May 1975

. ~
US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL
STAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
COMMANDANT
Major General John H. Cushman
DEPUTY, COMMANDANT
Brigadier General Benjamin L. Harrison
Editor in Chief
COL Jolin H. Chitty. Jr.
Associate Editor
COL Alfred J. Mork
Army War College
Assistant Editor
HAJ Joseph E. Burlas
Features Editor
CPT Robert C. MrDonald
Managing Editor
CPT Robert F. Witt
Production Editor
Dixie R. Dominguez
Spanish-American Editor
LTC Juan Horta-Merly
Brazilian Editors
COL Joao Olimpio Filho
LTC Haroldo Netto
Publication Officer
MAJ Steven E. Bartels
Art and Design
Jerome F. &heele
Military Review
Professional Journal of the US Army
FIFTY-THREE YEARS OF MILITARY SERVICE
VOL LV MAY 1975 NO 5
ARTICLES
Power ProjectIOn 1990 . LTC William M. Stokes III, USA, et al. 3
US Position on Chemical Warfare Disarmament MAJ Ray W. Bills, USA 12
The Vital Center COL Norman L. Dodd, British Army, Ret 24
General Hugh S. Johnson and the War Industries Board John Kennedy Ohl 35
Strategy and Tactics BRIG C. N. Barclay, British Army, Ret 49
Bicentennial Feature:
Marquis de Lafayette and the American Revolution
Waterloo and the Prmciples of War
Joseph R. Goldman 56
MAJ Carter H. Brantner, USA 58
One Man Command COL GEN Aleksander N. Yefimov, Soviet Air Force" 73
The Australian AIIVolunteer Force
Part II-The Impact on Force Levels
Western Strategy
Kenneth J. Coffey 78
LTC Peter A. Koman, Austrian Army 86
Reader Forum
Articles of Interest
Military Notes
Military Books
DEPARTMENTS
COVER
Sketch of 1st Infantry Division troops by staff artist Jerome F. Scheele from a
photograph by Specialist 5 Robert A Tousignant. US Army.
2
84
97
102
MILITARY REVIEW is published monthly in English. Spanish and Portuguese by the US Army Command
and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, KS 66027. Use of funds for printing this pUblication approved
by Headquarters, Department of the Army, 8 April 1974. Second class postage paid at Leavenworth. KS
66048. Subscription: $6.00 per year US and APO/FPO: $7.50 foreign. Single copies $ 75 US and APO/FPO:
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6845642 or AUTOVON 5525642. Unless otherWise stated, the views herem are those of the authors and
are not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element thereof.
US ISSN 0026-4148
READER FORUM
American Military
"The American Military ProfessIOn:
An Egalitarian View" by Lieutenant
Colonel Parham in the November 1974
Military Review says a lot that should
have been said long ago. However, I
would like to correct a couple. of minor
inaccuracies.
FIrSt: The origin of the militia system
of the US, as with many other nations,
dates to Kmg Henry II's ASSIze of Arms
in llBl, from which the National Guard
is a descendant. The system was carried
over to the Virginia and Plymouth settle
ments and, subsequently, to our present
day.
Second: The Second Amendment
referred 'to in his article does in fact place
some emphasis on the militia. It was
placed in the Bill of Rights to ensure that
every freeman shall always have inal
ienable nght to "keep and bear arms"
upon which the milltla system is largely
dependent. Jefferson and Mason were
insistent upon this and the other nine Bill
of Rights as a guarantee against infringe
ment upon the inalienable rights of the
people.
The colonel is in error, however, when
he cites ArtIcle II of the Consutuuon.
This article pertains to the powers of the
President, and Section 2 of Article II
establishes the President as the Com
mander in Chief of the Army and Navy,
as well as the militia when called into
Federal service.
Article I, Section B (15), (16), not
Article II, firmly establishes the citizen
soldier concept, providing for the train-
ing, arming, equipping and diSCiplining of
the organized or standing militia. Article
I, Section B (12), (13), is applicable to
the standing Army and Navy.
It is obvious that the Second Amend-
ment is not a duplication of Article I,
Section B. We, therefore, must look to
the meaning of the Second Amendment
and, for that, we go to the origmal draft
by James Mason who wrote to John
Lamb the following:
That the People have a Right to keep
and bear arms, that a well-regulated mlii-
tia, composed of the Body of the People,
trillned to arms, is the proper, natural and
safe Defense of a free state.
The militia is defined as the "body of
the people" and legally includes all males
16 years of age to age 65. The militia is
composed of the organized or standing
militia and the unorgamzed mUltla com-
posed of mainder of the "body of
the people ' It is this latter group that
forms ou third line of defense to be
called up under a general militia call and
to which the Second Amendment IS
applicable.
Such a call up is not without prece-
dent. The United States issued general
militia calls on a regional basis -for exam-
ple, Baltimore-Washington during the War
of IBI2. There were other such calls. In
recent times, we saw Ethiopia issue a
general milltla call for defense of their
home, and 1940 saw the English defense-
less for lack of private arms when it
(continued on page 111)
Military Review
(continued from page 2)
issued its general militia call-up.
So, in a sense, Colonel Parham is
correct. The Second Amendment
strengthens the roll of the militia in our
defense because the militia concept since
1181 depends upon the ability of the
citizen to possess weapons and to be
proficient in its use.
There may well be those who cite the
Battle of Chippewa and Lundy's Lane as
"proof" of the Regular Army superiority.
For their benefit, I would remind them
that the American Army was practically
nil and could in no way match the British
m number or proficiency even if conscrip-
tion had been imposed. General Scott
relied upon rigorous and better training
to offset the disadvantage. It should also
be remembered that the Regulars, what
there was of them, were not much better
trained than the militia. The units under
General Brown were the 9th, 11th, 21st,
22d, 23d and 25th Infan try and two
companies of the 2d Artillery, organIZed
into two brigades commanded by Scott
and Ripley. They were all new units and
by no stretch of the imagmation could it
be said there wa"t anything "regular"
about them except thg J)tle. Scott took
raw citizen material, disciplined and'
trained them, and made them "Regulars."
Equally tramed, there IS little distinctIOn
between "Regulars" and the citizen Gen
eral Scott proved that point.
I believe a distmctlOn must be made
between the regular Or standing army and
professional. As Colonel Parham points
out quite well, anyone trained m the
military, whether Active or Reserve, is a
professional. It is a matter of a primary or
secondary career and, therefore, the
degree of proficiency. It should be re-
called that the references made by some
that differentiate Regulars from militia
were self-serving, mainly by the Federal-
Ists who msisted upon a large-standing
army Without reliance upon the militia
units. Secretary of War C-alhoun was a
firm believer m the Regular Army, com-
prised by creating a full skeleton of a
May 1975
READER FORUM
wartime Regular Army in to which war-
time recruits would be absorbed and who
would quickly become as proficient as
the Regulars.
As the colonel points out, the differ-
ence is in the training and must not be
confused with the term professional. Cal-
houn laid the cornerstone for the United
States Army. Obviously, the Regular
Army, as distinguished from Reserves Or
National Guard, is better trained though
no more professional than the Reserves or
National Guard. Calhoun's wisdom is no
l ~ s s valid today. We do need the Regular
Army so that the disasters due to the lack
of training that occurred during the Rev-
olutionary War, War of 1812 and the Civil
War will never again be repeated. The
cornerstone is still the Regular Army, as
distinguished from Reserve and National
Guard, but the backbone IS the citizen
army which includes the Reserves,
National Guard and the Regular Army.
Stephen 0' Arngo Jr.
Finnish Policy
Major Gustav Hagglund wrote to the
Military Review (Reader Forum, October
1974) commenting on Lieutenant Colo
nel Peter J. Gaustad's April 1974 Revlew
article on Fmnish policy. ~ o r Haqglund
contends that Colonel Gaustad did not
accurately portray the threat to Finland
of a Soviet occupation of Finmsh terri
tory under the post World War II peace
treaty. Unfortupately, Major Hagglund's
view IS more patriotic than accurate, and
there is a historic crisis to illustrate where
the truth lies III the views of these two
officers.
It is Important flfst to look at the
source documents because observers Ill
terested in Scandinavian affairs routinely
fail to distinguish rigorously among
Russo-Finnish agreements. Two treaties
are of particular interest in this discus-
sion: The Treaty of Peace With Finland
111
READER FORUM
signed in Paris on 10 February 1947
between Finland and the "allied and
associated powers" mcluding the Soviet
Union. This treaty limited the size and
nature of the Finnish Armed Forces and
also imposed restrictions on weaponry. It
did not. however. contain any provisions
which might authorize th" Soviet Union
unilaterally to occupy Finnish territory.
except for those specific geographic areas
ceded to the Soviet Union (the province
of Pechenga) by the Peace Treaty of
12 March 1940 ending the Winter War.
The 1947 Treaty also permitted the
Soviet Union to "lease
Jl
a naval base in
the Porkkala-Udd area for 50 years and to
retain free access through Fmnish terri
tory to and from that base. Otherwise.
Finland retamed lts territorial integnty
under the 1947 Peace Treaty.
In terms of the stationing of Soviet
troops in Finland. a second later treaty IS
far more Significant. ThiS treaty is the
bilateral Agreement of Friendship. Coop-
eration and Mutual Assistance between
the Republic of Fmland and the Umon of
Soviet Socialist Repu bilcs signed in
Moscow on 6 Apnl 1948. Under Article I
of the treaty. the Soviet Union pledges
assistance to Fmland in the event of an
"armed attack by Germany or any State
allied with the latter." In the Soviet note
of 30 October 1961. the USSR invoked
Article I of the treaty and called -for
mili tary consultations with Finland
because of a revanchist Germany. The
SOVlCts cited the formation of the NATO
Baltic Approaches Command with West
German participation as eVidence of the
growing threat. Even with the erection of
the Berlin Wall m August 1961 and the
explOSIOn of the first Soviet 50-megaton
H-bomb on the same day as the note. the
Soviet insistence on military staff consul-
tations came as a surprise to the Finns.
The ensuing criSIS. usually called the
Finno-Soviet Note CriSIS of 1961. had
repercussions throughout northern Eu-
rope and particularly In the Scandinavian
countries. Norway and Denmark reacted
by drawing closer to NATO and made
veiled pronouncements about permitting
112
the stationing of NATO troOps and nu-
clear weapons in their countries. The
Swedish Cabinet met in emergency ses-
sion, and the Swedes intensified the
operatIOn of their early warning system.
. From a statement by Mr. Gromyko, it
became apparent that the motivation
behind the Soviet note was the establish-
men t of Soviet radar stations in Finland
as an improvement to the Soviet missile
warning system.
The important fact of the crisis is the
Soviet view that the 1948 Assistance
Agreement permits the USSR to station
Soviet troops in Finland under certain
threat conditions from West Germany.
Finland did not share this Soviet interpre-
tation, and the crisis eventually passed
following a meeting in Novosibirsk on
24 November 1961 between President
Kekkonen and Chairman Khrushchev.
Contrary to Major Hagglund's assertion,
however. the Soviet Union has never
retracted the text of the 30 October 1961
Note nor recanted its assumed right to
station troops within Finland under the
provisions of Article J of the 1948 Assist
ance Agreement.
The 1961 Note Cnsis also illustrates
Finnish courage under Soviet pressure.
and there is little doubt, given the exam-
ple of the Winter War and World War II,
that the Finns would fight tenaciously to
defend their country. Major Hagglund IS
correct that Finnish policy is to resist "an
attempt to carry out an occupation by-
force" and to resist by force of arms in
spite of the overwhelming odds.
It is true, however, that the Finns
signed the 1948 Assistance Agreement
with the Soviets which. unfortunately. by
Soviet interpretation, implies the Soviet
right to station troops in Finland and to
"assist" Finland against German aggres-
sion. Fortunately. the Finns have consid
erable experience and skill in dealing with
the Soviets, sO that this brave people
remains free in spite of Soviet paranoia
abou t Finland as a possible threat to
Soviet security.
COL A. L. Romanoski, USA
Military Review
J
Fort Leavenworth Hall of Fame
In 1970 the Fort Leavenworth Hall of Fame was established to recognize leaders
of the United States Army or the Army of the Confederate States of America
who have been stationed at Fort Leavenworth and who have made a significant
contribution to Army achievement, tradition or heritage. This memorial,
co-sponsored by the Command and General Staff College and the Henry
Leavenworth Chapter of the Association of the United States Army, conSISts of
a display of bronze shadow boxes in Bell Hall. Within each box is a photograph
and short biographical sketch of the honored Individual.
Each year a panel of esteemed military and civilian leaders and historians select
additions to the Hall of Fame from a list of nominees, spanning the history of
Fort Leavenworth. To date, 27 individuals have been Inducted, to Include Henry
Leavenworth, Robert E. Lee, J, E. B. S t ~ a r t Philip H. Sheridan, James F. Bell,
George C. Marshall, Dwight D. EISenhower, Matthew Ridgway and Maxwell
Taylor. One new addition to this impressive group and the first enlisted man s,o
honored-Percival G. Lowe-will be formally inducted dUring the first week in
May 1975.
Private Lowe came"to Fort Leavenworth in 1849 and campaigned With the First
Dragoons south to Mexico and West to the Rocky Mountains. He terminated his
five-year Army career at the age of 25 with the rank of first sergeant. As cIvilian
contractor with the Quartermaster Department at Fort Leavenworth from 1854
to 1859, he was in charge of supply and transportation for various major
expeditions to the West. After three years In the mercantile and freighting
business in Colorado, Lowe settled in Leavenworth. in 1862. He was active in
community and Civic affairS, becoming preSident of the Leavenworth City
Council (186370), sheriff of Leavenworth County (187781) and a member of
the Kansas State Senate (188589). He was also a member and preSident of the
Kansas State Historical Society as well as a frequent contributor to that society',
publications and to the United States Cavalry Journal. HIS autobiography, Five
Years A Dragoon, is a classic of the early West and covers the period between the
Mexican and Civil Wars.
~ ~ I ~ ~ PROJECTION ~ ~ ~ O O
The Role of US Military Power
Lieutenant Colonel William M. Stokes III, United States Army, et a!.
S
ERIOUS study of the role of US
military power in the 1990s is
often dismissed as being either unim-
portant or infeasible and, therefore, a
waste of time. No one will deny the
pitfalls involved in long-range plan-
ning. The complexities of the dynam-
ics of global interaction are clear
enough to planners, futurists and
model builders. But, to national power
managers, the need to grapple with
the future should be equally clear; the
alternative to not planning for the
long haul is to ignore vital needs of
the future or treat them with such
superficiality that events control US
security rather than the United States
ha vi ng even the possi bi Ii t; of pu 1'-
posefully influencing events.
For the United States. the question
for the 1990s is not whether or not
power should be projected, but how it
Can be projected to best sen'e national
interests and contribute to reasonable
stability in the world. Traditionally.
emphasis has been placed upon the de-
velopment of military strategy and
force capabilities to meet perceived
threats. Inadequate attention has been
given to the use of military power to
This article is based on a research project conducted by the following members of the class
, 01 1974 at the US Army War College: Lieutenant Colonel Andrew P, Chambers. US Army:
Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Connolly. US Air Force: Colonel Alfred M. Gray Jr . US Marine
Corps: Colonel John L. Heiss III. US Army: Lieutenant Colonel William M. Stokes III, US Army:
and Lieutenant Colonel Howard C. Whittaker. The faculty research leader was Lieutenant Colonel
. Lewis S. Sorley III. US Army. Department 01 Military Planning and Strategy.
May 1975
PDWER PRDJECTIDN 199D
help support national objectives and
policy . .\lilitary power projection will
be an important ingredient in the na-
tion'" ability, to renuce the need for
warfighting through deterrence and
leverage.
HOW THE WORLD WILL BE IN 1990
When the 19908 begin, it is lIkely
that no global war \\ ill have occurred
in the past 4:; yenrs, The Cnited
States and the Soviet lJnion will still
be the onl;' major powers \\'ith formi-
dable capabilities in all aspects of na-
tional power, and these two powers
will continue to maintain a competitive
relatiomhip. It is unlikely that a true
multipolar world will have emerged.
Western Europe, China and Japan will
join the Sm'iet Union and the United
State" as power centers, hut theij lack
of balanced power-political, military
and economic-will preclude the em,er-
gence of a multipolar balance of
power. Although a greater perme-
ability will likely exist between polar
boundaries, the United States land the
Soviet Union will continue to influence
heavily those states attracted to their
Spheres of influence wiII not
exist in the classical sense, however,
and a large segment of world will
remain nonaligned. It will continue to
be in the interest of the United States
and the Soviet Union to retain old
friends and attract new ones, and to
gain support from the nonaligned
. world for selected objectives. How-
ever, a condominium relationship
could well develop between the United
States and the USSR. While each po-
lar power will be free to pursue its
national goals, each will share the re-
sponsibility of harnessing major de-
structive power and supporting co-
operative activities designed to cu-;'b
dysfunctional international behavior,
Of necessity, in the 1990s, the
USSR will devote more attention to
the development of its resource and
industrial potential. Consequently, it
will become a more balanced power.
The Eastern bloc nations will gain
freer access to the Free World, par-
ticularly in economic and cultural af-
fairs, resulting in greater accommoda-
tion between East and West Europe,
lessened tension and increased inter-
dependence, Western Europe will con-
tinue to make progress toward politi-
cal and economic unification, but will
remain highly dependent upon energy
and raw materials imports. Depen-
dence upon outside resources will help
shape Western Europe's interests and
policies and tend to solidi fy the Eu-
ropean Economic Community. NATO
will remain a political and military
organization, but force commitments
will decrease.
The Middle East will remain an
area of vital interest to Western Eu-
rope and Japan; the region will be
important to US interests although
our need for Middle Eastern oil will
have decreased significantly. The sur-
vival of Israel will continue to be an
important objecti\'e of US foreign
policy.
US interests in Asia will increase,
and Soviet interests in the area wiII
continue; Southeast Asia, however,
will ferment in isolation. Japan will
become a major economic and political
power and is likely to increase its de-
fensive military capabilities. It will
remain highly dependent on world
trade and wiII play an increased role
in regional economic and political as-
sociations. China will progress eco-
nomically, but will not be strong in
all aspects of power potential. Conse-
quently. China's influence will be Iim-
Military Review
ited primarily to regional affairs.
MERGING NATIONAL POLICY AND STRATEGY
National self-interest should be the
major determinant of US policies and
strategy for the 1990s. The United
States should pursue policies which
maintain its position as a key world
power and which provide it with ade-
quate security. Having ensured such
imperatives. national policies can fo-
cus upon courses -of action which pro-
mote freedom. Justice. stability and
growth elsewhere.
Recognizing the continuance of a
loose bipolar world. US leadership in
world affairs will be essential to har-
monious international relations and
US well-being in the 1aaOs. The
United States should share interna-
tional responsibilities to a greater
extent with other states. but keep up-
permost among its objectives national
security and the creation of condi-
tions under which the nation may
flourish. US leadership and contribu-
tions to international harmony will
depend upon the ability to integrate
and coordinate strong defense pro-
grams. revitalize international politi-
cal arrangements and meet the in-
creasing challenges of international
economics.
While it is not possible. with any
assurance. to distinguish the specific
detail of US national strategy in the
1990s, it is possible to suggest certain
thrusts which could lead to programs
more supportive of policy aims. First.
it is essential that broader recognition
be given to the synergistic effect of
integrated power projection. The
whole range of US power-political.
economic. psychological and military-
must be applied in concert and in bal-
May 1975
POWER PROJECTION 1990
ance. Application of integrated power
should permit greater use of nonmili-
tary means to achieve national goals.
Second. more selective use should be
made of alliances and other arrange-
ments. The United States should avoid
inv01vement in unwieldy multilateral
alignments which restrict flexibility;
greater use should be made of bilat-
eral interactions which can be tailored
more closely to US needs. Abrogation
of existing arrangements would not
be required; arrangements could be
supported in varying degrees depend-
ing upon US needs. Additionally, the
United States should foster regional
alliances among other states which
contribute to its interests and secu-
rity. Third. the United States should.
develop a strong preference for solu-
tion of disputes by nom'iolent means.
As competition for limited resources
increases and nations continue their
search for identity. opportunities for
confrontation will increase. Diplo-
matic means and economic policies
should playa greater role in future
conflict resolution. A meaningful capa-
bility in conflict resolution will re-
quire the fuller development of long-
neglected diplomatic skills. Finally,
national policies must be pursued with
the full support of a strategy of con-
flict deterrence. backed by effective
military capabilities.
ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A comprehensive shaping of n,,-
tional policies in the lagOs will color
US perception of the threats and con-
cepts for using military force. The
international environment and domes-
tic factors. particularly national will.
social perceptions. economic require-
ments and technological possibilities.
POWER PROJECTION 1990
will help shape the national security
posture'. In order to narrow the focus
of examination. only the economic and
technological factors affecting the
1990 military posture will be explored
here since these forces will be the ma-
jor ones determining the manner in
which military forre will serve the
country.
Economic Considerations
Economic trends will be determined
largely by political and economic poli-
cies of the United States. the Soviet
Union. China. Western Europe and
Japan, Population growth. food distri-
bution. technological progress. the gap
'between developed and developing na-
tions. social change and the organiza-
tion of economic structures will have
a dynamic Impact on economic rela-
tionships.
The world population will exceed
five billion by 1990 if the present
growth rate is maintained. The high-
est growth rates will occur in regions
least able to cope with them. Popula-
tion pressures will widen the economic
gap between the developed and devel-
oping countries and o n t i n u ~ to re-
strain general e con 0 m i c progress .
. Global food requirements will be enor-
mous. Satisfaction of these food needs
would contribute to international sta-
bility and. thereby. US security.
Natural resources will continue to
he of world concern and will be a po-
tential source of international con-
flict. The distribution of strategic
resources may change geopolitical
power relationships. The Soviet Union
is likely to be the most self-sufficient
nation with respect to natural re-
sources. The lack of hard mineral re-
sources will make it virtually impos-
sible for many underdeveloped regions
to establish heavy industrial bases. Of
great significance is the potential end
of petroleum products as a critical
energy source by the 21st Century.
The diminution of oil supplies will
require an acceleration of efforts to
create alternative energy sources and
will impact upon the petrochemical
industry.
Continued efforts will be made to
assist developing nations in meeting
infrastructure and social needs. It is
unlikely that strong international su-
pervision will develop to tend com-
prehensive multilateral programs. And
some aid recipients probably will con-
tinue to abuse assistance by applying
it to less essential prestige projects.,
Increased economic interdependence
will be a major feature of interna-
tional relations. Such interdependence
offers the United States prospects of
both cooperation and international
friction. The possibility of a more
satisfactory sharing of raw materials.
greater stability in trade and im-
proved international economic proce-
dures could better both economies and
international understanding among
participating states. On the other
hand. greater competition for scarce
resources and world markets-hoth
legitimate s tat e objectives-could
prove destabilizing. National interests
will dictate the degree of cooperation.
With international economics as-
suming greater importance. consid-
eration must he given to the interrela-
tionship between military force and
economics. It is unlikely that military
intervention will he requited to sup-
port US economic objectives. Never
theless. allied perceptions of US con-
tributions in the event of aggression
and security assistance programs un
questionably will buttress US eco-
nomic interests. Similarly. US eco-
nomic pursuits will support security
aims. The economic-military link will
be ohvious to potential adversaries.
Military Review
Technological Considerations
National strategy in the 1990s will
require continued translation of scien-
tific knowledge into practical use.
Technology. will be essential to the
development of effective economic and
military capabilities and to the ability
to project these elements of national
power. No nation is likely to surpass
the United States in balanced tech-
nological capabilities d uri n g the
1990s, but there will be increased
challenges to our leadership in this
field. The United States must seek
technological capabilities which reduce
dependence upon external resources
and help overcome the environment-
industrial conflict.
Six major areas of technology are
of particular concern to the 1990s'
military strategy:
The United States should im-
prove existing means of destruction
and develop new ones while seeking
capabilities for reducing the destruc-
tive potential of its own and enemy
weapons. '''eapon development may be
circumscribed by arms control agree-
ments, but such agreements will not
diminish the need to explore improve-
ments in explosives, propellants, fuz-
ing, accuracy, range, system plat-
forms, defenses, noise and weight.
During the next 20 years, tech-
nology should be capable of producing
virtually any commann, control and
commnnication necessary to
support military requirements if the
nation is willing to pay for it. Com-
mand and control problems of the
19!1Os are likely to he associated more
with hum a n decisionmaking than
technological capabilities.
will permit advances
in the collection, processing and eval-
uation of intelligence information, as
well as means to protect data. Tech-
nological capabilities will permit meas-
May 1975
POWER PROJECTION 1990
urement of potential enemy capabili-
ties and contribute to the assessment
of intentions. Developments will per-
mit improvement of electronic war-
fare and countermeasure capabilities,
but So\'iet strengths in these fields
will prevent a significant relative ad-
vantage from accruing.
Logistics capabilities can be de-
veloped in the 1990s to support mili-
tary requirements adequately. Fund-
ing, however, will continue to retard
the fielding of all desired support
means. No major breakthroughs will
have occurred in transportation o;;ys-
tems although strategic mobility im-
provements will permit more rapid
deployment of greatel' tonnages.
Power requirement.s and l'e- t
source availability will spur the ex-
pansion of nuclear power and the
development of other power sources.
Nuclear power will become more eco-
nomical in its application to maritime
transportatIOn although its practical-
ity for aircraft use is unlikel,' to hm'e
been realized.
Within reasonable bounds of
cost and effectiveness. the United
States \\ ill continue to dewlop capa-
bilities for replacing human resources
on the battlefield \\ ith materiel. De-
sirable as this goal be. sO,ldiers
will remain essential to the proper ap-
plication of military They wiII
remain the final arbiters of the hattle-
field
NATIONAL POLICY AND THE THREAT
Processes for deriving and execut-
ing national policies will be essentially
the same in the 1990s. The national
purpose and supportive goals and ap-
praisals of the domestic and foreign
environments wiII provide the direc-
7
POWER PROJECTION 1990
tiim for military policies and strategy.
The militarY establishment will re-
main a key contributor to the success-
ful accomplishment of national objec-
tives.
The capabilities of potential adver-
saries will continue to be a major
factor in the development of military
strategy and forces. Hopefully, how-
eve,', the 1990s will bring us closer to
an ability to judge intentions within
a satisfactory range of accuracy. Ma-
jor adversary intentions will be of
greater importance to military strat-
egy in the future; greater ~ i s k s can
be assumed where perceived inten-
tions and eapabilities do not threaten
US vital interests. The only vital se-
cUl'ity interest in the 1990s will be
the protection of the United States
against di"ect attack.
Technology, economic growth and
perceived. threats will result in in-
creased capabilities for military ag-
gression in the 1990s. Only the majo!'
states, however. will be capable of
large-scale military aggression. In-
surgencies and civil w r ~ will continue
to be facts of life, and wars win con-
tinue among lesser powers. Threat
perception by the enited States will
change, and the threshold of threat
identification .vIII be raised. US inter-
est in presel'\'ing international har-
mony should continne into the future,
but greater tolerance should he shown
for lesser conflicts.
MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 1990s
It will remain axiomatic in the
1990s that military forces will be re-
quired for deterrence and defense. As
a minimum, military forces will be
needed to guarantee US survival.
However, US leadership in interna-
tional affairs can only be achieved if
our relations are underpinned by
strong military forces.
Therefore, military forces will be
required for national policy leverage,
as well as deterrence and defense.
Military forces should not function
merely as an "insurance policy," but
must be integrated fully with the dip-
lomatic and economic aspects of for-
eign policy. US military forces in the
1990s should be designed primarily to
I' e d u c e the need for warfighting
through deterrence and leverage. It is
unlikely that radical changes will oc-
cur in security philosophy; such
changes are frequently destabilizing.
Incremental shifts in policies for the
use of military forces are more likely.
The major role for military forces
will be deterrence of hostilities which
could result in major attacks against
US geographic areas-the only vital
US interest. Another important objec-
tive of dete,rence will be prevention
of major hostilities im'olving other
world power centers and states closely
a11ied with the polar powers. Deter-
rence of conflicts which could result
in a US-Soviet confrontation will be
essentia1. Forces will be required to
support US and Soviet condominium
efforts to create and maintain reason-
able stability in the world. Deterrent
actions may be jointly declared or
agreed upon in secret.
The increasing interdependence of
states in international economics and
the need for the United States to re-
main a world political and economic
leader require leverage forces for
achievement of a reasonable degree of
political support in international ac-
tivities. Leverage forces should be
used to discourage interference with
pursuit of economic objectives and to
provide alternative means of positjv2
action in support of stability opera-
Military Review
tions. Stability operations might in-
clude the of US forces
(with other national power) in a se-
curity assistance role and the threat
of direct involvement, if necessary.
Military forces must permit the
United States to emerge from any
conllict under conditions which ensure
survival of the nation. Credible war-
fighting capabilities are needed for
both deterrence and leverage. While
it is unlikely that the United States
will be required to participate in a
full range of conllicts, capabilities
must be maintained at a reasonable
level. Military forces should be capa-
ble of a full spectrum of violence,
bounded only by technological and
economic feasibility.
Conllict control will depend on
strong mil ita r y forces, economic
strength, national will and adept po-
litical efforts. Complete control will
not always be possible or desirable,
May 1975
HUMRRO
however. It may be in the interest of
the United States to permit certain
wars to run their courses. Generally
speaking, it is best to terminate hos-
tilities as quickly as possible. Early
termination, however, may not in all
cases permit negotiations to evolve in
ways most favorable to US interests.
Early and excessive use of power
could result in spasmodic actions and
less rational application of military
power.
NEED FOR MASS DESTRUCTIVE CAPABIlITIES
Mass destructive capabilities must
continue to be developed; the alterna-
tive is not to develop such capabilities
while other states do. Mass destruc-
tive capabilities are essential to the
protection of our one vital interest,
and they should contribute to deter-
POWER PROJECTION 199D
rence, warfighting and leverage.
A Strategic Package (STRATPAC)
will be an essential ingredient of any
viable strat'egy for the 1990s. The
STRATP AC should consist of three
major interrelated components: tech-
nology, control and strategic applica-
tion. The central focus of STRATPAC
planning would be the strategic ap-
plication of forces, but parallel. inter-
related efforts would be made in tech-
nolog,' and contl"Ol. The product of the
three STRATPAC components ,"auld
be the strategic concept for the use of
rna"" destructive power. T.he impetus
fOl' a concept may originate from
technological con,iderations, planning
for strategic application, or the need
for control. A more traditional view
holds that strategy drives technology;
this article suggests that recommen-
dationR concerl1ing mass destructive
power rna? be driven by technology
and control needs as well as strategic
plannmg.
The control aspect of STRA TPAC
will continue to include the conven-
tional approaches to arms limitations
we know today. The major djfference
in the concept for the future will lie
in the fulltlme effort that would go
mto control development concurrent
with force development. Control will
interact with technology. The need for
contl"Ol may drive technology-for ex-
ample, control may require particular
capabilities for verification, communi-
cations or discrete application. Tech-
nological development, on the other
hand, may generate the need for new
means of control 01' a different appli
cation of existing control mechanisms.
The key feature of the control-tech-
nology relationship is the concurrency
aspect. As technology proceeds in
weapons development, it is essential
that efforts be made to defend against
such weapons and to devise measures
10
to control their application.
Strategic application planning may
precede or lag behind development of
the technology and control components
of STRATPAC, but its function melds
the other components into the best
techniques for applying deterrence
and leverage in order to c6mpress and
diminish the need for warfighting in
support of national policy.
The Triad (a reasoned mix of
manned aircraft, intercontinental bal
listic missiles and submarine-launched
ballistic missiles) will continue to be
a feature of US military strategy.
The Triad will provide a greater
range of 'options than a single sys
tern.
Research should cOlltlllue into the
application of nonnuclear mass de-
struction weapons. While the United
States has declared an unwillingness
to employ chemIcal and biological
weaponR, continued examination of
such weapons is vital fmm a defen-
sive standpoint. Other means must
also be explored.
The application of STRA TPAC to
conflicts short of general war merits
further study. Roles might include the
creation of electromagnetic radiation
fields to hinder enemy command and
control capabilities at critical periods
during a battle, assistance in antisuh-
marine operations and support for
antishipping operations. Such an ap-
plication of strategic forces should
not be permitted to degrade survival
forces, however. Concepts for employ-
ing strategic weapons in conditions
other than general war must be pred
icated upon the ability to create an
awareness by other major nuclear
states that the actions do not consti-
tute a threat to their vital interests.
While capabilities should exist for
engaging in nuclear exchanges on a
selected basis, a meaningful and con-
Military ReView
trollable concept for subholocaust ex-
changes on national soil seems un-
likely du ring the next 20 years.
NEED FOR A TACTICAL PACKAGE
Like the Strategic Package, the
Tactical Package (T ACPAC) would
be developed to dampen enthusiasm
for warfighting as a means of resolv-
ing international issues by extending
the boundaries. of deterrence. The
TACPAC would be designed to mini-
mize the intensity of hostilities re-
gardless pf the US .point of entry on
the conllict spectrum. The most useful
application of TACPAC forces, how-
ever, would .be their role in providing
leverage for national policies. TAC-
PAC forces, with obvious usable
power, can playa more active role in
supporting power projection than
STRATPAC forces which will be able
to provide a broad backdrop of deter-
rence with their enormous, but less
IIsable, power.
TACPAC forces will contribute to
the deterrence of major aggression as
well as military power projection by
lesser states. Effective deterrence will
hinge on credible capabilities to pro-
Ject military power and the perceived
will to use such power. The national
strategy, therefore, must integrate
military power in a more obvious way.
Deterrence creates the essential shield
behind which all foreign policy initia-
tives must be undertaken; deterrent
capabilities support power projection
by the United States and block such
projection against US interests. Cred-
ible TACPAC war-fighting capabili-
ties will be required for both deter-
rence and leverage.
"Catered" conllicts will be charac-
teristic of the 1990s. 'Both the United
May 1975
POWER PROJECTION 1990
States and the Soviet Union will use
security assistance for leverage. The
TACPAC concept would recognize
this fact and consider the "catering"
of \\ ars or cQunterin:;,urgencies con':
currently with the So\iets. It may
also be considerably cheaper for the
United States to help restore ravaged
areas than to participate in conllicts
as a combatant. The TACP AC concept
envisions the use of vacuum forces to
ensure reasonable regional stability
while selected conllicts are underway.
Vacuum forces would be tailored to
restrict external imolvement in a
state or' region's affairs. Vacuum
forces would not be intervention
forces as such and, therefore, would
be tailored to insulate the conflict
nrea.
Successful T ACP AC power projec-
tion will require the support of mod-
ern technology and employment con-
cepts. New weapons will be required
with capabilities for more discrete
application and increased range and
accuracy. Technology must focus on
the nagging, but critical, problem of
improved tactical and strategic mo-
bility to permit the rapid deployment
and buildup of military power and in-
creased battlefield mobility for the
dispersed maneuver patterns of fu-
ture conllicts. However, the excite-
ment of innovation should not be per-
mitted to obscure the utility of tried
concepts and proven materiel.
The strategic initiatives suggested
here offer meaningful possibilities for
security in the world of the 1990s and
realistic expectations of the ability to
project power commensurate with our
national goals and responsibilities.
Hard as it is to predict the future,
the relative insensitivity of these
initiatives to variations in the world
environment offers some assurance of
their usefulness. ~
11
What Should Be the United States'
POSITION
ON
CHEMICAL
WARFARE
DISARMAMENT?
Major Ray W. Bills,
United States Army
T
HE United States has tradi-
tionally followed a no-first-use
policy with respect to chemical and
biological warfare (CBW). The devel-
opment of a CBW arsenal was pursued
to acquire a deterrent and retaliatory
capability. The possession Ofl such a
capability was an effeetive deterrent
during World War II where nonuse
appeared to be the result of both sides
having the capability and the exchange
of assurances that they would observe
the Geneva Protocol of 1925. 1 Addi-
tionally. no substantiated l' e cord
exists of CBW being used by any of
the powers involved in the Korean
. Conflict. 2
Governmental interest and attention
to our CBW programs have been spo-
radic, rising during times of identified
or perceived threats and public reac-
tion. The use of chemical warfare
(CW) agents by the Axis Powers in
World War 1 created an immediate .
demand for an intensified program of
12
developing our own capabilities. This
interest subsided after World War II.
and our efforts in CEW were, minimal
until the late 1950s and early 19608
When Congressional im'estigations de-
termined that our CBW capabilities
and civil preparedness were not < ade-
quate to meet the Soviet threat. ,j This
renewed effort continued into our in-
volvement in the Vietnam conflict
where our employment of riot-control
agents and herbicides brought adverse
reactions from the general US public,
the scientific community and the in-
ternational community.' Many felt
that the use of these agents in Viet-
nam was contrary to the Geneva Pro-
tocol which we espoused even though
we had not ratified it. The employ-
ment of herbicides and riot-control
agents by US forces in Vietnam
created an international environment
conducive for a thorough review of
Our CBW policies.
In November 1969. President Rich-
Military Review
ard M. Nixon declared that the United
States would not produce or use offen-
sive biological weapons of any kind
and would destroy all its existing
stocks; chemical weapons would be
used only in retaliation for use of
similar weapons by an enemy.5 In
February 1970, President Nixon added
toxins to the ban of biological weap-
ons. G Since those 1969 and 1970 state-
ments, the United States has been
instrumental in formulating a confer-
ence treaty for multilateral disarma-
ment of biological weapons. 7 This
treaty, negotiated by the Conference
of the Committee on Disarmament in
Geneva, was signed by 89 nations on
10 April 1972 and was sent to the US
Senate for advice and consent to ratifi-
cation on 10 August 1972. H Articles
IX and XII of the Biological Treaty
obligate the signatory nations to work
diligently for an effective prohibition
of CW weapons. 9 In May 1973, Presi-
dent Nixon again reiterated his desire
to achieve effective international re-
straints on chemical weapons. 10
Historically, there have been many
attempts to create international agree-
ments for the control of chemical
warfare." The first major attempt
was the Hague Conference of 1899
which proposed that all signatory na-
Major Ray W. Bills is assigned to
Headquarters, US Army Dugway
Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah. He
received a B.S. in Agronomy and an
M.S. in Botany from Utah State Uni-
versity, a Ph.D. in Botany and Genet-
ics from Washington State Univer-
sity, and is a 1974 graduate of the
USACGSC. Previous assignments in-
clude serving as Instructor and As-
sistant Professor in the Department
of Chemistry, USMA; Plant Scientist
for' herbicide damage investigations,
May 1975
CHEMICAL WARFARE DISARMAMENT
tions agree to abstain from using
projectiles which had the sole purpose
of disseminating asphyxiating or dele-
terious gases. The United States was
the only participating nation to refuse
to sign the agreement. The US rep-'
resentative, Navy Captain Alfred T.
Mahan, felt that gas projectiles were
not fully developed at that time and
that gas warfare was as humane as.
other forms of warfare. From the
emotional abhorrence generated by
use of gas warfare by the Axis Pow-
ers in World War I came additional
conference proposals for control of gas
warfare. The Versailles Treaty of
1919 pr9hibited German production
of gas weapons. The United States did
not ratify this treaty primarily be-
cause of its provisions establishing a
League of Nations. The United States
also viewed the terms of the treaty to
be applicable only to Germany. The
Washington Conference on the Limita-
tion of Armaments opened in Wash-
ington, D. C .. in 1921. During a ses-
sion of that conference in 1922. the
United States submitted a proposal
calling for universal prohibition of
CBW. This proposal was incorporated
as Article \Lin the Washington Treaty
of 6 February 1922. The treaty, re-
quiring ratification by all signatory
US Military Assisfance Command,
Vietnam; and Division Chemical Of-
ficer, 25th Infantry Division. Vietnam.

13
US All Force planes spray
a dense jungle in Vietnam
with a defoliating liquid
nation, before becoming an effective
international treaty. was signed ahd
ratified by the l'nited States. How-
ever. because France failed to ratify,
it never became an effective ipterna-
tional document. In June 1925. the
Geneva Protocol was signed by 29 na-
tions. The protocol prohibits the use
in war of chemical and biological
agents by all signatory nations. Many
nations signed and ratified the proto-
col with first-use reservations. To
these nations the protocol, in effect,
prohibits only the first use of CBW
agents in war. The first-use reserva-
. tions permit retaliatory employment
of chemical and biological agents
against any nation initiating a CBW
attack. The United States signed the
protocol without reservations. but the
Senate rejected ratification. The prin-
ciples of the protocol were espoused
by 'President Roosevelt as US policy
during World War II .even though it
14
~ had not been ratified by the Senate.
;;: The Geneva Protocol. the most
, widely accepted international agree-
"' " ment on the control of chemical war-
" fare, has been signed by 84 nations
and ratified by most major world po,,--
ers except the United States. '" The
United Nations Resolutions of 1966
and 1968 call upon all member nations
to adhere to the restrictions on chem-
ical warfare set forth in the proto-
col. '" Following these leads, President
Nixon in August 1970 resubmitted
the protocol to the US Senate for rati-
fication with the interpretation that
the United States did not consider teal'
gas and herbicides to be covered by
the protocol. The United States is in
the minority in this interpretation,
and there is considerable pressure to
change this interpretation. The Senate
Foreign Relations Committee has re-
fused to rati fy the protocol until the
administration reviews its reserva-
tIOns on tear gas and herbicides. "
Opposition to the administration's
position is based primarily on the UN
General Assembly vote on Resolution
2603A which takes the position that
the protocol does cover tear gas and
herbicides and the feeling that the
use of tear gas and herbicides is a
basis for proliferation and escalation
of CWo '"
US annual spending on CBW pro-
grams went from $10 to $20 million
in the early 1950s following the Ko-
rean War to $350 million (which in-
c ~ d e s procurement of smoke and
flame weapons) in the late 1960s. ,
In the late 1950s. Congressional in-
vestigations determined that both the
offensive and defensive CBW capa-
bility of the United States lagged sig-
nificantly behind the capabilities of
the Soviet Union." The feeling pre-
vailed that an adequate offensive and
defensive capability was essential to
Military Review
maintain an effective deterrent. Ef-
forts in research and development and
in testing and evaluation were greatly
expanded, and new technologies were
applied to improve our CBW capa-
bility. '
Expansion of our CBW capabilities
continued until 1968 when a nerve
agent from Dugway Proving Ground,
Utah, was implicated as a possible
cause of the death of several thousand
sheep in the adjacent Skull Valley.
The chemical agent was thought to
have drifted off the pl'Oving ground
following an aerial spray. The reac-
tions to the Dugway incident and the
adverse reactions to our employment
of riotcontrol agents and herbicides
in Vietnam brought our CBW pro-
grams under close scrutiny by the
public, press, Congress, university
students and the scientific community.
P,'ess criticism of our CBW pro-
grams in the late I(J60s was led by
journalist Seymour Hersh 10 and the
editOl' of The Nell' York Times."
Hersh stated in one article that, "The
whole subject of CBW has overtones
of horror and revulsion that far out-
strip the world's fears of nuclear holo-
callst." The editor of The Nell' York
TilllCs. commenting on "the position
that CBW programs are necesMry for
deterrence. stated that. "A deterrent
which would have consequences no one
can foresee or calculate i ~ more in-
credible than credible."
Congressional concern and opposi-
tion to the then-current CBW pro-
grams was led by Representative
Richard D. :\icCarthy from New
York. '"n McCarthy was concerned over
the cloak of security classification un-
der which our programs developed and
which did not permit public aWareness
or debate on US policies. He also felt
that our stated policy of no first use
w ~ being reversed by initiatives
May 1975
CHEMICAL WARFARE DISARMAMENT
from the Defense Department. His
actions were instrumental in focusing
public attention on the United States'
CBW programs and policies. Public
awareness was also intensified by
press publication of Defense Depart-
ment plans to dispose of excess nerve
agents at sea and the accompanying
transfer of the agents from manufac-
turing sites to coastal embarkation
for oceanic disposal or new storage
sites. :.'1
The intensified investigations into
our CBW programs disclosed that sev-
eral universities in the United States
were conducting classified scientific
research on CBW under Government
contracts. This knowledge, coupled
with student dissidence over our in-
volvement in Vietnam. resulted in
student and faculty demonstrations
demanding the termination of all such
research contracts.""
Opposition to our CBW programs
from the scientific community inten-
sified rapidly in the I(J68-70 time pe-
riod. Individual scientists and large
f:cientific associations decried our use
of tear gas and herbicides in Vietnam
and our programR of CBW reRearch
and development. They called for ces-
sation of the then-current research
and development programs and applied
professional pressure on scientists in-
volved in these efforts to terminate
thei r support of the programs. 0.\
Typical of the scientific community's
reaction was that of the American
Chemical Society. In EJ25. this or-
ganization recommended t hat the
United States not ratify the Geneva
Protocol. The society took the position
that nonlethal. temporary incapacitat-
ing chemical agents that may be de-
veloped would make war more hu-
mane. In 1970. the society reversed
its position and urged the Senate to
ratify the protocol. However. it did
15
CHEMICAL WARFARE DISARMAMENT
support the administration's interpre-
tation excluding tear gas and herbi-
cides from the protocol." In 1073, the
society again changed its position and
urged ratification of the protocol to
include tear gas and herbicides. "',
Opinions on the need for an, active
CW program are varied and contro-
versial.'r, Proponents for an active
program argue that the best defense
is a good offensive capability. They
cite the publicly available information
on Soviet capabilities and their stated
position of planned use of CW in any
future war. They argue that a viable
retaliatory capability is essential to an
effective deterrence, often citing the
. effectiveness of our capability as a
deterrent in World War II. Propo-
nents also argue that a CW capability
gives the United States additional re-
sponse flexibility by providing an op-
tion between an extended conventional
engagement and the employment of
nuclear weapons.
In today's environ-
16
field crews in protective
clothing and mask pre
pare a CWagentfilled
tank for loading on
an aircraft during a
testing program
ment, the availability of an option be-
tween the employment of conventional
or nuclear weapons may be of greater
significance than previously thought.
From the end of World War II to the
early 1960s, the United States enjoyed
a position of worldwide nuclear supe-
riority which provided an unques-
tioned umbrella of security to the
United States and its Allies. This nu-
clear umbrella was thought to be an
adequate deterrence against all forms
of warfare. A recent study conducted
by the Stanford Resem'ch Institute
(SRI) concludes that, in the current
international environment, a policy of
relying on nuclear superiority as a
deterrent to chemical attacks may
create some major difficulties.20 The
report states that the achievement of:
... approximate nuclear parity (be-
tween the U.S. and the USSR) and
the S t I' ate g i c Arms Limitations
Agreement have tended to modify the
!'Ole of strategic nuclear weapons as a
deterrent to all types of warfare.
Military Review
This s tat erne n t takes on even
greater significance when one con-
siders the number of additional na-
tions in the world who are currently
developing nuclear capabilities. The
SRI report further states that the role
of the nuclear umbrella as a broad
deterrence has been narrowed to "just
one of the strong links in the chain of
deterrence." If this p o ~ t o n is true,
then the capability of nuclear weapons
to deter the use of chemical weapons
may be significantly reduced.
There are numerous discussions
and evaluations of the Soviet CW
capability in the open Iiterature.
2k
Some estimates indicate their capa-
bility is superior to that of the United
States. Their military are well-trained
in offensive and defensive CW tactics.
and estimates of up to 30 million of
the civilian population have been
trained in CW defensive measures.""
It is known that the Soviets took Ger-
man toxic gas production plants back
to the USSR at the end of World War
II. The technology and facilities ac-
quired from the Germans served as
the foundation for a vigorous CW re-
search and development pro g ram.
There are published quotes from So-
viet :llarshal Zhukov made in the early
1950s that the Soviets viewed chemi-
cal and biological weapons as part of
an accepted and usable arsenal in any
general wars of the future .. '" Major
General Drugov of the Military Medi-
cal Service of the Red A rmy stated on
the 49th anniversary of the "great
October Revolution" that their scien-
tists regarded research on the actions
of poisons and the development of
antidotes to be their patriotic duty.
Soviet Army divisions have chemically
trained personnel and units down to
battalion level. Some authors have es-
timated that as much as one-third of
the Soviet's basic artillery load is
May 1975
CHEMICAL WARFARE DISARMAMENT
chemical munitions.:\' In a statement
given on 9 May 1974 before the Sub-
committee on National Security Pol-
icy and Scientific Development of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Mr. Amos A. Jordan. the Acting As-
sistant Secretary of Defense for In-
ternational Security Affairs, stated
that the Defense Department viewed
the CW preparedness of the Soviet
Union and Warsaw Pact countries as
a potential threat to US forces in Eu-
rope and elRewhere. Mr. Jordan also
stated that:
... the Defense Depart11lent be-
lieved thut the USSR is better pre-
pal'ed to operate offensively and de-
fensively in a chemical U'U1"!are en-
llil'onment than any otlier nation in
the world. " .
Many opponents of an active CW
program argue that the retaliatory
flexibility provided by a CW capa-
bility is ineffective and unnecessary.
They feel that our nuclear capability
is a sufficient deterrent to aggression
against the United States or its Al-
lies. Opponents further argue that an
active CW program provides an incen-
tive for a continned arms race; addi-
tionally. CW weapons represent a
relatively cheap mass destruction ca-
pability for small nations not having
a nuclear capability nor the means to
acquire it. Proliferation. a, argued by
CW opponents. greatly enhances the
destructh'e capability of smaller na-
tions and has the potential to change
the world power balance. " A recent
. United Nations study concludes that.
"The momentum of the arms race
would clearly decrease if production
of (CBW) weapons were effectively
and unconditionally banned." "
The safety problems inherent in
handling, transferring and storing
toxic chemical agents have been the
subject of investigation for a number
17
CHEMICAL WARFARE DISARMAMENT
of years. The United States has de-
veloped binary munitions which sig-
nificantly decrease the hazards of
handling, transfer and storage. These
munitions al'e filled with two nonlethal
compounds separated by a rupturable
membrane. Onl,' when the membrane
is ruptured b;. firing or detonation do
the nonlethal components mix to form
the lethal CW agent. The Defense De-
partment has ann U a I I y requested
money for continued research and de-
velopment of the binary concept,
basing its request on the need to mod-
ernize our aging in order to
maintain a deterrent and retaliatory
capability. ". In November 1973, Mrs.
Alva ;'vlyrdal. the retiring Swedish
representative to the disarmament
conference, stated that development of
the binal''v concept would only con-
tribute to a continued chemical arms
race and urged that it not be devel-
oped. If} ThIS .same .sentiment was ex-
pressed by :\11'. Fred C. Ikle, the Di-
rector of the US ArmR Control and
Disarmament Agenc;.' (ACDA). 37 br.
Hebe!t Scmille .J!'., ill testimony given
on 3 Octoher 19n before a subcom-
mittee of the 1l0uRe of Rep!',aReptatives
Committee on Armed Services, stated
the increased safety of handling and
tranRPorting binary munitions may
increase the potential for their use by
extremists and terrorists. lIe also ex-
pressed a concern that binary tech-
nology may make the use of CW more
attractive to many countries in the
world. 'II>.
The current position of the Defense
. Department and the Department of
the Army is that the United States
does need a credible deterrent and re-
taliatory capability,:m All available
information indicates that we are op-
posed by a potential enemy possessing
an excellent CW capability and an ac-
tive research and development pro-
18
Soviet mlJitary are welltraIned in ollensive
and defensive chemical warfare taclics
gram. A current debate in the United
States concerns the question of why
the Soviets continue their CW efforts.
Many feel that they do it to maintain
a retaliatory and deterrent force
against a known L:S capability. The
argument, then, iR that any increa,e
in our own CW programs is a provoca-
tion for continued Soviet activity and
a resultant proliferation in the CW
arms race. The inherent worldwide
implications of such a proliferation
create strong preRsures for CW disar-
mament Many in the United States
feel strongly that we should take more
of the initiative in CW disarmament
even if it iR unilateral action on our
part. 40
Numerous segments of our society
.. press for US ratification of the Ge-
Mililary Review
neva Protocol without the exclusion of
herbicides and tear gas. Such a ratifi-
cation would not only contribute to a
more precise definition of US policy,
but would also bring the United
States in line with the interpretation
held by the great majority of the in
ternational community. An additional
significant benefit of ratification would
be an increasell US credibility in the
international arena. It must be pointed
out, however, that ratification of the
protocol lIoes not represent an agree-
ment on rlisarmament, nOr does it ful-
fill the obligation imposed the bio-
logica I treaty to strive for a total CW
disarmament agreement. The Geneva
Protocol is a pledge against use of
CBW agents in war among signatory
nations. It does not prevent any na-
tion from pursuing an active ew rle-
velopment program or the maintenance
of a retaliatory capability.
Fulfillment of our obligation to Ar-
ticles IX and XII of the 1n72 Biologi-
cal Treaty imposes the pursldt of
total CW disarmament. The Soviet
Union has proposed enw disarma-
ment since ID52." The initial pro-
posals did not address details for
international enforcement of agree-
ments. The Cnited States has agreed
tn principle with the tnitial Soviet
proposal but called for a continuous
gygtem of disclosures and on-site in-
'peetions to assure compliance with
any treaty agreements. The Soviets
reJected the US inspection and verifi-
cation proposals. They have contended
since 1946 that each nation party to a
disarmament agreement should deter-
mine whether it had violated the
agreell]ent by national verification
means. Since 1962, there has been a
continuous effort by the disarmament
conference to negotiate a ew treaty.
Numerous proposals have been sub-
mitteu by the United States, the USSR
May 1975
CHEMICAL WARFARE DISARMAMENT
and Britain with comments and rec-
ommendations from other nations at
the conference. During tlie 1974 ses-
sion, the conference heard testimonies
of experts on the various technical as-
pects of CW disarmament and con-
sidered a draft disarmament proposal
submitterl by Japan. 10
Disagreements on a eBW
centered principally on two aspects:
the Soviet insistence that both chemi-
cal and biologIcal s>'stems be includerl
10 the same treaty anrl the US insist-
ence for on-site inspection. Recog-
nizing the rlifference in strategic value
of hiological and chemical weapons
and the greater unpredictability of
hiological weapons, Britain wbmitted
a propo!"al to make .separate treaties
for biological and chemical warfare
They also subrvitted a draft
biological treat> which was accepted
and formed the basis for the BIOlogi-
cal Treaty signed in 1 !l72.
Attempb to de\'elop a treaty simi-
lar to the bIOlogical one for chemical
warfare systcms go on. The princi-
pal difficulty in the current negotia-
tions is the continuerl rlifferences be-
tween the United Slates and the
Soviet Union concerning inspection
and verification means. The Soviets
eompletely reject and claim they \\ ill
ne\'er accept l'S proposals for on-sIte
inspections to assnre treaty compli-
ance. The United States is adamant in
its demand for on-site inspection and
to present working papers
on this subject to the disarmament
conference." The United States is
currently stUdying alternative verifi-
cation procedures submitted during
the 1974 session of the disarmament
conference. ,-.
Under a contract from the ACDA,
the Midwest Res ear c h Institute
(MRI) has c"onducted extensive inves-
tigations into the technical and verifi-
19
CHEMICAL WARFARE DISARMAMENT
. cation aspects of a chemical and bio-
logical arms control agreement.
Considering the technical aspects of
agent production ahd production-re-
lated the MRI studies con-
clude that the only foolproof method
of verification of any CBW arms
agreement is on-site inspection by
highly qualified technical personnel.
Any methods short of on-site inspec-
tion can, at best, only detect indication
of activity in the CRW area. These
indirect indicators can easily he ma-
nipulated by any party desiring to
breech the terms of any disarmament
agreement.
Disarmament can be viewed from
three aspects: unilateral, bilateral and
multilateral. It is imperative that the
conditions created b:c each of these
aspects be e\'aluated In determining a
position for negotiations. An an-
nounced unilateral policy would de-
finitely demonstrate the sincerity of
our position and would represent a
sholl' of leadership to the rest of the
world, Disadvantages to a unilate;al
policy include the loss of a deterrent
and retaliatory capability. This loss
may invite the use of CW against us
by other nations. Our only recourse
to a CW attack would be a conven-
tional or nuclear retaliation. Nuclear
retaliation wou Id create the possi-
bility of escalation to a nuclear holo-
caust.
A bilateral disarmament agreement
between the United States and the So-
viet Union would make a significant
contribution to the easing of world
tensions and would demonstrate a
venture of joint leadership to the
world. A bilateral agreement would,
however, increase US vulnerability to
a CW attack from Third World coun-
tries. Any bilateral agreement would
have to include verifiable safeguards
to ensure that neither party to the
20
US Marines in lull CW protective clothing during a
training exercise at Dugway ProYing Ground, Utah
agreement could supply lts allied na-
tlOns with a CW capability. As in the
case of a unilateral agreement, a bi-
lateral agreement would make both
the United States and the Soviet
{Jnion vulnerable to threats from
smaller Third World nations having a
CW capability. Both nations would
have to depend upon their conven-
tional and nuclear superiority as a
deterrent to a CW attack.
The most ideal type of disarmament
agreement would be a multilateral one
involving as many nations of the
world as possible. Such an agreement
would certainly ease international ten-
sions and possibly result in improved
mutual relationships in the world
Military Review
community. The greatest drawback to
a multilateral agreement would be an
increased vulnerability of treaty na-
tions from nonsignatory nations. This
vulnerability raises the question of the
desirability of a total disarmament.
If disarmament is not total, then one
is left with the difficult que,tion of
specifying what measures are purely
defensive and what limits should be
placed on defensive actions. These
question,s are of extreme importance
and demand exacting answer,.
Essential to any bilateral or multi-
lateral disarmament agreement is
provi,ion for adequate verification of
compliance by all signatories. Lack of
adequate verification techniques could
result in a sigmficant gain in the
world power balance by any nation
who choose, to ignore the terms of
the treaty while other nations adhere
to it. The question of verification tech-
niques is currently the major stumbl-
ing block to a multilateral disarma-
ment agreement. The Soviets accuse
the United States of playing politics
with the disarmament conference. The
United State, rightly views the So-
viet reluctance for on-site inspection
as reason for suspicion of their true
intentions.
As we enter the era of Mtenle and
peaceful coexistence, we may hope for
the development of a transideological
consensus, described by Aspaturian,
"in which different social and ideo-
logical systems could interact and co-
operate rather than function as com-
petitors."' Such a consensus would
f/)rm the foundation of greater mu-
tual trust between the two great su-
perpowers. This development of mu-
tual trust is essential for the achieve-
ment of the goals for exchange
between the United States and the
Soviet Union declared' in the joint
communique released by President
May 1975
CHEMICAL WARFARE DISARMAMENT
Nixon and Secretary Brezhne\' in
1974. Exchange of ;cientific informa-
tion was included as a desi red area of
exchange. A free exchange of indus-
trial c hem i c a I information accom-
panied by on-site visits to production
plants represent a major first step to-
ward a meanlllgful CW dIsarmament
agreement. Until such an exchauge of
information can be assured, the US
s i g nat u r e on a (,W disal'mament
treaty, bilateral or multilateral, woul<l
represent the loss of a significant tac-
tical capahilIty.
C.nclusi.n
While little progress in current ne-
gotiations has been made, the United
States is opposed by a potential enemy
who has a credible and modern (,W
capability supported by an active re-
search and development program. The
SoYiet Armed Forces and a large
numher of its civilian population are
well-trained in (,W doctrine and tech-
niques. The possession hy the United
States of a CI edible (,W retaliatory
capability has been an effective deter-
rent to (,W against the United States
since World War I. At this critical
time in world history, when the world
is becoming more multipolar as an in-
number of compete
for international power and influence,
the L'nited States cannot afford to lose
the tactical value of a credible CW
capability. Until all threats of aggres-
Foive LHie of chemical warfare agents
are removed by verifiable disarma-
ment agreements, the United States
must maintain an active (,W program.
OUI' program should be designed to
provide an adequate defensive deter-
rent against the use of chemical war-
fare by a potential enemy and to pro-
vide an offensive capability sufficient
for effective retaliation should deter-
rence ever fail.
21
CHEMICAL WARFARE DISARMAMENT
The US Senate ratified both the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the 1972
Biological Weapons Convention on 16 December 1974. The votes for rati-
fication were a unanimous 90 to 0 for both treaties. The Geneva Protocol
was ratified with a first-use which states that the protocol
will cease to he binding upon the United States in regard to first-use of
CW by any state or its allies. With tegard to herbicides and riot-control
agents, the United States has reserved the right to use herbicides to
clear vegetat;on around US basps and to use riot-control agents in situa-
tions where civilian lives are endangered. In cases where riot-control
agents are to be used, their use will be under the same restrictions im-
posed for similar use within the United States. l>
President Ford signed the instruments of ratification for both the Ge-
neva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention on 22 January
1975. The action officially binds the United States as a party to both in-
ternational agreements nn chemical and biological warfare.
:"OTES
IFl"f'rlf'nrk .J Rrllwn. rh(,1n'f' u l li'(lTfnf(' 4
Stl/dy "I U,.<,tTfJJutll. Princeton L'niVPl"Slty Pre.., ....
Prlllct'ton. N ,J, Ifl6R. pp 2'lrtn. and Matthew S
Mf'sl'!'lon . Behind til{' Nn.nn Policy of C'hl'mlcni
and BlOlO)!lrnl Rl.illetlll (If the '\.ta7l1w
S("I(,,,t.st. \'r>iuml" 2G, Numbl'r I, 19.0.
2 ('1,r1>lIral.n.olnr}1('uT.R'ldlo[oolral ll'Il"JuTP and
Its {1'/'iwr-mamclIt AS}lf'< ts, es f:enatl"
{'I"'mmltt('(> fin FOIP1J!"n R"jatlOn'l. A Study Prf'parerl
hy the S'lbcommltke 011 Dlo.,m'mamrnt, R6th ('on-
j:!l"e<;<;. SI.'con,1 Se""l0n, 29 August Hl60, Supenn-
tc>ndent of Dnnlmentfl, US (;ovPl'nmenS P, Illtlnj:!
nmef', Wa"hln!ton, IL (' , 1,flO. pp 5-b
:1 ('h,m>rn.}, Tl,olorl>('n.l, fwd Rnd,n.lor}l('al Agc.,ts,
U.s ("mrre ...... , Committe(' on Science and
H{,fllln12"S f;6th CnngrC'ss. Pn'"t Se ... -
slon. 1 nnd 22 Jnn{' 1 SllPel'mtl'nd{'nt of DOCll-
(-;u\{'lnmpnt Prlntmg Offie{', Wa",hlnlr-
ton, D. ('. 1!J511
I ChcmJ(',tfR,o/(J(}lcn./ H'llrfl1Tf U.!:'_ PollClcs Ulla
lutfTlloti(JI>(Jl E[rcrt8, US Congrc ... ", Hous{' Cnm-
mJtt{'p of Fnre1f!'n Subcommittee on Na-
tIOnal Seenll1\ Puhey an,I S('lentlfic Dc"elopml'nb.
HeDdnl2"<;, 01"t Con..rll'<;"" Flnt SessIOn. No-
v{'mh{'r I'l(,',j an,t :? fj and lfl D{'('{'mbpr 1969, Su-
1I{,1 mtenJ('nt of Docllm('nt'3, OS GO\ ernment Print
ing Offic', \\'u-hmgtnn, D. C, H170
. ;-, Pre'ililent Rlcharn M_ }l'l,\on. Prcss Rrlea8e. 25
N""ember 1%9
G Pre">Jtient Richard M Nl-.:on, Press Rc[eflSC. 14
February 19.0.
'i Arnt8 ContTol alld D,;'!aTmaUlcnt .1f1rN'UlCllts
1952-197, US Arms Control and Disarmament
Ag{'ncy. 1972. pp 00_
a Richard M. Nixon, U.S, POTl'/on Polu'Y for the
1970'!l Sha]ll"fJ a. Dllruble Pcnn, Supenntendent
oC Docum('nts, US Government Printing Offil'("
Wm.:;hmgton, 0_ C_. 3 May 1973, p 207_
22
'1 luntrol and Dlsarma1l1(1lt
lQ-'J-IQ;'.!,011 nt., pp 101-2.
111 Nb.on. 1.5 ForclfJ?/ PO/H'!) JOT thc 1.9;O's
SIoQTlIII(T a Dumble Pca('r, 0]1_ rlt, pp 207-1'
11 ChrmlrQlTl,ologrral-Radl070glcal ll'flrJaTc nn,1
Its D!sUrnlUrnel1t Asp("cts, Oll I'd, pp 6-10, an,j
(;eot,lre Bunn. "nannlllg POhon Gas and G(Il-m
Warfare Should thE' Umt('d Stat('\! AI!I('{," Cn,,_
(JT(Jsslol1al RaoTa, 21 May P E420':',
1:: Matth('w S. McseiRon, "Gas W:lIfnrl' an,] Ih,
Genc ... n Protocol of 1925," BlIllet!>1 01 till' 110""(
.... ("H'lItISt. VolumE' 2B, Number 2, 1972
"('hpmleul and Da('tetiologicni
'Weapons and the Effect" of Thei[' Po<;slblp V\>I;'''
Rqwrt of the Secretary GI'1Ier<1/. UmtNl Nattnn ... ,
NY. 1969. pp 9fj0';'
It Mpsf'ison, "(;aR Warfare an,i thl' Ocnf'\a
Proto('ol of 192il," op_ Cit., A.nu ReaTlII(lS 011 H R
9;'45, B,R. 9749, R.n. ]0011, n.lld H,R. lOOl'!.
Idelltt("ul ThlIs to Tnsure That No Pz,bll(' Fnlld." Tlr
(,';led for the T'l!T]lOSt' of TrrlnSl>ortl!l(/ (,hf'm1(l1
,VertC Agents to or From AI'JI lH,btary iI,swl/a-
tWll m the Ult1tcd Statfs for Storagf or "torl'II1/
/!fa l'uT]lOSCS UI,zf'88 It Is til.(' SCJlse (If Congress
to Do So, US Congress, House Committee' on
Armf'u Sprvice<;, Subcommittee Number 1. HAS C
Number 93-28, 93d Congress, First Sl':,;sion, 3 01'
tnbpl' SUP('rinwndpnt flf UH
G.l\ernment Offief', Wa"hington, D, ('.
1973, pp 77-79
n Chenncal-Bto1o(fJCal War/au U S.
amI [nterna.twnal Efferts, 01'. ("It, Bunn. 01'. C'lt,
and Mcseison, \Varfare and the Ge'ne'\a Pro-
to('01 oC 1925," 0 p_ C'it.
16 Me5elson. "Behind the' ND!on of Chem
i('al and Biological Warfare," op_ ('It" and John W
Fmney, "Pentagon Bares Cost of Germ Warfart'
Study," The New York Time8, 5 Marl'h 1969, p I,
col 8.
Military Review
17 Cheml('al. BIOlogIcal. and RadIOlogIcal Agcnts,
0]1. ('It.
IS Seymour M. Hersh, "Chemical and BtoloJ!'1eui
Weapon" -Thl' Secret Arsenal," The New l"oTI.
TtmeJJ. 5 August 11'J6f1, Section VI. p 26.
Ifl "Defense'" Dark Comer," Editorial, The Ncil'
York Tnne.'f, 23 April 1969, p 46. eol 1.
.!O ChcUtIf.rtl-Rto(oYICal WItTfare. U.S. POltcU18
alld llltcnwt!ollai T:.'[Jects. op. ("It. pp 28-45; and
Richard D. McCarthY, Thc UltImate Folly, ll'aT
b1J PI'sitlence. AsphYXIatIOn and DcfoitatIOn. Al-
fred A Knopf Inc,. N. Y. I!)6!).
:!1 McCarthy, op. ot., pp 9'J-l.1;:4 and HtnTlI,n'J
on H,R. 9745, HR. 971;9. H.R. J0011, and H.R
IflOI2. Idt"llit("al Rllfll to bllJ11TC That No Publtl
Funds Re Uscd fOT the PIITI_0:lC oj TTa/>,n'QT(rn"
Chc'mH"ui XI'T!'C Afll "tq to OT Frotn. A'!11 Mlllranl
InstallatIOn III tlu' Fmlrd Statr'l JOT StOTQge or
Stockluhno PnT1IOSt"S U,l1e88 It Is the 8rluJe oj
C071gTeSI$ fo Do So, on. Clt. For {'lI.phctt rO\l
('ragp. "(!e 1'he Nelt l"orfc TUnes, 16.31 July 196!)
2.! "Stu,!t'nts Occupy Stanford EI('ctronlc-. Lah-
oratory," Tile New YOTk Tlmc8, 11 April 196'),
p 2.t, col 5
2'l Robm rJarke, Thc SdeJ/t Wralons. Da .. iri
McKay Co Inc., NY, 1%8. pp 213-42.
l "Chemical SOCh'ty Ask<, War-lias llan," TII('
Nt'1f' YOTI .. 1'lfn(,8, 16 S('ptE'mbpr 19';0, p n4. rol :
:!:. "ChE"mH'al Soc-Iety Urgf's Dan on Ga5 War
fareo," The Ka11sa.s Clt?1 Tlmcs, fI October 1 n71,
p 2D. cill 1
:w Clwmlcal, BwlofltCal. and Radwloaunl Agellts,
Oil. nt, Ch{'1Tw::al-BwlO(fu:al WaTfarc tJ R. Poll
(/fS a1,d 1nt"T'//atlOnal /o.";cct.q. op. ('It, and HmT.
tIlg'" 011 H.R. 9745, H.R. 9ij9, H.R WfJt1. ami
HR. 1001:!, ldcnt/(o/ B,lls to ]nlHtTe That No
1'1,bllf" Fund", Re U'fl'd fOT the Purpos(' of TTallS'
POTtl11(1 Cilfml('(Il NeTve A(IC'ItS to OT Prom AlPJ
lllzlltarll 11I.qt"lIatio)t In th,. L'lIltt'd ..... tates tOT "tOT_
nal' aT Stoe/nlllwo PlITPOSf8 [hlcss It Is thc
<;clIse oj COllgrUUi to [)o So, op. Cit
:;:!. Clarc-me M. Dmenport and Alb('rt E Daw.
<'on, Int}'[,catlOlIB fOT Arm,'i COl/tTol
of VSSR'l1lP and lJ S./IV.1TO Chemtral WaTfale
CrtlJUiltl1tlfS (Unclassified), Volume On{': F:')I('ru
tJ\le Summary (Undnsslfi('d). Stanford Re'lf'arch
Instltuh'. Palo Alto. Calif., 1974, (Secret) p. ::l
(Note: No classilied mat('nal was E'xtractl'd from
thi'" puhhcatifln)
:':1:1 Chemtc(ll, nlological, and Ro.-dIO}ogwal Agf"tll,
011 ('It: and Chemlcal.Rwloqlcul "VaTffIrc ll:-;
Polle/c') tlnri ["tcTl1ati01'rtl E]]ecf8. 01). nt.
:W C}wvncr!l, Rl%glcal. al>ri RadlOioglrul AUc"i.<..
op. {'It. P 'n.
:i0 Cht'tnlcal.Bwloqlm/ Wa"faTe U.S. rOf'CIC/!
and IlIt,'nultwnal f;[fc{"ts, 01' CIt. P 20.
31 Marshal Stubbs, ''('BR A Power for Peace:'
... lrmed [.'OT('I'8 Chctni("al Jot/Tnal, Volum(' IB, Num
her 3, 1%0.
Stntement by Mr. Amos A. JOl'dan, Acting
ASSIstant S('cr('tary of for International
Set'urity Affairs, Refore the Subcommittee on Na
honni Security Pohey and ScientIfic Dpvelopmt'nt
,)f th(' Hom,l' Foreign CommiU('(', !l May
1974. COpy of the statement was obtninefl from
the Office of thl' ASSIStant Secretary llf Def('n,..p
for Puhlic Affair.:.
3a "Chemical- Warfare: US, PoIieie"
and Int(>rnational Effects," COl1gn'ss,ollal ReCorD.
25 Junf' 1970, p S9R23.
May 1975
CHEMICAL WARFARE DISARMAMENT
.H "Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological)
Weapons and the Efferts of Tlnoir pos!;lble Use,"
01' CIt., P 88.
3;. "Army Will Spend $200 Million for Saf('1'
Typ(' Nprve Gas," Thc New YOTk Ttmc8, 10 De-
cember 1973. p I, col 7, and Statemcnt by Mr
Amos A. Jordan, 01'. ('If
KnthlE"E"n Teit!'.eh. "Mrs. MYrrlal, L('avlnJ!
U.N , Warns of Nt'w Weapon"," The NC1l" }'otl,
Tim{''I. It No\('mber 1973, p 2, (01 3.
:Ii John W. FinhPy, "Nf'H{> Gas Ol'po"pd,"
The CIty T,mcB. 17 D('eemb('r
.18 HrflT!IIYIJ on 11 R. 974.5, H.R. H.R. Jo.'Jtt,
and H U. JfJf)12, ldenilcal Rlfl8 to Insure that Nn
Public ,Be Uscd fOT the PIlT}lO"lC oj Traml'
pOTtlllq Ch('mlcal Ntrvc .. lgents to or From AIIII
,l1rlltaTlJ hlitflUatln1l 1>1 the UTlIted StalCf! fOT "itm'
age OT Stoc/;'pilm(1 PUTP08C8 UUk6S It Is thl'
of ConqTeSft to Do So. 011. f"lt,. pp nS!l9
to Chrmlf"al.RlOlogual n'QrfaTe U ".
and Illtr:Tllatiollfll J.;fject'l, 01) fIt. and HCanl11J'l
(In H.R 974). H ll. 9749, Ii.R. lOfJIl. alld H U
Idel1t1cal BIlls fo l'Ilj11Te That No P"bl"
FlHuls Re Ust"d fOT the PnTpo",' of TTal1l1.]lOrtllH,
Cheml('al N(,Tl'f Agent.'! to or From All" MdltaTY
1}'stallatlOlI 111 tirr Cmted States fOT StOTagc or
Stoc/q}/lw(1 rI4Tl>OS('S U,1i('8ff It hi fl,(' SCI18e oj
Conflrcs8 to Vo So, op. CIt.
11 rl,cmu'lllRIoloqualRadlOlof1/ral IVflrfan a",/
Uf! /)''<flTm,/mt''}/t 11fiI'Cctll, 01' nt. pp 3::1-:\4, and
.T. F: et al., Thc Role 0/ Clum1cIll and
Iholo.'1/cnr n'ea7lO'nS 17' thr Defense of
the If'l'ted Statf"!, Um ... er<,lty of
Penn'l)'hnnia, Phllariclphlil., Pa. (SPrT'f'tl
(Note' No clas'>lfl("d mat'.'rinl \"'n-. c,,;tractcd ftum
thl"; publication)
12 Statement by Amba.,<,ador .Jo.o.cl'h Mar-tm J 1
at th(> 651th Plenary I\o1f'etlhg at the Conft"r('nl'c
nf the Commltt('f' on Disarmam('nt. 22 A.uJ!u"t
19701. A ropy of thiS .,tat{"mE'nt \\:1'" furni'lhed h\
the PlIbhe AlTalT!, Office of the US Arms Control
and Dl'-armum{'nt AJrpncy.
n Nhon. U.S. Forclgll Pf'itCIl fOl tll(,
":;lJllpmg a Dumbl(' Peacc. op CIt
-11 "DI",pute Over On,Slte In",p('llton
I\nl'W at t,('nella Parl('y," The !\,',ll' YOTf .. T'mol,
22 Marrh p :1. rol I. and' So",et, at "en(' .... I,
Offers Pact to Dar Chemlc-al Arms," TlJ(' : ... {'II
Yo,.'" TlTtlcl:I. 29 March 1972. p H. col
n Stat(>ment by Amb:t"!'.adOl' JO"'l'ph \tartm Jl .
op rtf
H, T. L. Ferguson, A. R. Hylton. and C E
Mumma, StudieS OJI the TI'f"hn/('al .4rmB Control
ASPl'f't'l of ChemU'nl and RlOlomcal IVarfare. Sum-
maTY, Midwest Researc-h In!'.titutt>, Kansa'- Cit:.,
l'rfo. 197:!, Volume I
4. Vernon D. Aspnturmn, "The USSR, the USA
and Chma in the SeH'ntles," Mllltanl Ret'i('1('
Janualy 1974. p 62
-18 "Aftel' 50 Year"', U.S. Says No on Gl'rm
Warfare," The Salt Lake TTlbul!e, 17 December
1974, and "The Geneva Protocol uf 1925, E.xcuti\l(!
J, 9Ist Conrrress, 2d SeSSIOn, The ConVl'nlton on
the Prohibition of Bacteriological TOXin Weapons,
S ... eeutnre Q. 92d Congress. 2d Se'lSlOn, Tht:'
Amended to Artldp VII of the 1965 Conven.
tlOn on Facilitation of InternatIOnal Munilm{'
Traffic. ExecutIve D, 93d Congress, 2d SeSSIOn,
and the Consular Conventlon With Bulgana, E.x-
ecutive H. 93d Congress, 2d Sesswn," Congres.
Biollal Record. Volume 120, NllmbE"r 176. PI'l
S215P7-607 and 21643-644,
23
Headquarters, AFCENT, Brunssum, The Netherlands
24 Military Review
Colonel Norman L. Dodd, British Army, Retired
T
HE sentiments expressed in
these two statements have not
been' questioned by any responsible
authority in the Western World. Yet
there is a constant demand for the re-
duction in defense expenditures in all
the nations which together provide the
shield for the Free World. There is
pressure in the United States to with-
draw troops from Europe. Belgium
has reduced its forces and the COll-
scription period to one year. West
May 1975
Germany has also reduced conscript
service to 15 months, and the Nether-
lands are considering proposals to re-
duce theirs to 12 months. Canada has
withdrawn most of its forces from
Central Europe, and the British Labor
Government, while professing strong
support for the alliance, has an-
nounced that it will reduce the de-
fense budget by "several hundred mil-
lion pounds."
NATO's Northern flank has always
25
VITAL CENTER
been dangerously vulnerable, and now
the Southern flank is in disarray due
to the confruntation in
Cyprus and the consequent with-
rlrawal of the Greek forces from the
NATO command. Even in the post-De
Gaulle era, France still stands some-
what aloof from the military planning
for the defense of Central Europe,
the region which is absolutely vital for
the ",hole of NATO's defense struc-
ture.
Allied Forces, C en t r a 1 Europe
situated at Brunssum in
the South Limburg Province of the
:-Ietherlands since 1969,' has never
been given the status or publicity that
its importance warrants. Too often, it
is confused with SHAPE (Supreme
Allied Powers. Europe)
or NATO Headquarters. and it is cer-
tainly not understood by civilians in
Britain and the United States that the
German Commander in Chief. Allied
Forces. rentral Europe (CINCE:-IT).
\\ ill command their armies and / air
forces should the NATO deterrent
faIl.
General Emst Ferber. whose last
appointment \\as Chief of Stiff of the
tierman Army and who has previom;ly
_ served \\'Ith the NATO Standing
Group. assumed the position of
rWCENT in 1973. He has held ap-
pointments at regimental. brigade, di-
vision and level, as well as serv-
ing in higher headquarters. and IS
well-qualified to know whether or not
the forces assigned and earmarked to
his command are capable of carrying
out the t.asks allotted to them and
what might result from any further
reductions.
As long ago as Hl56. the NATO
Council agreed with the military rec-
ommendation that 30 combat-ready
divisions were the minimum required
for the proper defense of the Central
26
General Ernst Ferber,
Commander in Chief, AFCENT
Region. In 1967, the Council adopted
the policy of basing the rlefense upon
"a full range of appropriate reactions,
conventional and nuclear, to meet all
levels of aggression 01' threat of ng-
as far forward as pOfifiible"-
a conrept which has come to be kno" n
as "flexible and forwarrl defense." To-
day, there are still only 2:l division;;
available, and some of these are under-
strength. stationed too far to the west
and not all completely combat-ready at
all times. They are outnumbered :l to
1 in tanks and 2 to 1 in artillery b.,'
the 60 Warsaw Pact divisions sta-
tioned in Eastern Europe. These diVI-
sions, which can be reinforced rap-
idly from Western Russia. are fully
equipped with standardized equipment
and weapons and manned by well-
disciplined soldiers who carry out two
years of tough training.
The situation in the ail' is not
much better. The Allied Tactical Air
Forces (ATAF) in Central Europe
are also outnumbered some 2 to 1, and.
here again. the Warsaw Pact has the
advantage of standardization. The Al-
lies have, for the most part, excellent
Military Review
aircraft. but of too many types. Many
do not have interchangeable weapons.
Happily, due to the speed and flexi-
bility of air power. the reinforcement
advantage held by the Warsaw Pact
is not so marked in the ground
and the professional skill of
the Allied pilots. particularly those of
the US Air Force (USAF) and the
Air Force (RAF), b generally
considered to be better than that of
their potential enemies. General Fer-
ber realizes only too well that. if the
outnumbered ground forces are to
have any chance of success, the maxi-
mum use of air power is essential. For
this reason, new al'l'angements have
been made for the command and con-
trol of the two Allied Tactical Air
Forces in peace and war.
Since NATO came into being. the
basic organization of the forces under
the command of the CINCENT have
not altered greatly. with the excep-
tions of the acceptance of the West
German forces into the Allied Com
mand in 1955 and the withdrawal of
the French forces from the Command
in 1966. The British Commanders in
Chief of the Northern Army Group
and the 2d Allied Tactical Ai,' FOI'ce
still have their headquarters in the
same buildings at Rheindahlen near
Monchengladbach. They control the
area from LUbeck and Hamburg in
the north to around Kassel in the cen-
ter of the region. The American Com-
manders in Chief of the Central Army
Group and the 4th Allied Tactical Air
Force, from their headquarters in
Mannheim and Ramstein respectively.
are responsible for the southern half
of the region from around Kassel to
the Swiss and Austrian borders.
The land forces in the Northern
Army Group are provided by the 1st
British Corps. the 1st Belgian Corps,
the 1st Netherlands Corps and a Ger-
May 1975
VITAL CENTER
man corps. Unfortunately. the Nether-
lands corps is located mainly in Hol-
land, and the Belgian corps is too far
west. In fact. most units are located
"nonopel'ationaHy" as they have to
make use of the barracks available,
often a legacy from the war. The all'
forces in the 2d ATAF are provided
by the same nations plus one squadron
from the USAF. located in Halland.
In the southern sector of the region,
the United States and Germany each
provide two corps and the Canadians
a battle group. These three nations
also supply the air squadrons fol' the
4th A TAF, with the main strength
coming from the United States. The
French forces in Germany, about two
divisions, are also in this sector bnt
are under national and not NATO con-
trol. There are, however, British and
US liaison officers at the French Head-
quarters in Bad..en, and there are
French liaison officers at the Bntish
and US National Headquarters and
with Headquarters, AFCENT, itself.
The British, Americans and French
still have certain responsibilIties fOI'
the defense of and access to Berlin,
and the British and Americans still
patrol the "ail' buffer zone" along the
demarcation line bet" een East and
West Germany. This, however, IS lIot
the concern_ of the CINCENT; he is
responsible for the propel' defense of
his region in accordance with the pro-
visions of the NATO Charter and on
orders from the NATO Council. In
this connection, under the NATO
Treaty, the signatories agree that all
attack on one is an attack on all, but
only commit themselves to "immedi-
ate consultations" to decide what ac-
tion, including military action, that
each must take. In theory. therefore.
the CINCENT must await instruc-
tions from the nations concerned be-
fore he can take any military action
27
VITAL CENTER
Dutch troops on maneuver
against Warsaw Pacr forces which
cross into \Vestern Germany, and he
must await the full assignment to .his
command of some of the forces. The
earlier Western European Union de-
fense agreement, which is still valid
and remains in effect until 1DDS, is
much more definite. The signatories,
which include the European members
of NATO, agree to come to the assIst-
ance of any member who is the object
of an armed attack in Europe with "all
the military and other aid and assist-
"nce in their power." AFCENT is the
direct descendant of the original
Western European Union Headquar-
. tel'S set up by Field Marshal Mont-
gomery in ID48. As Brigadier W. F. K.
Thompson, Retired, noted in the April
1974 NATO Re"ieu', it is a pity that
AFCENT has not been given the posi-
tion and prestige due in this role.
A visit to Headquarters, AFCENT,
and its Commander in Chief, however,
is very heartening, for here there is a
28
real knowledge of what confronts our
forces and the need to take every pos-
sible step to "reduce the odds" by good
trainmg, by coordinated plans and by
of weapons, aircraft.
ammunItion and procedures. General
Ferber has said that he believes the
forces under h;s command can pres-
ently carry out their assigned tasks,
but he con:.;iuers that any further re-
ductions and withdrawals would have
the most serious repercussions on the
credIbIlIty of the defense posture in
the Central Region.
General Ferber :.;aid:
The last four years have srcll thc
switch fmlll the old NATO policy to
the nen' <Inc of a for/l'a, ri and fle.rible
defence Just about completeri. This
change posed many problems fOl' the
around and air forces in tactics, train-
ing and equipment. In order to allou'
them to operate and fight convention-
al/y, if )'equired, it was necessary to
imp) ave the anti-tank capability of
Military Review
the ground forces and to strengthen
the conventional capability of the tac-
tical air !o)ces.
The lessons of the latest Arab-Is-
raeli War have been closely studied
at AFCENT, and the conclusion
reached is that no change is required
in the plans for the antitank defense.
The only mobile way of fighting an at
tacker's tank is still the tank. Its ar-
mor, cross-country perf0rmance and
its effective gun make the tank indis-
pensable on the battlefield. Tanks can
be concentrated rapidly and can speed-"
ily mount a counterattack. The finest
and best arranged antitank belt of
weapons, be they guns or missiles, ran
and will be disrupted by a coordinated
and determined attack. Once it is dis
rupted, there is no other means of
counterattacking except by tanks. An-
titank weapons are an essential part
of the infantryman's armory because
VITAL CENTER
he must be able to defend himself
against local tank attacks. In Central
Europe, considerable efforts have been
made to introduce more effective guns
and missiles for this purpose. These
now include the British SIL'ingjire, the
US TOW and Dragon, as weIl as the
Carl Gustav launcher and various an-
titank grenades. Remarkable progress'
has been illade in the antitank capa-
bility of -the tactical air forces. The
British and Germans have the cluster
bomb, the US the smart bomb and the
lI1avaick-type weapons. Antitank heli-
copters such as the Lynx and the
Cobra are coming into service.
The successful defense of the re-
gion depends greatly upon the close
cooperation between the land and air
forces, and it is in this field that recent
changes have been made. On 28 June
1974, a new a,ir headquarters was es-
tablished under the command
For a mobile, antitank defense, tanks and armored vehicles remain indispensable on the battlefield.
Shown here is the German Marder.
I
May 1975
29
VITAL CENTER
of the CINCENT. Named the Head-
quarters, A \lied Ai r Forces, Central
Europe (AA,fCE): it is presently lo-
cated at Ramstein, Germany, with the
4th ATAF, but, as soon as accommo-
dations are available, it will move to
Brunssum to be collocated with
AFCENT.
The principal task of the Com-
mander in Chief, AAFCE, General
John W. Vogt, USAF, is to exploit the
maximum air power of the Allied Tac-
tical Air Forces under his command.
In peacetime, he is responsible for en-
hancing the activities of the air forces
by harmonizing procedures, encourag-
ing standardization and common
training to allow the air forces to be
switched throughout the region. "Gen-
eral Vogt," said General Ferber, "has
not got an easy task because, unfor-
tunately, procedures, electronics and
training methods tend to vary in each
Nation." The methods used by the 2d
A TA F tend to follow the pattern pet
hy the RAF while those in the 4th
ATAF follow those of the USAF. The
RAF favors very low flying, whereas
the USAF tends to fly higherJand re-
lies more upon electronic methods to
penetrate the enemy radar screens.
The RAF is also a strong supporter of
the use of the VSTOL (vertical and
short take-off and landing) Hal'riers
operating from forward sides. Al-
though squadron exchanges and cross-
servicing between air forces are nor-
mal procedures, it is not always pos-
sible to rearm at an "away" base
. because the same bombs and weapons
are not used throughout the region.
These problems highlight the whole
question of standardization in NATO,
perhaps one of the least successful al-
liance projects.
Although standardization is impor-
tant both for efficiency and for eco-
nomic reasons, if is resisted by na-
30
tional industry and by those parlia-
mentarians who must defend the jobs
of their constituents. General Ferber
added another group: military men
with military ambitions! He said:
We milital'Y men must sometimes
accept something which is 90 % of
what we require if it is effective and
accepted for common use. We must
compromise.
He says that progress has been
slow, but there have been some suc-
cesses. He points out that all the tanks
in Central Europe, except the British
Chieftains, use the same ammunition.
In the artillery, the 155mm and
I05mm guns are common-user as are
all small arms. In the air, the Phantom
is used by three countries and the
F 1 04 by four. The smaller nations
have not yet been able to agree on a
replacement for the FI04, but at least
the British and Germans look as
though they will both be u sin g
the Anglo-German-Italian Multi-Role
Combat Aircraft (MRCA) which has
now made its first flight and will be iri
service by the 1980s.
Perhaps the most successful project
has been the NATO Air Defense
Ground Environment (NADGE) sys-
tem which stretches from the N orth-
ern Cape to Eastern Turkey and IS
used by all NATO nations.
The project which General Ferber
thinks is most important is that of
finding a standard battle tank. He
hopes that the present German-Brit-
ish-American discussions on the de-
sign of the new battle tank will be
successful.
Without more standardization, the
logistical problems in the Central Re-
gion will remain complicated and ex-
pensive to resolve. Each nation has to
supply, store and transport its own
ammunition, weapons and replace-
ments. "NATO as a whole," said Dr.
Military Review
VITAL CENTER
Part of the successful NAUGE system used by all NATO nations
Theodor Tromp,. President of the
NATO Industrial Advisory Group,
"wastes up to 870 million annually
uecause of duplication of arms and
military research," It is here, rather
than in the reduction of forces, that
defense budgets can ue lowered,
One of the suggestions made in the
early days of the Western European
Union defense arrangements was that
international formations should ue
created, and even integrated units
were considered, These suggestions,
except in the case of the mliltinational
Allied Command, Europe (ACE). Mo-
bile Force, were never implemented.
General Ferber. when questioned on
this subject, said that he did not think
that multinational formations uelo"
the Army Group Headquarters level
were necessary; national corps, bn-
gades and divisions were more effec-
tive. The ACE Mobile Force is an ex-
May 1975
ception because it IS designed for a
'pecific purpose, that of showing phys-
Ically on the ground NATO's solidar-
Ity at a threatened point 01' area.
Below the integrated army group
and tactical ail' force level, logistics, a
national responsibility, causes serious
problems; the resupply of integrated
brigades and divisions would be very
difficult over a long period of time.
Warsaw Pact forces do not have to
contend with these difficulties since all
are armed and equipped with standard
Soviet equIpment and weapons, and all
are organized and trained according
to Soviet directives.
To help NATO officers and men gain
experience and knowledge of the pro
cedures and traming methods of ,their
Allies. Headquarters, AFCENT, and'
the subordinate commands encourage
cross training, attachments and joint
exercises throughout the region. Staff
31
VITAL CENTER
office1's are exchanged within head-
quarters, units relieve each other for
short periods, units and formations
are invited to take part in each other's
national exercises, command post ex-
ercises are held between units and
formations of different nations and
officers are invited to attend formation
study periods. Headquarters, AF-
CENT, annually organizes two inter-
ATAF air competitions, the Tactical
Weapons Meet and a reconnaissance
exercise. There are also regular AF-
CENT air defense exercises. No doubt
the new Headquarters, AAFCE, will
encourage further iI.terchange be-
twe'en the various air forces and, in
doing so, will steadily harmonize pro-
cedures and doctrines. This is no easy
task in an alliance of free and equal
partners, all somewhat jealous of their
national prides and methods.
Time and space IS one of the most
difficult problems facing any Com-
mander in Chief of the Central Re-
gion. The "front" is over 800 kilome-
ters long, not allowing for the many
twists and turns of the demarcation
line. It is only 140 kilometers from the
Iron Curtain to the Rhine via the
shortest route-the Kassel Autobahn.
To have any hope of carrying out the
forward defense strategy without the
immediate recourse to nuclear weap-
ons, the Cn .. CENT must be given
time-warning time and political per-
mission to use that time to move units
to forward positions, to bring them up
to strength, to fly in reinforcements
from the United Kingdom and the
United States. Obstacles must be cre-
ated and political approval granted for
the use of nuclear demolitions. Air
forces must be dispersed and moved
into hardened areas or to their field
hides in the case of the RAF's Hal'-
riers. Because of the possibility that
there will be no time or very little
time available, the CINCENT mllst
have sufficient troops and aircraft
ready, on the spot and at fighting
strength, in his command area in
Troops of the mUltinational Allied Command, Europe, Mobile Force
32
Military Review
VITAL CENTER
A circle of NATO aircraft at a Tactical Weapons Meet in 1974
peacetime. Reinforcing arrangements
are second best. Experience unfortu-
nately has shown at the time of the
building of the Berlin Wall, at the in-
vasion of Hungary, in the Cuban
crisis and the repression of Czechoslo-
vakia in 1968 that the NATO nations
seem to be far too afraid of appear-
ing "provocative," although threaten-
ing and serious Soviet troop move-
ments are rarely considered provoca-
tive. Who could have said in absolute
certainty in August 1968 that the
buildup in East Germany was directed
only against Czechoslovakia? Could
not those forces, and others following
them, have continued into West Ger-
many? Yet few precautions were
taken by the NATO nations. As far
as is publicly known, no NATO alert
was called at that time.
May 1975
Given some warning time to allow
them to reach their battle positions,
t h e r ~ is no doubt that the NATO
forces in the Central Region could
give a good account of themselves. The
200,000 US troops are well-equipped
and are fast recovering from the de-
habilitation of the Vietnam War and
its drain upon personnel and mate-
rials. The British 1st Corps is part of
the most professional army which the
country has ever had in peacetime and
is rapidly approaching a peak in its
re-equipment program. The German
Army has not lost the fighting skills of
its forebears. The Belgian and Dutch
corps, given reinforcement and move-
ment time, should be able to fight a
delaying action. The air forces are
well-equipped, and pilot training is'of
a bigh caliber. The Warsaw Pact sol-
33
VITAL CENTER
diers, although well-trained and well-
equ ipped, are not supermen, but, re-
grettably, numbers must count.
In the Western World, the military
commanders can only point out the
hard facts; the political leade,'s must
decide whether 01' not their countries
can afford to maintain the forces the
commanders consider vital for the
tasks they are given, The successive
Commanders in Chief, Allied Forces,
Centr>!l Europe, have made their posi-
tions very clear. In l!lG8, General Graf
von Kielmansegg said: "Any further
reductions of my already limited
forces would make it impossible for
me to ca lTy ou t my task,"
General, Bennecke wrote in 1973:
We must increase rather than re-
duce our conventional forces in the
late 70s until there ;s clear evidence
that the Soviets .eill reduce thci,
forces jrnlll thei, present high level,
ll'hich appears to be so 1Jluch in e.l'CPSS
of "'hat is required for defence pur-
posPs.
In 1!l74, General Ferber said:
It is not only training but combat
readiness Ichich is ill/pO)'tant, Units
must be "ready to go."; this is often
not understood by civilians, If we arc
to have any chance of carrying out
the forlcard defence strategy we must
maintain combat ready forces on the
spot. We cannot rely on a rapid mo-
bilization of ,'eserves as a country in
a fa,' beiter position such as SU'i!zer-
land can do. We may not hal'e the time
necessary; OUI' units must be up to
strength with tmined men at all times.
These are clear enough statements
by very experienced officers, but will
they be heeded? The populations of
democracies are ostrich-like on de-
fense matters in peacetime, hoping
that, if they do not face the facts, the
"problem will go away." It will not,
In spite of SALT talks, disarmament
34
discussions and so caned "detente,"
the threat to our way of life does not
diminish and the aim of the Commu-
nists does not destruc-
tion of the capitalist society and its
subjection to Communist disciplines
under the direction of the Soviet
Union, We should be ready to nego-
tiate but constantly on our guard,
Somerset Maugham wrote:
If a nation values anything more
than freedom it will lose its f,'eedom;
and the irony of it is, that if it is
comfort 0" money that it values more,
it will lose that too.
Are we doing just this?
Colonel Norman L. Dodd, British
Army, Retired, is a writer on defense
maiters fO)' many military magazines
and is the British defense correspond.
ent for the German magazine Wehr-
kunde. He held a variety of NATO
staff appointments and, bef01'e his re-
tirement, was Chief of Public Inf01'-
mation, AFCENT. His article "Square
Pegs in Square Holes: The Selection
of Recruits in the British Army" ap-
.peared in the January 1975 MILITARY
REVIEW.
This article . was written after
Colonel Dodd revisited Headquart1S.
AFCENT, where he held discussion .
with NATO officers and interviewed
the Commander in Chief, Genaal
Ernst Ferber, German Army.
Military Review
,General Hugh s. Johnson
and the
War Industries Board
John Kennedy Ohl
R
ECENT concern over the role
of the military in American so-
ciety has generated considerable in-
terest in America's past experiences
with wartime economic mobilization.
Particular attention has been focused
on World War I, for, during tJ:!at
struggle, America had to make major
institutional adjustments to meet the
insatiable demands of the fighting in
France. In 1917, the military and in-
dustrial sectors were insulated from
each other. The Army and the busi-
nessmen of the War Industries Board
(WIB) each had their own concepts
of industrial mobilization, and, for
much of 1917, they struggled for
domination of the supply program.
This struggle raged unabated until
March 1918, when President Woodrow
Wilson granted the WIB and its new
chairman, Bernard M, Baruch, general
coordinating authority over industrial
mobilization and mandated that the
Army cooperate with the WIB. As a
result, the Army had to share the
May 1975
planning and execution of the supply
program with businessmen, and, al-
though no interlocked "military-in-
dustrial complex" emerged from the
war effort, never again would the mili-
tary and industrial sectors be insu-
lated from each other as they had
been in 1917.
In looking at the problem of indus-
trial mobilization during World War
I, historians have generally concen-
trated on the role of businessmen in
the WIE and the WIR's struggle with
the Army. For example, Robert D.
Cuff in The War Industries Board:
Business-Government Relations Dur-
ing World War I gives us good pic-
tures of the motives of the business-
men as well as of the development of
the WIB, while Daniel R. Beaver in
Newton D. Baker and the American
War Effort, 1917-1919 highlights the
conflict bet'ween the Army and the
WIB before March 1918.
'
But no one
has fully investigated the efforts to
effect cooperation between the Army
35
WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD
and the WI B after March 1918. To a
significant degree, these efforts cen-
tered around Brigadier General Hugh
S. Johnson of the War Department
General Staff. Well-known in Washing-
ton because of his work with the draft,
J ohnsol1" was assigned to the General
Staff in 1018 to assist in the re-
organization of the languishing Army
supply program. Thereafter, as a
member of the General Staff and later
as a member of the WIB, he played an
important role in the integration of
the military and industrial sectors.
On the surface, it would seem odd
that Johnson would be selected for
such an important role. A hard-bitten
and tempestuous cavalry officer, he
had never served with any of. the
Army supply bureaus. 2 Most of John-
son's Army career had been
with the 1st Cavalry in such remote
places as Fort Clark, Texas, and Camp
Stotsenberg in the Philippines. Out-
side of relief work in San Francisco
during the 1906 earthquake and the
chase after Villa in 1916, it had been
a rather uneventful career. The turn-
ing point in Johnson's Army career
came in 1014 when The Judge Ad-
vocate General, Brigadier General
Enoch H. Crowder, selected him for
appointment to the Judge Advocate
General's Corps and dispatched him
to the University of California for a
law degree. This appointment brought
rapid promotion from lieutenant to
major and assignment to Washington
in Crowder's office. During the first
year of the war, Johnson served as
Crowder's deputy in the planning and
organization of the draft. Here, his
latent organizational talents came to
the fore and earned him the attention
of both Secretary of War Newton D.
Baker and General Peyton C. March
who became Army Chief of Staff in
March 1918.
3
March determined that
36
he would be a valuable aid in "build-
ing up the War Department into a
more vigorous war machine." <I
When Johnson entered the General
Staff, he was struck by the undisguised
hostility the Army exhibited toward
the WIB. As he later told
B. Clarkson, the unofficial historian of
the WIB, the Army felt that it did
not need the WIB, that it was an im-
pediment to the Army's supply pro-
gram rather than an assistance, that
Baruch wanted to create a ministry
of Jllunitions, and th...t its civilian
members were moVivated as much by
the desire to help themse].ves as by
any sense of duty and sacrifice.
5
It
was a hostility ingrained by decades
of insularity between soldiers and
businessmen and aggravated by a
year's reluctance on the Army's part
to accept the WIB as a partner ip its
supply program.
In its quest for professionalism
after the Civil War, the military had
rejected the spirit of commercialism
and materialism that it saw at the
forefront of American society during
the Gilded Age. Military officers de-
plored the rise of businessmen to pre-
dominance in American society, feel-
ing that businessmen were committed
to advancing their self-interest' at the
expense of the nation. Wary of being
corrupted by this "spirit of the age,"
advocates of military professionalism
taught that the military had no choice
but to, isolate itself from the main-
strealn of society and cultivate its
own moral superiority. G This military
_ preference for isolation was rein-
forced by the relative simplicity of
Army requirements. The core of the
Army before World War I was a
moderate force of infantrymen whose
requirements did not necessitate any
elaborate relationship with the na-
tion's industrial sector. Consequently.
Military Review
the Army made no effort to coordinate
its supply programs with the produc-
tive capacity of the nation.
As the United States mobilized in'
1917, it was readily apparent that the
Army's isolation could not endure. The
ballooning supply requirements of
modern war could be met only by the
systematic integration of the military
and industrial sectors. Businessmen,
already a ware of the growing interde-
pendence of American society, recog-
nized this need early and, by August
1917, had organized themselves into
the WIB to rationalize this integra-
tion. Their goal was:
... to create the kind of Institu-
tional nrder that lcould both effectively
mobilize the nation's resources for
Imr and proteet the industrial econ-
omy's basic struetm'e and character
for peace.
An advisory agency, the WI R was
to assist the military in the acquisi-
tion of war supplies and to assist in-
dustry in the conversion to war pro-
duction. Most of its members assumed
that:
... businessmen had the best Icork-
ing knowledge of the industrial side
of 11'01', and as membe1's of the emer-
gency b1lreaucracy they lcanted formal
authority commensurate with their
newfound responsibilities. When they
did not I'ecrive it they carried on in a
haphazard, illegal fashion as best they
cOII/d, grasping all the fillle for more
pOll'er and leider j1lrisdiction. '
'The Army refused to accept the
premise that industrial mobilization
was a business proposition and should
be managed by businessmen. It was
dominated by "old-school" officers out
of the 19th Century, officers who had
yet to realize "that it was no longer
possible to compartmentalize civilian
and military functions" as had been
the case before 1917. R Inherently sus-
May 1975
'WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD
Brigadier General Hugh S. Johnson
picious of businessmen because of
their long isolation from the main-
stream of society, these old-school of-
ficers feared that the businessmen of
the WIR were attempting to usurp
legitimate military domain. To the
Army, it alone understood the battle-
field necessity and the technical as-
pects of military production and must
determine its own requirements and
procure supplies as it saw fit. Any
departure from this practice would
violate the dictum that he who con-
trols strategy must also control sup-
ply. "
Even if the Army'had been more
amenable to cooperation with the WIB,
its supply organization was in('on-
gruous with that of the WIE which
follo\wd the natural commodity lines
of the nation's economy. The Army
was supplied through a series of semi-
autonom'ous bureaus. each responsible
for procurement of specific functional
items such as ordnance supplies, quar-
termaster supplies and the like. Each
bureau operated as a separate pro-
37
,WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD
curement agency with separate sys-
tems for purchase, finance, storage
and distribution. There was no au-
voice charged with estab-
lishing priorities between the bureaus
or regulating inter bureau competition
for scarce supplies. And, to the WIB's
chagrin, no one was able to speak
for the Army as a unit, thus forcing
the WIB to hear from all the bureau"
before it could decide policy. It may
have been an economical system in
peacetime, but, in 1917, it was a left-
over out of America's laissez-faire
past.
The combination of the Army's re-
fu"al to accept the \vIB as a partner
in mobilization and its archaic "UP-
ply organization was the major con-
tributor to the "headless riot" that
marked mobilization through 1917.
The Army neither consulted the Will
on the magnItude of its requirements
nor did it systematically utiliZe the
WIR to locate sources of supply. Con-
tracts were placed indiscriminately;
supplies needed by other departments
hoarded; and manufacturing, storage
and transportation facilities seques-
tered without direction. The bureaus
overestimated the requirements for
some programs and attempted to sat-
isfy these by crenting new facilitie"
rather than converting existing facili-
ties. In the process. they tied up valua-
ble production capacity and threatenerl
the immediate transition to war and
the eventual transition to peace. '0
By the end of 1917, the war effort
was reaching the crisis stage, and
relntions between the Army and the
\vIB were deteriorating into open hos-
tility. Businessmen, led by Baruch,
demanded that all procurement re-
sponsibilities be separated from the
militai'y and be vested in a business-
dominnted ministry of munitions. The
Army was adamantly opposed to these
38
proposals and attempted to head off
the \VIE by reforming itself inter-
nally. But its reforms were not suf-
ficient to forestall an upgrading of
the \vIB. In March 1918, Baruch was
named chairman of the WIB and given
general coordinating authority over
industrial mobilization, thereby ter-
minating the Army's independence in
the market. The Army was able to
preserve internal control of its supply,
and, to a great degree, the WIB's ef-
fectiveness would depend upon the
establishment of harmony between the
\vIB and the Army and the process
of bureaucratization. 11
In March 1918, Johnson shared the
prevailing Army hostility toward the
WIB. presupposing that it Was an "ob-
noxious civilian interference." He had
given little thought to the \vIB's role
before his assignment to the General
Staff and had not questioned the
Army's verdict. Rut, whereas the opin-
ion of many of his fellow officers was
rooted in a deep-seated suspicion of
the civilians of the \vIB, Johnson's
was superficial. He had grown ac-
customed to working closely with ci-
vilians during his tenure in Crowder'"
office and had gained respect for their
efforts. He also had come to realize
that many traditional attitudes and
practices were outdated. The draft
was based on a program of far-reach-
ing cooperation between the civilian
and military sectors and taught John-
that mobilization for total war
was inextricably intertwined with all
of the nation's institutions. Once ex-
posed to the reality of the situation
and the civilians of the WIB. his
mitial distaste for the \VIB rapidly
melted. '"
Johnson's to the reality
of the situation began immediately.
On 2 April, he was named a member
of an ad committee, dubbed the
Military Review
WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD
.\
Baruch
.... Crowder March
Committee of Three, charged with
developing a functional organization
for the embryonic Purchase and Sup-
plies DiYision of the General Staff.
Formed in December 1917 to super-
vi He bureau procurement and to repre-
sent the Army before the WIR, the
division had lain dormant because of
infighting and lack of direction. I'
Johnson was appointed to the Com-
mittee of Three because of his knowl-
edge of War Department organiza-
tion and his organizational exper-
tise." For two weeks, he and the
other members of the committee were
engrossed in charting the necessary
organization for the division. In the
process, Johnson gained a crash course
in the bankruptcy of the Army's bu-
reau supply system which confirmed
doubts he had harbored about its ef-
ficacy.
Johnson had begun to question the
bureau system as early as the sum-
mer of 1917 when several bureaus
glibly claimed that they could furnish
supplies at the same pace as the draft
furnished men. IC, Events soon proved
May 1975
tbem wrong, resulting in shortages
of equipment in training camps and
postponed draft calls. J obnson's first-
hand knowledge of conditions at Camp
L'pton, New York, added to his initial
doubts, as did the Senate Military Af-
fairs Committee's inYestigatlOn of the
War Department. By the time his
work with lilie Committee of Three
was completed .. Johnson was l'onvincerl
that the nucleus of the supply problem
was the faulty organization of tbe War
Department and that centralized di-
rection of the bureaus by the Purcbase
and Supplies Division was the only
remedy.IO The concomitant to cen-
tralized direction of the bureaus was
imprO\'ed Army relations with the
WIE. Johnson quickly appreciated the
need for unitary contact with the
WIB, a point the Committee of Three
emphasized in the strongest terms."
And, if reality dictated that the Pur-
chase and Supplies Division must su-
pen'ise tbe bureaus, it SOOIl would
become clear to Jobnson that the Army
must also cooperate fully with the
WIR if mobilization was to succeed.
39
WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD
The Committee of Three completed
ib report on 16 April. On the same
day, March reshuffled the Army sup-
ply organization as part of his pro-
gram of asserting the power of the
General Staff within the Army. He
created the Pu rchase, . Storage and
Traffic Division in the General Staff
and designated Majoi' General George
W. Goethals, his longtime friend, to
head this "somewhat unwieldy" cre-
ation. The forthright Goethals was
given "complete charge of all matters
of supply" for the Army from the
point of production to France." Un-
der this arrangement, the Purchase
and Supplies DivislOn became the
Purchase and Sup ply Branch of
Goethals' division, and its head, Brig-
adier General Palmer E. Pierce, was
ordered out of the War Department.
March then named Johnson as Pierce's
successor over Johnson's heated com-
plaints that he knew nothing about
industry and that he wanted to go to
France instead. As Director of Pur-
chase and Supply, .Johnson was now
responsible for supervising the Army's
vast procurement programs and in-
tegrating them with industry.
Pierce stayed on as the principal
Army representative on the WIB until
early May when he was 'dispatched to
France. 20 Goethals was Pierce's logi-
cal replacement. But the famous "ca-
nal builder" ruled himself out, con-
sidering himself totally unfit for that
job. An old-school officer, Goethals
was temperamentally unable to work
with the civilians of the emergency
war agencies except in a superior
position. In 1917, as General Manager
of the Emergency Fleet Corporation,
Goethals had openly feuded with Wil-
Jiam Denman, the civilian head of
the Shipping Board. He left the fleet
after a few short months, firing the
barb that he regarded "all boards as
40
long, narrow, and wooden," 21 Once
he entered the War Department in
December -1917, Goethals was soon
feuding with Baruch as well. By May,
they had clashed twice, and relations
between the two had degenerated into
bitter animosity. George N. Peek,
Commissioner of Finished Products
for the WIB, suggested that Johnson
would be an acceptable representative.
Peek had met Johnson only once, but
he knew of Johnson's work with the
draft through Crowder."2 Thus, on
14 May, Baker designated Johnson,
now a brigadier general, to be the
principal Army representative on the
WI B where he primarily served as
Goethals' spokesman.
In recalling the hostility that
had permeated Army-WIB relations,
Baruch wrote: "When General Hugh
Johnson began to sit in for Goethals,
things improved considerably-as they
always did where Johnson was in-
volved.
2
' To a degree, Baruch's as-
Rertions was an em-
bellished by two decades of friend-
ship with Johnson. Yet Johnson's
presence on the WlB did lead to an
improvement in relations if for no
other reason than Johnson and Baruch
gravitated toward each other from'
their first encounter. The irrepressible
"Wolf of Wall Street" was captivated
by Johnson's infectious personality
and I'olorful language, a marked con-
trast to the acerbity of Goethals. With
Johnson sitting on the WIB, the per-
sonality conflicts that had marred
relations between the Army and the
WIB subsided. Baruch also appre-
ciated the substance beneath John-
son's bluster, and, as their work
brought them closer, he drew Johnson
into his entourage. Peek likewise was
Impressed with Johnson, and, as Peek
later recounted, relations between the
two were quite close. Johnson had re-
Military Review
sponsibility for the Army's vast busi-
ness while Peek was in charge of see-
ing that military requirements did not
needlessly interfere with civilian ne-
cessities, and both had to be consi-
dered together."4 Peek saw in John-
son the potential for an outstanding
business partner. 25
Johnson was flattered by the atten-
tion of Baruch and Peek. Although he
was not a sycophant, Johnson reveled
in being at the center of events and
at the right hanrl of influential men.
a position he had held for a year as
Crowder's deputy in the draft. It fed
his ego and helped him swallow the
disappointment of being deskbound in
Washington. But Johnson was an out-
sider with March and Goethals; he
personally began to feel more at home
with Baruch and Peek, considering
them his warm friends and trusted
confidants. These friendships. when
coupled with a growing estrangement
from March, smoothed Johnson's con-
version to the principles of the WIE.
The reality of the situation and his
growing intimacy with Baruch and
Peek soon convinced Johnson that the
WIB, instead of threatening Army
prerogatives, actually would serve
them by helping the War Department
fulfill its responsibility of supplying
the Army in France. By cooperating
with the WIE in satisfying its re-
quirements, the Army could ensure
that the facilities would be in place
to meet its requirements and that
supply would be synchronized with
demand. Johnson devoted his energies
to seeing that the bureaus utilized the
WIB to meet the Army's requirements.
At the same time, he struggled to
educate his fellow officers that the
"purpose" of the WIB was '''to line up
industry and put the' country behind
the Army."26
Johnson thought his "first job" was
May 1975
WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD
to furnish the WIE with a "statement
of gross requirements." Such a state-
ment was essential if the WIB was to
coordinate Government procurement
and "provide for the long-range pro-
gram of raw materials and facili-
ties." 27 Yet Johnson found in April
1918 that the Army had yet to provide
the WIB with such a statement de-
spite the WIB's repeater! requests and,
moreover, that every bureau was mak-
ing purchases on a different schedule
with none of them being based on the
approved Army program. This was the.
result of bureaucratic bungling within
the Army and the fluctuating condi-
tions in France which made it difficult
to settle on an Army program. The
initial Army program. based on 30
divisions in France by the end of 1918,
had been adopted in October 1917, but
was not officially transmitted to the
bureaus until the following February.
In March In18, the program was ex-
panr!ed to meet the threat presented
by the latest German offensives; how
ever, no notice was given the bureaug
of the magnitude of the new Army
program. This bred uncertainty over
the proper strength tables on which
to compute requirements and different
constructions of the Army program. ",
By the last week of April, Johnson
was growing increasingly apprehen-
sive over the delay in issuing the new
official Army program. The determina-
tion and issuance of the program were
outside Johnson's responsibility, but,
without the program, he had no guide
on which to have requirements com-
puted for the WIE. He, therefore,
decided to prod March to issue the
new program, and, in a candid memo-
randum, he argued forcefully for the
"immediate determination of the mili-
tary program not only for the balance
of 1918, but for 1919." He emphasized
that, unless this was done soon, there
41
WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD
would not be time for the WIB "to
create additional facilities to provide
the necessary supplies." 2" March came
upon the memorandum while it still
was in the formative stage. He was
incensed by what he considered John-
son's impertinence and castigated him
for his attempt at "running the
Army." Even more than Goethals,
March was a "soldIer of the old school
who did little, at first, to hide his low
opinion of the WIB." March instinc
tively resisted llny extraneous control
or influence over the War Department"
and already had crossed Raruch over
the WIB's priority power.\O Instead
of regarding Johnson's proposal as a
neeeHs,,,'y element of military planning
in the 20th Century, March simply
branded It an impertinent proposal
from an overzealous subordinate. The
whole affair left .Johnson discouraged
f or some tIme. and, in the process, he
perturbed his associates with his pout-
ing. Johnson could not understand
why March was so incensed and was
convinced that he had failed to per-
suade March that studies such as his
were necessar)". Thereafter. relations
between Johnson and March deterio-
rated so that, by the war's end, they
were spiteful antagonists.
11
On 30 April, the reVIsed Army pro-
gram was offiCIally announced, but it
did not provide the projected program
Johnson felt was so vitally necessary.
Rased on the contll1llation of troop
shipments to France until 42 divisions
were there by July 1919 and 54 divi-
sions by the end of that year, it was
soon outdated. Following extended ne-
gotiations with the Allies and a British
agreement to provide substantial ship-
ping tonnage, American troop ship-
ments were nearly trebled in the late
spring and early sumJIler of 1918. Dur-
ing these months, shipments averaged
200,000 men more than had been pro-
42
jected under the 30 and 54-division
programs. As Johnson later criticized,
neither the Army supply bureaus nor
the WIB was officially of
the change in the 54-division pro-
gram."" Certainly, everybody knew
that there had been an increase in
troop shipments, and, in such a fluid
manpower-shipPing; situation, it was
difficult to Jay down a fixed program.
Yet these do 110t excuse the failure of
both March and Goethals to make
future requirements more explicit.
11
The bureaus had no meaningful pro-
gram on which to base requirements
but the outdated 54-division program,
and, when Johnson was vigorously
queried at a WIR meeting on 17 Ma,
about future Army requirements, he
could only reply that he:-
... lI'ould not bet on anyone of the
statement.. 01 requirements to any
fIreat precisinn, but I know some big
facts that make me feel just as S1/"e
a,. [ am itting here that the j'equi"e-
ments aj'e goinfl to be bonsted Im11l
this time j01'l<'Urd.
J
I
While awaiting the issuance of the
new Army program, Johnson set abollt
to supervise the computation of bureau
requirements. It was a trying task,
taking over't"oWl months just to devise
forms for the reporting of require-
ments and to develop an office organi-
zation to compile and analyze them.
Even more exasperating were his ef-
forts to standardize requirements.
Only the Quartermaster Corps and
the Ordnance Department had specific
sections to compute requirements, and,
more often than not, the bureaus did
not submit their requirements in any
standard classification. To standard-
ize requirements, Johnson, in late
July, ordered each bureau to establish
a separate requirements section to
compute requirements and to report
them in uniform terms. When the
Military Review
...
Major General George W. Goethals,
longtime friend of General Johnson,
was placed in charge of supply matters
for the Army
On 26 June 1917, the first American troops
arrive at SaintNazaire, France
WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD
A convoy of transports en route to Europe. During the late spring and early summer months of 1918.
American troop shipments to France averaged 200,000 men more than had been projected. .,.
May 1975 43
WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD
new Army program was finally issued
on 25 July, based on 80 divisions in
France by July 1919, Johnson felt
confident in writing Peek that he had:
... organized to get a very prompt
reHtatement of Requirement .. ... rand
that] thfY ,,m come rolling into the
War Industries Board within the next
two o'r three weeks with startling re-
sults . . ).\
Thereafter, regular requirements
schedules for approximately 2700 ar-
ticles were received from the Ordnance
Department, the Quartermaster Corps,
the Signal Corps, the Surgeon Gen-
eral's Office, the Chemical Warfare
Service and the Mot 0 r Transport
, Corps. Although a gross stutement of
Army requirements based on the en-
larged Army program never was com-
pleted, by the time of the armistice,
computations "as a whole had been
pll\ced upon a solid and systematic
basis." 36
Providing the WIB with require-
ments statements was only one phase
of Johnson's efforts to effect coopera-
tion between the Army and the WIR.
He also had to shape the War Depart-
ment supply organization to interact
with the myriad of divisions, com-
mittees, boards and sections of the
WIB. The problem here was the "hy-
draheaded". nature of Army contact
with the WIR. During the "headless
riot" of 1917. no one spoke for the
Army as a unit before the WIB. Each
bureau pressed its own claims for
clearance and priority, forcing the
WIE to rule on conflicting Army re-
quests. To end this confusion, Johnson
commanded the bureaus to submit
all clearance and priority requests
through his office and prohibited them
from initiating contract negotiations
until clearance was received. Further-
more, Johnson supervised the estab-
lishment of clearance and priority
44
systems within the Army so that con-
flicting interbureau requests were re-
solved internally, thereby answering
the WlB's demand for "concerted
presentation of such matters." "
Most of Johnson's attention was de-
voted to tying in Army supply with
the commodity organization of the
WIR. Developed after Wilson's up-
grading of the WIR, it consisted of a
series of sectionR for materials in
"'hich shortages either existed or were
threatened. Each was designed to
::::el've a:::: a "clearing house for infor-
mation" for a specific industrY-wood.
chemicals. rubber. hardware and the
lIke. They were staffed by industrial-
ists who were considered the strongest
men in that industry and representa-
tives of the interested government
purchasing agencies. In actuality.
these sections "determined policy for
an administered" industry and were
the "backbone" of the WIB. '" But, as
Johnson later pointed out. the Army.
with its functional organization, was
not prepared to operate in terms of
commodities. In the case of woolen
goods. for example. several Army sup-
ply bureaus were buying without re-
lation to the needs of each other or to
the nation's requirements for woolen
goods. Coordination between the
chiefs of these bureaus was impossible
because woolen goods were only one
of the many commodities they were
buying. If the Army's demand for
woolen goods was to be measured
against the nation's supply, these bu-
reaus would have to be brought to-
gether. The Army had to shape itself
so that it could respond to the situa-
tion with commodities. 39
The need for commodity sections in
the War Department paralleling' those
of the WIB had been emphasized in
the deliberations surrounding the
WI8's reorganization in March 1918.
Military Review
But nothing of substance had been ac-
complished before Johnson became Di-
rector of Purchase and Supply in mid-
April. Within three days of his ap-
pointment, Johnson presided over
meetings of bureau representatives
and directed them to organize into
commodity committees and to select
a member to represent the Army as
a whole on all matters before the cor-
responding commodity section of the
WIB. to By 25 April, Johnson was able
to inform Baruch that 25 such com-
mittees had been formed in the War
Department, and, by November 1918,
37 were at work. He advised the bu-
reaus that hereafter they should ap-
proach industry only through the
commodity committee-section arrange-
ment." In this way, they could "ob-
tain suggestions" where best to place
their orders to enRure speedy delivery
and assist the WIB in Its efforts to
obtain "a scientific and common sense
distribution of business."
The commodity arrangement did
not perform as Johnson intended.
Many of the bureau officers serving
on the Army commodity committees
. ,re not committed to full cooperation
with the WIB. Often, they passed up
pertinent meetings of the WIR's com-
modity sections, forcing Johnson to
cajole them into attending commodity
section meetings and to lecture them
on the role of the WIR. 'c Such ad-
monishments proved to be of no avail,
for most Army commodity representa-
tives resented the fact that the para-
mount source of authority in each
commodity section of the WIB was
always a civilian. The section chief
had been given this authority to allay
the fear of the civilian commodity rep-
resentatives that the Army would com-
pletely dominate the section.
3
Bu t
this action served only to frustrate the
design of the commodity arrangement.
May 1975
W ~ INDUSTRIES BOARD
Demand and supply were to sit at the
same table and hash out their prob-
lems, yet many of the civilian section
chiefs, anxious to "reduce the mili-
tary's area of discretion," acted with-
out consulting the Army representa-
tives. Their arbitrary stance magni-
fied the ingrained military distrust of
civilians, leading the Army represent-
atives to avoid rather than seek con-
tact with the WIB. The situation be-
came so serious by August that J ohn-
son complained to Peek that:
.. examination of the "erords Of
mmutes indicate that the general
statement that the Sections do not
meet and conduct business as such, is
justIfied in respect for a majority of
cases . .j.i
Johnson responded with a two-
pronged attack. He implored Peek to
instruct the WIR's commodity chiefs
to accord the Army representatives
every opportunity to participate in
the deliberations of their respective
sections, and, upon Johnson's plea, the
entire section was clearly endowed
with the SOurce of authority. Equally
important, Johnson warned the Army's
commodity representatives to assert
themselves before the WIB's sections
and restated their responsibilities in
Supply Bulletin ;-;umber 22 which was
issued 28 August 1918. He urged the
Army commodity representatives to
consider themselves "as much a part
of the ... rWIB] as the officers of
the War Industries Board themselves"
and outlined his view of effective mili-
tary-industrial relations in' modern
War. Johnson reminded the Army
commodity representatives:
... that the duty of the War De-
pa,tmen/ is no/ perfonued by a mere
8ubmissinn of our needs and require-
ments to the IVaI' Industries Board.
Ow' officers must participate in all
delibemtions and plans fnr the fulfill-
45
WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD
ment of these requirements, bringing
to the knowledge of the industrial ..
fabric that is found among civilian
members of the board the technical
knoll'le(fge of material, the experience
of war purchase, and the relative ur-
gency of the military dem{].nd that is
found only in our organization. Ac-
tion by those units res lilting from the
deliberations should be the joint and
reasoned action of OUI' rern'egentatives
and the cil'llian and other l'e]YI'esenta-
tiL'es thereon . ... We should consider
it quite as much our function and
duty as tllOt of the War Industries
Bom'd to ean'y into effect the Presi-
dent's orders rclatin,q to the conver-
sion of 111du..try, the creation of ne",
facilities. and the relief of congested
dishicts. Wc should re,qal'd and con-
slant/y lise the board and all its sec-
tions as our p()n'erful help and aux-
iliary in carrying fOTlmrd the Army
program and never as in opposition 01"
hindmnce of that program. 1,1
After the issuance of Supply Bulle-
tin Number 22, the perfunctory nature
of Army contact with the WIB's com-
modity organization improved drama-
tically. A new spirit of cooperation on
the part of the Army representatives
was evident, and the commodity ar-
rangement began to function as the
efficient channel between the military
and industrial sectors that Johnson
had intended. 16 :\10re than any other
development, the organization and
maturation of the commodity arrange-
ment, under Johnson's watchful eye,
symbolized the intertwining of the
military and industrial sectors brought
on by the war. It was Johnson's most
important contribution to industrial
mobilization, and, in 1919, even an
old-school officer like Peyton March
could endorse the following recom-
mendation in the General Staff's an-
nual report:
46
If the United States should ever
again be involved in a mar comparable
in magnitude with the recent lOa'I'. one
of the first steps which would need to
be taken lI'ould be the reconstitution
of a set of commodity committees.
... This should be done in any event
,,,hether or not an organization simi-
lal' to that of the War Industries
Boal'd is to be created. P
In early October 1918, Johnson was
relieved from the General Staff and
given the command of an infantry
brigade under orders for shipment to
France. By this time, however, his ef-
forts to effect Army-WIR cooperation
were largely concluded. Almost from
the outset of his exposure to the WIB,
Johnson had recognized the need for
the Army to integrate its supply pro-
gram with the i n d u s t l' i a I sector
through the WIB. He had organized
to provide the WIB with statements
of Army requirements and had shaped
his office so that the Army could
"head in" with the organization of
the WIR. Ry September, the organiza-
tional phase was concluded, enabling
the WIR to get a grip on industrial
mobilization. In addition, Johnson had
instilled a new vitality in Army rela-
tions with the WIR that was manifest
in the increased spirit of cooperation
in the commodity sections." IIe had
chastized Army commodity represent-
atives for avoiding contact with the
WIB and, at the same time, guarded
against WIB control of the commodity
arrangement. After months of wran-
gling, the military and industrial sec-
tors were finally integrated to put
American industry behind "a massive
military program."
When the WIB dissolved at the
war's end, the nation had yet to final-
ize a standard doctrine for integrating
the military and industrial sectors.
Such old-school officers as March and
Military Review
Goethals still had not accepted busi-
nessmen as full-fledged partners with
the Army in industrial mobilization,'
while many businessmen still wanted
to divorce procurement responsibili-
ties from the Army. But the need for
more interdependent relations betwee4
the military ana industrial sectors
was now evident to alL In the National
Defense Act of 1920, Copgress par-
tially recognized this need by charging
the Assistant Secretary of War with
supervision of Army procurement and
planning for industrial mobilization,
wi(h the implicit understanding that
he should have a background of wide
industrial experience. Moreover, with
the founding of the Army Industrial
WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD
College in the early 19208, business-
men and soldiers had an ongoing
forum where they might jointly con-
sider the multifarious problems inher-"
ent in industrial mobilization. 19 John-
son himself left the Army in early
1919 to enter private business, and, in
1933, he gained national prominence
as the colorful and controversial head
of the National Recovery Administra-
tion in the Roosevelt New DeaL Nev-
ertheless, his concern with wartime
industrial mobilization did not abate,
and, throughout the interwar period,
Johnson was a fervent spokesman for
ongoing military-industrial planning
in numerous articles and lectures.;;11

John Kennedy Ohl received a B.S.
in Education from Slippery Rock Statr
College, an M.A. from Duquesne Uni-
"ersity, a Ph.D. ;n American History
{rom the University of Cincinnati, and
an M.S.L.S. from the University of
Kentucky. He has taught at Slippely
Rock State College, the University of
Cincinnati, and Wright State Univer-
Ritl!.
:-lOTES
1 Robert D Cuff, The )-Vat' Board
llelatwml DUTltlg World 'War
I, The Johns Hopkins University Press. Ballitnor>,
Md , and l.lani!\ R. Bf'avf'r, Newton D.
fwd the AmeT/cr(ll War Effort, 191(-1919, Univpr-
!'Ilty of Nebraska Press, Lwcoln, Ncb .. HlS6
2 For biographical information on Johnson's
bl'forl' thp war. "Re Hugh S John"on, Th(
RlIIl! F.naic From F.(m to Earth. Douhleda). Doran
& Co GaJ:"den CitY..:.,P. Y . 1935, pp 1-72
.1 DaVid A. LockmHier, Enocn H Crowder: Sol-
dIer'. l,awl/er alld Stntesman. UniveMity of
!'\ouri Presl'i. Columbla, Mo . 1%&, pp 152'P>O.
-t P>yton C March. Thl' Nation at Double-
day. boran & Co, Gnrden City, N. Y, 1932, pp
239-40. .
;) Grosvenor B. Clarkson, lndustnal A m("Ttra lit
the World War The Strategy Bf'hwd thf' L",t',
1917-1918, Houghton Mifflin ('0. Boslon, Mass.
1923, II l8I.
6 Samul'1 1'. Huntington, The SoldH'r and tJI("
State The Theo"! and POittiC8 of ClvdMIlltOTlI
May 1975
RelatIon.'!, Harvard University pr('ss. Cambrirl!2"(',
Mil""., 1957, pp 26.-69.
'j Cuff, 01'. dt, pp 3 and
H Paul A C. Koistinen. "The 'Industrl8l-MilJ.
tary Complex' in Historical PersP('ctive: World
War I," RIHHnc88 HIstory Rf!mrU'. Voluml' XLI.
Wint('r 1967, Pil 402-'L
!l Johnson, Oll. ("It, P 94
10 Harvel' A, DeWeerd, Pre'Hde"f Wllgon F1JJhtfl
Ht8 War World H'fl1'" 1 and thf! Amcricall Intf'r.
wuHon, Thl' Maemdlan Co., N. Y., 1968, pp 2:\6_3R
t t Cuff, op ",t .. pp 141-47, and Beaver. OI>. f'ft.,
pp 79-109.
1::! Clarkson, 0]1. {'It., P 131.
13 Annual Report nf the Assistant Chlt'J of Stnfi.
Diredor oj Purchase, StOfilge and Tramc DnH,8WI,
fo1'" Year Endlnq June SO, 1919, Natlonnl An'hive",
RG Number 165, Purchase. StoTage and Traffic
Dlvi<lion, Box Number 36, p 26.
47
WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD
14 ME'moTllndum From Colonel P. P. Bishop to
Chief of Staff. 5 April HilS, National Archives.
RG Number 165, of Staff Correspondence
FilE" 1917-1921. Box. Number 68.
1;'" Johnson, op. ('It . pp 85-87.
Hi Ibtd . p 86.
1. Memorandum From H. S. Johno;;on to Director
of Pur('ha<;e and Supplies, 2 April 1918, National
Archives, RG Number 16&, Purcha8(', Storage and
Traffic Divlsion. Box Number 38. For the report
of the Committee of ThrE"e, see \'R{'port of the
Committee Appointed by the AS<;lslant Secretary
of Wltr to Plan Pon OrganizatIOn for the Office of
the Director of Purchase norl Supphes," National
Ar('hiv('s, RG Number HiS, Purcliase. Storage and
Traffic DiVision. Box Number 489 and WaT De-
purtmcllt Annltul RepOTh, 1919, VolumE' I. pp
,H9w oO.
18 Edward M. Coffman, The HIlt oJ the Sword
The Ca,rCf'r of Peyton C. March, UniverSity of
Wlst'onsin Pre<;s, MadiBon, WIS., HI66, p 62; and
Dantel R. Beaver, "George W. Goethals and the
Problem of Military Supply," Some Pathways 11>
TwelltlctliwCo!turll Hliltor11 BS8UY8 tJ! HOllor oj
Ref]lll"ld Charle8 McGrane, Edited by Daniel R
Beaver, Wayne State UniVenilty Press. Detroit.
Mlf'h. 1969, p 100.
It) G. W. Goethals to Colont'l S. E. Tillman. HI
April 1918. Goethal,> Papers, Library of Congre'>s,
Ao'lC Number 4.
20 G W Goethals to G R. Goethai'>, 4 May 1918.
ltoethuls Paper .... Box Number 4.
':1 Frf'detk L,. Paxson, ,1meT/cu" Demol'roey alia
the World War, Thr('e Volumes. Houghton Mlmln
Co., Boston, Mass, 193.1-48, Volume II. pp 70. 71,
77 and 120.
2:! Cuff. op f"lt., p 165.
23 Bernard M. DnruC'h, Barul'h Tbl' Pubhl'
Yl'arll. Holt, Rinphllrt & Winston NY. 1960,
Volume II. p 53.
2-1 Cuff, oJ' f"It.. pp 166-67
:!fi Gilbert C. Fite, Groroe N. Peele and the FIght
jor Farm Par,ty. University of Oklnhoma
Nonnan, Okla., 1954, p 44.
:.:0 Minute,> of Meeting of Commodity Chids, 13
July PHR. Wa'>hington NatIOnal Records Center,
RG Number 92. QuartE'nna.stf'r Genpral Corre-
<'pomh:'ll('e File, 1917-22. Box 5490.
!!7 Johnson. op. rtt., pp 91-92.
Mt'morandum From G W. to Chief
of Staff, 13 May 1918. NatIOnal Archhc5, RG
Number 165. Chief of Staff Correo.;pondence File,
1911-21, Dox Number fi9. For the st..."ltcments of
the approved Army programs and the accompany-
Ing tahlf's, see "Flle of the Approved Army Pro
grams Used a'> a BaSIS of Army
Organlzatwn and ActlVItlCS of the Statist,cs and
Requtrements B'TI11Il'h of the Director of purchase,
Storage and Traffic, National Archiv<,s, RG Num-
ber 165, War Depnrtment Historical File. Box
Number 145, pp 34-35
29 Program for 1918-19, [29 April 19187]. Na-
tional Archives. RG Numbf'r 165, Purchase, Stor-
age and Traffic Division, Dox Number 512.
30 Darut'h. OJ}. elf .. P 57; and Coffman, op ('It.,
pp 64-65.
:n P. C. March to N. D. Baker, 19 October 1932.
March Papers, Library of Congress, Correspond-
48
ence for 1918-32; and The New York Times, 9 Oc-
tober 1932.
32 Clarkson, op. elt .. pp 134-3&.
33 Coffman, op. cit .. p -'74
34 Minute8 oJ the War Industrte8 Board from.
Augullt I. 1917, to December 19. 1918, Senate
SpeC'ial Committee Investigating th;' Munitions In-
dUstry, Senate Committee Print Number 4, 74th
Congress. First Session. 1935, p 287.
3;; H. S. Johnson 16 G. N. PeE'k, 26 July 1918.
Peek Papers, Wcstern Historical Manuscript Col_
lection. Univers.lty of Missouri Press. Columbia.
Mo . Box Number 3.
:W "DescriptIOn of System Employed lD Prepar-
ing and Reporting Rpquirements to the Purchase,
Storage ond TraffiC' DivIsion." Oroanlzatton of the
StatlBiTes and Requirement8 Branelt, pp 55-77.
37 War Department Annual Reports. 1919. op.
ett., pp 365-67 and 370-72.
38 Bernard M. Baruch, Am.cncun Indu8try I1l
fhe War A R('port of the War IlIdu8trie8 Board
(March 1921), Edited by Richard H. HippelhE"user.
Prentice HnTI Inc . N. Y 1941. pp 10916.
.'l!l WfTr Departme1!t Annual Reports, 1919, op
cit, pp 349-50.
ill LJt>utenant Colonf'l W. C. Spruance Jr .. "War
Industrlcs Doard Commodities Committees," 22
April 1918. WashlDl!ton NatIOnal Center,
RG Number 156, Chief of Ordnance Correspond.
encp File. 1915-31. Box Number 1161.
41 H S Johnson to Chief of Ordnance, 4 Junt'
1918, National Records C('nter. RG
Number 165, CHief of Ordnance Correo;pondt>n('('
Ftil', 1910-31, Dox Number 1162.
42 Office Memorandum, Purchase and Supply
Branch. 31 May 1918. National ArchIVes. ItG
NumQer 165, General Johnson's Papprs. Doll. Num-
ber 3: Mmutcs of Meeting of Commodity Chief ... ,
13 July 1918. Washmgton NatIOnal Records Cen
tf'r, RG Number 92. QUartennaster Generni Cor-
le ... pondence File, 1917-22, Bo'l( Number 5490.
43 DaruC'h, AmerIcan Ivdu8try 111 the u,.'ar, 01'
nt, pp 109-16
H H. S Johnson to G N. Peek 16 Augu ... t
191R, WIB Mmlltes, pp 427-28 .
4:-, Mmutes of the Superior Donl'd of Re"lew, 14
August 1918. NatIOnal Archives. RG Number 165.
PurC'hnsc, Storage nnd TraffiC' D1YI"ion. nox Num
ber 249; nnd Supply Dulletm Number 22. Orga1J!'
zatlOn oJ the Statl8tle8 and Requlrement8 Branch,
2R August 1918, P 85.
-w CirC'ular Lettpr. G. N Peek to CommodIty
S('ctlOn Chiefs. 25 September 191A, and Replip,>.
Wa!>hmgton National ReC'orn.s Center. RG Number
61. File Number 21A-A2, Dox Number !'!'
-17 lVar Departmellt Anmwl Reports. 1919. 01'.
cd. p 364
i8 KOistinen, OIl. crt . p 40J.
.l!) F. Weigiey, Hllltorll of the Unttcd
.'ltates Army. The MncmIllan Co., N. Y . 1967. pp
4049.
;;0 For examplt's, see Hugh S. Johnson, "Fallll.-
cies of 'The Universal Draft,''' Armfl Ordnalll'C,
November-December 1929, pp 155-57, and "In
dustrial and Man-Power MobliizatlOn," LC'ctur{'
Delivert'd at the Army War College, US Military
Hhtory Re'>earch Collection, Carhsle Barracks, Pa.
Military Review
Strategy and Tactics
Some Thoughts on the Change of Emphasis
Brigadier C. N. Barclay, Br!tish Army, Retired
U
NTIL the latter decades of the
last century, the dividing line
between strategy and tactics was well-
defined. Movement to the theater of
war, or to the battle area within the
theater of war, was strategy. When
the troops or warships reached the
battle area and came under fire, or
were liable to do so, it became tac-
tics. Of the two, strategy was re-
garded as the more important, mainly
because the results of a mistake could
be much more serious than a major
tactical error. Moreover, tactics was
comparatively simple and, for the
Army, approximated closely to parade
ground drill.
Gradually, over the years, condi-
tions have changed because of the
vast and continuous improvements in
firepower from sophisticated weapons,
including aircraft. This has resulted
in wider and wider dispersion and
will almost certainly lead to operations
of hitherto unknown fluidity, with
friend' and foe inextricably mixed and
May 1975
with no semblance of a "front line."
We saw something of this kind of
thing on occasions in World War II
and recently in more pronounced form
in Southeast Asia, the Middle East
and, on a smaller scale, in internal
security operations in Northern Ire-
land. As far as one is able to judge,
similar conditions would be likely in
the event of a general war in N orth-
west Eu rope.
In these circumstances, the dividing
line between strategy and tactics is
much more obscure. The approach of
American-British forces by sea to
North Africa in 1942 was clearly a
strategic move; landing and fighting
Germans was unmistakably tactics.'
But it is not easy to say exactly when
the change took place. For the purpose
of this article, we can simplify this
aspect. In a major war, such matters
as the decision to go to war, the
mobilization of national resources and
the selection of the theaters of war in
the case of overseas expeditions are
49
STRATEGY AND TACTICS
Parachute gunners on patrol in Bellast. Over the years, operations 01 hitherto unknown fluidity have
evolved with Iriend and loe inextricably mixed and with no semblance of a "front line."
often referred to as strategy. In many
people's "iew, including my own, this
is a mistake; these are matters of
national policy in which foreign policy,
economics and industry are involved
as well as the armed forces, and de-
cisions are made by ministers-the
ser"ice staffs being only one of the
sources from whom they obtain advice.
The problem can be further sim-
plified by confining it to the action
of land forces and their attendant
close support aircraft. We must not,
however, lose sight of the fact that
nayal forces, and so-called strategic
air forces, have similar problems al-
though diffel'ing in detail.
Tho Balance in Land Operations
The late Field Marshal Lord Archi-
bald Wavell was one of the first to
50
draw attention to the swing in im-
portance between strategy and tactics.
This I believe to have been mainly due
to his unique experience of both dur-
ing his period as commander in chief
in the Middle East in 194042. His
vieW\; were reinforced when later he
was commander in chief, and, finally,
viceroy, in India and in consequence
on the fringe of operations in Burma.
These views merit some explanation.
The British offensive in Nor t h
Africa in 1940-41 was successful, de-
spite a roughly 6 to 1 inferiority in
numbers, because of the tactical suo
periority of the experienced British
regular troops over the Italians. It
was the same in East Africa. The
situation Was reversed, however, when
less experienced British troops met
the highly trained Germans in North
Military Review
Lord Wayell was among the first to
point out the swing in importance
between strategy and tactics
Africa in 1941 and 1942 and in Greece
in 1941. Similarly, in Southeast Asia,
Japanese troops in the initial opera-
tion-well-equipped and s p e cia II y
trained for their particular roles-
had spectacular successes against
British and Commonwealth troops and
their Allies who, owing to commit-
ments elsewhere, in many cases, had
been hastily raised and insufficiently
trained.
By 1943, these conditions had
changed, and the Allies had assumed
the initiative, or were about to do so.
They also had learned their lesson.
resulting in a great improvement in
tadical training-particularly, minor
tactics.
. Lord Wavell also pointed out how
much easier was the task of those
who had to make decisions
compared to those who operate in the
tactical field. To take two extremes.
A corps, army or theater commander
making a strategic decision is sur-
rounded by a staff of experts with a
fUlld of experience and knowledge on
the problems likely to arise-intelli-
May 1975
STRATEGY AND TACTICS
gence, topography, engineering and
every kind of logistic problem. He will
have several hours, possibly days or
even weeks, to consider his plans. He
will be working in favorable condi-
tions apart from perhaps an occasional
air raid or rocket attack. Now, we
will take the other extreme-a cor-
pOl'al commanding an infantry sec-
tion of anything from four to a dozen
men in an advance during a modern
battle. Other sections are perhaps 200,
300 or 400 yards to his right and left.
Inevitably, a tricky situation arises
suddenly. It may be a concealed enemy
machinegun, an ambush, fire from a
rooftop in a builtup area, an enemy
air strike, the appearance of enemy
tanks or a minefield. If he is lucky,
there may be a friendly tank handy
to help him, or he_ may be able to
call .on air support through his com-
pany commander. Very often, how-
ever, he will have to rely on his own
tactical skill, probably under fire, with
no one to advise him and only a few
seconds to make up his mind.
There is little doubt as to which of
the two has the more difficult job-
even allowing for the two extremes
and, possibly, a little exaggN'ation
which has entered into my examples
in order to make my point. There is.
of course, a considerable difference.
There can be no doubt that the strat-
egist's decision is more important
than that of a single corporal, but
we are balancing it against the hun-
dreds or thousands of corporals, ac-
cording to the size of the forces in-
volved.
The strategists, with all the 'cards
in their favor, should not find it dif-
ficult to make sound. practical deci-
sions. bu t, however good their deci-
sions may be. they can be brought
to nought if the whole. or a substan-
tIal proportIOn. of the junior leaders
51
STRATEGY AND TACTICS
: : ' . ~ ~ .
American troops approaching North Africa by sea in 1942, clearly a strategic move; landing and
fighting the Germans was unmistakably tactics
in the combat arms fail. This includes
the corporals of my example. as well
as the suualtern:-:;, captains. majors,
and so forth right up the line.
The Aim and Its Implementation
It is generally accepted that the
Western soldier's training should in-
clude greater attention to tactics than
in the past. This is. of course. most
important for the combat troops-in-
fantry. armor, artillery and engineers;
but it is also important for adminis-
trative units which. in the fluid opera-
tions of recent times and probably
more fluid ones of the future. may
find themselves in a fighting role.
Every junior leader should be so
trained that he instructively makes a
sensible decision when confronted with
a tactical situation demanding im-
mediate action. As casualties and
waste among junior leaders are likely
to be high. the system must include
52
a high proportion of replacements.
These men are best found from WIthin
their own unit; indeed. that is the
only source from which a replacement
can be provided quickly. The ideal is
that every soldier should be trained
sufficiently to become an efficient jun-
ior leader at a moment's notice. This
is probably unattainable. but every
unit commander should set his sights
in that direction.
What are the requirements and ob-
stacles which have to be overcome
along the road toward the attainment
of this aim?
Length of Service. Unlike the
handling of weapons and other me-
chanical equipment, which can be
learned as a d rill comparatively
quickly, tactics is an art which re-
quires time to absorb. No two sit-
uations are exactly alike although
they may be similar. A man of aver-
age intelligence can become 'a good
Military Review
tactician only by constant practice-
by being confronted with a wide va-
riety of situations during training so
~ that, when he meets one in the "real
thing," his response is automatic.
Given enough time and specially se-
lected men, the desired result is fairly
easy to attain. But, when the aim is
to train large numbers of average men
against time, the problem is more dif-
ficult. Obviously, long-service volun-
teer forces are the ideal. Many people
well-qualified to judge consider that
two years is the absolute minimum
for a conscript to learn the basic re-
quirements such as discipline, ahility
to march long distances, and so forth;
to handle basic weapons and at least
one other piece of specialist equip-
ment such as a wireless set, a truck,
and so forth; to attain a high tactical
standard and also have a useful period
as a trained man in an operational
theater. If the theater of operations
is a distant overseas area, more than
two years is required. I do not think
many people with recent frontline ex-
perience would be critical of this as-
sessment. It is, however, interesting
to note that many countries have an
active duty period of less than two
years-among them West Germany,
15 months; France and Belgium, one
year; Denmark, nine months; and
East Germany, 18 months. An army
composed of long-service volunteers
is fortunate-provided it can get
enough men of the right kind. That
is not always easy!
Traming in Tactics. Apart from
the primary basic training which
every serviceman must undergo, an
army recruit requires two main skills
-to handle and maintain his weapons
and equipment, and tactical ability,
the art of getting troops into the best
position to use their weapons effec-
tively. Until recently, weapon train-
May 1975
STRATEGY AND TACTICS
Weapons traming comes easily to "\IIdern mechani
cally minded young men; minor tactics is different,
an art in which situations are never exactly repeated
ing "as considered paramount, and,
indeed, it is still very important. An'
inefficient, badly trained man with a
mechanical weapon is more of a lia-
bility than an asset on a battlefield.
Tactics took second place, but now, its
importance is greatly increased. Being
more difficult to learn, there is a
strong case for allotting more of the
available training time to tactics.
Weapon training comes e a s i l ~ to the
modern mechanically minded young
man, as do wireless sets, truck driv-
ing and similar skills. Minor tactics
is something quite different, an art
in which situations are never exactly
repeated and which has no parallel
in civil life. There is, howe"er, a hu-
man weakness which may be said to
popularize weapon training as op-
posed to tactics. Weapon training is
53
STRATEGY AND TACTICS
easy to arrange at short notice, a
great deal can be done indoors in com-
parative comfort, instructors are plen-
tiful in most units, and a great deal
of prior preparation is not necessary.
On the other hand, tactical instruc-
tion, if it is to be efficient and inter-
esting, requires a great deal of prepa-
ration by a good instrltctor-a scarce
commodity in many units.
A good lesson in minor tactics usu-
ally requires three stages:
An explanation of the particular
type of operation and the lessons to
be learned, by means of an indoor dis-
cussion on some form of model with
a film, if one is available.
A "followup" on a suitable piece
of ground, preferably with an "en-
emy."
A final indoor discussion.
Training of this kind cannot be ar-
mnged "ad hoc." It requires careful
preparation, yet there is no form of
military t}'aining which ean raise so
mueh enfhllslasm among young sol-
die}':-:; a:-: a well-run tactical exercise.
A common criticism of military
tl'aining is that, although tactical
training may be conscientiously and
well-taught within units, all is forgot-
ten when it comes to a hig exercise.
On these occasions, the troops fre-
quently rIo not know what is happen-
ing, are subjected to arbitrary deci-
sions by umpires and have little
chance to show thell' tactical ability.
This is a very real problem, and one
which is difficult to overcome. In some
quarters, trucks with broadcasting
equipment have been used as an ex-
perimeltt to keep all concerned up-to-
date with the general and local situa-
tions. It is understood, however, that
this experiment was not very success-
ful. A better solution has been to
provide umpires with motorcycles (in
a few cases, helicopters or even horses
54
in difficult terrain) and with their own
signal communications on a lavish
scale. Their special duty is to paint
the local picture to frontline troops
and thus give an opportunity for real-
istic tactical aetion. At the end of the
exercise, they report on the individual
actions taken by junior leaders in
order to provide opportunities' for diR-
cussian at "post-mortems" on the ex-
ercise. If well-organized, this system
gives good results. In order not to
penalize participating units too mucb,
it is essential that umpires and their
equipment be provided by units not
otherwise taking part in the exercise.
A side issue is that this method pro-
vides excellent training for the um-
pires. Their task is a difficult one,
and they should be selected from of-
with some experience on large-
exerch::;eR.
Conclusion
The armed forces of most progres-
sive countries accept the basic argu-
ment propounded in this article al-
though they do not always implement
it. This argument is that tactical skill
is as important for success in battle
as the ability to handle and maintain
weapons and other frontline equip-
ment. Tactics, being more difficult to
learn, should be allotted more training
time. The truth of this statemellt must
be apparent to all who have studied
military operations in the various
parts of the world in recent yenrs.
Campaigns and battles have not been
lost or won by superior weapons. In-
deed, in many cases, the side with
more plentiful and better weapons has
been the loser, or found his less-well-
equipped enemy a hard nut to crack.
Having emphasized the increased
importance and the increased difficul-
ties of teaching and learning the art
of tactics, it will not be out of place
Military Review
to conclude this article with a look
into the future and a brief considera-
tion of something which we hope will
never happen but which might happen
and for which we must be prepared.
I refer to a war in Europe between
the present rival groups of East and
West, with particular reference to the
Central Front.
Compared with the previous cam-
paigns in this same area during the
two world wars, the troops on the
ground would be very thin. In World
War I, the approximately 500-mile
front between Switzerland and the
English Channel was held at times by
around 200 Allied divisions, opposed
by an almost equal number of Ger-
mans. In the opening stages of a fu-
ture contlict, the numbers involved
would be only a fraction of these.
Machines would have largely taken
the place of men-tanks, self-propelled
artillery, armored personnel carriers
conveying infantry-all with aircraft
overhead. The Eastern attackers
would send guerrilla/saboteurs, and
probably drop airborne troops, deep
into the Western defenders' country.
These would be met by reserve and
home guard-type antisaboteurs. In
these circumstances, it seems highly
likely that in a very short time--
probably in a matter of hours-the
combat forces of the two sides would
become inextricably mixed and almost
impossible to identify. I do not know
how the higher commanders will func-
tion in these but, pre-
sumably, they have their plans.
What does seem certain to me is
that these conditions would rule out
the use in the combat area of even
the lowest /yield nuclear weapons. To
them might damage one's own
side as much. or even more, than the
enemy. )
It is true, of course, that fairly lo\\,-
May 1975
STRATEGY AND TACTICS
yield nuclear warheads could be used
against interdiction targets: at what
ranges it is difficult to forecast as
these would depend on the depth of
the "mixed up" battle area. The effect
of these weapons would probably not
become apparent for two or three
days, when the supplies of food, fuel
and ammunition for the fighting
troops began to run out. In this re-
spect, the defenders would have a
considerable advantag!, over the at
tackers.
Military prophets are not notable
for the accuracy of their predictions
on the tactical pattern of future wars.
They are nearly always wrong and
frequently very wrong. It is, there
fore, with some hesitation that I sub-
mit my views on the opening stages
of an East versus West contlict in
Eu rope vis-a.-vis the employment of
tactical nuclear weapons. I suggest,
however, that it is a matter worth
l'onRideration.
B";gadle>' c. N. Hare/ay, Bl'ill . h
Anny. Retirfd, was commissioned in
Ihe Cameronians (Smttish Rifles) in
1915 and sen'ed in both World Wars
[ dna II. He cul11manded a battalion
at Dunkh'k and later sal!' sen'ice in
Nortll1Nst Europe and Solttheast Asia.
He ;s a forme>' army editm' nf Bras
sey's Annual. a fanner edito>' of The
Army Quarterly and Defence Journal.
and, since his reti,.ement in 1946. has'
devoted his time to military "".iting.
55
The Commissioning of a Young Patriot
Joseph R. Goldman
W
HEN the Marquis de La-
fayette, along with Baron
Dekalb and another companion,
landed in South Carolina in June
1777, the 19-year-old would-be sol-
dier was filled with expectations.
Charleston teemed with the lusty
life and rich patterns of human
diversity found on the raw Ameri-
can frontier. Slaves and genteel
planters, bustling shopkeepers and
coarse wagoners, along with a
thousand other sensations and
voices, greeted the Europeans who
came to fight in the American Rev-
olution. For Lafayette, the very
idea of revolution meant more than
mere political change; it presented
the exciting possibilities of forging
a new nation for all the world to
admire.
Two overriding reasons spurred
56
Lafayette's desire to participate in
the American Revolution. The
young man wanted to find a new
land where the Old Regime and his
overbearing family could not com-
bine to hinder his talents. More
than this, however, was the desire
to uphold the principle of egalita-
rianism between all classes of
Americans; to see if the powerful
and weak could unite in the spirit
of freedom; and to help the gentle-
men and yeomen fight as allies for
independence. In Charleston, not
Paris, Lafayette boldly declared
himself a "republican." In the
France of Louis XVI, such an open
statement was confined to Rous-
seau's fiery pen or to the posh sa-
lons of the privileged.
After local dignitaries like John
Rutledge, President of the South
Military Review
Carolina General Assembly. Gen-
erals Howe and Moultrie. and
others feted the Marquis and his
friends. Lafayette thanked his
hosts by presenting Moultrie with
a gift of equipment and arms for
a hundred soldiers. The Frenchmen
then took their leave for Philadel-
phia. After six weeks on the road.
Lafayette and his companions en-
tered the capital of the infant
United States. Their bouyant ideal-
ism. however. soon faded as trepi-
dation overcame the travelers; all
Philadelphia talked about the re-
cent fall of Fort Ticonderoga to
the British. In a more direct way,
unpleasant rumors concerning cer-
tain American generals' refusal to
serve under "foreigners" disturbed
the Marquis and his friends.
In 18th-Century European ar-
mies. it was common practice for
officers of differing nationalities to
serve under one another. Lafayette
and his colleagues expected this
custom to be observed in the Con-
tinental Army. It was at first. but
American pride and revolutionary
zeal soon moved away from the
practice. Moreover. Lafayette did
not know that Baron Dekalb had
once proposed to Silas Deane. the
May 1975
MARQUIS DE LAFAYEITE
American Minister to Paris. that
Washington be replaced by the
Comte de Sroglie. When reports
of this affair reached the Continen-
tal Congress. more hostility was
generated against innocent men
like Lafayette. Congress resolved
the Dekalb-Deane Affair. however.
and the threatened resignations of
Generals Greene. Sullivan and
Knox were averted. and Washing-
ton never was seriously challenged
again as Commander in Chief.
Lafayette. after first b e i n g
treated rudely by Congressman
James Lovell. Chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Applica-
tions. was commissioned as a major
general without pay after the in-
tervention of General Washington
and Congressman William Duer.
The Marquis' honorary commis-
sion was later changed to a real
one, and Lafayette's name became
equally honored on the battlefield
alongside those who at first would
not serve under foreigners.
Dr. Joseph R. Goldman is an In..
str1lctor in the Depmtment of
StrateYlI. USACGSC.
57
58
The Battle of Waterloo
and the
Principles of War
Major Carter H. Brantner, United States Army
The Stage Is Set
T
HE socalled Battle of Waterloo was in fact a composite action made
up of no less than four contributory actions: two on June 16, Quatre
Bras and Ligny; and the two on the 18th-Waterloo and Wavre. A
whole is the sum of its parts, and each of the two smaller actions had a
most decided influence-lin what took place between la Belle Alliance and
the ridge of MontSt.Jean. ]
Napoleon had returned from his exile on the isle of Elba in March 1815. The
French rallied to him again, and, within two months, he had raised an army of
about 125,000 to invade Belgium.
The 1st Duke of Wellin,gton's forces were 30,000 men (80 percent new un
trained recruits) and 70,000 allied troops (Belgians, Dutch and Germans), many of
whom had fought under Napoleon. Gebhart leberecht von Blucher had an army of
120,000 men, half trained and poorly equipped. 2 (See Figures 1 and 2 for the
armies.)
Two courses of action were open to Napoleon in considering his campaign.
One was to remain on the defensive and let the allies take the first step. The allies
woultl not be ready until July or August, and he would have a large force ready by
then. The second was to assume the offensive before the allies could get organized.
He would be inferior in numbers but would attempt to come between the two armies
before they could unite. 3 Napoleon chose the latter course of action.
Military Review
BATTLE OF WATERLOO
His plan was to destroy each army separately. He knew the two armies were
cooperating, but he also knew there were differences between tbem and their co
operation was limited. He knew he could be caught in a pincher movement but felt
that since their supply lines were in different directions-Wellington, the English
Channel on the west, and BlUcher, the Rhineland on the east-they had a basic
division.
4
Napoleon used a direct approach to the armies of Wellington and BlUcher but
speed and secrecy marked his movements, aimed at their "joint." 5 When he was
north of Charleroi (Figure 3), he formed his forces into a ny" with the right wing
moving northeast to Ligny and the left wing to Quatre Bras, with the reserve trail
ing near the center. His plan was to find and fix the enemy with one wing, then
bring the other wing to crush them. Napoleon was aware that, if the commander
of either wing. failed at a moment and the allied army was allowed to' es
cape and concentrate forces, then he was in trouble. r.
Napoleon surprised the allies as he moved quickly north from Charleroi. The
two armies had not joined. Wellington had a brigade at Quatre Bras and another
portion of his force farther west, expecting an attempt by Napoleon to outflank
him. BlUcher had recognized the threat and concentrated his own forces in the
vicinity of ligny. The date was 15 June 1815. The stage WJS set.
Bras and Ligny
On 16 June, Napoleon's plan was to attack BlUcher at ligny while Ney pinned
down Wellington's forces at Quatre Bras. Napoleon intended to envelop Blucher's
right flank with part of Ney's troops, combining this maneuver with a penetration
of the Prussian center to trap and destroy the greater part of the Pruss ian force. '
With the forces of Grouchy, Gerard and Vandamme, Napoleon attacked at ligny
He had 71,000 against Blucher's committed 83,000. The battle swayed back and
forth during the day, but, because of the poor emplacements of the Prussians and
the superior tactics of Napoleon, the Prussians were taking a beating. Without
telling Ney, Napoleon had ordered O'Erion's corps to envelop the Prussian right
flank so as to deliver a final crushing blow. But. just as O'Erion arrived at the
May 1975
Major Carte,' H. Brantner is an Op-
erations Research Analyst with the
Co . ! Analys,s Dirertomte, Comptrol-
ler of the .4.rmy. Washington, D. C ..
He receil'ed a B.S. in Finance from
the University of Illinois, an M.B.A.
in Management from the University
of Georgia, and is a gmduat.e of the
llSACGSC. He has had various as-
signments in the Fedeml Republic of
Germany and tll'O tOllrs in the Repub-
lic of Vietnam.
59
BATTLE OF WATERLOO
NAPOLEON'S ARMY OF THE NORTH
NAPOLEON
SOUlT
Chief of Staff
I
I

Ney III Corps IV Corps
Commandmg Vandamme Gerard
I Corps VI Corps
Reserve

--
....
Cavalry
d'Erlon
lobau
Grouchy
--
II Corps
Reille
Figure 1
edge of the battlefield, he left one division and march.ed off, Napoleon assumed
Ney needed D'Erlon worse and did not send anyone after D'Erlon, With darkness
and thunderstorms, the battle ended at ligny with the Prussians defeated, in reo
treat, but not crushed as Napoleon had hoped. Because Napoleon did not call up
his reserves (lobau's corps) and did not pursue the Prussians to deliver a final
crushing blow, the stage was set for the defeat at Waterloo, R
Meanwhile, on 16 June, Ney was advancing toward Quatre Bras with Reille's
corps of 22,000 men; D'Erlon's corps of 20,000 followed some miles behind, At
Quatre Bras, Wellingtll.n had only a brigade which could easily have been overrun
60
Military Reyiew
BAmE OF WATERLOO
ALLIED ARMIES
ANGlODUTCH ARMY
Wellmgton
I
I
I Corps
II Corps Cavalry
Pflnce of Orange
HIli Uxbfldge
PRUSSIAN ARMY
I
Blucher
I
I
I I
I Corps II Corps
Zieten Pirch
III Corps IV Corps
Thlelmann Bulow
Figure 2
by Ney's forces. He delayed his attack, however, and gave Wellington time to reo
inforce to a strength of 33,000. Ney's delay had caused the ratio of troops to go
from 6 to 1 in his favor to 3 to 2 against him. '"
With the attack came a surprise counterattack that stopped the French forces.
During the day, Ney was steadily driven back. When Ney decided to call up his
reserve corps (Dlrlon's I Corps), he found that Dlrlon was marching toward ligny.
About that time, Ney received Napoleon's note stating that he was to hold the
British at Quatre Bras alone. Ney was furious. Disregarding Napoleon's order, he
sent a message to D'Erlon to return immediately.
May 1975
61
BATTLE OF WATERLOO
later, when Ney received a second note from Napoleon saying that D'Erion
was urgently needed at ligny, he accepted his fate but failed to rescind his note
to D'Erion ordering him to return. Consequently, D'Erlon arrived at Quatre Bras too
late to assist Ney. Neither had he been of any assistance to Napoleon which was
a waste of 20,000 men marching between battlefields. A crushing blow on either of
the battlefields might have drastically changed the upcoming battle. Il
The number of dead was enormous. At Quatre Bras, Ney IQst 4300 and Welling
ton 4700. At ligny, Napoleon lost 11,500 and BlUcher 34,000, including 12,000
deserters, dUring one day's fighting. Even though it was a victory for Napoleon, it
was not a crushing defeat for the allies. Some consider it an inexcusable blunder
that Napoleon left lobau's VI Corps in reserve. 12 Others feel that Napoleon did
not want to risk too much and preferred to use Ney only to fix Wellington at Qua
tre Bras, use D'Erion for the flank attack at Ugny and still keep lobau in reserve. 13
Napoleon did not use as much speed as in previous battles. His plan had been to'
fight the Prussians on one day and fight or pursue the AngloDutch on the next
The plan failed because he delayed the start of his battle, and, after the battle
with the Prussians, he failed to give any orders for pursuit of the Prussians by
Grouchy or to turn his attention to the Anglo.Dutch. 14
Between Battles
Napoleon wasted the morning of 17 June. He did not de!ermine the status at
Quatre Bras, nor did. he issue orders to Grouchy to pursue the Prussians. He did
not even send out scouts to determine in what direction the Prussians had gone,
assuming they had retreated along their lines of communication to the east.
At midday, Napoleon gave orders to Grouchy. Grouchy was to follow BlUcher,
communicate with Napoleon and protect Napoleon's right flank. He gave Grouchy
33,000 men-the corps of Gerard and Vandamme, an infantry division and three
more cavalry corps. " These men would be missed greatly on 18 June at Waterloo.
Napoleon then went to Quatre Bras where he discovered that Ney was inactive
and Wellington had retreated, leaving only some cavalry at Quatre Bras. Napoleon
was furious with Ney for allowing Wellington to escape and stated that "Ney had
sacrificed France" by permitting the escape. 16 'Napoleon immediately organized a
cavalry charge, which he personally led, to overtake Wellington. By this time, it
was late afternoon, and Napoleon was also hampered by violent thunderstorms. He
arrived at la Belle-Alliance, facing MontSaintJean, and was not able to continue
because of the weather. He began preparation of his attack for the next day.
Earlier in the day, when Wellington had learned of Bliicher's defeat at ligny, he
retreated to Mont-Saint-Jean and requested one corps from Blucher to assist him.
Bliicher, instead of retreating east, marched parallel to Wellington and promised to
personally lead three corps to Wellington's aid. BlUcher marched all day without
time to refit his troops and arrived in time to turn the tide of the crucial Battle of
Waterloo. "
Napoleon committed errors on 16 and 17 June which placed him in a bad posi
tion by the evening of 17 June. His orders to Ney were not precise, and Ney did
62 Military Review
Wellington '-_-\\_--'
Napoleon
(1) Napoleon defeats Prusslans
12l Nej holds other half of Allies
at Quatre Bras
(3) DirectIOn Napoleon thought
Prussians had retreated
French
c::=J Allies
BATTLE OF WATERLOO
CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO
0
- -
Bulow arnves In the afternoon
PLANCENOIT

(3)
May 1975 63
BATTLE OF WATERLOO
not understand his portion of the plan. This caused him to counter Napoleon's
order to O'Erlon during the battles on 16 June.
Napoleon did not send positive, clear orders to O'Erlon to attack at Ligny.
When O'Erlon received a definitive order from Ney, O'Erlon obeyed it immediately
and returned to Quatre Bras. 18
Napoleon did not follow Blucher and deliver a final crushing blow to his force,
thus permitting the two allied armies to join. 19
By not locating the Prussians, he sent Grouchy in the wrong direction. Another
error was in giving Grouchy too large a force for his mission. A smaller, highly
mobile force to fix the Prussians and prevent their interference at Waterloo WOuld
have been better. 20
Napoleon did (fot communicate with Ney while he was at Quatre Bras. He did
not determine the situation nor did he hold Ney to carry out his portion of the
plan. 21
The wasted time on the morning of 17 June could never be recaptured. When
Napoleon arrived at La BelleAlliance, with the light fading and no time to launch
an attack, his despair is shown in his cry, "Would to God I had Joshua's power to
stop the sun for two hours!" 22
The errors were committed, too late for a change. The forces were now op
posing each other in the drenching rain of 1718 June. Both commanders recon
nOitered their positions and the enemy, thought about the battle coming up and
. got some sleep.
Waterloo
Sunday morning, 18 June 1815, dawned misty after an all night rain. The
ground was soggy wet. Wellington was in his defensive position but had only
64,000 troops to meet more than 70,000 of Napoleon's men. The French would have
to attack uphill while Wellington's troops and their movements were hidden and
protected by a crest of a low hill. He still had a 17,000man force protecting his
west flank against a possible flank maneuver by Napoleon. The reduction of his
force by these 17,000 men nearly proved fatal to Wellington.
Wellington's defenses consisted of three protruding fingers to break up attacks
by Napoleon. One finger on the west was anchored in a chateau (Hougoumont); the
middle one was a farm (La Haye Sainte); the east was held by a complex of two
farms (La Haye Farm and Papelotte Farm) (Figure 4).
Wellington used a modification of the normal defensive positions. Since the
beginning of war, commanders had lined up troops in view of the enemy. But, be
cause of his experience with modern artillery, Wellington considered this foolish
and kept his troops under cover. 2.
Because of the wet ground and his disregard of Wellington and the English
troops, Napoleon did not begin his attack until 1130 in the morning. Napoleon
thought he was outnumbered and was not aware that onefifth of Wellington's force
was on the right flank, out of range to influence the battle.
The battle on the 18th was conducted in five phases. The first phase began at
64
Military Review
WATERLOO
c::::::J Wellington
Napoleon
May 1975
BATTLE OF WATERLOO
FIELD OF THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO
t
TO BRUSSELS
Figure 4
65
DAmE OF WATERLOO
1130. Napoleon attempted to destroy the east and west fingers of Wellington's
defenses. Rather than attempt a maneuver in the soggy ground, he mounted a
diversionary attack on the left with the main attack on the right.
After an artillery duel, the attacks began. Neither attack succeeded. The west
finger with 500 men (later reinforced to 2000) never fell to the repeated attacks of
ReifJe's 13,000man corps. ~
The second phase began at 1200 with an hour and a half of artillery prepara
tion. At 1330, D'Erlon's- corps attacked the allied left center with a 16,000'man
corps. " The artillery fire had demoralized the enemy, and, with the cavalry charge,
they retreated. The French almost succeeded in breaking through the lines, but a
cavalry charge by Lord Uxbridge forced the French back. Lord Uxbridge was caught
up in the excitement of battie, became fully engaged and swept down the hill after
the French. He was unable to extract himself and succeeded in destroying most of
the two cavalry brigades under his command. 26
Meanwhile, Napoleon discovered the Prussians arriving on his right flank and
dispatched Lobau with 10,000 men to meet BUlow's corps of 30,000. 27
At approximately 1500, Napoleon received a dispatch from Grouchy saying that
he was going to Wavre where he believed the Prussians were located. Napoleon
then realized that Grouchy would not be able to respond to his earlier dispatch
asking for help and that, in effect. Grouchy was driving the Prussians toward Wei
Iington.
28
_
At this point, Napoleon still had the option of an orderly withdrawal to save
his forces. However, he felt that he was better and stronger than Wellington even
though smaller in number. Accordingly, he attacked. 20
The third phase began at 1530 when Napoleon ordered Ney to attack La Haye
Sainte, the center of the line. Ney bungled even worse this time. He not only sent
unsupported cavalry against the fortress, but also failed to use an artillery prepara
tion against the thick walls in an attempt to clear a path for the attackers."" The
cavalry attack failed.
Napoleon diverted more attention to the Prussians on his right flank. Lobau
was not able to hold them and was slowlY, steadily forced back.
Meanwhile, Ney was in charge of the main battle with Wellington. He ordered
attack after attack, throwing more cavalry into the battle until there was barely
room to maneuver. Both sides committed most of their reserves in the total of 12
attacks. 31 Each time, the French were driven back with losses. Ney was so deeply
involved in the battle that he never gave an order to disable the English artillery
pieces which changed hands with every attack and counterattack. When Napoleon
was aware of what had happened, he remarked, "This is a premature movement,
and it may have fatal results in the course of the day. It is an hour too soon, but
we must stand by what is already done." 32
The fourth phase began around 1700 with an unsupported infantry attack on
'the center finger of Wellington's line, La Haye Sainte. Only the complete exhaus
tion of ammunition supplies by the handful of defenders allowed the French to
storm and occupy this key position at 1800. Wellington's . line was weak in many
66
Military Review
Duke of Wellington Marshal Ney
places with no reserves immediately available to fill the gaps. His desperate situa
tion prompted the remark, "Night or the Prussians must come." 33
Meanwhile, to counter the serious Prussian threat on the flank, Napoleon had
sent some of the battalions of his Imperial Guard to assist Lobau. They were suc
cessful in driving the Prussians under BUlow out of Plancenoit. However, Zieten's
corps had arrived on Wellington's flank. Wellington used the cavalry relieved on
that side to bolster his entire line.
At this time, Napoleon turned his attention to the main battle. He finally
granted Ney's request for troops (previously denied) and sent forward the Imperial
Guard:
The time was now about 1930. The fifth and final phase began. The attack of
the Imperial Guard, led by Ney, boosted the morale of all the French. These elite
troops were not used by Napoleon until the battle was almost over, and they could
deliver the final blow.
Ney led the attack toward the center of the line, but suddenly turned toward
the left to deliver a twopronged attack where the cavalry charges had failed all'
day. Wellington immediately counterattacked and swept the French down the ridge
and threw them into complete chaos with the psychological defeat of the elite
Imperial Guard. At the same time, the Prussians attacked from the east flank for
the final blow. 3.
The battle was over in less than 12 hours; the entire army defeated. Losses
were heavy on all sides: over 40,000 French, 15,000 English and 7000 Prussians,
. for a total of more than 60,000. 35
May 1975 67
BAmE OF WATERLOO
During the day of the 18th, Grouchy, with his 33,OOOman force, finally cor
nered the remaining Prussian corps under Thielmann at Wavre. Because of his suo
perior numbers, Grouchy fought the evening of the 18th and morning of the 19th
and was able to seCUre a victory, of little consequence in light of the disaster at
Waterloo. 36
Napoleon was finished. Three days later, on 21 June 1815, he signed his abdica
tion and was banished to the island of Saint Helena where he did in 1821. 31
Napoleon had made mistakes in other battles but usually covered them by
speed or his management of the battle. 38 This time he was not so fortunate.
Napoleon wasted time on the morning of the 18th which allowed the allies
time to join forces. Napoleon was confident that the Prussians would not arrive
and Grouchy would. 3D
Napoleon did not issue explicit orders. Each commander should have known
his part in the overall battle. Had Reille known his attacks were diversionary, he
would not have wasted as many men. Nor did Ney understand the battle plan. Con
sequently, he committed forces without support; cavalry attacked without infantry;
infantry attacked without cavalry; sometimes artillery supported the attacks, and
sometimes it did not. The effect was to piecemeal the forces to destruction. <0
Sir A. Frazer, commanding the Royal Horse Artillery under Wellington, wrote, "Had
Napoleon supported his first cavalry attacks on both flanks by masses of infantry,
he had gained the day." " .
Napoleon appointed secondrate men to key posts, hoping to cover them with
his tactical skills, but failed to exercise sufficient control over subordinates who
failed to execute his plan with a minimum of delay and confusion. He underesti
mated his opponents' abilities and cohesiveness. 12
Napoleon should have determined exactly where the Prussians were, then sent
Grouchy on an interior line of march, called him back sooner, and used all of his
forces to attack sooner."
The arrival of the Prussians probably caused some of Napoleon's mistakes. He
used brute force in his ensuing attacks instead of maneuvering. 41 He also could
have broken the action at this point and conducted an orderlY march to join Grouchy
at Wavre and defeat the Prussians there. 45
Napoleon hesitated in conducting his final blow. When the Imperial Guard was
finally committed, they were not adequately reinforced and had to make three
attacks instead of one. 46 Even at this point, he had the option of forming the Old
Guard to cover an orderly withdrawal to regroup to fight the next day. 41
Napoleon lost Waterloo because of his laxness and his indecisiveness. '8 He
could not control the weather, but he was responsible for the "lethargy, indolence,
and absentmindedness" he showed during the day. " Napoleon was thought to be
suffering from both piles and cystitis-a painful inflammation of the bladder and
urinary tract. The pain may have absorbed his attention instead of the plans for
the battle and the advice of his staff. 50 Others say his health was not a factor in
the campaign. 51
'Napoleon had had periods of lethargy since 1806. The attacks overcame him,
68 Military Review
BATTLE OF WATERLOO
and "its effects were that at some c(itical moment of a battle his wonderful power
of quick and correct decision seemed to desert him; so much so, that for the time
being he almost abandoned the reins to chance." The attacks affected him only
momentarily, and he was completely lucid at other times. This explains the periods
of energy and weakness he exhibited during the four days. '0
Errors were committed by both forces during the four battles. The final out-
come is a function of who committed the most serious errors at the wrong time.
Only Napoleon's errors h v ~ been discussed although errors committed by the al-
lies could have proven disastrous had Napoleon been able to capitalize on them.
Conclusions
Napoleon, whose tactical principles are still followed today, once said, "The
art of war can be reduced to one single principle, namely to mass at any given
point a greater force than the enemy." 53
Napoleon recognized other principles, and today nine principles are followed.
These nine will be used to analyze the Battle of Waterloo to determine if Napoleon
violated any .
Principle of the Objective. In the campaign which culminated in the Battle
of Waterloo, Napoleon's objective was to defeat, separately, if possible, the armies
of Wellington and Blucher. He advanced north through Belgium until he met the
May 1975 69
BATTLE OF WATERLOO
opposing forces and keyed his route of march on the joint between the two allied
armies. During the four battles, he did not attempt to seize a hill or town, but to
destroy the enemy forces. Napoleon did not violate the principle of the objective.
Principle of the Offensive. During the four battles, without question, Napo
leon's forces were on the offensive and the allies were on the defensive. Napoleon
moved forward; the allies fell back. Wellington carefully selected the defensive
positions around Mont-Saint-Jean and waited for Napoleon's moves. Even though, at
Quatre Bras and in the evening of the battle at MontSaint-Jean, Wellington's forces
made limited attacks, Napoleon never set up defensive positions. He did not violate
the principle of the offensive.
Principle of Mass. The army that Napoleon gathered was numerically equal
to, or slightly greater than, each of the allied armies separately, but he was not
superior in numbers if the allies joined forces. This was the basis for his plan to
divide and conquer. Moving in a "Y" shape (two wings with the reserve centrally
located) would give him the best chance to carry out his plan. On 16 June, Ney was
to "fix" the forces of Wellington while Napoleon attacked BlUcher and used part
of Ney's forces for a flank movement to destroy the Prussians Napoleon violated
the principle of mass when he allowed D'Erlon's corps to march off the battlefield
at Ligny without destroying the Prussians.
On the 18th at La Belle-Alliance, he suffered from a shortage of men by hav
ing given too many to Grouchy to follow the Prussians.
On the battlefield, Napoleon did not conduct coordinated attacks with infantry
and cavalry supported by artillery. This did not permit him to concentrate sufficient
troops and firepower to break Wellington. He came close to defeating Wellington
late in the day on 18 June, even after the Prussians had arrived on the flank.
That he split his forces to accomplish his plan was not a violation of the prin
ciple of mass. But, because he did not concentrate them at the critical time and
place in the batlle, Napoleon did violate this principle. Napoleon felt that this was
the one single principle overriding all others, and he violated it.
Principle of Economy of Force. On the 16th, the main effort was at Ugny.
Napoleon should have kept DIrion's corps at ligny rather than allowing it to march
back to Quatre Bras, the secondary effort in his plan. Even though Ney was in a
retrograde operation, he had enough forces to accomplish his portion of the plan.
On the 18th, the main effort was at la Belle-Alliance. Napoleon, in sending
33,000 troops with Grouchy on a "follow and fix" secondary mission, greally de-
pleted his own strength.
Napoleon, during both days, violated the principle of economy of force.
Principle of Maneuver. The tactics of the day called for frontal assaults by
cavalry and infantry with very Iitlle maneuvering. Napoleon, however, used flanking
movements to a great extent. Wellington was so worried that Napoleon would at
tempt to attack his flank that he kept a sizable force on his flank rather than rein-
force his lines at Mont-Saint-Jean. This move by. Wellington reduced his force by
one fifth and almost caused his defeat.
Napoleon, because of the rain, did not want to maneuver in the soggy ground.
70 Military Review
BATTLE OF WATERLOO
Accordingly, he resorted to frontal assaults.
At Ligny, he did attempt a flanking movement which did not produce the de
sired result because the force was not strong enough.
Napoleon partially used and partially violated the principle of maneuver, but
it was not the deciding factor in his defeat. Had he properly supported his frontal
attacks, he could have defeated Wellington as he did Bliicher, when the flank at
tack came late in the battle and was not the deciding factor in defeating the
Prussians.
Principle of Unity of Command. Napoleon was the undisputed head of the
army. He had separate corps commanders with Marshal Ney as a "task force" com
mander of two of the corps. They were all working toward the same goal, defeat of
Wellington, even if all of the battle plans were not absolutely clear to all com
manders. Napoleon did not violate the principle of unity of command.
Principle of Security. Napoleon early in the campaign had seized the initia
tive and retained it throughout the battle. This certainly minimized the enemy's .
ability to interfere with his plans.
What Napoleon overlooked was the element of surprise by the enemy. He did
not send scouts to determine which way the Prussians were retreating after the
battle at Ligny on 16 June. Consequently, he sent Grouchy in the wrong direction.
On the afternoon of 18 June, when the Prussians arrived on Napoleon's flank, he
was surprised. This forced him to divert a sizable portion of his reserves and reo
duced the forces avail&ble for use in his main effort.
By not knowing what the enemy was doing, Napoleon violated the principle of
security.
Principle of Surprise. Napoleon's campaign was based on sPQed and sur
prise. The allies certainly knew Napoleon was coming, but he arrived before the
two allied armies were able to accomplish a linkup. He had them separated and
proceeded to defeat them individually, failing because his plans were not properly
carried out. Napoleon did not violate the principle of surprise.
Principle of Simplicity. Napoleon's basic plan was simple-divide and con
quer. However, his principal subordinate commanders did not understand their part
in the plan. Confusion resulted because of vague orders to Ney and D'Erlon on 16
June at Quatre Bras, vague orders on 17 June to Grouchy to follow the Prussians,
L and vague orders on 18 June to Ney who actually conducted the battle at La Belle
Alliance. Napoleon, devising a simple plan, did not execute it with concise, clear
orders and violated the principle of simplicity.
Napoleon did violate some of the prinCiples of war. The most serious in his
eyes would be the principle of mass. Concentrating his forces at the critical time
and place may have changed the outcome of the battle and the history of Europe.
This analysis does not tell the entire story. War is a tug of war between two
forces. The "rope" is made up of strands based on many factors-the quality and
capability of the commander, the quality and capability of the troops, morale and
resources. Whichever opponent possesses more strands will have the greater rope
and should overcome his opponent.'
May 1975 71
BATTLE OF WATERLOO
Any complete analysis should also include the five functions of land combat:
command and control, intelligence, logistics, maneuver and firepower.
Yet, in the final analysis, the fault must lie with Napoleon. The decisions were
his. Whatever else may be used to analyze a battle, the nine principles of war must
be considered. The commander must apply them according to the situation. As we
have seen, even one of the world's greatest tacticians cannot violate them without
suffering defeat.
NOTES
1 D. G. Chandler, The Ca7l1pul!1110 oj Nn])olf'01',
Thf' Mnl'mlllnn Co . N. Y. 1966, p 1003.
2 D H. L,ddt'iJ Hart, "Description of thp BattJ"
nf Waterloo," EncydolJl'dl(f. AmeYll'ana, AmerU'(Lna
Corporation, N. Y., 19tH, Volume 29, p 47.
3 M. B. Gibbs, Napoll'o"tl's Mdtfaf"y Ca.,.l!''''. The
Werner Co. Chic-ago, flf.. 1895, P 443.
4 Manuel Komroff. The Battle of Waterloo. One
Hm,dTcd DaYB of Deatmy, The MUl'mi1lnn Co.
N. Y., 1064, pHI.
5 B. H. Liddell Hart, StrategY. Praelr('r Pub-
lishers Im:: . N. Y., 1954. p loll.
o Caplain Al'chibat.1 Frank BerkO'. Napoleon atld
Waterloo. Kegan, Paul. Trench, Trubnf'r & Co
I",td London, Eng. 11:114., Volume T. p 58.
.. Brlg-alher Ge-nf'r.o.i Vincent J E."poslto and
Colonel John Rollt'rt Elting, A Mllttaf1J HI8tOTTI
und Atla8 of Napoleonic War8. Praf'gcr Publishers
Inc, N. Y, 1D64. p ]69
R Chandler, ap. nt., p lon.
D Komroff, op. Nt. P 34
10 ESPO!>lto and Elting, op Cit. P 160
11 Komroff. 0]1 nt . p 34
12 John Naylor, Waterloo. The Macmillan Co.
N. Y., 1960. p 81.
13 T. A. Dodgp. G"'eat CaptatnB. Nal'oleol!.
Houghton Mift'hn Co., Bo'>ton, Mass., 1962, Volume
IV. po 679.
1-1 Hud .. P 683
Andre- Castelot. Nflpoleoll, Translate-d by Guy
Damels, Harper & Row N. y .. I'H;';'.
p 545
16 Liddf'll Hart, "DescriptIOn of the Battle of
Waterloo," 01' cff. P 49
18 Dodgf'. 01' Cit., P 578.
HJ Ale')!.ander Cavalle MeTce-r, Jou.rnal of the
'WateTloo Camp,u<Jn. Peter Davies Ltrl. London.
Eng. 1927. p 435
20 Dodge, 01l (,If, P 597
21 Ibtd p 612
22 Komroff', all. ('tt. P 44
:).3 David Howarth, Waterloo' Day oj Battlr,
Atheneum Publishers, N. Y" 1968, p 43.
2{ Liddell Hart, "Des('riplion of the Bsttle of
Wntf'rJoo." Of). rlt., p 49.
72
:!r, Becke, op. cit., P 47.
l!6 Howarth. 01'. cit., P 102,
!!i Komrotr, 01'. CIt., P 70
28 Howarth. op. CIt., P 71.
29 Esposito and Eltmg, ap. crt., p 165
30 Howarth, 01'. elt P 124.
31 Ibid .. p 131.
32 Ibid, p 133
3:1 IbId . P 162
J.J l/)fd,. p 174.
3;. Komroff. op. Ctt p 80 .
36 Naylor. op nt . p 156.
a j Liddpll Hart, "DescrjptlOn of the Battle of
Waterloo," op Cit,. P 51
38 Dodge, op. ('li. P 613
.39 Itlld., p 62&.
-10 E. K. S HOl'5burgh. Waterloo, A Nnrratttl('
and a Cntlf'l.Sm, Methuen & Co Ltd.. London.
Eng., 1900. p 249.
11 Becke, al'. CIt P 48.
12 Chandle-r. 01). ('It, P 1091
-13 Dodge, op. Clt., P 662
4! ColonpJ J. Cohn, The Great Battles of Htsforll.
Translated by Spenser WJikiMon, Hugh Rl'l'S Ltd.
London. Eng . 1915. p 133
45 Becke. OJI <'it., Volume II, p 150
46Ibld P 118.
4i Ibid., I> 14 .
-18 Komroff. op. ('It p 176.
.j'J Chandler, op. ('It p 1092
:,0 Howarlh, 01'. nt., p 55.
il LieUlenant Colonel Charlf'S C. Chpsney. Wa
lrTloo LccluTes A Study of the Campalqn of
Longmnns, Green & Co London. Eng . 1869, p 71
;):). Horsbul'J!'h. op. crt.. p 26B
;,1\ Beckf', 0]1. Cit. Volume I, p 55
;,-1 Alfrpd H, Burne. Thr Art of Wllr on Land,
Military Se-rVI('e- Pubhshing Co HarTl.,>burg. Pa.,
]!J47. V 3.
Military Review
from
One Man Command
Colonel General Aleksander Nikolayevich Yefimov, Soviet Air Force
Air Force Comment: The article below appeared in the 5 September 1974 edition
of the Soviet mlJitary newspaper Red Star. The article addresses the subject of
"one-man command," a recurrent problem throughout the history of the Soviet
Armed Forces. The author, Colonel General Aleksander Nikolayevich Yefimov, First
Deputy Commander in Chief of the Soviet Air Forces, argues that today's Soviet
military commanders are totally reliable politically and that one-man command is
essential in order to achieve victory in modern warfare.
T
HE Soviet Armed Forces face
increased demands on combat
readiness and troop mobility. In
.order to meet these new demands,
the army and navy must be an
efficient, well-organized organism
and must have a high standard of
organization and discipline in its
units. This creates a need for the
strengthening of one-man command
and increased command cadres'
responsibility.
The fundamental basis of Soviet
military organization always was,
and still is, the Communist party's
leadership exercised through the
strong influence of party organiza-
tions in the armed forces. In addi-
tion to strengthening its organiza-
tion and guiding influence, the
Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU) considers that a
most important principle of the
armed forces' organization is one-
man command.
Tht; theoretical justification for
the one-man-command principle is
contained in V. I. Lenin's works.
The Leninist approach to the prob-
lem of one-man command presup-
poses a clarification of the origin
and development of this principle
in conformity with the law; an
analysis of its sociopolitical essence
and class content; and an exposi-
tion of the social role of one-man
Repnnted from Soviet Press Selected TranslatIOns, translated and distrrbuted by Headquartels, United
States Air Force.
May 1975
73
ONEMAN COMMAND
command and the determination of
ways of raising its effectiveness.
V. I. Lenin convincingly demon-
strated that one-man command is
necessary to ensure "the uncondi-
tional and strictest unity of will
which directs the combined work
of hundreds, thousands and tens of
thousands of people." Such a unity
of will is necessary in the context
of a military organization. Lenin
regarded it as natural that the
experience of the Soviet military
organization should traverse a path
from haphazard, diffuse collective
leadership through collective leader-
ship embracing a system of organi-
zation covenng all army establish-
ments to one-man command as the
only correct work organization.
It follows that one-man com-
mand in our armed forces emerged
and developed as an expression of
necessity to ensure the unit of will
and actIOns of the broad popular
masses and of strict discipline and
organization for the reliable
defense. One-man command creates
the best conditions for troop con-
trol, ensures the successful solution
of the tasks con fronting us and the
fullest use of opportunities for vic-
tory in war.
The Communist party
approaches the application of the
principle of one-man command dia-
lectically and in strict conformity
with the specific historical situa-
tion. Here, priority attention has
always been devoted to at least
three factors-the s o i ~ l structure
74
of the command staff, the level of
military training and political matu-
rity of' the commanders, and the
readiness and ability of the masses
to accept a given form of control. It
was in the ligh t of all these factors
that full one-man command was
introduced.
Our armed forces currently have
politically mature officer cadres
who are devoted to the party's
cause and the people, in addition to
being well-trained militarily and
politically. Their social makeup is
typified by the fact that 90 percent
of the officers are Communists and
Komsomol members. Almost half
the officer corps is made up of
people with higher military and
specialized education. Almost 100
percent of the posts from brigade
commander upward and 80 percent
of the posts of regiment com-
mander are filled by officers with
higher military education. People
with this type of training are capa-
ble of coping with all tasks.
Profound qualitative changes
also have taken place am ong en-
listed personnel. Of the new, re-
cruits last year, for example, 78
percent were members or candidate
members of the CPSU and Kom-
somol members, and over 75 per-
cent had higher and secondary edu-
cation. Soviet servicemen are
devoted to the motherland, the
people and the party. They are
fully aware of the need for strict
conformity with regulations and a
high degree of combat readiness,
Military Review.
organization and discipline. This
facilitates the implementation of
the principle of one-man command.
But it also makes increased de-
mands on commanders. They must
have a good insight into the charac-
teristics and "operational mecha-
nism" of Socialist one-man com-
mand under present conditions.
The main characteristic and
effective strength of full one-man
command-which. is designed to
ensure high combat readiness, cen-
tralized troop control, unity of will
and action within the complex
army organization-lies in the fact
that it is wholly subordinated to
the interests of the implementation
of Communist party policy.
The commander has all the au-
thority he needs to perform the
diverse functions imposed on him.
Th'e performance of these functions
by the commander is steeped in the
spirit of profound party-minded-
ness.
In turn, party-political and all
educational work is aimed at shap-
ing high political, moral-combat
and ethical qualities. It makes an
effective contribution to increasing
organization and discipline and
strengthening the commanders'
aut hority. Party concern over
strengthening the principle of one-
man command is a major demand
of our time.
The decisive role in military
matters now belongs predominantly
to collective types of weapons, and
success in employing them is
May 1975
ONEMAN COMMAND
dependent on the skilled and coor-
dinated actions of many men. Thus,
high organizational standards, con-
stant alertness and faultless execu-
tion by all have assumed greater
importance. Under these condi-
tions, the will, firmness and good
management of the commander
assume particularly great signifi-
cance.
The increased role of the- princi-
ple of one-man command is due, in
part, to the new and higher de-
mands being made on the troops'
combat readiness. The time is long
past when high combat readiness
was required mainly of the front-
line echelons of the border military
districts, air defense forces and
naval forces. Marshal of the Soviet
Union A. A. Grechko, USSR
Defense Minister, poirtts out:
The tremendous range, powerjitl
strike characteristics and speed of
action 0/ modem means of attack
'lOW demand that all troops with-
out exception, even those stationed
far to the rear, be constantiy ready
for immediate action, .
All tasks aimed at increasing
combat readilHiss can be success-
fully resolved umder the conditions
of full, universal and effective one-
man command.
Finally, we must take into
account the profound changes in
the nature of combat operations.
Modern combat is distinguished by
exceptional speed of development,
high maneuverability of troops,
heavy firepower, extensive coordi-
75
ONEMAN COMMAND
nation among forces and rapidly
changing situations. It is the com-
mander who makes the decision to
fight and who takes charge of the
complex system of troop control.
thus the increased importance of
One-maIl command becomes obvi-
ous.
Increasing the role of the prin-
ciple of one-man command presup-
poses increasing its effectiveness
and viability, and this is unthink-
_ able wIthout a deep understanding
on the part of our command cadres
of the SOCIOpolitical essence and
class content of the principle of
one-man command.
It is most important for each of
our commanders to realize that he
holds hIS authority on the state's
behalf and that it serves as a means
of expressIng the people's will and
the party's policy aimed at ensuring
the reliable defense of the home-
land and of the gains of socialism
and commUnIsm. Class positions,
class self-awareness, high political
and ideological maturity and all
unbroken link with subordinate
personnel constitute the guarantee
that the commander never over-
steps the dem,ands of Soviet legality
or the norms of Communist moral-
ity.
One-man commanders must be
able to resolve the complex ques-
tions of increasing the troop's com-
bat readiness and enhancing their
lives; to possess a principled party-
minded approach and to be irrecon-
cilable in struggling against vestiges
76
of the past and against manifesta-
tIOns of bourgeois ideology. They
must show fatherly concern about
meeting their subordinates' needs
and about their everyday lives and
leisure, and they must cultivate
Communist fnterrelations among
their soldiers. They must set a
personal example of Irreproachable
observance of the demands of the
moral code of a builder of commu-
nism and of the laws and regula-
tions of military life. It IS i!1cum-
bent on the commander to have a
profound understanding of the role
and importance of party-political
work, to participate directly and set
th e to ne in that work.
Making effective use of one-man
command means being more exact
and striving to strengthen discipline
and maintain strict compliance with
regulations. However, exactingness
has nothing in common with rude-
ness or a disrespectful attitude
toward subordinates. Such an atti-
tude toward people is alien to the
nature of our armed forces.
Experience shows that the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of one-man
command are directly dependent
on the commaIlder's authority. It is
the commander's authority which
facilitates his making effective use
of the power accorded to him and
using it in the interests of the cause
and in the successful solution of the
specific tasks facing his unit.
The main stress during this ,aca-
demic year is being made on the
qualitative level of all combat and
Military Review
political trammg measures being,
implemented in the army and navy
and on the struggle for high combat
readiness, increased knowledge and
care of weapons and military equip-
ment. Commanders are charged
with directing the efforts of their
subordinates toward the solutIOn to
these tasks.
The possibilities of one-man
command and its effectiveness are
considerably increased by Socialist
competition which, in the army and
navy, is organized by commanders
in conjunction with the political
organs and party organizations.
Organizing the competition by the
commander is one of the Important
methods of leading subordinates.
By directing competition toward
further raising combat readiness,
increasing knowledge and the care
of weapons and military equip
ONE"'AN COMMAND
ment, the commander acquires
another reliable channel for exer-
cising the rights accorded him and
for the successful fulfillment of the
duties placed on him.
. Soviet oneman commanders are
a new type of military leader. They
combine profound knowledge of
MarxistLeninist theory with sound
military, engineering and technical
knowledge, high moral-political
qualities with combat organiza
tional capabilities, and the func
tlOns of a leader with the functions
of an educator of subordinates. Our
commanders are true sons of their
people. They worthily and selflessly
perform their duty to the Socialist
fatherland and toil honestly to raise
the combat capability and coIl}bat
readiness of the armed forces of the
USSR.
.,11
NOTICE
The continued al/d rapid increases in productioll {lIId di.r-
tributioll costs have necessitated all illo'ease ill the 1\1 I L 1-
TARY REVIEW'S subscriptioll rates. FJfecthoe 1
197 J, the follo'1R:ing rate s be used:
May 1975
US&APO/FPO
Foreign
$ 8.00 Per rear
$10.00 Per rear
Single copies: US & APO / FPO-$1.00
Foreigll-$1.2J
Part II The Impact on Force Levels
Kenneth J. Caffey
T
HE actions of the new Austra-
han Government in December
1972 to January 1973 to end conscrip-
tion in the Regular Army, to end the
pnrt-time training obligations of some
8000 National Servicemen in the Citi-
zen Military Force, and to allow :-ra-
tional Servicemen on active duty with
the Regu lar Army to "opt out" of
service had a maSRlve impact on the
force level of the Australian Army.
Prior to the December election, the
strength of the Australian Regular
Army was 44.086. including 11,974
conscripts and 2769 Pacific Islanders
serving in their "special" units.
1
At
the same time, the army reserve
forces (Citizen lIIilitary Forces) was
in excess of 30,000 personnel. 2
Although the Labor Government
actions could have resulted in a 25-
percent force level reduction for both
the regular and reserve forces, the
reduction for the Regular AnilY was
softened somewhat by small increases
in the volunteer force level. Shortly
after the force level reduction meas-
ures were announced, the new De-
fence Minister, Mr. Lance Barnard,
said that the all-volunteer army force
level would be increased by about 1000
officers and men-from 29,750 to
31,000 ..
1
Another planned increase
was proposed to Parliament by the
Minister of Defence in lIIay 1973. ' In
the Australian Defence Policy lVhite
Pape,', Mr. Barnard said that the
strength of the Regular Army (then
30,500) would be allowed to grow by
approximately 1000 per year in order
to reach a strength level of 34,000 by
1976. Mr. Barnard also said that the
army's organization and career struc-
ture would be based on a planning
strength of 36,000 and that eventual
growth to 36,000 would be determined
by a major review of defense capa-
bilities carried out in 1976. The fol-
lowing day, the government's army
policies were overwhelmingly endorsed
by the Labor Party caucus. r.
Less than three months after the
Part I. "The Political Evolution," appeared in the April 1976 MtlitaTy RevlCw.
78
Military Review
government's white paper was pre-
sented, however, Defence Minister
Barnard changed his mind on the
planned levels for the army and, at the
same time, decided on reductions in
civilian employment and in air force
and navy personnel strengths. Citing
no real threats to Australia in the
next 15 years, Mr. Barnard said that
the army strength would be held at
the then-current level of 31,150. Civil-
ian employees in the Department of
Defence would be reduced by 4500, or
nine percent in 1973-74. Further, he
said that there would be a reduction
of 1100 servicemen in the navy and
1200 servicemen in the air force. fl
These actions resulted in a Decem-
ber 1973 active duty force level for
the three armed services of 69,459, '
down from the Vietnam War high of
almost 84,500 in 1970.'
Kenneth J. Coffey is Associale Di-
reelm', Defense Manpou'er Commis-
sion, Washington, D. C. He is a Naval
Reserve ()fficers' Training Corps grad-
uate of NOItlucestern Unive;-sity and
has spenl four and one-half years in
the US Marine Corps. He has served
as Publie Affai,'s Officer, Peace Cmps.
staff; Chief, Fm'eign Sen' ice Person-
nel Division. US Information Agency;
and Public Information Offieer and
Diuetor of Ihe Office of Public Infor-
mation, Selective Service System.
May 1975
Force Levels During the
Post World War II Era
ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE
When Prime Minister Menzies an-
nounced in Parliament in November
1964 that the government was intro-
ducing conscription in order to raise
the strength level of the armed forces,
he said that conscripts would only be
assigned to the army. Although both
the Australian :-<avy and the Air
Force were to be increased, the
planned increases for these sen'ices
were substantially lower than the
planned army increase and would be
met through increased volunteer re
cruiting efforts."
The introduction of two-year con-
scription for the army had followed a
period of 11 years of generally con-
stant force lev'els. During this period,
all three services had relied on volun-
teers. Although National S e I' vic e
Training had been in effect from 1951
through 1959, the short-term trainees
were not conSIdered part of the regu-
lar forces. During the 1954-64 period,
army strength varied between 20,000
and 23,000 vol u n tee I' s, and navy
strength. between 10,500 and 14.000
with a 1%4 level of 12,569. The air
force strength had held steady at
about 15,000 until 1963 and 1964 when
it had increased to 15,800 and 16,000
respectively. 111
During the Vietnam War period.
the strength of the Australian Regu-
lar Army was doubled. In June 1961.
the Australian Army totaled 23,493
tincluding 812 Pacific Islanders). B ~
June 1970, the strength had reached
46,943, including 16,208 conscripts,
28,305 regulars and 2430 Pacific Is-
landers. 11
The 1971 government decision to
withdraw the Australian forces from
Vietnam prompted the first reduction
in the force levels since the buildup
began in 1964. At the same time, the
79
t1'Qllfln InformatIOn ServV"c
tours of <1uty for :-Iational Servicemen
were cut from 24 to 18 months. 12'
During the eight years (1%4-72) in
which conscription for overseas serv-
ice was in effect in Australia, 63,763
of 74!l,922 eligible men were inducted
into the armed services. 11
Of those not inducted, the vast rna
jority were "balloted out" by a lot
tery drawing. Only 3261 men were
exempted during the eight years as
religious personnel? conscientious ob-
jectors, or men with severe mental or
physical disabilities. 14
In 10 years of participation in the
Vietnam War, Australia suffered 3628
casualties, including 272 Regulars and
202 National Servicemen killed in ac-
tion. The conscripts comprised 37 per-
cent of the Australian troops who
served in Vietnam. 1i)
Armed Forces Acceptance Standards
The standards for acceptance into
the Australian Army during the post-
war period. were the minimum stand-
ards fixed in 1943 when the experi-
ence of war had shown that men of a
lower standard were an administra-
tive liability, a danger to the lives of
their comrades and threats to morale.
The educational level was a mental
80
Australian veterans 01 the Vietnam War
march through the streets 01 Sydney
age of 11 years and 9 months, and the
literary skills were those expected of
a child of 10. Further, the govern
ment claimed that no applicant was
rejected on these grounds alone if he
were capable of benefiting from fur-
ther education. In Regaldless of these
factors, the rejection rate of appli-
cants for the army was surprisingly
high, ranging from 72 percent in Fis-
cal Year (FY) 1965 to 6:1 percent dur-
ing FY 1968 and 1%9. " Although the
government maintained that the same
standards were used in all the years,
the two "low" years were the years of
maximum Australian commitment to
the Vietnam War.
Tiie specific reasons for rejections
were documented by the government
for FY 1970 and 1971 IR and are
shown in the chart.
The Australian Army recruiters
made extensive use of psychological
testing during this period, the results
of which are reflected in the category
entitled "unsatisfactory personal ad-
justment." The psychological tests
were developed specially for the army
and looked at the applicant's likely
compatibility with service life. The
medical tests were carried out by two
doctors who assessed the applicant's
ability to serve in any location and
cope with the demands of service life.
The standards were the same for
Regular Army enlistees and National
Servicemen. 19
Although specific data on the educa-
Military Review
ALLVOLUNTEER FORCE
REJECTION OF ARMY APPLICANTS BY AUSTRALIAN
GOVERNMENT
196970 197071
Reasons (percent) (percent)
Unsatisfactory civil record
4.2 5.1
Unsatisfactory previous record .7 1.2
Below required training potential
19.6 20
Below required literacy level
12.3 10.5
Medically unfit 12.5 12.7
lJ nsatisfactory personal adjustment 19.3 19.2
Processing discontinued .,
31.5 33.4
Due to withdrawals. or decisions that cnndidat{'s un<:;uitabl(' for sP{'clfi(' t'lnPloy-
ment/OB5ignmenta Bought. or overage/underage,
tional achievements of recruits were
not kept by the army, one observer
noted that, in the 1%8-69 recruiting
year, over 82 percent of those men
enlisted in the army had left school
before the fifth form (equivalent to
the junior year in high school), but
that this figure had been cut to 71
percent by the 1969-70 recruiting
year. 211
Although the educational attainment
of the Australian youth population is
not as high as in the United States,
su bstantial proportions complete the
fifth form. Australian census data
show that approximately one-third of
Australian youths leave school at 15,
slightly less than one-thin') at age 16,
WIth most of the remainder leaving
school at age 17. 'I In the Australian
school system, age 17 corresponds to
the fifth form.""
Force Levels During the
AIIVolunteer Force Era
In the 12 months following the deci-
sions of the Labor Government to stop
inductions of men into the army and
May 1975
to allow ~ a t l O n a l Servicemen to "opt
out" of active service, there was a re-
duction in the size of the Australian
Regular Army from H,086 to :14,776.
During this period, the number of
regular personnel lI1creased by more
than 1300, but the number of serving
conscripts was reciucell frum 11,974 to
1067. "'
Although the number of regular
personnel increased d uri n g 1973,
there also was an increase in the rate
of careerists leaving the ser\'ice. ~
During 19n, the level of "wastage"
equaled that of the Vietnam War
"high" of the late 1960s. The reasons
for the increase in the "\\astage rate"
during 1973 "ere not documented al-
though "m 0 I' ale low, resignations
high" was cited In a series of The
Sydney Mnrn;ng Herald articles enti-
tled "Army in Decline." ,-,
Although the number of men leav-
ing the army increased, their loss was
more than offset by an increase in the
number of new nonprior-service en-
listments. This increase, however, was
prompted by.a marked reduction in
81
ALLVDLUNTEER FDRCE
the rejection !'ate rather than an over-
all in applications. During
FY 1973, 12,401 men, applied for en-
listment; during FY 1972, 12,317 men
applied. 0" Thus, there was a net in-
cnase in applications during FY 1973
of only 84. However, only 51 percent
of the applicants were rejected during
FY 1 UR contrasted to the 70-per-
cent rate of FY 1972.2'
The Au,;tralian Army did not pub-
lIsh their justification for the abrupt
change in the I'ejection rate, but the
most likely explanation is that the
new Labor Government prompted the
change. based on thei r longstanding
commitment to an "educational tole"
fnr the army. For example, in 1964,
Labor Party Leader Arthur Cal well
al'!(t1ed that:
... I'oluntarl! enlistment lI'ollld "of
be mlled a fail"re for the army if
re(l,<wnahlr had been fnken tn
g;/'(' the pe(Jple who I( ('re rc.iertcd--
not (111 medlcrIl 01' se('urity or any
(dher !ll'fJuuds tlinn edu('utinnai-an
()]1]Jol'tunity tn .<;ccu.re the basir educa-
tion which the ,1fi11lstcl' said
t hey lacked."
Over the following years, the Labor
oPPOSItion in Padiament continually
pressed the point that at least an at-
tempt should have been made to edu-
cate ROme of those rejected, 2' and, by
1072. the "educational role" of the
army had become one of the major
Labor Party polIcies. ,I"
Changes in Conditions of ServIce
The steps that were taken by the
governments in the 1970-73 period to
make service careers more attractive
also influenced both the number and
quality of men who applied for army ..
enlistments. Following their Decem-
ber 1972 election, the new Labor Gov-
ernment accepted the final report of
the Kerr Woodward Committee. The
82
committee had been appointed in 1970
for the purpose of examining and
m a kin g recommendations to keep
service pay and other benefits compet-
itive with their civilian counterparts.
In total. the committee issued six
reports, five of. which were submitted.
atcepted and implemented prior to the
December 1972 general election."'
The final report, which was accepted
and implemented by, the new govern-
ment, established a service allowance
as "compensation for the demands of
service life" and re-enlistment bo-
nuses, among other improvements."
The new government also approved a
recommendation for improvement.s in
the service pension scheme.:\1
The announced policy of the Labor
Govel'l1ment to remove the bulk of
Australian tmops from VIetnam, Sin-
gapore and other nOli m a i n Jan d
bases q also could have influenced the
numbers and quality of men who ap-
plied for army service. As The SlJdney
Morn':"rI H e)'ald commented:
The opportunity fo]" foreign sentier
is tlte best of all attractions to the
armlJ. Fmm nOli' on, all the Austra-
lian Anl1ij will hal'e tn offer to poten-
flaT 1}olunteers is ser'l'ire in AushaNa
and 'derenh alized sen,'ire' au-ay f'rom
the 11117 cities at that. ,J,;
Summary
The Australian all-volunteer force
was created without a transition
period as a result of the Labor Party
commitment to end conscription and
to release conscripts from active and
reserve service obligations. In addi-
tion to prompting force level reduc-
tions. the new Labor Government re-
defined the country's military strate-
gic concepts so that the potential roles
for the armed forces were significantly
reduced.
In the 12 months following the
Military Revie,w
Labor Government actions. sufficient
numbers of Australian young men
volunteered for military service so
that the all-volunteer force was sup-
ported at the desired level without
major increases in service pay and
benefitg. In contrasting this
achievement to the recruiting difficul-
ties in the United States during the
same period. it should be pointed out
that the Australians were supporting
a force level of volunteers which could
have been supported during the Viet-
nam War period. In other words. the
Australians were supporting a force
level in which the conscript element
ALLVOLUNTEER FORCE
generally was not replaced by volun-
teers. In contrast, the United States
is attempting to increase the number
of volunteers in the forces. In this ef-
fort. the United States may not be
successful, because of the inability or
the unwillingness of the country to
pay the price of a conscript-sized all-
volunteer force. The lesson for the
United States from the recent
tralian experience is that the US
might be forced to accept yet further
significant force level reductions and
a redefinition of strategic goals as the
price the country is willing or able to
pay for an allvolunteer force.
;liOTES
1 Defence Report 1973. Austrahnn Department
of DcCpn('p, Austrnh:;m r.o" .. rnm['nt Publmhinc-
SprvlI:e. Canberra, Austr-aha, 1971, pp 15-16.
'1 Th .. LOlldon P'f11H-lul T,1'nr8. 2'1 [)pr['mbp\,
1972.
1 Cotnn10,,"'Nl/th PaTliaml"u/flT11 Dcbut{'ll. Au..,
tralian Hnll"L' uf RepresentatIve;;, 30 Mnv 1073,
p
;'". The Syd11(!!J MOTI>Il'g Herald. 31 May 19.3
G The Sud"f'1, M01'"Iltl!(1 Hrruld, 23 In73
'i The .... lldJl('y M07'lJlllg Herald. 19 January 1)74
h 1),:/(11((' RrllOrt lQ7[/, op. ('It. 1m 15-17
:) rommoll1t'l'ulrh Par/,am! "tUTy Debates, Au<,-
trailan ScnntE', 10 Novpmbcr HI61, p 15fi2.
111 [)dCllce Rfl'Ort 1972, Australian Dppartment
of Dt'fen('(', Au.,trahan Go .... prnmpnt PrmtlnV SI;;>r\'-
iee. Canberrn, Au<.traha. 1972, p fit.
11 Austral,a Army Str(,l,gths alld [)('plfHlmcllt,..
19.1-1971, Au .. tralian l)ppartmf'nt of Dpfl'ncc,
Annex A. and [)('fc"f'( RqJort 19,-'.
"I'. ('d,
1:! U, f(,l1rr Report 1971. Austl'alwn Df'parlment
of Def(,lll'f', Austrnhan l"iovernmpnt PnhiJ'lhinc:
S('1"\I("(', ('anh('rra, AUt>tralin, 1971, p 12
Lettel' to K('nnf'th J. Coffey flOm ("lionp1
W. J 1\. McCausland. Central Arm), Record:--,
Melbournp, Austraha.
H Gll'n Withprs ConBcriptlOn' N('('('sslt!] fllld
.JustlCl', and Rnbcrbon, Sydney,
1972 11 12"1
l-'.I1l/d., p 20.
1 f' CommonU'('alfh Pa.riHl71te"ta"Y D('bafcs. Au ..
tralian House of 16 NO\ember
1964, p 2993.
May 1975
1 j Data fnrnlshpn by Austrahan Dppartment of
Dl'fC'nl'p
1"l CammOl>lIffllth ParllllmcJltanJ Au ...
tralmn Hou"'e of Rppr('sentatlvPs, 25 Augu!'t 1971,
p 7J'I.
1'1 Thr "lId)}llj l/on'II'q Hnald, 17 O{'tobpl'
.!!l Dau'Y McCiatlrr, "Thp Ca ... c for a Smallt'l
A.rmy," Curr('nt Ar1aJT8 B!(I1('tl1>, 1 AU$:'u"t
Jl ;-;
.!1 Yrurbook 1972, Au'-trahan
,rnment, p 707
'J.' IlHd. p 61')
:! I nereJ/('/' Rrjlort 1973, 01' ('It. pp 15-16. Th('
"':"d"r'l '\.fOTl>"'" lIcT/lid. 19 January
.!-l [)r/el'('r Rf1>orf 1'1, J, OJI nt. D 34
.!;) Thr S"d"rlJ .l1or"!!!/1 H('ra/rf Septf'mhN
1
.!I' Data fUI'n1"hf,,-j b" thl' An .. trahao nt'pnrt.
mt tit ,If Def('n("('
.!'I ('01ll11l01l1l'u1UI 1',zrlurmcutar>1 lJfbatclf,
tralian of Rl'prp"'('ntntZ1.f's, NO\f>mh"t
1%4, p 2926
."1 CO".'frrlpliou ,,! AUBtralw, F.fhtcti by Ro'w
FOIward and Bob R('cce. UnlvehHty of Qucpnslnn<l
PlI''''S. Quet'm.land. Austr01lin, 196R. p RI).
III V..'ithf'n, OJ) ('It, P 53.
:n Dr/ClIff' R('port 1971, 01'. C!t. P 14.
;l;? De/ellre Rrl!Ort ]Q7.9, 01' rd. pp 1516
:U lind.
;H Commm'1l'eulth p(lrhnmc"tnrll DrbnfcB. Au .. -
halmn Hou_"c of Rpprp,entntl"'p",. :lO May 1!:l71,
pp 2t<G8-6f1.
1:) Thr Sydney Morning Herald, 9 December 1972.
83
WESTERN
STRATEGY
Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. Koman, Austrian Army
S
INCE 1945. the security of the
Western World has not been
threatened because of a lack of capa-
bility of either having or developing
necessary military technologies or
structures. However, such a broad.
positive generalization cannot be made
with respect to national strategy.
Throughout the period of the Cold
War. which many believe has been re-
placed by detente. Western countries,
attempting to maintain the status quo,
paid heavy materiel and political costs
in their efforts to fend off the initia-
tives of the Mandst-Leninist coun-
tries. Perhaps such costs were un-
avoidable. In any event, there are no
simple explanations for failures or
shortcomings in Western strategy.
One facet of the problem involves
those civilian and military officials
who contribute to the estimate and
decisionmaking process in national
86
strategy. The,'e are still those in
Western countries who believe that a
military professional should restrict
his field of competence to that of the
military technician. This implies that
he need not be concerned with the
realities of the political, social and
economic aspects of the domestic and
intet'national environments which in-
fluence strategy and in which strategy
must be executed. Such an attitude is
indefensible in an age where the dis-
tinctions among the elements of power
are, at best, gray and every military
action or inaction has political. social
and economic consequences.
The M'litary Involvement
It has been claimed that, if military
officials have a limited role in influenc-
ing national strategy. only the top
generals and admirals require exper-
tise. Such an argument ignores two
Military Review
fundamental realities: First, many of
today's generals succeeded as military
technicians in recent wars, and they
are not necessarily sophisticated in
their understanding of broad strate-
gic issues. To illustrate this point, one
needs only look to the writings on
strategy to see how few generals have
contributed significantly to strategic
thoughts. Second, generals at the
top echelons of the military structure
are so committed to administrative
tasks and bureaucratic concerns that
some have little or no time for an or-
dered consideration of strategic prob-
lems. The result is that, more often
than not, the younger officers are re-
quired to prepare drafts on strategic
questions which can find their way to
the top council of the nation's political
leadership. It is, therefore, not only
legitimate, but vital, that field grade
officers develop an interest and com-
petency in the field of national strat-
egy and, implicit in that requirement,
a grasp of international politics. This
is a formidable task because of the
huge quantity and complexity of data
and information which plagues the
student of strategy and international
politics. For a number of years, the
author has been involved in strategic
issues professionally and personally.
Du ring his attendance at the US
Army Command and General Staff
College in 1973-74, he concentrated
most of his efforts in further develop-
ing a systems approach to the prob-
lem. He discussed his theories with
the and civilian faculty of the
Department of Strategy, his fellow
students, and was invited to share his
ideas with the Commandant, Major
General John H. Cushman. Interac-
tions with fellow students and faculty
helped further to a I' tic u I ate the
thoughts which had been germinating
for' years.
May 1975
WESTERN STRATEGY
What Type of Model?
Essentially, the purpose here is to
provide a model for thinking and act-
ing with respect to strategy and inter-'
national relations. Wit h 0 u t some
means of classifying and ordering
data and information and applying it
to systems and processes, the task of
coping with the complex issues is im-
possible. The model developed is
a conceptual model and a model of
reality and can be applied to strategic
analysis and decisionmaking. It is not
restricted solely to military strategy
but can be used for the wide array of
instruments employed in foreign pol-
icy which includes means for under-
standing the international environ-
ment in which foreign policy is im-
Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. Koman,
Ausfl'ian A,.,uy, is Leader of the Na-
tional Defense Long-Range Planning
Section, Austrian Department of De-
fense. He received a B.S. from St.
Mary lngtitllte, Graz, Austria; studied
International Lan' at the University
of Vienna; attended the Austrian
Theresian Milita,'y Academy, the Aus-
trian Defense Academy. and the Acad-
emy for Organization in Sicitze"land;
and is a 1974 graduate of the USA-
CGSC.
The authm' e.<Tyresses aPP'reciation
to his USACGSC academic adviser,
Uentenant Colonel Louis J. Kochanek.
US A"my, to>' his assistance ill the
writing and preparation of this arti-
cle for publication.
87
WESTERN STRATEGY
plemented. Thus, the model contains
certain constants while allowing for
the considerations of variable func-
tions and processes. The expectations
_ of the model are ambitious and include
the following features or utilities:
Descriptiml. The model provides
a means for ordering and classifying
information to permit meaningful de-
scription of a number of elements 01'
systems- that is. political, psychoso-
cial, economic and milItary.
\,1/IO/"r.<. The model permits the
identificRtion of major variables such
Hf; the constraints \vith
bndget lImitation"
PI fdi('tioil. \Vhile no k no\\' n
model can predIct the future with ac-
cllracy, this model pJ'nndes a means
for e:-;timating probable dynamics In
the national nnd internatIonal environ-
ment.
OperatIonally, the model IS a device
or an aid in explaining and HtruC'tUl'-
ing the interactions and policy deci-
within a nation-state and also
among In an mternatlonal po-
lItical sy,tem. One may apply it to
gain new insight to the analysis of
past strategic situations. to e\'aluate
pre.sent strategic and proba-
ble outcomes of future alternative
options. Pllt in other terms.
the model helps the ,trategists to an-
the following qllestions:
What were the determinants
of past event::; '!
What are the key determinant,
of present events?
What liabilities exist and what
can be done to rectify them? For ex-
ample, a lack of material or psycho-
logical capability. n eredibility gap, a
dysfunctionally distorted perception
of reality.
What are the feaSIble strategic
options? What needs to be done, why
and how?
88
How can one predict the out-
comes of these options? What dy-
namics or shifts can render certain
options inoperative?
A Frame of Relerence
The reader should be aware of the
author's perceptions concerning the
realities of foreign policy and the in-
ternational political s y s tern which
form the conceptual basis for the
model. The author believes that the
international political system is
Inated by three PO\\ ers and. in certain
Instances, their client statcs. Of the
three. the Umted States and the So-
\ iet Union are c1ead.v the mo,t power-
ful In terms of raw power, but the
counterpoIllt role of the People's Re-
public of China, in spite of its obvious
pmhlems and shortcomings, places it
III a major actor-role. In addition to
these principal actors, the Illterna-
tIonal system IS also characterized by
bloc-independents, one of which is
lIOW a neophyte nuclear ]lower, and
reg-IOn" I groupings whIch are bound
less by geographic reasons than by
common social. economic and political
needs Among all of the maJor actors
within the international political
tem, there exists an interdependence
of intel'actions and processe.s. III ef-
fect, there is an integrative aspect to
the structure of international polItIcs
which mealls that new initiatives,
,hifts in capabilities and objectives,
as well as Clcljustments in strategies.
reverberate thl'oughout the interna-
tIOnal system and even have an impact
on the dome, tic s.,'stems of the actor
nation-states.
The author views foreign policy to
be essentially an action-reaction proc-
ess or mechanism. A simple definition
of foreign policy is those courses {of
action which are adopted by a nation
in terms of its relatiolls with other
Military ReVIew
states or international organizations
in order to achieve national objectives
which support national interest. Ob-
viously, a good foreign policy is one
that succeeds without unacceptable
risks or costs. Ideally, such a policy
takes into account the realistic ap-
praisal of national power and is con-
sidered in the arena of the dynamic
environment which characterizes the
international political system. Accord-
ingly, one would expect the foreign
policies of great powers to be ones in-
volving initi'ltives, whereas the pol-
icies of weaker -powers to be g s n ~
tially reactive. Obviously, this is not
necessarily the case in the real world.
Thus, the author, in \\orking on his
model, attempted constantly to con-
sider the isomorphic content of the
problem and to construct a model
which would not only be useful as a
conceptual device but also one which
can be applied to reality.
The Model
The model involves three dimensions
and is based on systems theory which
envisions the study of each actor,
problem or condition related to strat-
egy as a complex entity. By doing so,
the student of strategy can success-
fully apply the methods of analogy
and the formal logical content of one
system in a comparative sense as ap-
plied to other systems. In its most
rudimentary sense, a system is an
entity with identifiable parts which
interact with each other according to
prescribed or self-generating auto-
matic rules, dynamics and interde-
pendent interactions. Perhaps the sim-
plest way of illustrating this point is
.r to relate the human body to the entity
~ and its major organisms to the parts.
Quite obviously, a malfunction of one
of the parts creates a direct or indi-
rect impact on the other parts. At a
May 1975
WESTERN STRATEGY
minimum, a simple system must have
two elements or subsystems which
have the same orientation 01' purpose
with respect to the system and which
operate in an integrative structure. In
the realm of strategy and interna-
tIOnal relations, the system must be
clearly identified as to structure and
dynamics, and the mputs to the model
must include both quantitative and
qualitative data which is meaningfully
classified, ordered and evaluated in
terms of the purpose and outputs of
the system and its model.
The t!'i-dimensionality of the model
is composed basically of ends, means
and real and potential capability. In
this regard. ends include interests, ob-
jectives and goals; means include pro-
cedures. methods, strategies and tac-
tics; and capabilities include all those
tangible and mtangible factors and
qualities which constitute national
power or real or potential capability.
These three dimensions, as part of an
integrative structure. are in constant
action and reaction with one another.
A fundamental change in one will
cause a change or adjustment in the
other two. Simply. then. a substantive
increase in capability is likely to shift
in an upward direction the proposed
ends and also require are-evaluation
of means. Likewise. the discovery of
a new means may cause impacts on
ends and capabilities. The Marxist-
Leninist concept of so-called "wars of
national liberation" comes to mind in
this latter case. As a final caveat. the
reader is no doubt a,,'are that the
three dimensions of the model are
greatly conditioned by the national
domestic environment. the friendly,
external environment and the hostile
external emironment. Figures 1. 2
and 3 are simple graphic models which
describe the dimensions individually.
and Figure 4 depicts all three dimen-
89
FIRST DIMENSION
The first dImensIOn IS focused on the target nation, a nation whh;h should be
al'lalyzed.
/=,
/
/ I "'tI,,,, '\ "'-. 1V"'m
/
/b,"'d'"
\ (NDS)
/. /'1/' "
I
/" -/ '.,,--, \
(
' _____ environment......... ,
natIOnal (niel ............ national 'J
\
potential ) ___ \ procedure
WSlem synem
\ (NPS) (NPASJ /
,,'-/ '-- /
'---------'
The baSIC functIOn for uSing the Inodells
nilUOlla'
objective
system
(NOS)
functlOll
of
natIOnal
potential
system
(NPS)
,,'"
!latH,nai
procedure
system
(NPAS)
elf1brac!!dbv
thanatianal
Internal
eI1Vlrllnltleflt
Figure 1
sions in the integrative whole.
In terms of exposition, the author
has found it convenient to give cer-
tain labels to the ends-means-capabili-
ties dimensions. Hereafter, ends wiII
be labeled the national objective sys-
tem (NOS); means, the national pro-
cedure system ()lPRS); and capabili-
ties, the national potential system
()IPS). These terms are also used in
the figures and are further amplified
in the notes which accompany each.
The National Objective System
National objectives (Figure 1),
whether they are short, middle or
long range, are specific cognitive goals
which decisionmakers set so as to
achieve the more generalized national
interests which are both cognitive and
90
affective. Put in other terms, ,he na-
tional objectives system is, in a sense,
a subsystem or function of the na-
tional interest system. The former is
subject to change and is often the sub-
Ject of great debate, whereas the latter
expresses highly generalized elements
of an interest system which include
"self-preservation (spr), independence
(indl, national integrity (int), mili-
tary security (mil sec) and economic
well-being (ec)." I
Few critics of public policy would
argue over the national interest, but
it is not uncommon for major disa-
greement to occur over whether a
given national objective does in fact
serve the national interest or whether
it is consistent with the national pur-
pose. In any event, national interests
and objectives constitute a state's
Militaty Review
SECOND DIMENSION
The second dimension is focused on the friendly environment. This might be
one single nation or a nation system, for example, NATO. The structure of the
basic function maintains. but. according to the number of nations which should
be considered. it has to be extended. '-0 means the number of nations.
r---------,
I = f INPS l-n . NPRS 1.n)fr I
L. _________ ..I
,,----.... ,
/ ... --.. ,
.# / ,',,".,;tv '\ '
, (Objective , system
system of I ' ./ boundary
, \ West E.,op .. n I
, \ nations and I '
"US,,
, II ..... 1_ ... " '
/ , I' ,
, , . , ,
,--- ... external ,.,----"
" , .. _ f,;,ndlv _ " " \
I ,- potential _-- environment --.-. procedure \ \
I I system of -- ... system of , 1
, West Europe .WestEurope , ,
\ \ and US I \ and US I I
,\' / " ... ' I
...... __ .... ..._-- /
' .... __________________ .,tt'
Figure 2
compelling needs, and, although obJec-
tives may require adjustments and
readjustments, the national objective
system is the driving element of the
model.
well as those which are highly illusive
and intangible hut which, neverthe-
less, are of vital importance. There,
are se'\'el'al taxonomies for these ele-
ments, but the author has chosen the
following element" physical environ-
ment \ ph), political (p I, psychosocial
IpS), military I mil). scientific (sc),
technological (tch), economic \ ec),
leadership \ I) and national will I w).
The National Potential System
The total sum of a nation's extant
and potential capabilitips \ Figure 2),
both tangible and intangible, consti-
tutes its national power. It is opera-
tionally useless to consider national
power according to absolute stand-
ards, for only assessment of compara-
tive power is "elevant for the strate-
gist. What is country A's power
relative to its opponent, Country B?
The national potential system is com-
posed of several elements or subsys-
tems, including those which can be
finitely measured and evaluated as
May 1975
Qualitative 01' Quantitative shifts or
alterations in any of these subsys-
temic elements have an influence on
the others and change the nature of
the national potential systems. Quite
obviously, national power can be en-
hanced through meaningful bilateral
01' multilateral arrangements with
both f l' i end 1 y and hostile nation-
states. In using the national potential
system in the model, one must not
91
THIRD DIMENSION
The third dimensIOn is focused on the hostile or opposmg environment. This
agal" may be .a smgle nation or nation system, for example, the USSR or
Warsaw Pact versuS the United States or NATO. And again the basIc function
mamtains and can be altered according to the situation considered.
NOS
OP
= f (NPS NPRS lOP
1 n 1 n' 1 n
limIt hIS con"ldemtIOn to a static con-
{htlon of power Ht a gJven moment in
time, but, rathel', one should view
power in a kinetic ~ n f i in term::; of
Its range of effechvenes.s in a dynamic
natIOnal and internatIOnal environ-
ment.
The National Procedure System
It is virtually impossible to isolate
all objective 01' a strategy in purely
mIlitary, political or economic terms
(Figul'e 3), The distinctions between
these spheres is gray at best, and few
would disagree that every military
decision has political, economic and
social consequences. One might even
argue over whether an event or action
belongs to one domain or another, For
example. is the allocation of resources
a political or an economic act? When
do attitudes and values which belong
to the psychosocial element become
92
Figure 3
mobilized suffiCIently to be character-
ized aR pohtit'al? There :ll'e no easy
answers to these problems, but the
author wishes to acknowledge the
problem as a prelude to the explana-
tl,m belo\\'. One conceptual device
which must be adopted If the model is
to be useful is to think of the national
objective system and the national pro-
cedure system in terms of the ele-
ments of the national potential system
-that is. one can vi:;;lIalize economic,
military 01' political objecti ves and
procedures or means which employ a
nation's economic, military and politi-
cal power. The apparent artificiality
of this categorization is compensated
for in the systems and SUbsystems
structure of interrelatedness and in-
teraction, Thus. the model can legiti-
mately identify a political or economic
objective. strategy or procedure be-
cause of the explicit appreciation of
Military Review
MODEL STRUCTURE IN THREE DIMENSION
external opposing (hoshle) environment
(thud dimensIOn)
, .... ------,
, l1atllHlalobjectlVl! "
system allies. hle-nds ,
, .----.
, ,. nat,onalobjllCUve "'
t,/ // /",,,m'T'''tloo, "
" / / natlOnalmternal
environment "-
/ (flrstdlmen\,onl',
(
oatm,,1 """ "'" n' ... "I. ') IP ,
potential \ '
'iVstem - svstem" \
______ national \
/
,
,
I
, natIOnal
, potential
\ system allies,
, fnends
' .... _--
____ Example. mput liP)
---
output 2
--
output 1
external fnendlv
Figure 4
procedure I
svstemallllls.1
fnends

the Interaction and cross-fertilizations
of the subsystems and sYet,ems,
Interaction
A central concept of this model is
the interaction of the three dimen-
sions within the greater national
system (Figure 41. Every input or
impulse generated by one of the na-
tion-subsystems-that is. objectives.
procedures or potential. or other im-
pulses from the internal or external
environm('nt causes a temporary or
permanent adjustment in one or more
of the other dimensions, Depending
on the magnitude of the impulse. one
element could conceivably be displaced
by another. and the procedure or ob-
jective system can be drastically al-
tered. There is considerable evidence
to suggest that the heavy input from
the sociological environment within
the United States during the
conflict had a negative effect on the
national objective system and gen-
erated a change in the national proce-
May 1975 93
WESTERN STRATEGY
dures system and US strategy in
Southeast Asia. There is also evidence
to suggest that the Soviet strategy of
so-called detente has flavored the in-
ternational environment and percep-
tions within domestic environments to
the extent that, within some Western
nations, pressures have been generated
on national objectives and a lessening
of reSOUrce allocation to capabilities.
Whether detente is a real phenome-
non, whether there exists merely an
aura or' perceptiol). of detente and
whether Soviet long-range objectives
remain the same is not important.
What is important is that perceptions,
expected outcomes or perhaps even
wishful thinking is having a real ef-
fect though that effect may be difficult
to quantify or blame entirely on de-
tente.
Model Variables
An infinite number of variables
from the domestic and international
environments can provide input into
the model and affect, in different
ways, the three system dimensions of
the model depending on the magnitude
and direction of the input variable.
Because the system is and
interdependent, the input variable in-
fluences the entire system, but usually
the most immediate and preponderant
effect is on one of the major systems
---{)bjectives, procedures or potential.
To illustrate this point, one needs only
view the 1973-74 behavior of Organi-
zation of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC 1. OPEC limitation
or the withholding of oil and its huge
increases in crude oil prices has im-
pacted most directly on national po-
tential or capabilities. The obvious
offshoots of this principal effect have
been real or considered adjustments
in objectives and procedures. No one
would question, for example, that US
94
objectives and possibly its strategies
in the Middle East have shifted pre-
ceptibly since October 1973. Or course,
the ultimate settling of objectives and
strategies in that part of the world is
still not firm, and the character of
these two systems models will be con-
ditioned byevolving variables within
the US domestic environment and its
hostile and friendly international en-
vironments.
All nation-state subsystems within
the international political system have
some shared, vested interests in cer-
tain minimums of stability. But as
OPEC demonstrates, instability gen-
erated within one sphere of the inter-
national political system may serve
the immediate needs of. or be a tem-
porary stabilizing influence for, na-
tion-state systems or groupings of na-
tion-state s y s tern s-in this case
OPEC. In terms of objectives and pro-
cedures, some nation-state systems act
as stabilizers of the international sys-
tem by supporting essentially the
status quo and using their capabilities
to prevent sudden or cataclysmic shifts
of power or drastic instability. Other
actors can be called disturbers of sta-
bility because they have less vested
interest in stability, and the dynamics
of their objective system thrives, at
least doctrinally, on conflict and insta-
bility. These disturbers seek changes
in the status quo anci the major redis-
trIbution of power and thus, in the
terminology of Hans J. 1I10l'genthau,
can be called imperiali"t nation-state
systems.
Anothel' of the many variables be-
sides stability which continues to be
of major importance iII national and
international political affairs is credi-
bility-or perhaps reputation or pur-
ported power and commitment. In re-
cellt years, after Western nations have
experiencea a number of crises. the
Military Review
increased politicalization of society
has put credibility among one of the
top concerns of domestic politicians.
On the interstate level, the Cuban mis-
sile crisis was a dramatic test of will
power where the credibility game was'
played near the fields of Armageddon
for top stakes and constituted, almost,
the Day of Judgment for Mankind.
John M. Collins defines credibility
as " ... [The 1 clear evidence that capa-
bilities and national will are sufficient
to support purported policies .... " 2
In terms of input and output to the
model and its three systems dimen-
sion, credibility is essentially a psy-
chological and cultural phenomenon
which includes value and be 'ef 'ys-
terns and their effects on the istor cd
images and perceptions a he
leaders and masses view he world of
reality. To the extent that credibil y
is an operationally vital variable In
this model, objective reality becom s,
sometimes, less important and I s
functional than perceptions of rea Ii y
regardless of the degree of distortio .
Credibility is a variable which a -
erates in the model on two scales, t e
national and international, and at the
three systems dimensions. Do the
masses of a nation-state system be-
lieve in the interests, intentions and
objectives of the system? Do they be-
lieve the system possesses the capabil-
ities to support those interests and
:lchieve the objectives? Do they be-
lieve in the means being used or pro-
posed to employ those capabilities ef-
fectively and efficiently, and do they
have sufficient national will to sustain
the required effort through adversity
and Over an extended time? To what
extent do the elites of the nation sys-
tem believe these conditions? Within
the international system, how credible
are these factors among friendly and
hostiie actors?
May 1975
WESTERN STRATEGY
A so-called credibility gap within a
nation-state system usually produces
political tension, tends to cl'ystalize op-
ponents and supporters less on the
basis of substantive issues than on de-
fending or defaming the character of
national leadership and threatens the
legitimacy of the government-espe-
cially in societies which value the dem-
ocratic process. On the international
level, credibility of objectives, capa-
bilities and procedures takes on
greater importance because of the
dangers of miscalculation. In this re-
gard, credibility "hould not be con-
fused with predictability. Nixon's be-
havior In the Vietnam War may have
been purposely unpredictable to hiS
opponents to demonstrate the credi-
bility of his resolve in spite of the
domestic credibility gap and other
serious domestic restraints to his for-
eign policy. Strategists must be aware
of this systems variable so that they
can exploit situatIOns where they may
successfully e m p loy strategies to
achieve outcomes which might not
seem feasible based on an assessment
of tangible capabilities alone. One
could surmise that the leaders in Ha-
noi have been acutely aware of this
possibility. Conversely, this variable
and all of the psychocultural intangi-
bles which characterize it must also
be appreciated by strategists so that
dysfunctional 01' negative outcomes do
not occur which reflect less than the
relative power of one's own state COm-
pared to opponents, measured objec-
tively. Put in other words, two and
two do not necessarily equal four for
the strategists hut may equal three or
five.
The Systems Model and Decisionmaking
Models can be used for a number of
purposes or combinations of purposes
which may deal with a small body of
95
WESTERN STRATEGY
phenomena or which may be quite
comprehensive. For example, models
may be helpful in merely sorting out,
classifying, ordering and evaluating
data. They may_ assist in analyzing an
event, or they may aid one in bringing
fuller description of an event with
new insights as to why it evolved the
way it did. For a strategist, however,
the most useful model is one that is
functional in a problemsolving or de-
cisionmaking context. Scholars often
concern themselves with ideal abstract
models which often have a normative
end-a descl"lption of what ought to
be--but the strategist is more logi
c/tIly concel"ned with reality, present
and futUre capabilities and pragmatic
strategic solutions which are consist-
ellt with national value-systems and
needs.
In this regard, the strategist can-
not "iew his problem in a psychic or
valueless vacuum. He cannot merely
view strategy as the chess player
views the pieces on the chess board
and hIS opponent on the other end.
Thp strategic objectives he selects to
be secured or maximized must be con
siRtent with his values, na-
tional style, and both the tangible and
mtangible capabilities j:elative to his
opponents. He mllst be aware of the
myriad array of capabilities and com-
bination, of capabililies to achieve hlS
objectives. Finally, he must select
tho::::e proceri.ures or strategies. com-
patible \\ ith his nation's valne system,
to aehieve hi.s objective in a manner
which entails tIle least risk, the least
costs, both tangible and intangible,
and with the greatest probability of
:--iuccess.
Summary
The purpose of this article has been
to suggest a useful analytical frame-
work for the study of national strat-
96
egy and international atrairs which
permits the analyst to view systems
and their subsystems on various scales
within three common dimensions: ob-
jectives, capabilities, and means or
procedures. The author is the lirst to
admit that this framework is only an
outline of an orderly and systematic
approach to an extremely complex
problem. By viewing a major input to
the model, identifying complementary
and opposing inputs, determining the
intensity of them and the nature of
their relationship, one should be able
to gain a clearer insight into national
and international factors which limit,
constrain and lor enhance strategic
postures and decisions.
Most models do not cope explicitly
with the psychosocial or psychocul-
tural equation in the problem of do-
mestic and mternational politics. It is
much easier to measure other ele-
ments of power with varying quanti-
tative preciseness. It is, for example,
easier in a scientific senge to measure
gl'oss national product or steel pro-
ductioll or the number of army divi
sions than it is to measure national
will. III spite of the qualitative nature
and although it may be illusive, it is,
nevertheless, one of the major con-
cerns of the systems model.
The reliability and validity of the
model is obviously not something
which can be guaranteed but depends
upon the experience and Judgment of
the user and perhaps, above all, his
awareness and sensitivity to the
chosodal intangibles.
NOTES
J John M ('omnli. GTGlld StTflt('f1l1
and PractIces. Navnl In..,htule Pres.." Annapoh",
Md. 1973. Jl 2;3 .
::! IbId. p 266
Military Review
ARTICLES OF INTEREST
On the Psychological Burden
of the Soldier in Combat
By Dr Gunther Scherer
Truppenpraxls, October 1974
(West Germany)
V.l!lOU:' tIeton contribute to the
psychologlccll burden carried by a
m (OmbJ.L PrecondItioning dUrIng trdIll-
ing LJIl help prepare the soldier for the
-:,hocJ.... at h1<. [Irq encounter with enemy
fire dnd the Jc(ompdnying dngst (.1 com-
bm.Jtinll of fear. dn,\lety . .lgony . .tnguish.
<md terror).
Combdt nOIse .dfcct') the o;oldler and
h1s perform .. mcc both physltally and emo-
tIOllJ,lly. E:.XP0o;Ufl' to comb..lt nohe dur-
ing trdlnIng (..In help the o;oldler practice
.1Jju'>ting [0 the e\.haustlon dnd Insecurity
it (.Iu..,eo;.
Dunng enemy fire, <l o;oldler's contdct
Wlth comr.lcies .md supenurs sinks to d
mInlInum lnd he feels Isolated dnd alone
In the v."ness of the bJttlefield, An
indlviJuJ.l\ feelings of courdge, angst or
cowcUJIl.e bear d distinct relationship to
those of a .group of soldiers, Therefore,
camar aderic and group courage should be
developed .tnd prJctlced dUring t"tmng
in order to help the soldier handle his
own emotIons dUrIng combat. The com-
mander must establish himself as a model
capable of controlling his own feelings of
angst under the conditions so that
hls men can trust hIm durtng combat.
84
The mcreased technology of modern
combat demands greater Jblltty to func
tton under adverse condItions. It also
leaves httle time for the soldier to react
posItIvely to his emotion.s. The com-
mander " responSIble for thinking
through posSIble problem areaS m combat
situations, He then should be prepared to
[urni."h dnswer') and informatlon to hIS
men durmg trainmg. Previous explanation
of the symptoms. Cduses and conditIon."
of combat fatigue can help the soldier
avoid panic and be clble to carry out the
mis."ion in J. crisis_ The commander
should develop within hiS men the motl
vatlOn to defend during peacetIme so thJt
the .subcon.scious will to overCOme the
threat thrnugh actIon operates during
combat
No type of traInmg exercises l.an
adequJtely simulJte enemy fire on the
battlefield, However, the more a soldier
understands dbout combat noise. bJttle-
field conditions and hiS relatIOnship to hIS
unit and commander, the more re.sources
he Will have to drJW On to handle the
angst 0 f combat.
(The author holds the rank of aber
feldarzt, or the equivalent of lieutenant
colonel in the medical services, and is a
member of the Schule der Bundeswehr
fur l>mere Fuhrung (Sc1100l for Leader-
ship and Moral Guidance in the Bundes-
wehr),)
Military Review
Influences in the Indian Ocean
By Rear Admiral H. Labrousse
Forces Armees Francaises.
September 1974 (France)
Translated and condensed by
COL John W. Price. USAR
Every year the IndIan Ocean IS tra-
ver;ed by approxImately 4000 ships,
including 1400 tanker;. In certam nar
rows, the traffic equals one shIp every
hal(hour. All the great powers are seek
mg milItary bases in the area, preferably
on spa"el y mhabited islands. France
already has its share of pOSSIble sites:
Djibouti. a Common Market port visited
by 1800 shIps In 1966-67 prior to the
Six-Day War; Madagascar. with a great
natur,ll harbor and plenty of space for
aIrfIelds; Reumon and fIve small "lands
nearby, 5UItable for air bases .and weather
statIOns. the Comoros in the strategic
Strait of Mozdmblque; and certain Ant-
arctIc lands not covered by the demlh
tanz..1tion trcaty. However. France l'>
keepmg aloof from the power struggle In
the Indian Ocean. It favors regional coop-
eration, wit h the goal 0 f keeping'ihe great
powers at a distance.
These are the aims of the great powers
in the Indian Ocean area:
The United States wants to limit the
outward expansion of both the USSR and
China, to protect the flow of oil, and to
keep the CommUnIsts out of Afnca and
Indonesia.
The USSR wants to control the Red
Sea, limit the access of the West to the
oil. secure bases for Its merchant manne
and it, navy \preferably In Ceylon), pre
vent any SInoIndian rapprochement and
Implant a Communist regIme In Indo
neSla.
ChIna wdnt::. to be the domindnt
power In Southea'it ASia, to get direct
aCcess to the IndIan Ocean, to weaken
Indi.! by gaWlIlg mfluence In Pakistan,
Burma and Ceylun. to retain its fuothold
on the Africdn ContInent in TanzanIa, to
wm ..1 pO'iItlOn 10 Aden Jnd to encourage
revolution m all the developmg countries
of the .1re.l
These synopses are published as a service to the readers. Every effort
is made to ensure accurate translation and summarization. However. for
more detailed accounts. r.caders should refer to the onginal articles.. No
official endorsement of the views, opinions, or factual statements in
these items is intended or should be inferred. The Editor.
May 1975
85
MILITARY
NOTES
UNITED STATES
AUTOSCRENER DEMONSTRATED
An airborne device using an infrared line
seanner that automatically detects manmade
oblects on the ground has been demonstrated
by the US Air Force Avionocs Laboratory.
The autDscreener was built by Honeywell
Inc. as part of a fouryear, $560,000 advanced
developmental program. '
In the demonstrations, the device picked
more than 90 percent of the areas containing
valid targets with less than a three'percent false
alarm rate. An unaided photo interpreter is
only about onethird as effective at comparable
rates.
The autoscreener will aid in handling the
increasing data load produced by imaging sen
sors. Its detection capability is accomplished by
analyzing cues such as edge gradients, contrast,
brightness and texture.
The autDscreener divides the scanned ter
rain into area sectors along and across the
flight path. As soon as the sector has been
completely scanned, the processor gives a visual
indication when there are manmade objects
contained in the sector.
Although the present device indicates only
the general area containong manmade targets, a
modified version could be made to Indicate the
actual location of each object.
Combinations of probability and
false alarm rate can be selected by the operator
for different mission requirements.
Properly programed, the autoscreener is
relatIVely. insenSitive to changes In viewing
conditions and variations in target and back
ground-key factors for early application of the
device in operational systems.
The flyable, breadboard autoscreener occu
pies about 5 cubic feet and weighs about 140
pounds. An operational system is projected to
occupy 1 cubic foot and weighs 40 pounds.
The MILITARY REVIEW and the U.S. Army Command and Generel Staff College assume
no responsibility for accuracy of informetion containad in the MI L1TARY NOTES section
, of this publication. ltams are printed 81 a service to the reedeR. No officialendormment of
the views, opinions, or factual stetements is intended.-The Editor.
May 1975 97
~ f NOTES
98
CHINOOKS TO CANADA
Boeing Vertol has delivered the hrst two of eight Canadian CH147 Chinook helicopters
destined for the Canadian Department of National Defense.
The CH 147 Chinook represents a significant advancement in flying qualities, payload
and long-range rescue capabilities. The Canadian Chinooks are an advanced model of the
standard US Army CH47C (MR, Jan 1974, p 93,and Sep 1974, p 94) and will be used in
support of the ground forces. Missions will include transportation of troops and
eqUipment, longrange search and rescue, and assIStance to other government depart-
ments.
The twin-engme turbine-powered Chinook has a cruise speed of 150 knots and a
maximum range of over 1000 nautical miles.
The all-weather CH 147 has demonstrated a lift capability of 13 tons which will enable it
to recover all types of Canadian forces equipment, including disabled aircraft and
vehicles such as armored personnel carriers and artillery pieces. This advanced Chinook
can deliver 44 combatequipped troops to an operational area.
In addition to having an amphibious landing capability, the CH147 Chinook has
advanced communication and navigation equipmenl for operations in the far north.
Military Review
p
NOTES ~ t
FINLAND
J35S DRAKEN
The Finnish Air Force recently received its
first all-weather Swedish Draken fighter plane.
This J35S is a modified version of the J35F
already In service In the Swedish Air Force.
Finland has ordered a total of 12 J35S air
craft.-Flugwehr undTechnik, 1974.
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
GREECE TO USE THE MILAN
A contract has been signed between Greece
and a French-German concern for delivery of
MILAN tactical antitank missiles. The MILAN
weighs 11 kilograms (24.2 pounds), reaches a
maximum speed of 180 meters per second and
~ a s a range of 2000 meters. Infrared target-
seeking eqUipment helps guide the missile to
the target.-ASMZ, 1974.
GRENADE DEVELOPED
May 1975
3.Bsecond
delayedaction fuse
firing pin connection
cable
safety pin
The Diehl Company of West Ger
many has developed an antlper
sonnel grenade for close defense
of tanks. It has an effective range
of about 50 meters and can be
fired from modified fog throwers
on tanks or from new easily
mounted six-tube launchers. The
explosive charge consists of 275
grams of hexotol with 2800 steel
pellets about 4 millimeters in dl
ameter.-Soldar und Tech-
nik, 1974.
firing pin
powder charge
flame capsule
jets for powder gas
contact ring
99
~ t NOlES
SWEDEN
RADAR FOR MISSilE SYSTEM
The prototYpe of a pulse doppler search ra
dar system was recently delivered to the Swed
Ish Defence Materiel Administration by the LM
Ericsson Telephone Company, Stockholm. A
key component in the Swedish antiaircraft mis
sile system ROSIO (MR, Mar 1974, p 99), the
search radar is mobile.
A second prototype is to be furnished later.
The two will uodergo extensive tests.
The system is housed in a cabin mounted on
a standard military cross-country vehicle. The
cabin contains radal' and telecom munications
equipment, a 12'meter antenna mounted on a
collapsible mast, an air conditioning system and
a power generator.
The cabin accommodates a team chief, three
radar operators and one plotting operator. It
can be leveled hydraulicafly and the antenna
raised in less than five minutes. Operation is
independent of the vehicle.
100
The $.'Istem, dubbed PSIOIR, is the combat
control center for a ring of firing units up to 3
to 5 kilometers away. Its radar is a Cband pulse
doppler type which means that only moving
targets are displayed. Range coverage is 20 to
40 kilometers.
Data on target position, speed and course
are relayed by radio or telephone to target data
receivers located beside missile laUnchers. The
message is processed and generates an acoustic
signal which directs the missile operator to the
target.
The RBSIO antiaircraft missile system is be
lieved to be the first laserguided surfacetoair
missile system in the world. The system is de
signed to complement and partly replace cur
rent 20mm and 40mm automatic antiaircraft
guns.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
ROADLAYING TRUCK
A special version of the Czechoslovakian
T.rra 813 Kolos senes at 8 x 8 8ton
trucks has been deSigned for laying a
doubletracked roadbed In swampy or
ro ugh terrai n. -So/dat und Tech
mk,1974.
THE NETHERLANDS
B0105C'S ORDERED
The Royal Dutch Air Force has ordered 30
West German B01U5C helicopters. The aircraft
are scheduled for delivery in 197576.
Military Review
POLANO
PZL104WILGA
The Polish PZL 104 WI/ga high'wing air
plane.has been mtroduced mto the Pohsh
Air Force as a liaison and courier aircraft.
It is alreadv m use as a towing aircraft for
gliders in the Polish air club and in the
Society for Sport and Technology in East
Germany.-So/dat und Technik, 1974.
HUN8ARY
NCO BENEFITS
The Hungarian noncommissioned officers'
(NCO) school was established in Bekescsaba as
the central training center to ensure standard
training for all NCOs. BaSIC and advanced train
ing courses are offered.
Upon completion of the basic course, a Hun
garian NCO receives a monthly salary of be
tween $225 and $235, compared to an indus
. trial worker's wage which is between $170 and
$225.
In addition, every career NCO receives a
May 1975
onetlme allowance of $1120 for personal
clothing and equipment. He also receives a
yearly clothing allowance of $&24. Married
NCOs can apply for up to $2340 credit for fur-
nishings.
These measures serve to improve morale and
retentIOn of N COs in the Hungarian People's
Army .
The picture shows dismounted combat train
i ng of a motorized infantry unit at the
schooL-So/dat und Technik, 1974.
101
~ r BOOKS
THE PATTON PAPERS, 1940-1945
Edited by Martin Blumenson. 889 Pages. Houghton Mil/lin Co.
1974. $17.50.
When he was led to the basement of
the Patton family home in Massachu-
setts 'e\'eral years ago, Martin Blu-
menson must hav-e felt like one who
had just dIscovered buried treasure,
In a historical sense, he had. There,
contained within some 50 metal filing
cabinets, were the papers of America's
fightingest general since Robert E.
Lee-George S. Patton Jr. From his
pricele:-;:.; repository, Blumenson, au-
thor of several historie" concerning
World War II, fashioned the finest
biographical portrait in print of the
soldier whose name has become synon-
ymous with offensive combat.
The first volume of The Pation Pa-
pers, published in Jn72, traced Pat-
ton's career to the eve of World War
II; his early expel'iences with tanks,
hIS incessant quest for the fame and
glory of battle. his frustrations with
peacetime service I" ... as I approach
(the age of] 41 and there is no war,"
he wrote his wife in l!l26, "J ... fear
that I shall live to retire a useless sol-
dier"l.
The concluding volume of this mas-
sive, I885-page biography carries Pat-
ton through his triumphs and trage-
dies in World War II to his death in
an automobile accident in December
H145: Blumenson has done a magnifi-
102
cent job of presenting the mercurial
Patton personality by letting the sub-
JeCt tell his own story through his
diary, letters and official correspond-
ence. The result offers an intimnte
glimpse of 'battle leadership.
While Patton's unadulterated im-
pressions of well-known World War II
personalities may be shocking, none
can deny his right to have an opimon.
He was at odds with everyone who
disagreed with his brand of tactics
("In case of doubt, attack," and "con-
tinued ruthless pressure by day and
night is vital"). He cared less for his
immediate superiors, Eisenhower and
Bradley (whom he referred to as "Di-
vine Destiny" and "the tentmaker" I.
than we realized. He considered Brad-
ley" ... a man of great mediocrity."
Of Eisenhower and Mark Clark. he
wrote that they "have no knowledge of
men 01' war, Too damned slick, espe-
cially Clark." He was particularly
sensitive about C1al'k's accelerated
promotions, and his venom spilled out
III his diary; " ... it makes my flesh
crawl to be with him." Eisenhower's
Chief of Staff, General Walter Bedell
Smith, was " ... such a liar," while
First Army Commander, General
Courtney Hodges, was "less dumb
than I considered him."
Military Review

.:.
I, ,
...
A": --=

"" ' ""
. .
AllieR fared h ttle better: British
Chief of('4'e ImperIal General Staff,
GenerafATan Brooke (" ... nothing
but a clerk"), French General Giraud
(" ... an old type Gaul with blue eyes
and limited brains" \. Surprisingly.
Patton's rival for battle honors, Gen
eral Sir Bernard Montgomery, \\ as, in
Africa, "the best soldier ... I have
met in this war." He changed that im-
pression in Europe (" ... too
... would not take calculated risks" I.
A remarkable man, Patton was the
ultimate soldier-trained, ready, inno-
vative, mission-oriented. The complete
master of tactics';'- \v-eapons, military
history and battle psychology, he fused
this knowledge with an intuitive grasp
of the battlefield, a flamboyant ap-
proach to his men, a tenacious hold on
the realities of war and a stubborn de-
termination to win e\'ery battle.
He understood and preached con-
stantly the employment of combined
arms teams and the mobility and shock
effect of armored forces. About com-
bined arms, he wrote, "Each tIme we
fight with only one weapon when we
could use several \veapons, \\ e are not
winning a battle; we are making
fools of ourselves." Patton pushed his
armored forces ("they must attempt
the impossible and dare the un-
known") to their limit because he dis-
covered that death in battle was sim-
May 1975
BOOKS
ply -a function of time. "The longer
troops remain under fire," he wrote.
"the more men get killed. Therefore,
everything must be done to speed np
movement."
The tactical genius Patton dl>played
across the battlefields of Africa,
and Europe is well-known. His !l0-
degree wheel of the Third Army to-
ward the maelstrom seething around
Bastogne during the dal'k days of De-
cember 1044, in itself. has earned fol'
Patton a place among the great cap-
tains of warfare.
As much as he ached for a fight,
Patton "ought death in battle Refol'r
the North African landings. he said.
"If we fail, I tnl"t that I shall not be
present to make explanatIOn"." Later.
he wl'ote, "I wish I could get ollt ancl
kill someone." Told of troubles in
Italy. Patton from Sicily offered "to
fight a corps under Clark. I \\ould
serve under the Devil to get a fight."
To his devoted wife, Beatrice. he cnn
fided. "I guess I am the only one \\ho
sees glory in war."
He courted death as he dicl a fight,
and relished In relatIng hiS latest
brush with disaster to famil;' and
friends. Although con\'inced that "the
best end for an officer IS the last bullet
of the war," Patton was denied that
end-much to hiS regret. "The great
tragedy of my life." he wrote, "\\'a,
that 1 survived the last battle. It had
alwa;'s been my plan t" be killecl In
this war .... "
For a study of battle tactics, combat
leadership, and a better understanding
of wh;' old soldiers today "till claim
With unbridled pride and passion that
they "served witb Patton," run, do not
walk, to your nearest bookstore.
QUIckly, before the Image blurs ancl
fades. , ..
LTC JOHN G. FOWLER JR .
Depa,'/ment of Tactics, USA.CGSC
103
j
~ I t BOOKS
CLARKE OF ST. VITH: The Sergeants' General by
William Donohue Ellis and Colonel Thomas J. Cun
ningham Jr., USA-Retired. Introduction by Briga'
dier G"eneral Hal C. Pattison, USA-Retired. 344
Pages. Dillon/liederbach. 1974. $10.00.
Clarke of St. Vith is about one of
America's great soldiers-Bruce C.
Clarke. a four-star general who di-
rectly commanded more troops than
any other US officer, He commanded
every tactical unit from a squad to a
22-nation force, but he IS perhaps
most famous for hIS gallant stand at
St. Vith during the Battle of the
Bulge,
The book describes General Clarke's
part in this historically significant ac
tion, More important IS the overall
view of General Clarke as a lel.der of
men, and his approach to problem solv-
ing. One of the most refreshing as-
pects of General Clarke's approach
waR his uncommonly practical solu
w
tions to pI'oblems, Mamtainmg that
"the basic solution to all problems of
an army has always been sitting right
there in front of our nose-good basic
leadership principles," he labored con-
stantly to upgrade the Noncommis-
sioned Officer Corps and to improve
the leadership and training,climate of
his commands.
He always advocated getting back
to the basics, It \\ould do well for
leaders of all ranks to reread his pam-
phlets and to study thIS book.
General Clarke was frequently used
during his long career as a trouble-
shooter in various parts of the world.
The results of some of his sound rec-
ommendations and wise advice are
evidenced by the improved posture of
the Army today. Recommendations
such as reducing the size and number
of headquarters and improving the
leadership climate of the Army have
already been implemented.
104
Certainly, not everyone will agree
with all that has been written about
General Clarke, but all will agree that
a great deal can be learned by reading
about him and his leadership style. I
highly recommend this book to all
professional soldiers and particularly
to aspiring leaders. The sage advice
accumulated over almost half a cen-
t u r ~ of military experience is well
wOl,th the time spent with this read-
able book. Officers and men who served
under this distinguished commander
can get a new glimpse of a man who
made history.
LTC ANTHONY U. HARRING,
Office of the Director of
Reside"t In8truction, USACGSC
THE MIND OF CHINA by BenAmi Scharfstein. 208
Pages. Basic Books 1974 $8.95
The Mind of China is, as the author
states, " ... a concerted but not exclu-
sively superficial view, , ," of the Old
Chinese culture and traditions that
are presently under attack by the
leaders of contemporary China.
China has undergone a great and
no doubt unfinished revolution. The
author's concern is that this revolu-
tion, in its struggle to remain a living
and viable force with the people, is
causing the intellectual and artistic
culture of "Old China" to die. The
purpose of the book 18 to ensure that
the "Old China" will not be completely
buried and forgotten.
MI'. Scharfstein examines some of
the more prominent figures through-
out China's long history. The artists.
historians, cosmographers and philos-
ophers all made contributions in mold-
ing the Chinese culture into the
"China of tradition" that it is com-
monly thought of today, The author
not only uses his words, but also the
words of the ancients themselves in
Military Review
expressing their feelings and motiva-
tions as he weaves a tapestry that de-
picts the origins of much of China's.
tradition.
The author's expertise in East-West
comparative cultures is exhibited
throughout the work. This is espe-
cially evident in his comparisons be-
tween Chinese, Moslem and Greek his-
torians. Mr. Scharfstein feels that
Chinese historians write as "men who
are fulfilling a particular function"
while the Greco-Roman historians
write on' an individual basis. The
Greeks and Romans are less subordI-
nate to their tradition, and thus their
personal remarks are not confined to
prefaces and epilogues as are the
Chinese. One of the points made by
the author is the attempt by Greek
and Moslem historians to view history
on a universal level while the Chinese
failed to recognize the outside world.
A number of comparisons are drawn
bet wee n Easlern and Western
thought. An example is the compari-
son of the philosophies of Wang Ying-
Ming, a noted \J.5th-Century Neo-
Confuscian philoso!lhe'r, and John
Dewey, the 20th-Century American
pragmatist. The two were basically
different; in personal thought, how-
ever, they were much alike. They both
assumed the "unity of knowledge and
action and the related continuity."
Wang mentions "one body" and "one
family" and further states, "The great
man regards Heaven, Earth, and the
Myriad things as one body." John
Dewey used the term of "organic de-
velopment." This concept of a "living
creature" being an active part of its
world typifies the feeling of being
part of a greater world-organism. This
concept, shared by both men, is the
basis for their thoughts regarding
knowledge-that is, learning is not
intellectual alone but must include HC-
May 1975
BOOKS ~ t
tion which brings about change.
The reader who is interested in
broadening his understanding and
deepening his appreciation for the
"China of Old" would find this book
to be a valuable reference work for
obtaining a basic knowledge of the
origins of Chinese tradition and cul-
ture.
LTC MELVIN J. STANFORD, USAR,
Consulting Faclllty, USACGSC
tHE WORLD OF GEORGE WASHINGTON. An Ameri
can Hentage Illustrated BIography. 280 Pages.
Amencan HerItage PublIShing Co. 1974. $35.00.
As we have grown to expect from
American Heritage books, this "coffee
table" volume is lavishly illustrated
with paintings, prints and artifacts of
the late 18th-Century age in which
George \Vashington was RliCh a tower-
ing figure. Particularly impressive are
the printing of Benjamin Henry La-
trobe's watercolor landscapes which
handsomely portray the revolutionary
world we have lost. Because of the
mass production of thIS edition, the
publisher is able to prIce it reas0
n
ably.
Richard Ketchum's text is a well-
written study that wIll satisfy the
general public. He has obviousl," used
the excellent biographical writings of
D. S. Freeman, Marct" Cunliffe and,
most partieularly, J. T. Flexner as the
basis for his work. Although it lacks
depth of amdysls, particularly of the
presidential administrations, it is a
competent descriptIOn of the era,
mostly through Washington's eyes.
While the writing of the scholars
mentioned above may be more sub-
stantIve, this volume, with its excel-
lent illustrations, represents a fine
addition to one's Bicentennial collec-
tion.
MAJ DAVID C. SKAGGS, USAR
CO'YIwlting Faculty, USACGSC
105
BOOKS
PETER THOMPSON'S NARRATIVE OF THE LITTlE
BIGHORN CAMPAIGN, 1876 by Daniel O. Magnussen
340 Pages. Arthur H Clark Co. 1974 $22.50
Peter Thompson was a private in
Company C, 7th Cavalry, 25 June
1876, when Custer's command was an-
nihilated at Little Bighorn. Thompson
escaped death because his horse gave
out and he was not at the last stand
but hiding someplace along the river.
Later, he reached Reno's position and
wounded making a \\-'atel' run for
which he was awarded a Medal of
Honor. In 1914, his account Was
printed in a South Dakota newspaper,
but he had become confused during
the intervening 38 years about what
he saw or thought he pxperienced in
June 1876.
Magnussen provides a thorough
analysis of the re8Ult, following each
paragraph of Thompson's account
with detailed critical notes which eom-
prise the bulk of the volume. This
method of analysis and documentation
is somewhat distracting, but it is ef-
fective. Magnussen discredits much of
the narrative, which contains several
contradictions, and the notes are much
more valuable to students of the battle
than Thompson's descriptions.
This fascinating study will delight
students of the battle, for Thompson
and Magnussen shed new light or con-
and raise new question.s. The
editor's conclusion that luster divided
the remainIng five companies with him
into two UnIts, after earliel' separat-
ing Benteen, Reno and the packtrain
from his direct command, is well-
argued. Although Thompson was bla-
tantly anti-Reno, Magnussen does not
hesitate to place resprHlsibility where
it belonged, with Custer who diso-
beyed orders and determined the plan
of attack which he apparently changed
notifying Reno. He demon-
106
strates that Indians won because of
superiority of manpower, putting to
rest many theories that Reno or some-
one else could have saved the day. The
fact that a large portion of Reno's
command survived at all is seen in new
light.
The editor cqmbines a military ca-
reer, work as a Seasonal Ranger at the
Custer Battlefield National Monument,
a Ph.D. in History from the Univer-
sity of Montana, and extensive re-
search in the sources in his qualifica-
tions. The' result is one of the most
important publIcations on the subject
in recent years.
LEO OLIVA,
F01t Hay., Kansas State College
COMMAND ANO CONTROL, 19501969 by Major
General George S. Eckhardt 103 Pages. US Gov
ernment Printmg Office 1974. $1.50.
AIR POWER AND THE FIGHT FOR KHE SANH by
Bernard C. Nalty. 134 Pages US Government
Printing Office. 1973 $1.30
These two books provide up-to-date
and comprehensive information on the
most recent conflicts involving US
combat forces. While Khe Sanll de-
scribe" only a "mall portion of the
command and control problems and
801utiOOH achieved, it HerveR as a case
study in the actual application of com-
mand and control, along with the
problem of the application of ail' power
during a period of US military his-
tory when many supported the view
of a US "Dien Bien Phu" at Khe Sanh.
Command and Contml describes the
development of the US military com-
mand and control structure primarily
in the Republic of Vietnam. The air
war in North Vietnam, naval opera-
tions of the Seventh Fleet and other
outside agencies are discussed only as
Military Review
they impact on the US Military As-
sistance Command, Vietnam, and the
US Army in Vietnam. Both books are
valuable historical documentations on
current US military operations and as
such provide insights into helping the
military improve and develop combat
operational concepts in the applica-
tion of air and ground power interface
and command and control.
MAJ HARRY L. FRASER,
US Anny Combined Arms Combat
Developments Act1vity
THE REICH MARSHAL: A Biography 01 Hermann
Goering Leonard Pages. Doubleday
& Co. 1974. $12.50.
Mosley has presented an extremely
interesting, readable, insightful por
trait of a man who was the crown
prince of the glorious Third Reich and
clownish buffoon who ultimately was
stripped of all rank and title just In-ior
to the suicide of his mentor and idol.
Hitler. Drawing on recollections of his
own personal relationship wIth Her-
mann Goering pril;>r to World War H,
as well as intervieWs- with Goering's
stepson and widow, Albert Speer
and other surviving Nazi officials, and
a large collection of Goering's personal
letters and documents, Mosley pro-
vides a sympathetic yet tragic saga
of a gifted, once decent man. His place
in the sun, like that of his beloved
Germany, was incinerated in his suc-
cumbing to the meglomania of Hitler.
Not that Goering was without fault.
A braggart, drug addict, overdressed
fop and incessant collector of stolen
artwork, he was. at the same time. a
humanist who earned the contempt of
Himmler and the other madmen with
whom he shared the Nazi leadership.
He helped a number of Jews, including
two sisters who had assisted his re-
covei'y from wounds received <lUring
May 1975
BOOKS
the ill-fated Beer Hall Putsch and
Jewish friends of his second wife, ac-
tress Emmy Sonnemann.
Perhaps his greatest failure, other
than his consistent obeisance to Hit-
ler's every whim, lay in his national
economic planning, especially as it re-
lated to aircraft production. In 1940,
under Goering's management, German
factories produced fewer than 400 air-
craft per month as to the 4000
per month under Speer in 1!l44. Goe-
ring initially had opposed the German
invasion of Russia, but, after the im
plementation of Bar/>a1'os . u and the
subsequent beginnings of the Clltastro-
phe on the Eastern Front, the Reich
Marshal maintained that the Udt
waffe could supply the beleaguered
German troops even when he knew it
was impossible. The resultant disaster
IS history,
Although Goering has been placer!
historically alongside other NaZI crlm
mals as equally culpable for the holo-
caust that befell the European Jew
and other people subjugated by the
German war machine, what
from MOt"ley's detailed I!'
a figure of startling talents and abili
ties who tragIcally allowed the dark
l'lde of his nature to overcome hi:"' es-
sential humanity.
MAJ P. II. BOUTON.
Departme1lt of Strall'llI!, [,SAn;"r
THE ULTRA SECRET by F W. Wmterbotham J 99
Pages Harper & Row. 1974. $8.95.
To all those I1'ho have been brought
up in the belief that the Allied victory
Vl'er the Fascist pOlUe'fS u.'as aecom-
plished with some ease pillS the /Vii!
of God, perhaps. , . this book /l'iIl have
prQL'ided the sobering thought that
the victory didn't happen,
Mission accomplished. And more, as
well, for this short book-
107
BOOKS
by World War II history standards-
is an essential volume for a historian's
shelif-and for any young aspiring op-
erations officer 01' commander. Group
Captain Winterbotham has written a
very readable history of the process-
ing, distribution and utilization of the
intelligence derived from the crypt-
analysis of German machine-cipher
rne::'lsages.
His explanations of the intelligence
background for the Battle for France,
the Battle of Britain, Operations Sea
Linn, Torch, Hllsky and Ol'erlord take
nothing from the courage and per-
severance of the individual warrior
who was not "in the lmow." His writ-
ing takes little from the commanders
of those men-but his efforts do de-
stroy the idea that we \\on because
nUl' hearts were pure, hence luck fa-
vored us in the throw of the dice on
the battlefield. We won, barely in the
beginning, because of the cerebral ef
forts of a few men \\ ho believed that
if one group of men could design a
machine to encipher a message me-
chanically. another groUj1 of men could
design another machine that could
decipher that message -and did ex-
actly that prior to
The intellIgence denved from this
effort-the cryptanalysis of Luftu'affe
for a great part-that was
properly used aided in the major Brit-
ish and AllIed victories. Where this
intellIgence was ignored- -as at Anzio
and throughout most of the Italiau
Cam p a i g n-t h e Allied victories
achieved were costly and were, in
some ca,es, near-defeats. Where the
Germans practieerl proper communica-
tion, security-as in the Ardennes-
or where there was ju,t no intelligence
available-as at Arnhem-the Allied
forces suffered setbacks.
Clearly, this text is not a supplemen-
tary effort to Kahn's encyclopedic
lOB
work, The Codebleakers. Rather, it
is a complementary work and as such
be read by all who are inter-
ested in the proper management of
battlefield violence-crypto buff 01' not.
It should be read by .ll1l1ior officers
where, hopefully, it will make an im-
pression. It should be read by senior
commanders where, hopefully, it will
serve to remind them of the proper
integration of intelligence and opera-
tions and the never-ending need for
secu!'lty. And it should be read by
polIcymakers where, hopefully, they
will learn that proper utilization of
limited resource" can be prevented
completely as it nearly was in 1929
when Secretary of State H. L. Stimson
stated, as he closed down the American
equivalent of ULTRA, that "gentle-
men do not rearl other gentlemen's
mail."
MAJ WILLIAM G. HANNE,
Office of the Assistant Chief "I Staff
{P" intelliqenre
THE COLD WAR BEGINS: SovietAmerican Conflict
Over Eastern Europe by Lynn Etheridge DavIS 427
Pages Pnnceton UnIVerSity Press 1974 $1500
Essentially, thIS book is an examll1a
tion of how the United States moved
from a position of noninvolvement in
Eastern Europe prior to World War
II to active opposition to the Soviet
Union's activities in the area during
and after the war. Ms. Davis views
the growth of conMict over post-World
War II I"ule of the region as a major
cau"e of the Cold War.
The author argues very effectively
that the conflict over Eastern Europe
had its origins in America's strict
adherence to the general and some-
what v..gue principles of the Atlantic
Charter enunciated by Roosevelt and
Churchill in 1941. The general princi-
ples in the charter were rigidly fol-
Military Review
lowed throughout the course of Amer-
ican World War II diplomacy without
due considel'ation to the possibiliq,
that changing conditions would make
achiev-ement of the principles impos-
occupation of
Europe and general refusal to adhere
to the Atlantic ('hal-tel' were t\\'o cil'-
rumstanre:-. nut antiripaterl b.\' Ameri
can policy
1\18. Davis points out :-.evel'al
that aided in development of the rnn-
flict. Not the least of these factors
were Roo,evelt's refusal tn settle po-
litical problems until after military
victqry was achieved.
terest in the Cnited States tnward
Eastern Europe until it was too late
and the personal cummitment of State
Department people to the Atlantic
Charter principle,:.;, ThH, per:'::'!l1al com-
mi,tment to the charter prevented the
State Department fl'nm influencing
Roosevelt 01' Truman ill changing
American
This work is a \\ ell-\\ ritten. schol-
arly examination of a partic111al' thesis
orr the origins il( the Cnhl War,
Davis takes advamag-e of the latest
lllformation available on the subject
to document her argllment, She is also
aware of other arguments over the
origins of the Cold War and briefly
discusses them,
MA,/ JOHN A, HARDAWAY.
Del'",'t",e"t of StmteOll, USACGSC
THE YOM KIPPUR WAR by the london "InSIght"
Team of The Sunday Times_ 514 Pages Doubleday
& Co 1974 $10 00
The problems of \\Titlllg about a
e\eut al-' the Yom
'Kippur War are summed 11p. in part,
by the "uthore of this bouk: "A great
deal was published. at the time and
subsequently, about almost every as-
pect of the Yom Kippur War, A dIS-
May 1975
BOOKS
heartening amount wa", Int'Ol'l'ert."
The other part of the pl'Oblem lies in
the difiiculty of obtaining complete
and Hl'l'Urate informatIOn upon \\ hich
to an anaiy..;is. The :wthoritatlye
oflieial AI'mv' histo}'\' of \\'01'1,1 War II
touk year:-. ancl, e\en at
this late date, new f,UUl'ee...; are becom-
Ing available. '-'hedrling new lig-ht on
that war.
Bet\\ een these e:\ t Iemt:':-.. a ('011-
cpntnlted effort toward ob,iedi\ It,\
, l'an :-.tl'lke :Ill <tlTl'ptahle meall, The
London Sum/fly nne uf the
\\ Ilrld'", elIte lle\\ :-.pape} ..... H,":;-:l'mbled a
large h.'am of JIl\ l't:'IlOl'ter'"
awl HIlUly..:t'" and allowt:'d them to COl1-
l'entl':lte theIr e:-...pertI ... e on all <l\ail-
able ";OIll'tC'",_ Thl" h a hllok that
i" hip:hh reHdable and infol'matl\'e,
The ,ll1th",'< -killf,i1h' h:tlallce theil'
accuunt het\\t'E'll Arab and I .... r"di al'-
tlllll. 1I"'lllg a l hr(lllfliogll"al form.lt.
The Impact .!Ild dipiumatil malleuYer-
Ing' III the 1'(:,,,t of tht' \\tll'ld lfl\e1'ed
III enough detaIl tu :-;ho\\ Ib impor-
tance, but It i:-; never :-IlIoweu to di:-:.-
traet the reader fl'um the action of the
battle it,elf. BiographIcal detail. in-
and even recorded tac,tical
radIO l'oll\'C'r:.:.at{ons of the principal
milltar." figlll'e' give the reader a feel
for the de,e!upmellb of the \\ar a:-.
they mll:-.t have ol'l'tll'l'en.
The charts, alld phutograph,
should prove helpful to the
milital'Y in..;tl'urtol',
Thi:-; book one uf the be..:t to l'ome
f)ut :-:0 far. \\'hen conSidered 111 l'un-
jlmetion \\ Ith the more :':'l'holarly ('011-
irontat iUII by Walter Lacqueur, it
provide" the reader \\ ith more than
enough information to 111lciel'stann
what \\ as happening' during a tumul-
tuous IG day, of combat as \\elI a" the
problems that "till remain,
LTC PAUL B, PARHAM.
Head'llla,-tel's. Sixth ,\rmij
109
BOOKS
NEW BOOKS RECEIVED
THE LAST DAYS OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE by
Bruce Powe. 326 Pages. St Martm's Press. 1974
$895
SIDELIGHTS ON THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION by
Webb Garmon 176 Pages. Abingdon Press 1974
'$595.
CUBA IN THE 1970S: Pragmatism and Institu
tionalization by Carmela MesaLago 179 Pages
UnrverSity of New MeXICO Press. 1974 $995 cloth
bound. $395 paperbound.
DECISIONS IN ISRAEl'S FOREIGN POLICY by Michael
Brecher 639 Pages Yale UnrverSity Press 1975
$2500.
DIALOGUE ON WORLO OIL: A Conference Sponsored
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Foreword by MelVin R Larrd 106 Pages. Amerr
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THE CHINESE SECRET SERVICE by Richard Deacon
523 Pages Taplrnger 1974 $1495
BRITISH AIRBORNE TROOPS, 194045 by Barry
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TO UTAH WITH THE DRAGOONS: Glimpses of Life
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AMERICAN GUNBOATS ANO MINESWEEPERS by
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THE A'MERICAN WAR, 18121814. Text by PhilIp
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ANTITANK WEAPONS by Peter Chamberlain an;
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ASSAULT IN NORWAY, Sabotaging the Nazi Nuclear
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BRAZIL AND THE UNITEO STATES: Toward a Matur
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Ame"can Enterprise Instrtute for Public Policy
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BRINGING THE WAR HOME: The American SoldIer
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Free Press 1974 $1295
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