Schu W tz, Alfred (18991959)

Schumpeter J A 1954 History of Economic Analysis. Oxford University Press, New York Schumpeter J A 1954 Economic Doctrine and Method, Oxford University Press, New York Schumpeter J A 1970 Das Wesen des Geldes. Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Go $ ttingen, Germany Schumpeter J A 1989 The instability of capitalism. In: Schumpeter J A (ed.) Essays. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ Schumpeter J A 1991 The crisis of the tax state. In: Schumpeter J A (ed.) The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ Schumpeter J A 1991 The sociology of imperialisms. In: Schumpeter J A (ed.) The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ Schumpeter J A 1991 Social classes in an ethically homogenous milieu. In: Schumpeter J A (ed.) The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ Schumpeter J A 1991 The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ Schumpter J A 2000 Briefe\Letters. J.C.B. Mohr, Tu $ bingen, Germany Stolper W F 1994 Joseph Alois Schumpeter: The Pri ate Life of a Public Man. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ Swedberg R 1991 Schumpeter: A Biography. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ Weber M (ed.) 191420 Grundriss der Sozialo W konomik. J.C.B. Mohr, Tu $ bingen, Germany

1. Major Aims of Schu W tzs Theory

Alfred Schu $ tzs social theory focuses on the concept of the life world, which is understood as a social-cultural world as it is perceived and generated by the humans living in it. Schu $ tz identies everyday interaction and communication as being the main processes in which the constitution of the life worlds social reality takes place. In this sense, his approach pursues two major goals: the development of a theory of action which reveals the constitution of social reality with its meaning structure given in the commonly shared typical patterns of knowledge, and a description of the life world with its multiple strata of reality emerging from these constituting processes. These leitmotifs merge in a theory of life world constitutiona project which occupied Schu $ tz during the nal years of his life.

2. Main Intellectual Sources of the Schu W tzian Approach

Schu $ tzs conception originated in the intellectual discourse in the social sciences and philosophy of the early decades of this century. Schu $ tz developed his position from within a triangular interdisciplinary eld marked by Max Webers historising interpretative sociology ( erstehende Soziologie), the Austrian economic approach represented by Ludwig von Mises, and the philosophical theories of the stream of consciousness formulated by H. Bergson and E. Husserl. From the very onset, he adopted Max Webers view of social reality as a meaningful social-cultural world, as well as his concept of social action as a meaning oriented behavior, and shared Webers search for an interpretative method in sociology. He also shared the methodological individualism advocated by Weber and by the Austrian economists who denoted individual action as the starting point of social research. At the same time, he accepted the need for a generalizing theory of action, as stressed by his teacher Ludwig von Mises, and criticized Weber for neglecting to develop the basic framework of such a theory and especially for not inquiring into the constitution of meaning attached to social action. But Schu $ tzs criticism also addressed the general theory of action based on an a priori postulate of rational choice put forth by Ludwig von Mises. Schu $ tz rejected this conception since it imposed an abstract framework on actors orientation of action and ignored their actual stock of knowledge. In order to analyze how the meaning attached to action is revealed, Schu $ tz referred to the philosophical concepts of Henri Bergons and Edmund Husserl. Both oer insights into the stream of lived experience and into the acts of consciousness in which our world is meaningfully constituted. Schu $ tz adopted the Bergsonian idea of the stream of consciousness in his rst scholarly attempts in 192428 (Schu $ tz 1982), only to later recognize the diculties in Bergsons intuitivism 13603

R. Swedberg

$ tz, Alfred (18991959) Schu

Alfred Schu $ tz was born in Vienna on April 13, 1899. Here he studied law and social sciences from 1918 to 1921. After receiving his Doctorate of Law he continued his studies in the social sciences until 1923. His teachers included Hans Kelsen, an eminent lawyer, Ludwig von Mises, and Friederich von Wieser, prominent representatives of the Austrian school of economics. Equally important as his university studies was his participation in the informal academic life of Vienna, e.g., his participation in the private seminars of von Mises, where Schu $ tz also cultivated his philosophical interests. In addition to his scholarly activities, Schu $ tz held a full-time job as a bank attorney, a dual life which lasted until 1956. After the annexation of Austria to the Third Reich, Schu $ tz and his family escaped to New York. On his arrival, Schu $ tz got in touch with Talcott Parsons whose Structure of Social Action he intended to review. But despite their intense correspondence (Schu $ tz and Parsons 1978), the contact between Schu $ tz and Parsons broke down. Instead, Schu $ tz became aliated with the Graduate Faculty at the New School for Social Research in New York where he started teaching as Lecturer in 1943, advancing to a full Professor of Sociology in 1952 and also of Philosophy in 1956. He died on May 20, 1959 in New York.

Schu W tz, Alfred (18991959) and to turn to Husserls phenomenology which ultimately gave the name to his approach. Husserl was concerned with the acts of consciousness which establish the meaningful taken-for-grantedness of the world in humans natural attitude. His term life world, which Schu $ tz later assumes, is aimed at the reality constituted in those acts. Based primarily on this philosophical approach, Schu $ tz wrote his rst monograph, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt, in 1932, in which he developed the basic concept of his theory (Schu $ tz 1932). Starting with the criticism on Max Weber mentioned above, he devoted himself to the process in which humans create the social world as a reality that is meaningful and understandable to them. going on. The nal meaning of an action can be found in the experience perceived by the subject when looking at the changes that have emerged in the meaning structure of the action when the action is completed. The meaning attached to an action and consequently the schemes of experience are thus not only aected by the acts of consciousness but also by the action itself. In his second step, Schu $ tz proceeded to show how the schemes of experience are shaped by interaction and communication. He perceived communication as a process in which two subjective streams of consciousness are coordinated within a social interaction (Wirkensbeziehung). Thus, communication signies an interaction in which the meaning of egos action consists in the intention to evoke a reaction of the alter. Actions in this sense have the function of signs which are mutually indicated and interpreted. The ultimate meaning of my action is revealed in the reaction of the Other and vice versa, therefore communication generates a chain of moti es where my inorder-to-moti es become because-moti es of the Other and provide a common stock of shared patterns of interpretation which allows for mutual understanding even if each of the actors are always referring to their own schemes of experience. In this concept of understanding, based on interaction, Schu $ tz oers his own solution to the problem of intersubjectivity posed by Husserl. The constitution and appropriation of shared knowledge primarily takes place in long-lasting faceto-face interaction (we-relations) where the mutual expectations are learned, veried, and sedimented to typical patterns that can be applied to more remote and anonymous strata of the social world. As a result, the meaning structure of the social world is characterized by typications of actions, situations, and persons generated in interaction and communication. In these three steps, Schu $ tz laid down the main features of his theory of the life world. In his later work, Schu $ tz (1962, 1964, 1966) determined this communicatively created social reality as the world of everyday life, in which typical patterns are taken for granted, and which represents the intersubjective common core of the reality we live in. Later on (Schu $ tz 1962, 1970), he disclosed further structural characteristics of this everyday core of the life world. Since its typical structure greatly depends on action, it is also the pragmatic orientation selecting the areas where typication processes take place. Both typicality and this kind of selection, which Schu $ tz designated as pragmatic rele ance, represent two generative principles of order in the everyday world. They determine its formal structure and at the same time, when realized in action, they shape this structure into a concrete socialcultural world, which is thus characterized by social distribution and dierentiation of knowledge. A third moment structuring the everyday world can be found in the rootedness of its constitution in individual action. Here actors and their bodies represent the

3. Theory of the Life World with its E eryday Core

In order to grasp the constitution of the social world, Schu $ tz (1932) had to transcend the realm of consciousness and perception analyzed by Husserl. He included both acts of consciousness as well as human action and interaction into the constitutive process under scrutiny. Departing from the transcendental philosophical approach, he developed his own mundane phenomenology which analyzes the constitution of the meaningful reality within social relationships in the everyday world. He proceeded in three steps dealing with three problems constitutive for any theory of action which is searching for the construction of social reality. (a) How does a meaningful orientation of human action emerge? (b) How can we understand the Other? (c) How is socially-shared, intersubjective valid knowledge generated? Following the principle of methodological individualism, Schu $ tz started with the analysis of single individual action. Relying on Bergsons concept of the inner stream of lived experience and on Husserls investigations on intentionality and temporality of consciousness, Schu $ tz rst explored the constitution of meaning in subjects as a temporal process. The meaning attached to a lived experience emerges from successive acts of selective reection aimed towards it and framing it into a context of other experiences. The schemes of experience on which the primary meaning of action, i.e., its project is based, arise from this basic temporal dynamics and plasticity of consciousness. The temporality of the meaning attached to an action manifests itself in two kinds of motivation attached to its dierent temporal dimensions: in-order-to-moti es which direct action toward the future, and becausemoti es representing the roots of the action in the past. However, the meaning of the project of action changes during the time when the projected action is 13604

Schu W tz, Alfred (18991959) central point of the e eryday world and its temporal, spatial, and social dimensions that are arranged into spheres of past and future, of within-reach and distant and of intimacy and anonymity, respectively, to the ctors own position (Schu $ tz and Luckmann 1973). Everyday reality is nevertheless not identical with the life world on the whole. By suspending their pragmatic interests, actors are able to modify their everyday experiences and perceive them as objects of a game, fantasy, art, science, or, if the conscious attention is completely absent, as a dream. There are areaseven in the realm of everyday action directed by the principal of pragmatic relevancewhich are beyond the sphere of actors everyday practice and therefore transcend it. All these modications represent dierent provinces of meaning transcending the everyday world and constituting multiple realities (Schu $ tz 1962) which make up the life world. Nevertheless, among the dierent provinces of the life world, the everyday core denotes a paramount reality since it is only here that actors, driven by the fundamental anxiety when facing the nality of their lives, have to master their living conditions and are engaged in communicative processes producing common knowledge which makes mutual understanding possible. Schu $ tz (1962) viewed communication as a substantial constitutive mechanism of social reality and stressed the role of language in this process. He considered languageincluding its syntax and semanticsas an objectivation of sedimented, social provided stock of knowledge that preserves relevances and typication inherent to cultures and social groups, and thus as crucial for the constitution of the life world (Schu $ tz and Luckmann 1989). Schu $ tz saw language as delineating an essential case of social objectied systems of appresentation which bridges the transcendence between dierent areas and meaning provinces of the life world. Another important integrative mechanism in the life world are symbolic structures, which are often based on language, and intermediate between the everyday world and noneveryday realities such as religion, arts, or politics (Schu $ tz 1962). Schu $ tz did not restrict his study of the structure of the life world solely to theoretical research. He also applied his theory as a general interpretative scheme to several social elds and problems. He explored courses of intercultural communication and the social distribution of knowledge, the social conditions of equality in modern societies as well as the elds of music and literature (Schu $ tz 1964). plain social phenomena by modeling ideal actors and courses of action which they endorse with special features as explanatory variables. However, he did not see ideal types in the Weberian sense, i.e., as a scientic model which does not need to correspond to reality in all respects. For Schu $ tz, the ideal-typical method is legitimized by his ndings on the typicality of everyday world which is the object of social research. Social reality can be approached by type-construction on the scientic level because its immanent structure is typied itself. Thus, the Schu $ tzian theory of the life world and its structures represents a methodological tool to bridge the gap between sociological theoretical reasoning and its object. The methodological rule which Schu $ tz derived from his theoretical approach consists correspondingly in the postulate of adequacy (Schu $ tz 1962, 1964) between everyday and scientic typications. This postulate holds that ideal types featured by the social sciences have to be constructed in correspondence to the structure of the everyday typications, so that everyday actors can take the model for granted when they act under the conditions stated in the ideal type. In this sense, social scientists as well as everyday actors have to follow the same frame of reference given by the structure of the life world but their cognitive attitude dier in several respects: scientists neither share the pragmatic interest of everyday actors nor do they share their everyday rationality restricted by their beliefs in the grantedness of typical knowledge. Opposing T. Parsons functionalism and C. G. Hempels methodologic positivism, Schu $ tz stressed that scientists must not impose their own theoretical concepts and rationality on their object of studythe life world. First, they must discover and then respect its immanent meaning structure.

5. The Signicance of the Schu W tzian Approach for the Social Sciences
Since the 1960s, Schu $ tzs theory has drawn sociologists attention to inquiries into everyday interaction, communication as well as to the insight that social reality has to be considered as a construction produced within these processes. Sociologists started to examine the practices of everyday action, communication and interpretation from which social reality emerges. H. Garnkels (1967) Ethnomethology, which was aimed at nding the formal properties of everyday practices, led to a series of case studies covering a wide range of everyday life in society and its institutions. Continuing this line of research, examinations of everyday communication were provided by E. A. Sheglo and H. Sacks (1995), whose Con ersational Analysis became a widespread method in qualitative sociological research. A. Cicourels (1964) Cogniti e Sociology revealed the constructed character of data in social institutions as well as in science and thus initiated a 13605

4. Consequences of the Theory of Life World for the Methodology of the Social Sciences
Schu $ tz considered the construction of ideal types to be the general methodological device in the social sciences since sociology, economy, political science, etc., ex-

Schu W tz, Alfred (18991959) series of studies in the sociology of organization and in the sociology sciences. Milieus as formations of everyday interaction are the subject of the Social Phenomenology R. Gratho (1986). P. L. Berger and Th. F. Luckmanns (1966) idea of the Social Construction of Reality (as being a general process in which cultural worlds emerge) triggered new impulses in both the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of culture reconceived now in Schu $ tzian terms. In this context, Schu $ tzs impact can also be seen in the sociology of language and the sociology of religion. Contemporary Marxian theory saw the way in which Schu $ tz focused on the everyday practice as a possible mediation between social structure and individual consciousness. The term phenomenological sociology was coined in the 1970s (G. Psathas 1973) to address the spectrum of approaches oriented and inspired by Schu $ tzs theory. Under this label, Schu $ tzs approach became one of the general paradigms in the interpretative social science and theory of action. The diusion and empirical application of the Schu $ tzian approach enforced the search for qualitative research methods which would reveal data pertaining to the social construction of social reality in everyday life. Aside from ethnomethodology and conversational analysis mentioned above, this quest especially led to a renement in the techniques of narrative interviews and in biographical research. Once established in the 1970s, the Schu $ tzian paradigm inuenced the mainstream of sociological theory which became sensitive not only to the social construction of life world but also to the phenomenological background of the Schu $ tzian theory. The life world, in the sense of a basic social reality provided by humans in their natural intercourse, became one of the central terms in social theory (J. Habermas 1981). The everyday construction of social reality was recognized as a crucial mechanism in which society emerges (P. Bourdieu 1972, A. Giddens 1976, Z. Baumann 1991). The phenomenological conception of meaning constitution reformulated as an autopoiesis (selfcreation) of social and psychic systems inuenced the development of the contemporary sociological system theory (N. Luhmann 1996). Beyond of the scope of sociology, other humanities also gained innovative impulses from the Schu $ tzian approach. In philosophy, Schu $ tzs theory led to a critical assessment of the Husserlian view of intersubjectivity and to the conceptions of a worldly phenomenology (L. Embree 1988) or of a philosophy of modern anonymity (M. Natanson 1986). In the literature, Schu $ tzs constructionism inspired the esthetics of reception which pointed out the beholders participation in co-creating the autonomous reality of literary works (H. R. Jauss 1982). Schu $ tzs concept of the structure of life world also aected theorizing in social geography (B. Werlen 1993), educational theory (K. Meyer-Drawe 1984), and political science (E. Voegelin 1966). 13606 See also: Constructivism\Constructionism: Methodology; Culture, Sociology of; Ethnomethodology: General; Everyday Life, Anthropology of; Husserl, Edmund (18591938); Interactionism: Symbolic; Interpretive Methods: Micromethods; Knowledge, Sociology of; Methodological Individualism: Philosophical Aspects; Phenomenology in Sociology; Phenomenology: Philosophical Aspects; Verstehen und Erkla $ ren, Philosophy of; Weber, Max (18641920)

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Bauman Z 1991 Modernity and Ambi alence. Polity Press, Oxford, UK Berger P L, Luckmann Th 1966 The Social Construction of Reality. Doubleday, Garden City, New York Bourdieu P 1972 Esquisse dune TheT orie de la Pratique, preT ceT deT de trois eT tudes dethnologie kabyle. Droz S.A., Geneva, Switzerland nome nologie et les Sciences Sociales: la Cefai D 1998 Phe Naissance dune Philosophie Anthropologique. Libraire Droz, Geneva, Switzerland Cicourel A V 1964 Method and Measurement in Sociology. The Free Press of Glencoe, New York Embree L 1988 Wordly Phenomenology: The Continuing Inuence of Alfred Schutz on North American Human Sciences. University Press of America, Washington DC Garnkel G 1967 Studies in Ethnomethodology. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Clis, NJ Giddens A 1976 New Rules of Sociological Method. Hutchinson & Co., London, UK Gratho R 1986 Milieu und Lebenswelt. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt\M, Germany Habermas J 1981 Theorie des kommunikati en Handelns. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt\M, Germany q sthetische Erfahrung und literarische HerJauss H P 1982 A meneutik. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt\M, Germany Luhmann N 1996 Die neuzeitlichen Wissenschaften und die Pha W nomenologie. Picus, Vienna, Austria Meyer-Drawe K 1984 Leiblichkeit und SozialitaT t. Fink, Munich, Germany Natanson M 1986 Anonymity: A Study in The Philosophy of Alfred Schutz. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN Psathas, G (ed.) 1973 Phenomenological Sociology. Issues and Applications. John Wiley & Sons, New York Sacks H 1995 Lectures on Con ersation. Blackwell, Oxford, UK Schu $ tz A 1932 Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt. Springer, Vienna Schu $ tz A 1962 Collected Papers I. Nijho, The Hague, The Netherlands Schu $ tz A 1964 Collected Papers II. Nijho, The Hague, The Netherlands Schu $ tz A 1966 Collected Papers III. Nijho, The Hague, The Netherlands Schu $ tz A 1970 Reections on the Problem of Rele ance. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT Schu $ tz A 1982 Life Forms and Meaning Structure. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London Schu $ tz A 1995 Collected Papers IV. Nijho, The Hague, The Netherlands Schu $ tz A, Luckmann T 1973 Structures of Life World I. Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL

Science and De elopment

Schu $ tz A, Luckmann T 1989 Structures of Life World II. Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL Schu $ tz A, Parsons T 1978 Theory of Social Action: The Correspondence of Alfred Schu W tz and Talcott Parsons. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN Srubar I 1988 Kosmion die Genese der pragmatischen Lebensweltheorie on Alfred Schu W tz und ihr anthropologischer Hintergrund. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, Germany Wagner H R 1983 Alfred Schu W tz. An Intellectual Biography. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Werlen B 1993 Society, Action and Space. An Alternati e Human Geography. Routledge, London Voegelin E 1966 Anamnesis. Zur Theorie der Geschichte und Politik. Piper, Munich

I. Srubar Copyright # 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Science and Development

Duringthepasthalf-century,conventionalunderstandings of science, development, and their relationship have changed radically. Formerly, science was thought to refer to a clear and specic variety of Western knowledge with uniformly positive eects on society. Formerly, development was viewed as a unidirectional process of social change along Western lines. Formerly, science was viewed as a powerful contributor to the developmental process. Each of these ideas has been subjected to insightful criticism. This article will examine science and development, concluding that the relationship between the two is problematic, partly because of the complexity of the concepts themselves. Three major theories of development are considered, together with the main types of research institutions in developing areas.

1. Science
Much of what is termed science in developing areas is far from what would be considered pure science in the developed world. The root concept of science involves research, the systematic attempt to acquire new knowledge. In its modern form, this involves experimentation or systematic observation by highly trained specialists in research careers, typically university professors with state-of-the-art laboratory equipment. These scientists seek to contribute to a cumulative body of factual and theoretical knowledge, testing hypotheses by means of experiments and reporting their results to colleagues through publication in peer-reviewed journals. Yet when a new variety of seed is tested by a national research institute and distributed to farmers in Africa, this is described as the result of science. When the curator of a botanical exhibit has a college

degree, he or she may be described as the scientist. When a newspaper column discusses malaria or AIDS, scientic treatments are recommended. Seeds, educated people, and advice are not science in the abstract and lofty sense of the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake or systematically veried facts about the world. But they are science from the standpoint of those who matterlocal people who spend scarce resources on their childrens education, development experts who determine how and where to spend funds, politicians who decide whether to open a new university, corporate personnel who open a new factory in a developing region. Perhaps the most important shift in recent thinking about science is a broadening of the scholarly view to include the ideas of science found among ordinary people. These are often more extended in developing areas, because of the association of science with modern things and ideas. Science in its extended sense includes technological artifacts, trained expertise, and knowledge of the way the world works. The importance of this point will be clear in the conclusion. Given the fuzziness of the boundaries that separate science from other institutions, and the dependence of modern research on sophisticated technical equipment, the term technoscience is often used to denote the entire complex of processes, products, and knowledge that ows from modern research activities. Even if we recognize that the term science has extended meanings, it is useful to draw a distinction between (a) the institutions that produce knowledge and artifacts and (b) the knowledge that is produced. That is, on the one hand, there are organizations, people, and activities that are devoted to the acquisition of knowledge and things that can be produced with knowledge. These constitute the modern organization of research. On the other hand, there are claims involving knowledge and artifactsoften signicantly transformed as they leave the connes of the research laboratory. What makes claims and practices scientic is their association with scientic institutions. Modern research capacity is concentrated in industrialized countries. Indeed, with respect to the global distribution of scientic and technical personnel, scientic organizations, publications, citations to scientic work, patents, equipment, and resources, scientic institutions display extremely high degrees of inequality. The most common indicator of scientic output is publications. In 1995, Western Europe, North America, Japan, and the newly industrialized countries accounted for about 85 percent of the world total. Leaving aside countries and allies of the former Soviet Union, developing areas contributed less than 9 percent of the world total. Much the same applies to technological output measured in patents and expenditures on research and development (UNESCO 1998). Yet if we shift our focus from the question of inequality to the question of diusion, an entirely dierent picture arises. To what extent have the idea 13607

International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences

ISBN: 0-08-043076-7