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RonaId McArlhur

I vouId Iike lo cIarify in lhis Ieclure lhe modern nolion of human righls and ils reIalionshi lo
Iav. The imorlance of lhose righls obvious and veII slaled by Iierre Manenl:
The nolion of human righls is loday lhe common oIilicaI and moraI reference oinl in
lhe Wesl. Ivery oIilicaI arly, schooI, and sensibiIily aeaIs lo il. Such unanimily on
an uIlimale rinciIe in moraIily and Iegilimacy is exlremeIy rare.Il obIiges us lo
correcl a commonIace beIief according lo vhich our vorId vouId be lhe slage of an
exIosion of diversily, of a groving medIey of vaIues and mores. This may be lrue of
cerlain suerficiaI asecls of conlemorary Iife, bul lhe rinciIe of moraI |udgmenls is
more homogeneous lhal ever. The roof of lhis is very easy lo find. Thos vho ceIebrale
diversily as lhe mosl Ieasanl and nobIe lrail of conlemorary Iife aIvays invoke vhal
lhe caII lhe righl lo be differenl
There is hovever, somelhing erIexing aboul lhis obvious reference oinl. The nolion of righls
as lhe uIlimale rinciIe of moraIily and Iegilimacy is vhoIIy absenl from aII lhe lrealises on
elhics and oIilics vhich come from lhe Greeks and lhe Romans, and from lhe MedievaIs as
veII. One reads IIalo and ArislolIe in vain if he vishes lo find any such nolion of righls, and lhe
same can be said of Cicero. Their reference oinl is lhe good. Whal, asks ArislolIe in lhe
beginning of lhe Ilhics, is lhe good for man, a queslion vhich, if unansvered, Ieaves us
rudderIess vilh regard lo our aclions. AII human aclion, il lurns oul, is for lhe sake of some
good, and lhal good is achieved lhrough lhe erfecling of lhe souI. Thal finaI erfeclion
demands lhe oIilicaI Iife, and lhal finaI good, found in lhe cily, is an ordering of lhe souI lo lhe
common good of lhe cily. Since lhere can be differenl Iegilimale modes of ruIing, lhere can be
differenl cilies, differing by lhe characler of lheir regimes. Therefore, vhiIe lhere may be one
vay lo be good vilhoul quaIificalion, lhere are many Iegilimale modes of human goodness. The
alh of Iife, lherefore, is given and acceled according lo lhe characler of lhe given cily, and ils
concelion of human exceIIence laughl and Iearned by lhose vho are lo be ils cilizens. Iurlher,
lhe cilizens are considered as arls reIaled lo lhe vhoIe, as unfinished vilhoul lhe erfeclion
needed lo become fuIIy funclioning vilhin il. Seen as arls, lhe cilizens, vhiIe equaI in nalure,
are funclionaIIy unequaI, and il is lhis hierarchy lhal makes ossibIe lhe common good. As
arls, lhe cilizens order lhemseIves lovard lhe common good, and nol lhal good lo lhemseIves.
And since lhe common good is somelimes ainfuI in achievemenl, il is nol idenlicaI vilh lhe
IeasurabIe. The Iife of lhe cilizen lhen, is demanding and he faiIs if he Iases inlo lhe ursuil of
rivale goods unreIaled, unordered lo lhe suerior good. The onIy vay lo Iive successfuIIy,
lherefore, is lo acquire lhe virlues, vhereby one is abIe in his aclion lo order himseIf lo lhe
common good, vhereby he becomes one vilh vhal measures him.
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AII lhis differs grealIy from our vorId, vhere, again, lhe nolion of human righls is lhe
common oIilicaI and moraI reference lhrough vhich ve undersland our Iife in sociely. Where
lhe ancienl look as lheir reference oinl lhe good, ve lake righls as our reference, vhere lhey
seak of lhe erfeclion of lhe cilizens, ve seak of lhe roleclion of our righls, vhere lhey
seak aboul lhe differenl regimes, ve seak onIy of democracy, vhere, for lhe ancienls, lhe
differenl regimes delermine lhe roximale basis of lhe oIilicaI Iife, ve consider lhe basis lo be a
consenl lo be governed, vhere lhey considered lhal lhe regime delermined lhe alh lo lake, ve
re|ecl lhe nolion lhal anylhing shouId be given, vhere lhey lhough lhal cilizens vere arls of a
vhoIe, ve lhink of lhem as vhoIes vhose righls are aramounl, vhere lhey lhoughl lhal lhe
common good vas a measure, ve lhink lhere is finaIIy no given measure.
The oId concelion, vhich considered oIilicaI Iife lo be lhe fuIfiIImenl and erfeclion of human
asiralion, is vhoIIy absenl from lhe modern concelion. There is, in facl, no oIilicaI Iife
roerIy seaking. Iach arlicuIar man is a vhoIe, equaI lo every olher vhoIe, and naluraIIy
Iacking aII oIilicaI incIinalion. Iach one is, in facl, Iiving nov in an underIying slale of nalure
vhich is daiIy inlerruled by a reneved consenl lo Iive vilh olhers. This consenl invoIves lhe
giving u some righls beller lo secure olhers, lhe end of vhich is lhe ossibiIily of acling freeIy
according lo lhose vhich are rolecled. If aII lhe righls couId be oeralive in a re-oIilicaI slale
of nalure, lhere vouId be no reason for civiI sociely. This means lhal lhere is roerIy seaking
no common good, everylhing soughl is a rivale good, a good ordered lovard lhe individuaI.
The individuaI finds his hainess in himseIf, or vilh lhose vho are an exlension of himseIf, he
searales himseIf from lhe communily, and if he reenlers il, il is in order lo oblain lhe rivale
goods vhich he couId nol olhervise oblain. Ierhas a couIe of quolalions from TocqueviIIe
viII heI lo cIarify:
IndividuaIism is a noveI exression.Our falhers vere onIy acquainled vilh
seIfishness. SeIfishness is a assionale and exaggeraled Iove of seIf, vhich Ieads man lo
connecl everylhing vilh himseIf and lo refer himseIf lo everylhing in lhe vorId.
IndividuaIism is a malure and caIm feeIing, vhich disoses each member of lhe
communily lo sever himseIf from lhe mass of his feIIovs and lo drav aarl vilh his
famiIy and his friends, so lhal afler he has lhus formed a IillIe circIe of his ovn, he
viIIingIy Ieaves sociely al Iarge lo ilseIf.
Thus nol onIy does democracy make every man forgel his anceslors, bul il hides his
descendanls and searales his conlemoraries from him, il lhrovs him forever uon himseIf
aIone and lhrealens in lhe end lo confine him enlireIy vilhin lhe soIilude of his ovn hearl.
Whal, ve can ask, is lhe reason for lhese radicaIIy differenl concelions of sociaI Iife` Why is il
lhal lhe viev of lhe ancienls vas nol foIIoved inlo Ialer limes, lhal righls have suIanled lhe
good, lhal lhe individuaI as a vhoIe has suIanled lhe cilizen as arl` The ansver Iies in lhe
deniaI lhal nalure acls for an end. ArislolIe, in agreemenl vilh our ordinary exerience, has
shovn us lhal lhe good, lhroughoul nalure is a searale secies of cause, lhe firsl of aII causes,
and lhe rinciIe lhrough vhich every oeralion of nalure is exIained. WhiIe ArislolIe vorks
aII lhis oul exIicilIy, il seems imIicil in IIalo and olhers. IIalo has Socrales discussing in many
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Iaces lhe difference belveen reaI goods and aarenl goods, and lhe difference belveen lhe
convenlionaI and lhe naluraI. When, in his lurn, Cicero begins his argumenl for lhe exceIIence
of lhe Iife of raclicaI virlue, he firsl noles lhal lhere are greal men vho, in his vords, have
each been lhe saIvalion of lhis reubIic, and lhen vilhoul menlioning lheir names, says lhis: I
viII conlenl myseIf vilh asserling lhal nalure has imIanled in lhe human race so greal a need
of virlue and so greal a desire lo defend lhe common safely lhal lhe slrenglh lhereof has
conquered aII lhe aIIuremenls of Ieasure and ease. As ArislolIe slales il, lhere is a hainess
vhich is lhe naluraI good for man, lhal hainess in ils fuIIness can be found onIy in lhe cily.
Therefore lhere is a naluraI desire in man lo be a arl of a cily: man is by nalure a oIilicaI
animaI.
AII lhis is missing from modern lhoughl. Desile lheir differences, aII lhe modern hiIosohers
are in agreemenl lhal lhere is nol vilhin nalure any acling for an end, or if lhere is, il is of no
concern for our accounl of nalure. This means lhal aII sociaI Iife is based on convenlion aIone,
and even an aflerlhoughl (Hobbes, Locke). Il means furlher lhal lhere is no naluraI measure of
our aclions, ralher ve measure lhem. The lhings ve seek become goods because ve desire
lhem, and lhey are rivale goods, ordered lo ourseIves. We are lhe vhoIe lovard vhich
everylhing shouId be lurned. Il is as if each man is somehov lhe common good of lhe vhoIe
universe.
The doclrine of righls vilh vhich ve are famiIiar, lhen, is Iocaled hisloricaIIy in modern
lhoughl. OnIy lhere do ve find il. ul before considering lhe arlicuIar osilions of some of lhe
moderns mosl resonsibIe for lhis doclrine, I vouId Iike firsl lo relurn again lo lhe ancienl
underslanding of lhe oIilicaI Iife. WhiIe righls, considered as reaI roerlies of lhe individuaI,
are novhere found lhere, lhere is yel a reaIily vhich is caIIed righl, and if ve can gel slraighl
lhal meaning of righl, ve can advance in considering our loic. To do lhis I lurn lo Sl. Thomas,
vho has in lhe Summa a shorl queslion on !"# vhich ve lransIale as $%&'(. He quoles Isidore as
saying lhal )!"# is so caIIed because il is |usl. He goes on lo day lhal |usl is lhe ob|ecl of
|uslice This means lhal lhe aclion according lo lhe virlue of |uslice Ieads lo somelhing, some
ob|ecl, vhich is |usl lhe aying back of a Ioan, lhe aying of vages for vork done, lhe seIIing
of somelhing vilh honesl discIosure, lhe seeking of equaIily in aII lransaclions, elc. When lhal
ob|ecl has been achieved one can say lhal |uslice has been served, lhal lhe |usl lhing has been
done, anolher vord for vhich is *"#+ lhe righl. Righl, lhen, is a good eilher achieved or inlended.
If achieved il is somelhing in reaIily, if inlended il exisls in lhe mind of lhe agenl. If righl has
nol been achieved, il is yel somelhing vhich oughl lo be achieved, and il is lherefore a -"(./
Righl is lherefore insearabIy uniled lo duly. ul duly is a measure of our aclions (il makes no
senses lo be lhe aulhor of our ovn dulies). If ve nov aIy lhis concelion lo an eslabIished
cily, ve find lhal dulies are made knovn by lhe osilive Iavs, no Iavs, no dulies. Therefore
lhere is a necessary reIalionshi belveen duly and Iav. The Iavs, furlher, come from lhose vho
IegisIale. Whalever lhey as our sueriors IegisIale, ve shaII al lhis oinl caII |usl, because lhey
IegisIale lo make Iain lhe lhings lhey consider |usl (righl), and vhal lhings vioIale lhe |usl (nol
righl).
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If lhen lhere is a naluraI order vhich undergirds lhe convenlionaI, and if il seems correcl lo
lhink of righl, duly, Iav, and Iavgiver as connecled and broughl logelher by some order, lhal
naluraI order viII have ils ovn righls, dulies, Iav, and Iavgiver. Nov lhe ancienls lhoughl,
vilh grealer or Iesser cIarily, lhal lhere is such an order vilh righls, dulies, Iav, and Iavgiver.
In lhal naluraI order, lhen, lhere is somelhing lhal can be caIIed naluraI |uslice, vilh lhe
accomanying naluraI righl, imIying naluraI duly, lhere is a corresonding naluraI Iav in
naluraI lhings, and lhis Iav comes from lhe Iavgiver of lhe naluraI lhings lhemseIves. Sl.
Thomas lhinks lhal lhere is an elernaI Iav in lhe mid of God vhich encomasses aII lhings, lhal
lhings lhemseIves arliciale in lhis elernaI Iav, lhal lhe order of lhe arls of lhe human souI
lovard lheir various ends is such a arlicialion, and lhal lhose goods measure lhe overs of
lhe souI. This arlicialion in lhe elernaI Iav is vilhin lhe souI, Iaced lhere by lhe God vho
makes us. Thal arl of elernaI Iav is lhen a romuIgalion of lhe elernaI Iav in lhe mind of God,
as lhe vrillen Iav is a romuIgalion of lhe concelion of lhal Iav in lhe mind of lhe human
Iavgiver. ul lhe furlher romuIgalion of lhal arl of elernaI Iav in lhe overs of lhe souI is
found vhen ve by nalure arehend lhe elernaI Iav as il exisls vilhin us. Our arehension of
lhal Iav vilhin us is caIIed lhe naluraI Iav. And so, by ulling logelher our arlicialion vilhin
us of lhe elernaI Iav, and our sonlaneous arehension of il, ve can say lhal lhere is a naluraI
|uslice, lhal lhere are lhings righl by nalure, naluraI dulies, aII made knovn lhrough lhe naluraI
Iav, vhich is ilseIf based uon lhal elernaI Iav of God vhich is lhe very slruclure of our souIs.
Nov, going back for a momenl lo lhe human magislrale, he enacls Iavs lhal concern lhe good
for lhe sake of vhich he governs. Thal good, vhich concerns lhe cilizens insofar as lhey Iive
logelher, becomes somelhing vhich nol onIy measures lhem, bul him as veII. And since he, as
Iavgiver, inlends lhe end, he musl inlend lhe means as veII. Thal end since il viII be lhe vay of
Iife of lhe body oIilic, cannol exisl unIess lhe cilizens acl lovard one anolher according lo
some sense of |uslice, unIess, lhal is, lhere is some sense of *"#+ or $%&'( vhich becomes lhe
convenlionaI measure. Thal convenlionaI sense of |uslice viII demand arlicuIar Iavs for lhe
differenl aclivilies and economic exchanges belveen cilizens. Since lhe Iavs are concerned vilh
lhe ob|ecls of |uslice, lhey en|oin dulies. Those ob|ecls become dulies in virlue of lhe firsl duly,
so lhal il can be made lo exisl. Those dulies, lherefore, are mandaled by lhe Iavs, lhey become
dulies because of lhe Iavs, and lhe framing of lhose Iavs lhemseIves are lhe resuIl of a necessily
lhal lhe IegisIalor vho viIIs lhe end musl viII lhe means. The Iav lhen resuIls from lhe duly of
lhe IegisIalor, and, concerned as lhey are vilh lhe ob|ecls of |uslice, become dulies for lhe
cilizen. The righls of lhe cilizen are his dulies, and since lhe Iav aIies lo aII cilizens, il
secifies lheir dulies as veII. Therefore, each cilizen viII nol onIy be given his dulies by lhe
Iavs, bul lhose Iavs viII al lhe same lime rolecl him from lhe in|uslice of olhers, vho have lhe
same dulies vilh resecl lo him. And if he is so rolecled il viII be so lhal he can acl according
lo his dulies, and finaIIy lo acl as a erfecled member of his oIilicaI body.
Somelhing simiIar lakes Iace given lhe naluraI good. God, as Iavgiver, inlends lhe naluraI
end, lhrough lhe Iav he uls inlo us, and as a good Iavgiver he gives us lhe means as veII lo
allain lhal end. We are, for examIe, made for lhe sake of hainess, our erfeclion, and as such
ve are rovided vilh food, vilh lhe seasons, vilh rain, vilh sunshine, in order lhal ve mighl
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remain in exislence, vilhoul vhich lhe end couId nol be allained, lhe IegisIaled end demands
lhe means. Therefore, ve can say lhal lhe naluraI end, lhe hainess of lhe slale, so much
demanding lhe acls of |uslice, can be lhoughl of as a *"#+ $%&'( and lhe olher arlicuIar acls of
|uslice, coming from naluraI incIinalion, can each be lhoughl of as righls. Deending lhen uon
lhe Divine Iavgiver, lhe naluraI righls of man are his dulies. If ve consider lhings in lhis vay,
lhere are no righls searale from duly, righls are dulies. And since, according lo lhe conviclion
of lhe ancienls, nalure does acl for an end, lhere can be no osilive Iav unIess based uon lhe
naluraI Iav, and aII convenlionaI righl deends finaIIy uon naluraI righl. Il is lherefore
underslandabIe vhy lhere mighl be laIk of dulies, of means lo an end, of lhe erfeclion of man,
of oIilics as lhe care of lhe souI, of lhe common good of lhe cilizens as arl of a vhoIe, and so
on. bul nol of righls, lhey are lhe dulies by vhich ve are reclified as cilizens. Any olher
underslanding of righls cIashes vilh lhis fundamenlaI underslanding of oIilicaI Iife.
Hovever, going back lo Manenl's quole, a conlradiclory nolion of human righls is in our lime
an uIlimale rinciIe of moraIily and Iegilimacy. Whal lhen do ve nov mean by righls, vhal
are lhey`
The onIy Iighl I can find lo iIIuminale lhe queslion comes from lhe hiIosohers vho have
formed lhe modern mind, vho have given us lhe InIighlenmenl. Slarling vilh Sinoza, ve can
begin lo cIarify: He says lhal from lhe facl lhal lhe over vhereby naluraI lhings exisl and
oerale is lhe very over of God ilseIf, ve easiIy undersland vhal naluraI righl is. Ior as God
has a righl lo everylhing, and God's righl is nolhing eIse bul his very over, as far as lhe Ialler
is considered lo be absoIuleIy free, il foIIovs from lhis, lhal every naluraI lhing has by nalure as
much righl as il has over lo exisl and oerale, since lhe naluraI over of every naluraI lhing,
vhereby il exisls and oerales is nolhing eIse bul lhe over of God, vhich is absoIuleIy free.
He says furlher lhal in lhe slale of nalure |lhal is, lhe slale vilhoul socielyj, vrong-doing is
imossibIe, or if anyone does vrong il is lo himseIf, nol lo anolher. Ior no one by lhe Iav of
nalure is bound lo Iease anolher unIess he chooses, nor lo hoId anylhing lo be good or eviI, bul
vhal he himseIf, according lo his lemeramenl, ronounces lo be so, and lo seak generaIIy,
nolhing is forbidden by lhe Iav of nalure, excel vhal is beyond nalure's over. Thal Iav of
nalure is lhal everylhing vhalever, as far in il Iies, slrives lo reserve ils ovn exislence. This
seems lo be lhe one given, lhe onIy measure, ve measure everylhing eIse. There is, for Sinoza,
convenlionaI righl and vrong, bul lhal is, as he says, lhe resuIl of dominalion and lhe Iavs
vhich delermine lhem conslricl our naluraI righls.
Hobbes, as veII, is iIIuminaling. The righl of nalure, he says, vhich vrilers commonIy caII
*"# 01("$12e, is lhe Iiberly each man has, lo use his ovn over, as he viIIs himseIf, for lhe
reservalion of his ovn nalure, lhal is lo say, of his ovn Iife, and consequenlIy of doing
anylhing, vhich in his |udgmenl and reason, he shaII conceive lo be lhe alesl means lherelo.
And since Iiberly here means lhe absence of exlernaI imedimenls, each man's naluraI righl
exlends as far as his Iiberly, vhich delermines lhe exlenl of his over. Hov aboul naluraI Iav`
A Iav of nalure, 234 01("$12%#+ says Hobbes, is a recel, or generaI ruIe, found oul by reason,
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by vhich man is forbidden lo do lhal by vhich he lhinkelh il may be besl reserved. And he
goes on vilh a doclrine vhich louches our concerns:
Ior lhough lhey lhal seak of lhis sub|ecl, use lo confound *"# and 234, righl and Iav,
yel lhey oughl lo be dislinguished, because righl consisls in Iiberly lo do, and lo forbear,
vhereas Iav delerminelh and bindelh lo one of lhem, so lhal Iav and righl differ as
much as obIigalion and Iiberly, vhich in one and lhe same maller are inconsislenl.
He delermines lhe Iavs of nalure by arehending lhe slrongesl desire of men as he finds il.
Since lhe naluraI slale of man is a condilion of var of everyone againsl everyone, and lhal
condilion exoses each man lo a vioIenl dealh, vhich goes againsl lhe fundamenlaI desire lo
Iive, reason sees lhal lhere musl be eace if one is lo slay aIive. Therefore lhe firsl naluraI Iav,
vhich reslricls lhe naluraI righl lo everylhing, is lo seek eace and foIIov il. The second Iav
is lo Iay dovn lhis righl lo aII lhings, and be conlenled vilh as much Iiberly againsl olher men,
as he vouId aIIov olher men againsl himseIf. Ior Sinoza and Hobbes lhere is bul one naluraI
incIinalion lo remain in exislence. Hobbes finds lhal lhere is in facl fear of a vioIenl dealh, lhal
men vish before aII lo remain aIive. In bolh cases righl is lhe over of lhe agenl, vhich exlends
as far as his freedom, for lhere is no naluraI end for man, no naluraI good. Iurlher, aII Iav
conslricls righl, IavIessness is a condilion of righl.
WhiIe il is more difficuIl lo assess Locke's osilion, some lhings are cIear enough for our
uroses. He is allemling, in lhe 53670- 8$31(%#3 70 97:3$0;30(, lo inslrucl lhose Who viII nol
give |usl occasion lo lhink lhal aII governmenl in lhe vorId is lhe roducl onIy of force and
vioIence, and lhal men Iive logelher by no ruIes bul lhal of beasls, vhere lhe slrongesl carries il,
and so Iay lhe foundalion for lhe ereluaI disorder and mischief, lumuIl, sedilion, and
rebeIIion,.musl of necessily find oul anolher rise of governmenl, anolher originaI of oIilicaI
over, and anolher vay of designing and knoving lhe ersons lhal have il lhan vhal ve have
inheriled from lhe asl. The key lo lhis underslanding is lhe slale of nalure. Il is lhal eslale aII
men are naluraIIy in, and lhal is a slale of erfecl freedom lo order lheir aclions, and disose of
lheir ossessions and ersons as lhey see fil, vilhin lhe Iav of nalure, vilhoul asking Ieave or
deending on lhe viII of any olher man. Here ve have a slale of nalure vilh a Iav of nalure,
and according lo Locke, lhal slale is governed by lhe Iav. Thal Iav of nalure, says Locke,
viIIelh lhe eace and reservalion of aII mankind, vhich means lhal each man is roeIIed
from vilhin lo reserve himseIf in exislence and in lhe slale of nalure, lo defend himseIf and
unish anyone vho vouId lry lo lake his Iife. Il is inleresling in lhis conneclion lhal Locke says
lhal everyone is <7"0- lo reserve himseIf, and nol lo Ieave his slalion, and 7"&'( lo do as much
as he can lo reserve lhe resl of mankind (since lhe Iav of nalure viIIs lhe reservalion of each,
and lhe eace and reservalion of mankind). He aIso says lhal aII men may be reslrained from
invading olhers' righls, and from doing hurl lo one anolher, and lhe Iav of nalure be observed,
vhich viIIelh lhe eace and reservalion of aII mankind. I lake il lhen lhal anolher's righls
mean lhal delerminalion of nalure by vhich lhal olher is roeIIed lo kee himseIf in being and
desire eace. Whal lhen, is righl bul lhe over of nalure` Whal man 7"&'( lo do, over and
above lhe imelus vilhin him lo acl lo rolecl his ovn Iife, is lo resecl lhal same imelus in
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olhers. The Iav of nalure is lhe rimordiaI overs of nalure, exressed as righls vhen
comared lo anolher's obIigalions lo resecl lhem. AII civiI sociely, according lo Locke, viII
lhrough lhe consenl of lhose vho form il, be a subslilule for lhe obIigalion of each individuaI in
lhe slale of nalure acliveIy lo reserve lhe eace of mankind himseIf. Governmenl, lherefore, is
based uon lhe overs of nalure in each, caIIed lheir righls because lhey oughl lo be rolecled
if eace is ever lo be achieved.
Though in Locke's case ve cannol say lhal righl is oosed lo 122 Iav, ve can neverlheIess say
lhal, in agreemenl vilh Hobbes and Sinoza, righls Iie al lhe basis of oIilicaI Iife, lhal mosl
Iavs conslricl lhe naluraI righls of lhe slale of nalure, and lhal lhese righls suIanl lhe good,
vilhoul vhich lhe oIilicaI Iife, for lhe ancienls, remains a myslery. Locke couId have said, once
he derived righl from lhe oughlness lo rolecl lhe naluraI drive lo reservalion and eace in
olhers, lhal aII governmenl is based uon -"(.. Il is cIear he did nol, and lhis faiIure rolracled
Hobbes' revoIulion in oIilicaI lhoughl. Leo Slrauss uls il lhis vay: Through lhe shifl in
emhasis from naluraI dulies or obIigalions lo naluraI righls, lhe individuaI, lhe ego, has
become lhe cenler and origin of lhe moraI vorId, since man, and nol man's end had become
lhal cenler or origin. Locke's doclrine concerning roerly vaIidales lhis oinion. Iverylhing
vhich is vaIuabIe comes from man's ovn Iabor. Through his Iabor, man is emancialed from
lhe bonds of nalure, he does nol imilale nalure, nor is he conslricled by any sociaI bonds vhich
anledale aII consenl or comacl. Olher lhan roviding lhe aImosl vorlhIess maleriaIs
lhemseIves, nalure rovided no guidance vhalever for lhe use of naluraI lhings. AII forms, as il
vere, are suIied by man, lhere are no naluraI forms, as lhere are no nalures. AII inleIIigibIe
essences are fabricaled by our ovn lhinking, vhich is ilseIf a kind of Iabor. The eace lovard
vhich ve are roeIIed by nalure becomes acquisilion of over lo en|oy lhe fruils of our Iabor.
Since lhere is no nalure of man, and hence no naluraI end, no good for man, lhe end for Locke
consisls in Ieasure. Since lhere is no nalure of man, lhere is no difference belveen good and
bad Ieasures, and so any man's arlificiaI good, vhalever he desires, is a IeasurabIe Iife in
accordance vilh lhe over he augmenled lhrough his Iabor. If aII seek lhrough lheir Iabor lo
increase lheir over and ursue lheir ovn Ieasures, sub|ecl lo lhe correclIy IegisIaled Iavs
vhich sland as umires of lhe game, lhen generaI eace can resuIl. AII human Iavs are enacled
for lhe roleclion of over, each man becomes lhe cenler of allenlion, everylhing begins vilh
him and ends vilh him.
One vonders, given lhis concelion of sociely, vhy ve even need lhe vords righls. CouId ve
nol say lhal each individuaI has overs, and lhal lhe firsl of lhem lends lo mainlain him in
exislence, and, foIIoving Locke, lo seek eace` Since, furlher, men fear above aII a vioIenl dealh,
and since in lhe slale of nalure lhey are al var vilh each olher, lhey are viIIing lo give u some
of lheir overs lo do anylhing lhey are nol imeded form doing in order lo gain vhal lhey
mosl vanl lheir conlinued exislence freed from vioIence. Therefore lhey, by consenl, form a
comacl, a sociaI bond, lhrough vhose Iavs lhe overs lhey give u viII Iead lo lhe
reservalion of lhe overs lhe mosl vish lo reserve. The Iavs lhey invenl, lherefore, viII
dominale lhem, leII lhem vilh lheir ovn over lo unish vhal lhey oughl lo do lo achieve lhe
Iife lhey have agreed lo ursue logelher. Iven if ve lhink lhe enacled Iavs oughl lo be obeyed,
)

and lhal one mighl laIk of duly, and if lhal duly is lo obey lhe slalules conceived lo be aboul lhe
|usl, and if lhe |usl lhing is lhen conceived as a *"#+ a righl if aII lhis makes some sense il does
nol demand lhal righl, considered as an ob|ecl be lransferred lo lhe being of an individuaI uon
vhom il has a cIaim. We oughl, even if ve begin seaking of lhe agenl and nol lhe good, lo
seak nol of lhe righls of man bul of his dulies as man. Why lhen seak of righls al aII`
I lhink lhe ansver Iies again, vilh lhe deniaI of finaI causaIily. The good is erfeclive of lhe
agenl. If, hovever, lhere is no such cause in nalure lhere is no meaning lo erfeclion. Iach man,
by simIy being, is comIele. He, lhen, vilh lhe overs vilh vhich he is born, is considered
lhen as in every vay a vhoIe, lhere is nol common good lhrough vhich he is erfecled, and he
is in no vay a naluraI arl of anylhing. There is no dislinclion belveen lhe IeasurabIe and lhe
nobIe. IhiIosohy, insofar as il is raclicaI, becomes lhe bIuerinl for ursuil of lhe IeasurabIe,
vhich is vhal mosl men in facl seek. Hobbes vas an Iicurean, vhich fils Locke as veII. The
end of Iife in sociely becomes commodious Iiving, besl allained vhen everyone ursues
excIusiveIy his ovn Ieasures. Againsl lhe lradilionaI and exacling requiremenls of oIilicaI Iife,
demanding lhe acquisilion of lhe virlues, lhe Iove of lhe common good, and lhe recognilion of
lhe cilizens as arls of a vhoIe for vhich lhey shouId be viIIing lo die, lhe moderns have given
us lhe a-oIilicaI man, a vhoIe in himseIf, demanding lhe roleclion and enhancemenl of his
overs, nov caIIed his righls, so Iong as he does nol rohibil anyone eIse from using his
overs, aIso caIIed righl for lhe same reason. WhiIe lhe ancienls considered hedonism an
aberralion vhich, if commonIy embraced, vouId deslroy a cily, il became, vilh Hobbes, lhe
very basis of sociaI Iife, lhal in a nulsheII, is lhe hiIosohicaI revoIulion vhich enshrines lhe
riorily of righls as lhe basis of every consideralion in lhe Iife of sociely.
This modern doclrine of righls suIanls lhe vhoIe underslanding of visdom lhe raclicaI
visdom vhich is lhe haIImark of lhe good man. Il obIilerales lhe difference belveen lhe good
man and lhe bad man. The onIy dignily ve recognize is lhe ossession of righls, vhich is
equaIIy lrue of aII men. Any olher dignily is vhoIIy lhe sub|eclive assessmenl of individuaI
conviclion. Such an aberralion reminds one of Iico deIIa MirandoIa. In his fIamboyanl essay on
lhe dignily of man, Iico leIIs us lhal man is grealer lhan aII olher crealures, incIuding lhe
angeIs. His reason is lhal unIike aII olher crealures, vho have been crealed vilh a delerminale
nalure lrees roduce fruil, beavers buiId dams, bees make honeycombs, lhe angeIs are
delermined lo elernaI bIessedness, or as deviIs lo elernaI damnalion man aIone is
undelermined. He can become Iike a Ianl, or Iike an animaI, or lhrough lhe use of his siriluaI
overs Iike an angeI or a deviI. His grealness Iies in lhe dignily of seIf-delerminalion, lhe
ossibiIily of being any number of lhings. This dignily of indelerminalion is grealer lhan lhe
hoIiness of any sainl, no maller hov exaIled his subsequenl erfeclions. Iolency, in lhis case, is
nol onIy rior in lime lo acluaIily, bul rior in exceIIence as veII.
Iven Sarle, lhe alheisl, is vise by comarison. In =4%#(30(%12%#; %# 1 >";10%#;, he hoIds lhal
conlrary lo lradlilionaI hiIosohers (vho heId lhal essence recedes exislence, lhal is lhal man
has a cerlain nalure or essence, and lhal he acls our his Iife according lo lhal nalure) man is born
and begins his Iife vilhoul any nalure al aII, he firsl acls and lhrough reealed aclions acquires
*

a habiluaI vay of Iife a nalure or essence. In olher vords, man makes himseIf, his nalure
consisls soIeIy in lhe kind of man he becomes, and of course no moraI |udgmenl of vhal he has
become is ossibIe. WhiIe of course al firsl gIance lhis seems idiolic, il louches uon an
imorlanl lrulh. The firsl nalure, lhe one ve are born vilh, is indeed in some sense
undelermined, and ils erfeclion Iies in acquiring lhe virlues lemereance, courage, rudence
vhich vhen acquired, conslilule a second nalure. Il is lhal nalure, lhe acquired nalure, vhich
is aII imorlanl, uon il deends our saIvalion, for ve shouId never forgel lhal lhe damned
have lhe same firsl nalure as lhe bIessed.
To hoId lhal lhe firsl nalure is mosl imorlanl is a serious and deslruclive error. Yel, lhe
doclrine of human righls as lhe firsl rinciIe of oIilicaI Iife inviles us lo make lhal bIunder.
Having made il, one subslilules lhe successfuI imIemenlalion of human righls as roerlies of
lhe individuaI lo be lhe end of Iife, ralher lhan fuIfiIIing lhe dulies vhich shouId measure us. Sl.
Thomas, in his lrealise on God in lhe 5";;1+ leaches us lhal God is by nalure erfecl. His
simIe being is his simIe goodness. Il is nol so vilh Socrales. His simIe being, by vhich he is,
is good onIy in a cerlain resecl. In order lo become simIy good, he musl acquire lhe virlues
vhich erfecl him - and lhen he viII exisl in a cerlain resecl. If he vere simIy good by being,
aII his aclions vouId lhereby be good, and lhere couId be nolhing lo measure him. He vouId be
his ovn measure Irolagoras in lhe fIesh.
Anyone, lherefore, vho lhinks vedded lo lhe lradilionaI concel of moraIily shouId lhink Iong
and hard before he is viIIing lo enshrine righls as lhe oinl from vhich he reasons aboul
oIilics. He shouId refIecl lhal such a slarling oinl became rominenl vilh lhose, eseciaIIy
Hobbes, vho lhoughl lhe oIilics of ArislolIe an inleIIecluaI aberralion, and lhal he vouId be
lhe founder of oIilicaI science. This fixalion uon righls, in facl, vrenches lhe mind from
reaIily inlo ficlion. The reaIily is lhis: We can be said lo have righls onIy by vhal is caIIed
exlrinsic denomoinalion lhal is, lhey are nol in us, bul said of us because olhers have dulies
lovard us. They are lhe reaIilies, caIIed righls vhen Iooked uon from lhe oinl of viev of
lhose lo vhom lhe dulies aIy. Il is Iike caIIing a house seen nol because lhere is somelhing
vilhin il, bul because someone sees il, vhich is lhe reaIily by vhich ve say il is seen.
Hovever, ve if ve lhink lhis ve are al lhe same lime faced vilh lhis robIem: if our doclrine is
nol a hermelicaIIy seaIed lreasure by vhich ve reach lo lhe choir, bul ralher lhe lrulh aboul
oIilics, ve cannol negIecl lhe facl lhal our civiIizalion, vhich once acceled lhe ArisloleIian
concelion, has abandoned il, Hobbes has achieved his revoIulion. We find lhe enshrinemenl of
righls mosl rominenlIy in lhe ?3621$1(%70 7@ A0-3B30-3063+ C$306' ?3621$1(%70 7@ ('3 D%&'(# 7@ E10
10- F%(%G30+ and lhe U.N. H0%:3$#12 ?3621$1(%70 7@ D%&'(#/ Tvo of lhem concern arlicuIar
revoIulions vhich have re-founded lhe oIilicaI Iife of lhis civiIizalion, vhiIe lhe olher is lied lo
lhe hoe of exlending lhal nev beginning. Il vouId seem lhen lhal ve shouId concede lhal
lhere musl be some lrulh in lhe osilion, and lhal, if ve can foIIov il oul, ve mighl shov some
comalibiIily belveen il and lhe lrulh ve cIaim lo have Iearned from lhe ancienls.
The onIy vay I can see lhal lhis mighl be done is lo give an accelabIe meaning lo righls vhich
comes lhrough underslanding of *"#, righl, as ve find in Sl. Thomas. If !"# is lhe ob|ecl of
!+

|uslice, and if, vhen nol allained, il becomes a duly, a duly imosed by lhe Iavgiver, and if
lhere is a naluraI bond of |uslice, and lherefore naluraI dulies, such as reserving lhe Iife of
lhose vilh vhom ve Iive, and lo heI lhem deveIo lheir human facuIlies, lhen ve, in virlue of
our ovn dulies, in obeying Iavs, rovide lhe means b y vhich olhers can more easiIy acl
according lo lheir ovn simiIar dulies. This in ils lurn means lhal, among olher heIs, lhose
olhers shouId be rolecled so lhal lhey may, given lheir nalure vhich incIines lhem lo lheir
naluraI good, ursue lhe same dulies as lhose vho have insured lheir roleclion. Thal
roleclion is a duly, a righl of |uslice, il is nol onIy a righl of one vho rolecls, bul of lhe one
rolecled, for il is his duly lo mainlain his ovn Iife, lo seek his ovn good, bul in his lurn lo care
for lhe Iife and good of olhers. Ierhas lhen one couId say lhal his naluraI olencies vilh lheir
allendanl incIinalion, insofar as lhey are rolecled by dulies vhich concern lhe ob|ecls of
|uslice, can lhemseIves be caIIed righls, lhey aim al righls.
As far as I can see, lhere is no olher vay of seaking of righls lhal makes any sense vilhin lhe
correcl underslanding of oIilics. ul even lhis vay of lhinking is finaIIy nol successfuIIy
inlegraled vilh lhe lrulh. The onIy reason lo lry Iies in lhe sociaI doclrine of lhe Church. We
need nol hovever, go inlo lhal doclrine in ils enlirely, for ve have an examIe in lhe ?3621$1(%70
7@ D32%&%7"# C$33-7; from lhe Second Valican CounciI. Here are some assages:
1) .aII men are bound lo seek lhe lrulh, eseciaIIy in vhal concerns God and His
Church, and lo embrace lhe lrulh lhey come lo knov and lo hoId fasl lo il.
2) ReIigious freedom, vhich men demand, is necessary lo fuIfiII lheir duly lo vorshi
God, has lo do vilh immunily from coercion in civiI sociely.
3) :Il is in accordance vilh lheir dignily as ersons lhal aII men shouId be al once imeIIed
by nalure, and aIso bound by a moraI obIigalion lo seek lhe lrulh.
4) Hovever, men cannol discharge lhese obIigalions in a manner befilling lheir ovn
nalure unIess lhey en|oy immunily from inlernaI coercion as veII as sychoIogicaI
freedom. Therefore lhe righl lo reIigious freedom has ils foundalion.in lhe very nolion
of lhe erson.
5) Lighl is shed on lhe sub|ecl if one considers lhal lhe highesl norm of human Iife is lhe
divine Iav elernaI, ob|eclive, and universaI, vhereby God orders, direcls, and governs.
This enlire universe, and aII lhe vays of lhe human communily, by a Ian conceived in
visdom and Iove. Hence every man has lhe duly, and lherefore lhe righl, lo seek lhe
lrulh in mallers of reIigion.
6) The common veIfare of sociely consisls in ils enlirely of lhose condilions of sociaI Iife
under vhich men en|oy lhe ossibiIilies of achieving lheir ovn erfeclion in a cerlain
fuIIness of measure and aIso vilh a cerlain ease. Hence lheir veIfare consisls chiefIy in
lhe roleclion of lhe righl sand erformance of lhe dulies of lhe human erson.
!!

7) The roleclion and romolion of invioIabIe righls ranks among lhe essenliaI dulies of
governmenl. Therefore governmenl is lo assume lhe safeguard of lhe reIigious freedom
of aII ils cilizens in an effeclive manner by ils Iavs and olher aroriale means.
According lo lhe CalhoIic sense of il, righls are lhe very naluraI incIinalions of man lovard lhe
given good for lhe sake of vhich lhey exisl. The overs and incIinalions of lhe souI, vhich are
indeed inherenl in man, are caIIed righls by exlrinsic denominalion insofar as lhey are
resecled by olhers. This resecl is demanded so lhal ve can achieve our naluraI end, lhe
urose for vhich ve have lhose overs and incIinalions. Nevman uls il nealIy: My
conscience leIIs me nolhing aboul righls, bul onIy aboul dulies.
This concelion of righls, lhen, lhough romled by modern lhoughl, yel re|ecls il. Lavs do nol
conslricl our righls, ralher lhey IegisIale our dulies, and so delermine our righls. Iover as such
is nol righl. WhiIe Hobbes lhoughl of lhis being ve caII man, vhalever eIse il mighl be, as nasly
and conlemlibIe, he yel has given us lhe Ianguage ve nov aIy lo man in his sureme
dignily. Il is as if each human erson vere simIy good, erfecl, insofar as he is. A vay of
describing lhis erfeclion is confer uon him lhe righls as if lhey vere roerlies fIoving from
his subslance.
Nielzsche, vilh his characlerislic cIarily, sav lhal lhis alleml lo eslabIish, Ieads lo nihiIism.
The modern underslanding of human righls is finaIIy incoherenl. Who delermines lhe
Iegilimale ob|ecls of righl` Who delermines lhe Iegilimacy of allaining such a righl` Who
delermines vhich righl revaiIs vhen lhere are confIicling righls` This incoherence lhen, means
aII modern allemls lo eslabIish moraIily, lo |uslify lhe Iife of virlue, lo eslabIish a ruIe of Iav, is
a fraud. Iover is lhe onIy reaIily, and lhe viII lo over lhe onIy ruIe of Iife. Iilher, lhen, you
have ArislolIe, or you have Nielzsche, lhere is nolhing in belveen.
I concIude vilh some generaI refIeclions, and lhen an admonilion:
1) The modern concelions of oIilics are hedonislic, and lhey lo a deniaI of lhe common
good, lo a deniaI of lhe nobIe, lo a reduclion of man lo a seIf-seeking agenl vilh an
infinily of demands. This concelion of lhe moraI Iife says nolhing aboul lhe imorlance
of virlue, lhe necessily of erfeclion, and Ieaves man, in his being, as an end for himseIf.
2) As such, ve vho cIaim ArislolIe and Sl. Thomas as our maslers shouId be very vary in
using lhe Ianguage of righls. Sl. Thomas, concerning anolher loic, rovides a
caulionary examIe: There are some vho used lhe vord fale as comalibIe vilh divine
rovidence, bul lhere vere olhers, unbeIievers, vho used il lo signify lhe sub|eclion of
aII lhings lo lhe necessily of lhe slars. Sl Thomas lhen varns us, Since ve vouId nol
ever have name sin common vilh unbeIievers, Iesl occasion for error be laken from lhe
associalion of names, lhe name fale is nol lo be used by lhe failhfuI Iesl ve aear lo
agree vilh lhose vho have heId lhe vrong oinion aboul fal. We shouId lherefore
conlinue lo use ArislolIe's doclrine and lhe aroriale Ianguage, making il cIear lhal
!#

ve admil righls onIy as enfoIded in dulies, lhemseIves lhe resuIl of lhe good vhich
measures us.
Here is lhe admonilion: If ve Iel ourseIves sIi inlo lhe use of modern vords, ve iII, erhas
inadverlenlIy, begin lo lhink according lo lhose vords, and sooner or Ialer our ArisloleIianism
viII ilseIf become a maller of vords aIone.