The Pragmatism of Hilbert's Programme Author(s): Volker Peckhaus Source: Synthese, Vol. 137, No.

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VOLKER PECKHAUS

THE PRAGMATISM OF HILBERT'S PROGRAMME

ABSTRACT.

It is shown

that David

Hilbert's

formalistic

by a certain pragmatism companied external foundation of mathematics. as a reconciliation

that is compatible with Hilbert's foundational

to axiomatic is ac approach a philosophical, or, so to say, can thus be seen programme

is elaborated of Pragmatism and Apriorism. This by dis interpretation are or can be related two recent positions in the philosophy of mathematics which cussing to Hilbert's In a first step it is argued axiomatical and his formalism. that the programme of Hilbert's axiomatic contradicts posed a reproach are closed systems systems, is discussed the question whether Hilbert's the opinion that Hilbert style axiomatical In the second section by Carlo Cellucci.

pragmatism

to an a-philosophical "naturalism answer is "no", because for Hilbert to found mathematics. This

in foundational issues comes close pragmatism as suggested in mathematics" The by Penelope Maddy. had its in the tasks philosophy specific general project

is illuminated in the concluding further evidence section giving his "axiom of the existence of mind" and apriorism by discussing of the German of logic, Ernst Schr?der, it to the "one and only axiom" algebraist relating the inherence of signs on the paper. postulating for Hilbert's foundational

1. INTRODUCTION

On

the G?ttingen took part in the festive unveil society monument in memory of the great mathematical ing of the Gauss-Weber and physical of G?ttingen. tradition of the University On the occasion of 1899 this event tributions: (Wiechert a commemorative Emil Wiechert's volume on was paper 1899) and David Hilbert's published the foundation two con containing of electrodynamics of geometry

17 June

paper on the foundations

(Hilbert 1899).
Hilbert's bestseller, Hilbert himself one paper became a mathematical of the leading figures in the world of mathematics. This is best illustrated to speak at the Second Congress of by the fact that Hilbert was honored Mathematicians that took place in Paris in August 1900 on the occasion of the centenary world's fair at that place. Hilbert's lecture 'Mathematical Problems' (Hilbert 1900) was intended to set and at least partly succeeded in setting the mathematical agenda for the new century. Hilbert was able to capture problems t4 y% "the imagination of the mathematical for the twentieth century", as Constance world Reid with wrote his list of p. (1970,

Synthese 137: 141-156, 2003. ? 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in theNetherlands.

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142

VOLKER PECKHAUS

that a mathem 84). "His rapidly growing fame", she continues, "promised atician could make his reputation for himself by solving one of the Paris (ibid.). problems" In his Foundations introduced a branch based of Geometry, published what can be called paradigmatically This one year earlier, Hubert a formalist foundation of

of mathematics.

ics is usually opposed on an axiomatical

of mathemat in the philosophy position as to Logicism It is understood and Intuitionism. deductive like Euclid's Ele method, organized intuitive base and sufficiently justified on completeness, and independence

from any ments, but independent meta-axiomatical investigations by

consistency. In the following it will be shown that this formalistic presentation is that side of Hilbert's accompanied by a certain pragmatism approach so to of with a philosophical, external foundation is compatible or, say, can foundational mathematics. One can even say that Hubert's programme be seen as a reconciliation ation is elaborated of mathematics of Pragmatism and Apriorism. This interpret two recent in the philosophy by discussing positions are or can be related to Hilbert's which axiomatical pro

In a first step it is argued that the pragmatism gramme and his formalism. contradicts the opinion that Hilbert style axiomatical of Hilbert's axiomatic a are closed systems, systems reproach recently posed by Carlo Cellucci section the question in foundational issues comes pragmatism as suggested in mathematics" close to an a-philosophical "naturalism by answer is "no", recent The in book her 1997). (Maddy Penelope Maddy had its specific tasks in the general project because for Hilbert philosophy 1993, 1996, 1998, (Cellucci whether Hilbert's is discussed 2000). to found mathematics. further evidence This is illuminated foundational in the concluding apriorism. section giving for Hilbert's In the second

2. HILBERT'S In his Foundations

AXIOMATICS

AS OPEN SYSTEM

of Geometry Hilbert does not really reflect on mathem of Euclidean He actually gives a foundation atical methodology. geometry a simple and complete which he calls "a new attempt" for establishing im the most axioms that allows one to deduce system of independent in such a way that the significance of the theorems portant geometrical can and the of of axioms be different consequences groups recognized clear (Hilbert 1899, p. 4). The basic objects of his certain axioms become of human thought i.e., products system of axioms are "thought-things", (ibid.). Geometry tuition becomes now becomes irrelevant, a speculative its relation to in discipline, took it, the connection or, as Hans Freudenthal

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THE PRAGMATISM OF HILBERT'SPROGRAMME between

143

is cut (Freudenthal 1957, p. 111). The non reality and geometry to the is one of the main differences character of the new geometry a branch of pure mathematics. Ad becomes Euclidean model. Geometry to Freudenthal, axioms are no longer evident truths. According ditionally, intuitive it does not even make sense to ask about with justification placed by three meta-axiomatical to be consistent, the axioms have to be independent from one another and can to has the axiomatical This be interpreted as a be system complete. or at least from some philosoph of geometry from philosophy, dissolution As ical aspects being usually connected with mathematics. in 1922 (Bernays Paul Bernays might be quoted who wrote to Mancosu 1998, p. 192): according
The

of the axioms

their truth (ibid.). The Euclidean is re the help of intuition and evidence the axiomatical conditions: system has

an example 1922; quote

was 'Foundations of Geometry' that here, from important thing [... ] about Hilbert's in the laying down of the axiom the beginning and for the first time, the sep system, aration of the mathematical and logical from the spatial-intuitive and [spheres] [sphere], was completely with it from the epistemological foundation of geometry, carried out and expressed with complete rigor.

Foundations is not an essay earlier, Hilbert's of Geometry on method, of a method, but the result of the application the axiomatical method. Hilbert the theory started, so to say, with the model, providing in later contributions. The axiomatical method has been interpreted as As mentioned an attempt of providing a final or absolute of mathematics. foundation seem comments to Hubert's in the problems lecture support this inter his elucidations the second problem on pretation, especially concerning The Compatibility of the Arithmetical Axioms' Newson's (Mary Winston in investigating the foundations of used). When being engaged we a to "set of Hilbert have axioms which contains science, says, up system an exact and complete of the relations subsisting between the description renders (Hilbert 1902b, p. 447). Hilbert to with "To the axioms: prove that important question regard are a not that that finite number of is, they contradictory, logical steps based upon them can never lead to contradictory results" (ibid.). In this the consistency of arithmetic has an programme proof for the axioms elementary as the most outstanding "the proof of the compatibility of the axioms [of position: same at is of the time the the mathematical existence arithmetic] proof of the complete system of real numbers or of the continuum" (p. 448). Such proof would furthermore end the preliminary state of all relative consistency proofs in his Foundations consistent own proof of the consistency of geometry where he had shown that geometry is of Geometry, if arithmetic is (cf. ibid., p. 447). A consistency for the proof like Hilbert's ideas ofthat science" translation

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144
axioms labeled
that every tlement,

VOLKER PECKHAUS of arithmetic would provide a confirmation or even an "axiom" in the problems "Hilbert's dogma" (ibid., p. 444)
definite either of mathematical in the form its solution must problem of an actual answer and therewith

of what Hubert lecture, what

called

a "conviction"

others had

impossibility

be susceptible of an exact set necessarily to the question asked, or by the proof of the the necessary failure of all attempts.

For Hilbert, there is no ignorabimus Emil du Bois-Reymond's conviction

inmathematics "ignoramus

(ibid., p. 445), against - we are et ignorabimus"

systems resulting from this stand In of the G?del's results such an attempt light systems". point "closed has to fail necessarily, 1998, and Gil (1993, cf. Cellucci says Cellucci the 19th century founders lies' review 1999). In Cellucci's reconstruction, the axiomatical of mathematical i.e., the method, logic had identified axiomatic-deductive igating Cellucci with the mathematical method. And method, had to be the task of mathematical method this mathematical criticizes three basic assumptions of today's mathematical invest logic. logic

ignorant and we remain ignorant. has called axiomatical Carlo Cellucci

(1993, p. 211):
(1) The mathematical method. method is to be identified with the axiomatical the for is

result no single formal system can represent (2) Although by G?del's there are formal systems that are adequate whole of mathematics, current mathematical practice. representing (3) In view adequate Cellucci of this, the notion of formal system as a closed system for mathematics and is unaffected result. by G?del's

objects that "the concept of formal system as a closed system for mathematics" (ibid., p. 212). His alternative suggestion inadequate based on the demand (ibid.),
that each formal system for any branch of mathematics

is is

number containing theory must of formal be extensions, any particular system would proper an to to eventual need it. Therefore the go concept beyond subject intrinsically provisional, as a closed of representing is incapable the mathematical of formal system process. system admit and hence the choice

Cellucci

should be erected as an "open sys that mathematics suggests has to be based on a new paradigmatic tem". Open mathematics logic, a "computational logic" that has some features in common with the pro

In PROLOG axioms and inference rules language PROLOG. gramming can be changed during a proof with the help of the predicates "assert" and
"retract".

Cellucci methods

is right against

in emphasizing the importance of analytical-regressive for synthetical-progressive methods the usual preference

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OF HILBERT'SPROGRAMME THE PRAGMATISM or ways

145

He is right in demanding that the mathematical of presentation. of the has to be considered i.e., process, process producing mathematics, in in logic and He is wrong, the philosophy of mathematics. however, in his historical evaluation of Hubert's foundational approach. A closer look on Hilbert's historical have within on own writings reveals rather the mythical character of the he his draws for First of all, we motivating suggestion. picture to ask: what is the axiomatical method to Hilbert? Its role according the axiomatical is neatly expressed in Hilbert's lecture programme delivered the Swiss before Mathematical Thought' Society in September 1917 (Hilbert 1918). There Hilbert compares math with the reconstruction and enlargement of a building

'Axiomatic

in Zurich ematical

research

(Hilbert 1918, quote according toEwald (ed.) 1996, p. 1109):

The procedure the foundations edifice of the axiomatic method, domains of the individual that one wishes as is expressed of knowledge and to build to a deepening of here, amounts - a that is necessary for deepening its stability. higher while preserving

every

to expand

shows Hilbert's foundational The axiomatical quotation pragmatism. method is a tool of supplementary and supporting character which aims at keeping mathematics axiomatical method premises
I understand

This

running. As early as 1902/1903 Hilbert defined as a procedure of finding for a given proposition from which it follows. He wrote (1902/03, p. 50):
under the axiomatical does

the the

which investigation with this truth, but truths in such a way

an of a mathematical truth [or theorem] exploration new or more not aim at finding theorems general being connected to determine of this theorem within the position the system of known are necessary that it can be clearly said which conditions and sufficient of this truth.

for giving

a foundation

Hubert based matical

thus aims at using the axiomatical the hierarchical cedure which determines on the relations method can between thus be conditions identified

method

order of a network

pro of statements, and consequences. The axio

as an architectural

with what Pappus defined as the the of traditional analytical method, regressive or critical method in Hilbert's axiomatical 1986, p. 82). Its objective (cf. Pappus philosophy of foundations" in those branches of mathem is "deepening programme atics where the foundations had been questioned. is a dynamical This or with are deepened as far as necessary in the sense that the foundations process for providing the consistency of the respective branch of mathematics. It does not aim at a "final" or "absolute" foundation. Hubert illustrates this

of the set-theoretic aspect in a discussion pragmatic paradoxes which can be found in a lecture course delivered in G?ttingen in 1905 (Hilbert 1905b,

p. 122):
It had, indeed, been usual cultivating a discipline in the historical of science that we began practice development as as without onwards far that many scruples, pressing possible,

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146
we however, thereby, turn back and reflect like a dwelling run on

VOLKER PECKHAUS
into difficulties the foundations of only after a long time) that forced the discipline. The house of knowledge is first well laid-out before the erection us to

(often

is not of the

erected

where Science

the foundation prefers

living quarters begins. in which it can rule, the loosely proceeds healthy joined in propping development.

and only foundations up and

rooms as quickly as possible comfortable obtaining when it becomes clear that, here and there, subsequently, are unable to support the completion of the rooms, science them. This is no shortcoming but rather a correct and

securing

These

to Hilbert's show that according quotations background are axiomatical far from systems being closed systems.

philosophy

3. NATURALISM

Given

this reconstruction, seems to be a Hilbert's foundational position what of had called "naturalism in math perfect example Penelope Maddy ematics" (Maddy 1997). In her recent book she rejects her earlier Realism inMathematics

model 1990) and, together with the ontological (Maddy new all other Her is there, suggested "philosophical" approaches. position on modeled to any supra Quine's who held that science is "not answerable scientific tribunal, and not in need for any justification beyond observation and the hypothetico-deductive method" (Quine 1975, p. 72). In analogy the mathematical naturalist's "that mathemat propagates Maddy position to any extra-mathematical tribunal and not in need of any justification beyond proof and the axiomatic method" (Maddy 1997, p. the case of set theory where almost all methodological 184). Given ques tions are settled in practice, but most of the corresponding philosophical debates yet (p. 191), she denies the right of philo She even goes so far sophy to disturb successful mathematical practice. as to propose some sort of "pleasure theory of truth", when suggesting (p. have not been finished ics is not answerable

163):
If it is legitimate, that we are free in the set theoretic case, to argue from "this theory has properties we

like" to "this theory is true", if this is not just a form of wishful thinking, then it appears
to extend our set theory in any way that suits our need [...].

The question now arises, who gives the justification for techniques of proof or for the axiomatical to reduce philosoph itself? Is it enough method to the question whether are settled certain proof methods ical argument If so, philosophy of mathematics is reduced to a de in mathematics is "largely scription of settled practice. And if naturalism as concedes it remains whether 233), open (p. Maddy non-philosophical", in practice her "naturalistic philosopher" (pp. 200-205) is a philosopher at all, or or not?

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THE PRAGMATISM OF HILBERT'SPROGRAMME some sort of judge

147

counterparts,
practice.

new elements of practice with their settled comparing at in present-day hand only one criterion: usefulness having In her discussion of Quine's

like this. arguments Maddy anticipates she writes scientific naturalism (p. 181):
Opponents to recording sometimes complain the pronouncements of scientists, to mere that it is reduced of science. sociology of naturalism

that the naturalistic that such philosophy

is reduced philosopher has no critical function,

Maddy
Natural

holds
science

that this is not true (ibid.):

[and one

develops to join use ones; within

as well] could add, mathematics is a self-critical that enterprise norms. The naturalistic its own methodological is free philosopher in this part of ongoing to like anyone that she cannot science, else, except expect are The methods. available methods the scientific any peculiarly philosophical only and debates for the naturalist, science, using the evaluation those very methods and assessment themselves. of scientific method must take place

were closed in respect to the argues as if science and mathematics Maddy methods they use. She argues as if it had once and for all been determined what scientific and mathematical methods of are, or that any development The philo has to come from inside science and mathematics. methodology or can but he she has nothing to say, not even sopher join the discussion, that the demand to justify methods themselves is clearly using the methods circular and therefore representative of a different not a good advice. The philosopher branch of knowledge. is external, the

Form is writing like Logicism, Maddy against foundational positions are the "philosophers" she Their representatives alism, and Intuitionism. more wants to get rid of. The case of philosophy much however, is, is an activity which is not bound to any to the professional status of the one who or scientist does it. If a mathematician is self-critically and developing or own or his her he she is norms, debating methodological doing philo says, but there is no good reason to maintain sophy. This is what Maddy complicated. institutional Doing philosophy framework or even that the professional the logician or the proof theorist have no philosopher, the say in this "self-critical enterprise". There is no strict border between philosophizing of mathematics from mathematician or science. outside One or scientist should not force and the professional philosopher the self-critical mathem

again and again. The philosopher or to give science coming might be capable them orientation for solving foundational He open the might problems. scientist's eyes for problems and ideas which are relevant for his problem, but not in the focus of his usual research. mathematics

atician or the scientist

to invent the wheel

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148
Let us return to Hilbert. tional aimed

VOLKERPECKHAUS Hilbert was a naturalist insofar as his founda

at securing traditional mathematics in cases where attempts foundational and anomalies had occurred. But he was aware problems was a mathematical of the fact that Formalism which had programme to be supplemented In his early writings foundation. by a philosophical a logicistic he preferred based on a Kantian foundation epistemology, was not compet and he knew that he, as a professional mathematician, ent enough to handle this philosophical task. Therefore he looked for professional Neo-Friesian mund Husserl philosophical philosopher (cf. Peckhaus in G?ttingen, assistance, e.g., the supporting Leonard Nelson and the Phenomenologist Ed 1990, pp. 196-224). Later i.e., proof theory based who he developed the on strict finitism can be called the

meta-mathematical was assisted One tinction

programme,

which is itself a real philosophical programme (cf. Sieg 1999). Again he

by a trained philosopher, Paul Bernays, architect of proof theory. of the reasons for Hubert's with of branches all branches

and for collaboration and Leibnizian derlying of professional

for philosophical openness questions was to a strict dis his philosophers opposition of knowledge. He was an adherent of the Cartesian universalis, i.e., a general and therefore transcending science un the borders

idea of a mathesis of knowledge mathematics.

To sum up: Hilbert's methodological is no naturalism be pragmatism cause Hilbert the formulation of a foundational system being supplements of sufficient for mathematical purposes with a philosophical justification If there is a dynamical procedure. it has the in (Letztbegr?ndung) background, idea in the Kantian i.e., it served as a regulative only a heuristic function, as a general method, sense. The axiomatical not method is understood this system. The foundational is any idea of final foundation enterprise restricted in which reflection to proper mathematics. structurable arguments of mathematicians. method It holds occur. for all domains of knowledge If this is granted, it follows that method" is not restricted to the com

on this kind of "axiomatical

petence mathematical

as starting points cannot be which proposal as is done

of the The basic problem of all applications is to justify the choice of a set of certain statements This is clearly a philosophical of deductions. problem to the success of a certain solved by simply referring in aMaddy style Naturalism.

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THE PRAGMATISM OF HILBERT'SPROGRAMME 4. HILBERT'S PROGRAMME AND PHILOSOPHY

149

The

last section

deals with it to Leonard

by connecting
mathematics".

some aspects of Hilbert's apriorism, Nelson's attempt of formulating

especially a "critical

formalism

between Hilbert's interpreters deny a connection pragmatic as a and philosophy. On the contrary, they consider Formalism to in successful influence mathemat any philosophical attempt extinguish serve as an example who interpreted Hilbert's ics. Herbert Mehrtens might Several as in his foundation of the objects of geometry of geometry that appears to be "creation from nothing". The mathematician is the autonomous master of a world created by himself 1990, (Mehrtens introduction

"creation"

He does not ac p. 124). He separates his work sharply from philosophy. influence of philosophy (ibid., p. 130f.). And indeed, cept any normative an at sets Hilbert's formalism internal of mathematical aiming justification of propositions cannot really be regarded as a philosophical foundational position. this picture is false. In Hilbert's foundational Nevertheless, programme, comes at In in several the Hilbert circle, axiomat places. philosophy ical systems were regarded as hypothetico-deductive in a naive systems sense. That statements is, they are deductive regarded as hypotheses. start from systems, and the deductions Paul Bernays, stressed (1930/31, e.g., that the relation between axioms and theorems assert, the theor theorems is a relative truth, Mathematics abstracts from from any Bernays' status the the axioms

quoted in 1976, pp. 19-20) is purely hypothetical. "If it is the case what ems are valid". Thus, the truth of mathematical relative to the truth of the axioms themselves. the truth of the axioms, intuitive (anschaulichen) position axioms to clarify philosophy 4.1. Even by does have. not answer and it is therefore content

to abstract possible of the theory (ibid.). However, the question of what epistemological

is simply left open. It is a philosophical The answer task this status, and therefore the question marks an anchorpoint of in the business of founding mathematics. Axiom

Hilbert's

of Reasoning

if one accepts that formalistic axiomatical mathematics is unaffected not it does follow that mathematics is entirely free from intuition, element. Hilbert The connected his foundational efforts with

assumptions. "thought things" as basic objects in the are one Foundations of Geometry example. Another example are Hilbert's on the conditions being necessary critical considerations for producing any mathematics at all. These conditions can be understood in the sense of

any philosophical strong idealistic

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150

VOLKER PECKHAUS

to act in a the old postulates which give the conditions for the possibility or certain way. A postulate of this kind is Hilbert's "axiom of reasoning" "axiom of the existence of mind" presented in the lecture course Logische Principien
I have

des mathematischen

Denkens

(1905a,

p. 219):

to think things, and to designate the ability them by simple X, Y,...) signs {a, b,... a completely can characteristic that I them again without way always recognize with these designated to doubt. My in certain ways, operates thinking things according certain these laws through and to describe laws, and I am able to recognize self-observation, in such them perfectly.

of this principle as "axiom", although it sets the conditions true and mathematical and although it claims to be materially operations not only generally note to Ernst Hellinger's valid. In a marginal lecture Hubert denotes a priori". This shows this "axiom" the "philosophers' see a to the responsibility that he wanted for of this principle justification an important role He thus granted philosophy in the hands of philosophers. to found mathematics. the enterprise within notes Hilbert calls 4.2. Ernst did Schroder's not stand 'One and Only Axiom alone '

Hubert

of the algebra of logic Ernst German representative can be mentioned. In his Lehrbuch der Arithmetik (1841-1902) a textbook published in 1873, Schr?der gave a foundation und Algebra, of a "formal algebra". He created this algebra according to the model of the Schr?der general doctrines Hermann Hankel. of connections (cf. Peckhaus Schroder's was and suggested by Hermann G?nther Gra?mann as a general theory formal algebra was understood included the algebraical structure, i.e., the algebra of logic 1996, 1997, Chap. 6). of arithmetic had its effect. As late as 1898 it foundation The of forms

extra-mathematically ample the outstanding

with

in the attempt of founding mathematics the help of axioms of that kind. As a further ex

on 'Grundlagen in his contribution Schubert adopted by Hermann der Arithmetik' for the Encyklop?die der mathematischen Wissenschaften in the serious polemics (Schubert 1898) which provoked Gottlob Frege's (Frege 1899), which pamphlet Ueber die Zahlen des Herrn H. Schubert in fact the numbers of Mr. Schr?der. Schroder's about formal

were

algebra can be found in the "formal" thoughts as a textbook to its intended function part of the textbook. According for mathematics teachers at grammar schools, Schr?der started, however, with an introductory "real" part in which he treated the theory of natural numbers. as far as possible on up arithmetic For this programme he thought to get by with conventional stipulations. one single axiom. It should be noted that Schr?der used the term "ax Schr?der intended to build

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THE PRAGMATISM OF HILBERT'SPROGRAMME iom" in its traditional Schroder's

151

of objects. number as the sum of units. bolized by strokes

sense, as a self-evident Strictly speaking proposition. on the behaviour "one and only" axiom is a classical postulate for Schroder's It is a presuppositon of the natural definition "Units" p. 5). Hence, represent countable objects, are characterized numbers sym

(1873, by a a that is under the that counting procedure only possible precondition sign, once set, will persist. This precondition is for Schr?der "an axiom for every deductive science at all". The "one and only" axiom for arithmetic is the "axiom of the inherence of signs". It gives us the certainty, says Schr?der (pp. 16-17),
the signs will persist in our memory and even more on the paper. Without this principle received and [... ] constantly by induction from a very rich experience, indeed induction be illusionary, would every generalization a deduction because when after having clothed the begins just at the moment suffiently of into of is the the the properties signs objects investigation objects replaced by the that in all of our derivations and conclusions investigaton of their signs.

It is due

an assumption on depending properties continues,

to the empirical evidence of this axiom that Schr?der calls it "which has only a greater or lower degree of probability, or of the the calculating power of recollection person's of the used material". "if one would write with probability would be very low, he a volatile or secret ink". Despite this that he could base our conviction of the ab truths on the reliability are circular. His of this axiom axiom determines in This

Schr?der restriction, thought solute certainty of mathematical practise (p. 17). Of course, Schroder's the behaviour of material

considerations which

objects operations with signs in mathematics, is obtained phenomenologically So it is by induction over this behaviour. not astonishing that he had to receive serious criticism for his "one and Frege (1884, p. VIII) and Benno Kerry (1890, in and still 1927 it was the reason for polemics of the G?t pp. 333-336), Leonard Nelson. This last polemics brings tingen neo-Friesian philosopher only" us back 4.3. to Hilbert. Criticism was axiom from Gottlob

is a precondition for sucessful and at the same time this behaviour

Nelson's Nelson

Leonard

Peckhaus

the founder of the Neue Fries'sehe Schule (cf. of the philosophical 1990, Chap. 5). In continuation systems a "critical of Immanuel Kant and Jakob Friedrich Fries, he propagated around the "regressive method", of i.e., a method philosophy" centering discovering everyday those philosophical experiences. principles which are the foundation of our

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152

VOLKERPECKHAUS of life", he writes (1904,

we

"If we pick out of the experiences

such them, decisions and

pp. 4-5),
can dismember that were

presupposed

a consensus and judgements which exists, concerning trace the common so, by a regressive method, philosophical and applied in reaching these decisions and judgements.

principles

parallelism mathematical axioms

Hilbert's axiomatic of discovering method is evident, and so it is obvious that Nelson extended a was his his interests to mathematics. aims "critical Among philosophical of the axioms of mathematics" deduction within frame the (1904, p. 37) a work of "critical mathematics", developed together with his friend, the cf. Hessenberg 1904). Critical the mathem beside comprises a axiomatic task atical task of examining second, philosophical systems, for the validity of the mathematical of investigating the apriori conditions truths as such (Nelson axioms and on this way for mathematical 1906, is For "to these tasks it within p. 149). mastering important distinguish a mathematical

certain

with

(1874-1925, geometer Gerhard Hessenberg or philosophy of mathematics mathematics

can be proved discipline sharply between objects which for such a proof" (1928, logically, and those that are intuitive preconditions a comes The from lecture last entitled 'Critical Philosophy p. 109). quote on of the and Mathematical delivered Nelson the occasion Axiomatic', by of philologists 56th meeting the year of his death. The and teachers lecture was in September 1927, in 1928, published posthumously address written by David Hubert. At the time at G?ttingen

accompanied by a memorial of the lecture Nelson stood under circle of proving

the impression of attempts in the Hilbert of the arithmetical the consistency axioms then believed as a task of critical math to be successfully finished. Nelson emphasized axioms to immediate, ematics to deduce the mathematical i.e., not logically the mathematical derived and not empirical knowledge axioms, underlying on pure intuition of space and time (1928, p. 112). In the discussion lecture was sharply criticized by Richard Courant and Paul period Nelson's felt urged to an unusual move. of this criticism Nelson Bernays. Because based He a very polemical almost as long as the lecture "response" published and Bernays, had should have in mind, that both, Courant itself. One movement. of the neo-Friesian Accord been among the early followers and Bernays' summaries of Courant's arguments they had ing to Nelson's sense that mathematics in a formalistic doubted any knowledge provides to restrict the usual [Erkenntnis]. Courant suggested to whereas metamathematics, Bernays went validity mathematical axioms ledge at all. Bernays of axiomatical consistency to immediate notions of truth and that further holding are not connected with any claim of being know to prove the said that this follows from the demand the axioms immediate

in reducing systems. If one succeeds these axioms are themselves and true knowledge,

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THE PRAGMATISM OF HILBERT'SPROGRAMME

153

In would be superfluous. and true knowledge, i.e., a proof of consistency with the doctrine such a kind of mathematics consistency proofs operating of founding axioms on pure intuition is untenable. Not passages all of Nelson's will can be discussed, only those specific rejoinders where he refers to Schroder's axiom (1928, be mentioned If pure in criticism. in order to show the absurdity of Bernays' for mathematics is disavowed in consequence, in empirical or the metamathematician rather operates

p. 140) tuition of space as a source of knowledge one has to consider, in metamathematics tuition. The experiments
are therefore chalk strokes In order on the blackboard inferences

signs with

which

or traces which

of

ink on

the paper

which

can be

perceived needs,

however,

sensually. certain have strokes

to find

preconditions are the chalk axiom,

to be on

preconditions themselves

concerning

are generally the steadiness

valid metamathematics

valid. apodictically the blackboard, then mathematics

chalk strokes are constant and claiming at any place of the blackboard. And this axiom as an apodictical judgement on knowledge a priori of the everlastingness a priori. Mind you: knowledge one who believes that he can dispense of mathematics with the foundation that these of space has to dare instead a knowledge a priori on the fate of blackboard

of its signs; and these If the object of metamathematics an apodictically needs certain to produce that it is possible them would be based The of chalk!

on pure intuition and chalk.

Such mathematical

empiricism would the loss of pure mathematics, which we us in find control experimenting, The

turn everything upside gave us the conditions

down:

"After

for sensible

of a metaphysics of chalk scorning on condi of mathematics any experiment". attempt "finally founding nature tions concerning the of the writing material", he continues, had been no a less undertaken than the "well-known founder of person seriously by called Ernst the algebra der logic", as Nelson Schr?der. incorrectly Does Nelson's knew criticism concern since Hilbert's axiom as well? Nelson lecture ob in the the axiom he attended the respective the two axioms of Hilbert

viously summer seem

term of 1905. At a glance and Schr?der to be quite similar. While Schr?der of speaks certainty won by in duction that chalk strokes representing units are steady, Hilbert postulates the capacity to think things and symbolize them by definitely recognizable signs, e.g., by chalk strokes. Both axioms are similar in their demand that can be A difference the symbols used should be definitely recognizable. seen in the fact that Schr?der formulates his axiom in respect to what is whereas Hilbert's axiom is focused on epi i.e., ontologically, recognized, If Hilbert had deduced the demanded mental stemological preconditions. or acts from factual of from facts of the physiology reasoning capacity of the brain, Nelson's could be argument against empirical mathematics directed against Hilbert's axiom as well. Anyway, for both axioms we can say, however, that they concern the conditions of formal axiomatics, i.e.,

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154
they are not part of it. This conditions "axioms". Hilbert's and Schroder's

VOLKER PECKHAUS necessary is veiled such

separation

by naming

of founding mathematics extra attempts It should be noted, however, had admittedly their defects. mathematically to found founda conscious about the problem that both authors were tions themselves. axiomatics insofar on Hilbert knew that Formalism as characterized only provides as it sets only the proper foundations. secure, i.e., consistent a relative of mathematics, foundation domain of the mathematicians' This domain by formal relative work

it is surrounded ence mathematics. foundations mathematical ening

contexts which by non-mathematical to state the of mathematical According are fixed insofar This

is quite in the air, nevertheless influ

of mathematics

practice. the foundations

the knowledge as it is for necessary only is expressed in Hubert's metaphor of deep can be called studies (Hilbert 1918, p. an "absolute" foundation the mathematician. of a universal It is the

as a task of foundational

that which 417). In this opinion, does not concern of mathematical knowledge but part of the big project task of philosophers, in which both, mathematicians

and philosophers,

mathematics, are involved.

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