Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Terry Flew
While it may seem unusual to begin a discussion of new media and cultural policies with
a discussion of old economists, a case can be made as to why the contributions of John
Maynard Keynes, Joseph Schumpeter and Karl Marx remain vitally relevant in shaping
what continue to be the intellectual parameters of the field. John Maynard Keynes was
the great British economist of 20th century social democracy, whose theory of
macroeconomic demand management provided the middle way between the free market
capitalism that was in crisis with the 1930s global economic depression, and state
socialism and a centrally planned economy, and whose ideas have returned to
prominence since the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. Less well known is Keynes’s
central place in what is today referred to as cultural economics or the economics of arts
policy. During World War II, Keynes chaired the Council for the Encouragement of
Music and the Arts (CEMA), which would become the Arts Council of Great Britain. He
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was a great believer in the inherent qualities of the arts, and always believed that the
purpose of arts policy was to promote creative excellence, with the central role for
government being in providing the financial and infrastructural scaffolding was to ensure
that this would always occur. At the same time, he believed that while the purpose of
good arts management as being central to ensuring the widest public access to and
appreciation of music, drama, and the visual and performing arts (Skidelsky, 2000: 286-
299). In many ways, Keynes’ attitude to the arts echoed his wider social philosophy. For
Keynes, the market economy was a reasonably effective vehicle for meeting most human
needs, but for those higher order goals and principles – such as artistic excellence or
public welfare – what was needed was the wise and judicious use of public funds by
experts who held the public good at heart, trained in the elite academies and separated
The Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter was Keynes’s contemporary, but his
destruction. At the same time, while the interaction between innovation, private profit,
entrepreneurship and access to credit were the elements that Schumpeter saw as
debate that was very much alive around Schumpeter for all of his life – he was also aware
that while ‘creative destruction fosters economic growth … it undercuts cherished human
values … [and while] poverty brings misery … prosperity cannot assure peace of mind’
(McCraw, 2007: 6). In his assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of capitalism in
that by promoting individualism and undercutting social relations of trust and reciprocity,
capitalism increased the risks associated with personal error and failure. He was also
aware of the ways in which material progress is a poor proxy for human happiness, and
how people may feel dissatisfied and worse off – and thus more inclined towards
Behind the debates between followers of Keynes and Schumpeter – which continue to
this day– is the specter of Karl Marx. Without going into the complex questions of the
relationship of Marxism to culture or Marxist cultural theory (see Nelson and Grossberg,
1988; Artz et. al., 2006), there are three aspects of Marxism that are relevant here. First,
there is Marx as the radical critic of capitalist modernity, whose vision of capitalism as a
relentlessly dynamic system that subordinated all other spheres to the expansionary
principles of capital accumulation was an influence upon the work of Schumpeter. Both
Marx and Schumpeter believed that capitalism was a dynamic system rather than one
prone to stagnation, and neither would be surprised by Manuel Castells’ observation that
culture is now deeply embedded within the productive forces of contemporary capitalism
(Castells, 1996). Second, there is the Marxist critique of political economy, which points
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Golding and Murdock, 2004; Sparks and Calabrese, 2004). Finally, there is the Marxist
commodity, where ‘the devaluation of the human world increases in direct relation to the
Conventional wisdom would see these three economists allocated particular roles in
relation to cultural policy. Although Keynes died before British arts policy was fully
established, he had already flagged many of the themes that would be central to cultural
economics, including the relationship between private patronage and state subsidy,
tensions between promoting excellence and broadening access, the role of cities in the
nurturing of creative talent, and the significance of regional diversity in arts funding
policies (Skidelsky, 2000: 288-299). More generally, Keynes was one of a generation of
intellectuals who saw the arts as a higher-order social good, and believed that as
economists and social reformers could address the scourges of poverty, unemployment
and boom-bust cycles under capitalism, there would be more scope for a wider cross-
section of society to enjoy the arts as part of a better life for all. By contrast,
Schumpeter’s name is rarely mentioned in relation to the arts and culture, but he is seen
observes in his biography of Schumpeter, his ‘signature legacy is his insight that
innovation in the form of creative destruction is the driving force not only of capitalism
but of material progress in general’ (McCraw, 2007: 495). Yet he was not a naïve
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defender of capitalism. He saw that material advancement was a poor proxy for human
well being, and that the success of capitalism as an economic system could generate its
own social critique, by appearing to reduce everything to the status of commodities and
cost-benefit calculus.
In some ways, Marxism has the most complex relationship to new media policies. While
Marxist political parties and movements have been in decline in the West for many
decades, the notion that capitalism has a double-edged nature, promoting growth and
innovation while it also generates commodification and social anomie has become a
Sennett, 2006). At the same time, the Marxist critique of alienation has itself become part
of a new spirit of capitalism. Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) argue that one unexpected
inauthenticity, and a system that inhibits human freedom and creativity, has been the rise
of discourses within both capitalist management and public policy that seek to harness
participation, creativity and individual autonomy for economic ends (Bilton, 2007). This
has been accentuated by the rise of the Internet and digital media, particularly Web 2.0
technologies and user-created content where, as the OECD has described such trends:
The Internet as a new creative outlet has altered the economics of information
production and led to the democratization of media production and changes in the
- or return - of the amateurs’). Changes in the way users produce, distribute, access
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Media managers and media policy-makers are grappling with a new media environment
marked by the shift from a 20th century mass communications paradigm, towards a model
which has been referred to as a convergent media or Web 2.0 environment. Some features
Table 1
Media/Web 2.0
innovation transform the mass media model into a new social media model (e.g. Perez,
changes, such as the continuing importance of the public service remit in the new media
environment. This in turn would connect with the propensities of new media theorists to
understand media change in terms of epochal shifts or graduated change that is consistent
with existing understandings of media and society, as well as whether they make
and Promotion
Media policy has historically been associated with public interest regulation, where ‘the
corporations and the general public’ (Horwitz, 1989: 23). Rationales for media regulation
have included:
‘vulnerable’ individuals;
• The capacity to use media for citizen-formation and the development of a national
being a common resource with competing public and private uses (Streeter,
1996);
• ‘Public good’ aspects of the media commodity, including non-rivalrous and non-
barriers for new competitors and lack of content diversity (Picard, 1989);
• The potential relationship between economic power and political power arising
which typically involve public support for the production of media content, and output-
based forms, which typically involve regulating the conduct of private media
organizations (Flew and Cunningham, 2002). Media policy has historically differed from
policies towards the creative and performing arts, not just in rationales for government
support, but also in the primary focus on regulating what are seen as media industries,
At a comparative level, van Cuilenberg and McQuail (2003) have drawn attention to the
great divergence after World War II between European and American approaches to
media policy. The European model placed public service broadcasting at the centre of the
broadcast media system, and generally saw media policy as being connected to the
service of national social, political and cultural objectives. By contrast, the U.S. model is
almost exclusively centered on commercial media (the Public Broadcasting Service only
emerged in the 1960s, and has been at the margins of the American system), and the
regulatory process takes a largely legal and statutory form with broadcasters having an
arm’s length relationship to the government of the day. The European model tended to
align media policy with arts and cultural policy, particularly around questions of
diversity, citizenship and national identity and their relationship to media content,
whereas U.S. media policy has tended to align with telecommunications policy around
the legal dimensions of ownership, access and the development of new services.
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From the 1980s onwards, there are pressures towards deregulation of media policies,
service broadcasting. The media policy environment that has emerged has been one
where ‘policy has generally to follow the logic of the marketplace and the technology and
the wishes of consumers (and citizens) rather than impose its goals’ (van Cuilenberg and
McQuail, 2003: 200). The mass popularization of the Internet and digital media
technologies since the 1990s has furthered such tendencies towards media policy driven
by competition policy rather than cultural policy objectives, raising the question of
whether media can continue to be seen as sufficiently distinct from other areas of
business to warrant specialist regulations (Flew, 2006; Livingstone et. al., 2007). But it is
a mistake to focus one-sidedly upon a loss of state capacity in the area of media policy,
since what emerges are new debates about how best to stimulate domestic media content
production in the context of globalization and media convergence. If media policy in the
second half of the 20th century was shaped to a significant degree by priorities to develop
national culture on the part of the protective or regulatory state (Schlesinger, 1991, 1997;
Mattelart, 1994; Neveu, 2004), there are from the 1990s onwards new questions being
asked about how the state can better enable innovation in digital media content
computing, telecommunication and media, and the mass popularization of the Internet,
acted as stimuli for a phethora of national policy strategies to develop the information and
communications technology (ICT) sectors, and to enable social, economic and cultural
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adaptation to the emergent global information society (Henten and Skouby, 2005). These
policy documents tended to have a three-part structure: the first priority was to develop
the ICT sector, and then focus on how to adapt society and culture to the new
the ‘dot.com crash’ of 2001 brutally exposed, was around media content. While much
attention had been given to the importance of developing the ‘fat pipes’ of broadband
Internet, very little discussion had occurred about how online content would be used, and
what transformations may occur in the production, consumption and use of media
accessed through the Internet. There was a strong tendency to view online as a new
distribution channel for existing media content that would be produced by established
media businesses. What became apparent in the early 2000s was that globalization was
squeezing margins in the ICT sectors no less than in manufacturing, and national
information policies that hitched economic fortunes to the ICT bandwagon lacked the
The rise of creative industries policy discourse can be understood in this context.
Drawing upon cultural policy work undertaken in the 1990s on cultural industries value
chains, creative industries strategies sought to build links between the arts, media and
ICT sectors, and to identify new opportunities for cultural sectors in national innovation
policy strategies. Creative industries strategies first developed in the United Kingdom in
the late 1990s under Tony Blair’s “New Labour” government, but were adopted with
industries policy strategies have been based upon the premise that, in an age of globally
mobile capital, commodities, information and talented and skilled individuals, it is the
‘cultural’ or ‘software’ side of ICTs that can generate distinctive forms of intellectual
innovation in the digital economy increasingly occurs at the margins, through start-ups
and small-to-medium enterprises, rather than through the large corporations and publicly
funded flagships that have been the traditional focus of both arts and media policy and
cities agenda has drawn attention to the relationship of arts, media and cultural policy to
the emergence of ‘creative milieu’, or cities and regions that become catalysts for
The study of media policy draws attention to three recurring questions. First, there is the
question of where to set boundaries between media policy and other policy domains. A
distinction is often drawn between print and broadcast media, on the basis that the former
has traditionally had significant freedom from government controls (at least in the
English-speaking world), whereas licensing and regulatory requirements have seen more
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extensive regulation of radio and television. As noted above, media policy has frequently
been pulled into the domains of cultural policy, particularly around questions of how to
promote local audiovisual media content, but also into telecommunications policy. The
rise of the Internet and the convergence of media with computing and communications
networks also brought media policy into the domain of national information policy
strategies, with digital content being identified as a new growth industry (OECD, 1998).
The second issue is the relationship between media policy, media regulation and media
governance. Freedman defines media policy as ‘the development of goals and norms
leading to the creation of instruments that are designed to shape the structure and
behaviour of media systems’ (Freedman, 2008: 14). This definition is broader than media
agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission in the U.S. or Ofcom in Great
Britain, but narrower than media governance, which incorporates informal as well as
formal means of shaping media systems, and to the role of supranational as well as
national policy agencies (e.g. the role of agencies of ‘global media policy’ such as the
World Trade Organization and the World Intellectual Property Organization (Raboy,
2002)). Finally, there are the politics of media policy, or the extent to which the forms
that media institutions and policy settings take arise not so much as the result of neutral
policy expertise as the exercise of power in and through the policy process. In his
historical account of the shaping of United States broadcasting, Streeter argued that
policy discourses that appear neutral between competing interests have already been
shaped by and are ‘dependent on extensive and ongoing collective activities … that
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typically involve favoring some people and values at the expense of others’ (Streeter,
1996: xii).
Observing the interaction between political power and the policy process raises the
question of the extent to which the conduct of media policy should be seen as reflective
of political and ideological positions, and the degree to which ideas in the policy process
are seen as reflections of political-ideological interests. Recent work on media policy has
(2005) account of the rise of neo-liberalism as a global ideological project that has aimed
to shift power and resources to corporations and wealthy elites through the privatization
of public assets, removal of ‘public interest’ regulations over large corporations, and tax
cuts targeted towards the highest income earners. Harvey defines neo-liberalism as:
A theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well being can
market, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional
This has marked a transition from what Jessop and Sum refer to as a shift from Keynesian
welfare state capitalism that prevailed from the 1940s to the 1970s, to a Schumpeterian
workfare state associated with neo-liberal projects and ‘a rejection of social partnership
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arrangements in favour of managerial prerogatives [and] market forces’ (Jessop and Sum,
2006: 111).
Hesmondhalgh (2007) and Freedman (2008) have argued that media policy in the 1990s
and 2000s has largely involved the implementation of neo-liberalism. For Hesmondhalgh,
the rise of media and cultural industries to greater prominence coincides with the ‘Great
Downturn’ of the world economy in the 1970s and 1980s, generating a policy response
focused upon marketization, or ‘the process by which market exchange increasingly came
to permeate the cultural industries and related sectors’ (Hesmondhalgh, 2007: 110).
Through a series of waves of such principles being advanced through the global system,
Hesmondhalgh argues that ‘neo-liberalism and the neo-classical conception of the market
have made huge advances in the cultural sphere’, so that ‘strong traditions of public
ownership and regulation … were abandoned or severely limited during the neo-liberal
turn’ (Hesmondhalgh, 2007: 135). Freeedman’s account of the politics of media policy in
the U.S. and Britain proposes that the period from the 1980s onwards has marked a
decisive shift from pluralism to neo-liberalism in media policy, associated primarily with
‘a much narrower and more consumer-oriented role for the media’, and ‘conceptualizing
media policy … towards a focus on the largely economic benefits that may accrue form
the exploitation of the media industries’ (Freedman, 2008: 219). From this perspective,
the turn towards creative industries policy discourse as a factor shaping media policy is
core of the creative industries’, and that ‘neo-liberalism [has] understood people
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I would argue that this interpretation of media policy in the 1990s and 2000s as largely
involving the enactment of neo-liberal principles in the media space, to the benefit of
large media conglomerates and at the expense of the public interest, is one-sided and
liberalism as a political and philosophical tradition that has many dimensions, and cannot
as an example, he was clearly a liberal who drew upon longstanding classical traditions,
but his work was central to the development of economic strategies for the reformist left
in the post-WWII period. In so far as the economic downturn of the 1970s and 1980s
exposed limits to Keynesian demand management policies, the monetarist and laissez
faire responses associated with authors such as Freidrich von Hayek and Milton
Friedman were only one response. Others argued for an extension of Keynesian
economics to the supply side through activist industrial and labour market policies,
Arestis et. al., 1999) and applied in the ‘welfare capitalist’ states of Europe and
Scandinavia (Esping-Anderson, 1990). Jessop and Sum (2006) observed that neo-
liberalism represents only one possible post-Keynesian policy strategy, with European
neo-corporatism and East Asian neo-statism being equally important responses (c.f.
Perraton and Clift, 2004). It has also been observed that – contra Harvey (2005) – neo-
forces in China (Kipnis, 2007; Nonini, 2008). In relation to creative industries policies,
Cunningham (2009) has noted that it is misleading to focus solely upon the experience of
interventionist media industry policies developed under the signs of creative industries
and the creative economy have been emerging throughout Europe, Asia and the
developing world.
The other feature of new media policies in the 2000s and going into the 2010s is the
extent to which the media as policy object is radically changing. In the 20th century era of
mass communications media, there were a relatively small number of powerful media
producers and distributors, and a large number of relatively powerless media consumers.
The public interest in media policy entailed a commitment on the part of government to
protecting the latter in the face of unequal power relations with the former, whether
commitments to stimulate certain types of media content production (e.g. local content,
custodial role in the management of the airwaves and how they are to be used. In the
1980s and 1990s, this protective state role was challenged by positions that can be termed
neo-liberal – although they can also be left-libertarian – that wondered why the state
channels and content proliferation. In the 2000s, there are not only further blurring of
lines between media forms, but also between media producers and consumers, and
between media professionals and so-called ‘pro-ams’ utilizing social media and
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distributing user-crested content (Jenkins, 2006; Bruns, 2008). As media industry leader
What we are presently experiencing is the shift away from a top-down business
users. The era in which a privileged few accessed tools to facilitate the publishing
of content for distribution over exclusive distribution networks reaching the masses
that can provide anyone with the ability to communicate their ideas to anyone else,
In such an innovative milieu, we may be tempted to ditch the statist and dirigisme of
cultural policy with its Keynesian overtones of the protective state, and look instead to
the ‘gales of creative destruction’ identified by Joseph Schumpeter as the raison d’etre of
capitalist culture. But just as it is one-sided to see new media policies as abandoning a
role for government as an enabler of digital media content, it is also a mistake to simply
the political economy of communication, reminds us to the extent to which the market
itself will not redress questions of inequality of access of a national or a global scale,
even if digital media technologies promise new opportunities for popular engagement and
consumer co-creation of media content. The most valuable insights into new media
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economy of new media, the wellsprings of creativity and innovation, and the enabling
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