1 Summary of the article Meaning and Action by May Brodbeck (1963) For the DA 8100 Class (Philosophy of Social

Science)
Wit Prasompluem Student ID: 5610131007 1 September 2013

This paper examines the alternative to the view that human actions are not open to causal, scientific explanation. Such alternative, called mentalism, holds that there is an intrinsic difference between the study of man and of things. Neutral, nonmentalistic terms (or objectivist methods) cannot sufficiently describe social concepts like money or voting. Understanding the language, we understand the meaning of other peoples overt acts by analyzing the concepts appropriately applied to the situation, tracing their logical connections with the other mentalistic concepts. A matter of conceptual analysis, our understanding and knowledge of man is therefore a priori and necessary rather than, as with the natural sciences, a posteriori and contingent (Brodbeck, p. 60). Concepts Versus Terms: Four Meanings of Meaning In one usage (to refer to character of things), concept is a termwhite and blanco are two different words, but only one term. In a mentalistic usage, concept generally refers to the content of any mental actthinking, perceiving, believing, hoping, or intending. Brodbeck also discusses four different senses of meaning: 1) Referential meaning This is a matter of convention; it is something we give the concept. For example, the term green referentially means the color green because we have chosen to use the term in this way. 2) Significance This, also called lawfulness, is a factual matter. When, within natural science, the reference of a term . . . is known to be lawfully connected to other things, then the term is also significant or meaningful (Brodbeck, p. 60). 3) Intentional meaning Intentionality is what a mental act intends, means, or is about. 4) Psychological meaning This refers to, or referentially means, certain other things, verbal or nonverbal, that a person does upon hearing sounds or seeing certain marks (Brodbeck, p. 65).

2 For Brodbeck, there is an apparent distinction between an action and a bodily movement. The two expressions raising an arm and arm going up differ in meaning in all four senses of meaning, referentially, intentionally, psychologically, and in significance (p. 73). Moreover, Brodbeck exemplifies two opposing views of the nature of human action: objectivism and mentalism. According to the objectivist belief, whenever there is a mental state, there is always a corresponding bodily state. To deny that minds and bodies interact is to assert that the laws permitting us scientifically to explain human behavior need not mention anything mental (p. 63). Nonetheless, the mentalist view implicitly denies causal relation between mind and body by asserting that causal explanation and description are inappropriate to the explanation and description of human activities (p. 63) and that man can be understood by mentalistic explanation (e.g. by motives) while body by physical explanationthat is, by causes. Five Kinds of Understanding In this section, Brodbeck classifies five standard uses of the term understand in the English language, each with its attendant use of the term meaning: 1) I do not understand Finnish because I do not know the referential meanings of its symbols. 2) Nor do I understand what it meant to be a member of the Italian Resistance because I have not had the special feelings, emotions, or attitudes which are motivated only by having gone through certain experiences or joined certain kinds of events. 3) Nevertheless, I do understand what it meant to be a member of the Resistance since, having also undergone fear, patriotism, courage, and hatred of tyranny, I can be in sympathy with members of the Resistance. 4) I understand why Tom Jones left schoolthat is, I know that his motive was the desire to make money. 5) I also understand that augmented production costs mean an increase in selling pricethat is, I believe I know the significance of the rise in costs. Only in the first usage does meaning normally refer to referential meaning. Only in the last two usageswhen these associations reflect empirical lawful connectionsdoes understanding correspond to scientific explanation.

3 Criticisms of a Science of Man In this section, Brodbeck examines criticisms of the objectivist view. The mentalist claims that one cannot understand society by means of scientific observation or experiment because 1) the investigator must understand the language of the people being studied. To learn a language, he must share the mode of life with the subject; and 2) the natural scientist uses external criteria to conclude if two events are of the same kind. But whether the two actions are of the same kind must be decided by participants, not the spectator. The method by which we understand others is . . . subjective, not objective. Logically, therefore, there cannot be generalizations about man and society (Brodbeck, p. 68). However, an uncritical use of concept and of rule, as well as a mixture of various uses of meaning and understanding, gives those criticisms a weak chance of withstanding close analysis. At the end of the paper, Brodbeck concludes that the objectivist program has not appeared to be indefensible, despite the bombardment of criticisms from the mentalist opponents. Questions after reading the paper 1) According to Brodbeck (1963), Parallellism and the belief in physical determinism [bold added] form the basis for the objectivist belief that a complete account of human activities can be given in nonmentalistic terms (p. 63). However, Rosenberg (2000) has pointed out problems associated with applying Newtons law of determinism to the study of human behavior: If the brain is nothing but a complex physical object whose states are as much governed by physical laws as any other physical object, then what goes on in our heads is as fixed and determined by prior events as what goes on when one domino topples another in a long row of them (p. 8). Then, is it really possible for the proponents of objectivism to eschew all talk about mental states (Brodbeck, p. 59)? 2) Why are the terms cause and motive NOT interchangeable in mental-act contexts? (See Brodbeck, p. 64)