Nationalism before the War British rule provided a favourable climate for the commercial and economic pursuits

s of the plural communities of Singapore and discouraged anti-colonial agitation. o Chinese Largest community in Singapore due to influx of immigrants from China. Constant riots which were directed at rival gangs and not the British. Damaged British prestige with their inability to cope. o The passing of the Societies Ordinance in 1890 and the subsequent deregistration of secret societies. No longer a serious political challenge Revival of interest in politics in ~1900 Defeat by the Japanese. Reform movement and the Chinese revolution in 1911 o China began aggressively courting overseas Chinese for their financial and political support. o Setting up of consulates and visits by leaders and political activists Allowed overseas Chinese the means to participate indirectly in the affairs of the homeland. Brought together by a common concern for China, Chinese from all walks of life were sensitised politically. Malay Lived within an open commercial urban metropolis and, enjoyed a liberality that was not as available to their kith and kin in the Peninsula. However, Arab Muslims and Jawi Peranakan rose to positions of community leadership due to their traits. Frustration amongst the Malay Muslims over these non-Malay Muslims dominating them economically. o Singapore Malay Union founded in 1926. Singapores urban concentration of Muslims was where traditional views were less strong and thus became a sanctuary for Islamic reformist ideas. Malays were also quite satisfied with present arrangements as they know full well that if they get rid of the British, they will be worse off under some other power. Indian| Few issues that roused the Indians from traditional docility. The Indian labourer was better off in Singapore than elsewhere. Visits by the Indian National Congress in the 1930 Political awareness became apparent but mainly within the Tamil labourers working mainly in the plantations of Malaya.

Greater concern lied within the communists. o Nanyang Communist Party, the forerunner of the Malayan Communist Party established itself in April 1930 No aversion to the use of revolutionary violence.

End of the Japanese Occupation o British realised that they could not govern Malaya the way they did before the war. Conceded that occupation affected the peninsular too great a depth. Prepare for eventual self government but still within British Empire. Malayan Union Scheme announced. Oct 1945 o Split into 2 Crown Colonies. Malayan Union and Singapore. To prevent Singapore majority Chinese to interfere with the Malayan region. Singapore to act as a free pot and the bastion of British defence in Asia. Key political parties in that period. o Malayan Democratic Union inaugurated. Dec 1945 (First non-communist party) MDU had the co-operation of the Malayan Communist Party. MDU believed that the co-operation of all anti-colonial parties was crucial and, the MCP was the mass movement in that period. Malay Nationalist Party (MNP) originating in Perak on Nov 1945 Opening of a Singapore Branch in Feb 1946. Sought a union between Malaya and Indonesia to form a larger Malay political unit through a possible violent anti-colonial struggle. Found little support amongst local Malays who sought to revive the prewar loyalist Singapore Malay Union instead. Malayan Communist Party. Immensely popular with Chinese due to their part in the anti-Japanese resistance movement. Steered away from armed struggle to current constitutional party by Lai Teck. Who was an agent of the British Secret Branch. Spate of strikes and public events humiliating the British throughout Oct 1945 to Feb 1946. Cumulated in a crackdown in Feb 1946 which lead them to cultivate support with MDU and MNP.

Malayan Union Scheme was eventually scraped to form Anglo-Malay Scheme o MCP rejected it in Feb 1946. o MDU and MNP initially accepted it as it meant merger. MNP changed stance and rallied with United Malays Nationalist Organisation. (UMNO) to oppose scheme. Mar 1946 MDU urged British to change stance in Oct 1946. MCP activities throughout that period. o Revived labour union and renamed it Singapore Federation of Trade Unions. (SFTU) Controlled 2/3 of trade unions and membership of 50000 members in its peak. Organised a hundred over strikes from 1945 to Sep 1947. Mass base of communist movement in Singapore.

PMCJA-PUTERA formed via alliance. Main aims were to oppose British (anti colonial) and UMNO (anti colonial) Jan 1947. o MCP took a greater political stance from the late 1946 Called for a non communal self-governing Malaya in Sept 1946. Engaged support from MDU, MNP and political individuals. o Council of Joint Action and subsequently Pan Malayan Council of Joint Action. Consisting of right wing, left wing and largely communist organisations, together with other groups on the mainland. (PMCJA) Nov Dec 1946 o MNP followed suit and formed Pusat Tenaga Raayat (PUTERA) PMCJA-PUTERA o Largely communist. Drew mass support from trade unions in Singapore and Malaya. o Demanded the immediate establishment of a united Malaya inclusive of Singapore. Full self government and elected legislature. Common citizenship with equal rights. o Did not have the support of Chinese Chambers of Commerce(CCC) Because it did not want to be associated with communism. Acted on their own with somewhat equal demands. Anglo-Malay Scheme still went ahead despite PMCJA-PUTERA and CCC opposition. May 1947 o Lead to CCC allying with PMCJA-PUTERA. o Peoples Constitution proposed to challenge aforementioned scheme. Cumulated in a nation-wide hartal on 20 Oct 1947. Greatest country wide strike in the history of Malaya. Period after Oct 1947. o PMCJA-PUTERA declined rapidly. MCP disillusioned with constitutional struggle. CCC also began to distance themselves once it was clear the Anglo-Malay Scheme was going to be pushed through. Behind the scenes, MDU tried retaining CCC support. o CCC defection to the British side on Jan 1948. 1948 General Election. o MDU urged a boycott. For participating in election meant undermining PMCJA-PUTERA. o Singapore Progressive Party (SPP) introduced. (Formed Aug 1947) Self governing Singapore through gradual reforms. Poor support from the public. o Only 15% voted. High turnout from Indian Community English educated and knew the importance of democracy.

MCP from Jul 1947 o Large decline. Due to stringent supervision of trade unions. Improved living and conditions and the end of labour shortages reduced frequency of strikes. o Decided on a policy of armed revolution from Mar/Apr 1948 Lead to the dismantling of PCMJA-PUTERA by Apr 1948 o Tried to lead strikes to disrupt the economy. Failed due to government crackdown and arrests. Jun 1948. The Emergency (in response to MCP armed revolution) o An environment hostile to radical left wing policies. Prohibition on public political meetings. Intense screening on all who had previous connections to SFTU. Left the political arena to those more acceptable to the British. o Withdrawal of the MDU. Jun 1948 Period between 1948 and 1953. o Three political parties British colonial power Singapore Progressive Party (SPP) Lead by C.C Tan. Was an elite party and lacked mass support. Gradual Progress towards self govt. Singapore Labour Party (SLP) founded Sep 1948. Championed self government. Merger and socialist society. o Radical goals. But went along with British Policy. Singapore issues began to dominate. o Politics of collaboration between parties replaced mass politics of the past. Development moved at a leisurely pace. o With the British pre-occupied with communist threat. Seats in the legislative council increased to 9. o General election of 1951. Candidates from British North Borneo allowed. Low turnout though. 25% SPP 6. SLP 2. Increasingly Right Wing. o This period of time when the public service went through the most reforms. Public Service Commission formed in 1951. Unified scheme of 26 services in 1949. Steady recruitment of senior local officers, but top level govt positions were still restricted. English education was advanced, but not for other languages. Central Provident Fund set up. o Rise in popularity with the British. Particularly with the SPP, the possible successor to power in the eyes of the British. o SLPs decline from 1951. P.M Williams expels Lim Yew Hock from the party. Dec 1951

Rendel Constitutional Commission in Nov 1953 o Sought to transfer large degree of power to local hands with more seats in the legislative assembly being transferred to local authority. Setbacks of communist guerrillas. MCP driven completely underground from 1948 to 1953. Communist ties with workers completely severed. o Only two minor and unsuccessful strikes during that period. Anti-British League (ABL) contained. o Recruiting of leftist individuals and outstanding students from the University of Malaya and the Singapores Teachers union halted. Chinese groups marginalised during that period. o SPP and SLP unable to relate to Chinese speaking Chinese. English sole official language in the administration. English education advanced while other languages ignored. Franchise rights only conferred on British or British protected subjects. Chinese merchants found it hard to do business. o Chinese Chamber of Commerce responded with a campaign for equal treatment of Chinese education and a multilingual policy. Along with franchise rights for Chinese. Was extremely popular and brought the interest of politics to the large population of Chinese in Singapore. o SPP and SLP rallied against this movement in support of the British. Subsequently loss the respect of the majority Chinese community in Singapore. Political parties to them were more interested in trivial and odd problems instead of supporting Chinese education for the 80% Chinese population. Introduction and revival of left wing parties o Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Keng Swee, Toh Chin Chye, K.M Bryne decided in London that upon their return, they would fight for a socialist Malaya. Fought for the rapid Malayanization of the Public Service. Organised English educated workers in the govt service. May 1952. Staged a successful strike via the Postal and Telecommunication Uniformed Staff Union. Council of Joint Acton (CJA) set up. Represented 21 govt unions. Mass rally and expansion of union activity to non-English Speaking workers from Nov 1952. Rendel Constitution published in Feb 1954. (For general election in 1955) o Removed restrictions and allowed more freedom in the Singapore political arena. Ample scope for anti-colonial agitation. o System of automatic registration of voters, enlarging electorate t o 300000 Eliminated the Indian dominance in voting and along with the rise in political conscious Chinese via the CCC, gave rise to greater electoral battles.

Premise to the 1955 General Elections. o o Alliance movement from the mainland decided to contest. Consisting of UMNO, Singapore Malay Union and Malayan Chinese Association. Singapore Labour Front (SLF) inaugurated April 1954. Formed by Francis Thomas and Lim Yew Hock, both who were ousted from the SLP Led by David Marshall. Elite Party with little mass support whose main aims were that of public office. Emergence of MCP and the subsequent alliance with the Council of Joint Action Drawn to the radical inclinations of the CJA. Made overtures to Lee Kuan Yew via Devan Nair and Samad Ismail both of which were past members of the defunct Anti-British League Arrived at policy of co-operation in early 1954. CJA needed the mass support of the communist and removal of colonialism was the immediate task. May 1954. British decision to call up 2500 Chinese school students for military service. May 1954 Led to demonstrations by students via the MCP. o Led to arrests of students. Lee defending these students in court. Introduction of Lee to the leaders of Chinese schools o CJA had bridged the gap to the Chinese educated world. Got to know Chinese educated leaders who would join them to form the Peoples Action Party. Further broadening and influence among Singaporeans of the CJA via the successful defence of 8 university of Malaya students. Inauguration of Peoples Action Party on 21 Nov 1954. Strongly militant anti-colonial line that demanded immediate national independence through peaceful constitutional means. Urged all anti-colonial force to co-operate in the struggle. o Justified itself co-operating with the MCP. Built itself as a mass political party. Relying heavily on union support. (8 of its convenors were trade unionist) Drew support from lower socio-economic group. o Chinese schools and Chinese workers. The united front movement of the MCP apart from PAP Through student riot of May 1954, Chinese student was more unified and anti colonial. Formed Singapore Chinese Middle Schools Students Union (SCMSSU) Pro-Communist revived anti-colonial labour movement. Lim Chin Siong formed Singapore Factory and Shop Workers Union Took leadership of the Singapore Bus Workers Union. Extended the influence of the MCP to rural inhabitants. Offered material and assistance to flood victims in rural areas. o Organised Farmers Association and the Wooden House Dwellers Association in 1955.

April 1955 General Elections. o Meant to elect government under Rendel Constitution. Tailored for the SPP. Constitution enforced close co-operation of ruling government and the British. Devised to make the government an avid instrument of colonial power. o Instead, right wing political parties (SPP and Democratic Party) who fielded 42 candidates only won 6 seats. Significantly caused by the automatic registration of non-English speaking Chinese workers who had no respect for the SPP and, also decimated Indian dominance, the strongest supporters of the SPP. The Democratic Party who championed Chinese business interest was seen as a millionaires party and not for the working class. o Consequently, SLF won 10 seats and formed the coalition government with David Marshall first Chief Minister. o PAP, SPP and DP formed the opposition. With Lee Kuan Yew the de-facto opposition leader. After the election. o SLF thrust into power when it was expecting itself to be the opposition. Had to co-operate with the British due to the Rendel Constitution. Proved difficult with the British unwillingly to work with a left-wing party. Trapped itself in a government in coalition with colonial powers which diminished its left-wing and anti-colonial credentials and, casted itself as a stooge of the British. o PAP anticipated itself as an opposition. Calculated that the Rendel Constitution was unworkable. By being the opposition, it was able to expose the short comings of the Constitution. Used its forum in the Legislative Assembly to establish itself as a vehemently leftwing and anti-colonial party. Embarrassed the British and the SLF. o Caused David Marshall to veer impatiently leftwards in wake of criticism. Causing a greater rift between his ruling party and the British. o The division of PAP after the election. Lees side of socialist Malaya through open constitutional struggle. Could not afford to be anti-communist as they needed the help of the Chinese educated communist to bridge the gap to the Chinese educated world and population. Lims side of communist Malaya through violent take over via a destabilised political system. Needed a left wing party to provide cover for its subversive activities in Malaya.

Challenges of the SLF government. o Confronted with labour-student activism in May and June 1955. Hock Lee bus riots over dismissal of 200 members of SBWU. Became a full scale riot on 12 May. Responded with the closure of Chinese High and Chung Cheng High and the expulsion of students involved. o Students responded with a sit-in strike at Chung Cheng. David Marshall retreated. o SFSWU seeing the success of the strikes. Organised a strike on 7 June. Government on British insistence arrested 5 unionists under Emergency Regulations. o Each concession was interpreted as weakness and encouraged further disturbances while each act of repression was perceived as added proof that the govt was just a British tool. o PAP was perceived as power hungry and causing industrial unrest through violence and bloodshed. This led Lee to state that the PAP cannot be responsible for ever single member. Change of command from David Marshall to Lim Yew Hock on 7 Jun 1956. o Due to disagreement between Marshall and the British. British were prepared to hand over internal self government except on issues of internal security. While Marshall did not wish to cede that right. o Lim Yew Hock policy on stressed co-operation with the British and repression of communists. Sep and Oct 1956. A series of pre-emptive anti subversion purges which led to the detention of the entire top level of the MCP open front leaders. Expulsion of Chinese middle school agitators and the forceful removal of 4000 students who staged a sit in. These actions did not specifically isolate the communists from the Chinese community. o Thus, the SLFs actions were seen as an attack on Chinese. SLF were then viewed as the dogs of the British. Allowed Lee Kuan Yews party to build up, unmolested by the manoeuvres of Lim Chin Siong. Change in the matters of Internal Security through talks in London from Mar to Apr 1957 o Formation of the Internal Security Council (ISC) that comprises of 3 representatives each th from Singapore and British governments and a 7 from the Federation. With those known to have been engaged in subversive activity (communists) not eligible for election to the first Legislative Assembly. o Alarmed the Pro-Communist in PAP. Intensified attempts to intimidate or even capture the PAP in order to repudiate the supportive stand taken by Lee. Led to attempts to capture the Central Executive Committee (CEC) during the party th conference on 4 Aug 1957. 6 of the communist nominees took place. While the 6 remaining non communist refused to take office. o 21 to 22 Aug 1957. Second purge took place and 5 out of these officials were arrested. o Allowed the party to prepare for the 1959 election free of internal division with the removal of the communist.

1959 General Elections. 30 May 1959. o PAP swept the polls winning 43 seats Compulsory voting and automatic registration meant an enlarged and effective electorate that included a large proportion of Chinese educated and lower income workers. Had support of the majority Chinese due to its support of the strikes. Denounced the privileges of the English educated. Remnants of the SLF led by Lim Yew Hock reorganised itself into the Singapore Peoples Alliance (SPA) and won 4 seats. Alienated the Chinese through its purges and neglected the lower-income group. UMNO-MCA secured 3 While the independents won 1. o Lee Kuan Yew became the first Prime Minister.

The Battle for Malaysia Importance of Singapore to the British. o Focal point of presence and extensive base facilities. British power could be deployed to support the South East Asia Treaty Organization Concession by the British via matters of internal security which was managed by the ISC. o Consisted of 3 British Officials (with the British Commissioner holding the chair) 3 representatives from the Spore govt and 1 from the Federation Of Malaya British also had the right to suspend constitution and assume direct rule. Belief by PAP that long term future lied within a merger with Malaysia. o Provided a valuable common market for industrialising Singapores exports. o Greater political stability and security. With authorities in KL taking responsible for any repressive actions against communists. Important to the PAP as internal tensions grew high. Trade union based side of PAP critical of Lees leadership due to the lack of militancy and pragmatic forms of socialism. Defeat of PAP in Hong Lim by-election by Ong Eng Guan, an expelled party member. Split of the PAP with some members defecting to from the Barisan Socialis. Creation of an enlarged federation could offer a chance to forestall the threat from the Barisan and allow the PAP to retain some power at a local level.

Malayan Government opposed merger. o Conservative leaders did not want to take in a nation plagued with strikes, riots and political extremism. o Merger would tilt the communal balance, with the Chinese as the majority. Hence, the proposal that merger would include Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei. Where non-Chinese population could counteract the Chinese numbers. British for this idea as it meant that they could cast off their remaining colonial responsibilities in the region. However, still a strong distrust. Fact remained that they (Chinese in Spore) would never be Malayas friends in a thousand years. o However, with the deterioration of Lees position in 1961. Malayan ministers had doubts that the British will able to take drastic action should the Barisan took over. Fear that a Barisan government would seek closer ties to Communist China and would undermine the nearly created Malaya. Possible solution was to take matters of internal security into Kuala Lumpurs hand. Difficulties faced by the British on the issue of merger. o Necessary to ensure that Singapore was still available for unrestricted use as a base by the British. o That the Borneo territories were strongly opposed to any rushed moves toward a Greater Malaysia. Preferring instead to closer ties within themselves. But without merger, a change in government would mean the rapid eviction of the British. o Hence, in Aug 1961. London gave the scheme of greater Malaysia their consent Further difficulties faced by PAP. o 6 Dec 1961. Singapore Assembly voted 33-0 in favour of merger. But, Barisan members had walked out of the debate and taken no part in the vote. o 1962. Barisan stepped up its agitation against Lees merger proposals. Lee referendum bill introduced in Mar 1962 made it so that voters would only be given choices of 3 different forms of merger rather than an option to reject. Furthermore, blank ballots would be taken as in favour. Malayas views on the PAPs position. o No qualms over the use of repression if it felt threatened by the communist situation. o Confessed to the British that if a socialist majority would be apparent in the next election, then the 1964 Malayan Federal Elections will not be held. Would use their control of the armed forced to take over the country and install a Malay dictatorship. o Suspected that Lee would be unwilling to take tough and unpopular measures against proCommunist Began to press for more decisive action by the ISC. British officials resisted for fear of exacerbating the political situation before merger. o Will only take action upon strong evidence.

Lee eventual support for the plan of arrests by the ISC o With an arrest programme seen as a precondition for merger, Lee began to align himself with Malayas call in Mar 1962. Malayan and Singapore special branches began to work out a plan for arrests. Change in Lees stand during discussions in 1962. o Lees visit to the colonial secretary Reginald Maudling in London where he argued on deferring action against the communist until referendum has taken place. So as not to be seen as using the arrest to secure a positive causing a boycott of the polls. o Lord Selkirk, British Commissioner to Singapore, continued to maintain that any arrest would be indefensible to domestic British or world opinion. Already, London had a negative reputation over its use of repressive action in its colonies. ( Massacre in Kenya and the Devlin report in Nyasaland) No recent proof of Communist activity or allegiance on leading Barisan figures, Lim Chin Siong and Fong Swee Suan. Further deadlock on the merger with issues on the Borneo Territories o Cobbold commissions survey of opinion in the Borneo Territories had results that seemed clear that great majority of the population is at present opposed to Malaysia now and would rather see a continuation of British rule. Recommend that the Malayan government listen patiently to peoples fears and objections and try to devise safeguards and special conditions of association with the new federation to meet them. o Drafting of the Cobbold report in May 1962. Tunku made clear that the Malaysia project would be killed if there was any dilution in the final report. British officials then reassured the Tunku that real negotiations would be between them and the Tunku and not within the Cobbold Commission. Final report made on 21 June 1962 with the recommendation that the Borneo territories had the best prospects with Malaysia. However, it also contained separate recommendations with deep concerns over the Borneo territories and the wish for a dual sovereignty scheme. o Causing the Tunku to reject the conclusion of the report. o Negotiations over the Cobbold report and the need for arrests. British still unrealistically hoped that the Tunku might agree to merger with Singapore prior to accepting the Borneo territories. Malaya was on the brink of abandoning the project and furthermore, regarded the neutralisation of Communist leadership in Singapore as an essential condition of merger. o Hence, the Tunku might offer to accept the Cobbold report if he were allowed to lock up all extremist opposition in Singapore. Lee and the Tunku would make the British shoulder the blame if the merger fell through.

Negotiations in London on 17 July 1962. o The Malayan government wanted H.M.G to be associated with the action so that more severe action against the Communists after the merger could be seen as a continuation of policies initiated under the British. o British changing their recommendations in the Cobbold report away from a long transitional period for Borneo Territories. o Secret agreement also negotiated with Singapore and Brunei being incorporated first if Singapore appeared to be on the verge of collapse. Providing British with some insurance. Tunku however changed his mind upon consultation with his Malayan colleagues. o Tunkus final proposal that transfer of sovereignty takes place by 8 Feb 1963 for Borneo territories, Singapore and Brunei. With Sarawak and North Borneo by 1963. Essentially, an accelerated timeline for Borneo Territories which was alarming. British knew that they had to acquiesce in rounding up of the political opposition if they wanted merger to succeed. Barisan stuck to legal methods of political activity with Lim Chin Siong working very much on his own. With the main aim not of communist millennium but to obtain control of the constitutional government. o It became an issue not of security but in getting rid of political enemies. o Outline agreement reached on 28 July. Agreement to the new timeline. With lee proposing an arrest programmes in Singapore after the referendum. Indications that the British resistance to future action by the ISC would be removed. However, a reasonable case for each case must be presented. Referendum of 1962 o Lee setting of 1 Sept 1962 as polling day for the referendum. Giving only the minimal amount of time for the opposition to organise. o Had control of all the official organs of publicity and access to vastly superior funding. o White Paper terms secured a 71% share. Lee then portrayed the result as a vindication of his merger policy but he was also determined to follow up this victory with more blows. Preparations and the subsequent arrests. ( Operation Cold Store) o Pretext for the arrest programme had to be found. 8 Dec 1962. Opportunity was provided by the outbreak in Brunei by A.M. Azaharis party. Soon emerged that Lim Chin Siong had med Azahari on 3 Dec and that Barisan greeted the Brunei revolt with expressions of sympathy. o Chance to justify action against the Barisan. o With heavy pressure and new evidence, Selkirk was under heavy pressure to change his stance. Moore: It was clear that the Malays are now very determined to force us to take action and will no longer listen to the arguments we have hitherto marshalled against it. Sandys: But if we are to avoid a dangerous disagreement with the Malayan government, we shall have t take some action of this kind before merger. Should move at once with the Brunei revolt providing the best possible background.

ISC met on the 13 Dec. Go head given for the programme beginning on 16 Dec. Last minute additions of names by Lee and the insistence on either the secretary of the Malayan Labour party or the chairman of the socialist front, both firmly anti-Malaysia, should also be detained. o Federation was unwilling on these changes and withdraw its representative in the ISC. Latent mistrust and animosity between Lee and the Tunku. o Lee feared that once he had given way to the Tunku on the arrests, there could be no guarantee that the merger would go on. o Lee also hoped that the British could extract a written assurance that if the arrests were carried out, Malaysia would go ahead. Hardly seemed like practical politics to the British. Arrests were being bargained. Further meetings on 1 Feb 1963. Operation Cold Store went into high gear. To British dismay, three members of the small United Peoples Party including Ong Eng Guan, were included. Director of the branch could not justify such action on security grounds. o Insistence on the operation by Sandys as it could not be allowed to collapse again. Arrests would have to go ahead. Tunku made clear on 30 Jan that if this operation failed again, merger was off. o No choice but to accept majority opinion on the ISC and vote for a unanimous decision on all the arrests. Allowing cold store to swing into action at 2.15am 2 Feb 1963. Aftermath of Cold Store. Interview Lee Kuan Yew gave. Where he implied that he disapproved of the action taken by the ISC, and that he would have preferred matters to have been left until after the inauguration of Malaysia. Outraged the Tunku and the Malayan government. Protest against the arrest on 22 Apr led by 5 Barisan leaders. All were arrested with most being set free while some were convicted on charges of rioting. British were also concerned with the slow pace of interrogations. Amnesty international also took up their case with the British to no avail. By mid 1963, matters to the final stage of merger took more precedence. Economic and financial issues together with the confrontation with Indonesia.

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Politics of the PAP after Cold Store. 3 Sep. Lee dissolved the Singapore Assembly and called a general election. Lee also made clear that he was unhappy with several aspects of the London Agreement of July and told British minster Sandys that if further concessions were th not forthcoming, he would declare independence on 12 Sep. Would then negotiate terms of entry into Malaysia as an independent head of state. o Fear that Malaysia authorities would have to use force to assume federal powers in Singapore declaring a state of emergency and arresting Lee. Malayans persuaded by the British to offer a final package of concessions which were accepted on 11 Sep. 16 Sep, Malaysia formed comprising of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak. Polling day on 21 Sep. Barisan never fully recovered o Barisan entered in poor condition with many of its leaders and members still in detention or preparing legal defences. o Most government presses were blocked causing problems with printing campaign literature. PAP won 37 out of 47 seats.

Conclusion for this time period. Aware of British predicaments over how to liquidate their formal empire in South East Asia, Lee Kuan Yew, and at times the Malayan authorities exploited fears of collapse of the Malaysia project to extract the terms and conditions that they judged necessary for their domestic positions. o Lee bargained for measures that would give him the necessary leverage to defeat the threat from the Barisan. o Lee was able to press for concessions and make last minute demands even though he seemed to possess nothing. Able to float the idea of separate independence if his final conditions were not met by Kuala Lumpur. Which he knew the British would not allow it to happen thereby using the British to do the negotiations. Operation Cold Store did not generate an upsurge of protest against the PAP but instead underpinned Lee Kuan Yews hold on power. o With governmental power and the emerging threat from Indonesia, where it was assumed Malaysia could offer enhanced security from both internal subversion and external attack, Lee had complete mastery within Singapore by Sep 1963. Effects of Cold Store seem to invalidate the original premise on which the Malaysia scheme was founded, for by the time of the Singapore elections of Sep 1963, the PAP underlying position has been immeasurably improved. Real internal threat lay not with left-wing extremism or subversion but with the problems of communal tensions and struggle between political leaders.

Separation and eventual Independence on 9 August 1965. Marked differences between the two territories. o Basic problem lay in the historical consciousness of the Malays that Malaya was primarily a Malay country and that the non-Malays, who had settled there under British rule, were in Malaya on sufferance and were not entitled to citizenship rights except on Malay terms. o Kuala Lumpur never evinced much interest in wanting Singapore to return to the Malayan fold. Tunku became inclined to the idea only after he reached the conclusion that Singapore must be absorbed before it could threaten Malaya. o Singapore only agreed to the scheme as the only possible way to become independent. o Even though there was the inclusion of the Borneo territories, it did not address the fundamental challenge that the inclusion of a largely Chinese-dominated state posed to the communally organized and racially weighted political system in the Federation. Merger in the eyes of the Federation. o Malaysia would be an extension of Old Malaya. Political parties organised on a communal basis under the hegemony of UMNO. No special accommodation to suit the PAP. o Desire for the left-wing socialist and non-communal PAP to adjust itself to a Malaysia run along conservative and communal lines by the Alliance. Basically, PAP should keep out of Malaya and confine its mission instead to making Singapore the Commercial heart of Malaysia. o To the Malayan Chinese association, the PAP was its natural enemy. Competing for the same Chinese votes. Merger in the eyes of the PAP. o PAP saw Malaysia as a new entity requiring a more dynamic form of political organisation in which they could play a more prominent part. o PAP was non-communal and pan-Malayan. Expansion to Malaya and eventually to Borneo must take place. Little political will to involve PAP more fully in National Affairs. o Even though Alliance leaders should recognise that Malaysia is a Federation and not an empire, there was no hope in altering the terms of conditions of Singapores entry into Malaysia. Singapore agreed to have no official participation in the processes of decisionmaking in the Central government so they would just have to make the best of it and live with it. o Much friction and difficulties could have been avoided had Kuala Lumpur adopted a more tactful and less partisan approach in its dealings with Singapore. The Federal Government has the prime responsibility for making the Federation work. UMNO unwilling to allow Singapore into the common market as it wanted to develop the Malayan economy. Singapore also unhappy about paying its large contribution to the Malaysian treasury. Led to escalating rounds of political rivalry and eventually racial tension and conflict.

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Looking back, the significance of the 1963 election. o PAPs overwhelming victory consolidated its position in Singapore and afforded it a strong base for expansion into Federation Politics. The fact that it had succeeded in getting a number of Malays to vote for it was a major political red light for UMNO as well. In order to retain political and administrative control of their country, Malays rely on a purely communal vote. The possibility of having their solid communal UMNO vote eroded by the PAP is the basic cause of Malayas major problem today, mutual fear and tension between Malay and Chinese. UMNO never thought the PAP would have much appeal to the Malays and SUMNO humiliation made it politically inopportune for the Tunku to involve PAP in central government politics. Total political defeat of the Singapore United Malays National Organisation. Had Lee arranged for SUMNO candidates to win in at least in MalayMajority constituencies, the course of Malaysia would have been very different. o Not politically possible for PAP to do just that. Countenance communal politicking which was contrary to PAPs ideology and it needed every vote over Barisan Socialis. Encouraging signs after the defeat. Moderate UMNO leaders begun thinking about bringing a minister or two from the PAP into the Federal cabinet. Opposition from the MCA and the extremist elements in UMNO. o Opportunity lost. Better to have a Singapore state minister within the Federal Cabinet and under Cabinet control and discipline rather than outside of the Cabinet where there would be a tendency to attempt to rally opposition to the Central Govt.

PAP participation in the 1964 Federal Elections. o o First critical event in souring relations. PAP came into direct political combat with the alliance for the first time. Set in motion the events leading to separation. Seen by the Tunku as an attempt to circumvent the constitutional terms by which Singapore was accepted into the Federation which limited Singapore representation to 15 seats. Understanding to stay out of each other political arena. But, PAPs entry did not seem to support the evidence of any firm commitment by the PAP to permanently refrain from extending their party organisation into Malaya or campaigning in Malaya to elect PAP candidates. Could also be that because of the Federation campaigning in the Singapore Assembly of 1963, the PAP felt that it was not bound anymore by Lees assurance. Central Executive Committee considered all bets off. Not all CEC members were in agreement that the PAP should stay out of Malaya. Claims that PAP all along meant to participate in Malayan politics. Appeared that PAPs CEC took the fateful leap to participate, n ot Lee, during the latters absence in Africa.

PAP motives for contesting the 1964 Federal Elections. o Viewed within the context of the party that without a show of power, Kuala Lumpur was unlikely to agree to a share of power with the PAP so as to allow the party to play a wider national role and fulfil its ideological mission. So long as the PAP remained confined, the Alliance should be able to bring the full weight of Federal Power to bear on the island and erode the influence of the PAP over time. Added urgency for PAP as KL decided to hold Malayan State and Federal elections simultaneously. Denied the party an intermediate opportunity to test Malayan opinion until the next elections in 1969. Assumption that PAP could work with moderate Malay leaders in UMNO and should the PAP be successful against the MCA, the Tunku would have to come to terms with the PAP much earlier and bring it as a partner into the National Government. Intervention carried risk but alternative would be the PAP remaining in opposition and the eventual head on fight with UMNO.

The Alliance reaction to PAP decision to contest. o Deteriorated relations. MCA convinced the PAP had designs to supplant it. While UMNO read the intervention as an attempt to divide the alliance. Causing UMNO and MCA to close ranks to defeat the PAP. Saw the PAPs ability to draw unprecedented crowds and its socialist appeal to the have -nots as critical points of alarm. References to SUMNO defeat of 1963 came into play. Even though PAP was decisively defeated and only won one sea. UMNO saw PAP as the ultimate Chinese challenge to a political arrangement that would end Chinese political passivity as represented by the MCA.

Alliances reactions after the Federal Elections. o o Alliance policy sought to confine the PAP to Singapore. Saw opportunity presented by the PAPs defeat to weaken or destroy the PAP in Singapore. Began a campaign to undermine the multiracial basis of the PAPs support by wooing back Malay voters. Through Malay newspapers and the UMNO organ MERDAKA. Accusing the PAP of being anti-Malay. Appeared to inflame the Malays, possibly to riot, with the objectives of intimidating the PAP government into submission and causing Singapore Malays to fear the PAP and withdraw the support. o Played no small part in contributing to the race riots of July and September 1964. PAP knew that it could not work with UMNO.

Change in PAPs strategy. o Announced the decision to assume the role of an Opposition party in Nov 1964. PAP would be finished off by the extremists if it remained isolated and vulnerable. The moderates in UMNO were not sufficient to place them in check. Formal power was now necessary to agitate for the suppression of these extremists. Malay federal Minister was in charge of Singapores Police and internal security allowing Malay extremists less restraint in anti PAP-activities. Intensify efforts to expand into the Federation to form what eventually crystallised as the united front of like-minded opposition parties in support of a Malaysian Malaysia.

Offer of disengagement in late December 1964. o Singapore to gain much greater autonomy in economic and fiscal matters, including internal security, without interference from KL. At a price of limiting PAPs capacity to influence only in Singapore. Disengagement proposal lapsed. British feared that it would lead to greater separatism. Tan Siew Sin and Ismail were extremely bitter about giving up any levers of control. Reports that PAP was organising a united front of opposition.

Fighting the PAP directly and politically. o PAP knew their strength lay in their capacity to gather the support of non-communal groups in Malaysia including nearly all non-Malays. Proceeded with the expansion of its branches in Malaya. Formed the Malaysian Solidarity Convention to spearhead its Malaysian Malaysia. Hoping that it will draw back Tunku to the negotiating table to discuss disengagement. o Instead, Alliance attitudes hardened, Fear that the addition of the large Chinese population seem to be realised. Possibility that the indigenous peoples of Borneo might side with the Chinese instead of providing a balance against the Chinese. No constitutional way to check the Malaysian Malaysia campaign short of repressive actions against Singapore with national and international repercussions. Looser form of federation proposed on 7 Aug which was rejected. th No other alternatives except for Separation on 9 Aug 1965.
th

In conclusion. o To have merged and separated was to have discovered the considerations that led to its initial separation in 1964 had been indeed deep seated ones. o Not to have consented to separation would have resulted in communal clashes and chaos. Denying the people of Singapore their sovereign right to determine their own future and chart their own destiny as a truly non-communal multiracial nation.