UPDATED: 9 10 05. Index of quotations on Key Words from or!oran" #. 19$9. Ar%umentations and &o%i!. Argumentation '" 1()*'.

+u,,-emented .it/ additiona- -o%i!a- termino-o%y. Initially compiled by Andrew Spear This index was originally constructed by taking the key words listed on page 17 of Argumentations and Logic and registering significant !uotes pertaining to each key" word from the body of the text under a bold"face key"word heading# $ther entries ha%e been added o%er the years# &age citations are included immediately after each !uotation# Sometimes many !uotations are taken from a single page# In such cases the page is cited at the end of all !uotations from that page' not after each indi%idual !uotation# (ross" references to the literature ha%e also been added# The original article was intended as an essay and not as a learned treatise ' accordingly it has no footnotes' no page"references and no bibliography# (omments and suggestions for other !uotation and key"word inclusions are welcome# adspear)acsu#buffalo#edu www#buffalo#edu*+adspear ,$TATI$,- The usual con%ention is to use single !uotes for making names of sentences and other expressions' for example names of words' phrases' symbols' etc# Thus .$ne plus two is three/ is a fi%e"word 0nglish sentence and .s!uare/ is a six"letter 0nglish word' both of which were used by 1oole' but neither of which would ha%e been recogni2ed by Aristotle# 3ollowing 1ertrand 4ussell 51903' 67ff# and 1905/1967' 889 and others' double !uotes are used in naming propositions and other meanings# Thus' $ne plus two is three is a true proposition known both to 1oole and to Aristotle and s!uare is a concept also well known to both# In familiar cases' expressions express meanings or senses and they name entities or things# Thus' the sentence .$ne plus two is three/ expresses the proposition $ne plus two is three and the number"word .three/ names the number three# Pro,osition: Some propositions are known to be true and some are known to be false# 1ut the propositions that are important to us often include hypotheses' propositions which are neither known to be true nor are known to be false# 17u17# The properties true and false ha%e as their range of applicability the class of propositions# 7:u17# Any attempt to affirm or deny true or false of a non"proposition results in gibberish' incoherence' category error' nonsense# 7:u1;# +enten!e: Some sentences express propositions and some do not# 7:u<=# The sentence .Two exceeds one/ expresses the true proposition Two exceeds one # The sentence .$ne exceeds two/ expresses the false proposition $ne exceeds two # The sentences .$ne is true/ and .$ne is false/ do not express propositions at all# 7:u1;# 01: Socrates asserted the proposition that the side of a s!uare whose area is double the area of a gi%en s!uare is a line e!ual to the diagonal of the gi%en s!uare# 1ut he did not use the 0nglish sentence .The side of a s!uare whose area is double the area of a gi%en

s!uare is a line e!ual to the diagonal of the gi%en s!uare/# &ropositions are what we belie%e' what we know' what we doubt' what we assume for purposes of reasoning' and so on# They are the ob>ects of our propositional dispositions and acts # Sentences are what we use to con%ey our beliefs' doubts' etc# to others and the sentences are what we make inscriptions of in order that we can con%ey our beliefs' etc# to people who are not present at the time we ha%e the desire to do the con%eying# See (ohen",agel 1887# xxii" xxiii# 2y,ot/eses: #propositions which are neither known to be true nor known to be false# 0%ery hypothesis is either actually true or actually false# 1ut no hypothesis is either known to be true or known to be false ? by the person for whom it is a hypothesis# 5179 Ar%umentation 34,ro!ess56: Argumentation is in%ol%ed in settling hypotheses on the basis of what we already know# @educti%e method and Aypothetico"deducti%e method# 51:9 ,1 Argumentation is to the argumentations as deduction is to the deductions# Argumentation is to the indi%idual argumentations as inference is to the indi%idual inferences and as calculation is to the indi%idual calculations# In one sense the word .argumentation/ is an abstract proper name of a general process and in this sense it is not a common noun' it takes no article' and it has no plural# In another sense the word .argumentation/ is a common noun and it is strictly speaking not a name# In the second sense it takes article 5.an/' .the/9 and it has a plural# Ar%ument: The expression argument 5more clearly premise"conclusion argument9 indicates the two part system that bounds an argumentation# An argument can be constructed from an argumentation by deleting the chain of reasoning# Bore explicitly' an argument is a two pat system composed of a set of propositions called its premise"set and a single proposition called its conclusion# 0%ery argument bounds infinitely many argumentations' but no argument is an argumentation# 5<:9 argument*argument text 5 ;=9 In this essay the expression .argument/ is used in such a way that e%ery argument is concrete' there is no such thing as an abstract argument ' an argument de%oid of concrete terms ' a formal argument ' etc# 0%ery argument is composed of propositions and e%ery proposition is either true as it stands or false as it stands# 5;19 Ar%umentations 34,rodu!ts56: In order to be a proof it is necessary and sufficient that an argumentation ha%e premises all known to be true and that its chain of reasoning be cogent in context# See ($C0,T below# An argumentation whose chain of reasoning is cogent in context is itself said to be cogent and an argumentation whose chain of reasoning is not cogent in context is said to be fallacious# An argumentation is a three part system composed of a set of propositions called the premise"set' a single proposition called the conclusion and a discourse called the chain of reasoning# 5<69 ,1 An argumentation can also be regarded as a two"part system one of whose parts is a two"part system# 3rom the perspecti%e an argumentation is composed of an argument' i#e#

<

a premise"conclusion argument' and a chain"of"reasoning# It is important to be clear that the premises of the argument are not necessarily premises of the chain"of"reasoning and' %ice %ersa' the premises of the chain"of"reasoning are not necessarily premises of the argument# This distinction between the premises of the argument and those of the chain" of"reasoning is presupposed but not explicitly made by Aristotle 5Prior Analytics 1 1;' D<b<8"789# Aristotle was the first person to study argumentation by studying the argumentations# In fact it may be difficult or e%en impossible to attribute awareness of argumentations per se to anyone before Aristotle# 0%ery argumentation whose premises are true and whose conclusion is false is fallacious and e%ery argumentation in the same form as a fallacious argumentation is fallacious# 5<:9 3or definition of .in"the"same"form"as/' see <7E<7"E; and Same 3orm below# The class of argumentations is the range of applicability of conclusi%e and of inconclusi%e# (ogent and fallacious simpliciter apply exclusi%ely to argumentations# An argumentation is cogent or fallacious according as its chain of reasoning is cogent in context or fallacious in context# 57:9 Fust as we ha%e distinguished propositions from sentences we likewise distinguish discourses from discourse"texts' arguments from argument texts and argumentations from argumentation" texts# 5 ;=9 Glogic should be pronounced to be the systematic study of argumentations# 5;<9 ommon noun- <D@:' The common noun .deduction/ is often used %ery nearly in the sense of .cogent argumentation/# Aere we take it to be an exact synonym# 5<D9# Hords normally used as common nouns include .conclusion/' .logician/' .noun/' .number/' .premise/' .proposition/' .proof/' but not .Aristotle/' .0uclid/' .Archimedes/' .,ewton/' .Ailbert/ and .Tarski/# The latter are normally used as proper names of indi%iduals# It is no accident that no logician is named .logician/# He coherently say that Aristotle is named .Aristotle/' but it would normally be taken as incoherent were we to say that .logician/ is named logician# Hhen words are plurali2ed or preceded by articles' they are normally used as common nouns# Dedu!tion: <6E17' <D@:' 0%ery proof is a deduction but not e%ery deduction is a proof# 0%ery proof makes e%ident the truth of its conclusion and e%ery deduction makes e%ident that its conclusion follows logically from its premise"set# 0%ery deduction whose premises are all true has true conclusion# 5<D9 0%ery deduction whose conclusion is false has at least one false premise# ,o deduction has all true premises and false conclusion# 0%ery deduction is an argumentation whose conclusion is implied by its premise"set' but not e%ery argumentation whose conclusion is implied by its premise set is a deduction# 5<D9 ##deduction is a temporal acti%ity performed by thinkers# 5<89 In order to know that a %alid argument is %alid it is sufficient to deduce the conclusion from the premises' to construct a chain of reasoning that is cogent in the context of the argument# @eduction is an epistemic action performed by thinker agents in drawing

forth particular information from other information in which it is already contained# @eduction takes place in time# @eduction is the process of coming to know implication# A deduction is sufficient for knowledge of %alidity# 57<9 @educibility is a criterion of %alidity## A deduction reduces the problem of whether its conclusion is true to a problem that has not necessarily been sol%ed' %i2# the problem of whether its premises are all true# 5779 The fundamental problem of deduction is to explain how immediately %alidated arguments are known to be %alid# 5779 The action"%erb .deduce/ is tensed# Its sub>ect is a thinker' its direct ob>ect is a proposition and its indirect ob>ect is a set of propositions# 5789 The common noun .deduction/ is often used %ery nearly in the sense of .cogent argumentation/# Aere we take it to be an exact synonym# 5<D9# The fact that it is possible to make deductions based on premises not known to be true is central to our intellectual life# This was already recogni2ed by Socrates and then articulated in some detail by Aristotle# 5<69 Aere the reference to Socrates is meant to remind the readers of the Socratic hypothetical method used to test hypotheses by deducing and e%aluating their conse!uences# Thus Socrates might be one of &lato/s sources for his Bethod of Analysis# Inferen!e: (ognates of .infer/ occur only ele%en times in this essay and always as a synonymous rhetorical %ariant of cognates of .deduce/# This was an error# I now see that .infer/ and .deduce/ are well suited to mark an important contrast# ESAC0 ,$T0- The %erbs .infer/' .deduce/' and .deri%e/ used in logic and philosophy of logic are ambiguousI logicians use each with multiple normal meanings# They are often used as synonymous rhetorical %ariants# Se%eral of their meanings are %ague in that they admit borderline cases# This essay could be impro%ed in regard to usage of .infer/ and .deri%e/' but its use of .deduce/ is entirely well chosen# In the sense recommended' the %erb .infer/ is used for the epistemic acti%ity of >udging a proposition to be true by determining that it is a conse!uence of gi%en propositions known to be true# The %erb .deduce/ is used for the epistemic acti%ity of determining that a proposition is a conse!uence of gi%en propositions# Aristotle disco%ered that the same process of deduction used inferentially to draw a conclusion from premises known to be true is also used non"inferentially to draw a conclusion from premises whose truth or falsity is unknown' or e%en from premises known to be false# @emonstrating his grasp of this point in the first few pages of Prior Analytics' he distinguished demonstrati%e from non" demonstrati%e deductions# Ae noted that e%ery inference is a deduction but not e%ery deduction is a inference# Inference' or demonstration' producing knowledge of the truth of its conclusion' and deduction' producing knowledge that its conclusion is logically implied by its premises' must both be distinguished from deri%ation' which consists in arri%ing at a string of characters by means of rule"go%erned manipulations starting with gi%en strings of characters# @eri%ation by itself does not and cannot produce knowledge# ,o proposition can be inferred from a contradiction because no contradiction is known to be true# 0%ery proposition can be deduced from a contradiction# And what can be derived from what depends upon which character"manipulating rules are allowed#

Proof: 0%ery proof is an argumentation that pro%es its conclusion to be true# 0%ery proposition pro%ed to be true is known to be true by those persons who ha%e pro%ed it to be true# JThe expressionsK .proof and .pro%ed to be true/ make tacit reference to a participant or to a community of participants# 5#<<9 ,ot e%ery argumentation whose premises are all known to be true is a proof# 0%ery such argumentation that is not a proof in%ol%es a fallacious chain of reasoning' a chain of reasoning which does not deduce the conclusion of the argumentation from its premises# 5<79 In order to be a proof it is necessary and sufficient that an argumentation ha%e premises all known to be true and that its chain of reasoning be cogent in context# Thus' if an argumentation is not a proof' then either it begs the !uestion or its chain of reasoning is fallacious in context# 5 <69 ##e%ery proof has all true premises and true conclusion# 5<D9 ##e%ery proof is a cogent argumentation but not e%ery cogent argumentation is a proof# 0%ery proof is a deduction but not e%ery deduction is a proof# 5<:9 &ro%ability is a criterion of truth and dipro%ability is a criterion of falsity# @educibility is a criterion of %alidity and refutability is a criterion of in%alidity# A proof sol%es the problem of whether its conclusion is true by reducing it to a problem that has already been sol%ed' %i2#' the problem of whether its premises are all true# 5779 +ame 7orm- The simplest form"preser%ing transformation Jcalled one"new"term" substitutionK###is###substituting one new non"logical term for e%ery occurrence of a gi%en non"logical term Jof the same semantic categoryK####0%ery argumentation obtained from a gi%en argumentation by a finite number of one"new"term"substitutions is in the same logical form as the gi%en argumentation###5<79# 8a-id: If the conclusion is a logical conse!uence of the premise"set' the argument is said to be %alid# 5<89 In this and in most works on logic' to say that an argument is 5logically9 %alid is simply to say something about the relationship of its conclusion to its premise"set' %i2# that the conclusion follows 5logically9 from' is 5logically9 implied by' is a 5logical9 conse!uence of' its premise"set# 5discussion of .logical conse!uence/' next paragraph down 7=9 0%ery argument in the same form as a %alid argument is %alid# In order to establish the in%alidity of a gi%en argument it is sufficient to exhibit an argument known to be in the same form whose premises are known to be true and whose conclusion is known to be false# 5719 It is clear that a %alid argument per se pro%es nothing' not e%en that its conclusion follows from its premise"set# In order to know that a %alid argument is %alid it is sufficient to deduce the conclusion from the premises' to construct a chain of reasoning that is cogent in the context of the argument# It is clear that in order to know whether a gi%en argument is %alid or in%alid it is ne%er necessary to know the truth"%alues of the premises and conclusion 5of the gi%en argument9# 57<9 @educibility is a criterion of %alidity and refutability is a criterion of in%alidity# 5779

The class of arguments is the range of applicability of %alid and in%alid# 57:9 Im,-i!ation: In order for a conclusion to be a logical conse!uence of a premise set it is necessary and sufficient for the information of the premise set to include that of the conclusion' in other words' for there to be no information in the conclusion beyond that already in the premise set# In order for a conclusion to be a logical conse!uence of a premise set it is necessary and sufficient that it be logically impossible for the premises to all be true with the conclusion false# In order for a conclusion to be a logical conse!uence of a premise set it is necessary and sufficient that were the premises all true then necessarily the conclusion would be true' in other words' that were the conclusion false then necessarily at least one premise would be false# Those who ha%e grasped the concept do not need any characteri2ation# The problem of characteri2ing .logical conse!uence ' despite insightful attempts by (arnap' Tarski' and Luine' is still open# ,o true proposition implies e%en one false proposition# 0%ery true proposition is implied by infinitely many false propositions# 0%ery false proposition is implied by infinitely many false propositions# 0%ery false proposition implies infinitely many true propositions# 0%ery proposition implying its own negation is false# 0%ery proposition implied by its own negation is true# 0%ery proposition implying a certain proposition and also implying the negation of that certain proposition is false# 0%ery proposition implied by a certain proposition and also by the negation of that certain proposition is true# 0%ery proposition implies itself# It is of course not the case that e%ery true proposition implies e%ery other true proposition# ,or is it the case that e%ery false proposition implies e%ery true proposition# ,or is it he case that e%ery false proposition implies e%ery other false proposition# 57=9 The relation"%erb .implies/ is tense"less# Its sub>ect is a set of propositions and its ob>ect is a proposition# 5789

o%ent: A chain of reasoning is said to be cogent per se if the conclusion that it reaches is actually shown to follow from the premises that it uses# 5<6 @69 ,1 (ogency"per"se is a participant"relati%e' epistemic or sub>ecti%e property of chains"of"reasoning' not JfullK argumentations# Thus to determine whether the ($4 of a argumentation is cogent"per"se' it is not necessary to know what the premises or conclusion of the argument are' but only those of the ($4# If a ($4 is cogent"per"se' then the conclusion it reaches actually follows from the premises it uses# 1ut there are many ($4s whose conclusions follow from their respecti%e premise' but which are grossly fallacious# Hhether a conclusion follows from gi%en premises is completely ontic' ob>ecti%e ' and participant?irrele%ant in the sense that no participant in%ol%ement is rele%ant#

A chain of reasoning is said to be cogent in context of an argumentation if it is cogent per se and its conclusion and premises are respecti%ely the conclusion and among the premises of the argumentation# 01 (ogency"in"context is not a property of chains of reasoning' but it is a relation of a chain"of"reasoning to' in effect' an argument# Thus it is incoherent to say that a gi%en ($4 is cogent in context when no argumental context has been indicated# (ogency"in" context is an epistemic' sub>ecti%e ' or participant"relati%e relation' basically' of ($4s to premise"conclusion arguments# If Jan argumentation/sK chain of reasoning is fallacious in context then either it is fallacious per se 5and hence in%ol%es a gap or logical error in the narrow sense9 or else it smuggles a premise or it reaches a wrong conclusion# An argumentation whose chain of reasoning is cogent in context is itself said to be cogent and an argumentation whose chain of reasoning is not cogent in context is said to be fallacious# (ogent in context ' cogent per se '# apply to discourses' or chains of reasoning' whereas cogent and fallacious ' simpliciter' apply to argumentations# 5<69 ##e%ery cogent chain of reasoning is finite# 5 <89 Aow does a deduction make e%ident the fact that its bounding argument is %alidM Hhat makes a chain of reasoning cogentM 5pg 779 In order for a linear deduction to be cogent for a gi%en person' that person must ha%e knowledge of the %alidity of the component arguments# 5 7;9 As has been pointed out by others' there are three species of knowledge- ob>ectual knowledge or knowledge of ob>ects 5entities' concepts' propositions' argumentations9' operational knowledge or known"how to perform %arious tasks' and propositional knowledge or knowledge that propositions are true or false# It is already clear that cogency of a deri%ation re!uires all three and that it pi%ots on operational knowledge# (ogent per se ' cogent in context ' fallacious per se and fallacious in context all apply exclusi%ely to chains of reasoning# (ogent and fallacious simpliciter apply exclusi%ely to argumentations# An argumentation is cogent or fallacious according as its chain of reasoning is cogent in context or fallacious in context# 57:9 There is no way to de%elop a coherent philosophy of logic without careful attention to coherent discourse# 5789 01 As mentioned abo%e' the expression .cogent in context/ is used in connection with an argumentation for a relation between its chain"of"reasoning and its bounding argument# Imagine two cogent argumentations' one arithmetic and the other geometric# In each case the ($4 is cogent in contextNbut the contexts are different# ,ow imagine two new argumentations obtained by interchanging the two ($4s# ,ow' the two ($4s are not cogent in context ? because the context changed# The two new argumentations are both fallacious- at the %ery least they in%ol%e wrong"conclusion or ignoratio elenchi# E--i,sis" E--i,ti!a-: <1@11' 78E1;' ;=@1:";1@7' (ohen",agel 1962/1993' xxiiiE1:' 7=' 1D:' 17<' 1:7 E,istemi!9:nti!: <= E11

Deri;ation: Let us use the word derivation to indicate a chain of reasoning that is cogent per se' i# e# that shows' makes clear' makes e%ident the fact that its final conclusion is a logical conse!uence of the propositions it uses as premises# 57;9# Thus in this sense a deri%ation is not a syntactic entity composed of characters arranged a certain way# 7a--a!ious: In some cases' the chain of reasoning is fallacious per se' for example' by %irtue of logical errors# In some cases' the chain of reasoning is fallacious in context 5sc# $f the argumentation at issue9' for example by %irtue of using premises not among the premise of the argumentation or by %irtue of reaching a conclusion other than the conclusion of the argumentation# fallacy of premise smuggling fallacy of wrong conclusion 5<;9 7orma-: It is at the le%el of deduction that the principle of form enters logic# 0%ery two argumentations n the same logical form are both cogent or both fallacious# 0%ery argumentation in the same form as a deduction is itself a deduction# 0%ery argumentation in the same form as a fallacious argumentation is itself fallacious# ,o fallacious argumentation has the same form as a deduction# These are principles of form for argumentation# 5<79 The principles of form for arguments' which are not to be found either in Aristotle or in Tarski' are the following# 0%ery argument in the same form as a %alid argument is %alid# 0%ery argument in the same form as an in%alid argument is in%alid# 0%ery two arguments in the same form are both %alid or both in%alid# 5719 Paradox: An argumentation that seems to deduce a conclusion thought to be false from premises thought to be true is called a paradox# The phrases .seems to deduce/' .thought to be false/ and .thought to be true/ make tacit elliptical reference to a participant# 5<19 8a-idation: Oalidating an argument is determining that it is %alid' gaining knowledge of its %alidity# In%alidating an argument is determining that it is in%alid# It is con%enient to refer to the process of constructing a deduction for an argument as deducing the argument and to say that an argument admitting of %alidation is deducible# ##a %alid argument per se pro%es nothing' not e%en that its conclusion follows from its premise" set# 5 7<9 The fundamental problem of deduction is to explain how immediately %alidated arguments are known to be %alid# 5779 8erifi!ation: Verifying a proposition is determining that it is true' gaining knowledge of its truth# Falsifying a proposition is determining that it is false# The process of constructing a proof for a proposition is proving the proposition' and a proposition admitting of %erification by proof is prova le! The process of constructing a disproof of a proposition is disproving the proposition and a proposition admitting of falsification by disproof is disprova le! It is clear that pro%ability and dispro%ability are participant" relati%e#

&ro%ability is a criterion of truth and dispro%ability is a criterion of falsity# @educibility is a criterion of %alidity and refutability is a criterion of in%alidity# 5779 3or further discussion see "o#en and $agel 193%/1962/1993& 'vii# 0%ery premise of a proof has been %erified by e%ery person for whom the proof is conclusi%e# Oerification is broader than demonstration# In normal 0nglish' .pro%e/ has a broad and a narrow sense' like .animal/# In the broad sense' e%ery human is an animal# In the narrow sense' no human is an animal# In the broad sense of .pro%e/' e%ery proposition that has been %erified has been pro%ed# In the narrow sense' a person/s ultimate premises were necessarily %erified' but except in rare cases they were not pro%ed# ,othing pre%ents a person from non"demonstrati%e %erification of a proposition already demonstrated# And' of course' nothing pre%ents a person from demonstrating a proposition already non" demonstrati%ely %erified T0,TATIO0 1I1LI$C4A&AP Alexander of Aphrodisias c#<==# (n Aristotle)s Prior Analytics 1!1*7# Trs# F# 1arnes' S# 1ob2ien' Q# 3lannery and Q# Ierodiakonou# Ithaca- (ornell E&# Anderson' (# 188:# Alon2o (hurch/s (ontribution to &hilosophy and Intensional Logic# +ulletin of ,y- olic .ogic ;-1<8"171# Anderson' (# and Releny' B# 188: See /eleny and Anderson 1990# Aristotle# (n 1nterpretation# Aristotle# 2etap#ysics! Aristotle# Posterior Analytics! Aristotle# Prior Analytics! 5,-it# 19099# Aristotle# ,op#istical 3efutations# Atlas' F# 18:8# P#ilosop#y 4it#out A- iguity! $xford- $xford E&# Audi' 4# 0d# 1888# "a- ridge 5ictionary of P#ilosop#y# (ambridge- (ambridge E&# 1enacerraf' &# and &utnam' A# 0ds# 18:7# P#ilosop#y of 2at#e-atics6 ,elected 3eadings# (ambridge- (ambridge E&# 1ernays' &# 186:*1881# A'io-atic ,et 7#eory# ,ew Pork- @o%er# 1irkhoff' C# 1876# $n the Structure of Abstract Algebras# Proceedings of t#e "a- ridge P#ilosop#ical ,ociety 31- ;77";6;# 1lackburn' S# 188D# ('ford 5ictionary of P#ilosop#y# $xford- $xford E&# 1ochenski' I# 186D*18D1 8istory of For-al .ogic# Trans# and ed# by I# Thomas# ,otre @ame' I,- ,otre @ame E&# 1oole' C# 1:;7# 7#e 2at#e-atical Analysis of .ogic! (ambridge- Bacmillan# 1oole' C# 1:;:# The (alculus of Logic# "a- ridge and 5u lin 2at#e-atical 9ournal 3-1:7"18:# 4eprinted in 3#ees 1952' 1<6"1;=# 1oole' C# 1:6;*<==7# .a4s of 7#oug#t# (ambridge- Bacmillan# 4eprinted with introduction by F# (orcoran# 1uffalo- &rometheus 1ooks# 1oolos' C# 188:# .ogic& .ogic& and .ogic# (ambridge BA- Aar%ard E&# 1oolos' C#' 1urgess' F# and Feffrey' 4# <==<# "o-puta ility and logic# (ambridge(ambridge E&# 1unge' B#' 0d# 1877# 2et#odological :nity of ,cience! @ordrecht- Qluwer# (hurch' A# 186D# 1ntroduction to 2at#e-atical .ogic# &rinceton- &rinceton E&#

(ohen' B#' and ,agel' 0# 187;*18D<*1887# 1ntroduction to .ogic! IndianapolisAackett# (ooper' F#' 0d# 1887# Plato6 "o-plete ;or<s# Indianapolis- Aackett# (opi' I#B# and Could' F#A#' #0ds# 18D;# 3eadings on .ogic# ,ew Pork- Bacmillan# 0,@ 8 16 =;

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