Soul and Body in Plato and Descartes Author(s): Sarah Broadie Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New

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XIV*-SOUL AND BODY IN PLATO AND DESCARTES' bySarahBroadie

in comparison with nonare often Although they grouped together dualist Plato'ssoul-body and Descartes' theories, dualism, mind-body dualism, different. The doctrines examined are thoseof the Phaedo are fundamentally from which others liesin Plato's and theMeditations. The maindifference, flow, oftheassumption thatthesoul (= intellect) acceptance and Descartes' rejection is identical with whatanimates thebody.
ABSTRACT

and arestill at thebroad-brush mind-body relations, stage, thempairing Plato and Descartesas the quite oftenone finds twomosteminent dualists of ourWestern As Plato to tradition. thethrough-and-through to materialist so Descartes Democritus, Gassendi,it is oftensuggested-reasonably, perhaps.As the modern non-reductive materialist to his Cartesian betenoir,so Aristotle to Plato on soul-bodyrelations, we are sometimes told-a misleading For thepurpose analogy, somethink. ofcontrast with variousnon-dualist viewsitmayseemuseful to group Plato'sdualism and thatofDescartes together, and inmany contextstheir differences But if one simply commay not matter. with each other, notwith the paresthetheories anythird system, differences are fascinating and seemimportant. Of coursethereare similarities to sustainthe initialpairing. Bothphilosophers arguethatwe consist of something incorporone callsit 'mind'or 'soul',which eal,whether forthetime being is somehow united with a bodythatis partofthephysical world. Both identify the self,the 'I', withthe incorporeal member of thisalliance.Both hold thatmy mindor soul will survive the demise ofthebodybywhich I am nowpresent to thisaudiencein turn which is present to methrough itsmembers' bodies.Both
1. A version of thispaper was delivered as the2000 FoersterLectureon theImmorof the Soul, at the University tality of California at Berkeley. *Meetingof the Aristotelian Society,held in Senate House, University of London, on Monday,4thJune, 2001, at 4.15 p.m.

the'-ism's' to henphilosophy teachers present pertinent

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as holding may be understood thatthemindor soul can exist altogether of body, though Plato may have independently Both are concerned changedpositionon thispoint.2 withthe immortality of thesoul. Here I shallfocuson separability of mindor soul from body in Plato's Phaedo and Descartes'Meditations. But first a word I have said 'mindor soul' as about terms. Severaltimes already ifthewordsmeant thesame,which of coursethey do not.Plato butnotso Descartes. consistently In speaksofthesoul (psuche?), his prefaceaddressed to the theologiansat the Sorbonne Descartes claimsthathe willprovetheimmortality of thesoul. He is usingthechurch's label forthedoctrine, butit is doubtful thatwhathe thought he could proveis whatthechurch means I suppose,thechurch's by thephrase.Roughly, meaning spotlights the humanindividual minusa biologicalbody. It is this thatcan sin and be forgiven, is summoned to the Last Judgesaid for its salvation.But what Descartes ment,has prayers believed hecouldshowis theimmortality ofthemind or intellect, and although themind, as he was foreverstressing, is proneto error and shouldbe expected to conductitself to an according intellectual code of conduct, its errors are not sins or offences against morality.In more philosophicalcontextsDescartes explicitly mindfrom distinguishes soul,reserving 'soul' forthat whichanimates thebody.In thissenseof 'soul' he either denies thatany such principle existsor reducesit to a physical configuration. The biological difference between a living bodyand a corpseis the purely physical difference between a machinein orderand one thatis broken working or wornout. So what Descartesis leftwith,in additionto his machinebodyevenexists, whichat thebeginbody-if his or any other ningof the Meditations he calls into doubt-is a mindwhose business is to think and imagine, but not to animateany corporealsystem. And sinceit is himself thathe finds thinking, and sincehe is unable, no matter howhardhe tries, to doubthisown existence as this currently thinking thing, Descartesidentifies himself with this mind. Butat first he is notin a position to assert that he, or the mindthat is he, can existwithout the body,
2. In theTimaeusitis taken for granted that theworld-soul must havea body; and human intellects return purified to spatial instars. locations

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or its becauseprima facie it is possiblethatthemind'sexistence on bodyin someway.For essential activity of thinking depends theminddoes notrequire eventhough bodyin thewayin which a bodyifit is to do an animating principle presumably requires its thing of animating something, themindmaydependon the so to speak,it is the bodyin some other way,a way in which, of body thatgiveslifeto the mind,muchas an arrangement particlesgives rise to a magneticfield.Later on, however, Descartes maintains thataccording to hisclearand distinct ideas of mindand body,neither of thesenatures or refers contains to the other. And meanwhile he takeshimself to have established thateverything he clearly and distinctly is true.Hence perceives he can concludethatmind,and perhapssoul in thetheological is separable from is thebasis forproving sense, the body,which mindor soul immortal. Descartescan concludethatmind and Or, more precisely, from each other once he is free of his initial bodyare separable wholesale doubtconcerning therealexistence ofbody.For obviworldis onlyhisfinite dreamobject, ouslyifthephysical mind's it nor any of its partscan existindependently neither of that And in that case not it may be easyto showthatthe dreaming. finite mindthatdreamssuch a dream-a dreamin whichit is embodied and itsbodyis partofa physical world-can be free of thisor other dreams likeit.Butifwe taketheopposite dreaming that thephysical hypothesis, world exists then this independently, world,especially the part of it that is Descartes'body, can reasonably be heldresponsible fortheappearances of thephysical thatare present to Descartes' mind.In thatcase it is reasonable to assume these appearances willceasewhen bodyand mind actuallyseparate.The mindwill thenbe phenomenally unembodiedas wellas really so. But as longas it is uncertain whether thephysical is realindependently ofthefinite mind, one can suppose thateither thismindgenerates theappearances from itself, or they are causedin it byGod. But sincethefinite mindcannot be separated from God anymorethanit can be separated from on either ofthesehypotheses itself, thecause of theappearances is necessarily with thatfinite always mind-so why shoulditever be without theappearances? It is true thatin thesixth Meditation Descartessays he can clearly and distinctly understand himself to be a complete beingevenwithout his faculty of sensory and

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Fromthishe concludes that he or his imaginational appearances. and its objects.It follows mindcan existwithout thatfaculty arise fromthis that those objects,the empirical appearances, neither from his own intellectual nature nor directly from God whois alwayspresent is to,or evenin,hismind.ThusDescartes thattheimmediate source onlyone stepaway from concluding ofthese must be something different from appearances altogether mind,bothfrom thefinite mindthatis Descarteshimself, and fromthe infinite mindthatis God. In sum,the sourceof the mustbe a corporeal a realphysical appearances substance, thing thatexists mind. of Descartes' independently But letus stopour thinker before he takesthatlast step,and If he or his mindreallyis or questionhim about his premiss. would be a complete of sensory and beingminusthe faculty imaginational do these appearances, why, byhis ownadmission, besethim so? No doubt theyfade away whenhe appearances absorbshimself in puremathematics completely or in thoughts aboutGod and aboutpurefinite ifthere is sucha thing as mind, mind.But in Descartes'ownexperience purefinite theempirical appearances alwaysreturn. So perhapsit is the natureof his mindto conjure them up foritself againand again,or to become receptive againand againto theseeffects causedin himbyGod. If,on careful reflection, one can consider thispossible, Descartes is mistaken in claiming thatthehumanmindcan attaina clear, distinct and complete idea of itself as existing freeof empirical to itself. Thatthese appearances sometimes recede when themind is abstractly does not that engaged prove are notamongthe they objectsnatural to it or naturally served up to it immediately by God. For whereis it written thatall themind'snatural objects are present to it at once? Certainly, Cartesian doubtcan save Descartesfromregarding theseappearances as anything more thanphenomenal, buthe knows from experience thatdoubtcannot put an end to the phenomena as such. He may alwaysbe saddledwiththem, evenifonlyas appearances then, recognised as such.In thissense,a sortof phenomenalist sense,the self's body and physicalenvironment may be as immortal as the humanmind. Thus Descartes'ideas of himself or hismindare not,I think, able to show thatthe humanmindis in every senseseparable

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from he mustfallback on theindependent body.To showthis, attractiveness of the thought that'real' or 'externally' existing bodyis whatcausestheempirical Thisis ofcourse appearances. an independently attractive to theextent thatit is unatthought tractive to supposethatGod (whomDescartes has by now proved to existand to be hiscreator) deceives or meanly frustrates a finite mindlike that of Descartes.For insofar as Descartes cannothelptaking theempirical appearances to be of independently existing bodies,ifDescartes werealwaysmistaken in this thenGod wouldbe a deceiver; and evenif Descartes can break out of thedeception by meansof systematic doubt,God would be cruelin making theescape dependon a method so hardfor thehumanmind. So if one is a Cartesian, thepositionthatmindis separable frombody,not only ontologically but also phenomenally, is secured by meansof twoconclusions: if there is any suchthing as a really existing body,mindis not existentially on dependent it; and: body reallyexistsand is the separable cause of mind's corporeal experiences. I wantnow to say something about the universality of Cartesianseparability, and something about whatunites theseparables while they are together. These are points on which Descartesand Plato differ fundamentally. First, in universality: claimingthat mind and body are ontologically separable, of course, Descartes, claimsmuchmorethanthata givenmind can exist apartfrom a given natural body.Separability is guaranteedforhimby theessenceof mindin general and theessence of bodyin general. Fromhis ideas of theseessences he believes he can see thatmind-any mind-can existapartfrom bodyanybody,and viceversa(Meditation 6). This is in linewiththe Church's teaching, to which according every humansoul comes to theLast Judgement either stripped ofbodyaltogether, or with a sortof supernatural bodythrough whichit can communicate and suffer, butwhich is notsetin a natural physical environment and is notsubject to thelaws of physical nature. Phenomenal separability, as I am calling it,is likewise universal fortheCartesian insofar as theCartesian holdsthatmindas such is subject to corporealappearancesbecause and only becausean associated realbodycausesthem. It follows from this

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premiss thatforanymindM, once thecausal nexusbetween M M is automatically and realbodyis broken, not only separated from realbodybutalso from all corporeal appearances.3 In sum:bothontologically thepossibility and phenomenally, thata human is linked mind to corporeal and thepossibilthings, ityofitsnotbeingthuslinked, flow from thenature common to all humanminds;and a mind'sactuallinkage or non-linkage is or is based on itsstanding in causal nexuswith or not standing something external to itself. Its linkage or notto metaphysically is therefore notdetermined corporeal things menbyanyinternal tal disposition of its own, stillless by any internal in respect whichone particular humanmindmaydiffer from for another, of strong in a certain examplein respect involvement typeof Consider in his unusualifnotunique pursuit. Descartes himself ofseeking enterprise certainty through doubt.Thisextraordinary can surely practice be described as a letting go of thecorporeal and it leads him,or so he thinks, perspective, to theproofthat mind and bodyareontologically Butthis separable. proof applies even to mindssunkin ordinary habitsof thinking, mindsfor whichCartesian doubtis meaningless and impossible. And this proofis not performatively givenin thepractice, but is derived from independent truths which thepractice uncovers as suitable ThuswhatDescartes starting points. whenhe proves proves separationpossibleis a truth thatwouldhold evenifno mindever engagedin Cartesian or similar detachment. It surely suitsthe doctors of orthodox thatDescartes theology presents them with thediscovery of a truth thatis likethetruths oflogicand mathematicsand Cartesian in thatit holds no matter physics what any of us maythink or feelabout anything. This is by contrast with any factsor possibilities he himself mightbringabout a mental through activity willedby him. Now forthequestion of whatunites theCartesian separables whentheyare together. It is not the finite mind'sown agency thatconnects it witha body whichit thenfeelsto be its own. Thiscouldonlybe donebyan act ofwillon thepartofthefinite mind.But although Descartesregards his willas 'not restricted in anyway' (Meditation 4), itsunrestricted domainturns out to
3. For Descartes these include memoriesso far as the latterdepend on images groundedin the body.

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to whichhe maychoose not to of propositions consist entirely This unrestricted assentwhentheyfailto be clearand distinct. itsownassertion aboutexcept willis nota willto bring anything For this truths and falsehoods. constituted and denialofalready as he is pureintelto Descartes insofar willbelongs unrestricted it cannottake as its objectsthings lect.On its own,therefore, for according to Descartessuch that are sensedor imagined, united to themindonlywhenit is already can be present things forthis unioncantheexplanation with thebody.Consequently, witha mindwantsor willsto be connected notbe thatthefinite For withsomeparticular bodyor other. particular body,or with or definite we couldnothavean idea,either out senseexperience ofa particular anyexplanation indefinite, body.And presumably in terms to be connected with ofthemind's bodywould wanting attend to whatit feelsliketo have a body-the mindwouldbe to havea senseofwhatthatfeels like,and to be drawn assumed towards a corresponding existence as ifitwouldbe at homein a of and the imagination body. But forDescartessuch feelings is so them can onlyarisewhenthemind already embodied, they embodiment. cannotexplain Obviously, Nor can we explain it byturning to bodybyitself. is powerless to connect witha mind.Only itself body by itself can causebyhiswilla union God, a third beingofinfinite power, between substances aliennatures as mindand of suchmutually of finite things dependson body.Of courseevery arrangement thewillof God, butother sayofbodywith body, arrangements, fall within a naturalsystem by familiar and can be explained causesaccording to thesystem's laws.Mindand body, secondary however,fall withinno such single system,accordingto ofa supernatural Descartes; their uniontherefore speaksdirectly cause. On present from finite showing, thiscause is as different mindas it is from are bothdevoidof finite body,sincethelatter thethird In thisrespect, thefinite thing's powerto unitethem. mindis as passiveand inert as matter is traditionally supposed to be. Let me now turn to Plato. Readersof thePhaedosometimes takePlato to taskforconsoul as mindor thatwhich with soul as thatwhich fusing thinks, animates the body.Perhapsthisis a terrible mistake. But it is not a confusion in the senseof a blunder committed en route

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else. For the identification of thinking soul with to something in thePhaedo. animating soul is Plato's theory In trying to understand one might seemto discern a close this, if one identifies analogybetween and animating thinking thinkofintelligence and assumes, as is natural for ingwith theexercise manypeople,thatthepractical is thearenaforexercising sphere For thepersonof practical intelligence. is switched intelligence on to thepractical of his situation demands in a waynotunlike the way in whicha perceptually is switched sensitive organism on to signalsin theenvironment and its own body,4 and again notunlike thewayin which theelements of a physiological systemare switched on and offby chemical signalsin theinterest ofpurely biological animation. Again,someone whois irresponsive to things thatinterest mostpeople may be said not to be properly alive,and evennotto be properly animating his body. In sayingthiswe need not mean thathe functions below par we mayinstead physiologically; be regarding hisbodyas a social presence, an instrument foractionand communication, which comesto lifewhenactivated. Beingalive on thislevelpresupposes being biologically alive, and for most normal human beings, aliveautomatically being biologically results inlifeon the levelof practice, exceptforwhentheyare sleeping. These two modesof beingaliveare linked in sucha waythat,rather than themanalogous,one might, deeming moreprimitively perhaps, failto distinguish them, and thusconflate whatthinks with what animates thebody. Plato's view,however, is quitedifferent, becauseforhimthe paradigm exercise of intelligence is theoretical or at anyratenot immediately practical: it deals in universals and abstractions, it is conducted at leisure from practical life, and it has no palpable effects on thethoughts ofoneself except and a fewinterlocutors. Platobelieves thatthesoulthinks bestwhendissociated from the one is theobservation body.He has tworeasons: thatwe cannot in thekindofthinking engage thatforhimis thinking par excellencewhenwe are physically activeand attending to goingson in our bodiesand in our physical environment; and theother is histheory thatthesoul has latent within ita supremely pureand beautiful kindof knowledge whichit could onlyhave come by
4. Thus phronein (= 'to have one's witsabout one') rangesin meaningfrom'to be sane' to 'to be conscious'.

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soul is at its best birth before into a body. Since the thinking Plato whenin fullcontactwiththe objectsof thisknowledge, concludes thatthebestthing thatcan happento thissoul is to be separated from bodyupon death. So farone might think thatPlato'sthinking soul cannotpossiblybe whatanimates thebody;forit seemsabsurdto suggest thatsomething bothanimates a bodyand is a pureintellect that functions that bestaway from thebody.But in fact,thebelief the soul is an intellect thatfunctions best away from body is precisely one of two assumptions thatlie at thebase of Plato's The secondassumption equationof intellect withanimator. is thatthisself-same intellect is also intimately withthe connected body.The argument forthisis mediated by theconceptof the self.On the one hand it is naturalforSocratesand his interlocutors in thePhaedoto identify themselves with their intellects. After in thePhaedo, all, if you are Socratesand I am Simmias thenwhatare you and I engaged in ifnotparadigmatic intellection, while minimally using ourbodiesto exchange ourthoughts? If we could think at our bestwithout everexchanging thoughts, or could exchange thoughts by somenon-physical means,then we as intellects wouldnotneedbodiesat all. On theother hand, though, each one ofus knows conhimself to be in or intimately nected with a body.And Socrates' friends knowthisof Socrates, or whywouldthey dreadlosingSocrates oncehisphysical death has beendecreed? is theself So theselfthatis Socrates'intellect boundup withhis body.And thefactthatin thislifethesoul functions bestas intellect whenleastinvolved in bodilyactivity and sensation, together with thedoctrine thatthesoul'sintellectualactivity was at itsabsolutebestwhenthesoul was attached to no body,now strongly pointsto theconclusion thatintellectual activity waxesas bodilyinvolvement wanesand viceversa. And sinceit is natural to think of bare biological animation as thelimiting case ofa soul'sbodily involvement, and as thebasic formwhichmore complicated forms-the ones expressed in actionsand emotions-depend on and presuppose, it is notdifficult to drawthefurther conclusion thatthesoul thatcan functionas pureintellect is thesameas thesoul thatkeepsthebody alive.5
5. If bare biologicalanimationis thought of as continuousin kind withintelligent physical activity suchas playing tennis or cooking, itwillseemplausiblethattheoretical contemplation at itsfullest dependson suspension of animation, sinceit seemsto be a fact,and not a merely contingent one, thatattention used in theoretical contem-

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But now if one and the same entity, the soul, can function intellect and as animator of a body,what bothas unembodied it to one of thesefunctions than the other? determines rather And sincethey and thesoul is capableof both, are alternatives, is neither to it,anymorethana pieceof wax function essential is essentially theshapeofa ball oressentially theshapeofa cube? is essential Butifneither function to thesoul,we havebeentold nothing of the soul's nature.If, on the otherhand, both are essential, whatunites them? According to the theory of the Phaedo, the soul becomes involved witha bodybecauseit desires to livein a wayin which it onlycan ifit has a bodyof suitable kind.To beginwith, perhaps,thesoul is notoriented to anyvery specific setof physical activities or pleasures, sinceit has no experience of any. So to beginwithperhaps all thatit takesto involve a soul withbody is thesoul'sfailure to understand or fully believe that itsexistence can be complete as a pure intellect. Not realizing this,it feels incomplete, and thisbreedsthedesireforsomenon-intellectual and lo and beholdthesoul finds activity; itself witha body,and presumably a physical environment, of a sortthatwouldenable it to livein thewayit thought wouldbring it completeness, but whichin fact, of course, does nothing of thekind.Now it is in thebodyof a humanbeing, or perhaps a humanmale,and ifit continues to misunderstand its own original nature-whichis easiernow forit to do, sinceit has cometo feelat homein an actual physical existence, and to becomehabituated to various kindsofembodied pleasures-then it seeksto be in a body,and alwaysa bodythatwouldbestexpress theway it wantsto live. So on physical death, a soul in thisstateis reincarnated, perhaps as another humanbeing, but also perhaps (so Plato held,to the great embarrassment ofsomeofhisadmirers) as a loweranimal, say a pig or wolfwhosewallowing or ravening life-style fleshes out thesoul's mostprecious previous desires.6 Alternatively, the
plationis attention takenaway from intelligent physical activity, and viceversa.Plato modelsintellection on dreaming, whichthesoul is free to do onlywhennotgoverning thelimbsand perceiving through thesenseorgansin wakinglife(cf.theHippocratic treatise On Dreams [Regimen roundwith IV], 86). However,Plato thenturnsthings hisfamiliar dictum thatthewakingworldis thatoftheeternal intelligibles, thedream worldthatof everyday life. 6. Aristotle was unfair if he meantto includePlato in his criticism of thePythagoreans forassigning 'any chancesoul to anychancebody' (De AnimaI 3, 407b 20-24).

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embodied soul mayincline towards and achieve disembodiment, it or come closerto achieving it by practising its intellectuality and rejecting This is why, and worldly enthusiasms. in physical thePhaedo,about-to-die Socrates tries to comfort hisfriends by them thatifdeathis theseparation ofsoul from telling body,the shouldbe gladto die,sincethephilosopher has lived philosopher his present lifegladlypractising fordeathby losinghimself to intellectual activity. In Plato,then, thequestion of separability of soul from body is not a simpleone. In the first embodiedsoul is place, every separablefromits current body, since the soul is immortal, whereas anygiven soul is in bodywillwearout. Secondly, every principle separable from bodyaltogether, sinceevery embodied soul is in principle, or at least by virtue of its original nature, able to refine itself to the pointwhereit wantsnothing thata body can provide.However,sayingthis is a bit like saying: humanbeingsby naturecan live without heroinor cocaine; heroin and cocaineaddicts arehuman beings bynature; therefore can livewithout they heroin or cocaine.Granted have the they capacity, theylack the powerto exercise it as of now,just as humanbeingsby contrast withbull-frogs have thecapacity to speak severaldifferent but someonewho has never languages, learnt a foreign language lackstheability to exercise thishuman In thissense, capacity. someembodied soulscannotliveseparate froma body suitedto theirdesires, whileothers, a minority can. perhaps, According to thispicture, thebodyis simply theinstrument of thesoul,a viewthatAristotle too wouldendorse at one stageof hiscareer. Thatis, thesoul does notdependon thebodyexcept to do through it something thatit wantsto do. Thusit fashions and animates itsbodyforthesake of physical action,sensation and experience. Thatthesoulcan do thisifitchoosesgoesalong withthethought, whichwe findagain and again in Plato,that the soul is divineor godlike.This meansthatin itself it has a sortof limited If it willsor really omnipotence. desires a certain kindoflifeforitself, its'willis done' evenifit willswhatis bad forit: automatically it comesto be equippedwith whatis necessary.But onceit is in a body,ofcourse, whatit can bring about is limited bythenature of itsbodyand theenvironment. So to answerour earlierquestionsabout the essence of soul-the soul forPlato is essentially a valuing power:a power

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to create thelife ittruly and thinks and maintain foritself desires accoutrements good, alongwiththatlifestyle's or freedom from function and itsbody-aniaccoutrements. Its purely intellectual function If we mating different bentsor inclinations. represent itis presumably consider soulin general and in theabstract, conwhether and embodied this tingent soulis embodied, wayor that, or whether it is pureintellect. Whatis essential and fundamental is soul's determinability, in contrary in factself-determinability, ways.If,however, we consider an individual soul,itsdeterminate condition-its beingembodiedor not, and if embodiedthen how-is all butfundamental forthisindividual. For on theone hand this conditionreflects the individual's dearest currently values,and on the otherhand it affects almosteverything the in itscurrent individual does and experiences life. We maywonder how thesoul is supposed to takeon a body. Plato sayslittle aboutthis. At one pointhe seems to suggest that thesoul 'weaves'a bodyforitself.7 Certainly he does not want to imply thatthesoul has handsand movesa shuttle to and fro. The idea presumably is thatthe soul informs certain materials whichin its presence grow and organisethemselves into the requisite body.A previously embodied soul maystart with some matter from itsprevious body.8 Plato showsno signof holding thatthesoul creates itsbodyex nihilo. Some philosophers balk at the idea thatthe soul has might powerto re-arrange if theyacceptedthe matter. They might, existence of the soul at all, feel more comfortable with the thought that the soul actuallydreamsits body and physical environment. Someworkwouldthenhaveto be doneto explain whether, and ifso, how,soulsdreaming different physical dreams in somesensesharea world nonetheless with each other. Butthis is not Plato's problem, forhe does not strike out in theidealist direction. It is sometimes suggested thatone needsto have been bitten by thebug ofexternal-world scepticism before one can seriously consider idealism. Certainly thebugofexternal-world scepticism did notgetto Plato. Butthere is something elseone shouldbear
7. Phaedo 87b-e. The weavingidea occursas partof a viewthatis rejected, butwhat is rejectedis not the weaving,but the thoughtthat,as withan actual weaver,the soul might cease to existbefore wearingout its finalcoat. 8. Cf. Phaedo 80c-81c.

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Plato'ssilence on these inmind whenconsidering great questions thepointofviewof The factis thatfrom ofmodern philosophy. which Platonicethical concern, is a pointof viewthatpervades whether the soul it makesno difference mostof the dialogues, choosesto dream,and thenbecomesaddictedto dreaming, its or whether it choosesand thenbecomesaddicted embodiment, to lifemediated by a real,independently existing, bodyin a real thismakesall the environment.9 Whereas forDescartes physical theother difference-one wayGod is a deceiver, waynot-for Plato either way the soul in questiongetswhat it wants,and in wanting it if the body turnsout to be is just as misguided realas it wouldbe ifthebodywereitsfantasy. independently I have been comparing Plato's argument in the Phaedowith Descartes'in theMeditations from thatsoul is separable body. Let me end by comparing someof thewiderpurposes of those arguments. Plato offers theargument ofthePhaedoas, inter alia, of thekindof intellectual an instance and example exercise that loosens the human soul's attachment to its body. Since the thesoul'smisunderstanding attachment reflects ofthetrue nature of happiness, thePhaedoargument, forthosewho enter intoit, in soul-saving. is an exercise what DescartesdisBy contrast, coverswhen he discovers his reasonsfor declaring the mind the body is entirely separablefrom different from the intellectualization he himself in order undergoes to reachtheproof. And he cannotovertly, evenifhe is inclined so inwardly, claimthis refinement as a sortof soul-saving without running foulof the religion of his time.For although thisreligion differed within itself on how muchfaithcountsforsalvation, and how much works, thesewerethe onlyoptionsconsidered, and Descartes' does notcomeunder activity either. hisavowedpurpose Instead, in following thepathof theMeditations from doubtto himself, and from himself to theGod whois nota deceiver, is to establish firm and lasting in the sciences',10 'something i.e. mathematics and mathematical physics. This is an extremely puzzlingremark if it meansthatthese failas sciences ifthey sciences cannot be rendered indubitable by
9. Plato can of coursemake thisdistinction evenif,as I am arguing, itdoes notcarry forhima burning question;but theword'real' used as above would presumably not be his tool formakingit,sincehis realia are immutable Forms. 10. Meditation I, first paragraph.

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an argument thatfirst doubtsand thenreinstates theclearand ideas on which distinct suchinquiries depend.For themathematician'sperformance as suchis not less clearor less accurate if he lacks a proofto the effect the mostrigorous thatalthough mathematics to man can be doubted, conceivable nonetheless in the end we are theologically in accepting them.But justified surely Descartes'hopeis notto makethemathematician a more successful butrather to showtherestof us that mathematician, mathematical initsownsphere science carries thesameauthority in its,sincebothcomefrom as divine revelation thesamesource. Rightly understood, thepractice ofsuchabstract studies, though nota religious exercise, is notsecular either, foritexpresses God as reasonor the naturallight.Plato would surely have agreed thatit is notsecular, buthe couldnothaveimagined thehistorical context thatmadeit so important forsomeone in Descartes' to distinguish position priest and mathematical scientist, in effect at leasttwokindsof 'higher postulating calling', one devoted to theother to reason. faith, Princeton University 1879Hall Princeton, NJ08540 U.S.A.

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