis pendentia throu*h its decision dated October ;=, ;(((G and that the R3C in Pasay City did not err in affirmin* the #e3C. .herefore, )e *rant the petition for revie) on certiorari, and, accordin*ly, )e reverse and set aside the decision promul*ated by the Court of &ppeals on June ;5, ;((;. .e reinstate the decision rendered on October ;=, ;((( by the #etropolitan 3rial Court, $ranch 45, in Pasay City. Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent. :O OR+7R7+.