Document created: 4 August 00 Air & Space Power Journal - Chronicles Online Journal

Thucydides and PME: History's Role in Intermediate and Senior Service School
by William Rynecki
Attending

Professional Military Education (PME) courses in-residence is an institutional reward for a job well done, as well as preparation to assume more responsibility, i.e., promotion. T e cr!me de la cr!me of t e acti"e duty force, #uard, $eser"e, and international officers, as well as federal ci"ilians, are rewarded wit a fascinating year in Montgomery, %ea"enwort , &arlisle, 'ewport, (as ington, or o"erseas. T e effecti"eness of istory in t e curriculum "aries at t e different institutions. T is essay does not pretend to address t at. $at er, t is essay will attempt to demonstrate t at as difficult as T ucydides is to read, t e "alue of suc istorians is t eir ability to wea"e a t reat from t e Peloponnesian (ar to peace)eeping missions. T e point being t at studying istory does matter in PME and must be considered more seriously t an simply relegated to *dead guy +uotes.* &onsider first Pericles, flawed strategy t at led to t e e"entual siege and capitulation of At ens. -t relates to modern conflicts--specifically t e American $e"olution, t e .irst (orld (ar and /ietnam 0in t at belligerents wit real or imagined military superiority are not necessarily always "ictorious. 'e1t consider t ree +uestions. .irst, could 2aiser (il elm -- a"e learned anyt ing from reading T ucydides--regarding a protracted struggle of force-on-force warfare3 ( at about two asymmetrical conflicts almost two undred years apart3 Per aps 2ing #eorge --- or %yndon 4o nson,s aides could a"e benefited from reading t e *creator of objecti"e istorical science* (Anc or Atlas, 56). T e bottom line is t at study of T ucydides and t e Peloponnesian (ar is rele"ant to military policy and strategy ma)ers today. T ere are often unintended long-term conse+uences w en war is started wit out a clear end-state in mind. &onsider At ens. Alt oug At enians were obliged to render military ser"ice to 7parta, t e final "ictor in t e world-wide power struggle, in"ol"ing #reece, Macedonia, T race, t e Aegean, Asia Minor, 7icily, and %ower -taly, was not 7parta, but t e Persian Empire (Anc or Atlas, 56-89). %i)ewise, powerful #reat :ritain ne"er imagined t at upstart American colonists would gain a military "ictory and full independence less t an ten years after t e first s ots were fired at %e1ington. -n t e summer of 9;9<, #erman, .renc and :ritis political and military leaders, as well as t e ran) and file, were con"inced t e war would end in si1 mont s, not & ristmas 9;96. 7imilarly, =nited 7tates leaders failed to foresee t e prolonged agony of /ietnam w en ad"isors were first sent t ere in t e early 9;8>s. T e g ost of t at war still lingers--witness its aunting impact on American use of t e military instrument of power during t e last +uarter century. :ut first, rewind to a war t at occurred before & rist preac ed peace on eart and good will toward men. A year before t e outbrea) of t e Peloponnesian (ar in <?@ :&, Pericles con"incingly tells At enians t at war wit 7parta is all but ine"itable. Aespite t e Megara decree, to w ic bot parties are signatories, Pericles argues t at *7parta entertained designs against us* and claims 7parta refuses arbitration as called for in t e treaty (T ucydides, 6>). Be continues wit a list of 7parta,s specific and unreasonable demands. Be as)s for citiCen support to use t e military instrument for no mere trifle, arguing t at *t ey order us to raise t e siege of Potidaea, to let Aegina be independent, to re"o)e t e Megara decreeD and t ey conclude wit t e ultimatum warning us to lea"e t e Bellens independent* (T ucydides, 6>-9). Be emp asiCes t at e wants no

one to t in) At ens is going to war for slig t cause, pointing out t at *E-Ff you gi"e way Eto 7partaF, you will instantly a"e to meet some greater demand* (T ucydides, 69). Be goes on to say *ma)e t em clearly understand t at t ey must treat you as e+uals* (T ucydides, 69). Auring t e *7peec of Perciles* is r etoric e1udes confidence in At ens, military capability. :ut e was in fact less t an confident. Be begins t e comparison not by pointing out At ens, ad"antages but, rat er, 7partan wea)nesses. And in so doing Pericles ma)es a number of w at turned out to be wrong assumptions regarding 7parta,s military capability. Be says *EPFowers of t is description are +uite incapable of manning a fleet or often sending out an army* (T ucydides, 69). T ese two )ey strategic assumptions turned out to be dead wrong. Be continues, *t ey cannot afford t e absence from t eir omes, t e e1penditure from t eir own fundsD and besides, t ey a"e not command of t e sea* (T ucydides, 69). :ut & ian and ot er 7partan allies did command t e sea and e"entually t e landmass (T ucydides, 595). T ey laid siege to At ens and t en demanded its capitulation in <>< :.&.. T e peace conditions included raCing t e *long walls,* dissol"ing t e Aelian %eague, and establis ing 7partan egemony (Anc or Atlas, 89). :y t e summer of t e second year, Pericles, strategy and tactics were in tatters. T at second summer 7partan in"asions were accompanied by plague, and T ucydides says a c ange came o"er t e Peloponnesians. T ey were now more inclined to find fault wit Pericles. :ut e tries to rally t ose +uestioning is strategy and reminds t e beleaguered At enians of w at is at sta)e. *E(F at you are fig ting against is not merely sla"ery as an e1c ange for independence, but also loss of empire . . . besides, to recede is no longer possible* (T ucydides, 9@8). Pericles begins to bac) off ta)ing full responsibility for t e military debacle, arguing t at *you must not be . . . angry wit me w o, if - "oted for war, E-F only did as you did yoursel"es* (T ucydides, 9@8). T e 7peec of Pericles as stri)ing similarities to t e beginning of t e .irst (orld (ar. E"en after two years of ea"y casualties and little eadway #erman leaders ip, li)e Pericles, maintained a faGade of confidence as t e #reat (ar dragged on into stalemate. After August 9;9< only 2aiser (il elm could a"e stopped t e bloodbat propagated upon Europe following t e assassination of Arc du)e .ranC .erdinand, t e Bapsburg eir apparent. Be ad neit er t e "ision nor t e bac)bone to stand up to t e li)es of t e gloomy & ief of #eneral 7taff, #eneral Belmut "on Molt)e. (il elm,s near simultaneous c ildis biases and belligerent r etoric during t e decisi"e ours of ?9 4uly-9 August 9;9<--as t e #erman leaders ip waited for $ussia,s response to t eir ultimatum--is well )nownH *- ate t e 7la"sI - )now it is a sin to do so. (e oug t not to not ate anyone. :ut - can,t elp ating t em,* t e 2aiser screams (Tuc man, J?-<). T e pre"ious nig t, (il elm publicly played t e mobiliCation card, telling t e frenCied crowds milling on t e streets of :erlin t at t e *sword as been forced into our and* (Tuc man, J<). (ar was t e product of is poor judgment, combined wit bad intelligence from &ount Pourtales, w o, after se"en years in $ussia predicted *$ussia will not fig t for fear of re"olution.* (Tuc man, J<). %i)e Pericles before im and t e missiles of modern warfare yet to come, istorian :arbara Tuc man says t at *once t e mobiliCation button was pus ed, t e w ole "ast mac inery for calling up, e+uipping, and transporting two million men began turning automatically* (Tuc man, J<). Koung men w o sur"i"ed t e carnage of t e .irst (orld (ar )now, li)e many /ietnam "eterans later in t e century, t e wider implications of sur"i"ing war. Eric Maria $emar+ue ad e1perienced combat. *(e will be superfluous e"en to oursel"es, we will grow older, a few will adapt t emsel"es, some ot ers will merely submit, and most will be bewildered--t e years will pass by and in t e end we s all fall into ruin* ($emar+ue, @;<). American aut ors li)e (illa &at er and .. 7cott .itCgerald ad pre"iously "alidated $emar+ue,s account in t e early 9;@>s wit t eir no"els of American soldiers in t at war. Anot er interesting parallel is between wars almost two undred years apart--t e American $e"olution and /ietnam. T ey are alarmingly similar in t eir conduct and conclusion, per aps

suggesting t at #eorge --- and $obert Mc'amara did not study T ucydides. T e relati"ely sudden t rust into force-on-force battlefield and na"al engagements common in t e Peloponnesian (ar and t e wretc ed trenc warfare of (orld (ar -, were largely absent during t e American $e"olution and /ietnam. T e latter were asymmetrical conflicts--essentially wars w ere t e two belligerents are of une+ual military capability. -nitially t e :ritis in t e American $e"olution and Americans in /ietnam adopted a strategy of attrition warfare. -n /ietnam, #eneral (estmoreland,s intention *was to inflict on t e enemy more casualties t an t ey could tolerate, t ereby forcing t em E'ort /ietnamF to abandon efforts to subjugate 7out /ietnam* (7orley, 9). More important t an military capability, bot #reat :ritain and t e =nited 7tates lac)ed sustained popular support for attrition warfare. Lddly, :ritis political resol"e began to crumble early, as t e debate in parliament was "igorous. $ic ard 2etc um captures t e mood in Lctober 9JJ5H *Again and again, t e ,unjustness of t e cause, was cited, and t e points made in Parliament were ta)en up across t e land. =ni"ersities too) sides, as did clergymen and merc antsD e"en military men e1pressed t eir antipat y to t e war* (2etc um, 8<). :y contrast, &ongressional debate in t e =nited 7tates early in t e /ietnam (ar was muted. Public support for t e 4o nson administration,s /ietnam policy remained surprisingly strong t roug mid9;8J, despite rising =7 casualties and increasing media scrutiny of t e war. :etween 4anuary 9;88 and t e Tet Lffensi"e, former Aefense 7ecretary $obert Mc'amara admits t at *debates o"er ground strategy, pacification and especially bombing intensified dramatically* (Mc'amara, 1i-1ii). =nderlying it was a growing policy sc ism between t e president and is secretary of defense. T e growing gap is laid bare in Mc'amara,s May 9;, 9;8J memorandum to President 4o nson. Bis lengt y memo meanders into many areas but essentially +uestions #eneral (estmoreland,s re+uest for more ground troops. Lb"iously close old at t e time, Mc'amara appears influenced by growing sentiment against t e war, especially on college campuses. Eit er t at or e may a"e finally awa)ened to t e war,s moral dimension--a side e admittedly lac)ed in t e early *w iC )id* days of t e 2ennedy administration. ( ile being ec)led at Bar"ard, Mc'amara recalls is time as a student at :er)eley w en c allenged to defend an increasingly untenable policy (Mc'amara, @55). Many a"e criticiCed Mc'amara for is ard line in 9;8J and w at some belie"e to be empty empat y nearly t irty years later. :ut reading is memo in @>>>, Mc'amara gains credibility. -t sounds "ery muc li)e an anti-war stand t at could a"e been written by a t oug tful anti-war acti"ist. Arguing t at t e sig t of a *superpower )illing or seriously injuring 9>>> noncombatants a wee) . . . is not a pretty one,* t e secretary is clearly struggling wit demons of a policy gone badly wrong (Mc'amara, @8;). T at memo combined wit t e Tet Lffensi"e si1 mont s later began t e unra"eling of 4o nson,s /ietnam policy and (estmoreland,s strategy and tactics. T e general consensus is t at public support turned against t e war following Tet. -n addition, disagreement among policyma)ers ig in t e 4o nson administration combined to raise +uestions about w et er America was winning t e war. 7upporters of American military strategy in /ietnam point out t at Tet was not a military defeat. T ey are correct but miss a larger point. T e "isual e"idence t at t e war was not going as smoot ly as policyma)ers would a"e t e public belie"e was a significant de"elopment t en. And it as ad gra"e implications since. Among t em is t e increased media scrutiny t e military as recei"ed since t e ad"ent of t e @<- our news cycle. Lt ers belie"e t e */ietnam 7yndrome* as resulted in misusing t e military in mur)y non-traditional roles. A potentially more serious fallout of /ietnam is possible reticence to not use t e military instrument of power in traditional roles e"en w en it may clearly be in our national interest to do so. 7o w at a"e we learned from studying Pericles, 2ing #eorge ---, (il elm --, and more contemporary strategy and policyma)ers3 A great deal. A constant t eme in reading military istory or listening to oral istories of t e few Americans w o a"e

actually e1perienced combat is t eir confirmation t at war is ell and t at it is better to a"oid or deter it w ene"er possible. T e +uestion for ci"ilian policyma)ers and military implementers is ow to balance deterring war t roug a policy of engagement w ile )eeping t e ran) and file energiCed in a world of c anging security en"ironments w ic often dri"e di"ergent military re+uirements. .or e1ample, do we want t e same fer"or e1 ibited by t e troops in August 9;9< for a peace)eeping mission in t e :al)ans in 9;;;3 T e answer lies in not more PME but a more focused PME curriculum for all ran)s and appropriate ci"ilians t at seriously addresses t e issues raised in t is essay. At present Air .orce PME, certainly by correspondence, is considered a necessary and nasty urdle to o"ercome for promotion. T e residence programs, alt oug better--especially wit t e 9;;;-@>>> academic year,s radical curriculum c anges at Air &ommand and 7taff &ollege (A&7&)--must stri"e to be bot academically rigorous but "alue-added to t e Air .orce in terms of product. $ecently - was tal)ing to a fig ter pilot w o stated, *'o point in studying a losing war, just t e ones we won.* T is alarming response from a fellow A&7& student s ows t e pertinent "alue of0necessity--for good, istorically reflecti"e PME. 7ome of t e current curricula t at attempt to co"er e"eryt ing from t e budget process to planning by t e joint doctrine coo)boo) in"ite disaster. Military istory, to include wars from before & rist to current peace)eeping and umanitarian operations s ort of war, must be interpreted for present day application and, t us, made central to PME curricula. :ut most importantly, it must be rele"ant to policyma)ers, soldiers, sailors, airmen, and riflemen ali)e. Lt erwise, T ucydides stands little c ance of being read seriously by a new generation of war fig ters wit as yet undefined missions in a new millennium. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Bermann 2inder and (erner Bilgemann, eds., T e Anc or Atlas of (orld Bistory, /ol. 9, .rom t e 7tone Age to t e e"e of t e .renc $e"olution, ('ew Kor)H Anc or :oo)s, 9;J<). 2. $obert :. 7trassler, ed., T e %andmar) T ucydidesH A &ompre ensi"e guide to t e Peloponnesian (ar, ('ew Kor)H 7imon M 7c uster, 9;;8). 3. :arbara (. Tuc man, T e #uns of August, ('ew Kor)H :allantine :oo)s, 9;;<). 4. Eric Maria $emar+ue, All Nuiet on t e (estern .ront, ('ew Kor)H .awcett &rest, 9;;9). 5. %ewis 7orley, A :etter (arH T e =ne1amined /ictories and .inal Tragedy of America,s %ast Kears in /ietnam, ('ew Kor)H Barcourt :race M &ompany, 9;;;). 6. $ic ard (. 2etc um, T e (inter 7oldiersH T e :attles for Trenton and Princeton, ('ew Kor)H Anc or :oo)s, 9;;9). 7. $obert 7. Mc'amara wit :rian /anAeMar), -n $etrospectH T e Tragedy and %essons of /ietnam, ('ew Kor)H $andom Bouse, 9;;5).

Disclaimer T e conclusions and opinions e1pressed in t is document are t ose of t e aut or culti"ated in t e freedom of e1pression, academic en"ironment of Air =ni"ersity. T ey do not reflect t e official position of t e =.7. #o"ernment, Aepartment of Aefense, t e =nited 7tates Air .orce or t e Air =ni"ersity. T is article as undergone security and policy content re"iew and as been appro"ed for public release -A( A.- ?5-9>9.