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Carlyle A Thayer
Professor of Politics
Director UNSW Defence Studies Forum
School of Humanities & Social Sciences
The University of New South Wales at
Australian Defence Force Academy
c.thayer@adfa.edu.au
Winter School on
Globalisation and Its Counter Forces
co-sponsored by
Swedish School of Advanced Asia-Pacific Studies
and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
Singapore
Carlyle A. Thayer *
‘We must not confuse a few al-Qaeda escapades with Southeast Asian Islam as
a whole’ Robert W. Hefner, March 25, 2003.
Introduction
Prior to the Bali bombings of October 12, 2002, the conventional view of Islam in
Southeast Asia, and Islam in Indonesia in particular, was that it was different
from Islam in the Middle East, Pakistan and Central Asia. Islam in Southeast
Asia was viewed not only as moderate but inward looking and tolerant. The
conventional view also held that radical Islam represented a tiny minority and
*Iwould like to acknowledge my intellectual debt to Greg Barton who provided me with copies
of three of his unpublished manuscripts. This paper draws heavily on the various reports issued
by the International Crisis Group and Political Islam in Southeast Asia, Conference Report,
Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.
Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.. March 25, 2003. All references may be found in the
bibliography.
3
The vast majority of Southeast Asia’s Muslims are Sunni. 1 In many areas Islam
has become intertwined with pre-existing values and belief systems associated
with folk religion, Buddhism and Hinduism. This intermixing resulted from the
history of Islam’s arrival from the twelfth century. The bearers of Islam spread
their views peacefully and not by force of arms. They adapted to local customs
and conditions. A broad historical overview would also reveal that a tiny
of the faith.
The Bali bombings challenged the conventional view of Islam. The causes of
terrorism were now widely perceived as closely linked to Islamic politics. The
established links with militant groups not only throughout Southeast Asia but
1The Sunni tradition is known in Arabic as the Ahl-i Sunnah (the People of Sunnah). The word
‘Sunnah’ means custom, method, or path and refers particularly to the example of the prophet
Muhammed as found in the Hadith. The Sunnis are those who follow the tradition of the prophet
and his companions in understanding the Islamic faith. Shia Muslims hold the same fundamental
beliefs of other Muslims, with the principle addition being that they also believe in an imamate,
which is the distinctive institution of Shia Islam. Islam experienced a schism about a century after
death of the prophet Mohammed. The dispute centred around the appointment of a caliph. The
Shias argued that only a direct descendant of the Prophet could be appointed, while the Sunni
argued any person approved by the religious community was eligible. The caliph had substantial
political and military power but no inherent religious authority. Sunni Muslims view the caliph
as a temporal leader only and consider an imam to be a prayer leader, but for the Shia the historic
caliphs were merely de facto rulers, while the rightful and true leadership continued to be passed
along through a sort of apostolic succession of Muhammed's descendants, the Imams (when
capitalized, Imam refers to the Shia descendant of the House of Ali). This dispute became
entrenched in doctrine.
4
declare Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) a terrorist group perhaps was an indication that
violence associated with radical Islamic groups was an internal domestic issue in
insurgents who advocated either autonomy or separatism. Now the picture was
Some international terrorism experts have painted a more alarmist picture. They
argue that Muslims in Southeast Asia had been radicalized by the spread of
Wahhabi puritanical doctrine and Jihadi extremism. They view Southeast Asia as
the second front if not the global epicenter of international terrorism. Some
observers argue that Indonesia might go the way of Pakistan. Country and area
specialists take a more measured view, but they are in disagreement about
Southeast Asia.
This paper will present an assessment of the role of radical Islam and political
upon.
Problems of Definition
Any discussion of Islam and its possible connection to terrorism is fraught with
peril. In April 2002, for example, the Organisation of Islamic Conference meeting
in Kuala Lumpur issued a Declaration on Terrorism that stated, ‘[w]e reject any
terrorism acceptable to all. No doubt the view that ‘one person’s terrorist is
another person’s freedom fighter’ is partly responsible for this impasse. Even the
United States has not adopted a single definition of terrorism. While it is defined
in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, the Departments of State and Defense as
6
well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation all have separate definitions. Some
countries have attempted to side step this semantic problem by drafting laws
defining terrorist acts. Other countries view these so-called ‘terrorist acts’ as
One possible way out of this conundrum is to define a terrorist group as any
group proscribed by the United Nations. A caveat needs to be entered that the
UN lists only those groups associated with the Taliban and Osama bin Laden.
Islamic groups. There is a tendency among security analysts to lump all Islamic
Islamic groups. As yet there is no agreed definition of key terms. A quick survey
Islamism, Islamist, political Islam, radical Islam, militant Islam and Islamic
extremism.
2Indonesia has not yet declared JI a terrorist organization. JI’s leader, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was
found guilty of involvement with JI. But the Indonesian court said it lacked the evidence to
demonstrate that Ba’asyir was JI’s amir or spiritual leader.
7
There is near unanimous agreement among the Muslim elite in Southeast Asia
has been underway among Muslims in Southeast Asia for a decade or more. It
refers to the adoption of pious religious habits such as fasting during the holy
months, saying daily prayers, and adopting Muslim dress (tunics for men,
Islamism is ‘the belief that Islam should guide social and political as well as
personal life’. 4 Islamists are who want legislated recognition and a direct role for
Political Islam may be defined as ‘those individuals and organizations that gain
their legitimacy from Islam and that seek to gain power through electoral
3International Crisis Group, Indonesia Backgrounder: A Guide to the 2004 Elections. Asia Report no.
71, Jakarta and Brussels, December 18, 2003, 13, note 40.
4Sheri Berman, ‘Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society’, Perspectives on Politics (American
Political Science Association), June 2003, 1(2), 257.
8
two types of political Islamism (conservative and radical) and militant Islamism. 6
The term radical Islam is often used by international terrorism experts as a short
hand equivalent for extremists and terrorists. Country specialists argue that
radical Islam is more a religious than a political movement and should not be
equated with terrorism. Indeed some radical Islamic groups oppose terrorism
extreme.
The sources of radical Islam in Indonesia are both internal and external. Most
modernist Muslims who were oppressed during the New Order. 7 Modernist
Muslims argue that the true basis of Islam is the Koran and the example of the
Prophet Mohammed and they believe Islam should play a greater role in
5Political
Islam in Southeast Asia. Conference Report, Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H.
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.,
March 25, 2003, 2.
6GregBarton, ‘Islam, Islamism and politics in post-Soeharto Indonesia’, unpublished manuscript,
December 25, 2003, 6-8.
7Generally, orthodox Muslims in Indonesia can be divided into two very broad religious streams,
the modernist and traditional. Traditionalists base their views on Islamic tradition handed down
by history including even Javanese traditions. The leading traditionalist organization is Nahdatul
Ulama (NU). Traditionalists accept the secular state.
9
the views of modernist Islam. Masyumi was banned by President Sukarno for its
The external sources of radical Islam in Southeast Asia lie in the intrusion of
Western culture and globalisation, the impact of the Iranian Islamic revolution in
1979, the promotion of Islamic fundamentalism by Saudia Arabia, and the jihad
provides the ideological underpinning of the Saudi state. What was exported to
religious ideology that far exceeds the conservatism of official Saudi Wahhabism.
Finally, Islam in Indonesia has been influenced by Salafism or the pure Islam of
the first century as practiced by the Prophet and his Companions. International
terrorism experts fail to take note, however, that many groups that adhere to the
Salafi tradition are not violent. The spread of radical Islamic beliefs and the
10
impact of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 which resulted in the collapse of
Militant Islam has two meanings. Militant Islam may be defined as the support
of violence in the defence of Islam. At one level it may take the form of public
perceived to be under attack. In its most extreme form, militant Islam supports
Islamic extremism has been defined ‘as those groups which have a
the faith and have a conviction that Islam must be implemented in its full and
literal form, free of compromise. They are trenchantly reactive, whether through
as not going far enough. It is in this tiny fringe that modern day political
Finally, arising from the discussion above, it should be noted that there is no
clear distinction between moderate and radical Islam. These groups do not
8Political
Islam in Southeast Asia. Conference Report, Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H.
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.,
March 25, 2003, 13.
11
political Islam or Islamic politics in the context of terrorism risks distorting our
analysis. There is much more going on in the Islamic community than just
society.
Indonesia
Indonesian Islam has been heavily influenced by domestic folk religion and
extremist groups have existed since independence in 1949. They made their
appearance in three distinct historical periods: (1) late 1940s to early 1960s in
form of Darul Islam; (2) mid-1960s to late 1990s, a period of state repression of
political Islam; and (3) mid-1990s during which there was a revival of Islamic
radicalism initially instigated by the Suharto regime itself. One rallying call
among various Islamic groups, including radicals, is for the adoption of the
9Islamic mysticism shaped by Persian and Indian thought; see Greg Barton, ‘Making sense of
Jemaah Islamiyah terrorism and radical Islamism in Indonesia’, unpublished paper, January 14,
2004, 12.
12
‘Jakarta Charter’ or the restoration of seven words deleted from the declaration
Clifford Geertz, an anthropologist, has popularized the terms abangan and santri
to describe Islam in Java. The former is a term used to describe nominal Muslims
whose belief systems are heavily infused with indigenous beliefs and folk
Indonesia’s santri are associated with either the Muhammadiyah (30 million
members) or Nahdlatul Ulama (35 million members). As noted above, the former
These two great streams (aliran) in Indonesian politics were represented in the
were represented by their stalking horse, the Masyumi party. Table 1 displays
the results. Four parties garnered 78 percent of the total vote. The two major
Muslim parties received 39.3 percent of the total vote, while the two secular
10These words were dropped from the first of the five sila (Pancasila), ‘with the obligation for
Total 78.0%
insurgency in West Java, which attracted support in Aceh and South Sulawesi in
the 1950s. In 1958, Indonesia was also subject to rebellion in West Sumatra and
banned. Its successor, Parmusi, was politically constrained. 11 In 1960s and 1970s,
Islam. In 1973 Indonesia’s eleven legal political parties were grouped by fiat into
three oganisations. All the Muslim parties were grouped into the United
Development Party (PPP). Secular nationalists were grouped into the Indonesian
Democratic Party (PDI), while supporters of the New Order formed GOLKAR as
11In1967 Suharto engineered an internal coup in Parmusi to block former Masyumi leaders from
gaining office.
14
their political organisation. In the 1970s the NU’s pesantren system was
modernized and this led to the birth of small group of Islamic liberals. In the
ideological basis of the Indonesian state (accepting belief in one God rather than
The New Order regime continued to view Islamism with suspicion. When the
threat of communism receded, the New Order identified the danger of militant
Islamism and extremist Islam as the major domestic threats to national security.
university campuses and within certain mosques and madrasah (religious day
school) communities.
With political space closed, the leaders of modernist Islam transferred their
quickly became involved in verbally attacking their more liberal brethren who
15
chose to work with the New Order regime. The DDII became increasingly
militant.
Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World (Komite Indonesia untuk
Palestinians and used this issue to recruit members. In 1990s KISDI launched
interest in Islam. For more than a decade a revival of interest in Islam had been
bureaucrats, and public servants take time out from work to pray and to fast
during Ramadan. As noted, the fall of the Shah, Saudi funding for religious
President Suharto and elements of the New Order regime, including members of
the political civilian and military elite, courted the support of Islam by providing
finance, protection and patronage during their final decade in power. Most
The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 led to the collapse of the New Order and a
Islamic parties were formed, a sure sign of weakness, lack of cohesion and
ideological fragmentation.
One major indication that radical and militant Muslims only represented a tiny
fraction of Indonesian society was the result of the 1999 national elections. These
were the first free and fair national democratic elections since 1955. Table 2 below
sets out these results. These results reflect a similar breakdown of communal
affiliations in 1955. The two secular nationalist parties, PDI-P and GOLKAR
received 56.3 percent of the total vote. The three mainstream Muslim parties
received 30.4 percent of the total vote, while the two avowedly radical Islamist
parties Crescent Moon and Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, BPP) and Justice
Party (Partai Keadilan, PK) received a miniscule 3.3 percent. Even if this total
were combined with the PPP’s tally, the total vote received by identifiable
Islamist parties was only 14 percent. The 1999 election results clearly indicate
that few Indonesian voters are attracted to any variety of political Islamism or
radical Islamism.
Total 90.02%
In the aftermath of the fall of the New Order, three prominent radical groups
Islamiyah. 12 It is important to note that all three had their roots in militant
For all that has been written by international and regional terrorism experts, the
fact remains that al Qaeda has achieved only a superficial degree of coordination
with local Islamic radicals in Indonesia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Both
Laskar Jihad and the Islamic Defenders Front, for example, have distanced
12International Crisis Group, Indonesia Backgrounder: A Guide to the 2004 Elections. Asia Report no.
themselves from al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. Al Qaeda established links
with only two major groups in Southeast Asia, JI and the ASG, and both have
The Islamic Defenders Front 13 (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) was founded on
Indonesia. Total FPI membership has been placed at 40,000 of whom 5,000 were
residents of Jakarta. The FPI is not a product of al Qaeda machinations but rather
and military elite. As Robert Hefner remarked, the FPI is heir to Indonesia’s
the 1990s the FPI was used as the elite’s cats paw to mount violent attacks on
movement because its main activity has been to harass and physically attack
nightclubs, gambling dens, red-light districts, and other sites of vice and iniquity.
Within days of the Bali bombings the Islamic Defenders Front suspended its
activities.
Laskar Jihad (Holy War Fighters) represents the second largest but best funded,
coordinated and armed Islamic paramilitary group to emerge after the fall of the
New Order. It was formed in early 2000. Laskar Jihad is the paramilitary wing of
the Communications Forum of the People of the Way of the Prophet and the
Muslim Community (Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah,). Like the
Laskar Jihad, like the FPI, acted as a vigilante group in attacking bars, brothels
and discotheques. Although its total membership was quite small, Laskar Jihad
their armed militias in Maluku and Central Sulawesi. Laskar Jihad may be seen
There can be no doubt that Laskar Jihad received high-level patronage from
opportunistic elements of the Indonesian elite including the military who were
military escorts as it traveled from West Java to Surabaya. Laskar Jihad was
Jihad’s violent activities, seemingly carried out with impunity, incurred the
15International Crisis Group, Indonesia Backgrounder: A Guide to the 2004 Elections. Asia Report no.
wrath of rival political factions. Laskar Jihad clashed repeatedly with the police
and military. Its leader, Jafar Umar Thalib, was arrested in May 2001.
Laskar Jihad was dissolved in October 2002 three days after Bali bombings.
regional separatists in Papua and Aceh. In other words, far from serving the ends
of ‘global Islamic extremism’ Laskar Jihad has served to support the unity of the
Jihad ‘reveals the low level of support for their brand of political Islam among
Indonesian Muslims’. 16
Jemaah Islamiyah draws its inspiration from the Darul Islam rebellion led by
Second World War. In January 1948 Kartosuwirjo formed the Islamic Army of
Indonesia (Tentara Islam Indonesia, TII) in West Java and rebelled against the
controlled by his troops. Kartosuwirjo called this area Darul Islam (abode of
peace). DI strength may have reached 20,000 fighters. Rebellion spread to the
16Michael Davis, ‘Laskar Jihad and the Political Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia’,
Contemporary Southeast Asia, April 2002, 24(1), 28.
21
provinces of Aceh, South Sulawesi, Kalimantan and Central Java in the early
demobilize his forces. He made contact with Kartosuwirjo and in 1953 Sulawesi
declared itself a part of the rebel Islamic state of Indonesia. Kartosuwirjo’s forces
was declared in 1949. In 1962, Kartosuwirjo was arrested and three years later the
resistance leader in South Sulawesi was killed. The Darul Islam movement
civilians, lost their lives, another half a million persons were displaced from their
homes.
Little was heard about Darul Islam over the next decade. In mid-1977 Indonesia
arrested 198 persons who were reportedly members of Komando Jihad. All had
backgrounds in the Darul Islam movement. These events still remain murky. It is
movement to counter communism. When they did so, they were rounded up and
arrested. Whatever the case, the Komando Jihad affair had the consequence,
Sulawesi, Sumatra and Java, and reviving the idea of promoting an Islamic state.
The revival of DI set the scene for the emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah.
The rise of JI is closely associated with two figures, Abdullah Sungkar 17 and Abu
Bakar Ba’asyir. Both Sungkar and Ba’asyir joined the Masyumi party and
Dakwah Islamiyah Surakata in Solo. They both founded the Pesantren al-Mu’min
In November 1978, Sungkar and Ba’asyir were both arrested during the round
up of DI members. They were put on trial in 1982 and sentenced to nine years
imprisonment. This sentence was overturned on appeal and the pair were
to return to their home villages and form cells of around a dozen members and
live communally. Soon Islamist cells and discussion groups sprung up in Solo
and Yogyakarta.
Government security forces shot dead dozens of Muslims. In February 1985 the
17Sungkar was born in Brebes, Central Java in the late 1930s of Yemeni descent. He was a former
officer in Kartosuwirjo’s TII.
23
to Sungkar and Ba’asyir. In this climate, Sungkar and Ba’asyir fled to Malaysia
among the tens of thousands of migrants from Central and East Java who had
relocated there.
While in Malaysia, Ba’asyir and Sungkar resumed teaching and maintained their
links with associates in Jakarta, Central and West Java, North Sumatra and South
Sulawesi. Sungkar recruited volunteers for the mujahidin in Afghanistan. The first
group followed a year later. These recruits were first sent to Peshawar where
Later, recruits were sent to Camp Saddah run by the Afghan mujihadin
commander Sayyaf. In 1991 Camp Saddah began the first of several three-year
volunteers from Malaysia and Singapore. Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi and Imam
Samudra were among the prominent graduates of Camp Saddah. In 1992 Camp
Saddah was moved to Torkham, Afghanistan. This was at a time when a Taliban
where he forged ties with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
24
In 1993 a split occurred in the ranks of DI activists that led directly to the
establish a training facility within the MILF-run Camp Abu Bakar in Mindanao.
Later in the year JI shifted to Mindanao where they set up their own training
facility, named Camp Hudaibiyah, within the Camp Abu Bakar complex. Camp
Hudaibiyah was sub-divided into Camp Solo, Camp Banten, and Camp
Abu Bakar was overrun by the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 2000. JI then
set up a new training camp in Poso, Central Sulawesi and also continued to train
in Mindanao.
bombings trained and fought in Pakistan and Afghanistan during the period
In 1990s Sungkar and Ba’asyir came into contact with radical elements who
broke away from the Egyptian Brotherhood and founded the al-Gama’at al-
alumni formalized the structure of JI which they set out in a manual entitled,
25
commander/leader.
Pondok Ngruki. Pondok Ngruki is one of five so-called ‘ivy league’ pesantren
2001. Other jihadist pesantren are located in Java, Kalimantan and Sulawesi.
Graduates from these pesantren form JI’s foot soldiers. JI’s pesantren network is
schools). 18 But these JI-run boarding schools nevertheless have had a major
Qaeda were Ngruki graduates: Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, Hambali, Abu Jibril
The period after the fall of Suharto, as noted above, witnessed a sharp rise in the
number of radical Islamic groups. These groups were diverse in origins, beliefs
and the manner in which they operated. After his return to Indonesia, Ba’asyir
18Pesantren are known elsewhere as madrashas. In Indonesia the term madrashah denotes a day
the archipelago. This congress formed the Indonesian Muslim Council (Majelis
governing council. Many Ngruki alumni and ex-Afghan veterans took up key
leadership roles.
Hambali orchestrated the December 2000 Christmas Eve bombings during which
attacks were made on thirty-eight churches and priests in eleven cities resulting
in nineteen deaths and 120 wounded. Hambali also ordered planning for major
against so-called soft targets. This led directly to the Bali bombings in October
Bandung, Sukabumi and Ciamis in West Java were conducted by other JI cells.
For example, Omar al-Faruq was active in Riau. JI cells were also reportedly
deep roots in Indonesian society extending back to the Darul Islam movement of
the late 1940s. The terrorist core of JI consists of a loose network of radical
Islamists associated with the Pondok Ngruki pesantren in Solo, Central Java.
Many of the key leaders in JI have had military experience in Afghanistan. Some
are related by marriage. The core of this group is difficult to estimate, but it may
militants who form part of a regional and international network with ties to al
Qaeda.
In addition to the three main radical groups just discussed, there are numerous
and Laskar Mujahidin (Holy War Fighters). These organizations have created
armed groups who have battled Christian militia in the outer islands. These
groups are purely parochial. But not all of Indonesia’s radical Muslim groups are
violent. For example, Hizbut Tyahrir, which favours an Islamic caliphate and
stage protests and mass rallies. Yet these organizations have been careful to
Political Islam is a fact of life in Malaysia and reflects the communal nature of
Malay society. The federal government has always been in the hands of a
coalition representing Malays, Chinese and Indians. This tripartite coalition was
initially known as the Alliance. After 1971 the coalition expanded and became
was swept by the forces of Islamization emanating from the Middle East.
the post-independence period. PAS engages in what has been termed ‘ethnic
party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). Political Islam has
the Malay community. In recent years there has been a growing generational
The 1999 federal elections serve as a case in point. Due to the fall out from the
Anwar Ibrahim affair, the Malay elite was split. In the 1999 elections less than
PAS. But a detailed examination of the motivations of these voters reveals that
they voted against UMNO and not in support of PAS’s brand of Islamism.
29
During the 1999 elections both PAS and UMNO vied with each other in
UMNO has sought to control both public Islamic discourse and the political
opposition, including PAS. In June 2001 acting under provisions of the Internal
Security Act authorities arrested over 70 individuals who were charged with
Amir
Central Command
Governing Council
Southeast Asia up into four regions or mantiqi (see Chart 1) with a special focus
radical Islamic network had a regional and not a national focus. While a number
Nearly all detainees or suspects linked to the Bali bombings had permanent
Malaysia. There have been three notable exceptions, but these incidents are the
exceptions that prove the rule: the attack on a police station in Johore (October
arms from military depots in Grik, Perak (July 2000). After the wave of arrests of
Historically, political Islam has not made any headway in Singapore where the
significant feature of the detainees arrested in the island state was that they were
Philippines
Muslims make up 17% of the population in the southern Philippines. But the
may be divided into three major and a number of minor ethnic groups. Each is
whose religion has become intertwined with local animist beliefs. The southern
on Islam. When Islamic parties have arisen they have championed regional
The Moro separatist movement is quite distinct in that is has attracted significant
popular support based on local issues such as inequality in land ownership and
poverty. The Moro National Liberation Front has negotiated a peace agreement
arrangements. A break away group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
should be viewed as a bona fide rebel force and not a terrorist organization. The
Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The MILF has permitted Israeli irrigation
bombings at Davao airport (later claimed by the Abu Sayyaf Group). The MILF
has offered to help apprehend international terrorists and has refrained from
criticizing U.S. military support to the AFP directed against the ASG. The
terrorism. The MILF provided training facilities at Camp Abu Bakar to the JI
during 1996-2000. Recent reports indicate that JI members continue to train MILF
Mindanao. 20
The Abu Sayyaf Group represents an exception to this picture. It was formed in
1993 by Filipino veterans of the Afghan conflict. But the ASG has failed to grain
traction among the majority of the Muslim community in Sulu, Tawi Tawi and
Basilan. The ASG quickly degenerated into criminal behaviour to such an extent
that al Qaeda may have distanced itself and sought out ties with the MILF
instead. The ASG’s links with al Qaeda were tenuous at best and atrophied if not
The ASG is an atypical Muslim separatist group in that includes new converts to
Islam and non-Muslims among its members. The ASG today may total around
200 fighters, divided between eighty percent common criminals and twenty
percent Islamic militants. Prior to 1995, the ASG was probably the only Islamic
group in the Philippines to have espoused global Islamic demands (eg. freeing
those convicted in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center). The ASG is the
20Oliver Teves, Associated Press, ‘Terror group members from Indonesia training rfecruits in
Philippines’, November 26, 2003; Kimina Lyall, ‘Manila admits JI training continues’, The
Australian, December 12, 2003; Kimina Lyall, ‘JI grows terror in Philippines’, The Weekend
Australian, December 13-14, 2003; and Karen L. Lema and Friena P. Guerrero, ‘Gov’t says no large
JI presence in Mindanao’, Business World, December 17, 2003.
33
only Islamic extremist group to employ kidnapping, murder and general terror
as its main tactics. The ASG claimed responsibility for the March 2003 Davao
airport bombing.
and violent, has been and remains overwhelmingly concerned with Muslim
ethnic nationalism rather than fundamentalist Islamic goals. The roots of Muslim
grievances extend back hundreds of years; the factors that led to the emergence
of the MNLF and MILF predate al Qaeda’s arrival in the region by several
decades.
Southern Thailand
Thailand has a Muslim minority representing about five percent of the total
population. One half of all Thai Muslims live in the south where they constitute
the majority in four provinces: Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala and Satun. Thai
especially rife from the late 1960s until the mid-1980s. The Patani United
Liberation Organisation (PULO) and its armed wing, the Patani United
Liberation Army (PULA), were the most visible Muslim separatist organizations
In 1995 a dissident faction known as New PULO broke away from the main
body. In 1997, PULO and New PULO formed a tactical alliance and operated
under the name Bersatu (Solidarity). This alliance suffered a set back the
the last decade, due to Thai government policy, the influence of separatist groups
example, southern Muslims currently hold eight seats in the Senate and the
There are unconfirmed reports that KMM/JI remnants from Malaysia fled to
meeting place. For example, there are unconfirmed reports that JI terrorists may
have planned the Bali bombings at a gathering held in Thailand. 21 The arrest of
Hambali, a leading JI figure, indicates that Thailand may also have served as a
21These claims have been discredited by Indonesian police that targeting of Bali was decided in
There has been a marked upsurge in violence since late 2001. An estimated fifty-
six security personnel have been killed since then. In January 2004 there was
incident, a military camp was attacked and over one hundred assault rifles were
stolen from its armory; at the same time eighteen schools were set on fire. Thai
rife that this violence may be linked to criminal activity, police-military rivalry or
the revival of separatism. Police and security officials have identified Gerakan
Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) as the most likely perpetrator, but Barisan
Revolusi Nasional (BRN), PULO, and New PULO have been implicated as well. 22
A key GMIP leader fought in Afghanistan and GMIP may have had links with
gathering of gangs’ with ‘no real political ideology’ and should not be equated
22‘Barrack raided, 20 schools torched in South’, The Nation [Bangkok], January 5, 2004; ‘Wanted
rebel leader a key suspect’, The Straits Times Interactive, January 6, 2004; ‘Bt1m reward for top
suspect’, The Nation, January 7, 2004; ‘New command post to be set up Defence minister wants
full-scale force’, The Bangkok Post, January 6, 2004. Rohan Gunaratna has also identified Jemaah
Salafiah as a Thai extremist group; see: Patrick Goodenough, ‘Thailand Gov’t Urged to Get
Serious with Terrorists’, CNSNews.Com, January 9, 2004.
23Alisa Tang, Associated Press, ‘Terrorist group helping insurgents, Thailand says’, January 9,
2004.
24‘Attackers had “outside help”’, The Nation, January 9, 2004.
36
The exact size of the Muslim community in Cambodia, mainly ethnic Chams, is
unknown but may number several hundred thousand. There is little historical
evidence of Islamic militancy or extremism among this group. But in 2003, the
teachers have been expelled. Three of those arrested were associated with the al-
Mukara school which taught Wahhabi religious beliefs and received funding
from Saudi Arabia. Another detainees was associated with an Islamic school
Myanmar is host to a Muslim minority totaling 3.8 percent of the population. The
Rohingyas are an Islamic minority group located in the western state of Arakan.
meeting held under JI auspices. Extremist Rohingyas reportedly have also made
25Ker Munthit, Associated Press, ‘3 Muslim Foreigners Arrested in Cambodia’, The Guardian, May
28, 2003; Michael Kitchen, Voice of America, ‘Cambodian Linked to Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist
Group’, June 12, 2003; Ek Madra, Reuters, ‘Cambodia, Thailand Take Aim at Militant Islam’, June
12, 3003; ‘JI cell members may be set free in Cambodia’, Radio Australia, December 19, 2003; and
Ek Madra, Reuters, ‘Cambodia to Try Egyptian, Thai Militant Suspects’, January 5, 2004.
26Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003,
173-175.
37
Conclusion
This paper began by raising two main issues: (1) whether the conventional view
of Islam in Southeast Asia needed to be modified in light of the events of the Bali
bombings in October 2002 and (2) whether Southeast Asia has become the second
radical Islam has deep historical roots in the region, especially in Indonesia. But
political Islam has not generally been politically influential. Radical Islamist
groups have had a significant impact on politics and security out of proportion to
This paper also argued that developments in Middle East remain crucial to our
understanding what is occurring not only across the Muslim world but in
Southeast Asia as well. In this respect, political Islam in Southeast Asia has not
from the Middle East when combined with the forces of globalization serve to
reinforce radical Islam because they undermine state sovereignty and encourage
any major radical Islamic group in Southeast Asia to hitch its domestic struggle
community and it lies on the fringes of radical Islam. The dominant influences on
radical Islam do not emanate from overseas or al Qaeda but from domestic and
elite instigation of sectarian conflict, the role of paramilitary jihadis and economic
crisis. Theologically conservative Islam is here to stay but it will be one of many
conventional view that Islam in Southeast Asia is moderate, inward looking and
The theses that Southeast Asia is international terrorism’s second front or the
patterns are evident in each country. In Singapore, Islamic politics are confined
to the ruling party. In Malaysia some sections of Islam have developed a more
to their experiences under colonialism and rivalry with ethnic Chinese. More
recently there has been a closing of the democratic space in Malaysia and a shift
towards Islamic conservatism. But Islamic extremism and terrorism has failed to
gain traction. Thailand has followed a more inclusive path in its southern
39
provinces, but the upsurge of violence recently casts a question mark over the
motivated by regional and global rather than local factors. Throughout the
What about the situation in Indonesia? First, this paper has noted that militant
for several centuries. Radical Islamic groups have used violence to further their
aims since the early years of independence. Over the past decade there has been
violence and physical destruction. This is partly the result of the Afghan
experience and regional networking. But domestic factors appear to weigh more
heavily. This paper has identified three key drivers of radical/militant Islam in
violence in Indonesia has been the collapse of local governance, loss of elite
Is Islam a rising or declining force in Southeast Asia? Greg Barton argues that the
initial stages of regime change has allowed small groups of Muslim radicals to
influence Indonesian society and politics out of all proportion to their true size
40
and that this process will continue. 27 Barton notes that Indonesia’s lower classes
Barton also argues that there is a real possibility Islamist political parties will
enjoy considerable leverage after the 2004 elections when they can expect to
The long term trends indicate that the secular political traditions dating back to
the colonial era in countries with Muslim populations are eroding. There is a
growing belief in the region that Islam should not be confined to the private
sphere. In sum, there is clear evidence that Islamisation has spread in Southeast
Asia. But this process has not resulted in the rise of political Islam as a major
force. The Indonesian case is instructive. In the post-Suharto era, the major
noted, there was a decline in electoral support for Islamist parties between 1955
and 1999. There is also evidence that public support for the constitutional
27Greg Barton,. ‘Indonesia at the Crossroads: Islam, Islamism and the Fraught Transition to
Democracy’, Paper presented to the Conference on Islam and the West: the Impact of September
11’, organized by Monash University and The University of Western Australia, Melbourne,
August 15-16, 2003, 27.
41
In the future, the influence of radical Islam in Southeast Asia will have little to do
politics and economic life. Success on these fronts will undercut the appeal of
radical Islam and its links with political terrorism in Southeast Asia.
42
Asia
43
Source: Political Islam in Southeast Asia. Conference Report, Southeast Asia Studies Program, The
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Johns Hopkins University, Washington,
D.C.., March 25, 2003, 3.
44
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