Lakatos' Methodology of Scientific Research Programs

Last modified on Thursday, September 24, 1998, by Malcolm R. orster Points of Disagreement between Lakatos and Kuhn 1. Subjective or objective? !uhn"s demarcation criterion appears to be sub#ecti$e%%it depends on &hat scientists do and &hat they belie$e 'their psycholo(y). *n contrast, La+atos insists that ,a statement may be pseudoscientific e$en if it is eminently -plausible" and e$eryone belie$es in it., .elief that earth is flat may count as an e/ample of that. 0nd ,it may be scientifically $aluable e$en if it is unbelie$able and nobody belie$es in it., 1opernicus2s theory that the sun mo$es li+e that, and $ery fe& belie$ed in e$olution &hen 3ar&in introduced his theory. 2. Sociology or logic? 0nother point of disa(reement bet&een !uhn and La+atos is &hether a demarcation criterion should be tal+in( about &hich statements are scientific or pseudoscientific, or &hether it should be sayin( &hich community is scientific or unscientific. La+atos, as a neo%4opperian, &as raised in the tradition in &hich logic &as the main tool in philosophy of science, &hereas !uhn is more interested in the sociology of science. 5. Religion or Science? !uhn compares science to reli(ion, but La+atos re#ects this comparison. Main Point of Agreement between Lakatos and Kuhn 0ny (ood science can be practiced in a pseudoscientific &ay. The demarcation bet&een science and pseudoscience refers to its method and not #ust &hat the theory says 'its content).

or e/ample, some e$olutionists may be tempted to fill in au/iliary assumptions in an ad hoc &ay by &or+in( bac+&ards from &hat is to be e/plained. or e/ample, if see from the fossil record that horses teeth become elon(ated, &e may be tempted into usin( e$olutionary theory to infer that there &as some chan(e in the en$ironment that made shorter teeth less fit, and then e/plain the chan(e by appealin( to the la& of natural selection that ,only the fittest sur$i$e., *t &ould be e6ually easy for 7e&tonian mechanics to be practiced in a pseudoscientific &ay. 0fter all, 7e&ton"s la& of inertia says that a body continues in a strai(ht line &ith uniform $elocity until acted on by a force, and then defines a force as anythin( that di$erts a body from uniform motion in a strai(ht line.

Lakatos on Popper s Demarcation !riterion 1. La+atos ar(ues that -falsifiable" already refers to ho& science is practiced. 8e interprets 4opper as demandin( that scientists ,specify in ad$ance a crucial e/periment 'or obser$ation) &hich can falsify it, and it is pseudoscientific if one refuses to specify such a -potential" falsifier." *f so, 4opper does not

demarcate scientific statements for pseudoscientific ones, but rather scientific method from non%scientific method., 2. 9hile 4opper"s criterion does focus on practice, it is still &ron( because it ,i(nores the remar+able tenacity of theories., Scientists &ill either in$ent some rescue hypothesis 'accommodate the theory) or i(nore the problem and direct their attention to other problems. or e/ample, some problems may be too hard 'nobody re#ected 7e&tonian mechanics because it couldn"t predict all the properties of turbulent fluid flo&, or the chaotic motion of a physical pendulum). A Pu""le about Prediction :arlier, &e sa& that 4opper2s t&o e/amples, 0dler2s theory at one e/treme, and :instein2s theory at the other, illustrated a difference bet&een accommodation and prediction. 0dler2s theory merely accommodated the facts because it &or+ed bac+&ards from the e$idence E to the au/iliary assumption A needed so that the theory T entailed E 'T ; A E). 0t the other e/treme, if intellectual honesty re6uires that a scientist specify a -potential" falsifier" in ad$ance, then they must specify A in ad$ance. That is a sufficient condition for the theory to ma+e a prediction. .ut is it necessary< Lakatos s Picture of Science The typical unit of science is not an isolated hypothesis, but rather a research programme, consistin( in a hard core 'theory), protective belt 'au/iliary assumptions) and a heuristic. Lakatos quote= 0 heuristic is a ,po&erful problem sol$in( machinery, &hich &ith the help of sophisticated mathematical techni6ues, di(ests anomalies and e$en turns them into positi$e e$idence. or instance, if a planet does not mo$e e/actly as it should, the 7e&tonian scientist chec+s his con#ectures concernin( atmospheric refraction, concernin( propa(ation of li(ht in ma(netic storms, and hundreds of other con#ectures that are all part of the pro(ramme. 8e may e$en in$ent a hitherto un+no&n planet and calculate its position, mass and $elocity in order to e/plain the anomaly., 'La+atos, 19>>, p. ?)

*n !uhn2s terminolo(y= 8euristics are hints about ho& to sol$e normal science pu@@les. *n my terms= 0 heuristic is a hint about ho& to chan(e the au/iliary assumptions so that the theory better fits the facts.

The negative heuristic forbids scientists to 6uestion or critici@e the hard core of a research pro(ramme. ,The positive heuristic consists of a partially articulated set of su((estions or hints on ho& to chan(e, de$elop the 2refutable $ariants2 of the research pro(ramme, ho& to modify, sophisticate, the 2refutable2 protecti$e belt., 'La+atos, 19>A, p.15?). Example= Le Berrier and 0dams &ere faced &ith the follo&in( problem in 7e&ton2s theory of planetary motion. There &ere discrepancies 'unpredicted &obbles) in the

motion of the outermost planet +no&n at the time 'Cranus). They postulated that these mi(ht be caused by a hitherto un+no&n planet. .ased on that con#ecture they recalculated the solutions to 7e&ton2s e6uations, and fit the solutions to the +no&n data for Cranus. That fit e$en predicted the position of the postulated planet, &hereupon 7eptune &as seen for the first time once telescopes &ere pointed in that direction 'actually, it &as later disco$ered that it had been seen before, but mista+en for a comet).

*n this e/ample, the positi$e heuristic used &as somethin( li+e this= ,*f there is an anomaly in 7e&ton2s theory on the assumption that there are n planets, then try assumin( that there are n+1 planets.,

#he Role of $ackground %&idence 9e ha$e identified au/iliary assumptions &ith La+atos2s protecti$e belt. That is, &e are assumin( that au/iliary assumptions are al&ays pro$isional in some sense. 8o&e$er, &e must no& decide &hether to count statements of bac+(round e$idence, prior obser$ations, and data, as au/iliary assumptions. They are au/iliary in the sense that they are needed in order to ma+e predictions. *n the Le Berrier%0dams e/ample it &ould be impossible to predict the position of the postulated planet &ithout ma+in( use of the obser$ed positions of Cranus, and the other planets. Let use refer to this background data by the letter D '232 for data). 9e no& replace the pre$ious pattern of inference 'T ; A E) by the pattern= T ; A ; D E. 9e still refer to A as the au/iliary assumption, but &ith the e/plicit understandin( that it e cludes the bac+(round obser$ational e$idence or data D. Models *t may be useful at this point to introduce the concept of a model. 0 model is theoretical statement, 'often in the form of an e6uation) usually deduced from a theory &ith the aid a au/iliary assumptions. That is, a model ! is e6ual to a theory T combined &ith an au/iliary assumption A '&hich &ill be lon( list of assumptions in most cases). That is, ! D T ; A. Example= *n the LeBerrier%0dams e/ample, there &as first a 7e&tonian model of planetary motion that assumed that there are only > planets. There &ere discrepancies bet&een the predictions of this model and the obser$ed motions of Cranus. Therefore, the model &as replaced by one that assumed the e/istence of 8 planets. 7ot only did that accommodate the anomalous motion of Cranus, but it predicted position of the ei(hth planet, &hereupon 7eptune &as disco$ered. Remarks= 1. 0 model ! is falsified &hen ! ; D E because D is not blamed for the failed prediction. Therefore, models are falsifiable, or refutable, e$en thou(h theories are not.

2. The notion of a 2model2 corresponds to La+atos2s notion of a 2refutable $ariant of a theory2. *f a La+atosian heuristic defines an ordered list of au/iliary assumptions, AA, A1, A2, A5, ... then it also defines an ordered list of models !A, !1, !2, !5, ... 5. This use of the term 2model2 differs from t&o other uses that are common in the philosophy of science. 'a) 0 2model2 as in a model airplane. Such models do appear in science, such as in the 2model of the 370 molecule2 9atson and 1ric+ used, &hich &as made of &ooden balls #oined &ith stic+s. 'b) 2Model2 in the sense used by mathematicians in model theory. There it has a rather technical meanin(, &hich corresponds rou(hly to &hat lo(icians call an interpretation of a language 'an assi(nment of ob#ects to names, set of ob#ects to properties, a set of ob#ect pairs to relations, and so on). 4. Scientists use the term 2model2 all the time, and it $ery rarely fits sense 'a) and absolutely ne$er fits sense 'b). Eur use of the term best fits the standard scientific usa(e. Solution to the Pu""le about Prediction *f a heuristics e/ists, then a scientist has an ordered list of su((ested models !A, !1, !2, !5, ... 7o& the theory T is no lon(er falsifiable in 4opper2s methodolo(ical sense, for if a scientist tries ma+es the prediction EA from model !A and EA pro$es to be false, then the scientist does not blame T, but instead mo$es to !1, because it is ne/t on the ordered list, and so on. Scientists no& predict E1 because !1 ; " E1. 0nd so on. There is no falsifiability of the theory, but it can still make predictions. Thus, the idea of a heuristic may sa$e the distinction bet&een accommodation and prediction, and thereby pro$idin( a &ea+er sufficient condition for prediction.

7ote that the research pro(ram ma+es a different set of predictions at different times. This allo&s La+atos to introduce the idea of novel predictions%%ne& predictions not ma+e before.

'hen Should (ne Model Supercede Another) La+atos does not belie$e that falsification is important in science, but li+e !uhn, he does reco(ni@e that theories, or paradi(ms, are superceded in science. 8e ob#ects to !uhn2s description of this process, of scientific re$olutions, as bein( a li+e a reli(ious con$ersion, or a social re$olution. La+atos thin(s that the process is more ob#ecti$e. 8ere is his $ie&. Thesis= 0 model ! supercedes a model ! if and only if '1) ! has e/cess empirical content o$er T = that is, it predicts novel facts, that is, facts improbable in li(ht of, or e$en forbidden by !F '2) ! e/plains the pre$ious success of !, that is, all the unrefuted content of ! is contained '&ithin the limits of obser$ational error) in the content of ! F and '5) some e/cess content of ! is corroborated. 'see La+atos, 19>A, p. 11GF the phrase ,should supercede, is my paraphrase, and * ha$e replaced 2theory2 by 2model2.)

This is La+atos2s account of normal science.

La+atos introduces some ne& terminolo(y to help formulate his theory of science. 1. 0 problemshift is a series of models ...!1, !2, ... such that 'i) each can e/plain the empirical success of its predecessor, and 'ii) each can e/plain at least some of the emprical failure of it predecessor as &ell. *n other &ords, a La+atosian problemshift occurs &hene$er a !uhnian solution to a normal science pu@@le is found, since to be a solution is must remo$e the anomaly &ith creatin( ne& one. 7ote that a problemshift does not ha$e to ma+e no$el predictions. 2. 0 theoretically progressive problemshift is a problemshift that predicts some no$el facts. 5. 0 problemshift is empirically progressive if it is theoretically pro(ressi$e and some of the no$el predictions ha$e been corroborated. Note= *n La+atos2s ori(inal &ritin(s, La+atos uses the &ord 2theory2 instead of 2model2, but only because he fails to ma+e the distinction. * thin+ that he models in mind. Definition= 0 problemshift is progressive if it is theoretically and empirically pro(ressi$e. Ether&ise the problemshift is degenerating. The idea of a degenerating problemshift corresponds to !uhn2s notion of crisis. Example 1= The LeBerrier%0dams disco$ery of 7eptune is a (reat e/ample of a problemshift that &as pro(ressi$e, because '1) it led to no$el predictions 'the position of 7eptune), &hich '2) &ere then corroborated. Example 2= 4tolemaic astronomy &as de(eneratin( not because it failed to be theoretically pro(ressi$e '4tolemaic astronomers had the option of addin( more epicycles) but because it &as not empirically pro(ressi$e. That is, addin( an epicycle &ould lead to no$el predictions, but they &ere not corroborated 'confirmed). Lakatos on Re&olutions 9hat is La+atos2s theory about &hen one theory should supercede another< *n fact, La+atos does not pro$ide such a criterion. 7ot e$en &hen one research pro(ram is de(eneratin( and another is pro(ressi$e does La+atos say that scientists do or should only &or+ on the pro(ressi$e one, because li+e the stoc+%mar+et, they may chan(e their status o$er time.

The methodology of scientific research programmes does not offer instant rationality#

*t is not irrational for a scientist to &or+ on a youn( research pro(ramme if she thin+s it sho&s potential. 7or is it irrational for a scientist to stic+ &ith an old pro(ramme in the hope of ma+in( it pro(ressi$e. Thus, La+atos appears to a(ree &ith !uhn that theory chan(e is a rather fu@@y phenomenon. .ut he does insist that it depends on the assessment of objective facts%%the future pro(ressi$eness or de(eneration of research pro(rams. The decision of scientists, ho&e$er, must rely of their sub#ecti$e predictions of the future course of science. Cnli+e !uhn, La+atos does not thin+ that the uncertainty ma+es these decisions irrational.

Example 3= 4rout2s pro(ram. 4rout, in 181?, claimed that the atomic &ei(hts of all pure elements &ere &hole numbers. 8e +ne& that the e/perimental results +no&n at the time did not confirm his theory, but he thou(ht that this arose because chemical substances as they naturally occurred &ere impure. Thus, there ensued a pro(ram of research &hereby chemical substances &ere purified by chemical means. This pro(ram led from one failure to the ne/t. The pro(ram at this sta(e &as degenerating. 8o&e$er, Rutherford2s school e/plained this failure by the fact that different elements can be chemically identical 'as e/plained by the periodic table). They proposed that the substances should be purified by physical means 'po&erful centrifu(es), &hereupon the pro(ram made a pro(ressi$e shift. La+atos '19>A, pp.158%14A) uses this as an e/ample of &hy it &ould be &ron( to ad$ise scientists to instantly abandon a de(eneratin( research pro(ram. Question= 9e ha$e tal+ed about La+atos2s $ie& of normal science and re$olutionary science. 8o&e$er, this is separate from the demarcation issue. 4opper thin+s that the essence of science lies in the nature of re$olutions, but !uhn thin+s that the essence of science lies in the nature of non%re$olutionary science. 9here does La+atos stand on this issue< Lakatos's Demarcation !riterion La+atos is not e/plicit about his demarcation criterion in the passa(e &e read, but he is e/plicit about in his 19>A article= ,9e 2accept2 problemshifts as 2scientific2 only if they are at least theoretically pro(ressi$eF if they are not, &e 2reject2 them as 2pseudoscientific.2, '19>A, p. 118) 4resumably, therefore, a research pro(ram is scientific if and only if it is at least theoretically pro(ressi$e. 7ote that it is possible for a research pro(ram to be scientific at one time, but not at another. *t is e$en that a pro(ram practiced by one (roup is scientific, &hile the practice of another (roup is pseudoscientific. This is ho& La+atos is a(reein( &ith !uhn2s point that e$en a (ood theory can al&ays be practiced in a pseudoscientific &as. Thus, 0dler2s theory 'about inferiority comple/es) mi(ht potentially be a (ood theory, but the fact is that it &as bein( practiced in a pseudoscientific &ay 'if 4opper2s account is correct).

La+atos is a(reein( &ith !uhn, a(ainst 4opper, that the essence of science lies in the nature of normal science.

Example 4= 0strolo(y. 0strolo(y has no theoretically pro(ressi$e problemshifts, and therefore no empirically pro(ressi$e problemshifts. That is, it made no novel predictions, despite that fact that it made predictions. Therefore, astrolo(y &as not a science. Example 5= 4rout2s pro(ram. 9hile 4rout2s pro(ram &as de(eneratin(, it &as still theoretically pro(ressi$e, and hence scientific. Example 6= Heane 3i/on &as a self%proclaimed psychic &ho predicted that H !2s assassination. She made o$er 2AA predictions each year 'most of them &ron( of course). 3id her method count as scientific< *t &ould be by 4opper2s criterion, but not

by !uhn2s or La+atos2s demarcation criteria. Li+e astrolo(y, there &as no !uhnian pu@@le sol$in(, and no theoretically pro(ressi$e problemshifts. Musgra&e's !riticisms of Lakatos *n an article called ,Method or Madness, 'in 1ohen, R. S., eyerabend, 4. !.. and 9artofs+y, M. 9. 'eds) Essays in !emory of $rme %akatos, 3ordrecht, 8olland, 3. Reidel), 0lan Mus(ra$e '19>G) raises some interestin( ob#ections to La+atos2s theory of science, &hich * ha$e e/panded upon in places. 1. s the ne!ati"e heuristi# nee$e$% .efore 18?A, 7e&tonian seldom treated 7e&ton2s la& of (ra$itation as part of the hard core. Therefore, scientists did not follo& La+atos2s methodolo(y and render 7e&ton2s la&s unfalsifiable by fiat. 0nd &hy should scientists ha$e to specify in advance not to modify or renounce them in the face of difficulties. Surely, it is enou(h that it is harder to produce theoretically problemshifts by chan(in( central assumptions because it is then harder to e/plain all the successes of the superceded model. .ut there is no reason to rule it out in ad$ance. 2. &re positi"e heuristi#s al'a(s spe#ifie$ in a$"an#e% 9here &as the positi$e heuristic in the e/ample of 4rout2s pro(ram< 7o%one tried physical separation of chemical substances as soon as the chemical methods failed. They +ept tryin( to impro$e the chemical methods. *t &as only after the disco$ery of chemical similarities that the hint or su((estion appeared. 5. )h( not #ompare one resear#h pro!ram a!ainst another% Mus(ra$e thin+s that La+atos is o$ercautious in not recommendin( any rule for choice bet&een competin( research pro(rams. 9hy not say, that on the &hole, the scientific community should de$ote more resources to pro(ressi$e as opposed to de(eneratin( research pro(rams<