Newton, the Parts of Space, and Spacetime Structuralism

Edward Slowik

Abstract: (word count: 110) his essa! will in"esti#ate the interrelationship between the parts of space and topolo#ical and metrical structure in Newton$s natural philosoph!, as well as its influence in contemporar! spacetime debates% he historical back#round to Newton$s claims will form an important part of the in"esti#ation, in addition to an assessment of the recent articles b! Nerlich, &u##ett, orretti, 'iSalle, and se"eral others, on this sub(ect% )hile "arious aspects of these pre"ious contributions will pro"e informati"e, it will be ar#ued that the underl!in# #oals of Newton$s pronouncements on the relationship amon# the parts of space, includin# their methodolo#ical and ontolo#ical implications for absolute space and contemporar! spacetime theories, ha"e lar#el! eluded prior anal!sis%

Newton, the Parts of Space, and Spacetime Structuralism

Edward Slowik

An eni#matic discussion in Newton$s unpublished tract, De Gravitatione, on the immobilit! of the parts of space has brou#ht about much discussion, and man! recent reappraisals, amon# philosophers of space and time% *esides the contributions of +c,uire, 'iSalle, +audlin, &eale!, orretti, and others on this topic, there ha"e appeared two important assessments b! Nerlich and &u##ett which more directl! e-amine Newton$s specific ar#uments% .n short, does Newton$s pronouncements on the parts of space, which seems to base their identit! on their structural interrelationships, undermine his alle#ed substanti"alism (i%e%, that space is an independentl! e-istin# entit! of some sort), since all the parts in infinite Euclidean space bear the same structural relationships with one another/ .n order to better #rasp the possible intentions underl!in# Newton$s treatment of these issues, this paper will e-plore the back#round and possible sources of influence on Newton$s theor!, as well as criti0ue the interpretations and ar#uments ad"anced b! these commentators with respect to both Newton$s h!potheses and modern spacetime debates% .n conclusion, the anal!sis put forward thus far will be shown to be deficient in "arious respects, such that Newton$s conception of space either a"oids the problems that the! ha"e raised, fails to acknowled#e ke! components in Newton$s o"erall ontolo#! and methodolo#! of space, or pro"ides the wron# analo#ue as re#ards modern spacetime theories% Section 1 will e-plore the details of Newton$s 1immobilit! ar#uments2, as the! will be dubbed, as well as the formulations of these ar#uments pro"ided b! Nerlich and &u##ett%

3 he historical conte-t in which Newton$s ar#uments were de"eloped will form a lar#e portion of the remainder of this essa!, with the crucial role of the 1simplicit!2 of space, i%e%, the notion of ph!sical indi"isibilit!, e-amined in section 3% he interpla! of metrical and topolo#ical notions in Newton$s #eometrical conception of the points and parts of space, and a discussion of the 1holistic2 nature of the metric, as ad"ocated b! Nerlich and &eale!, will also be in"esti#ated in section 3% )hile the holistic conception will #ain a #ood measure of historical support, the underl!in# ontolo#ical foundations of space, i%e%, ,od$s omnipresence, will also be shown to comprise a crucial feature of Newton$s spatial theor!% .n section 4, these ontolo#ical implications for contemporar! structuralist interpretations of spacetime will be e-amined, alon#side the applicabilit! of acti"e and passi"e transformations and the problem of 5eibni6 shift ar#uments in &u##ett$s reappraisal of the immobilit! ar#uments%

1% Newton$s .mmobilit! Ar#uments 1.1 Contemporary Analysis. .n Newton$s De Gravitatione, an important tract from (probabl!) the earl! 1780s, an ar#ument for the immobilit! of space is presented which has spawned much debate amon# Newton commentators and philosophers of space and time% 9ollowin# &u##ett$s important contribution to these issues (3008, 3), the apparent chan#e of emphasis in this passa#e, will be labeled (Ai) and (Aii) respecti"el!: :(Ai); he parts of space are motionless% .f the! mo"ed, it would ha"e to be said either that the motion of each part is a translation from the "icinit! of other conti#uous parts, as 'escartes defined the motion of bodies, and it has been sufficientl! demonstrated that this is absurd< or that it is a translation out of space into space, that is out of itself, unless perhaps it is said that two spaces e"er!where coincide, a mo"in# one and a motionless one% :(Aii); +oreo"er, the immobilit! of space will be best e-emplified b! duration% 9or (ust as the parts of duration are indi"iduated b! their order, so that (for e-ample) if !esterda! could chan#e places with toda! and become the later of the two,

4 it would lose its indi"idualit! and would no lon#er be !esterda!, but toda!< so the parts of space are indi"iduated b! their positions (positiones), so that if an! two could chan#e their positions, the! would chan#e their indi"idualit! at the same time and each would be con"erted numericall! (numerice) into the other% he parts of duration and space are understood to be the same as the! reall! are onl! because of their mutual order and position (ordinem et positiones inter se partes)< nor do the! ha"e an! principle of indi"iduation apart from that order and position, which conse0uentl! cannot be altered% (300=, 3>) A line of ar#ument similar to (Ai) also turns up in the scholium on space and time in the first edition of the Principia (178?), a passa#e which we will identif! as (*)% :(*); @ust as the order of the parts of time is unchan#eable, so, too, is the order of the parts of space% 5et the parts of space mo"e from their places, and the! will mo"e (so to speak) from themsel"es% 9or times and spaces are, as it were, the places of themsel"es and of all thin#s% All thin#s are placed in time with reference to order of succession and in space with reference to order of situation (situs)% .t is of the essence of spaces to be places, and for primar! places to mo"e is absurd% he! are therefore absolute places, and it is onl! chan#es of position (translationes) from these places that are absolute motions% (300=, 77) .n brief: (Ai) and (*) ar#ue that the parts of space cannot mo"e since that would entail that a part could mo"e 1out of itself2, (Ai), or parts could mo"e 1from themsel"es2, (*), which is presumabl! a contradiction: i%e%, nothin# can mo"e out of itself% (Aii)Athe identit! ar#umentAclaims that, since the parts of space are understood to be the same due to their 1the mutual order and position2, and since an! interchan#e of parts preser"es the same mutual order, thus there can be no interchan#e of parts, and thus the parts did not reall! mo"eBinterchan#e% As noted b! &u##ett, the (Aii) ar#ument does not appear in (*)< ne"ertheless, a remnant can still be traced: 1All thin#s are placed in time with reference to order of succession and in space with reference to order of situation2% )e will return to (Ai) and (*) in section 3, but a more inCdepth e-amination of the identit! ar#ument is in order #i"en the loomin# contradictions for the concept of absolute (or substanti"al) space

= alle#edl! inherent in Newton$s claims% 1.2: The Problem with the dentity Ar!ument. As &u##ett succinctl! puts it, 1if an! two parts of space are indistin#uishable with respect to their metrical relations, then the! are strictl! identical2 (3008, 7)% .n order to reach this conclusion, therefore, somethin# like 5eibni6$ 1principle of the identit! of the indiscernibles2, P.., must be in pla!: if two ob(ects, thin#s, substances, etc%, ha"e the same properties (such that none has a different propert! than the other), then the! are identical (i%e%, the! are the same ob(ect)% .n what follows, S will stand for the instantaneous specification of the metrical relations of the points of space, with p and " representin# points or parts of space% 1) Donsider an! two states, S1 and S3, such that in S3 a point " has all metrical properties that a point p has in S1% hen b! the P.., " E p (i%e%, " 1would be con"erted numericall! into2 p)% &ere, one could also replace worlds, ), for states of one world, S% 3) Newton claims that points ha"e no 1principle of indi"iduation apart from :their; position2, where Newton$s phrase is defined as the metrical relations between points% 4) he s!mmetries of (infinite) Euclidean space are such that e"er! point has the same metrical relations to e"er! other point% =) Donclusion: he points of Newton$s (Euclidean) space are identical (i%e%, the! are the same point), which raises a contradiction for Newton$s conception of absolute (substanti"al) space, and also contradicts the standard interpretation of Euclidean #eometr!% Nerlich #i"es a similar interpretation: 1E"er! point in Euclidean space satisfies :Newton$s (Aii);2< and 1order and situation without some hint of indi"idualit! independent of that order is powerless to identif!Ato distin#uish an! point from an! other2 (300>, 134)% Needless to sa!, it is the s!mmetric and homo#eneous nature of Newton$s Euclidean conception of space that #enerates the difficult!, althou#h other s!mmetric spaces, such as spherical, would suffer the same fate #i"en Newton$s identit! ar#ument (but not most

> "ariabl! cur"ed and d!namical spaces< e%#%, the pseudoCFiemannian spacetime manifold of ,eneral Felati"it!< see, section 4 below, and )Gthrich 3008, for a criticism of spacetime structuralism alon# the same lines as Nerlich$s a#ainst Newton)% &u##ett ultimatel! attempts to den! the necessit! of P.., and thereb! e"ade the unpalatable conclusion that all of the points in Newton$s absolute space are the "er! same point, b! utili6in# a form of de re representation of points across states or worlds (An e-amination of &u##ett$s attempted solution is not the sub(ect of this essa!%) Het, as will be ar#ued, a more inCdepth historical anal!sis of Newton$s conception of space, and the immobilit! ar#uments in #eneral, can side step the problem raised abo"e e"en if one #rants the role of the P.. in the identit! ar#ument%

3% he *ack#round to Newton$s .mmobilit! Ar#uments% As is clear from the title of his article, 1Dan the Parts of Space +o"e/2, Nerlich sees the immobilit! ar#uments primaril! as a metaph!sical effort to counter that "er! possibilit!% &u##ett understands these ar#uments in a similar fashion, e"entuall! concedin#, as re#ards (Ai), that 1it is not clear how this ar#ument secures Newton a#ainst the motion of the parts of space relati"e to one another% )h! should we not define another sense of the motion of places, not as motion out of place, but a chan#e of distance to other places2< and, with respect to (Aii): 1althou#h :A(ii); does demonstrate the relati"e immobilit! of the parts of space, since Newton cannot consistentl! hold it :due to the identit! ar#ument;, he has no demonstration at all2 (3008, =)% *ut, are Newton$s immobilit! ar#uments reall! intended to preclude the motion of the parts of space/ his section will stri"e to show that Newton actuall! had different ob(ecti"es in mind<

7 specificall!, to refute the notion that space has real, di"isible parts, as well as (at least potentiall!) to den! that space itself re0uires a space or place% 2.1. #neness. Ine of the traditional difficulties with the concept of place in the AristotelianBScholastic philosoph! is the potential infinite re#ress that ensues #i"en the stipulation that all thin#s (e-cept ,od) re0uire a place: 'oes place also need a place/ And, if place needs a place, then the 1place of place2 would need a place, too, etc% hese problems were well known b! the late +edie"al period, as is e"ident in the writin#s of Albert of Sa-on! and @ohn *uridan (see, ,rant 1J81, 18)% Aristotle$s finite conception of the uni"erse could e"ade this particular worr!, howe"er, since his definition of place, as the boundar! of the containin# bod!, entailed that the uni"erse as a whole did not ha"e a place (due to the absence of a containin# bod!)% *! the late se"enteenth centur!, on the other hand, the re#ress ar#ument would ha"e ac0uired a newCfound si#nificance, since the AristotelianBScholastic definition of place had fallen out of fa"or amon# man! natural philosophers, especiall! amon# the brand of atomist (,assendian) and neoCPlatonist conceptions of space pre"alent in Newton$s da!% +oreo"er, the belief that space was infinite in e-tent, i%e%, without boundar!, was nearl! commonplace amon# these same natural philosophers% he Dambrid#e neoCPlatonist, &enr! +ore, ma! address the re#ress issue, albeit indirectl!, in his $nchiridium %etaphysicum (17?1), a work that almost certainl! #reatl! influenced Newton$s De Grav.1 .n makin# the case a#ainst the 1discerpibilit!2 of space, which refers to the ph!sical di"isibilit! of the parts of space, +ore contends that 1if it were supposed that parts were discerped, the! would be ipso &acto mo"ed in the same place and, so, the place in which the! are mo"ed would be more internal and deeper than

? that which we ha"e hitherto needed2 (1JJ>, 70)% Althou#h it is difficult to track the e-act rationale behind +ore$s claim that place would need to be 1more internal and deeper2 then 1needed2 if spatial parts were allowed to mo"e, an awareness of the potential re#ress of place ma! be a factor% .ndeed, +ore$s insistence that infinite spatial e-tension is 1one2 would seem to incorporate the same concerns about a multiplicit! of places: 1infinite e-tension distinct from matter % % % is one to the e-tent that it is absolutel! impossible that to that one there be man!, or that it make man!, since it has no ph!sical parts from which the! can be combined and into which the! can be trul! and ph!sicall! di"ided, % % % 1 (>8)% .t is the 1oneness2 of space which most likel! underlies Newton$s immobilit! ar#uments as well, since this would e-plain wh! Newton finds it e0uall! contradictor! for the parts of space to mo"e% 5ike +ore, if a part of space could mo"e, it would mo"e 1out of itself2 in (Ai), and parts would mo"e 1from themsel"es2 in (*), and these assertions, alon# with their intended contradictor! implications, onl! make sense #i"en the stipulation of space$s oneness% 2.2. ndiscerpibility and 'implicity. In +ore$s estimation, the oneness of space is ine-tricabl! linked with its 1simplicit!2 (that space is without parts) and, of course, indiscerpibilit! (the denial of ph!sical di"isibilit! of space b! a process of tearin# or cuttin#)% .n chapter 8, section J, of the $nchiridium, +ore draws to#ether these three features of infinite spatial e-tension in order to describe an added characteristic, namel!, immobilit!% &e aims to relate (in what way that in&inite immobile e)tension distinct &rom matter is one, simple, and immobile*, after which he defines oneness (see section 3%1) and simplicit!: 1:infinite e-tension; is aptl! called simple, seein# that it has, as . ha"e said, no ph!sical parts2 (>8)% +ore continues:

8 And this simplicit!, howe"er, is easil! understood of its immobilit!% 9or, no infinite e-tension which is not combined from parts, nor is condensed or thickened in some wa!, can be mo"ed, either from part to part, since the whole is simple and indiscerpible, nor can the whole at the same time, since it is infinite, be contracted into less space, since it is not condensed an!where nor can it lea"e its place, since this infinite is the intimate place of all thin#s, within or be!ond which there is nothin#%2 (+ore 1JJ>, >8) .n short, the inabilit! of the parts of space to mo"e follows directl! from the oneness, simplicit!, and indiscerpibilit! of infinite e-tension% hat Newton$s immobilit! ar#uments, (Ai), (Aii), and (*), are predicated on a set of beliefs, similar to +ore$s, about the oneness, simplicit!, and indiscerpibilit! of space is practicall! indisputable% .n an unpublished tract from the earl! 17J0s, entitled 1 empus et 5ocus2 b! +c,uire (hereafter, e5), Newton openl! declares that 1space itself has no parts which can be separated from one another, % % % % 9or it is a sin#le bein#, most simple, and most perfect in its kind2 (+c,uire 1J?8b, 11?)% he likel! moti"ation for both Newton and +ore$s "iews is the troublin# prospect that discerpibilit! ma! be ascribed to both space and the ontolo#ical foundation of space, i%e%, the omnipresent ,od% .n the De Grav, Newton cautions that 1lest an!one should % % % ima#ine ,od to be like a bod!, e-tended and made of di"isible parts, it should be known that spaces themsel"es are not actuall! di"isible % % % %2 (300=, 37)% *! den!in# that space is comprised of separable parts, Newton thus blocks an! maneu"er, such as 5eibni6$ insinuations in the 5eibni6CDlarke correspondence (5eibni6 and Dlarke 3000, =>< 5%K%=3), that attribute parthood to ,od "ia spatial di"isibilit!% ,i"en the assistance that Newton likel! rendered to Dlarke, it is thus not surprisin# that man! of the themes of oneness, simplicit!, and indiscerpibilit!, both for space and ,od, fi#ure prominentl! in Dlarke$s detailed replies: 9or infinite space is one, absolutel! and essentiall! indi"isible, and to suppose it parted is a contradiction in terms, because there must be space in the partition itself, which is

J to suppose it parted and !et not parted at the same time% he immensit! or omnipresence of ,od is no more a di"idin# of his substance into parts than his duration or continuance of e-istin# is a di"idin# of his e-istence into parts% (3000, 1J< D%...%4) Parts in the corporeal sense of the word are separable, compounded, ununited, independent of, and mo"able from each other< but infinite space, thou#h it ma! be partiall! apprehended b! us, that is, ma! in our ima#ination be concei"ed as composed of parts, !et since those parts (improperl! so called) are essentiall! :indiscerpible;3 and immo"able from each other and not able to be parted without an e-press contradiction in terms % % % , space conse0uentl! is in itself essentiall! one, and absolutel! indi"isible (3000, 41< D%.K%11C13) As re#ards Newton$s immobilit! ar#uments, Dlarke$s contention that 1there would be space in the partition2 is the direct analo#ue of Newton$s earlier claims that a part of space would mo"e 1out of itself2 in (Ai), and 1from themsel"es2 in (*)% he contradiction that both +ore and Newton had tried to articulate is e-pressed more successfull! b! Dlarke, howe"er: since 1there would be space in the partition2, this 1is to suppose it parted and not !et parted2% his is a much better formulation than +ore$s reference to a 1more internal and deeper :place; than that which we ha"e hitherto needed2, or Newton$s assertion that spaces are the 1places of themsel"es2 in (*)% Donse0uentl!, it is important to bear in mind that the immobilit! ar#uments are not solely intended to establish a thesis prohibitin# the motion of the parts of space: rather, their specific intention is to offer reasons for den!in# that the parts of space can be physically divided or separated from one another% he immobilit! of infinite space is secured, not b! the immobilit! ar#uments per se, but b! the oneness, simplicit!, and indiscerpibilit! of space, with the immobilit! ar#uments offered as a #rounds for establishin# those latter properties% 2.+. 'implicity and the 'tructuralism. At this (uncture in our historical e-amination of the immobilit! ar#uments, it is essential to assess the back#round to the identit! ar#ument,

10 (Aii), for it is the ori#in of man! current disputes concernin# the partCwhole relationship in Newton$s conception of space% he problem, to recap, is that if the identit! of the parts of space is pro"ided b! their mutual metrical relationships, which rou#hl! correlates with Newton$s order of positionBsituation of spatial partsBplaces (see section 1), then the parts are all strictl! identical since their mutual metrical relationships are all identical% Ine route out of this difficult! is to embrace a form of spatial structuralism, such that the parts of space are no lon#er "iewed as the elements that directl! form or construct the whole of space% Father, the dependence relationship #oes in the other direction, with the whole of space comprisin# the basic ontolo#ical entit!, and the partsBpoints as (somehow) deri"ed from, or super"enin# on, the lar#er structure% Nerlich, drawin# on &eale! 1JJ>, ultimatel! fa"ors this interpretations of Newton$s spatial theor!: Somethin# must be a structureCinstantiatin# entit! somewhere for realism to sur"i"e% *ut the parts of space need not pla! that role% Assume that space is real, but it is not made up of its parts, nor !et analy,able into parts with an! kind of ontic independence. Perhaps, e"en, that spatial parts and their relations are, ontolo#icall!, supervenient on the structure of space% (Nerlich 300>, 141, ori#inal emphasis) In this model, since infinite (Euclidean) space is, itself, the 1structureCinstantiatin# entit!2, the fact that all of the parts of space bear the same metrical relationships with one another fails to undermine the coherence or consistenc! of Newton$s theor!% hat is, since the order of position (metric) is not #rounded on a notion of ontolo#icall! independent spatial parts, where these parts are concei"ed as the foundational elements of the whole of space, the failure to pro"ide a uni0ue criterion of identit! for those parts does not lead to the problems discussed in section 1%3% In this structural interpretation, it ma! be difficult to distin#uish the different spatial parts and points #i"en the homo#enous nature of infinite Euclidean space, but this is an empirical problem far remo"ed from the deepl! troublin#

11 ontolo#ical worries associated with &u##ett$s readin# of (Aii), where all of the partsBpoints become numericall! the same partBpoint% In a structural construal, accordin#l!, it would be incorrect to assert, as does &u##ett, that the metrical relations in Newton$s theor! are between points, 1of their metrical relations to one another2 (?), since this implies that the points ha"e an e-istence prior to, or separate from, the o"erall metrical structure of space% Feturnin# to (Aii), a structuralist readin# thus allows a literal interpretation of Newton$s statement that 1the parts of space are indi"iduated b! their positions, so that if an! two could chan#e their positions, the! would chan#e their indi"idualit! at the same time and each would be con"erted numericall! into the other%2 his form of reasonin#, ad"anced in a number of works b! &oward Stein as well (most recentl!, 3003, 3?3), e-actl! parallels contemporar! structuralism in the philosoph! of mathematics, as &eale! remarks in connection with Newton$s immobilit! ar#uments: In this conception, it is its place in a certain relational structure that makes p the spacetime point that it is% .n this respect spacetime points are analo#ous to mathematical ob(ects% .t is its position in the natural numbers which makes 4 the number that it is, so it is impossible, e"en unintelli#ible, to suppose that the number 4 mi#ht ha"e been the se"enth natural number% (1JJ>, 404) .n an ironic twist, this 1holistic2 conception of space that both &eale! and Nerlich posit can be best described usin# the neoCPlatonic terminolo#! emplo!ed b! +ore and Newton< namel!, that spaceAincludin# the metric (order of position of spatial parts)Ais one, simple, and indiscerpibleL Althou#h &eale!, Nerlich, and Stein, seem unaware of the historical backdrop to the immobilit! ar#uments, and the! do not pro"ide an! historical support for their interpretations, the discussions abo"e do indeed confirm a conception of Newton$s spatial theor! that is consistent with a structuralist interpretation of the parts of space% he intent of (Aii), put simpl!, is to make the mereolo#ical case that space is a nonC

13 a##re#ate, partless whole, such that the "er! indi"idualit! of parts deri"es from the whole% he (Aii) ar#ument, hence, pro"ides a more detailed elaboration for wh! the motions of the parts of space, criti0ued initiall! in (Ai), is not possibleAif the! mo"ed out of space, the! would no lon#er e-ist< and this also e-plains wh! there is no talk of the parts movin! in (Aii), rather, two parts merel! 1chan#e their position2 with respect to one another% .n a passa#e from e5, from which a smaller 0uotation has alread! been #i"en abo"e, the simple, nonCa##re#ate structure of space is likewise defended: *ut neither does Place ar#ue the di"isibilit! of a thin# or the multitude of its parts, and on that account imperfection, since space itself has no parts which can be separated from one another, or be mo"ed amon# themsel"es, or be distin#uished from one another b! an! inherent marks% Space is not compounded of a##re#ated parts since there is no least in it, no small or #reat or #reatest, nor are there more parts in the totalit! of space than there are in an! place which the "er! least bod! of all occupies% .n each of its points it is like itself and uniform nor does it trul! ha"e parts other than mathematical points, that is e"er!where infinite in number and nothin# in ma#nitude% 9or it is a sin#le bein#, most simple, and most perfect in its kind% o be bounded in time and in place, or to be chan#eable does ar#ue imperfection, but to be the same alwa!s and e"er!where is supreme perfection%2 (1J8?b,11?) Amon# its man! disclosures, it is worth drawin# specific attention to Newton$s assertion that space onl! has parts in the sense of 1mathematical points, that is e"er!where infinite in number and nothin# in ma#nitude2< and, 1nor are there more parts in the totalit! of space than there are in an! place which the "er! least bod! of all occupies%2 .n other words, Newton$s conception of the partCwhole constitution of space follows, what we ma! call, the standard AristotelianCEuclidean "iew of #eometr!, wherein a line of an! len#th can be conceptuall! decomposed into an infinit! of points, althou#h the line itself is not actuall! constructed b! a process of addin# points (since the! ha"e no ma#nitude)% his aspect of Newton$s theor! clearl! has holistic o"ertones, but the trul! nonCreducible character of the spatial metric, and its relationship with (Aii), will onl! become e"ident

14 pro"ided further e-e#esis of the Newtonian corpus% 2.-. The #rder o& Position o& 'patial Parts. 'espite its later ori#ins, the Aristotelian #eometric inclinations in e5 (earl! 17J0s) can be traced back to some of Newton$s earliest fora!s into these topics% .n the rinit! Notebooks from 177=C177> (.uestiones), there are numerous features in Newton handlin# of spatialBmathematical h!potheses that are identical with his later work on the metaph!sics of space, in particular, De Grav, Principia, and e5% he similarities can be described, rou#hl!, as pertainin# to the indi"iduation of points and the continuit! of space, two aspects of Newton$s treatment that are intimatel! linked to the 0uestion of the holistic, or simple, nature of the metric of space< i%e%, that the metric of space is not deri"ed from the relationships amon# its parts% .n the %etaphysics (1J8=< K%7%1017b3=C3?), Aristotle pro"ides what ma! be the determinin# conceptual distinction that underlies Newton$s (Aii): 1that which is indi"isible in 0uantit! is called a unit if it is not di"isible in an! dimension and is without position, a point if it is not di"isible in an! dimension, and has position%2 .n short, points are without dimension, but (unlike unitsBnumbers) ha"e a position% As +c,uire and amn! clarif!, in the AristotelianCEuclidean tradition, 1 he point itself lacks e-istence independent of the line, but it can be distin#uished b! its position relati"e to another point, or with respect to the line itself2 (1J84, 73)% he moti"ation behind the use of position as a means of identification likel! resides in the uni0ue difficulties associated with points and the definition of continuit! (on the latter, see, e%#%, Physics K.%1%341a31C341b18)% Since points are 1partless2, points cannot touch without completel! o"erlappin# (i%e%, the! can onl! touch whole to whole)< or, put differentl!, if two points are in contact the! would then possess common e-tremitiesAbut two thin#s that possess common e-tremities are

1= continuous and one, since the! occup! the same place% his interrelationship between the place and continuit! is echoed in Newton$s .uestiones: 1E-tension is related to places, as time to da!s, !ears, etc% Place is the principium individuationis of strai#ht lines and of e0ual and like fi#ures< the surfaces of two bodies becomin# but one when the! are conti#uous, because in but one place2 (4>1)% 5ikewise, 1if !ou sa! then that :a point; mi#ht touch one of the other points that makes the line, . sa! then that that point is in the same place with the point that it touches % % %2 (=31)% As in (Aii), the #eometric elements themsel"es are indi"iduated "ia the o"erall spatial backdrop (places, order of spatial parts), since the peculiar character of #eometric elements on the AristotelianCEuclidean scheme renders them incapable of securin# their own indi"iduation (due to the continuit! problem)% Needless to sa!, this form of reasonin# undermines an! attempt to construct the metric of space from the relationships amon# its partsAindeed, if the parts are actuall! indi"iduated b! the metric, then Nerlich$s claim that the parts super"ene on the o"erall structure of space would appear to be somewhat "indicated% .n response, the critic mi#ht ar#ue that Newton$s appeal to place as a means of indi"iduatin# #eometrical elements onl! commits him to the weaker (topolo#ical) notions of coincidenceBnonCcoincidence, and not a metric (order of spatial parts)% Newton$s e-planation that 1e-tension is related to places, as time to da!s, !ears, etc%2 would seem to undermine this line of reasonin#, ne"ertheless% Since a da! or !ear is a part of duration in the sense that it has a finite amount of duration, it follows that place is likewise a part of e-tension in that it possesses a finite de#ree of e-tensionAhence it is "er! difficult to tie Newton$s use of 1place2 to a nonCmetrical, topolo#ical conception% his last inference is, in addition, supported b! ar#uments put forth in the 5eibni6CDlarke correspondence,

1> where space and time are cate#ori6ed as 10uantities, which situation and order :are; not2 (3000, ?3< D%K%>=)% &e continues: 1the distance, inter"al, or 0uantit! of time or space % % % is entirel! a distinct thin# from the situation or order and does not constitute an! 0uantit! of situation of order< the situation or order ma! be the same when the 0uantit! of time or space inter"enin# is "er! different2 (?4)% Situation and order are likened to ratios and proportions, which 1are not 0uantities but the proportion of 0uantities2 (?4)% 5eibni6$ definition of space as the 1order of coe-istences2 (1=, 5%...%=) is the sub(ect of Dlarke$s somewhat mis#uided criticism (for 5eibni6 insists that his relational conception includes distance< >0, 5%K%>=)< but, Dlarke$s e-planation nicel! demonstrates that the Newtonian world"iew presumes, at the least, the metric (1distance2) as a basic 0uantitati"e feature of spaceAand this, of course, imparts a metrical si#nificance to all of its constituti"e parts, whether points, lines, surfaces or "olumes (as is consistent with the AristotelianCEuclidean #eometric tradition)% he scholium on space and time raises the same issue in a passa#e we shall label (D): :(D); Place is the part of space that a bod! occupies, and it is, dependin# on the space, either absolute or relati"e% . sa! the part of space, not the situation :situs; of the bod! or its outer surface% 9or the places of e0ual solids are alwa!s e0ual, while their surfaces are for the most part une0ual because of the dissimilarit! of shapes< and situations, properl! speakin#, do not ha"e 0uantit! and are not so much places as attributes of places :"uam a&&ectiones locorum;% (300=, 7>) As with Dlarke$s description, situations 1properl! speakin#2 do not ha"e a 0uantit!, unlike space and its associated places% .ndeed, situation is an attribute of the 0uantit! place, and hence space, #i"en the oneness of space discussed abo"e% +c,uire and amn! interpret this last passa#e, (D), as a re"ersal of (Aii), howe"er% he parts of space do not obtain their identit! from the order of position (situation), as in (Aii)< rather, since positions are the attributes of places, it follows that the places, as the

17 parts of space, are prior to the order of position% he! conclude that 1this indicates that situations deri"e their character from the parts of space on which the! depend, and not the con"erse as De !ravitatione states2 (1J84, ?4)% *ut, this confuses the order of position per se, namel!, as in Dlarke$s e-amples of pure ratios or proportions, which do not ha"e 0uantit!, with the order of position of spatial parts, which does (hence the rationale behind our use of the latter desi#nation throu#hout this essa!): that is, Newton$s immobilit! ar#uments alwa!s associate order or situation with space< e%#%, 1the order of the parts of space2 in (*), and 1the parts of space are indi"iduated b! their positions2 (Aii)% Since Newton specificall! mentions 1the situation of the bod! or its outer surface2, it would seem that, like Dlarke, his #oal in (D) is to critici6e the #eneral relationist idea that place is determined b! the mutual situations of bodies, as well as the ScholasticBDartesian idea that place is the boundar! of the containedBcontainin# bodies (both aspects bein# contained in 'escartes$ concept of e-ternal place< 'escartes 1JJ1, =>C =7< Principles, .. M14C1>)% Donse0uentl!, there is no e"idence in (D) to warrant o"erturnin# the identit! ar#ument (Aii), since the latter applies specificall! to space and not bod!, unlike the former% +oreo"er, as F!nasiewic6 (1JJ>, 1=1) has noted, Newton$s e-planation that 1the places of e0ual solids are alwa!s e0ual, while their surfaces are for the most part une0ual because of the dissimilarit! of shapes2 is a reference to the inherent "olume of place (as opposed to the surface area of the bod!$s boundar! or the nonC 0uantit! orderBsituation of bodies), and "olume is a metric measure% hus, when (D) is added to the holistic, simple characteri6ation of space in the De Grav, e5, etc%, abo"e, the basic metrical nature of space, as a 0uantit! with the attribute of orderBsituation, becomes readil! apparent%

1? *efore lea"in# this section, it would be fruitful to e-amine a passa#e from De Grav that demonstrates Newton$s adherence to the AristotelianCEuclidean conception of the continuit! of #eometr!Bspace, and which also hi#hli#hts the relationship between parts and points, a sub(ect that is not often treated in his discussion% .n all directions, space can be distin#uished into parts whose common boundaries we usuall! call surfaces< and these surfaces can be distin#uished in all directions into parts whose common boundaries we usuall! call lines< and a#ain these lines can be distin#uished in all directions into parts which we call points% And hence surfaces do not ha"e depth, nor lines breadth, nor points dimension, unless !ou sa! that coterminous spaces penetrate each other as far as the depth of the surface between them, namel! what . ha"e said to be the boundar! of both or the common limit< and the same applies to lines and points% 9urthermore, spaces are e"er!where conti#uous to spaces, and e-tension is e"er!where placed ne-t to e-tension, and so there are e"er!where common boundaries of conti#uous parts< % % % % (300=, 33) his anal!sis nicel! relates both the #eometrical nature of Newton$s ontolo#! of space, as well as its composition: points, lines, surfaces, and thus "olumes, are all elements of Newton$s one, simple, and indiscerpible space (much as e5 also described space$s parts as 1mathematical points2)% hat is, althou#h (D) does not refer to points and other #eometrical elements, it would be a mistake to sin#le out onl! place or "olume as the ke! components in Newton$s spatial ontolo#!% *elkind (300?) attempts to make a case for "olume as central to Newton$s defense of absolute space, based lar#el! on the scholium on space and time, and emplo!in# Newton$s antiCrelationist ar#ument that 1whole and absolute motions can be determined onl! b! means of unmo"in# places, % % %2 (300=, 7?)% Het, as we ha"e seen, nonCdimensionless points are held to be as much a part of space as place ("olume), since points are distin#uished b! the metric, as in the .uestiones e-tract (=31) abo"e% 'espite the fact that Newton$s e-amples utili6e mo"in# bodies, which ha"e "olume, the appeal to the compound motions of the constituti"e parts of bodies could ha"e emplo!ed bodil! points as easil! as bodil! "olumes to attack 'escartes, alon# with usin#

18 the points of absolute space to determine absolute motions (as opposed to relati"e motions)%4 2./. 0east distance. he inference that space has an essential metric structure is corroborated elsewhere in the rinit! notebook, where Newton e-plores, and ultimatel! re1ects, the possibilit! that spatial len#ths ma! be comprised, bottom up, from a least unit of distance linked to the topolo#! of its constituti"e mathematical points% he main #oal of these in"esti#ations seems to be the Epicurean atomist idea that there e-ists a minimal indi"isible 0uantit! of matter, such that the minimal distances become 1the basis of all other e-tensions and the mould of atoms2 (=34)% Newton emplo!s a cipher method of markin# off the points on a line, with the stipulation that the ciphers 1resist bein# the same2 (=31), that is, the! retain a power of nonCcoincidence (cf% &u##ett 3008, 8)% he collection of ciphers thereb! represents the units of least distances amon# the points, partes e)tra partes, alon# the line% ,i"en a point, if 1there be another point with which it refuses to be (oined, % % % then there is distance between the two, thou#h indi"isible, and the least that can be, % % %2 (=34)% Newton$s assumption that these least distances are indi"isible ne"ertheless runs into the ob"ious difficult! that, at least conceptuall!, 1the least e-tension is infinitel! lar#er than a point and therefore can contain it and be di"ided b! it2 (=3>)% his prompts the repl!, 1. confess it is so2, alon# with an aborti"e effort to insist that, althou#h a least distances 1has no inside, no midst, nor center2, it therefore must be the case that the infinite number of points in that least e-tension 1must be all in the borders or sides and outward superficies of it, and that cannot make out a place for di"ision2 (=3>)% 9or our purposes, the important de"elopment is that Newton crossed out these notebook pa#es, i%e%, the pa#es that elaborate his least distance thou#ht e-periment, likel! due to the

1J untenabilit! of his defense of their indi"isibilit!% hereafter, Newton would fa"or a material atomism that is merel! ph!sicall! indi"isible, and thereb! ob"iate the re0uirement for a least distance commensurate with a conceptuall! indi"isible unit of matter (see, +c,uire and amn! 1J84, 70CJ1, for an e-tended anal!sis)% Another difficult! with Newton$s least distance h!pothesis, which ma! ha"e contributed to its abrupt demise, is the ine"itable implication that there must e-ist a direct correlation between the len#th of a line (fi#ure) and the number of its, probabl! &inite, constituti"e points% Dentral to Newton$s h!pothesis, of course, is the notion that the points 1are imbued with such a power as that the! could not touch or be in one place % % %2, which leads to the followin# conclusion: 1add these :points; as close in a line as the! can stand to#ether% $very point added must make some e)tension to the len#th, because it cannot sink into the former$s place or touch it2 (4=4, emphasis added)% his inference not onl! contradicts other sections of the notebooks (e%#%, 1points added between points infinitel! are e0ui"alent to a finite line2< 4=>), but it is clearl! alien to the AristotelianCEuclidean direction that Newton$s mathematical thou#ht would increasin#l! take after 177=C177>% Fecallin# Newton claims, in e5, that 1space is not compounded of a##re#ated parts2, and his denial that there are 1more parts in the totalit! of space than there are in an! place2, the metric of space would thus seem to ha"e ac0uired a simple, holistic 0ualit! fairl! earl!, since his nonCsimple, nonCholistic conception of an atomic least distance is absent from all later works subse0uent to these (deleted) pa#es from the rinit! notebook%= .t is for these reasons that Newton$s utili6ation of the order of positionBsituation of spatial parts, in (Aii) and (*), is similarl! imbued with a metrical si#nificance: that is, #i"en the failure to construct the metric from a topolo#! of points (which possess a primiti"e power of 1nonC

30 con(unction2), and since the #eometrical elements are indi"iduated b! a metricall!C influenced concept (e%#%, the .uestiones, 4>1)% 5astl!, based on their anal!sis of the cipher construction in the .uestiones, +c,uire and amn! offer a prescient obser"ation with respect to the De Grav$s (Aii) which can be seen as the forerunner to the difficulties later de"eloped b! Nerlich and &u##ett% he! obser"e that 1positions are positions of parts, and the! depend for their character on the parts themsel"es2, rather than on the points of the earlier cipher method% *ut, the infinit! of space necessitates that 1one position, an! one, be nameable independent of the others2, which 1cannot be done2 (1J84, ?3)% As with the later commentators, howe"er, +c,uire and amn! err b! o"erlookin# the simplicit! and oneness of space: to claim that the positions of parts 1depend for their character on the parts themsel"es2 is tantamount to askin# for a criterion of the indi"idualit! of the parts independent of the whole, which raises a host of problems for Newton$s other nonCreducti"e, holistic pronouncements on the parts of space (as discussed abo"e)Ae%#%, 1nor are there more parts in the totalit! of space than there are in an! place which the "er! least bod! of all occupies2 (1J8?b,11?)% &ow does one make sense of this passa#e on +c,uire and amn!$s su##estion/ In the other hand, the! construe these difficulties 1from an epistemic perspecti"e2 (?3), which marks a notable impro"ement o"er the much more ontolo#icall! tin#ed alle#ations submitted b! both Nerlich and &u##ett% Part of the moti"ation for +c,uire and amn!$s criticism of (Aii) ma! lie in their assertion that one of the features that ma! ha"e sur"i"ed Newton$s abandonment of the least distance h!pothesis, at least in some form, is the cipher method of demarcatin# the units of distance, i%e%, a metric: 1e"er! cipher % % % bein# different or distant from all the

31 former b! the 0uantit! of a unit2 (=34)% )hile it ma! be true that the cipher method is analo#ous with Newton$s later discussion of the spatial order of position in the De Grav and later works, the #eneralit! of the concept of a metric order hardl! re0uires the earlier precedent, althou#h the relational structure of the arra!ed ciphers does bear a "a#ue resemblance with the identit! ar#ument in (Aii)% hat is, #i"en a collection of 11 ciphers, demarcatin# 10 units of distance, the collected ciphers represent a nonCa##re#ate, simple metrical structure such that one cannot add another cipher 1into the midst of them, as between :ciphers; fi"e and si-2 (=34)% Het, unlike (Aii), the relational structure of the ciphers is #enerated from 1a nature and 0ualit! that the! will resist bein# the same2Ain other words, each cipher retains enou#h individuality that it can resist bein# identical to another cipher, and from these indi"idual 1powers2 the metric is constructed% (Aii) stipulates, in contrast, that the indi"idualit! of spatial parts is determined b! the metric (order of position of spatial parts) alone, with no hint of an! indi"idual traits apart from, or prior to, the metric of the whole (simple, one, indiscerpible) space%

4% Dontemporar! Spacetime 'ebates and the .mmobilit! Ar#uments% Not surprisin#l!, there are a number of contrastin# interpretations of the rele"ance of Newton$s immobilit! ar#uments for modern spacetime theories, especiall! substanti"alism and structural realism% .n what follows, we will e-amine some of the more prominent studies that are pertinent to the fore#oin# historical anal!sis% +.1. Trans&ormations2 Feturnin# to the De Grav "ersion of the immobilit! ar#uments, orretti has proposed that (Aii) can be interpreted as pro"idin# a criterion of the identit! of points 1but onl! up to isomorphism2 (1JJJ, >>< where 1isomorphism2 is defined as 1a

33 structureCpreser"in# oneCtoCone mappin#s2 of the points of space): NewtonianAthat is, EuclideanAspace admits an infinit! of distinct internal isomorphisms % % % % .n particular, if we desi#nate one of these copies be $ and we represent b! the "ector v a translation of each point of $ in the direction of v b! a distance e0ual to v$s len#th, then, if the parameter t ran#es o"er the real numbers, the translation tv !ield the successi"e positions of a frame $v +o"in# throu#h $ with a constant "elocit! v2 (>7)% orretti draws the conclusion that, based on this readin# of (Aii), 1all inertial frames are e0ui"alent2 (>7), and hints that this NewtonCinspired approach can also help to resol"e Einstein$s 1hole2 ar#ument: i%e%, the hole ar#ument 1for#ets the fact, so clearl! set forth b! Newton, that points in a structured manifold ha"e no indi"idualit! apart from their structural relations2 (3J?)% Nerlich (300>, 13J) ri#htl! critici6es orretti$s anal!sis as inconsistent with the last sentence of (*), which posits motionless absolute places, such that 1chan#es of position from these places % % % are absolute motions2% o be specific, while Newton$s Principia draws a distinction between absolute and relati"e space (with the latter bein# inertiall! related copies of absolute space), the true rest frame of the material world is absolute space, and thus not all inertial frames are ontolo!ically e0ui"alent (see also section 4%3 below)% Het, it is more instructi"e to e-amine orretti$s readin# a#ainst the backdrop of the De Grav$s immobilit! ar#uments, since (Aii) informs his structuralist appraisal, as opposed to (*)% )hile not a mathematical mappin# or transformation of the parts of space per se, (Ai) does offer two reasons for re(ectin# the idea that the parts of space can mo"e% 9irst, he insists that it cannot be 1a translation from the "icinit! of other conti#uous parts, as 'escartes defined the motion of bodies2 since 1it has been sufficientl! demonstrated that this is absurd2% .n a precedin# section of the De Grav, Newton offers a number of ar#uments a#ainst 'escartes$ (Aristotelian) conception of e-ternal place, as the boundar!

34 of the contained and containin# bod!, and its correspondin# definition of motion as chan#e of place ('escartes 1JJ1, >1< Principles, .. M3>)% Newton ar#ues that 1after the completion of some motion the position of the surroundin# bodies no lon#er sta!s the same as it was before2 (300=, 1J), since the boundar! no lon#er e-ists, and since 'escartes$ plenum also dictates that the place of a mo"ed bod! is filledCin b! other bodies% Now since it is impossible to pick out the place in which a motion be#an, % % % for this place no lon#er e-ists after the motion is completed, that tra"ersed space, ha"in# no be#innin#, can ha"e no len#th< and since "elocit! depends upon the len#th of the space passed o"er in a #i"en time, it follows that the mo"in# bod! can ha"e no "elocit! % % % % (30) ranslated into orretti$s terminolo#!, the demise of the ori#inal place of the bod! entails that there can be no determination of v (and t, for that matter) in the isomorphism $v% Newton$s reasonin# deser"es careful scrutin!, moreo"er, for it raises a number of intri#uin# 0uestions as re#ards his ontolo#ical conception of space% 'oes Newton belie"e that, like 'escartes, the remo"al of a part of spaceBe-tension would brin# about a reshufflin# of the remainin# parts of spaceBe-tension, presumabl! because there can be no nonCe-tended "acuum/ ( hat is, 'escartes holds that there is onl! a conceptual distinction between matter and e-tension, and if the matter were remo"ed from the inside of a "essel, its sides would con(oin< Principles, .. M11C18: 'oes Newton accept a similar outcome/) At the least, Newton$s claim that the motion of a part would be 1a translation from the "icinit! of other conti#uous parts2 su##ests that he is usin# a plenum model to depict the motion of the parts in space, as opposed to out o& space% his last point is e"ident in the second (Ai) criticism of the idea that spatial parts can mo"e: 1or % % % it is translation out of space into space, that is out of itself, unless perhaps it is said that two spaces e"er!where coincide, a mo"in# one and a motionless one2% )e

3= ha"e alread! e-amined, in section 3%3, the basis for this alle#ed contradiction in claimin# that space can mo"e 1out of itself2, namel!, usin# Dlarke$s e-planation, that it is 1to suppose it parted and !et not parted2% he second half of this sentence, howe"er, is of particular interest, and not simpl! due to its relati"e obscurit!% he phrase 1unless perhaps it is said2 apparentl! si#nifies that it is an e-ception to the idea that the part mo"es 1out of space into space2, and this is consistent with the remainder of the sentence: that is, Newton ima#ines that the soCcalled 1mo"in#2 part does not actuall! lea"e its space, but merel! occupies two spaces simultaneousl!, the ori#inal motionless space and a mo"in# space that 1e"er!where coincides2 with it% .f this interpretation is correct, then this brief aside likel! constitutes the closest appro-imation to a #eometric transformation concept in Newton$s spatial theori6in#% Het, the t!pe of transformation en"isa#ed is not an acti"e transformation, 1a oneCone mappin# of spacetime onto itself2 ( orretti 1JJJ, 374< which he labels a 1point transformation2), since this implies a mappin# 1out of space into space2 which Newton re(ects% Nerlich also finds orretti$s e-e#eses a "iolation of the 1out of space into space2 prohibition (138), but Nerlich fails to take the transformation analo#! a bit further% he mappin# that best correlates with Newton$s (Ai) e-planation would more likel! fall under a passi"e (or coordinate) transformation, where the #eometric ob(ects remain &i)ed under a substitution of coordinatesAin the (Ai) case, it would be a transformation of a coordinate frame ) at a point p, to a another coordinate frame y also at p, where y is related to ) b! a "elocit! boost v, rather than as an acti"e mappin# h from p to its ima#e under the mappin#, hp (see, e%#%, 9riedman 1J84, >1C>4, in addition to orretti, 374C37=). Donse0uentl!, if the resolution of Einstein$s hole ar#ument necessitates an acti"e (point) transformation, as orretti maintains (3J?), then his citin# Newton$s (Ai)

3> as an historical precedent falls wide of the mark%> +.2. (0eibni, 'hi&ts* and the 3nderlyin! #ntolo!y o& 'pace. As pre"iousl! mentioned, &u##ett stri"es to a"oid the implications of the identit! ar#ument, (Aii), b! de"elopin# a representational account of point: 1if two points in different worlds or states ha"e the same metrical relations to other points then the! represent the same points2 (3008, 11)% Het, #i"en the homo#eneit! of Newton$s Euclidean space, it therefore follows that the material world cannot differ as re#ards its position in absolute space (static shift), and hence nor can the material world be in motion in absolute space (kinematic shift): Donsider two states in which the #eometr! is Euclidean % % % , so that e"er! point in one world is metricall! indistin#uishable from e"er! point in the other% Since representation de re super"enes on the metrical relations between points, one state cannot une0ui"ocall! represent an! point as standin# in an! different relation to bodies from the other% *ut bodies can onl! mo"e with respect to spaceAi%e%, absolutel!Aif the! can occup! different parts of space at different times< and that is impossible if matter isn$t represented as occup!in# different parts of space in the possible states in the world% (3008, 1=) F% 'iSalle accepts these conse0uences of (Aii), claimin# that Newton 1is e-pressl! den!in# that the points of space % % % are Nirreducible ob(ects of first order predication$ (cf% Earman (1J8J)) and therefore den!in# b! implication that the material uni"erse would be intrinsicall! different if it e-isted at different spatial and temporal points2 (1JJ=, 37?)% *ut, as &u##ett correctl! points out, Dlarke admits that 5eibni6 shifts are distinct, possible states of the world (D%K%1C30), a stance that Newton apparentl! found unob(ectionable in his re"iew of the 5eibni6CDlarke correspondence for 'es +ai6eau- (see, Oo!rP and Dohen 1J73)% .ndeed, one of the main #oals of the scholium is to demonstrate that 1absolute and relati"e rest and motion are distin#uished from each other2 (300=, 77)% .t is thus not surprisin# that &u##ett finds the demise of 5eibni6 shifts to be a ma(or obstacle for his de re representation account, althou#h he does not construe this de"elopment, as perhaps he

37 should, as a reductio of his interpretation% o briefl! return to the se"eral topics from section 4%3, it is important to bear in mind that Newton pro"ides a fairl! bod!Ccentered definition of absolute and relati"e placeBspace in the scholium: 1relati"e space is an! mo"able measure or dimension of % % % absolute space< such a measure or dimension is determined b! our senses from the situation (situm) of the space with respect to bodies and is popularl! used for immo"able space, % % %2 (300=, 7=)% his t!pe of description could be seen as upholdin# a form of acti"e transformation, and it would naturall! ali#n with Dorollar! > of the Principia as well, i%e%, the principle of ,alilean relati"it! (see also endnote 4)% Ne"ertheless, it is not a transformation of the sort as e-pressed in passa#e (Aii) from the De Grav, where the transformation only in"ol"es the parts of space and are concei"ed metaph!sicall! or conceptuall! (and which more accuratel! resembles a passi"e transformation an!wa!)% Father, since the Principia$s ,alilean transformations are defined, so to speak, materiall! or 1operationall!2 (usin# bodies),7 it follows that these acti"e transformations operate at the purel! phenomenal le"el, such that one, and onl! one, of the potentiall! infinite set of the transformations corresponds to Newton$s immobile absolute placeBspace% And, despite Newton$s "aliant efforts to distin#uish absolute and relati"e space b! wa! of absolute motion and its effects, the scholium$s thou#ht e-periments that are intended to determine the absolute motion of bodies (i%e%, the rotatin# bucket and rotatin# #lobes) are incapable of breakin# the s!mmetr! of the ,alilean transformations to re"eal the true rest state of space (i%e%, absolute space)% he readin# that both orretti and 'iSalle fa"or, conse0uentl!, (ust does not capture the intended meanin# of Newton$s (Aii), which concerns the metaph!sics of the parts of space, and not the s!mmetries of material inertial s!stems%

3? All told, &u##ett$s formulation of the 5eibni6 shift problem still relies hea"il! on a conception of 1the metrical relations between points2 (1=)% .n contrast, the holism of the &eale!BNerlich "iew is that the points super"ene on the (metric) structure of space as a wholeAand thus, alon# with the points, the position or motion of the material world can be determined relati"e to whole of space as well, thus eliminatin# the underdetermination worries% o recall &eale!$s natural numbers analo#!, e"er! point in space (point manifold) has a distinct structural role position, (ust as the number 142 does in the natural numbers< so, the position of the material world can be fi-ed relati"e to this framework% he infinit! of space need not be re#arded as a ma(or problem for this h!pothesis, moreo"er, since the De Grav asserts that 1we can understand2 the infinit! of space, such that this conception is 1ma-imall! positi"e2 (300=, 34C3=)%? Analo#ousl!, the infinit! of the natural numbers are does not undermine the structural role pla!ed b! the number 142, and, similarl!, the infinit! of space does not undercut the structural role position of an! point in a holisticall!Cconcei"ed account of space% Het, lea"in# aside this reason for re(ectin# &u##ett$s 5eibni6 shift problem, there is another basis upon which to #au#e the positions and motions of the material world, a central feature of Newton$s spatial ontolo#! that cropped up fre0uentl! in our anal!sis in section 3% .n short, Newton maintains that the ontolo#ical foundation of space is an infinite ,od, and thus there is a "er! uni0ue irreducible 1ob(ect2 (of first order predication) that #rounds the e-istence of space, as well as its immobilit! and infinit! (as is the case with &enr! +ore and the other Dambrid#e neoCPlatonists< see section 3 and endnote 1)% here are abundant passa#es in Newton$s corpus from which to choose, for e-ample: De Grav, 1space is eternal in duration and immutable in nature because it is the emanati"e effect of

38 an eternal and immutable bein#2 (37)< ,eneral Scholium, Principia (1?14), 1&e :,od; endures fore"er, and is e"er!where present< and b! e-istin# alwa!s and e"er!where, he constitutes (constituit) duration and space2 (300=, J1)% his last con(ecture, that ,od 1constitutes2 space, would hence seem to rule out the possibilit! that an! motion, or point transformation, is applicable to this entit! (a#ainst Ohamara 3007, 111C113)% his ontolo#ical component of Newton$s theor! raises a trick! 0uestion: 'oes the utili6ation of an infinite, immo"able bein# as the ontolo#ical basis of an infinite, immobile space thereb! undermine the reason for puttin# forward (Aii), since ,od could now be claimed to #uarantee the identit! of parts of space, and not their 1mutual order2/ 9irst of all, (Aii) onl! concerns space, and not ,od$s role, which is an additional stipulation or feature of his ontolo#! not treated in (Aii)% +ore importantl!, the oneness, simplicit!, and indiscerpibilit! of space are the (emanati"e) effect of a one, simple, indiscerpible ,od, as the man! passa#es cited in section 3 disclose% .n the De Grav, for e-ample, Newton replies to the worr! that ,od is ph!sicall! di"isible b! pointin# out that space is not ph!sicall! di"isible either (300=, 37)% Accordin#l!, there is abundant e"idence to support the conclusion that the holistic nature of space is the conse0uence of a holistic ,odAand this ma! support the further contention that the lack of a primiti"e identit! for the parts of space ma! be matched b! an analo#ous lack of primiti"e identit! for the parts of ,od (but this is admittedl! a difficult inference to make)% I"erall, the details of the theolo#ical underpinnin# of Newton$s spatial metaph!sics raises numerous interpreti"e difficulties, but, since the immobilit! ar#uments onl! concern space, the uncertainties are much less problematic for his o"erall theor!% +.+. 4ewtonian 0essons &or 'pacetime 'tructuralists. *! wa! of conclusion, it would

3J be useful to compare Newton$s "iew on space, both in their ontolo#ical and structural aspects, with contemporar! debates in the philosoph! of spacetime theories% I"erall, a plausible case can be made that man! of the current 1sophisticated2 crop of interpretations, whether substanti"alist, relationist, or structural realist, are #enerall! consistent with the broad outlines of Newton$s conception% hese approaches follow Newton$s holistic lead b! emphasi6in# the crucial role of the metric (1order of position of spatial parts2) in determinin# or characteri6in# the point manifold (i%e%, without re0uirin# the primiti"e identit! of points in the manner of manifold substanti"alism), and b! placin# both structures on at least an e"en ontolo#ical footin#< e%#%, 'orato 3000, Esfeld and 5am 3008, to name but a mere few% Ne"ertheless, despite the structural role identit! that Newton ascribes to the parts of space, the Platonism that underlies Newton$s commitment to all of the elements of spatial #eometr!, both topolo#icall! and metricall!, would likel! conflict with the rationale behind some modern attempts to demote the realit! of the point manifold in fa"or of metric structure< e%#%, &oefer 1JJ7, and possibl!, Stachel 3003% &oefer$s metric field substanti"alism aims 1to strip primiti"e identit! from spaceCtime points2, such that 1the focus of this "iew is on the metric tensor as the real representor of spaceCtime % % %2 (&oefer 1JJ7, 3=)% Newton$s AristotelianCEuclidean #eometric inclinations, on the other hand, would not warrant this form of skepticism about the realit! of spatial points: the metric ma! determine the location, and thus identit!, of points, but it does not undercut their ri#htful role as part of 1the real representor2 of space% Newton, as we ha"e seen, assi#ns an e0ual de#ree of realit! to both the metric and points, since 1space can be distin#uished % % % in all directions into parts which we call points% (300=, 33)2% .n fact, the structure of

40 ph!sical space is practicall! e0uated with (Euclidean) #eometr!, as the last 0uote$s ensuin# discussion re"eals: 9or the delineation of an! material fi#ure is not a new production of that fi#ure with respect to space, but onl! a corporeal representation of it, so that what was formerl! insensible in space now appears before the senses% % % % )e firml! belie"e that the space was spherical before the sphere occupied it, so that it could contain the sphere< and hence as there are e"er!where spaces that can ade0uatel! contain an! material sphere, it is clear that space is e"er!where spherical% And so of other fi#ures% (33) his mathematical conception of space, which is not metaphorical but literal, has not been sufficientl! stressed in the literatureAit is, in particular, consistent with an (ontic/) structuralist approach to spatial #eometr! that draws inspiration from a realism about mathematical structures in #eneral, whether Platonist or of a milder "ariet! (see Slowik 300>, for more details on this spacetime structural realist strate#!)% .f one were to "enture a classification that fits the particulars of Newton$s o"erall ontolo#! of space, which includes its foundational role for an omnipresent bein#, an in re #eometric structural realism would seem to best capture his intentions, since the oneness of space is predicated on the oneness of ,od (see, section 4%3, and, Shapiro 1JJ?, on the "arieties of mathematical structuralism)%8 Qnlike the contemporar! spacetime scene, thou#h, Newton$s realism about spatial #eometr! benefits from the absence of an underdetermination of alternati"e #eometric formalisms (tensors on manifolds, twistors, Einstein al#ebras, etc%) or alternati"e ph!sical constructions (a la PoincarP), since Euclidean #eometr! was the onl! a"ailable option in the se"enteenth centur!% 9urthermore, a ma(or factor that separates Newton$s AristotelianCEuclidean #eometric outlook from the concerns of modern spacetime ontolo#ists is that the latter are moti"ated b! the underdetermination dilemma imposed b! the hole ar#ument, especiall! the modern "ariant formulated b! Earman and Norton (1J8?), and, in #eneral, b! the isomorphisms of

41 spacetime structure that are an essential part of modern mathematical formulations% .n contrast, the mathematical structures used to characteri6e the point manifold in these theories, such as Einstein al#ebras, would likel! be (ud#ed b! Newton as either additional spatial structures or simpl! useful mathematical techni0ues, but not as a definition for what it means to be a spatial point% As e-plained abo"e, the De Grav$s (Aii) is not a se"enteenth centur! analo#ue of a transformation ar#ument, and thus the delineation of #eometric structures (metric, manifold, affine, etc%) that such techni0ues can assist in disclosin# is simpl! not a part of Newton$s holistic #eometric realism% 9inall!, to return to a thread that connects much in our anal!sis, the immobile entit! (,od) that supplies the foundation of Newton$s immobile space needs to be taken into account when ad(udicatin# amon# modern spacetime counterparts of his theor!%J 5ike the Ancient$s attachment to constant circular celestial motion, Newton$s ,odC#rounded ontolo#! of space elucidates its infinite, unchan#in# nature% .n the passa#e from e5 0uoted in section 3%3, which refers to space, but could e0uall! describe his theolo#!, he states: 1to be chan#eable does ar#ue imperfection, but to be the same alwa!s and e"er!where is supreme perfection2 (1J8?b, 11?)% As re#ards this issue, there is thus an important sense in which +audlin$s 1metric essentialism2Athat the 1parts of space bear their metrical relations essentiall!2 (1J88, 87< put forward, incidentall!, a#ainst the backdrop of (Aii))Ais much closer in spirit to Newton$s Euclidean realism than the man! sophisticated ontolo#ies, listed abo"e, that rel! on a class of 5eibni6 e0ui"alent models (b! wa! of diffeomorphisms) to characteri6e the realit! of the point manifold% he essential metrical 0ualities of the parts and points of Newton$s space are secured b! the oneness of space, of course, in a topCdown fashion, as opposed to the possibl! bottomsCup

43 (from points to the whole of space) orientation of +audlin$s ori#inal idea% Ne"ertheless, the metric properties of Newton$s space can ne"er chan#e, a reali6ation that likewise undermines the alternati"e, d!namic scenarios of his spatial metric en"isa#ed b! both Nerlich (141) and &u##ett (13)%

FE9EFENDES Aristotle (1984). Metaphysics, translated by W. D. Ross, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by J. Barnes, Princeton: Princeton University Press, Vol. 2, 1552-1728. Belkind, O. (2007). Newtons Conceptual Argument for Absolute Space, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 21, 271-293. Charleton, W. (1654). Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charletoniana, London, 1654. Descartes, R. (1991). Principles of Philosophy, translated by V. R. Miller and R. P. Miller, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 'iSalle, F% (1JJ=)% 1In '!namics, .ndiscernibilit!, and Spacetime Intolo#!2, 5ritish 6ournal &or the Philosophy o& 'cience, =>, 37>C38?% 'orato, +% (3000)% 1Substanti"alism, Felationism, and Structural Spacetime Fealism2, 7oundations o& Physics, 40, 170>C1738% Earman, @% and Norton, @% (1J8?)% 1)hat Price SpaceC ime Substanti"alism/ he &ole Stor!2, 5ritish 6ournal &or the Philosophy o& 'cience, 48, >1>C>3>% Earman, @% (1J8J)% 8orld $nou!h and 'pace9Time. Dambrid#e, +A: +. Press% Esfeld, +%, and 5am, K% (3008)% 1+oderate Structural Fealism about SpaceCtime2, 'ynthese, 170, 3?C=7% ,arber, '%, &enr!, @%, @o!, 5%, and ,abbe!, A% (1JJ8)% 1New 'octrines of *od! and its Powers, Place, and Space2, in The Cambrid!e :istory o& 'eventeenth Century Philosophy, ;ol. 1, eds%, '% ,arber and +% A!ers% Dambrid#e: Dambrid#e Qni"ersit! Press, >>4C734% ,rant, E% (1J81)% %uch Ado About 4othin!: Theories o& 'pace and ;acuum &rom the %iddle A!es to the 'cienti&ic <evolution, Dambrid#e: Dambrid#e Qni"ersit! Press% &all, A% F% (3003)% :enry %ore and the 'cienti&ic <evolution, 3nd ed% Dambrid#e: Dambrid#e Qni"ersit! Press%

44

Hoefer, C. (1996). The Metaphysics of Space-Time Substantivalism, Journal of Philosophy, XCIII, 5-27. Khamara, E. (2006). Space, Time, and Theology in the Leibniz-Newton Controversy. Dordrecht: Ontos Verlag. Koslow, A. (1976). Ontological and Ideological Issues of the Classical Theory of Space and Time, in Motion and Time, Space and Matter, ed., P. K. Machamer and R. G. Turnbull. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 224-263. Koyr, A. and Cohen, I. B. (1962). Newton and the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, Archives internationales dhistoire des sciences, 15, 63-126. +audlin, % (1J88)% 1 he Essence of SpaceC ime2, Philosophy o& 'cience Association, .., 83CJ1% +c,uire, @% E% (1J?8a)% 1E-istence, Actualit! and Necessit!: Newton on Space and ime2, Annals o& 'cience, 4>, =74C>08< reprinted in Tradition and nnovation: 4ewton=s %etaphysics o& 4ature, 'ordrecht: Oluwer, 1JJ>, 1C>1% +c,uire, @% E% (1J?8b)% 1Newton on Place, ime, and ,od: An Qnpublished Source2, 5ritish 6ournal &or the :istory o& 'cience, 11, 11=C13J% +c,uire, @% E% (1J83)% 1Space, .nfinit!, and .ndi"isibilit!: Newton on the Dreation of +atter2, in Contemporary 4ewtonian <esearch, ed%, R% *echler% 'ordrecht: Feidel, 1=>C 1J0% +c,uire, @% E%, and amn!, +% (1J84)% Certain Philosophical .uestions: 4ewton=s Trinity 4oteboo>. Dambrid#e: Dambrid#e Qni"ersit! Press% +ore, &% (1JJ>)% :enry %ore=s %anual o& %etaphysics: A Translation o& the Enchiridium +etaph!sicum ?1@ABC, Parts . and .., translated b! A% @acob, &ildesheim: Ilms% +ore, &% (1JJ? :17>J;)% The mmortality o& the 'oul, *ristol: hommes Press% Newton, .% (300=)% Philosophical 8ritin!s, translated and edited b! A% @aniak and D% @ohnson, Dambrid#e: Dambrid#e Qni"ersit! Press% Fickles, '%, and 9rench, S% (3007)% 1Suantum ,ra"it! meets Structuralism: .nterwea"in# Felations in the 9oundations of Ph!sics2, in The 'tructural 7oundations o& .uantum Gravity, eds%, '% Fickles, S% 9rench, and @% Saatsi% I-ford: I-ford Qni"ersit! Press% F!nasiewic6, F% (1JJ>)% 1*! heir properties, Dauses, and Effects: Newton$s Scholium on ime, Space, Place, and +otion2, 'tudies in :istory and Philosophy o& 'cience 3>, Part ., 144C1>4< 37, Part .., 3J>C431%

4=

Saunders, S% (3007)% 1Are Suantum Particles Ib(ects/2, Analysis, 77, >3C74% Shapiro, S% (1JJ?)% Philosophy o& %athematics: 'tructure and #ntolo!y (I-ford: I-ford Qni"ersit! Press)% Slowik, E% (1JJ7)% TPerfect Solidit!: Natural 5aws and the Problem of +atter in 'escartesU Qni"erseT, :istory o& Philosophy .uarterly, "ol% 14, 1JJ7, 18?C30=% Slowik, E% (300>)% 1Spacetime, Intolo#!, and Structural Fealism2, nternational 'tudies in the Philosophy o& 'cience, 1J, 300>, 1=?V177% Slowik, E. (2008a). Newtons Neo-Platonic Ontology of Space. Forthcoming in Foundations of Science. Slowik, E. (2008b). Newtons Metaphysics of Space: A Tertium Quid betwixt Substantivalism and Relationism, or merely A God of The (Rational Mechanical) Gaps? Forthcoming in Perspectives on Science Stachel, @% (3003)% 1$ he Felations between hin#s$ "ersus N he hin#s between Felations$: he 'eeper +eanin# of the &ole Ar#ument2, in <eadin! 4atural Philosophy, ed% b! '% +alament (Dhica#o: Ipen Dourt), 341C377% Stein, &% (3003)% 1Newton$s +etaph!sics2, in The Cambrid!e Companion to 4ewton, edited b! .% *% Dohen and ,% E% Smith, Dambrid#e: Dambrid#e Qni"ersit! Press, 3>7C40?% orretti, F% (1JJJ)% The Philosophy o& Physics. Dambrid#e: Dambrid#e Qni"ersit! Press% )Gthrich, D% (3008)% 1Dhallen#in# the Spacetime Structuralist2, forthcomin#, Philosophy o& 'ceince.

See, Grant 1981, for an extended treatment of the Aristotelian/Scholastic theories of space that influenced the seventeenth century development. On Newtons indebtedness to his predecessors, whether More and the other neo-Platonists or other schools of thought, see, e.g., Hall 2002, and McGuire 1978a, and Slowik 2008a. Newtons Trinity notebook, the Questiones (1664-1665), discussed below, contains evidence that he had read both Charletons Physiologia (1654) and Mores The Immortality of the Soul (1997), but he must have been thoroughly familiar with Mores Enchiridium (1995), as well. Finally, the influence of Barrow and Wallis would seem to have helped shape Newtons move towards the Aristotelian-Euclidean conception of geometry; see, McGuire and Tamny 1983, 54-57, 94-97.
1 2

As Koyr and Cohen point out (1962, 91), most modern translations incorrectly use the term indiscernible in place of indiscerpible, the latter being the term used in Clarkes original reply.
3

There are several other problem with Belkinds analysis, moreover. That a Cartesian bodys quantity of motion is joined with its volume, or internal place (actually, the volume of its second and third elements; see, Slowik 1996) is not undermined by the fact that the constitutive parts of that body may have their own motions, and thus their own quantities of motion linked to their own volumes. This is no more a problem for Descartes than for Newton, whose Corollary 5 (i.e., the principle of Galilean relativity) fatally weakens the case for an absolute/relative divide as regards inertial motions anyhow. Newtons ship example, ironically, is Descartes own part-whole illustration: on a ship, all motions are the same with respect to one another whether the ship is at rest or is moving uniformly straight forward (Newton 2004, 78; Descartes, Principles, II 13). Indeed, if Belkinds suggestion that the scholiums part-whole critique (above) is devised to support the concept of momentum (288), as opposed to a mere metaphysical criticism of Cartesian thought, then Corollary 5 would undermine Newtons own mechanics (since the true motion of the ship would need to be determined in order to calculate the momentum of any interactions on the ship)! Contrary to Belkinds estimate (290), furthermore, the rotating bucket and globes examples in the scholium are best viewed as inferences (to the best explanation) of the reality of absolute space, since the non-inertial effects of rotation are not correlated with the relative motions of the bodies, contra relationism (and this is the only legitimate case that Newton can make).
4

McGuire (1982) and Koslow (1976, 254) attempt to make a case for a least spatial unit in Newtons post-Questiones natural philosophy, or that Newtons spatial ontology at least does not countenance dimensionless points. But, the passage quoted from TeL above (1987b, 117) utterly refutes these readings (and McGuire, in fact, rejects the least distance interpretation in an endnote added later, 185).
5

Then again, if the hole argument is conceived as employing a passive (coordinate) transformation, rather than an active (point) transformation, than maybe Newtons (Ai) could be seen as foreshadowing a resolution of the problem. That is, the type of underdeterminism that plagues the hole scenarios could then be viewed as the result of different coordinate frame constructions of the same state-of-affairs (passive), as opposed to different states-of-affairs (or possible worlds) viewed within the same coordinate frame (active). Overall, a passive construal would thus seem to render the underdeterminism as merely alternative representations of the same reality, whereas the active reading describes a genuine physical underdeterminismand the former is much less troubling than the latter.
6

For example: place is the part of space that a body occupies (65); and we define all places on the

basis of the positions and distances of things from some body that we regard as immovable, and then we reckon all motions with respect to these places (66). He adds that absolute motions can be determined only by means of unmoving places, . . . and relative motions to movable places (67). As for absolute place/space: the only places that are unmoving are those that all keep give positions in relation to one another from infinity to infinity . . . (67).
7

We cannot imagine the infinity of space, however, due to the limitations of the cognitive faculty of imagination (24). In contrast, Descartes view of extension, as indefinite (Principles, I 26), would likely pose a problem for a holistic idea, given the incomplete or uncertain connotations implicit in this description.
8

In Hoefers terms, Newtons Aristotelian-Euclidean holistic conception of geometry would likely translate into a metric plus point manifold substantivalismbut, see, Slowik 2008b, which argues that Newtons ontology of space is best categorized as a property theory, albeit with various qualifications, and not substantivalism.
9

However, if one were to use the strategies surveyed in Wthrich (2008) for resolving the problem of the identity argument (as we have labeled it), then the foundational role that an omnipresent being assumes in Newtons theory does raise a number of intriguing possibilities. In essence, this type of being, which is infinite and non-limited by definition, could naturally provide Newton with the basis for the numerical plurality of points, or for securing an irreflexive, weak discernibility function on points (Saunders 2006) without therefore having to assume more than one point. As regards modern, non-theological spacetime equivalents, a good candidate for an underlying ontology that could bring about or constitute space (see section 3.2), and whose numerical plurality could dissolve the (Aii) difficulty, might be found in some of the latest quantum gravity hypotheses, such as string theory or loop quantum gravity (assuming they are sufficiently background independent; see, e.g., Rickles and French 2006).