The intellectual problems that faced the 20th century had their roots in the Enlightenment.

Two thoughts in particular emerged from the Enlightenment that shaped the ideas of the 20th century. The first is that science gives us a complete description of reality. Science, specifically natural science, is the ideal of human inquiry. What is is what science says there is. What can be known can be known by the scientific method. The second is that we can formulate a comprehensive theory of ethics and politics of what I as an individual ought to do and what we collectively ought to do. We can do this, furthermore, on the general model of the sciences. There s an ob!ious tension between these thoughts. Science tells us what is and why it is, but not what it ought to be. There's a gap between is and ought, between description and prescription, between fact and value. This is the problem of normati!ity, how to make sense of norms"" should, ought, good, bad, heroic, e!il, right, wrong, #ust, un#ust and so on. They don t describe the world, they e!aluate the world. What, if anything, makes normati!e #udgments true$ %ow, if at all, can we know them$ The scientific re!olution began in the &'th century.

(t reached its culmination in the &)th with work of *opernicus, Tycho +rahe, ,ohannes -epler, .alileo .alilei, and (saac /ewton. The signal achie!ement of the scientific re!olution was the de!elopment of a system of uni!ersal and necessary laws of nature. Science quickly became the model for all of human knowledge. 0oltaire e1pressed skepticism about anything beyond the realm of science. %e ad!ocated toleration for beliefs that lay beyond the bounds of science, for they couldn t be established or refuted by scientific"" and for him, that meant rational"" means. 2enis 2iderot edited a 2) !olume encyclopedia. %e thought science #ustified materialism, the !iew that the world consists solely of matter. This world, he wrote, is only a mass of molecules. +aron 3aul d %olbach argued that science established materialism and also atheism, that .od does not e1ist. (f the world is nothing but a mass of molecules mo!ing around according to scientific laws, howe!er, what sense can we make of norms, of !alues$ What sense is there in speaking of right and wrong, good and e!il, #ustice and in#ustice$ (t would be like looking at the motions of the planets and recommending or denouncing them. (t wouldn t make any sense. The Enlightenment has been called the 4ge of 5eason. Enlightenment thinkers tend to assume that we can know the nature and laws of nature, of human beings, of society, and of ethics and politics.

(mmanuel -ant, the &)th century .erman philosopher who wrote an essay called, What (s Enlightenment$, pronounced the Enlightenment motto"" dare to know. Enlightenment thinkers differ in many respects. They take !arying stances on the nature !ersus nurture question, for e1ample. Some are empiricists who think that all knowledge comes from e1perience. 6thers are rationalists who think that some knowledge of the world is a priori, independent of e1perience or innate. Some belie!e in .od, some don t. +ut all accept four basic assumptions. First, truth-there are truths that are absolute, independent of any individual mind and thus, universal. Second, knowledge. It's possible to have ob ective knowledge of some of those truths. Third, reason. !eason is the best way to achieve and ustify such knowledge. "nd fourth, progress. "cting rationally in response to ob ective knowledge improves our chances of achieving our aims. The first three are inspired by the success of science. The scientific re!olution yielded knowledge of uni!ersal, ob#ecti!e, and absolute truths by way of the scientific method. -epler s 7aw, for e1ample, that the planets mo!e in elliptical orbits with

the sun at one focus. .alileo s 7aw, that the distance an ob#ect falls o!er time is one half the gra!itational constant times the time squared. /ewton s 7aws that e!ery action has an equal and opposite reaction, that ob#ects don t accelerate unless acted upon by some force, that force is mass times acceleration, and the gra!itational attraction between two ob#ects is proportional to the product of their masses and in!ersely proportional to the square of the distance between. That seemed to show that there are absolute, uni!ersal truths, that we can ob#ecti!e knowledge of some of them, and that reason in the form of scientific method is a good means for achie!ing that knowledge. The fourth, progress, was inspired by technology. We can use reason and the knowledge it pro!ides to achie!e our aims. That assumption, concerning progress, offers a hope that within the Enlightenment paradigm, we can speak of norms in terms of rationality. The Enlightenment scientific image of man threatens to undermine morality. (f the world consists of particles mo!ing according to laws, what sense does it make to speak of right and wrong, good and e!il, #ustice and in#ustice$ +ut Enlightenment thinkers tend to think of morality and politics on the model of science. They approach morality and politics by affirming ob#ecti!e uni!ersal laws e1pressing a moral ideal. %ow can these thoughts be reconciled$ /e1t time, we ll look at ways of trying to base morality and politics in rationality.

%ere we ll e1amine an argument that it can t be done. #avid $ume published his magnum opus, " Treatise of $uman %ature, when he was in his &'s. %e was disappointed that it was initially ignored. (t fell stillborn from the press, he said. (t s now considered one of the greatest works of Western philosophy. %ume wrote shortly after the death the death of (saac /ewton, during a lull in scientific ad!ance. %e fancied himself the /ewton of the mind, in effect, the first psychologist. (n music, this was the height of the +aroque, the time of +ach, %andel, 0i!aldi, %asse, and 3ergolesi. (n literature, it was the birth of the no!el, the time of Swift, 8ielding, ,ohnson, 2efoe, Sterne, and 0oltaire. Economics was born as a science in the writings of %ume s compatriot in Edinburgh, 4dam Smith. %ume ad!ances a simple argument. (orals have an influence on actions and affections. 5eason alone can ha!e no such influence. So morality is not a conclusion of reason. /otice the assumption. 5eason is inert. (t can t influence actions or affections, that is feelings. 5eason deals with facts. +ut facts are what they are. They don t and can t moti!ate anyone.

9orality, %ume concludes, consists of no matter of fact. :ou should or you shouldn t. Thou shalt or thou shalt not. That s good or bad, #ust or un#ust. Those aren t matters of fact. They re directed at action. +ut facts"" it s warm today; 2 plus 2 is <; force is mass times acceleration"" aren t directed at action. +y themsel!es, they re neither good nor bad, #ust or un#ust. They don t direct anyone to do anything. %ume thus robs rationality of its role in grounding norms. +ut then what, if anything, does ground them$ %ume offers an answer. %e s most famous for pointing to the gap between is and ought, between fact and !alue. (n e!ery system of morality ( !e met with, ( !e noticed that the author proceeds for some time reasoning in the ordinary way to establish the e1istence of a god or making points about human affairs. 4nd then he suddenly surprises me by mo!ing from propositions with the usual copulate"" is or is not"" to ones that are connected by ought or ought not. This seems like a !ery small change, but it s highly important. 8or as this ought or ought not e1presses some new relation or affirmation, it needs to be pointed out and e1plained. 4nd a reason should be gi!en for how this new relation can be inconcei!ably

a deduction from others that are entirely different from it. 9oral reasoning"" and we need the scare quotes here"" goes from is and is not to ought and ought not. %ow can we go from is to ought$ 5eason supplies no connection. %ume s answer, feelings. Why is cruelty wrong$ Why is generosity good$ /o fact of the matter is to be found in them. (t is the ob#ect of feeling, not of reason, he says. (t lies in yourself, not in the ob#ect. 9orality, in other words, stems from feelings of approbation or disapprobation, appro!al and disappro!al. When ( say that murder is wrong, ( mean that murder arouses a feeling of disapprobation in my breast. When ( say that generosity is good, ( mean that generosity arouses a feeling of approbation or appro!al. Sentiment or feeling then, not reason, takes us from is to ought. What then is the role of reason$ 2oes it ha!e one when it comes to norms$ (t has only one, %ume thinks. 5eason is and ought to be the sla!e of the passions. 6ur feelings are particular. They re directed at particular acts or e!ents. 4n action or sentiment or character is !irtuous or !icious.

Why, he writes. +ecause its !iew causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind. ( respond emotionally, passionately to particular actions and e!ents. ( then generali=e, holding that stealing is wrong, for e1ample, on the basis of reactions to some particular instances of theft. 6ur moral sense is the capacity we ha!e for the feelings that constitute the basis for our moral #udgments. Some people ha!e a strong and well de!elopment moral sense. 6thers don t. Some may e!en be morally blind. The 8rench 5e!olution would soon put the idea that reason should be the sla!e of the passions to the test. (n nine months in &>?2 in the 5eign of Terror, the *ommittee of 3ublic Safety e1ecuted '0,000 people. They de!eloped a new technology of mass murder using the guillotine and in the chilling anticipation of the 20th century, e!en loading people onto barges to be sunk in the middle of the ri!er to kill people more quickly and efficiently. Some of those killed were aristocrats, nobles against whom the re!olution was directed. +ut that was only about )@ of the total. 2'@ were from the middle classes. 3easants and workers made up A0@ of those e1ecuted. This was in part dri!en by political theory. ,ean",acques 5ousseau, whose writings inspired the re!olution, had asked, what happens when an indi!idual s will conflicts with the general will, the

common good of the community$ %e answered that the general will must take precedence. +ut he added that since an indi!idual in the social contract commits himself and e!erything he has to the community, yielding to the general will isn t merely an obligation for the greater good. (t s an e1pression of his own freedom. Those whose interests conflict with those of the state must be crushed for their own good. (n his words, they must be forced to be free. 9adame de Stael, witnessing this, saw the end of the age of reason and feared for what might come ne1t. 3assions are immensely dangerous. They must be controlled by reason, she urged, in indi!idual li!es and in society. The proper roles of reason and passion would remain at center stage throughout the &?th and 20th centuries. +oth, it turns out, would pose serious dangers. 9illions would die because of someone s theory. 9illions more would die because of someone s unbridled passion. The Europe 9adame de Stael knew would disappear, ne!er to return.