The Failure of Lewis's Functionalism Author(s): Joseph Owens Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 36, No.

143, Special Issue: Mind, Causation and Action (Apr., 1986), pp. 159-173 Published by: Blackwell Publishing for The Philosophical Quarterly Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2219766 Accessed: 23/11/2010 16:57
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Vol.36 No. 143 ThePhilosophical Quarterly ISSN 0031-8094 $2.00

THE FAILURE OF LEWIS'S FUNCTIONALISM

BYJOSEPH OWENS
kindsofmistakes Certain oflogicalbehaviourism werecharacteristic and radical physicalism, and subsequentaccountsof the mentalhave been withthesedifficulties formulated in mind.The logicalbehaviourist identifiedmental states withdispositions to overt in the behaviour, thereby flying faceofthestrong intuition that total forexample, sharemuchthe paralytics, same range of mentalstatesas we do, despitethe factthattheyexhibit forthe no behaviour. Such individuals posed no specialproblem virtually radicalphysicalist who identified mental etc.) with (pain,belief, state-types which of states the states), state-types (e.g.,types neurophysiological physical totalparalytic radical could clearlyinstantiate. has However, physicalism thanlogicalbehaviourism. Giventhediversity of provedevenless attractive it to is as the radical life, does, implausible suppose, physicalist intelligent that to each kind ofmental there state, corresponds e.g.,pain,someparticuin organisms ofphysical larkind state.Statessuchas painare realized whose in to have little common. More even appear physiologies importantly, if it shouldbe possibleto provide vastdisjuncphysiological predicates (perhaps with tiveones) whichare in factco-extensive mentalistic there is predicates, thisco-extensivity no reasonto supposethat in character.1 wouldbe law-like one can conceiveof nomologically Given any such correlation, possible inwhich failto obtain; inwhich worlds thecorrelations worlds there possible withfamiliar are individuals mental statesbutwithnon-standard neuroloThese widely sharedintuitions, ofcourse,conflict with thephysicalisgies.2 states are tobe identified with ticclaimthat kinds ofmental kinds ofphysical states. In a number ofinfluential and original papersDavid Lewis has defended, a account of the mental, on a priori one employing functionalist grounds, and physicalistic but to certain behaviouristic fashioned intuitions, explicitly avoid their twin pitfalls.Actually, over the years,he appears to have ofa priori defended threedifferent versions functionalism. The first version
in L. Fosterand see Donald Davidson,"MentalEvents", For discussion ofthesedifficulties and Theory (Amherst, 1970), and HilaryPutnam, J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience "Psychological Predicates",in W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merrill(eds.), Art,Mind, and Religion 1967). (Pittsburgh, 2 For thepurposes theradical is one whoidentifies mental ofthis state paper,then, physicalist statetypes holdsthat theseidentities P, ... Pn,and,inaddition, Ml ... Mn with physical types obtainin every possibleworld.

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we maycall "the strong the second one, "token-functionLewis theory", the third The strongLewis and one, "species-functionalism".3 alism", tosteer with was the one associated formulated him, explicitly theory, usually a course betweenlogical behaviourism and radicalphysicalism. Though Lewis nowhere the second and third verformulation, rejectshis original sionsare substantially weakerthanthefirst, and they elements incorporate in thefirst. His basicstrategy the to circumvent difficulties remains designed in character. in thesedifferent On and itis twofold accounts, same,however, ofmental terms as abbrevitheone hand,he developsa conceptual analysis which definite states descriptions designate descriptions satisfying ating - and in formulating thesedescriptions he reliesupon conditions functional On theother intuitions. modified behaviouristic hand,he secureshismaterin factdesignate so thatthesedescriptions ialismbyarguing states, physical in his states.4 These twocomponents thatmental statesin factare physical in in his strong version(considered construal accountare givena specific in thesecondand third version are modified SectionI here),and they (see each oftheseaccounts mySectionsII and III). In thispaperI willarguethat noneofthesefunctional his claimsto thecontrary, is defective; that, despite and betweenlogicalbehaviourism analysesprovidesfora way of steering radicalphysicalism.

THE STRONG LEWIS THEORY theclaimthat namesofmental In hisoriginal formulation Lewisdefended in which states termsof their characterize statesabbreviate descriptions 'the state that is of the form: causes and effects; typically descriptions typical which in further mental states results inducedin suchand sucha fashion, M, ... Mn, and which in turnresultsin this and thatbehaviour'.So, for such as: a description a termsuch as 'pain' is takento abbreviate example, of to or is induced 'thestatethat tissue; damage, by danger damage, typically in crying ofself-pity, in feelings thatresults out,in seeking help,in aversive causalroleof thecharacteristic behaviour... 'These descriptions specifying fromcommon-sense statesare to be extracted the variouspsychological one mustacquireif thekindofknowledge and they psychology, encapsulate
3The strong and defended in his "An Argument fortheIdentity is elaborated Lewis theory and 63 (1966), pp. 17-25, and in his "Psychophysical ofPhilosophy Theory", TheJournal 50 (1972), pp. 249-58. He TheAustralasian Theoretical Journal Identifications", ofPhilosophy TheJournal viewin his "ReviewofArt, thetoken-functionalist defends Mind,andReligion", of in his 66 (1,969), species-functionalism pp. 22-7, and he optsforwhatI am calling Philosophy in Philosophy "Mad Pain and MartianPain", in N. Block (ed.), Readings (CamofPsychology Mass., 1980). bridge, 4 and Theoretiand "Psychophysical theIdentity for For details see "An Argument Theory", cal Identifications".

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5Details maybe obtained once againfrom thepaperscitedin note4. 6Lewis and providesthis more technicalaccount of mentaltermsin "Psychophysical and in doingso he drawsupon a generalaccountof theoretical Theoretical Identifications", 67 termshe earlieradvancedin "How to Define Theoretical Terms",Journal ofPhilosophy in the terms his claimis thatpsychological maybe defined (1970), pp. 427-46. Veryroughly, Let P(M1 ... M.) be a formulation of our common-sense fashion. psychological following whichis fashioned of everyday usingthe platitudes), (the conjunction psychological theory terms M1 ... Mn (all of whichare names).FromP(Mi ... M,) we obtainthe psychological names M1 ... Mn by the psychological replacing open sentenceP(xl ... xn) by uniformly distinct variables xl ... xn.Takinghis cues from Ramsayand Carnap,Lewis thenarguesthat that a claimto theeffect oftheoriginal the"empirical content" theory P(Mi ... Mn) is simply The terms theopen sentence there ofstatessatisfying exists a uniquen-tuple M1 P(xl ... Xn). is sucha uniquen-tuple ifthere themembers ... Mn respectively ofthisn-tuple (and designate thisintuition. in such a wayas to capture and theyare defined otherwise), designate nothing as follows: They are defined
Mi d/fqyl[Y2 * * [Yn(Xl) ... (Xn) (P(xl ... Xn) =yl = Xl&y2 = X2& .. . &Yn = Xn)

one is to be a competent of everyday terms. The psychological employer that to of someone he idea here is that we reluctant would be general say not it if know that was a understood the term he did (or concept) fully 'pain' of thekindjust causes and effects statewithcertain kindsof characteristic his mentioned.5 In a more technical vein, Lewis elaboratedand refined of everyday terms common-sense treatment by construing psychological to define each as a theory, and thenapplying techniques Ramsey psychology theoretical terms defined term as the them postuby (treating psychological we may ignorethese For our purposes,however, lates of the theory).6 thisdeviceallowedhimto replaceeach to notethat technical details, except whichspecified term a a statein with definite description psychological withothermentalstates, termsof its causal relations inputsand outputs, in thedescription. We will without employing anypsychological vocabulary such as the consideronlyintuitive functional specifications, accordingly in mindthat themental one justgiven for'pain',whilekeeping abbreviated in such descriptions eliminable. are theoretically whichfigure terms to allow,on the In construing mental in thisfashion, he attempts terms one hand, thatthe statedesignated by a givenmentaltermMi may,on causal roleto playitscharacteristic whilefailing occasion,be instantiated thestatetypically It is enoughthat total as in thecase ofthenearly paralytic. are descriptions playsthis causal role. On the otherhand these definite causal roles,and thusthey in terms ofstates accidental oftheir descriptions different kindsofstates in appropriately different worlds, possible designate In thissection and thushe hopestoavoidtheexcessesofradical physicalism. thisaccount is notadequateto I willarguethat, to thecontrary, appearances I will argue thatthe way in whichhe tailorsthis thistask.In particular, of thetotalparalytic of his accountso as to allowforthepossibility version

termsare replaced by definite for M2, M3, etc. In this way the psychological Similarly do contain do notemploy which they quantifiers though descriptions anymentalistic vocabulary states. overmental ranging

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the commits himtoconstruing mental terms as non-contingently designating him to radical commits and thus samephysical statein every world, possible and all itsattendant implausibilities. physicalism thestatethathappensto term On thisaccountthemental Mi designates the relevant characteristic conditions satisfy typically C, ... Cm, and an in the actualworldis in Mi if and onlyif it is in the statethat individual that each It is notnecessary Cl... Cm(intheactualworld). satisfies typically characterconditions the causal tokenof thestatedesignated Mi by satisfy in the of 'typically' isticof Mi, and thisfactis conveyed by the insertion the Thus the and with associated Mi. non-paralytic may paralytic description thestate does not in thecase oftheformer eventhough be in thesamestate, well,but one wantsto knowwhat playitsusual causal role.This is all very - whatkindsof Lewis countsas beingin thesamestatein such instances is in painjustin case that thetotal are these? One mayadmit states paralytic role of pain,but stillwantto he is in thestatethatplaysthe characteristic forbeingin this are necessary and sufficient knowwhatkindsof conditions in the functional the causal conditions kind of state.Obviously specified in question, as theconditions ofpaindo notofthemselves definition provide The functional thecausalconditions. ofthisstate instances mayfailto satisfy of the state;it instances the causal role of typical characterizes description its causal role. Some care, picks out the stateby an accidentalfeature, is needed in understanding however, just how the account appeals to x and that twotokens The claimis notone to theeffect accidental properties. y are instancesof the same mentalstate if and onlyif theyhave some thesame causal role,for viz. thatofplaying in common, feature accidental statemayfailto playthesame causal role.The tokens of the same mental stateMi is of thesame mental thembothas instances reasonforregarding which is such kind ofstate, ofsomefurther that are instances Ni,a state they associatedwith the functional conditions thatitsinstances satisfy typically terms is thatwhenwe use mental Mi. The suggestion M, ... Mn,we use N, there are (intheactual that them with thepresumption world) state-types, functional the relevant ... Nm, whose tokens satisfy descriptions. typically state is in mental Mi justin case he is And,in theactualworld anyindividual us in attributing in thecorresponding stateNi. This indeedis whatjustifies individual. mental statesto theparalyzed Lewis ofthesestate-types, So faras thenature N,... Nm,is concerned, are neurophysiological; thatthey arguesthatwe have good reasonto think the intrinsic to specify thatit fallsto idealizedneurophysiological theory of characterizations of these states(as opposed to the extrinsic character to in theadequacyofphysical Confident their causal roles).7 theory explain he envisions behavioural all physicalphenomena, phenomena, including
7 See papers 4. innote cited

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idealized neurophysiological theory as providing us with intrinsic ... of characterizations, Dm, the statesN. ... Nm; i.e. withintrinsic D, of the physicalstatetypeswhichhappen to satisfy characterizations the functional conditions ofmental ... characteristic states Given such Mm. M, a physiological one couldsaythat an individual in theactualworld is theory, in a given in state mental case he in the is state Mi just Di, i.e.,just satisfying in case he is in Ni. No longerwould we need to employ'typically' in the we for would have available the intrinsic characformulating conditions, terizations ofthosestates whoseinstantiations satisfied therelevant typically functional conditions. Idealizedphysiology would allowus to saywhatthe stateis thatplayssuch and such a causal role,to say "what'sthere"even whenit does notplaytheusual role,and thusit allowsus to dispensewith 'typically'. of such physiological characterizaBut, of course,Lewis does notthink tionsas providing and sufficient conditions for the of necessary obtaining in different mental worlds. states He does not his as possible regard analysis himtothat kindofphysicalism which wouldidentify committing implausible mentalstatesM, ... Mm withphysiological statesN, ... Nm in every allowshim,on theone hand,to possibleworld.He claimsthathis analysis Ml ... Mm respectively withN1 ... Nmin the actualworld, while identify on theother itcommits himtomaking theseidentities in hand,that denying, world. He attempts toallowfor each mental this possible every byconstruing termMi as abbreviating a definite of the form 'the statethat description in a possibleworldWj the typically playscausal roleRi'. Mi thusdesignates state(in Wj) thattypically playscausal role R; and since different physical in different states thiscondition worlds Mi willdesignate maysatisfy possible different statesin different possibleworlds. physical WhatI wantto question mental is whether he can plausibly terms analyse as contingent in thissenseand atthesametime envision idealized neurophyas providing theintrinsic characterizations ofthestates designated siology by in the actualworld.Suppose,forthe sake of argument, mentalterms that suchphysiological weretoproceedafter themanner investigations suggested in this that individuals world byLewis. That is, supposewe wereto discover are in pain if and onlyiftheir c-fibres are firing (or some such),thatthey have the thought thatsnowis whiteif and onlyif some specific neuronal and so on forthevariousmentalstates.This, of Ni obtains, configuration butI wantto drawattention toa quitedifferent is highly course, implausible, and successful problem.Suppose now, in the lightof thisverypowerful one oftheseneurophysiologists, claimthat it thatAlf, wereto boldly theory, is simply notpossibleforanyone (in anypossibleworld)to be in painunless that hisc-fibres that we can are firing. He is informed he is clearly mistaken, in whichindividuals ofworlds are in pain,eventhough there easilyconceive

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in theseworlds at all. However, are no c-fibres he is notat all swayed bythis to conceive of such for he is too well aware of worlds, apparent ability only to construe themistaken theoretical identities (a posteriori) tendency general as contingent. It was, forexample, notuncommon forindividuals to think thattheycould conceiveof worldsin whichwaterfailedto be H20. They in whicha colourless, conceived ofworlds odourless, potable... liquidwas notH20, and they that were ofworlds in supposed they thereby conceiving whichwater was notH20. Theyweremistaken ofcourse,in thatthey were notofworlds inwhich water ofworlds failed tobe H20 butrather conceiving in which some liquid otherthanwater(H20) had manyof the surface ofwater to pickit features ofwater.True, weuse theseaccidental features nora sufficient forsomething's a necessary condition out,but it is neither these conditions. It has fallento science to being water that it satisfy ofthestuff that satisfies and we have thenature theseconditions, determine it is not thatit is H20. Giventhatthisis the natureof water, determined fail that water to be should H20.8 possible ofthestuff in to determine nature as itfellto thechemist theintrinsic Just it theactualworlddesignated our term in our has fallen 'water', so, by story, theintrinsic of thestatedesignated to thephysiologist to determine nature that'pain' by 'pain' (in the actualworld).And we havein factdetermined the commonly This is the state that satisfies designatesc-fibrefirings. functional conditions associatedwith'pain', just as H20 is the employed the everyday conditions associatedwith substancethat in fact satisfies thestate Prior 'water'. to thisdetermination, so longas one identified only by about'pain' itsaccidental itseemedreasonable to speculate causalcharacter, in different We simply kindsofstates different possibleworlds. designating for didn'tknowwhat 'pain' really (thiswas not a prerequisite designated in theuse of 'pain'), and so thereappearedto be nothing beingcompetent itdesignate state world odd aboutletting Nkinworld Ni in possible Wj,state theintrinsic character nowthat we havedetermined Wi,and so on. However, otherthanwhatit is, thatit could be anything of pain, it is sillyto think as itwouldbe to supposethat water could c-fibre justas silly namely, firings; fail to be H20. In short, Lewis's efforts to avoid radicalphysicalism, by which definite that the mentaltermsabbreviate descriptions suggesting in different seemsto different states worlds, possible contingently designate in hisaccount, theclaimthat eachmental be undercut bythesecondelement a kind ofphysical state. Werephysiological term in fact investigadesignates conditions envisioned tiontoproceedin themanner byLewis,thefunctional
8For a defence "The Meaning of"essentialistic" intuitions see Hilary ofthesekinds Putnam, andReality: Vol. 2 (Cambridge, ofMeaning",in hisMind,Language Mass., Philosophical Papers, to provide and I willnotattempt are,I believe, 1975). These intuitions plausible, any intuitively additional forthemhere. support

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would cease to have the appearanceof being necessaryand sufficient wouldbe little or no temptation to conceive and there ofmental conditions, terms as abbreviating In these conditions. descriptions embodying Kripkean wouldbe moreakinto reference-fixing thedescriptions thanto terminology, of and sufficient conditions. descriptions necessary Ifone is going to claim, as Lewis does in theseearly that there is a papers, kind of state each mental a term, particular neurophysiological designated by character is to be revealedby neurophysiological state whose intrinsic thenI failto see howone can avoidthisobjection. It certainly investigation, won't do simply to claimthatfunctional are different from descriptions in that it is that for is analytic descriptions pain, example, reference-fixing functional This is thevery whatever satisfies therelevant conditions. at point that throw hisinvestigations doubton this issue,and Alfcan simply respond on his side. The he can claimto havehistory Moreover, allegedanalyticity. that itis in someway'analytic' that painis thestate onlyreasonforthinking causal conditions we wouldnotsay that certain characteristic is that satisfies of someonethathe had acquiredthe termor concept'pain' if he did not knowthat etc.But,then, consider fashion, painwas inducedin thisand that thefamiliar term'water'once again.Who couldbe said to understand this itto designate term thestuff that fills ourrivers, unlesshe understands lakes, etc. It is requiredof an Englishspeakerthathe be acquainted withthese to himan underkindsofcommonplace features before we wouldattribute of'water'.However, itis correct a speaker to saythat must standing though knowsomething likethisaboutwaterbeforehe can be said to understand to inferfromthis thatthese kinds of the term,it would be incorrect conditions are necessary and sufficient forsomething's conditions being of the character water.Priorto the scientific determination of water,one havebeen tempted to elevatetheseconditions to thestatus ofnecesmight to thinkthatit is somehowanalytic that conditions, saryand sufficient ifand onlyifitsatisfies theseconditions. After is water all,when something one learnedtheterm 'water'one learneditas designating thestuff thatfills to exposethe inadeour lakes,etc. It has fallento scientific investigation quacy of thisproposal.Likewise,in the case at hand. Priorto our actual there that was a certain in determination painsare c-fibre firings, plausibility relied upon in identifying supposingthatthe causal conditions typically of pain were necessary and sufficient forsomething's instances conditions that it true is in indeed is that whatever satisfies pain being pain; analytically in there was a that theseconditions. plausibility supposing Consequently, in which'pain' designated ofpossibleworlds one could conceive something in theactualworld. in as was evident thanwhatitdesignates other However, about what one can and can't the case of water,one can be mistaken In general, as to thepossibility ofa given statehaving conceive. speculations

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in different thisor thatdifferent are somewhat composition possibleworlds unfounded when made priorto the actual scientific of the determination of thestate.This investigation on character limits what one can and places can'tconceive.In thecase at hand,we havediscovered thecommon element between thetotal thenon-paralytic, and a dog,invirtue ofwhich it paralytic, in is trueto sayofthem all that are in each case their c-fibres are pain they This is all ittakeshere,no moreand no less; and thisis all ittakesin firing. anypossibleworld. A moreplausibleline of defence forAlf appearsto be at hand,however, the pain/c-fibre a crucial distinction in treating seems to be ignoring on the model of the water/H20 identification. identification He is simply in thinking thathe can dismissclaimsto be able to conceiveof mistaken in the way in whichhe worldsin whichpain fails to be c-fibrefiring in which waterfailsto be claimsto be able to conceiveofworlds dismisses how an H2O. One can dismissclaims of the latterkind by explaining be of in herself to worlds individual suppose conceiving mistakenly might whichwaterfailsto be H20. She conceivesof worldsin whichsomething other thanH20 has thesurface ofwater and producesexperiappearances toour"water-experiences". One can conceive of identical encesqualitatively inwhich ofa world fails and though thisis nottoconceive water suchworlds, itis. to be H2O, it is all too easyto supposethat is quite different; But in the case of pain the story one cannotdismiss inwhich ofworlds fails tobe c-fibre claimstobe able to conceive pain firings One cannotundermine in anysimilar fashion. such a claimbyarguing that in thinks she is of world which is the claimant a there conceiving pain though of something in the absence of c-fibre she is really quite firings thinking of a worldin whichsomeonehas an she is merely different: conceiving identical to the we havewhenwe experiexperience experience qualitatively occursin identical ence pain,a worldin whichthisqualitatively experience One cannot thisstrategy to dismiss theabsenceofanyc-fibre employ firings. for thesimplereasonthat identical suchclaims, beingin a statequalitatively of a to the statewe are in whenin pain is beingin pain. Thus, conceiving identical to our pain worldin whichan individual is in a statequalitatively ofa world in theabsenceofc-fibre statedespite is,in fact, firings conceiving is in pain without therebeinganyc-fibre It whichthatindividual firings. would appearthenthatAlfcannotappeal to some simpleanalogy between 'water' and 'pain' to dismisshis opponents'claim that 'pain' does not eventhough that c-fibre is whatitdesignates in designate firings necessarily the actualworld;he cannotexplainawayhis opponents' to apparent ability ofworlds in which be able to conceive there is painin theabsenceofc-fibre firings.

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in arguing effect Such intuitions were,ofcourse,used to great byKripke of I kinds and various are, think, identity quiteconvinagainst theory, they not to a defender of are available maybe, they though they cing.Compelling One cannotopt forthe functionalist of Lewis stylefunctionalism. analysis of the form: a description 'the statethattypically is 'pain' as abbreviating induced in such and such a fashion... thatis causallyrelatedto other same time internal states Si, Sj, etc.in thisand that way.. .', andat the employ thatan individual intuition is in pain if he is in a state the semi-Cartesian to the statewe are in whenin pain. If theconceptof identical qualitatively is such that experienceis a sufficient havinga certainqualitative pain it in then can't also be that one condition for concept partofthat being pain, a of satisfies is in pain onlyifone is in thestatethat range complex typically has optedforan accountof once thetheorist In general, causal conditions. from characteristics the mentalwhich removesintrospectible qualitative whether an individual is in which the issue as to account for an centre stage rather than considerations in pain is ultimately determined by theoretical - thenthat thekindofKripkean can no longer theorist employ introspection in a statewhich If in to is above. intuitions being pain being appealed in which worlds c-fibreless causal then certain satisfies conditions, complex to our pain experiidentical an individual has an experience qualitatively countas possibleworldsin whichsomeoneis in ences willnotnecessarily cannot Thus the functionalist firings. pain despitethe absence of c-fibre claimto the in response intuitions toAlf'splausible appealto suchKripkean ofpain,viz,c-fibre the realnature thatphysiologists have discovered effect firings. of construal if onlyin passing,thatthe functionalist It is worth noting, a whenitcomestoproviding states cutstwoways mental states as theoretical cannotuse The functionalist role forthese kindsof Cartesianintuitions. butneither of his identity character thecontingent themto support claims, to a lot of additional can Kripkeuse them,at least not without support, does not claims.The functionalist functionalist undermine simply (identity) which and will failto be movedby anyargument accept these intuitions, which has been notedby This lastpoint, makesundefended appealto them. in any a numberof authors, precludesour usingKripkestylearguments a theorist suchas Lewis.9 simplefashion against thewayin whichLewis's is to indicate To repeat:thepointof thisstory - by supposing that the case of the paralytic forhandling initialstrategy servesto kinds- ultimately mentaltermsin factdesignate physiological undercut his analysisof these termsas definite descriptions contingently
9 See, forexample, 71 TheJournal W. Lycan,"Kripkeand the Materialists", ofPhilosophy (1974), pp. 677-89.

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It commits in different kindsofstates different possibleworlds. designating he himto radicalphysicalism a and all itsattendant implausibilities, position was intent uponavoiding. II TOKEN FUNCTIONALISM for we haveassumedthat he Lewis'sanalysis In posingtheaboveproblem with kinds ofsorts: kinds of mental states is a type/type identifier identifying that hold in theactualworld, whiledenying theseidentities ofphysical states across possible worlds. Our concernwas to argue thatthis positionis in theactualworldone should ifone optsforsuchidentities that untenable; retainthem across possible worlds.Now it may be objected that this thathis analysis the does notreally is unwarranted, presuppose assumption in theactualworld. The suggestion is of suchtype/type identities existence he presents his accountas an accountofidentity between thateventhough to his functional is rather accidental and is best thisfeature analysis types, thebasic functional formulation so as Indeed itis easyto modify discarded. to suchtype/type In ourdiscusto clearly identities. avoidanycommitment to saying thatan indiwe have been accustomed sion of Lewis's position in case he is (att)in mental state some time vidualx is in a given Mi (at t) just of causal thestatethattypically the role characteristic Mi. Whatwe plays x is in Mi (at t) justin case he is (at t) in thestate shouldsay,however, is that of M'.'0 Underthis thatin himtypically playsthe causal rolecharacteristic much as of terms "surface mental we leave the analysis" pretty reading the statethatplays a certain before;'pain', forexample,stilldesignates and thisdistinction shift causal role.We simply theorderofthequantifiers, in notbe readily is one thatmight betweenthe twoformulations apparent of of terms. kind functional our ordinary these This analysis employment in without thatindividuals materialistic accommodates intuitions, requiring thesamepsychological statebe in thesamephysiological state;itis enough some the stateor othersatisfying thattherebe in each of theseindividuals in states theseconditions different relevant functional conditions; maysatisfy notkindsofstates. and thestates identified are tokens, different individuals to criticism in responding Furthermore, by Putnam,Lewis seems to that is the sucha "token-physicalism" takethis position, suggesting explicitly ofidentity He writes: viableform theory. only Putnamargues thatthe brain-state (and with it the hypothesis oughtto be rejected functionally-specified-brain-state hypothesis)

10 in note6 can,ofcourse, be easily modified to The kindoffunctional definition mentioned see Hartry obtainthisresult. For an exampleof such an explicit modification Field, "Mental Erkenntnis 13 (1978), pp. 9-61. Representation",

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as scientifically He imagines thebrain-state theorist to implausible. claimthatall organisms in pain- be they men,mollusks, Martians, nondisMachines,or whathaveyou- are in somesinglecommon of brain Given the state. junctive physical-chemical diversity organBut the brain-state theorist who isms, that claim is incredible. makesit is a strawman. A reasonablebrain-state theorist would that in thecase ofmen, wellbe one brainstate anticipate painmight and someother brain(or nonbrain) statein thecase ofmollusks. It evenbe one brainstatein thecase ofPutnam, in the another might case ofLewis." It certainly here appears as thoughLewis regardshis own analysis as forhe surely thantoken-identities, his nothing stronger regards requiring our earliercriticism own position as viable.Does this,then,not undercut that he was a type/type committed totheclaim which identifier, presupposed in pain.The problem to all individuals common that there is one brain-state it whenthefunctional is so construed with is that thismove, however, theory no longerhas the resourcesto accountforthe kindsof cases whichhad to the logical behaviourist: cases of the perfect proven problematical thetotal and so on. On theoriginal deceiver, reading paralytic, physicalistic of the theory in attributing one was justified a mentalstateMi to such an he or sheinstantiated individual on thegrounds that somephysiological state are such as to typically the relevant satisfy Ni - the statewhose instances to presuppose that causal conditions. we are no longer there Now,however, in state these different indiis anyonephysical causal conditions satisfying cannot of the whose and talk state instances we viduals, physical typically play we cannot suchand sucha role.In thecase ofthetotal paralytic, sayofhim thathe is in Mi because he is in thestatethattypically playsthecausal role characteristic of Mi - thereneed be none.Nor,on theother hand,can we to him he in Lewis of that is the modified definition Mi because say employ there is in him somephysicalstate or otherthatplays the causal role subscribe ofMi. We can'tsaytheformer becausewe no longer characteristic in ofthe because the case to type/type and we can't the latter identities, say does not causal role its role mental state its the simply play typical paralytic of that such as specified common-sense We psychology. can, course,say by an individual is in Mi sincehe is in themental statethattypically playsthe ofMi, butthischaracterization is empty. It causal rolethatis characteristic the which the kinds of conditions into failsto provide paralytic anyinsight versionavoids and in virtueof whichhe is in Mi. This revised satisfies, butit does so at thecostofproscribing commitment to type/type identities, to provideany It failsthereby all appeal to commonphysical state-types.
" Lewis,"ReviewofArt, Mind,andReligion", p. 25.

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non-mentalistic account oftheconditions which aremetbytheparalytic and in in which both to be conditions virtue of are said alike, non-paralytic they weakversion ofa priori falls to one thesamestate. So this functionalism prey oftheproblems which wrecked theoriginal behaviouristic programme. III SPECIES-FUNCTIONALISM be tempted to opt fora revised one might Faced withthis difficulty, of the analysis whichcommits one to type/type but of a version identities, to identities whichare, so to speak,species-specific. moremodestvariety, but rather What we functionally defineis not pain simpliciter, pain-infor therestofthe and likewise etc., humans, pain-in-molluscs, pain-in-dogs, a states. for is thestate(presumably Pain-in-humans, example, psychological such such a causal role that in humans and state) typical physiological plays witha kindofphysiological R. As such,pain-in-humans is identified state, is no requirement totheeffect that this kindofstate be instantiated butthere kinds ofphysiologiare in pain.Havingrestored whenever dogsor molluscs to theaccount, thetotal and do so cal states we can againallowfor paralytic, in the first section. to the difficulties mentioned Given without falling prey the there won't be therelevant differences between kinds, any physiological of themental to think terms as rigidly kindsof real temptation designating states. physical me as beinga deviceof desperation This brandof functionalism strikes to be or nothing to commend it.Yet,thisseemsin effect little and as having in "Mad Pain and Martian effort whatLewis optsfor Pain",hismostrecent In thispaperhe recognizes a priori that thecentral to defend functionalism. on that of radical the one is between hand,and steering physicalism problem - allowing ofpain in boththe forthepossibility on theother behaviourism He argues that thesetwo Martian and thetotal (ormadman). paralytic plastic in functionalist once we can be accommodated a theory recogpossibilities in our use of psychological terms. He retains the nize a certain ambiguity ifit intuition that an individual functionalist central is,say,inpainifand only roleR ofpain.But,since is in thestatethat typically playsthecharacteristic we statesmayplaythisrolein men,dogs,and Martians, different physical To be fully thesisto make this explicit. should fashionour functionalist likethefollowing thefunctionalist claimshouldbe castin something explicit, An individual state ofkindK (e.g.,thehuman fashion: Mi kind)is in mental ifitis in thestatethat occupiescausal roleR typically (e.g.,pain) ifand only Thus a human causal roleofpain) inthat is in kind.'2 (e.g.,thecharacteristic statethat occupiesthecausal typically pain ifand onlyifit is in thephysical
12

"Mad Pain and Martian Pain",pp. 219 ff.

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ofpain in humans;and it is on suchgrounds rolecharacteristic that we can in A of a total on the other hand,is in speak paralytic being pain. Martian, Martians. this role in if it is in the state that if and typically plays pain only Thus it would appear thatone can, witha littleingenuity, fashionthe functionalist accountto steerthedesiredmiddlecourse. however.For considertwo individuals: This appearanceis deceptive, Herman,a normal, human,and Mary,a totally non-paralyzed paralyzed bothof whomare in pain. Hermanis in the statethatplaysthe Martian, roleofpain in humans(call itPh),whileMaryis in a different characteristic roleofpain in state, Pm,the statethat playsthecharacteristic physiological in share both don't Martians. are "directly" anynonpain,though they They in their are different characterization. composiphysical They psychological states.Lewis would tions,and in theactualcausal rolesof their respective stateas Hermansince thestate say thatMaryis in the same psychological role in typical characteristic she is in (Pm)is the statethatplaysa certain membersof her species (whichis the same as the role playedby Ph in ofhisspecies).13 So Maryis in thesame state members Hermanand typical of her members are withother as Herman(in pain) because of howthings areboth The issueas towhether thisis implausible. they species.But,surely of in painornot, which is notan epistemological issue,is surely independent To put the Martians. are withMary'sfellow the questionas to how things ifMaryand Hermanare ifsomewhat in an intuitive, matter crude,fashion: cannot and one simply sharesome "internal bothin pain,thenthey state", otherthan Mary and locate this sameness in the states of individuals or whatever. Martians Herman,in Mary'sfellow of is simplycompoundedwhen we look to a variety This difference inwhich is ensconced worlds different worlds; Mary(orherreplica) possible In some constant. herphysiology remains in different communities, though roleofpainin herfellows, ofthesepossibleworlds Pj playsthecharacteristic she is in painin the whilein others Pkplaysthisrole.Arewe thento saythat one worldand not in the other, despitethe factthatthereis no physical are compatible Whilesuchintuitions in her acrosstheseworlds? difference in the philosophy of mind,theyare, I withcertainanti-realistic positions intuitions and materialistic thekindsofrealistic at odds with believe, clearly (he is, afterall, an identity espoused by Lewis and otherfunctionalists donot bearon Mary's ofcounterfactual considerations These kinds theorist). notbear on the should and hence they or functional composition, physical is notan epistemic remember ornotshe is inpain(which issueas towhether that two for thepossibility on thisscore:in allowing remark issue). One final
13 are Martians suchas Maryand arguesthat considers they Indeed,Lewis explicitly atypical causalroleofpainin their thecharacteristic that in painwhenthey state are in thephysical plays fellows ("Mad Pain and MartianPain",p. 220).

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in thatone is in pain whilethe differ identical individuals might physically tothedoctrine counter other is not,Lewis is clearly running ofpsychophysithatis close to theheartofmostmaterialists. cal supervenience, a doctrine is fashioned so as to enableus to speak Thus, whilespecies-functionalism and non-typical shared of a common state (i) bytypical (e.g.,physiological) membersof a species (including madmen, etc.), and (ii) of a paralytics, of different commonstatesharedby individuals species (the functionally fora sameness ofstate it does not,in a likefashion, state), provide specified of It members another. of one and members between species atypical typical of how such differaccount failstoprovide intuitive, non-psychological, any as Herman and Mary mightbe said to be in the same ent individuals stateofpain. psychological thatthereare difficult cases whichdo not seem to be Lewis recognizes decidedbytheaccount proposed.Thus he writes: Whataboutpainin a beingwho But one case remains problematic. It seems is mad,alien,and unique?Have we madea place forthat? his allegedstateofpain not.Since he is mad,we maysupposethat we him.Since he is alien, causalrolefor theproper does notoccupy role for causal it not the that does also occupy proper suppose may us. And sincehe is unique,it does notoccupytheproperrole for other members ofhis species.Whatis left? He goes on: I thinkwe cannot and need not solve this problem.Our only thatthe recourse is to denythatthecase is possible.To stipulate in was in is this pain example illegitimate.'4 being we have of Lewis's responseto thiscase, the difficulty we think Whatever whoare bothin is oftwoindividuals posed is notofthiskind.Our example what we do notknow The difficulty is notthat pain on Lewis's owncriteria. or state(physiological internal do notshareanycommon to say,butthat they are in thatthesetwoindividuals In effect we seem to be saying functional). in in common overand abovebeing pain. havenothing they paineventhough in common we are toldto lookto element To findsome non-psychological account ofthespecies.Butsurely members theother anyadequatereductive characterized of pain must property provideforsome non-mentalistically whichis commonto both,the possessionof whichdoes not turnon how ofthespecies. members are withother things fails of functionalism theseversions ofa priori I conclude, that each then, whichLewis was intuitions aboutthemental to do justiceto commonsense And sincethere does notseemto be anyfurther intent way uponcapturing.
14

"Mad Pain and Martian Pain",p. 221.

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inwhich we should, thisfunctionalist we might modify programme, plausibly I believe, the central thesis the claim that commonsense reject psychology define"our everyday It is servesto "functionally psychological vocabulary. of the timeto abandononce and forall thelastlingering legacy positivism, i.e. reductive, of the mental.15 searchfor"interesting", analyses TheUniversity ofMinnesota

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ofthispaper. on an earlier version wishto thank comments TylerBurgeforhelpful