ilitary Review

Sinkiang: Trouble Spot? . Himalayan Border War Soldiers of the Party . New Steppingstones for Moscow? Battlefield Language . A Jangled Ball of Yarn! Army Group Logistics NATO Infrastructure. Encirclement at YukhnoY Clausewitz: A Reappraisal . Turkey's Armed Forces The Sergeant. German Nebelwerfers . Military Notes Military Books Dynamics of National Power

VOLUME XLIII

NUMBER 5

MAY 1963

Anthony Harrigan

3
8

Wg Cdr M. K. Chopra, Indian Air Force, Ret

Col Preston E. James, USAR, Ret Malcolm Mackintosh Fritz E. Giese Ma; David R. Hughes, USA Erna K. Basore Lt Col John A. Hoefling, USA

17 27 (/ 32 38
46

50

Wg Cdr P. G. M. Ridsdale, Royal Air Force

Ma; Gen H. Reinhardt, German Army, Ret Capt S. 0 Tiomain, Irish Army Dr. Jiirgen Weise Capt William J. Le Clair, USA Lt Col Joachim Emde, West German Army

57
61 76 80 87 93

99
109

The Military Review, a publication of the UNITED STATES ARMY, provides a forum for the expression of military thought and a medium for the dissemination of Army doctrine of the division and higher levels. The VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORS' and not necessarily those of the US Army or the Command and General Staff College.

Editor in Chief
Col Kenneth E. Lay

Assistant Editor
Lt Col Albert N. Garland

Features Editor
Lt Col Cleo S. Freed

Layout Edi, tor

1st Lt Russell W. Munson. Jr.

Spanish-American Editor
Lt Col Juan R. Melendez

Asst SpanishAmerican Editor

Maj Jose E. Tizol

Braztlian Editor
Lt Col Joao H. Faca

Associate Editor
Col Daniel E. Halpin Army War College

Executive Officer
Maj Lorenzo D. Laughlin

Production Officer
Lt Col Louis Ruiz

Staff Artist
Charles A. Moore

MILITARY REVIEW-Published monthly by U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in English, Spanish, and Portuguese. Use of funds for printing of this publication has been approved by Headquarters, Department of the Army, 3 July 1962. Second-class postage paid at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Subscription rates: $3.50 '(US currency) a year in the United States, United States military post offices, and those countries which are members of the Pan-American Postal Union (including Spain); $4.50 a year in all other countries. Address subscription mail to the Book Department, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

SINKIANG:
A Sino-Soviet Trouble Spot?
Anthony Harrigan

N VIEW of the current disagreement between the Soviet Union and Communist China, it is time that students of military affairs take a look at the Sino-Soviet border area in central Asia. It is not outside the realm of possibility that some form of armed conflict may take place along this border in the years ahead. "To outsiders," E. K. Faltermayer of The Wall Street Journal said recently, 44the possibility of Red China encroaching on Soviet territory might seem remote. It doesn't to many Russians." The fact is that Red China, with upward of a half billion people and deficient in materials needed for industrial production, long has looked on the Soviet Far East with covetous eyes. Asiatic Russia has vast deposits of coal, enormous forests, diamonds,
May 1963

gold, abundant supplies of nonferrous metals" and considerable hydroelectric power, production. The Sino-Soviet frontier is approximately 4,000 miles long, a much longer boundary than any shared by other nations in the world. It extends from the Sea of Japan in the east to the Pamir Mountain Range near India's northwest frontier. On the Chinese side of the border are Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang. Across the border are the S 0 v jet territories of Kazakhstan, Tadzhikistan, Kirghizia, and the region known as the Soviet Far East. Whatever settlement is made of ideological disputes between the Soviet Union and Red China, nationalistic ambitions for territory seem certain to remain constant. Indeed, in
3

SINKIANG
appraIsmg Communist Chi n a, it would be a grave mistake to overlook traditional Chinese ambitions in central Asia. The late George E. Sokol sky, who lived in China for many years and who also was familiar with Asiatic Russia, wrote in May 1962 that: Red China plans to expand China to the Ch'ien Lung Line which means . . . that its actual territorial control would have a line from Turkistan to the Bay of Bengal. This means that China's ambitions would extend westward to a region not remote from the Soviet's Caspian Sea. Ch'ien Lung, who was cited by Mr. Sokolsky, lived from 1711 to 1799. For much of his lifetime he devoted himself to conquering new territories for China. It was during his reign that China expanded to her greatest extent and, it has been said, Mao Tsetung's ambition is to restore China to the limits of Ch'ien Lung's empire. Soviet Interest The Sino-Soviet border area has a long history of strife. As early as 1643, the Russians occupied the area west and east of Lake Baikal. But the big Russian drive came in the 19th century. Prior to 1858, four divisions of what is now the Soviet Far East- the Maritime and Khabarovsk regions and the Amur and Sakhalin Provinces-belonged to China. In that year Co u n t N. MuravievAmurski, governor general of eastern Sib e ria, fixed the Russo-Chinese border along the Amur and its right bank territory. Between 1858 and 1860, Russia forced China to cede the above-named territories. The Soviet Government proved no less interested in Asia, and Sino-Soviet border incidents continued after the 1917 Revolution. Japan's expansion onto the Chinese mainland resulted in serious trouble between Soviet and Japanese armed forces. In 1938 and 1939 the Soviet and Japanese Armies tested each other in two full-scale battles along the Manchurian border. It is interesting to note that the Soviets supported a faction of nationalists in Sinkiang d uri n g the 1940's in an effort to establish an independent Eastern Turkistan Republic, a satellite they envisioned as being similar to the Mongolian People's Republic. The "liberation army" of this Chinese secessionist group was led by a Soviet Army officer. But with the success of the Communist power drive in China in the late 1940's, the Sino-Soviet border difficulties came temporarily to a halt.

Anthony Harrigan is Director, Foreign Pol icy Research Institute of South Carolina. Educated at Kenyon College and the University of Virginia, he saw service in World War II. Mr. Harrigan is Associate Editor with The News and C 0 uri e r of Charleston, and is a frequent contributor to military journals both here and abroad.
4

Possible Difficulties If there are to be fresh difficulties in the future, it is likely that they will take place in Sinkiang. To understand why this is so, one has only to look at a map and follow the Sino-Soviet border. In the east there are substantial populations and a condition of widespread and thorough settlement. Any Chinese encroachment near the Soviet's Pacific frontier would be sure to escalate into a major conflict because the conditions are not unlike border conditions in Europe. The n, for approximately 2,000
Military Review

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SINKIANG
miles, Chinese and Soviet territories are separated by the buffer state of Mongolia. This land is as Poland was to Russia and Germany in prewar days. West of Mongolia is Sinkiang, where Soviet and Chinese territories meet in the great Altai range of red sandstone mountains. Continuing southwest along the border, one finds the Dzungarian Basin with an elevation of 600 to 1,500 feet completely ringed by mountains of the Tien Shan Range. Located here is the historic Dzungarian Gate, the ancient highway from China to the Kazakh Steppes and the Volga. The Tien Shan, with peaks over 20,000 feet high, snowfields, and glaciers, separates this area from the Tarim Basin to the south. Proceeding southwest along the Sino-Soviet border, one continues in a mountainous region. These mountains meet and join the mountains along the Afghan and Pakistan-Indian borders. In short, this part of the Sino-Soviet border is very close to a region where Chinese imperialism is now being manifested; Red China's conquest of Tibet also emphasizes the long-range, continuing interest of the Peking regime in conquering lands to the west. The Uighurs are agricultural people settled in oases along the northern edge of the Tien Shan where it borders the Dzungarian Basin. The Kazakhs are nomadic herders who graze their livestock in the Dzungarian pasturelands. At last report, approximately 300,000 Chinese were in Sinkiang; they are government officials, military personnel, merchants, and professional workers. Sinkiang's economy is chiefly agricultural, and grain crops and cotton are planted extensively. Development of irrigation after 1949 brought new areas under cultivation. In addition, about 60 percent of Red China's wool comes from Sinkiang. Oil was found in 1960 and prospecting is ,continuing for tungsten and other nonferrous metals. A major rail line crossing Sinkiang from Kansu Province to the junction of Aktongai on the Turksib railroad in the Soviet Union was opened for service in the early 1960's. Across the Sinkiang border in the Soviet Union is the same kind of mountainous, wild country. Most of Kirghizia, the Soviet Republic of central Asia west of the Takla Ma:kan Desert, is above 5,000 feet. In the Kazakh region to the north, anti-Russian guerrilla warfare flourished for many years.

Borderland
The name Sinkiang means borderland. A former province of China, it today bears the name "Sinkiang Au~ tonomous Region." The territory is 660,977 square miles in size, with a population (as of 1958) of almost six million. Uighurs, a Moslem Turkicspeaking people, comprise 75 percent of the population; the Kazakh, people related to the Kazakhs across the border in the Soviet Union, comprise the second largest ethnic group.
6

Classical Conflict
Clearly, the Sinkiang border constitutes a region ideally made by nature and history for classic central Asian border warfare. In the mountains and deserts, Red China and the Soviet Union could duel as China and India have dueled. Conflict could take place without any formal declaration or without a major war resulting. Moreover, the empty lands of Sinkiang, with a border cutting through mountainous c 0 u n try, afford Red
Military Review

China wide opportunities for making threats with the Chinese population bomb. If Red China were to move large numbers of Chinese into this remote western territory, it would be the greatest kind of threat to the Soviets and one most difficult to counteract. Soviet fear of this population bomb was in existence even b e for e the present Chinese regime took power. Throughout the Stalin era, as well as during the Khrushchev years, the Soviet Government has put heavy stress on developing the lands opposite Sinkiang. This concern for building up the Soviet population in Asiatic Russia is evidenced in the following figures: In 1926 the population of the Soviet Far East was 1,200,000; by 1959 the total had risen to 4,300,000. Sizable cities also are growing up in the area. Alma-Ata, located in the Tien Shan Range west of Sinkiang, had 455,000 people in 1959 and spe-

cializes in production of heavy machinery.

Differing Maps One indication of potential trouble to come between the Soviet Union and Red China may be found in the maps prepared by the two countries. On these map~ ' the Sino-Soviet border is often 60 miles apart; the disputed territory tot a I s more than 25,000 square miles. In this connection it is appropriate to bear in mind that the mountain warfare between Red China and India had its alleged beginning in controversy over border positions. Thus it would appear that if there is an increase in Red Chinese aggravation with the Soviet Union sufficiently great to lead to some form of overt action or pressure, it is almost certain to result in difficulties somewhere along the 4,000-mile border. Sinkiang is the most likely spot for action or pressure to be exerted.

. . . what will be the course of the deep-seated differences between the USSR and Red China? ,.. ,..

The ideological dispute between the USSR and Red China-apparently centered on how to effect our destruction-is certainly their problem even though we can assure them that neither of the solutions over which they are divided will work. . . . . The efforts of the Communist leaders to resolve their dilemmas will be as ruthless and violent as will serve their purpose. These effortsall tied to the goal of world domination-mean a continuation of the grave military danger we have known for the past 17 years. All changes in this danger have been in the direction of growth rather than of decline.

General Earle G. Wheeler

May 1963

THE HIMALAYAN BORDER 'WAR: AN INDIAN MILITARY VIEW

Wing Commander Maharaj K. Chopra, Indipn Air Force, Retired

N 22 October 1962, while President Kennedy spoke to the American people on radio and television about the Cuban crisis, a half-world away Prime Minister Nehru of India spoke to his countrymen over radio about the Himalayan border crisis. This was, of course, a coincidence; probably, too, on the opposing side, there had been no deliberately engineered collusion of the two crises. But if you look before and after the events, some striking similarities appear. The military posture of the Soviet Union and the Red Chinese had bee n strengthened and weapons piled up much before the showdown. When the time for decision came, the Soviet Union abandoned the position of force immediately; Red China did the same a month later. These crises have had a profound
8

impact upon national as well as international thinking. As we in India know for certain, our country will never again be- as it w'as in the fall of 1962. And we feel the same" can be said of the West. The Himalayan border extends from the trijunction of Kashmir-Afghanistan-Sinkiang east to the trijunction of Assam-Burma-Sinkiang; it is 2,500 miles long and forms a great divide between Red China and the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. For all but 900 of these miles-in Kashmir and in Nepal -India faces Red China directly. On her side, Red China enjoys an unbroken control over the entire length of the border, which is a distinct military advantage. It is true, of course, that this control is not uniformly firm throughout: Tibet has seen a rebellion and is not yet returned
Military
Re~iew

to full normalcy; Sinkiang has not completely shed its traditional recalcitrance.

Natural Guardian
On the other hand, the Red Chinese iron hand is at work and Tibet and Sinkiang could hardly be relied on to present indefinitely "soft bellies." Precisely because Sinkiang and Tibetthe former with great industrial possibilities and nuclear resources- are not completely settled, Red China has concentrated military power in those areas. This region contains Mount Everest (29,028 feet) and more than three dozen peaks each over 24,000 feet in height. The upper areas are capped with ice and glaciers, where if it does not snow it rains, and if it does not snow or rain, cold, biting winds blow. It contains some of the world's thickest jungles; and is littered with impassable ravines and gorges. This is the Himalayan border long considered by Indians as a standing natural guardian of the north, which could not be demolished or penetrated by an enemy. But we are in the 20th century. Aircraft take little account of the Himalayan altitudes and there is a regular Delhi-Moscow air service over the Himalayas. North of the Himalayas there has been an enormous concentration of power which can be applied much more

widely and effectively than ever before. Altitudes, terrain, and adverse weather conditions have lost a good deal of their edge in the face of new weapons and techniques. The Himalayas were never completely isolated from the traveler, the trader, or the soldier. Today masses of men can operate where yesterday only individuals could.

Areas of Conflict
China made a breach in two widely separated sectors of the border in Ladakh and the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA), 900 miles apart. Ladakh is a province of Kashmir, having Sinkiang, Tibet, and India's Himachal Pradesh as its contiguous territories. Its area of 37,000 square miles contains a population of 100,000, which gives an indication of its sparse character and comparative isolation. No wonder! Leh, its capital, is at 11,000 feet, not far from the Indus River; the average height of the surrounding mountain ranges is 19,000 feet; mean rainfall is 2.7 inches; and temperatures often fall below freezing point. Until India took up development programs, there was practically no road worth the name leading into Ladakh. Against the backdrop of Chinese aggression the poverty of communications is all the more depressing. Despite its forbidding features, Ladakh has long attracted explorers and adventurers, travelers and traders. It also has been the scene of battles. In the past, in the days of FaHien, whose spirit might be biting Mao, it was a meeting ground of peoples from Sinkiang, Tibet, and India. At Leh converged numerous routes, one from Kashgar, another from Rudok, a third from Gartok, and a fourth from Srinagar. These routes are still
9

Wing Commander M a h a raj K. Chopra, In,dian Air Force, Retired, is military correspondent for the English-language Indian newspaper, The Indian Express. He is the author of "How Can Red China Be Contained?" and "Southeast AS'ia: A Mosaic" which appeared in the November 1962 and January 1963 issues of the MILITARY REVIEW.

May 1-963

HIMALAYAN BORDER WAR

there but they do not converge. That is the price Ladakh paid to become a vital strategic crossland between India and central Asia. Aksai Chin is Ladakh's northern sector, which China has occupied by force and through which she has built a road. This is, in fact, the area best suited for land communications. It is here that you have a peephole into central Asia; and it is the Chinese design to force India out of it. overran in 1944. From bases in Assam, General Joseph W. Stilwell received the bulk of his supplies for the Burma Campaign. From here, too, flew American transport planes over "the Hump" carrying material and equipment to enfeebled and impoverished China. It must have been a most perverted twist of fate which goaded China to invade this region of all regions in the world.

China Develops Cold War

To go back a little, by 1954 India and Red China had entered into a treaty of peaceful coexistence. India gave away all her rights in Tibet as an earnest of her good intentions. In that same year, China laid claim to a small area in the middle sector of the Himalayas. During the next five years this small claim bloated to include part of Ladakh and the whole of the NEFA, altogether 50,000 square miles. During these years Red China completed the Aksai Chin Road connecting Tibet with .sinkiang. A battle of diplomatic exchanges started, accompanied by sporadic skirmishes in Ladakh. From 1959, when the Dalai Lama fled into India following the rebellion in Tibet against Red Chinese rule, Mao turned his full steam on India, which overnight becam e "reactionary," "imperialist," and "aggressive." To settle the dispute, officials of the two countries met and produced a report. There was no settlement. There were more border incidents and further proposals, but little signs of a major showdown until July 1962 when Red Chinese troops made still another_push into Ladakh. Two months later the conflagration spread into NEFA; the invasion came on 20 October 1962. Red Chinese border designs are
Military Review

Rain Determining Factor

While Ladakh has the air of central Asia, NEFA breathes of the tropical. Assam, of which NEFA is the northern part, receives the full blast of monsoons from the Bay of Bengal, bringing heavy rains. Rainfall is an important determining factor for military operations in this area. The rainy season lasts from May to August, which explains why the Chinese launched their offensive in September. With rains conspire tortuous terrain and high altitudes, and NEFA, with its 30,000 square miles of territory, is described as "so mountainous, so cut about, chopped up, and divided that on a month's tour you may well climb a height exceeding that of Mount Everest." Some of the battles which raged in NEFA were for passes as high as 15,000 feet. Living conditions are as difficult as in Ladakh, although in a different way. Ladakh is barren, while NEFA is ablaze with luxuriant growth and wet with water. It is a land par excellence of tribal folks-the Monbas, Akas, Daflas, Miris, and Abors. It is being assiduously developed by the Indian Government. Militarily, Assam is better known to the outside world than Ladakh, for it figured in World War II. It was a part of Assam that a Japanese force
10

clear. If you look in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1957), you will find this statement about Ladakh: "It extends northward to eastern Gilgit and to a frontier with Sinkiang, undefined but roughly indicated by the Kuen Lun range." Red China wants the frontier to come down from the Kuen Lun crest, also down from the Karakoram Range, and even farther south, to include the loop of Aksai Chin. In the east the frontier must descend from the crest of the Himalayan Range-along the crest is the famous McMahon Line, described now as an "imperialist creation"-to the foothills. In both cases India must surrender a vital mountain tract of great strategic value; to this she will never agree.

strongly garrisoned centers such as Rudok in Tibet. The Aksai Chin Road, 100 miles long, was the base of further roads penetrating into Ladakh and leading to numerous concentrations: a dozen of them could be counted in the Chip Chap River Valley facing Daulat Beg Oldi. Here, the Chinese scored heavily, for all their forward concentrations could be reached by dependable supply lines. Heavy trucks were seen plying on the roads, as well as tanks, which the Chinese brought into the battles. Reliability of communications and rapidity of movement were definite Red Chinese assets.

The Battles In Ladakh, Indian strategy was something like this (Figure, 1). The main base was Srinagar, capital of Kashmir, from where supplies could be airlifted or transported by road. The road went up to Leh, a distance of about 200 miles, but could not be relied upon for speedy deliveries. Therefore, air transport was India's principal logistical weapon. Airstrips and landing grounds were gradually constructed north and southeast of Leh, mainly to serve as links in the supply line. About four dozen small military posts were established along the border, good for watch and ward, but feeble against a massive invasion. One such post, more colorful than effective, was at Daulat Beg Oldi, a few miles south of Karakoram Pass. Chushul had an important airfield which did not fall to the Red Chinese despite their heavy shelling. Chinese strategy was land based rather than air based and was sustained by a network of roads and
May 1 1 963

Withdrawal Within a week of the outbreak of war on 20 October, the Red Chinese 1aunched a three-pronged attack on the Indian positions in Ladakh. One column crossed the border in the vicinity of Daulat Beg Oldi; another came in 100 miles to the southeast at Pangong Lake; the third crossed still another 100 miles southeast at Demchok. After heavy casualties on both sides, numerous Indian posts fell, followed by a general withdrawal of the troops. After a lull of three weeks, Red Chinese pressure was exerted on Chushul. During the lun, however, this important post had been reinforced. Although heaviJy shelled, it remained in Indian hands. All told, the Red Chinese advance was hardly more than 15 miles anywhere along the Ladakh front when, on 21 November, Red China declared a unilateral cease-fire. Ladakh was an instance of very limited land warfare, in which light tanks, artillery, and hand grenades were used. The use of airpower was confined to supply drops, and fighter and bomber aircraft were not employed by either side.
11

HIMALAYAN BORDER WAR

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THE DELINEATION OF INTER NATIONAL BOUNDARIES ON THIS MAP MUST NOT BE CON SIDERED AUTHORITATIVE

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12

Military Review

Air Transport Vital

NEFA presents in many ways a duplication of the principal strategic elements found in Ladakh. Tezpur, in Assam, was the principal Indian base. Not far from Tezpur the Himalayas begin to rise, and from a place called Foothills, Indian engineers had constructed a road to Bomdi La, Se La, and Towang, the three important places which figured in the fighting. From Towang to the McMahon Line there was no road until the Chinese constructed one after invasion. Despite the road to Towang, Indian logistics in NEFA relied heavily on air transport. In fact, to the east at Walong, even a proper road did not exist; air transport was about the only means of supply. China had at least three airfields in Tibet. But as in Ladakh, surface roads were the main arteries of logistic support; these were constructed almost parallel to the McMahon Line barely 10 to 12 miles away. Facing Walong was the major base of Rima, and Rima is connected through Tibet and Aksai Chin with Sinkiang-a distance no less than 3,000 miles. Once again it was a three-pronged Chinese attack, at Thaga La to the west, Longju in the center, and Kibito to the east of the McMahon Line (Figure 2). Only the first and the third thrusts were followed by sizable Red Chinese advances. The character of the invasion followed the model of Ladakh; a week of attack, a three-week lull, another week of attack. This shows an efficient central direction on a wide front.

China used the lull that followed to construct a road from the border to Towang, and to bring up supplies and reinforcements. Secure in their supply lines, a wave of Chinese troops swept south and launched a frontal attack on Se La Pass; another wave bypassed the pass and by a pincer movement headed for Bomdi La, 30 miles to the south as the crow flies but 80 miles by road. The fall of this key defense center jeopardized the entire Indian position in NEFA, and was quickly followed by another 30 to 40mile advance by the Red Chinese troops right up to the edge of Assam Plateau.

Civil Administration Restored

In the center, Longju fell. Similar was the fate of Walong to the east, from where the Chinese marched south to about 100 miles from an important Indian oilfield. Then, on 21 November, the Chinese halted. Winter set in and the McMahon Line was wrapped in snow. As a selfimposed condition of cease-fire, Red Chinese troops withdrew from NEFA, and by the end of December they had the area almost cleared. Indian civil, but not military, administration in the area was restored. There was no Red Chinese withdrawal from the areas captured in Ladakh. Having done this, the Red Chinese said in effect: "Comrades, let us now sit down and talk." Meanwhile, other events had transpired. India made a fervent appeal to the Western Powers for assistance, which was forthcoming immediately, particularly from the United States and Great Britain. Six nonaligned powers met at Colombo and made proposals for settlement, which India accepted but Red China did not. From this point on the two antagonists began a life of suspended animation;
13

Troops Move Southward

Descending from Thaga La Ridge, the Red Chinese troops overwhelmed the Indian border posts and marched southward to capture Towang. Red
May 1963

NORTHEAST FRONTIER AGENCY FIGHTING

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this may continue for years, unless it becomes worse.

Retrospects and Prospects In the wake of the conflagration, numerous questions arise. Why did the Red Chinese call a halt when their armies touched the fringes of the Indian Plain and there seemed to be nothing to stem their galloping speed? There could be many answers. With the onset of winter the Red Chinese could not afford stretching their lines of communications. Indian resistance showed every sign of mounting. Western aid was quick and could become massive if hostilities stretched. Even the Soviet Union did not go whole hog with China. And Mao must have asked himself: "Do we have the means of fighting against Western and Indian Power s simultaneously-along an Asian front of 8,000 miles?" The dramatic collapse of Indian resistance would be another point of query. Here, only a few indications are available. The control and direction of Indian military policy was unsatisfactory. There weren't enough men or material and what was available failed to acquire momentum. The Indian Army was excellent for the good old times, but not for guerrilla warfare of the Communist pattern. Adverse terrain and inadequate acclimatization to high altitudes hampered operations. Above all, Indian intelligence services were poor. IFrontier Guards' The tactics of the Red Chinese "frontier guards" would be another field of observation and research. Drawn from mountainous areas, they had been trained on the "roof of the world," in Tibet; acclimatization was no problem. Not far from the frontier a large number of bunkers have now been photographed, dug into earth to
May 1963

make soldiers' homes. The Red Chinese soldier's garb was shabby, but reasonably comfortable. The Red Chinese soldier often stole the olive green of the Indian dead or wore the native tribal dress for deception. His food was simple; not for him hot meals, rum rations, "cakes and ale." Movements depended upon requirements. Groups of men prowled about causing little sound and leaving behind no trace; occasionally they took Indian posts unawares.

Blitzkrieg Methods Most of the frontal attacks w~re made in waves in overwhelming numbers, sometimes exceeding Indian garrison strength in the ratio of 10 to l. Shouts, whistles, and explosions were frequent precursors of attacks. A traditional tactic, which the Red Chinese had practiced in Korea, was this: each rifleman in the attacking wave would be supported by two others carrying ammunition and lighter weapons. Earth-moving machinery and automatic saws were two important tool~ operated by a special labor corps which accompanied the troops. This corps also performed other vital functions. As the lugger of heavy equipment, it carried guns and wheeled transport over high passes; it helped build roads, so that the 16-mile road from Thaga La Ridge to Towang, constructed in less than a fortnight, must certainly be a record. The Chinese push had all the air of a blitzkrieg. There was one difference, however, it was not mechanized. "Time and the hour runs through the roughest day"-thus said Shakespeare in Macbeth. It may be quoted to describe the fortunes of the Indian Army. It was not so much the losses the Indian Army sustained, but the sheer weight, fury, and suddenness of
15

HIMALAYAN BORDER WAR

pounding. The army found its Pearl Harbor in NEFA, but not its Waterloo. Reorganization The reorganization and augmentation of the Indian armed forces is presently a foremost task of the Indian Government, and this is being done with the assistance of British and American experts. While it will take time before new patterns are evolved, certain angles of approach are becoming visible. In general, the entire strategy of Indian defense must change, with the Himalayan border as a focus, and it must take into account the global aspects of defense against Chinese expansionism. Reputedly half a millio'n strong, the Indian armed forces will expand considerably in consonance with the greater demands of security. Defense production, which so far has functioned within its own departments and fields, will be geared to the total five-year plans which India has been pursuing since 1950. A more realistic assessment will be undertaken as to the assistance to be sought from foreign powers. From what occurred in NEFA, Indian training must now incorporate quickly the tactics of mountain and jungle warfare. The new Defense Minister, Y. B. Chavan, the "angry young man" of the Indian Cabinet, is known for his drive and efficiency, as well as for a freedom from inhibitions and predilections; he is expected to deliver the goods. Red China from further adventurism. Soviet friendship has been shown to India, but it had little direct effect on the crisis. In any case, in material terms it has been nothing comparable to what the Western Powers have given. A comment could be: "Prime Minister Nehru has not crossed the Rubicon, but he is ankle deep in water."

Military Assistance Foreign military assistance to India has raised an important point: Will India be aligned or unaligned? The United States and Britain have come to India's help speedily and generously, a factor which has deterred
16

Nonalignment On the other hand, the Prime Minister has declared that India will not give up her policy of nonalignment. A little reflection would show that this is no mere diplomatic profession. During the Chinese invasion, Communist powers were by and large friendly toward India, but even more important than this is the hard reality of the geopolitical situation. The S 0 vie t Union is a neighbor of India, only a stone's throw from the frontier in Kashmir. Having one hostile neighbor such as Red China is bad enough; to have two like her might be a disaster. After all, if you live in water you try not to fight with all the crocodiles. In any case, nonalignment is only a policy, not a principle; it must change under the pounding of events. Some Indians are asking for a change. But foreign policy, of which nonalignment or otherwise is but a part, will be only one factor in the shaping of things in India. There will be many another-the massive and baffling geography of the border; India's capacity; the vital compulsions of social and economic uplift; democratic ways of life, which are difficult; and emotions bound with culture and civilization. Out of all this must now develop power. It is power alone that can stem the contagion and menace of the Asian heartlands.
Military Review

Dynamics of National Power

Colonel Preston E. James, United States Army Reserve, Retired

THAT geography, or areal differentiation, is fundamental to military planning and the assessment of military power, no military man would disagree. The ingredients of a true and meaningful areal differentiation are not so commonly known. The dynamics of modern geography have only recently gained recognition.-x The term "geographic factor" cannot be limited to physical features of the earth. Geography deals with the differences between one place and another on the face of the earth, and with the movements and connections among places. Areal associations must necessarily include features of human origin as well as those resulting from natural processes.
* This article is based upon a presentation to the students of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D. C., in November 1961.
May 1963

Modern geographers hold that the significance to man of the physical and biotic features of the earth are a function of the attitudes, objectives, and technical skills of man himself. Clearly, the physical and human features of an area cannot be set apart. A geographic factor is any feature that contributes to the areal differentiation of the earth's surface. With these ideas in mind, what geographic concepts contribute to the analyses of national power? One of the basic elements in such analyses must be an evaluation of the resource endowment. But what is a natural resource? Is coal a natural resource? Most people would say yes. But a closer examination of coal as a resource shows that it may be so considered only for
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NATIONAL POWER
a relatively short time. Some imaginative men in Pennsylvania in 1804 dug a little anthracite coal out of the ground near Scranton. They tried to sell it in nearby Wilkes-Barre, but were unable to find anyone interested in buying it. Not until a proper grate for burning coal had been built, and not until it was demonstrated that coal could heat a house better than wood, did a market for coal develop. Still, coal would scarcely have been included in a resource inventory for judging the strength of a nation. requires a reevaluation of the meaning of coal as a resource. In 1910 coal provided 75 percent of the energy needs of the United States; in 1960 coal provided only 23 percent. Oil and gas now provide some 73 percent and hydroelectric power another four percent. Furthermore, the ratio of coal to iron ore in making steel has almost been reversed. The cost of shipping steel to the place where it is to be used is greater now than the cost of shipping both coal and iron to the steel plant. Hence steel plants today are located near the markets for steel. Coal has ceased to be a locating factor. The time may come when coal will be useful only as a raw material for making plastics and synthetics. Coal became a natural resource only as a result of human technology; continued change of technology may remove coal from the list of basic resources.

Reevaluation Not until 1858 was the process perfected that made it possible to convert large quantities of bituminous coal into coke and to use it in making steel. In 1860 it took some two tons of coal to make one ton of iron ore into steel. As a result, between 1860 and 1900 steel industries appeared in many parts of the world, located near or directly over deposits of bituminous coal. This was the time of steel development in western Pennsylvania and Ohio, in Illinois, in the German Ruhr, and elsewhere. Only about a century ago did coal become a major resource factor in the localization of industry. But continued technological change
Colonel Preston E. James, United States Army Reserve, Retired, is Professor of Geography and Chairman of the Department of Geography, Syracuse University. He received his Master's degree from Harvard University and his Ph. D. from Clark University. During World War II he served in the US Army with the Office of Strategic Services as Chief, Latin American Division, and Chief, Europe-Africa Division. A recognized authority in the field of geography, he was Fulbright Professor at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland, in 1957.
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Natural Resources There are, of course, certain minerals which have been used for a long time, and so have been natural resources ever since man learned how to make tools. Copper is one such mineral. When bronze became the major metal for making weapons, the sources of tin became important. Now tin is a resource for another reason: its importance in the manufacture of motor bearings. Iron ore has long been a resource. But to be included among resources today, there must be a huge quantity of iron ore because small ore bodies, however rich, are too expensive to develop. Many minerals have become natural resources only recently, including nickel, chromium, molybdenum, tungsten, vanadium, and manganese, the hardeners of steel. Bauxite was not of basic importance before this century;
Military Review

and uranium has just now become important as a resource. Modern technology makes possible and requires the mining of vast quantities of ore. It has been estimated that Anglo-America will need 12 times as much aluminum in the year 2000 as it needed in 1960. It will need twice as much iron ore, three times as much timber, and two and one-half times as much fresh water. Can these enormous increases be provided? The answer to this question is disputed vigorously among scholars. There are some who forecast the collapse of a civilization that is so dependent on the large-scale use of nonrenewable resources; there are others who believe that scientific and engineering advances in technology will permit the indefinite expansion of resource use.

operation in our world seem to become obsolete almost as soon as they start to work. A nation is strong only if it has the necessary facilities and personnel committed to research and development. A nation is strong only if it has better machines, better techniques, and skills on the drawing boards:

Economic Problems It is important to understand the economic problem involved in the use of nonrenewable resources. What is the real cost of changing a given volume of ore into a useful form and of transporting it to the place where it is wanted? There are two elements in real cost: the number of hours of human labor, and the amount of capital needed. During the 20th century the real cost of resource use in the United States has been declining because of the development of engineering skill. This decline has contributed not only to the continued rise of the American standard of living, hut to the potential military strength of America as well. The basic problem is whether the future needs of the Nation can be met without a rise of real costs. One principle emerges clearly-no longer can the strength of a nation be measured in terms of capacity to produce needed goods. Industries in
May 1963

Natural Barriers What about the significance of natural features as barriers or military obstacles in the way of potential invaders? Here, again, we find that the significance of nat u r a I features changes with the changing technology of warfare and transportation. With the collapse of Charlemagne's empire, France emerged from the medieval period as a strong nation state. She was protected from her European neighbors by a succession of natural barriers: the Alps, the Jura, the Vosges" and the Ardennes. These heavily forested hills and mountains formed so serious a military obstacle that all the invasions of France, even before Caesar's time, came through the Flanders' gap between the Ardennes and the sea. Furthermore, within France, the Paris Basin was built lik~ a pile of saucers with their edges up'turned, facing steeply away from Paris. Invaders had to advance against a series of outfacing heights. Much of World War I was fought along these outfacing defenses, as at Verdun. Then came World War II, and some people were still thinking of these natural defenses as if their significance remained unchanged. Because of the mechanization of armies, paved roads had taken on a new importance. The old axiom about seizing the high ground was still valid. But with mechanized equipment, it is possible to
19

NATIONAL POWER
move much faster on paved roads t.han off the roads, and the strongpoints of World War II turned out to be the little villages such as Bastogne where all the paved roads came together. Military leaders found that the Ardennes was no longer to be considered as a barrier. The lesson is this-there is no such thing as a final and complete analysis of the military significance of terrain. Terrain must be reevaluated again and again with each change in the technology of warfare. Mackinder From the broad level of geostrategy comes another illustration of the operation of the principle regarding the changing significance of the earth features. Early in the 20th century, H. J. Mackinder shocked the military strategists with his famous pronouncement on the heartland. He pointed out that the preeminence of the nations of maritime Europe was due to the former supremacy of seapower. But by the early 20th century, railroads had for the first time made rapid land travel possible and facilitated the shipment of bulky goods overland. With these changes, centrally located nations had an advantage over nations spread around the periphery of the land. Mackinder wrote: Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the H eartland commands the World-Island [Eurasia and Africa]; who rules the W orld-I sland commands the world. During World War II Mackinder restated his heartland concept with the added note that now not only could the central powers deny access to seapower, but also land-based airpower could overcome sea-based airpower. Mackinder's concept of the heartland was extended to the Soviet Union oc20

cupying the central position in Eurasia. Since World War II it seems that Mackinder's heartland concept requires a basic revision. Today, with high-flying aircraft and intercontinental missiles, it becomes necessary to look at the earth as a whole, and the old concept of the continents must be examined critically. In the United States, where we have been accustomed to looking at continent maps hanging with north at the top, most people are certain that the Atlantic Ocean lies between America and Europe, and that the Pacific Ocean separates America from eastern Asia. In fact, one of our outstanding military leaders described the Pacific as a moat between the United States and the Orient. This is not true. The eastern shore of Asia and the western shore of North America form a straight line, and the Pacific Ocean lies all to one side of this. Actually, then, North America and Asia are on the same side of the moat.

Land Hemisphere Pick up a globe and hold it freely in your hands. Forget the idea that north is somehow "up" and south is "down." The only "up" is away from the center of the earth. South is in no sense "down." Turn the globe about freely until you find the position in which you can see the largest proportion of the world's land areas. Forget about Antarctica. You will find onehalf of the globe contains 90 percent of the inhabited land area of the earth. In this hemisphere there are 94 percent of the world's population, and 98 percent of the world's economic and military capacity. Geographers describe this as the Land Hemisphere. If you try the experiment with the globe, you will find that the center of
Military Review

the Land Hemisphere is in western France (Figure 1).

Geographic Factors Location at or near the center of the Land Hemisphere has only been a significant geographic fact for a few years. It became significant when modern air travel was freed from close attachment to the surface of the earth, and men were free to seek the shortest routes from place to place without regard to ice, fog, storms, mountains, or deserts. In ancient times, when Babylon and Egypt became great powers, the most centrally located part of the earth-as determined by the patt@rn of population and the routes of connection-was in southwestern Asia. Later, the Mediterranean lands became central, with the settlement of the country farther west and farther north by civilized men. With the age of exploration which started in the 15th century, the most central part of the earth shifted again -this time to maritime Europe which was accessible by sea to the other great concentrations of the people. Still man was tied to the earth's surface, and the chief lines of travel were spread over the oceans of the middle and low latitudes. A Mercator map was tolerable because the polar regions were of no importance to man. At that time the Atlantic did lie between America and Europe. But now, with the globe in your hands, and with men able to move freely from place to place over the earth without regard to surface conditions, you find that the ocean that separates us from Eurasia is the Arctic Ocean. You can make a mathematical calculation that will show the centers of the world's countries are more closely accessible to western Europe than to any other spot on the globe.
May 1963

Ideas and events in western Europe affect the lives of more of the world's people than those taking place anywhere else in the world; and the political, economic, and military strength of western Europe becomes a vital matter in world stability. For the first time, we must rephrase Mackinder: Who rules the center of the Land Hemisphere can command the world.

Patterns of Conflict We can also throw additional light on the patterns of conflict in the contemporary world. The 11 regions shown on Figure 2 offer a geographic structure around which to organize the study of the fundamental changes now sweeping over the earth-for the patterns of change are not chaotic and haphazard. Rather, the pattern is developed by a process of revolutionary but orderly and predictable change. The explanation takes us far back in human history. Anthropologists will point out that revolutionary change in man's way of living-his culture-is not common. Over the long course of man's presence on the earth there are only a few periods of radical change. Since the appearance of Homo sapiens about 50,000 years ago, there have been before the present period only two periods of great change. Revolutionary Changes The first period of change was brought by the agricultural revolution, when men learned to cultivate crops and domesticate animals. The second revolutionary per i 0 d was marked by the rise of the early civilizations-Babylon, Egypt, the Indus civilization, the Chinese civilization, the Mayas of Central America, and the Andean civilization of South
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NATIONAL POWER

Figure 1.

22

Military Review

America. But after the rise of these early civilizations, which started about 4,000 B.C., there was no fundamental change in the way man made a living from the land until the middle of the 18th century. Power was derived from human and animal muscles, from wind, or falling water. If population increased faster than the food supply, there was famine, disease, and warfare. The size of cities was limited by the amount of food that could be transported to them.

Contemporary Period
Today we find ourselves in the midst of the third great period of rapid and revolutionary change in man's relation to earth resources, and in man's relation to man. The contemporary period can best be understood if we recognize the existence of two revolutions: the industrial revolution and the democratic revolution. Geographers point out that both revolutions began about 1760, and both originated in the area around the North Sea in Europe. In the process of spreading from the source region, both produced chaos and conflict along their advancing fronts where they made (and are still making) impact with preindustrial and predemocratic societies. It is possible to prepare maps decade by decade since 1760 to show the areas reached by the spreading revolutions. And the content of the revolutions has continued to develop during the process of spread, so that the impact today is not exactly the same as the impact in Europe in the 18th century. The industrial revolution means more than just the development of industry. Essentially, it results from the use of controlled inanimate power instead of muscles and uncontrolled natural forces. There is a vast increase
May 1963

in the capacity to produce and in the need for nonrenewable raw materials. With new sources of power, transportation facilities can move a vast volume of goods from place to place. Cities grow to huge size; with the automobile, urban workers can spread far oU,t into the surrounding rural areas; ' the proportion of city people rises steeply. As the industrial revolution sweeps over one country after another, the proportion of farmers in the total working for c e greatly decreases. Fewer farmers produce more food on less land than ever before. Advances in medicine and hygiene result in decreasing death rates, with a resulting population explosion. Research and development is given the highest priority to keep man's technology of production ahead of the increasing numbers of people. All these changes are a part of the industrial revolution. The democratic revolution started at about the same time, and also in western Europe. It consists of the demand for equality of treatment before the law, for the right to select one's own form of government, for an end to colonialism and subservience, and for freedom of access to knowledge. The two revolutions have spread in somewhat different patterns, and the areas into which they spread are not all alike: there are varied kinds of habitats, varied preindustrial and predemocratic societies. Each area has reacted somewhat differently to the impact of the new technology or the new ideas of human dignity. Our world has been brought more closely together than ever before by the new technology of transport and communications, yet has never been so sharply divided into rich and poor, autocratic and democratic.
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NATIONAL POWER
With every change in technology, the meaning of the physical and biotic features of the earth must be reevaluated. What was once a natural resource may cease to be a resource. What was once a barrier to movement may cease to be such a barrier. Even what was once good farmland may become poor land because of changing farm technology. The "crossroads" region, the dry belt that separates Europe from southern Asia and from Africa south of the Saha.ra, which has long been the scene of efforts to find and control rou tes of passage, and which is now enormously complicated by the discovery of oil. South Asian. The center of Indian culture, where nearly 500 million people struggle toward economic development within the framework of free institutions. Southeast Asian. The shatter belt between India and China, where these two giants have been, at least indirectly, in conflict for thousands of years. East Asian. The center of Chinese culture, where a vast number of people struggle toward economic development within the framework of a Communist society, and Japan where the two revolutions have gone forward rapidly since World War II. African (south of the Sahara). Where African peoples, still largely organized in tribal units, are attempting to form modern states, and where the legacy of European colonialism produces great differences in the reactions to the two revolutions. A ustralian-New Zealand. At the end of the earth, remote in the midst of the "Water Hemisphere," where both revolutions have been developed without hindrance from preexisting societies. Pacific. The islands of the South Pacific, where long-isolated native peo": pIes were overwhelmed by World War II . These regions are the contemporary result of the processes of revolutionary change now sweeping the earth. Each region needs the services of specialists, with the background and
Military Review

Impact The 11 regions on Figure 2 measure the impact of these twin revolutions. In each culture region there is a certain basic homogeneity in the reaction to these revolutions, and in the economic, political, and military problems that result. The following is a brief characterization of each of the regions: European. The core of this region includes the North Sea culture hearth where the two revolutions originated, and the bordering area of western and central Europe w her e previously created institutions provided strong resistance to both revolutions. It includes also two marginal areas: Norden where both revolutions are far advanced; and Mediterranean Europe where ' they are retarded. Soviet. Th~ Soviet Upion and eastern Europe, where the industrial revolution is being rapidly advanced by a "command economy," but where the reaction to the democratic revolution is to deny all aspects of it. Anglo-American. Where both revolutions have been developed beyond the ideas and technologies brought from Europe. Latin American. Which is today feeling the full impact on the advancing fronts of both revolutions, with a resulting complex pattern of rich and poor, democratic and autocratic. N 01,th African-Southwest Asian.
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"<
CD

3:

en w

CULTURE REGIONS

(II

Figure 2.

NATIONAL POWE'R
understanding to provide meaningful interpretations of conditions and problems. It is my thesis that we are already in world war III. This is a war of ideas, and it's going to remain a war of ideas because of the stalemate in weapons. Certainly, there will be all kinds of little skirmishes and shootings. And I am not suggesting the disbandment of the Armed Forces. What I am suggesting is that we be ready to fight in this new dimension-the dimension of ideas-because there is where this war is going to be fought to a finish. The day we start shooting will only postpone the ultimate resolution of the battle between democratic ideas and autocracy. There is much to be gained from thinking of the world as divided into cultural areas, particularly if we recognize the importance of their positions on the globe. For centuries political and military leaders have paid lipservice to geography, but they have not always learned its lessons and applied them. To direct military planning, to participate actively in a war, or even to understand military strategy and tactics, one must know the areal factors and their effects on military operations.

AWARD COMPETITION
The purpose of the annual award is to stimulate effective expression of military thought among members of the military profession. Articles published in the MILITARY REVIEW which are written by members of the United States military services on active duty are eligible for the awards. Annual awards have been given each year since 1953. The award year runs from November through the following October. Two annual awards, $250 for first place and $100 for second place, are presented. Award winners are determined by a judging committee of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College staff and faculty. Selection is based upon accuracy, authoritativeness, completeness, originality, readability and reader appeal, soundness, substance, and over-all merit of the articles.

26

Military Review

SOLDIE, RS OF THE PARTY

Malcolm Mackintosh

use of armed force for political ends has been a part of orthodox Communist thought sin c e the days of the Communist Manifesto over 100 years ago. Friedrich Engels, in particular, devoted a great deal of study to the military aspects of the seizure of power by the Communistled proletariat, and Lenin wrote extensively on the same subject. Trotsky, of course, had practical experience of it during the abortive Russian revolution of 1905, along with other "Old Bolsheviks" who spent the next 12 years of their lives reflecting on their experiences in Siberian prisons. Indeed, considering the part allotted to armed force in B 0 Ish e v i-k theory, it is hardly surprising that much of its terminology, both before
May 1963

THE

and after the seizure of power in Russia in 1917, was military. Phrases such as: "mass assault on the enemy's positions," "tactical w.ithdrawals designed to pre par e strategic offensives," and "the training of future battle cadres" occurred frequently in Bolshevik treatises. In a sen s e it seemed logical to Lenin and his collaborators that their seizure of power

This article was digested from the original, published in the NATO LETTER (France) September 1962. Mr. Mackintosh is Consultant on Soviet Affairs to the Institute of Strategic Stu die s, London, England.

27

SOLDIERS OF THE P 'ARTY

should come in the midst of war and military disaster. The early Bolshevik leaders were particularly anxious to avoid a professional army detached from the Communist Par t y and the people, which might try to be an independent power in the pol i tic a I life of the country. This was one of the reasons for the creation of the Institute of Political Commissars during the civil war in Russia, according to which every professional officer serving in the Red Army was controlled by an experienced com m iss a r, without whose countersignature no order was valid. When the civil war endeq, strenuous efforts were made by the new government to ensure that the Red Army was thoroughly integrated into the Communist political system. The commissar system was confirmed at the 13th Party Congress in 1924, recruitment was severely restricted to the sons of workers or peasants, and all personal ranks were abolished. Commanders and soldiers ate in the same mess and wore the same uniform which had detachable badges indicating the responsibilities of those who held command or staff posts. The army was reduced to 71 divisions of which only 29 were regular. These provided a frontier d e fen s e force. The remainder were territorial. The latter were stationed in the major industrial centers, and maintained only a cad r e of professional commanders. The local factory workers and peasants were called up for periods of training during the year, but, in the intervals between callup, carried on with their normal occupations. On top of this, the army was subjected to an intensive propaganda cam28 paign of indoctrination, in w h i c h great attention was paid to the complete integration of the forces into the political life of the country and its deep involvement in the acts of the Communist Party.

What Kind of Army?

A military system founded on such a basis could not, however, stand up to the responsibility of. defending the Soviet Union in the 1930's when the rise of dictatorship in Germany, Italy, and Japan threatened the existence of the Soviet state. Between 1934 and 1940 Stalin reorganized the Red Arm y. He abolished the territorial s y s t e m, and b r 0 ugh t back compulsory military service for all Soviet citizens, regardless of class origin. He reintroduced personal ranks and titles, including those of general and marshal of the Soviet Union. He modified the commissar system to allow the commanders direct responsibility for both the military and political training and the efficiency of their units and formations. As the army, thanks to the industrialization programs under the five-year plans, began to receive new and more complicated weapons, so the standards of education and technical efficiency of its commanders rose. Clearly this clash between the kind of army required for an efficient national defense and the basic fears of a nonpolitical army becoming an independent power in the state was one of the rea son s for Stalin's brutal purge of the Red Army in 1937-39, a purge which has now been denounced by Mr. Khrushchev. In 1937 the commissar system was reintroduced, but, w hen the war against Finland revealed its shortcomings, Stalin once again abolished it. Instead, Stalin tried to ensure the Military Review

complete integration of the army into the country's political life by the selection of its high command from soldiers who owed special a]legiance to himself, including Marshals Timoshenko, Budenny, Voroshilov, and Kulik. The German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 initially put a great strain on these army-party relations. The early defeats of the Red Army in central Europe, in which the Soviets lost some two million prisoners, including many voluntary defections, aroused mass defeatism among the people. Widespread blame was thrust on the party for failing to provide an efficient defense for the country. Stalin and his colleagues soon realized that only an appeal to Russian nationalism could u nit e the people and army. In the course 'of the campaign to arouse Russian patriotism, the s tat u s of the Red Army was raised to the position of the savior of the nation. Purely political indoctrination was soft-pedaled, and, by the end of the war in 1945, army personnel, and particularly the successful generals and marshals, found themselves invested with a prestige among the people which far ~utshone that of the party. After the war, Stalin qui c k I y brought the army to heel and restored the position of the party, personified in himself, in complete control of the armed forces. Stalin kept the army under control by terror and there was no one to challenge his authority. Quite a different situation arose, however, when Mr.- Khrushchev began to struggle for power. He required army support against his rivals. Partly because of his war record and his personal links with many
May 1963

I e a din g commanders, and partly through his promises to improve the position of the army in the state, he secured the allegiance of such military leaders as Marshals Zhukov, Konev, Malinovsky, and C h u i k 0 v. They supported him in his struggle against Beria-and secured the demolition of much of the secret police network in the forces as a resultagainst Malenkov in 1955, and in his final showdown with Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov in July 1957.

Specter of a Nonpolitical Army

l

Meanwhile, the arm y prospered: promotions w ere speeded up, and army leaders increased the privileges, retirement benefits, and general prestige. By 1957, however, a parallel crisis had developed in army-party relations, due partly to Marshal Zhukov's overconfidence and conviction that he was indispensable to Mr. Khrushchev. Zhukov openly set out, in his own words, "to make political work serve mil ita r y efficiency." While he was Minister of Defense, he permitted only those elements of political indoctrination which, in his view, contributed to improvements in mil ita r y training. Since this ruled out most instruction in theoretical Marxism-Leninism, the party I e a d e r s became alarmed and all their old fears of an independent nonpolitical army became aroused. Khrushchev resolved to strike directly at Zhukov: he sent him on a visit to Yugoslavia while he prepared the ground for his dismissal. On his return in October 1957, the marshal was presented with a fait accompli. The fall of Marshal Zhukov initiated a period of readjustment in army~ party relations and in the position of the army in Soviet pol i tic a I life.
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SOLDIERS OF THE PARTY

Military leaders are always in evidence during the public presentation of Communist Party policy

Khrushchev has tried to introduce his own idea of the correct balance between the necessary degree of professionalism in the army for an efficient force (particularly in regard to the growing technical complications of nuclear and rocket weapons), and complete control of the forces by the Communist Par t y. The main methods he has used to try to keep the forces in what he regards as their correct station may be divided under four heads.
Ideological Penetration

In the spring of 1958 a new statute for party workers in the armed forces was issued, making it compulsory for every unit to devote a minimum of 50 ( hours to political instruction in each training year, to be taken during military training periods. This program was to be devoted, above all, to Marxist-Leninist theory, admitted to be the weakest link in the political indoctrination. The standard of lectures on ideology was to be improved and the practice, developed
30

under Zhukov, of trusting officers to do political "homework" in their own time was to be abandoned. Senior officers were to be required to take their place in the program and all commanding officers of the most technical branches of the service-and they are obviously on the increase in the age of nuclear weapons and guided missiles - were not to be excused from political indoctrination. The whole weight of evidence indicates that the present Soviet leadership has launched a campaign which, to judge by its scope and intensity, is intended to produce an ideal type of Soviet soldier for whom loyalty to the party should take precedence over loyalty to his military profession or even to the country. The seriousness of this campaign was underlined for the Soviet Army by an overhaul of the Main Political Administration of the Ministry of Defense. For the first time in its history, this administration was placed under a senior officer of the regular
Millitary Review

army, Marshal Golikov, presumably to make its incursions into army affairs more acceptable to the senior officers. For the first time, too, the head of the Main Politi a ~has
_~~~~ ~mm~~~~~~ oo

Control of Personalities

ommittee. Changes were made among its leading personnel, and, in several cas~s, the heads of its most important directorates were promoted to give them ~dded authority. It has been made clear that the political officer must take part in every aspect of a military unit's life and there must be no restrictions placed upon his rights to criticize or encourage in the interests of over-all efficiency and political loyalty.
U'::l1Senior Officers and Party Policy

The par t y leadership has taken steps to see that wherever possible the military leaders are committed in the eyes of the population to the decisions of the civilian policyn):akers. Leading service chiefs have been elected to the Central Committee of the party since the days of the civil war. Today, marshals and generals are full and candidate members of the committee. Considerably more prominence has recently been given to the fact that professional soldiers attend policy sessions of those committees, and speak and vote on government measures. This trend is of particular importance in identifying the army leaders with party policy. It eliminates the possibility of creating an image of army leadership which can claim credit for its patriotism in war and yet absolve itself of responsibility for the less popular aspects of politics. Khrushchev wants to build up the impression that the arm y is as deeply involved in party decisions as the civilians.
May 1963

The third important factor in party control of the army is selection of personalities for the key posts in the high command. This seems to be done not only on the principle of the political reliability of the officers concerned, but on their indebtedness to, and their association with, Mr. Khrushchev. Mention has already been made of the close association bet wee n Mr. Khrushchev and the group of generals with whom he served during the Battle of Stalingrad. It is now true to say-and it appears to be a matter of deliberate policy on Mr. Khrushchev's part-that nearly all the major posts in the Soviet Army are in the hands of members of this group. The latter includes Mar s hal Malinovsky, the Minister of Defense; Marshals Yeremenko and Grechko, his deputies; Marshal Moskalenko; and the commanders of many of the most important military districts, as well as the commanders of the air force, navy, and air defense commands. This selection of personalities on a basis of personal loyalty reinforces the ordinary party controls through indoctrination and the political apparatus within the forces, but 'it is, nevertheless, a very important factor in itself.
Police Supervision

Fourth, there remains the element of police supervision within the army. Although the secret network in the army has declined in prominence since the fall of Beria, it still exists and has considerable powers of investigation, interrogation, and arrest. What is important in this connection is that the network appears to be subordinate to the party leadership and can, therefore, be classed as an instrument of party control over the army.
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NEW STEPPINGSTONES FOR MOSCOW~

Fritz E. Giese

NUMERICALLY, the Soviets have the second largest fleet in the world. The size of this fleet, which exceeds . the naval requirements for the defense of the Soviet sphere and the protection of Soviet interests in foreign countries, indicates overseas objectives. But the Kremlin has disadvantages in the competition for naval power. The USSR lacks bases outside her immediate area of control even though there is some promise in the various types of "research centers" and similar establishments now being developed. Also, a fleet operating overseas cannot exist for an extended period without repair and supply facilities. The long routes the Red Fleet must travel to reach potential areas of op-

eration are a still greater disadvantage. Hence it is understandable that Moscow is seeking opportunities to reduce this handicap. Each new crisis or trouble spot opens up new opportunities for the USSR. It is not yet clear what the developments in the Mediterranean

This article was translated and digested from the original, published in WEHRKUNDE (Federal Republic of Germany) October 1962, under the title, "Neue Sprungbretter fur Moskau?" Mr. Giese is the author of "The Soviet Position in the M editerranean" which appeared in the October 1962 issue of the MILITARY
REVIEW.

32

Military Review

will produce. In the Indonesian archipelago, the Dutch will soon withdraw from their last base on New Guinea. In several South American republics, a growing unrest has been evident for some time and future developments are uncertain. The Kremlin undoubtedly will try to take advantage of each new opportunity to win the steppingstones which it needs for the worldwide employment of its fleet.

valuable as the waters there are free of ice the year around. Farther to the south on the Sea of Japan is Vladivostok, for many years the major harbor of the czarist and later the Red Fleet. A harbor was established at Sovetskaya Gavan, north of Vladivostok, in 1945. During recent ' years, this harbor has been greatly developed and improved.

Restricted Access to the Sea

A weakness of the USSR's seapower lies in the geographical features of the four regions where her naval forces are distributed-the Arctic and the Pacific Oceans and the Baltic and the Black Seas. The exits from the Baltic and the Black Seas are complicated by narrow straits. The Arctic and the Pacific Fleets must travel thousands of nautical miles before they can be employed in the most important western sealanes. Thus the problem is to obtain advanced bases from which naval operations can be supported. Prior to World War II, the only Soviet harbor having direct access to the open sea was Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The major part of the Pacific submarine forces is based at this port. Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski has the disadvantage of being ice-locked nearly three months of the year, as are most of the Soviet harbors in this northern region. However, the Soviets have an adequate number of icebreakers to eliminate this obstacle at any time. Through the occupation of the Kurils and the southern part of Sakhalin Island, which belonged to Japan before World War II, the Soviet Union gained additional ports, including Karsakov and Aleksandrovsk. The southern part of the Kurils is particularly
May 1963

The Outward Push

The Soviets have obtained additional bases along the route to the south on the Red Chinese coast in North Korea and in North Vietnam. During this push to the south, Moscow managed to obtain a small island of the Indonesian archipelago on which it was permitted to establish a so-called "research station" through an agreement with the Indonesian Government. Reliable sources report that Moscow had to pay Indonesia with several destroyers and submarines for this "loan." In case of an emergency, this base will enable the Soviet Fleet to disrupt the important passageway between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. Soviet submarines could also dominate the Molucca Passage. Mos-:. cow could thus secure control of the Indian Ocean. The continuing crisis in Laos emanates from Red China. Communist China also menaces Thailand, Burma, Malaya, and Singapore. Singapore lies as a safety bolt in front of the international seaway which links the South China Sea and the maritime regions behind it with the Indian Ocean. In Co~munist hands it would be an ideal takeoff position to India. India's neutralism has improved the Soviet chances in this area. If the states of southeast Asia and Indonesia were conquered by communism, India and
3

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USSR'S WA'RM WATER EXITS AND STRATEGIC PASSAGES

Pakistan would be exposed and threatened.

Aden and the Arabian Peninsula

Singapore and Aden are the two most important hubs of the shipping traffic which flows through the Indian Ocean. Aden has been the bulwark at the entrance to the Red Sea which gives access to the Suez Canal and thus the Mediterranean. The Arabs in Aden are demanding a larger measure of independence. According to an agreement concluded between the British Government and the Federation of the Arab Amirates of the South, allowances are to be made for these claims. The colony itself, however, is to remain under British sovereignty. Aden, with a population of over 200,000 and an important naval and commercial harbor, is to have a Hprivileged position" within this federation. But there are already signs of difficulty. In recent years, Yemen has demanded the incorporation of the Aden Colony and Protectorate into its territory. Now these claims are being renewed. Thus this region, too, has become a powder keg. Moscow has coveted the southern portion of the Arabian Peninsula for a long time. From there the Soviets could extend their influence into the Persian Gulf. Iran has been a target of Russian expansion for centuries. Here the czars were concerned with acquiring ice-free access to the vast oceans. Once the abundance of oil in these areas was discovered, Moscow's yearning for the Persian Gulf increased. Soviet success in blocking the West's access to the Arabian oil might have dire consequences. Moscow has already managed to acquire a camouflaged strongpoint in this area with financial, economic, and industrial aid.
May 1963

A large harbor is being built with Soviet support at the northern tip of the Persian Gulf not far from Abadan. Soviet foreign policy in this case has capitalized on the differences between Iran and Iraq.

The Indian Ocean and the West

The We~tern position in the Indian Ocean is very weak. The US 6th and 7th Fleets in the Mediterranean and southeast Asian waters are available to halt a Soviet advance, but there are few Western forces worth mentioning in this area. The British bases which formerly existed have been reduced to a minimum. At present, the Indian Ocean, once a focal point of British naval policy, is practically unprotected against aggressive seizure. The Middle and the Near East are no longer merely crossroads of world traffic but also the inroads to Africa, that enormous, but completely unpredictable continent w her e unrest seethes or swelters since the end of colonial rule. The Kremlin has been aware for some time of the chances which offer themselves in this region. Although current efforts are centered on the numerous, newly established repu blics along the African west coast, east Africa presents ample entry points for Communist propaganda.

The Situation in the Atlantic

When the Castro regime came into power in Cuba a few years ago, concern was expressed that the Soviets might find a suitable steppingstone there to the American continent. The United States carefully watches all that occu rs on the island. Cu ba has become more important as a largescale pro,paganda center than a military strongpoint. The Soviets have used it surreptitiously to channel their "educational material" into the Central and South American states. This
35

STEPPINGSTONES

Small Soviet ships ply the coastal waters of the Free World collecting information

is done quite openly, not only through the embassies but also through education and instruction agencies which were established for this specific purpose. Running parallel to this development is extensive espionage activity. There are repeated reports of "harmless" Soviet trawlers and flotillas turning up in the American coastal waters. Traditional naval visits, maneuver trips, and training cruises are used by the Soviet Admiralty for intelligence purposes. Submarines apparently take a great part in this activity. As recent as two years ago, the sudden appearance of mysterious submarines off the South American coast made the headlines of the world press. Similar vessels had often been detected off the North and South American Atlantic coast.
36

The existence of the Free World depends on the free use of the oceans. If their use is restricted or blocked by enemy submarines, the consequences could be disastrous. The su bmarine incident in New Gulf sets one to thinking. The question a r i s e s whether or not the West has done everything necessary to meet such danger. "Sneak Trenches" in the Atlantic Oceanographic research only recently discovered a peculiar phenomenon which may enable hostile submarines to sneak unnoticed up to a coastline. These are so-called "warm water pockets" and magnetic fields in the oceans. These natural trenches protect submarines against sonar systems and other devices which normally are able to detect the magnetism in the hull of metal ships at long ranges.
Military Review

Conventional sonar equipment is relatively ineffective in these "warm water pockets." In areas of the oceans where magnetic deviations prevail,\Jnderwater magnetic systems perform inadequately. Where both of the above conditions exist, submarines may elude detection. Such areas afford a relatively safe passage for rocket-carrying submarines. The fact that such conditions exist in vast regions of the Atlantic confronts submarine defense with completely new tasks.

Western Preparedness
The West has also exploited policy and economic aid as a means of defense. Strong and independently operating naval units have been established in endangered maritime regions, and other precautionary measures have been taken. The US Fleets in the Mediterranean and in the Pacific are comprised of aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and numerous tenders. These forces are able to operate independently of land bases. Strong warship squadrons are stationed in the North and South Atlantic. Finally, the number of available Polaris submarines of the US Navy is steadily growing, especially in the Arctic. While the primary task of the fleets is that of a "floating fire brigade," it may be assumed that in the event of aggressio~ the Polaris submarines will have offensive missions. The efforts of the US Navy will be supported by allied or friendly navies. This contribution will by no means be unimportant. The Atlantic community pooled its forces in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Members are the three leading Western naval powers-the

United States, Great Britain, and France. The smaller navies of Canada, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Turkey also contribute to NATO's power. The alliance safeguards Western Europe from North Cape to the Caucasus. The southeast Asian countriesPakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines-are united with the three Western Powers in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. There is a certain military cooperation among them under US leadership. SEATO is primarily concerned with the protection of free shipping in the Indian Ocean. In addition, there is Australia's Navy. Since the erection of a Soviet "research station" on the island of Amboina, Australia is particularly interested in the security of her own shipping between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. The three largest South American countries-Argentina, Chile, and Brazil-have considerable sea forces of their own. Moreover, in an emergency they would have the support of the US Fleet. The member states of these alliances have sufficient harbors and bases on all naval frontiers to guarantee supply and repairs of their combined fleets. However, in Africa the strategic position of the West has become somewhat less favorable as the creation of a large number of small independent states has increased Moscow's prospects for the procurement of bases for its sea forces in maritime regions formerly undisputedly dominated by the Free World. In spite of that, the balance of seapower still favors the West.

May 1963

37

UR UNRECOGNIZE TTLEFIELD LANGUA "E

Major David R. Hughes, United States Army

LANGUAGE is a combination of mutually understood symbols by which thoughts can be communicated between people. I submit to you professional officers who deal with tactical combat units that our present overlay techniques have become a genuine form of language-a special tactical language. I further submit that it has acquired an awkwardness which may well be inhibitin" g our tactical originality. There is a great difference between the use of map symbols merely to represent things with names-such as divisions, water points, and obstacles - and the use of multiple symbols to convey, without words, tactical missions, tasks, and responsibilities. For instance the symbol

stands for an armored battalion command post. When put on an overlay it represents where that command post exists on the ground. But consider the following:

--+---+-8:' A

This does not just stand for a company in a defense position. On an operations overlay it is an order for Company A to stop, repel, and eject the enemy within the specific area bounded by the lateral lines, and somewhere behind the dotted line. Further, it requires the commander to coordinate his task with Company B and the 3d Battalion at two particular points, and states that the choice of the exact
Military Review

38

positions is up to the commander of Company A. This is more than map symbology, this is language, for it tells us to do something. I have found that wherever such symbols, awkwardly called overlay techniques in Field Manual 101-5, Staff 0 fjicers' Field Manual, Staff Organization and Procedure, become language they always convey these elements: A specific tactical responsibility. An area on the ground where this responsibility must be discharged. The unit responsible. We have developed our use of this language so far that today a commander can receive a small piece of authenticated tissue paper with a few bold lines and symbols on it, keyed to a map, without words, and he knows what to do with his entire command.

commonly understood by men who are required to act on the orders. To ensure this at anyone point in time the whole meaning must be readily available in one reference manual. The range and number of such symbols and the meaning attached to them must be great enough to express all the common tactical possibilities combat units may execute on the battlefield. Unfortunately, there appears to be a lack of awareness and consistency in observing these principles. For example, if you turn to Appendix VII of Field Manual 101-5, you will find many overlay techniques described for you. But not all are defined in the sense that you can determine precisely what you are responsible for doing when you receive orders in which they alone convey the meaning. Even the lowly boundary line

Dependence
In theory our overlay language is an efficient means of communication. But the reliability and usefulness of such a special tongue is wholly dependent on its obeying three fundamental principles: The visual marks must have an exact meaning in all three elements common to tactical orders-the unit responsible, the place of the responsibility, and the precise nature of the responsibility. This complete meaning must be

has a specific coordinating meaning. But you must search elsewhere from this manual to discover it. There is a second deficiency. Our difficulty in finding complete tactical meanings of our current symbols is compounded when these meanings are frequently changed by either interpretation or doctrinal revision. I give as an example the following overlay statement common to orders:

Major David R. Hughes is a student in the 1962-63 Regular Course of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. He holds an M. A. from the University of Pennsylvania, attended the New Zealand Staff and Tactics College, served in Korea, was an instructor at the United States Military Academy, and prior to coming to Fort Leavenworth, was with the 27th Infantry in Thailand.
May 1963

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39

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BATTLEFIELD LANGUAGE
On an overlay-type order this diagram, and it alone, directs the 1/13 Mechanized Battalion to attack and seize Objective 3. But what else does it order the battalion commander to do with respect to his zone? Up to a few years ago it told him to clear the zone of enemy. Today it does not say that. Now, if we should give the above overlay to several infantry and armor lieutenant colonels eligible to command a mechanized battalion and ask each of them to state all the tasks demanded by this order, would they all agree as to what it says about the zone? I think not, for the simple reason that, lacking amplifying words in the text, it would be only by coincidence that all these officers would have learned about such a change in meaning in the past several years of their assignments. There is nothing self evident in the symbols to denote any change. That is one of the troubles with a schematic language: the symbols mean on]y what our individual schooling, reading, and experience teaches us. Thus with our use of overlay-type orders, continual revision of old meanings can cause even well-trained staffs to make basic mistakes. an esoteric one, known only to a handful of specialists within the profession.

Awkward Evolvement
Up to now I have only argued for clear, stable, tactical meanings and a ready place to find total definitions. Now, I would like to go further, because our present difficulties are only symptoms of a deeper vagueness about what this language is and how it works. Like all professional languages, ours has grown like Topsy, without a master design or particular underlying principle. It simply happened as necessity drove officers to find ways to solve their immediate problem of communicating tactical instructions. Those responsible for doctrine then adopted and codified the most useful and general of these techniques. All growing languages are like that. They evolve, but they often get awkward in the process. To show how illogical technical terms can become, consider the common phase line. Any young lieutenant when first looking at a phase line concludes that it must denote where one military phase of something begins and another one ends. This is not so. Under current doctrine, rarely is any operation below corps phased. The first thing the bewildered young man must digest, therefore, is that whatever phase lines mean, they have absolutely nothing to do with phases. Historians will have fun with our jargon. I cite this example for more than a laugh at our own foibles. It illustrates that while tactical concepts change, our nomenclature tends to remain with the familiar. T his is reasonable. Names stick, ideas move. But by now you should see a paradox in my first argument. If we freeze the meaning of
Military Review

Orders Must Be Clear

Orders must be clear. This is a first principle. Any combat arms officer who has pursued a career of branch schooling, command, staff, and the usual proportion of general assignments should be able to pick up a tactical order appropriate to his rank, read and understand the missions and responsibilities it assigns, and be required to go no further than a military dictionary and the Staff Officers' Field Manual, if that far. To think otherwise is to foster not just a professional language but
40

our symbols, and these meanings contain complex tactical ideas, then I seem to be urging that we stop changing tactics. This is not true. I am only making my first point that frequent change of meaning brings confusion in orders, whatever it does to tactics.

Basic and Comp'lex Meanings

Another part of the problem is that we have confused the distinction between basic tactical meanings, and complex doctrinal meanings. Our doctrine and broader concepts are what undergo change, not the most basic tactical ideas. Let me use a very simple hypothetical example. Suppose I draw a circle

span of time this doctrine holds sway; the same headquarters which approves the manuals also approves the symbols. One day a well-meaning reviewer yells, "This overlay stuff is too cluttered, let's SIMPLIFY it." So with a stroke of the pen, but after duly sending it around for comments, he rubs out all those marks and puts in the manuals that hereafter the symbol

o
means seize and secure. Sounds sensible. But what happens in the field that day when the colonel says: S3, order the heliborne company to capture the bridge, dismantle it, and withdraw immediately. I want the 2d Battalion to protect the takeoff and landing zone. And yes, put out a simple overlay order for a change, will you? The hapless S3 finds that the symbols desert him. Instead of an overlaytype order, he ends up writing all that he intends, only because the acceptable symbols do not have a basic enough meaning for him to build up the concept on the overlay out of basic tactical jobs. All he can show is location; everything else has to be explained.

and say that this means seize. Whereever this symbol appears it is an order for you to seize the area shown. That is a basic tactical idea. Now let me introduce the basic tactical idea of secure in the sense of protect. Let the following symbol stand for secure. .

Now, by combining the two symbols

Encumbrance
Some of our present techniques may be so encumbered with our tactical opinion that the tactical possibilities which we can readily show on an overlay order are restricted. We might consider the present compound tactical meaning of the direction of attack arrow. In Field Manual 101-5, not only does the symbol describe the exact trace over which the attack is to be made, but it also spells out that it refers to the exact trace of the main attack. Too many qualifying meanings
41

I can express the two-part mission seize and secure. But let us suppose that in our system of producing tactical doctrine, we come to the decision that normally we should protect everything we seize. That is reasonable enough tactical advice. So over the
May 1963

' BAnLEFIELD LANGUAGE

on one symbol merely reduce the number of situations in which it can be used. There is one other way doctrinal normals can affect the published symbols. That is by eliminating symbols themselves, reasoning that normally another one will suffice. Consider the axis of advance arrow. Long ago someone suggested that a broad arrow be called an axis because it could then denote only the center line on which a force was to orient its advance, not the exact path on the ground over which it was to move. So useful was this symbol and meaning within the doctrine of the time that it became itself doctrinal and assumed a fixed meaning. Few officers today do not know that meaning. But right away we get into difficulty, because Field Manual 101-5 differentiates between those symbols used as overlay techniques and those used on plans and on situation overlays. In other words, what a broad arrow means on a planning map is not necessarily what the same arrow means when transferred to an overlay order. It was inevitable that such a subtle distinction would be lost many places in the field-it is too academic. Thus staffs used the arrow on orders where it didn't mean much of anything, as in this example: separate symbol. But when the doctrinal decision was made that a zone need no longer be cleared, then, it was reasoned, normally zone symbols could be used where the axis had been used before. Thus the axis of advance arrow is, as of this writing, generally not recommended for use. The change is not yet Army doctrine but it may become so. This seems like a blow for simplicity, but simplicity is a fickle maiden. Consider, too, this portion of an overlay-type order:

LO

52

lY

~X~ 55 ______

So long as units were responsible for clearing zones, shown by boundaries, the axis arrow was needed as a
42

This is an attack in which the commander desires that the subordinate brigade bypass the built-up area to the north. The southern division boundary is established by corps, not his own headquarters. How, without using the axis of advance, can he show his tactical desire? He cannot. If he uses a direction of attack arrow, he is adding even more restrictions to the subordinate commanders than just to avoid the city to the north. He can tell the 1st Brigade what he wants, or he can write it in the order. (When
Military Review

the Brigade S3 gets the order, the first thing he probably will do is pencil in the restriction. ) Yet the idea is best shown by a symbol on the map, because it relates to the tactical movement over particular terrain. The very purpose of overlay orders is to clarify, with the brevity of symbols, instructions reI ate d to the ground. If you say that the tactical idea is not normal, I answer that this is exactly my point-such a decision is up to the commander in the field, and so long as his idea is not wildly unorthodox, he ought to have the means to express it using common techniques.

Convey an Idea
Here is another simple problem. Under nuclear conditions it is frequently of great importance to make a passage of lines so as to reduce vulnerability. How can you properly and unambiguously show subordinate attacking elements the exact area in which you want them to pass, but not restrict their maneuver after the passage? Simple idea, but an involved problem when you try to convey it on an overlay. I am not putting forth a case for a single solution to these problems. I am merely trying to illustrate two things: If our overlay language remains too linked to our normal tactical notions, then we have a language which can only express an elusive normal, and not the refinement, the complex, or the awkward. If we change or restrict the meaning of our symbols because they are misused, then we are unconsciously attempting a very subtle form of tactical thought control-trying to prevent poor thinking and poor orders by removing the symbols with which to think and order.
May 1963

The real victim is the commander, staff, or unit which knows what it is about, and needs every available visual device to express orders better and more briefly, without extra words. Is it any wonder that our overlay orders today seem to have m.ore words, while tpe overlays get blanker and blankel"? At this point let me parry another argument which is frequently used to dismiss the matters I bring up here. This line of reasoning goes, "Well, after all, overlay symbols are not promulgated by Army Regulations, as is the military dictionary. Like doctrine they are only guides. When you get to a unit you can do as you like. You can devise your own." If there is any phenomena characteristic of the US Army today, it is that few units contain the same men in key tactical positions for more than a year. More and more the only thing which provides continuity of routine procedures in units is the common service schooling, manuals, and school guidance. I have watched staffs composed of skilled professional officers grab the supposed guides even more quickly than field manuals to speed the process of drafting plans and orders. This is partly because they are the only insurance against confusion in lower units, and partly because orders today are so complex that it is a laborious, painstaking job to set down even the simpler plans of maneuver. Yet part of the labor is a curious puzzle game of trying to fit the tactical scheme to the available symbolic means for expressing it. Sounds a little inverted doesn't it? Orders were never easy to write well. With any awkwardness of symbols we create additional roadblocks.
43

BATTLEFIELD LANGUAGE
Order Doctrine
With the stress today on joint and combined, as well as uniservice, task organizations, it is unrealistic to talk about units writing overlay orders the way they would like to. Could units deploying to Lebanon, Thailand, and Florida risk phrasing their contingency plans in anything other than our common language of overlay symbols? If our tactical doctrine is just a guide, our order doctrine is most certainly more than that. Circumstances make it practically law. I have only discussed current basic tactical responsibilities. I have not raised the point about how flexible and adequate our overlay language is to show newly significant responsibilities which occur in time and on terrain-infiltration; zonal security along routes; area search; dispersion; control of areas; or basic tactical missions such as cover, screen, block, and delay. Again I must point out that, although all of these can be put in written orders, they are common enough that they should be expressable in overlay orders, if we are ever to regain the brevity we desire. examination, the staff study. It is then we look hardest to glimpse the whole idea, ~ecause there is more to tactics than just the game-like counterplay of red arrows and blue arrows. A military plan must end with specific tasks given to specific units. That is what distinguishes the professional soldier from the armchair tactician - his ability to translate concepts into jobs. The formal language of our tactical orders, that which conveys missions, is the common and final means by which we come to understand both the idea and the management of it. On the map is where we see and begin to feel the form of the battle. When the picture is inadequate, the symbols don't carry the thought; the idea evaporates. It seldom occurs to us when we see an officer trying to get his concept unchained from the tyrant of his tongue that it may not be his scheme that is inadequate, but his tools. Here is the soul of my argument. When it becomes more difficult to express a tactical idea than to think it, then men tend to stop thinking. They substitute form for content, and forget their own ideas.

Cumulative Effect
This brings me to my last and most serious point. It is the cumulative effect of all the faults I have pointed out before. We are discouraging and thwarting tactical freshness and originality by the rigid deficiencies of the language most suited to express it. The great influence of our manuals, schools, and demands of time makes this language the one we must fall back on to propose, debate, and examine each other's ideas. When the discussion is over, the proof of the pudding is in the study of the plan on the blackboard, the overlay, the
44

Recommendations
Because of these trends which I have observed as a school tactics instructor, a commander in combat and in training, an operations officer, and several times a student, I recommend: That we officially recognize what we now obliquely call overlay techniques are, in fact, a formal tactical overlay language. Identify it as such or find an even more descriptive term. That we separate this language from doctrine, and resist the temptation to enforce doctrine by the restrictive use of overlay language. That this overlay language be
Military Review

published and defined in Field Manual 101-5 and at the rear of each tactical manual-apart from mere symbol description; that it be defined completely in all three elements of tactical meaning-the unit designated, the complete responsibility indicated, and the precise area and limits of this responsibility. That enough useful fundamental symbols be developed within this language, with associated basic tactical meanings; that the common tactical possibilities can be expressed in overlay orders, serving the commander, not limiting him, or driving him to words-the unnatural language of tactics. That after the stroke of recognizing this separate and independent language, we resist the impulse to redefine and alter its basic meanings. A properly conceived language does not have to be changed-it is more fundamental than the complex ideas it expresses. It is, in principle, better to create a new symbol or combination than half change the meaning of an old one-for an officer who sees a new symbol will be alert to find out its meaning, but when he sees an old one, he may never k now it has been changed. Whether you agree or not with this admittedly deep plunge to what I think are the roots of many officers' discontent with our means of communicating and directing tactics, it is wen to remember that at the opposite end of the scale from our monolithic efforts to codify and make potent our

tactics stands the commander. If the American Army draws strength from our uniformity of doctrine, it should draw even more from his unique ability to surpass it. After all, he has three tremendous traditions going for him -our n, a tional trait of ingenuity,. a great e,ducational background, and our willingness to let him think for himself on the battlefield . If we have any lead over our potential enemies, this is one which we must ever maintain. In the long history of wars we remember best those soldiers whose command qualities were capped by their skill at defeating larger forces through the inspiration of their tactics. Brute power is nice to have, but we may be facing a bigger brute than we care to admit. I would like to raise one small voice for a return to the officer of his chance to develop his own combat ideas. A better visual tactical language is just one item-it gives him a chance to describe and direct his battle exactly as he wants it. But there are others. When that first nuclear strike occurs, it may reduce much of our military logic to dust. We will then be very much dependent on those few commanders on the ground who must think fast and hard, see what is to be done, and order it so. If they have the language, a common language, and if they have the habit of using it, they may adapt faster than their enemies. This adaptability alone can win the first battle. And if there is anything that breeds success, it is that first taste of victory.

May 1963

45

A Tangled Ball of Yarn!

Erna K. Basore Just as you think you have unravelled a knotty string of evidence, it coils up in a fresh tangle.

-B. H. Liddell Hart

HISTORY is a strange blend of fact and fiction. It is difficult to determine where the one ends and the other begins, or to draw a dividing line between the two. History's pages are filled with words, phrases, and dogmas that cry for identity and origin. Predominating views, concepts, and stratagems, at times, seem to have no discernible, authoritative basis. This is true not because there is always a lack of documentation, but because of the inability to discriminate between the real and the imaginary. To some people, history is merely the process of accumulating bundles of facts, data, and statistics. But it is much more than that. It is more than the Fall of Rome and the Landing of the Pilgrims. History is concerned with the phenomena of human nature;
46

it is a record of what man has thought, said, and done. The historian's purpose is to create order out of chaos by separating the threads that are inextricably tangled together, following Francis Bacon's heeding that:
It is the true office of history to represent the events themselves, together with the counsels, and to leave the observations and conclusions thereupon to the liberty and faculty of every man's judgment. This is not an easy task, even for the most experienced. History is interwoven with threads of both fact and fiction; throughout this intricate pattern, elusive elements are woven in with the woof and warp of both. It has been said, for example, that anyone who starts reading the Iliad as history will find it full of fiction; that

Military Review

anyone who starts reading it as fiction will find it full of history. In a sense, all history is like that.

Early History History began with epics, folk tales, and chronicles, and some of the earliest historical works of astonishing adventures were compiled from folk tales and anecdotes strung together on a thin thread of historical knowledge. Certain of Alexander's exploits were extended into realms of pure fantasy. He talked with the sun and moon; harnessed winged monsters; and conversed with a mythical queen. Socrates was said to have slain dragons in a region of Armenia at the bequest of Philip of Macedon. The fact that Armenia was never in Philip's possession and that Socrates was no longer living at the time seemed irrelevant to early historians. The philosopher Euhemerus, who reduced all national gods to historic characters, pretended to have found on the Isle of Panchaea a memorial dedicated to Zeus by his ancestors. But where is this mysterious isle? And where is Atlantis? Or EI Dorado? In medieval chronicles there was no dividing line between early Greek and Roman personages and individuals. Romulus was nearly as perceptible as Caesar. An encounter between two superhuman personalities is the plot of some of the greatest dreams that it is possible for human imagination to conceive. In Greece the gods were exiled into a sphere between two worlds
Erna K. Basore taught in the Missouri public school system for two years before joining the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College Library in 1950. A Reference Librarian, she has long been interested in military history.
May 1963

where they lived, loved, hated, and fought, much like mortals. Of course, early history (if such it can be called) often fades into fable; fact becomes clouded with doubt. The writings of Herodotus are the chief source for the study of the Persian War. B,u t if Herodotus were alive at the time, he could only have been an infant. The writings of Plutarch are cited as a source for the study of G r e e k history; investigation has shown that events he narrated occurred several hundred years before his time.

Modern-Day Historians Later historians had better knowledge of where myths ended and true chronology began. Still, some histories record that following the Battle of Waterloo, the Duke of Wellington was not even correct in stating the moment when La Haye Sainte fell into French hands. Even modern-day historians do not agree on the number of troops who participated in a particular battle, or on the length of certain marches, or on the time that certain important strongholds or terrain features fell. And many so-called factual accounts of glorious battles are only regretful reminiscences which quickly lose their glitter when subjected to the cold, hard test of comparison with official records. This may be because history is sometimes both subjective and individual, largely reflecting an individual's interest and vision. Many historians contend that historical construction cannot be achieved without the aid of fancy. Thus the line between fact and fiction is left undrawn. And, according to Thomas B. Macaulay, the best histories may sometimes be those in which a little of the exaggeration of fictitious narrative is
47

BALL OF YARN
judiciously employed; something may be lost in accuracy, but much is gained in effect. over a strip of land or a border fort seemed unimportant. But Xenophon and Thucydides would have considered the fights at home of vital importance. Although history may not repeat itself, parallels cannot be completely ruled out. It does not seem too presumptious or improbable to speculate that any nation or its leaders, in the determination to become more powerful, might fail to see the perils of mice battling over a strip of land, and thus lose from within what they sought to gain from without.
Inspiration

Uses of History What use, then, can the soldier make of such a heterogeneous mixture, of such a tangled skein? Perhaps Major H. E. D. Harris, a professional soldier who has made a long study of history, expresses best the value that history has for the military man. In his article in the November 1962 issue of An Cosantoir, Major Harris states: . . . I am impressed by the way history can help the soldier professionally . ... Apart from its professional use, history has cultural values; it can help to satisfy the intellectual curiosity, it can add to living by providing bases of common interests with other people and so lead to greater understanding, and it gives one perspective, a sense of proportion as to time, place and circumstances. It hands down traditions-the carrying on of the habits and lessons of the past as inspiration into the future.
Perspective

Neither characters, events, periods of time, nor circumstances are ever the same, or of equal consequence. Accordingly, the soldier must have perspective in order to recognize continuous change and to develop a sense of values. Not long after Alexander the Great won his battle over the Persians at Arbela, he received news from Greece that the King of Sparta, along with 5,000 of his soldiers, .had fallen in battle. Alexander turned to his generals and said, "It seems that while we have been conquering the Great King there has been a battle of mice in Arcadia." To Alexander, while an Eastern empire was being won, fights at home
48

The myths of the ancients record the history of religious ideals and moral conduct. Although there are some who will insist that to search for the truth in mythology is vain, these same individuals will agree that to sea'r ch for truth through mythology is profitable. Historians have always been somewhat guilty of so-called "myth-making." They have created beliefs or impressions; they have emphasized, with some degree of success, particular events or actions at the expense .of others. In this sense, though, and at least for the soldier, the myth has a useful purpose. The spirit and emotions of a nation are expressed best in some artistic medium. So much as Sennacherib cried, "Where are the gods of Hamath and the gods of Arpad?" so in later times do we ask, "Where are the Great Captains?"
Experience and Wisdom

General George C. Marshall once wryly commented: "History has repeatedly proved that it is not with the brass hats but with the brass heads that the danger to the country lies."

Military !Review

In a recent article, Major General Frank Besson, Jr., stated: It would indeed be a boon to military students if historical examples were so clear cut that generals could turn the pages of history and find the 'open sesame' which would unlock for them the portals of victory. ... General Besson also commented that truth is often stranger than fiction, and that history is full of gruesome examples of commanders who thought they had entered the doorway to conquest. Overdependency on historical examples is not strongly recommended, because all conditions in given situations will never be identical. But historical examples do serve the military man well as teaching methods. Experience gained by the study of history will always be valuable experience, for history is the raw material of both imagination and wisdom, and

history is, and will continue to be, the source of experience.

Conclusion History is a strange mixture, a potpourri of fact and fiction. History cannot be changed; only its course may be altered. It is a recording of men and events, <;>f emotions and desires, of the hopes and aspirations of all nations, all races, and all creeds. Whether we call history an art, a science, a tool, or even a weapon, it can be a beacon light to help guide our destinies and to shape the future. From history the soldier can gain a sense of perspective, inspiration, experience, and wisdom. Tangled though its threads may be, a Joseph's coat of many colors, it is an interesting record for those who read it; a priceless gift to those who make use of it; and a rightful heritage for those who perpetuate it.

Fitting Words:
liThe colors were shot down sixteen times, and on each occasion a man was ready to spring forward and place the colors in front."
This is a sentence taken from a correspondent's account of the Battle of Antietam, published in The New York Times, Sunday, 21 September 1862. The colors were those of the 63d of New York, one of the four regiments comprising the Irish Brigade, commanded by General Thomas Francis Meagher, who had been condemned to death by England, then banished to Tasmania, and who finally escaped to the United States. In this fiercely contested battle on Maryland soil, McClellan, commanding 70,000 Union troops, attacked Lee's army of 40,000 Confederates. McClellan claimed a victory; historians have reduced it to a draw.

May 1963

49

LOGISTICS IN THE ARMY GROUP

Lieutenant Colonel John A. Hoefling, United States Army

I N THE past the army group has been considered primarily a tactical
headquarters. This was true of the World War II organizations in Western Europe which carried Generals Bradley and Devers to fame. It has been true subsequently of our service school instruction and our doctrine. Developments of the postwar era have intensified our concern for logistics and have focused attention on this relatively neglected function at the army group level. In effect, I believe we have uncovered a serious gap in our knowledge of the logistic problem. The campaigns of World War II drove home the importance of logistics by emphasizing the dependence of the combat forces on their lines of communication. Many of our senior
50

N A TO commanders today believe as General Eisenhower learned, "It is logistics which controls all campaigns and limits many." After the war our service schools picked up the ball, devoting a large portion of their classroom time to logistic instruction. Consequently, few of today's senior commanders think solely in terms of tactical operations. Concurrent with this growing logistic consciousness, we have witnessed the growth of multinational forces. Because of the numerous treaties and alliances, I believe it is safe to say that the purely national army group is a thing of the past. NATO's W est ern European land forces, readied for action in the world's most likely arena of large-scale warfare, Military Review

certainly point conclusively in that direction. Integrated Staffs This has brought about the creation of integrated staffs at army group headquarters. The NAT 0 arm y groups control armies, and in some cases corps, of the nations repre~ sented. This being the lowest level of integrated staffs within the NATO chain, logistics naturally has claimed its share of the army group commander's attention. A prime example of the integrated army group is the C e n t r a I Army Group, or CENTAG, which has been in active existence since 1 October 1960. CENTAG experience provides

a convenient model for study of the logistic problem and how it can be solved today. In wartime, CENTAG will include such major units as the 7th United States Army, the 1st French Army, and the 2d and 3d German Corps. The CENTAG staff consists of well over 100 officers, of whom 50 percent are American, 25 percent are French, and 25 percent are German. The headquarters is maintained on a fully operational basis and can take the field on short notice. Generally speaking, separate logistic systems exist for the several major national forces (see chart). The national forces receive their supplies

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANl lZAnON (LOGISTICAL SUPPORT)

UNITED STATES

-OPERATIONAL COMMAND

DIRECT LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

May 1963

51

LOGISTICS
from depots located in the communication zone in France and from the combat zone located on both sides of the Rhine River. Thus the first and foremost army group logistic activity is that of coordination between nations. There would be no problem if supplies and technical support were balanced between the forces and if the old system of an army group being a "tactical" headquarters only were in effect. But for numerous reasons (political, economic, and technological) supplies are not balanced; the army group commander is naturally concerned that he will not be placed in the position of having one national force capable of fighting only two days while the others are capable of 30 days' combat. He looks to his logistic staff to keep him informed so he can take positive action to keep his lOgistic support coordinated. Evaluation of logistic support of assigned forces and other normal logistic staff functions.
Mutual Logistic Support

Uniq,ue Activities There are other logistical activities, most of which are unique to the new army group within the NATO system: Mutual logistic support. Standardization. Infrastructure. Movements coordination.
Lieutenant Colonel John A. Hoefling is with Headquarters, Central Army Group, Germany. He holds a Master's degree from the University of Alabama and is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the 1956-57 Regular Course of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. Other assignments include duty in Japan and Korea with the 11th Airborne and 45th and 24th Infantry Divisions. Prior to his present assignment, Colonel Hoefling was with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics in Washington.
52

Mutual logistic support, or the providing of logistic aid by one nation to another, has t h r e e broad aspects. There is the necessity for peacetime agreements which will remedy known logistic deficiencies-in peacetime. Such agreements already are working for the provision of facilities by a host nation to the military forces of guest nations. Too, there has been considerable progress in the provision of transportation and labor assistance by one nation for the others. The army group m 0 nit 0 r s peacetime agreements; most of the actual negotiation is conducted directly between the nations concerned. .A more ~ifficult form of mutual logistic support is the provision in peacetime of agreements covering known deficiencies which will occur in wartime-difficult because it involves the earmarking of supplies in being. Naturally, interested nations are hesitant to promise supplies: they feel they will need all of their supplies for their own forces, particularly since the effects of enemy nuclear strikes and the duration of the war are unknown; and the earmarking of certain stocks may cause the receiving nation to fail to build up its own stocks and divert its resources to other needs. The role of the army group in this type of mutual support is to help determine existing deficiencies which can be eliminated by negotiation at higher levels. Finally, provision must be made for logistic support coveri,n g those unforeseen difficulties which occur in an emergency in war. Once again,
Military Review

procedures must be worked out which will ensure the provision of emergency support by one force to another if the mission requires support. Army group studies the logistic situation and makes recommendations on the proper emergency procedures to be used. Much progress has been made on this particular aspect of logistic support during Fallex 62. In fact, there were over 20 incidents where one national force furnished supplies or maintenance support to another national force.
Standardization

Since each nation brings into the NATO entity its own organization, tactical concepts, armament, and language, standardization within the forces is essential in order to accomplish the operational mission. * Much of the effort in standardization of equipment and procedures among NATO nations is undertaken by the Military Agency for Standardization (MAS) in London. The army group cooperates by searching out material and procedures for standardization, and furnishing comments on those items recommended for standardization by the nations through MAS. The bulk of the work in the field of standardization (perhaps a better word is uniformity) for the army group falls into two areas. A catalog is compiled containing those items which are common to two or more assigned forces in order that the various staffs know the proper nomenclature of common equipment and to ensure that mutual logistical support can work. For example, a 12.7-millimeter maschinengewehr, a .50-caliber mitrailleuse, and a .50-cal Colonel John W. Barnes, "International Cooperation in Army Research and Development," Military Review, January 1963, pp 48-56.

iber M2 machinegun are all the same. A common nomenclature is also important to identify those local resources which may have to be used in case of war. A complete catalog has been developed by the CENTAG staff and is presently in use. In the area of standardized procedures, the main task of the army group is to produce a good workable standing operating procedutes (SOP) which is clearly understood by all assigned forces. Because staff procedures in the national forces are different, this is the same as a normal SOP except that is must be in more detail. As a minimum it has been found that the army group SOP contains sections which cover supply; procurement of local resources; mutual support; petroleum, oils, and lubricants; hospitalization; movements and transport; area damage; and boundaries.
Infrastructure

In NATO, the term infrastructure designates those fixed installations necessary for the deployment and operations of the allied armed forces. The installations which are funded by NATO funds include war headquarters, communications, portions of the European pipeline, missile sites, and training facilities used by NATO forces. The army group staff is involved directly in programing infrastructure projects which will be used by assigned national forces, including recommendations on budget priorities. Once again, coordination of the national forces is a prime responsibility of the army group. Through liaison visits and conferences, agreements are reached on the infrastructure projects to be undertaken in the army group area and the priority to be
53

May 1963

LOGISTICS
given to each project. These projects are th~n finalized for presentation to Supreme H e ad qua r t e r sAllied Powers Europe at an annual conference held at Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) level.
Movements Coordination

Proper coordination of movements within the land combat zone is one of the most important tasks of the army group. One can imagine the complexity of movements within two different armies with several different type corps when both tactical units and necessary logistic support must be moved on short notice. The execution of movements and transport functions directly involves three major chains of command-that is, the Allied chain; National Territorial Chains (both French and German) ;

and the French, German, and US N ational Logistic Authorities in Paris and Bonn. Primary coordination of this composite movements system is accomplished at the AFCENT level. In addition, each of the major national forces maintains a movements center for coordination of movements within its sec tor. The army group monitors movements and establishes necessary priorities. In the CENTAG area, where surface (rail and highway), inland waterways, and air transportation are in use, the coordination of transport means is a painstaking task. A special headache in Western Europe is the coordination of movements over the existing Rhine River bridges. In addition, in a NATO army group, one of the major considerations must

Courtesy of author

Allied officers discuss logistics during a 1962 CENTAG exercise

54

Military Review

be the establishment of a common system of identification of routes and standard movements procedures so that all transportation personnel can speak the same technical language.
Evaluation of Logistic Support

Evaluating the logistic posture of the assigned forces is a most difficult task. Attempts have been made to have individual nations report on the same basis. Unfortunately, there has not been a mutual acceptance of the prescribed formula. In order to obtain an accurate picture of iogistical stocks, the basis of calculation must be understood and factors must be developed in order to make a valid comparison. Periodic (semiannual or monthly in peacetime, daily in warlime) reports must be developed which en a b 1 e the army group staff to present a valid logistic situation to both the army group commander and higher commanders. The format of these reports must include: The levels of supply by class (adjusted for easy comparison) stocked by the major assigned forces. The items which are critical in the combat zone. The status of maintenance, facilities, and technical personnel. A brief synopsis of the medical and transportation situation. Peculiar to Western Europe is a section devoted to the Rhine River bridges. Within CENTAG, much has been accomplished in the field of logistic evaluation since its formal activation. Systematic reports have been set up and these reports act as a basis for reports to higher NATO headquarters and the daily briefings to the army group commander during command post exercises.
May 1963

Normal Staff Tasks The main logistic tasks outlined here are in addition to the normal logistic staff tasks of evaluation of subordinate logistic plans; preparation of the logistic portion of plans and estimates; and the monitoring of day-to,;,day operations. Without followup, the best laid plans and procedures are for naught. CENTAG followup is accomplished in the main by full-scale command post exercises. Of particular interest is the annual NATO fall exercise in which procedures are practiced on a wartime basis, and which involves all levels of commands. A false impression would be created if one were to believe that aU of the above activities were being accomplished in smooth-working fashion. Many difficulties have been encountered; some even seem insurmountable at times. Human nature being what it is, most nations feel that their particular system of supply is the best available and if there are to be any changes then the other person must change. This feeling is aggravated by the fact that logistic decisions affect a nation's economy and have political implications. Agreement is a slow, tedious process which involves numerous conferences with ensuing delay. Securing necessary agreements in peacetime to avoid the loss of precious time in war is another difficulty. As a host nation, which is located almost entirely within the combat zone, the Federal Republic of Germany must shoulder a large responsibility for furnishing labor, transportation, and other local resources in wartime. The passage of necessary emergency legislation in peacetime to shorten the reaction time in war has been understandably slow.
55

LOGIST' ICS
These are the m a j 0 r problems, along with the firm belief of some NATO members that logistics is a pure national responsibility and neither NATO nor anyone else has any business interfering or even seeking information on the national system of supply. Fortunately, the old argument of the "have" nations versus the "have not" nations has been lessened. To overcome such problems the army group and higher NATO G4's must be more than logisticians-they must be diplomats as well. Patience and understanding must be the foremost qualities, along with a tho r 0 ugh knowledge of one's own logistic system. The US officer assigned to NATO in the logistic area is usually at a disadvantage initially because he has never been exposed to the special type of logistic activities peculiar to the army group. He tends to think of an army group spending its tilne on future operational planning and ignoring the day-to-day logistic problems. As the pendulum swings toward more integrated logistic systems in N A TO, we must recognize that the army group does have definite logistic functions. The problem of how best to support a large multinational force is a real one. More effort should be expended in our own military organization on this vital problem area.

COMMENTS
The Military Review welcomes your comments on any material published. W.e do not publish letters to the editor, but we will make good use of your ideas and suggestions. An opposite viewpoint or a new line of thought will assist us and may lead to publication of your ideas. If you are an authority on a certain subject, why not write an article for our consideration? If you have only an idea, query us; perhaps we can assist you in developing an acceptable article.

56

Military Review

INFRASTRUCTURE: T
H E B
I
N THE 13 years of its existence the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has undertaken the greatest military construction program in the world. About 220 airfields have been built and are ready for use, and fuel storage depots with a capacity of 440 million imperial gallons for ships and aircraft have been constructed.

A C K
B

In addition, more than 5,000 miles of fuel pipelines have already been laid, and 27,000 miles of telephone lines and submarine cables have been installed. Throughout the treaty area, training facilities for air and land forces, naval bases; radar-warning devices, and headquarters have been bu ilt. Most of these military installations would undoubtedly never have been constructed if it had not been for a unique experiment in NATO, inspired by the unanimous wish of member countries to share their resources with one another while still retaining their national sovereignty.

N E

OF NATO
Wing Commander P. G. M. Ridsdale, Royal Air Force

May 1963

57

INFRASTRUCTURE
The term "infrastructure" is a word borrowed from French railway construction terminology. In NATO, infrastructure means all fixed military installations which are necessary for the deployment and operation of modern armed forces. It includes airfields, naval bases, communications and radar systems, petroleum products and ammunition storage installations, and training facilities.

Unique Financing Scheme

To qualify for NATO financing, a NATO common infrastructure project must, in general, be for wartime use of the forces of more than one nation. The need for common infrastructure was first recognized by the Western Union defense organization in 1950. The program was eventually taken over by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and a cost-sharing formula laboriously evolved. Prior to development of an individual program (or "slice" as it has come to be called), the North Atlantic Council establishes a financial ceiling for the next three or four-year period. This basic figure is arrived at after considering recommendations of major commanders-the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander At-

Radar warning systems stand guard for

NATO
lantic (SACLANT). This ceiling, once established, is virtually unalterable. The money required is apportioned for payment among the NATO nations and agreed to unanimously. The formula, in essence, is a cost-sharing agreement taking into account economic benefits, ability to pay, population of countries, national economies, and other factors. The proposed program is coordinated with the various agencies of the NATO organization and with the host ' and user nations. Concurrently, the host nation on whose territory the facility is to be built prepares cost estimates and preliminary plans. Following approval, the host nation develops detailed engineering designs and furnishes them, with a refined cost estimate, to the NATO agencies and user nations for review. From Military Review

This article was dig est e d from the original, published in NATO's FIFTEEN NATIONS (The Netherlands) August-September 1962, under the title, "Military Infrastructure-T h e Backbone of NATO." Copyrighted U}62 by NATO's FIFTEEN NATIONS. Commander Ridsdale is Assistant Director for Logistic Programs. on the staff of NATO's Sup rem e Allied Commander Atlantic.
58

this review, final contract designs are prepared, funds requested, and the project is advertised internationally for bids. Construction Problems International competitive bidding is a time-consuming process. It is normal that from six months to a year is consumed in bidding and award of contracts. o n c e the successful contractor begins work, all the usual construction problems plus those created by language differences, variances in construction techniques, and lack of familiarity with local customs must be solved. The construction work is supervised by the host nation or by private engineers and architects hired by the host nation. When the physical works are satisfactorily completed and the fiscal and administrative details are all resolved, the facility takes its place among the growing inventory of tangible assets

Multilingual operators serve the infrastructure network

More than 5,000 miles of pipelines serve the NATO nations May 1963 59

INFRASTRUCTURE

NATO Photos

Part of the extensive forward scatter communications system built with international funds throughout NATO

which are evidence of the unity of NATO nations and which serve as a vital contribution to the defensive strength of the Atlantic alliance.

Real Economy
Seen in perspective, the cost of the infrastructure projects has been remarkably low. The total annual expenditures on infrastructure programs amount to less than one-third of one percent of the total of the national defense budgets of participating countries. N A TO works on the principle of

sharing costs, benefits, and burdens, chief among them being the burden of preventing war. The existence today of a complex of military bases on NATO territory, and the knowledge that NATO has the wherewithal to operate forces and launch weapons from them, is tangible and visible evidence of NATO's ability to meet force with force, and thus to deter aggression. Infrastructure is providing a vital and worthwhile contribution to this ability to prevent war.

60

Military Review

ENCIRCLEMENT AT YUKHNOV:
A Soviet Airborne Operation in World War II
Major General Hellmuth Reinhardt, German Army, Retired

In 1934 the Soviet Union startled the military world when in maneuvers in White Russia, 900 paratroopers jumped with all of their weapons. The following year, near Kiev, 1,200 Soviet paratroopers jumped; in 1936 a rifle division was air landed; and in 1937 more than 7,000 Soviet paratroopers were exhibited. Despite these displays of advanced military thinking and development of a new doctrine for the employment of military forces, the Soviet Union did not use large numbers of airborne troops in any operation
May 1963

during World War II. Whether this was because of a shortage in trained airborne troops or a shortage of transport aircraft is difficult to say. Soviet airborne troops, however, in relatively small numbers (as compared with operations conducted by the Western Allies or by Germany), were used on numerous occasions in support of ground operations. Since the end of World War II, the Soviet Union has placed increased emphasis on developing her fleet of military air transports and enlarging the number of airborne
61

ENCIRCLEMENT

INORTH I

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Figure 1.
62 Military Review

units. It has been estimated that today the Soviet Union has at least 10 airborne divisions in being, which constitute a special branch of the Soviet armed forces. What follows is a description of the first action of World War II in which Soviet airborne troops in any sizable number were employed. It is based largely on the author's study on Soviet World War II airborne operations prepared in 1952 for the Office of the Chief Historian, Headquarters, United States European Command. During World War I I the author served as operations officer of the German 25th Infantry Division in the French campaign; as Chief of Staff in the Army General Office, Berlin; as Chief of Staff of the German 8th Army; and, finally, as Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief Denmark (Lindemann Army). Retired from active military service in September 1962, General Reinhardt now resides in Ahornweg, Germany.- Editor.

worked supply lines; with the last of their reserves long since committed; unable to maintain a continuous line in the face of the Soviet offensive, the German divisions pulled back into a series of hedgehog defenses around key communications centers. Violent fighting broke out in the rear areas for possession of the few major German ~upply lines. Of.u tmost importance to the German logistical structure were the two Rollbahns which ran generally east and west: one between Smolensk and Vyazma, the other between Roslavl and Yukhnov; the west-east railroad lines that ran from Smolensk to Vyazma and from Smolensk to Sukhinichi; and the north-south railroad line between Rzhev and Bryansk. 1 As the German frontline lost continuity, as gaps appeared, the Soviets pushed forces through to link up with the partisan bands.

IN

JANUARY 1942 the German Army Group Center, its thrust at Moscow blunted and thrown back, lay along the general line from which it had started its offensive in November 1941. From north to south, for 150 miles between Ostashkov and Kursk, Field Marshal Gunther von Kluge, the army group commander, disposed his 3d Panzer, 9th, 4th Panzer, 4th, 2d Panzer, and 2d Armies (Figure 1). The German armies had suffered heavy casualties during the preceding two months. Heavy Soviet pressure from the east continued without letup. Partisan bands, appearing now in increasing numbers in the rear areas, added to the German woes. At the end of a few, long, overMay 1963

Frontline Gaps By mid-January 1942, three large gaps in the German frontlines had assumed considerable importance, to the Germans as well as to the Soviets (Figure 2). One, some 50 kilometers wide, had opened between the 2d Panzer Army -whose left flank was near Sukhinichi -and the 4th Army- then withdrawing near Yukhnov. Into this gap the Soviets had pushed General Below's 1st Guards Cavalry Corps followed by the 10th Army.2 Advancing to the west through the gap, 10th Army elements reached Kirov (a railroad junction) and cut the Bryansk-Vyazma railroad. The main Soviet force, though, swung north after clearing the gap and drove
1 Rollbahns were roads designated as the main axes of motorized transportation, from which all animal transport and marching columns were normally barred. 2 A Soviet army approximated in size a German corps.

63

ENCIRCLEMENT

SITUATION lAST HALF OF JANUARY 1942

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for the Roslavl-Yukhnov Rollbahn, the German 4th Army's only major supply line to the rear. Through a second gap about 15 kilometers wide between the 4th Army and the 4th Panzer Army had poured units from the Soviet 33d Army. The Soviets temporarily cut the northsouth road between Yukhnov and Vyazma which was the main route of
64

communication between the two German armies, but then stayed east of the road. Eventually, the German 4th and 4th Panzer Armies succeeded in establishing a narrow connection between the army flanks north of Yukhnov, but five Soviet divisions remained to the west of the connection. On the left flank of the German 9th Army, near Rzhev, General Dovator's
Military Review

2d Guards Cavalry Corps, and the Soviet 29th Army pushed south through still a third gap. Although the Germans managed to close the Rzhev gap in January, a number of Soviet units from the 29th Army remained behind the 9th Army's frontlines encircled in a seven to eight-kilometer area, and Dovator's cavalry cor p s advanced south into the rear of the German 4th Panzer Army to threaten the Smolensk-Vyazma railroad and RoUbahn.

Strong Partisan Forces

By late January the main portion of the German 4th Army had been flanked by Soviet forces. Its only supply line to the rear-the Rollbahn running southwest from Yukhnov-was under constant Soviet attack. Farther to the north, the 4th Panzer and 9th Armies had strong Soviet forces in their rear areas. And Soviet forces moving south from the Rzhev area were threatening the railroad and the Rollbahn which ran from Vyazma. The German situation was made more serious by the presence of strong partisan forces which were particularly active in the extensive wooded area around Bogoroditsk (about 50 kilometers west of Yukhnov), and in the Yelnya area (farther to the west). The temperature had dropped to 4.4 degrees below zero (F). Deep snow and the extreme cold made any movement difficult. It was in this setting that the Soviets committed substantial numbers of both parachutists and air-landed troops to assist in cutting off the German armies of Army Group Center. By the outbreak of World War II, the Soviet Army had at its disposal large, well-trained airborne units and numerous rifle divisions that had been trained for air-landed operations. But as the main efforts of the Soviet airMay 1963

craft industry had been concentrated on the production of tactical aircraft, the number of transport aircraft available to the Soviet Army was small. For this reason, it was not unusual for the Soviet airborne and air-landed forces to be transported in bomber aircraft, a dangerous procedure since the bomber crews were not well trained in the conduct of airborne operations. Because of the shortage of transport aircraft, and the need for welltrained soldiers at the front, a large number of the airborne units had been employed in ordinary rifle units during the first few months of the war. The Soviet supreme command employed airborne troops operationally only in small groups and with limited missions. As an example, in the Kiev area during the summer of 1941, several units from the 104th and 212th Airborne Brigades were dropped to demolish highway bridges behind the German lines and to destroy German ammunition dumps and supply depots. Depending on the type of mission to be accomplished, the airborne groups consisted of as few as three men, or as many as 50 men.

First Parachutists
It was during the German withdrawal from Moscow in the winter of 1941 that a substantial number of Soviet airborne and air-landed troops were employed for the first time. Planned for early January 1942, the airborne operation was designed to assist the advancing Soviet 1st Guards Cavalry Corps in cutting in behind the German 4th Army, by seizing the railroad station at Myatlevo, and preventing the Germans from withdrawing along the road from Myatlevo to Yukhnov. Two paratrooper battalions and an
65

ENCIRCLEMENT
airborne rifle group from the 250th Rifle Regiment were designated to participate in the operation. One paratrooper battalion was to be dropped on the airfield at Bolsnoye-Fatyenovo (about six kilometers east of Myatlevo) to clear it and make it ready to receive the men from the 250th Regiment. The other paratrooper battaJion was to jump southwest of Medyn, move north to the Medyn-Yukhnov Road, and de mol ish the highway bridge over the Schanya River southwest of Medyn. Since the number of aircraft allotted to the operation was small, the Soviets planned that each aircraft would have to make at least three, or possibly four, sorties. On the night of 3 January 1942, one paratrooper battalion plus elements from the second, a total of 416 men, jumped over the airfield at BolsnoyeFatyenovo. By the evening of 4 January, the Soviet paratroopers had secured the field. But because of the deep snow, they were unable to clear the field properly to receive the air-landed rifle elements. For the next 12 days the Soviet paratroopers harassed the German rear areas. Finally, on 20 January, the paratroopers made their way back to their own lines.

Cancel Air Drops

On 6 January, because of German reaction and the advent of bad weather, the Soviet command decided to cancel any further drops, and ordered the paratroopers who had already landed to conduct independent operations in rear of the German 4th Army. The Soviet paratroopers m 0 v e d south to the railroad line between Myatlevo and Kaluga, tore up some of the track, and destroyed a bridge. They then turned back to the north, and on 8 January seized the Myatlevo railroad station, destroying two complete German supply trains, one of which carried 28 German tanks.

A Different Mission In the meantime, the second paratrooper battalion plus the 250th Rifle Regiment had been reassembled on an airfield near Moscow to prepare for a different mission: to assist the 33d Army's advance through the gap between the German 4th and 4th Panzer Armies. A total of 452 paratroopers were available for the operation; the rifle regiment could count 1,200 men. The initial drop was to take place near Znamenka and Lugi (Figure 3) where Soviet intelligence reports had indicated there were no significant German forces. The objective of the force was to cut the main German supply lines which led into Yukhnov. In the early morning hours of 18 Jan u a r y 1942, the paratroopers jumped at Znamenka and Zhelanye. At nightfall, on a landing field prepared by the paratroopers, four Soviet aircraft brought in the first detachment of the rifle regiment- 65 men to secure the landing area. On the next day, the paratroopers, assisted by partisan forces, carved out a new and better landing area at the northern edge of Velikopolye, and early on 20 January the paratrooper commander reported the airfield ready to receive aircraft. 3 But because of bad weather the Soviet air operation extended over the next five days. Eventually, a total of 1,643 men with 31 light machineguns, 11 bazookas, 34 mortars, and two 45millimeter guns were placed behind the German lines.
3 For a more detailed description of partisan support during these operations. see Department of the Army Pamphlet Number 20-244. The Soviet Partisan Movement. 1941-1944. pp 35-36. 77-85. 90-93.

Military Review

Inte'lligence Reports Inaccurate

The Soviet intelligence reports, which had predicted no significant German forces in the area, proved to be wrong. In Znamenka, besides supply and transport personnel, the Germans had about 300 infantrymen and another 100 mounted troops. In other villages situated about 10 kilometers west, southwest, and southeast of Lugi, the Germans had additional troops that could counterattack the Soviet airborne forces. And this the Germans did. Under this German pressure, the commander of the Soviet air-landed group received instructions to disregard his original mission, and to move a portion of his forces to the south to

assist the attack of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps. Two Soviet battalions were assigned this task, and on 28 January linked up with Below's cavalrymen near Tynovka (five kilometers northeast of Klyuchi). Against increasing German pressure the remaining elements fought to hold their ground near Znamenka. Continued Soviet aerial resupply missions, plus help from partisan bands in the area, permitted the Soviet rifle regiment to hold most of the ground it had originally occupied. While this fighting was going on in the immediate rear areas of the 4th Army, the Soviets threw in still a third airborne operation against the deep

SITUATION END OF JANUARY 1941

xxx
II V U 2D GUARDS (DOVATOR)

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PANZER

~DOROGOBUm

M
"11
_

SOVIET JST GUARDS CAVALRY CORPS (BELOW) GERMAN POSITIONS SOVIET ATTACKS SOVIET PARACHUTISTS

<i=

r;;

Figure 3. May 1963

67

ENCIRCLEMENT
rear areas of the 4th Panzer .Army west of Vyazma. For this operation, the Soviets assembled the 4th Airborne Corps together with 40 PS-B4 and 22 TB-3 aircraft, all the aircraft that the Soviet Air Force could spare. According to the Soviet plan, the main Soviet force was to drop west of Vyazma to disrupt the German supply lines and routes of communication between Vyazma and Smolensk; other smaller units would block the German 4th Panzer Army from withdrawing to the northwest from the Vyazma area. To mislead the Germans, a number of reconnaissance details as well as mock landings were scheduled prior to the drop of the main body. The advance guard of the Soviet 4th Airborne Corps-the 2d Battalion, 8th Airborne Brigade-was to jump during the late afternoon hours to secure the landing area; the main force was scheduled to land during the night. To reduce the time of flight, and to permit each aircraft to make additional sorties, the 4th Airborne Corps moved forward from Moscow to airfields near Kaluga (30 to 40 kilometers behind the frontlines). for communication with the airborne corps headquarters was lost. After a brief orientation, the Soviet 2d Battalion commander decided to move north to the designated landing zone; he left behind a small detail to mark his landing place in the event additional Soviet paratroopers should be dropped in the area. Although no radio communication with the advance guard could be established, the drop of the 8th Airborne Brigade continued. Another battalion from the brigade jumped during the night. As weather conditions worsened and the situation on the ground changed, though, further airborne operations west of Vyazma were canceled. Reinforced by partisans and by elements of Dovator's cavalry corps which was advancing from the north through the German 9th Army's rear areas, the Soviets cut the Rollbahn at several points between Vyazma and Smolensk. It was not until 2 February and after heavy fighting that the German 4th Panzer Army, which had to turn several frontline divisions against the Soviet threat, was able to reestablish some semblance of control over its main supply route. The situation in this area appeared to be under control for the time being.

Inadequate Night Training

During the late afternoon of 27 J~n uary 1942, the Soviet advance guard, with each aircraft flying two sorties, dropped west of Vyazma. But because of inadequate night flight training on the part of the aircraft crews, the paratroopers landed some 15 kilometers south of the intended landing zone. Too, the German antiaircraft guns had not been previously subdued and this fire compelled the Soviet paratroopers to jump from high altitudes, resulting in their dispersion over a large area and rendering their assembly difficult. In addition, the radio set designated
68

Parachutists in the South

It was farther to the south, in the German 4th Army's rear areas, that the Soviet airborne troops made their presence most keenly felt. Here, since the middle of January, the Soviets had continued to resupply the units near Lugi, Velikopolye, and at Zhelanye; to drop in small groups of parachutists as reinforcements; and to build up the partisan movement. Despite all German attempts, the Soviets had held on
Military Review

to several landing fields they had carved out of the wilderness. The air-landed forces and additional parachutists, reinforced by the partisan bands which already operated from the woods, moved against 4th Army's Rol1bahn from the north. Other Soviet parachutists also attacked the big Ugra River bridge on the Kirov-Vyazma railroad which was guarded by a four-company German force. From the south, Below's cavalry corps and several battalions from the 10th Army struck at the Rollbahn. This attack crossed the Rollbahn and linked up with the combined airbornepartisan force. In the extensive, swampy woods north of the Rollbahn, the Soviets began to build up a sizable force, supplied by air and reinforced constantly by parachutists and other airborne troops.

Main Supply Center Threatened Happily for the Germans, Below pulled his cavalry corps out of the fighting-leaving it to the 10th Army to take the supply road-and wheeled off to the northwest in an apparent attempt to link up west of Vyazma with Dovator's southward-moving cavalry corps. The 4th Army managed to hold off the Soviet 10th Army's attempts to take the Rollbahn. But as the Soviet attack against the road failed, the impetus of the assault spread deeper and deeper into the 4th Army's rear area and began to threaten the main army supply center at Spas-Demensk. The crisis came on 17 February when the last of the German reserves-the crews of two flak batteries without guns-were committed to stop the Soviets. The impetus of the Soviet 10th Army's attack then seemed to decrease.
May 1963

A New Danger Meanwhile, the remainder of the Soviet 4th Airborne Corps, released from its original mission to land west of Vyazma, moved from Kaluga back to airfields near Moscow, where it received orders to support the Soviet forces operating in rear of the German 4th Army. The corps, after dropping and air landing in the Lugi area, was to move south to seize Klyuchi and Tynovka; cut the Rollbahn west of Yukhnov; and link up with the Soviet 10th Army, thus cutting off that portion of the German 4th Army in the Yukhnov area. During the night of 17 February, the 4th Airborne Corps began jumping in the Lugi area, an operation that was continued for six more nights. During these seven days, 7,015 men and 1,500 parachute loads of arms, ammunition, and equipment were landed. German commanders, trying to figure out what the Soviet 4th Airborne Corps would do, considered three possibilities. The Soviet airborne forces might: Turn northwest to reinforce Below's cavalry corps. Turn northeast to link up with the 33d Army. Attack south to meet the 10th Army, which was expected to renew its attacks on 23 February, Red Army Day. But the German commanders had to wait on further Soviet moves before they could commit any more forces against the Soviet buildup in rear of the 4th Army. The 10th Army did attack on 23 February, on a front of 15 kilometers (Figure 4). Elements succeeded in cutting the Rollbahn at several places. The Soviets also seemed to be advanc69

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ATTACK OF SOVIH 4TH AIRBORNE CORPS FEBRUARY 1942

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PANZER

PARTISANS

MILYATINO

rill W

LANDING AREA OF SOVIET AIR-LANDING TROOPS

Figure 4.

ing from the north-a previously unoccupied village north of the road was reported entered by Soviet forces.

Soviet Forces Separate

The next day (24 February) the Soviets pushed from the north in cQmpany-sized units. They also sent small detachments to the southeast to attack the villages of Ivantseva and Zherdovka, and other small forces to attack the German force at the Ugra
70

River bridge. Now, the Soviets appeared to be splitting their forces. During the following day the picture clarified and it seemed apparent that the main Soviet pressure was being directed south against the Rollbahn. For the first and only time in the fighting that took place during these months, a large force of Soviet airborne troops appeared as an independent operating element. The Soviet airborne troops occupied
Military Review

Klyuchi and a number of other villages north of the Rollbahn, but could get no farther south. At the same time, the Germans managed to throw back the Soviet 10th Army and to reopen the Rollbahn to traffic on the evening of 25 February. But neither north nor south of the road could the Germans push the Soviets far enough away from the Rollbahn to eliminate the constant, acute threat to supply traffic. On the evening of 3 March, the 4th Army abandoned Yukhnov and withdrew to a new defensive line behind the Ressa and Ugra Rivers, thereby giving the army additional forces to throw into the fight for the Rollbahn. A critical day for the Germans was 6 March. In the early morning, Soviet infantry and tanks from the south pushed across the road. It was not until noon that they were thrown back by a German counterattack. Simultaneously, the Soviet airborne corps attacked south from the Klyuchi area and advanced to within four kilometers of the Rollbahn before they, too, could be repulsed.

taken from the 10th Army on 10 March stated that on that same day the Rollbahn was to be crossed and firm contact made with the airborne forces near Klyuchi. The behavior of the Soviet airborne troops was obscure. Some airborne prisoners stated that the captured villages north of the road were to be held until the 10th Army crossed the Rollbahn from the south. Other airborne prisoners stated that a breakthrough across the road had been planned. It appeared that the airborne force did not have any artillery or heavy weapons, and that its striking power was limited.

German Attack
On 7 March the German 43d Corps, whose front had been relieved of pressure as a result of 4th Army's withdrawal, had assumed command of the defense of the Rollbahn. The corps planned to push the Soviet 10th Army back from the Rollbahn by a series of short attacks with limited objectives. North of the road, the understrength 131st Infantry Division (about 1,100 men) was to advance west through the upper Popolta River valley against the rear and left flank of the Soviet airborne corps. With some difficulty, the 131st Division plowed its way through the deep snow and attacked one Soviet-occupied village after another. There were some reverses. The airborne forces were composed of the best type of Soviet infantry, with ample numbers of machineguns, mortars, and automatic rifles. They were excellent marksmen, and installed in trenches made of banked-up snow, they defended tenaciously the villages they had captured. On 18 March, Pushkino (about five kilometers north of Klyuchi) feU to the 131st Division. And as a result of
71

Partisan Bands
Farther to the west-at Yelnya-a new threat appeared in the 4th Army's rear. Here, in an area occupied by only weak German forces, the Soviets had been gathering together various partisan bands. Here, also, the Soviets had dropped parachutists during the night of 4 March (Figure 5). The parachutists and the partisans quickly drew a narrow circle around the town. The 4th Army had no troops immediately available to go to the relief of Yelnya. The struggle for the Rollbahn continued, with the apparent Soviet intention being to link up the 10th Army with the airborne corps. Prisoners
May 1963

ENCIRCLEMENT

SITUATION OF GERMAN 4TH ARMY AT END OF MARCH 1942

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~
PANZER

xxxx

Figure 5.

this German pressure, the Soviets evacuated Klyuchi on 19 March and withdrew into the woods.

Situation Changes
In the meantime, the situation in the north-in rear of the 4th Panzer Army--ehanged. Below's 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, after crossing the Rollbahn west of Yukhnov at the end of January, had turned northwest and advanced to the Smolensk-Vyazma Rollbahn, about 50 kilometers west of Vyazma. There it linked up with the partisans and with the elements of the 8th Airborne Brigade already in
72

the area. Below also established radio communications with Dovator's cavalry corps, then northwest of Vyazma. Below and Dovator planned to carry out a coordinated attack on Vyazma, the important German-held rail and road center. But before the Soviet attack could be made, the German 5th Corps, which on 6 February had been assigned the mission of clearing the 4th Panzer Army's rear area, struck the Soviet forces. With four full divisions and elements of a fifth division under its control, 5th Corps began a systematic series of attacks against the various
Military Review

Soviet forces in 4th Panzer Army's rear. Gradually, 5th Corps compressed the Soviets into separate pockets. With this accomplished, the corps began to reduce one pocket after another. By the end of March the first large Soviet pocket west of Vyazma had been cleared. Under this pressure, Below's corps withdrew to the south, apparently trying to establish contact with the airborne corps. In doing so, it met the small German group at the Ugra River bridge. This group had resisted all Soviet attempts to demolish the bridge, had been cutoff since the end of February, and was being supplied from the air.

neighborhood of the planned drop zone. Some of the pilots could not locate the drop zone and returned to the takeoff field without dropping their paratroopers. Nevertheless, about 400 Soviet paratroopers were able to jump, and their presence on the ground gave the men from the 29th Army a lift. An immediate attack against the encircling German lines was begun on the following day, and after five days of bitter combat, the remnants of the Soviet units managed to reach their own lines.

Clearing the Rear

On 25 March the situation in the rear of the 4th and 4th Panzer Armies appeared to be that: The Soviet 33d Army was located on both sides of the narrow connection between the 4th Army and the 4th Panzer Army, near the junction of the Vorya and Ugra Rivers. The Soviet-occupied sector to the westas far as the Yukhnov-Vyazma Road -was relatively quiet. On the other hand, the Soviets mounted furious attacks from the east against the link between the two German armies in order to join up with its elements behind the German lines. These attacks had all been repulsed. Moves by the 4th Army from the south and the 4th Panzer Army from the northeast and northwest to clean out the Soviet pocket were making only slow progress. The Soviet airborne corps was concentrated in the wooded areas near Bogoroditsk. The corps had suffered heavy losses, but still contained about 1,000 combat-effective men. The German 131st Division continued to push slowly from the east against the airborne troops. Northwest of this area, on the
73

Soviet Paratroopers Attack

Farther to the north, in rear of the German 9th Army, the Rzhev pocket -formed when the Germans closed the Rzhev gap and encircled a number of Soviet units from the 29th Army -had been eliminated in late February, but only after some difficult fighting. Here, too, the Soviets had employed airborne forces, but unlike the Soviet airborne efforts in the south, they had been used to assist the encircled 29th Army troops to break out. On the night of 16 February, the night before the 4th Airborne Corps began jumping into the Lugi area, some 500 Soviet paratroopers from the 4th Battalion, 204th Airborne Brigade, took off to assist their encircled compatriots. Because of the small size of the Soviet-held area, the Soviets could employ only single planes, and the drop zone could be marked only by open fires. But because of the fighting that had been going on in the area, a large number of other fires burned in the
May 1963

ENCIRCLEMENT
Ugra River, all units of Below's 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, with the exception of one cavalry division, had been located. The main force was situated on both sides of the VyazmaKirov Road and was directly north of the river. The smaH German force at the Ugra River bridge, pressed between the cavalry corps and the airborne corps, continued to hold out. A German attempt to break through with a group of about 300 infantrymen, a few guns, and three or four tanks, had failed mainly because the tanks had been unable to advance through the snow. South of the Ugra River, Soviet forces~presumably parachutists and possibly part of Below's cavalry force -pressed south toward the supply center at Spas-Demensk. Yelnya was closely surrounded by So vie t parachutists and partisan forces. The Soviets had penetrated the town, but the German garrison continued to hold out in the northern part. The question uppermost in the minds of the German commanders was in which direction Below's cavalry corps and the airborne corps, now linked up, would turn. Would these forces turn west to join in the fighting for Yelnya? Or would they turn south to join forces with the Soviet 10th Army? Or would they try to find a way of reaching the Soviet 33d Army by advancing to the northeast? Seemingly, Below tried all three solutions. During the night of 26 March the Soviets attacked south against the Znamenka-Vyazma Road. They were repulsed. But the Soviet troops who participated in this attack were neither cavalry nor airborne. They were newly drafted but well-trained
74

youngsters-15 or 16 years old-led by officers and commissars. Prisoners taken by the Germans stated that their mission had been to go by way of Znamenka and to block the road. Behind them, elements of the Soviet cavalry corps were to break through and reach the 33d Army. After this attack failed, Below appears to have given up this plan. N ext, a movement toward the south by Below's forces, apparently trying to link up with the 10th Army, was intercepted by the German 131st Division. In the meantime, the 4th Army beat back all attempts by the Soviet 10th Army to seize the Rollbahn, and although the fighting here would carryon until late in April, no serious threat would come from this direction. The oniy way now open to Below led to the west. But there, on 25 March, the Germans had succeeded in reestablishing contact with the encircled garrison at Yelnya. Moreover, by marching to the west, Below separated his forces from the airfields at Lugi and Velikopolye through which they could be supplied and reinforced from the air. Its prospects of achieving any further successes were limited.

Evaluation of Soviet Air Landings

The Soviet force did remain in the rear of the 4th Army for weeks to come, constituting for the latter a constant and unpleasant threat. It was not until 22 June that the German 4th Army put a conclusive end to this threat by using forces withdrawn from the front. Below's corps was finally routed in the Yelnya area. Below escaped with a small group of his men by making a surprise sortie toward Kirov. The German commanders held differing views on the effect of the SoMilitary Review

viet air landings. The Chief of Staff of the 4th Panzer Army stated that, "Although the whole matter was very annoying it had no strategic consequences." According to statements made by the army commander, the 4th Panzer Army felt that the Soviet penetrations of the gaps which existed in the German lines constituted a substantially greater danger than the parachute jumps in the rear areas. The 4th Army's war diary, on the other hand, for the period between the middle of February and the end of March almost daily mentioned the fear that the Rollbahn would be cut thus severing the army from its base~ of supply. Certainly, the withdrawal of the 4th Army to the Ressa-Ugra line at the beginning of March was at least partly caused by the operations of the Soviet airborne corps. It also became necessary for the army to release forces (the 131st Division) to attack the airborne troops. And the fighting for control of the Rollbahn did cause the Germans to abandon a plan to launch a joint attack at the end of March to retake Kirov, an attack that was to be undertaken by the 4th and 2d Panzer Armies. The forces set aside by the 4th Army for this purpose were tied down by the attacks of the Soviet 10th Army on the Rollbahn from the south and the simultaneous threat from the north by the airborne corps.

Soviet Airborne Troops

The Soviet airborne troops were well equipped and well trained. They were good marksmen, and their armament included numerous machineguns, mortars, and automatic weapons. Ar-

tillery pieces and antitank guns were lac}<ing. It appears that the Soviet airborJ'le troops were elite forces composed only of infantrymen. Since most of the Soviet jumps and landings took place during the first few hours of darkness in areas not controlled by the Germans, no generally valid picture could be drawn as to the organization and methods used for the delivery of the airborne trooPs. There were several reports that in the approach fiight,individual aircraft followed each other at specific intervals-usually about five minutes apart. This seems to have been the case for the delivery of supplies as well as for personnel. on several occasions, Soviet parachvtists were dropped without parachutes, the men placed in sacks filled witl1 straw. The straw-filled sacks plus the deep snow were probably intended to soften the shock of landing. One Ger1llan report stated that Soviet aircraft dropped six men without parachutes from an altitude of 10 meters. Too, in order to increase the number of wen transported by air, the Soviets sometimes placed men in wooden cases tied to the wings of the transport or bomber planes. It would be folly to assume that futtJre Soviet airborne efforts will be only of the same type. In light of the keerl interest the Soviets have always sho""n for airborne operations, in view of tpe effort they expend and the time they devote to improving their equipment, it would appear that, since the darl' days of the winter of 1941-42 the Soviets have made great strides i~ the airborne field and that, the next time, their efforts in this area will take a distinctly different turn.

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May 1963

75

CLAUSEWITZ:

National Archive8

A REAPPRAISAL
Captain S. 0 Tiomain, Irish Army

Karl von Clausewitz probably is quoted and misquoted more frequently in philosophical military writing than any other authority. The brief sketch of the man and his teachings which follows places bdth in appropriate perspective.- Editor:
many years ago the study of the works of Karl yon Clausewitz was necessary for all who aspired to a military career. But those were the days of conventional war when campaigns and battles were fought much as they had been for hundreds of years. The rules, if difficult to apply, were easy to understand. But what of today? Can we look to Clausewitz for guidance in this nu-

NOT

clear age? Is there anything relevant in the ideas which he expounded so meticulously almost 200 years ago? It is not easy to answer whether an individual maxim is valid now. All that can be said is that he wrote from a deep historical knowledge and a wide practical experience w h i c h always gave sound and practical expression to his dialectics. He was always realistic. We must not forget that Clausewitz is the expert in the small war- the partisan war. In this period of "nuclear parity," this must surely be good

This article was digested from the original, published in AN CoSANTOIR (Republic of Ireland) October 1962.
Military Review

76

reason for rescuing him from temporary eclipse.

Prologue
Clausewitz died of cholera in -his 51st year on 16 November 1831. His contemporaries knew little about this Prussian major general other than that he had been on the general staff of Field Marshal Gneisenau and that he had been prominent in seeking the reform of the Prussian Army. This anonymity is not surprising for he was a man who never saw the necessity to project himself either in his work or in his memoirs. Nevertheless, he was an ambitious soldier, a man of vision and lofty ideals who never saw the fulfillment of his fondest hope: to gain a position of sufficient influence where he might translate into reality his ideas on the theory and conduct of war. But his military fate always tied him to the desk or rostrum. For a soldier so full of new and revolutionary views on war this was indeed unbearable frustration and so he died "pushing aside his life like a heavy burden." Another 75 years had to pass before his teachings began to gain attention and respect in his own country as well as in France, Britain, Russia, and Japan.

General Military Academy and in 1810 he married the Countess Marie von Bruhl. Some two years later we find him, in the company of other Prussian officers, withdrawing his service from his King (Frederick William III) in protest against a treaty which the latter had concluded with the traditional enemy-France. He joined the Russian Army for a short period during which he organized the Landwehr in Poland and East Prussia. Back again in the Prussian Army, his defection forgotten, he was promoted in 1814 to colonel and in 1818 to major general. The years between 1813 and 1830 were spent as Director of Administration in the General Military Academy, Berlin. In 1831 he became Chief of Staff to Gneisenau in Poland and on the dissolution of that army he assumed his final appointment-inspector of the 3d Artillery Corps at Breslau.

His Personality
Scharnhorst was quick to notice the talents of his young aide: the inquiring mind, the penetrating thirst for knowledge which was slaked by continuous reading. What Scharnhorst saw was, in fact, his own reflection, for Clausewitz was modeling himself on his great commander in chief, whom he afterward described as "the true father of my mind." But if Scharnhorst was his mentor, Frederick the Great was his star. He referred again and again to Frederick's campaigns in his writings whenever he wished to draw an analogy or to drive a point home. He did not confine his attention and study to far off things and battles of long ago. The great events taking place and the great shapers of men's destiny in Europe at the turn of the
77

Early Life
Clausewitz was born at Burg near Magdeburg in 1780. At the age of 12 he entered the Prussian Army and at the age of 14 was selected as officer material. After receiving his commission at the Berlin Cadet School, he was appointed personal staff officer to General Scharnhorst in Konigsberg. In 1806 he was promoted to staff captain and was appointed, on Scharnhorst's recommendation, Adjutant to Prince August of Prussia. He spent some time on the instructional staff of the
May 1963

CLAUSEWITZ
18th century were his special interest. He followed closely the development of the French Revolution and the career of Napoleon Bonaparte. He studied the emergence of the new spirit of
~mocrn~~Frnn~~doo~d~~

fully its effects on the old political, spiritual, social, and economic values of Europeans of his day. Such epochmaking revolutions as occurred between 1789 and 1830 made a deep impression on his mind.

His Works With his final appointment to the Berlin academy, Clausewitz saw his chance of active duty recede. Finding himself deprived of all other outlets, he turned to writing as the only means left of expressing and developing his theories. His book On War is undoubtedly his greatest work. In writing it he hoped "to iron out some of the wrinkles in the heads of statesmen and strategists." Generally speaking, the book contains a philosophic view of war, seen as an instrument of state policy. In it he examines the nature of war, the relationship between attack and defense, and the connection between purpose, aim, and means. Clausewitz attempted to determine the true relationship between politics and war, between mmtary and political power. He was the first to postulate the supremacy of political activity and to subordinate war into a mere sector of politics. His maxim, "War is nothing more than a continuation of policy by other means," is perhaps his best known and most often misunderstood saying. It does not mean that once war breaks out all political activity automatically comes to an end. On the contrary, war is the offspring of politics and can never be disowned.
78

The maxim implies that the statesman must allot the objectives of war to the soldier and must remain responsible for them. War, according to Clausewitz, may be permissible in order to preserve peace or to restore it at the earliest possible time, but never as an end in itself. The state that sets out on a military rampage is bankrupt of policy and merely jeopardizes its future on a senseless gamble. The notion of "unconditional surrender" as a final objective of war policy is also shown to be delusory. These are just some of the many trains of thought in this rich and exhaustive work so full of deep ideas on strategy, politics, and moral factors. He wrote another book called Principles of War for his royal pupil, Frederick III. Of it he writes in preface: These principles through the result of long thought and continuous study of the history of war have nonetheless been drawn up hastily and thu8 will not stand severe criticism in regard to form. In addition only the most important subjects have been picked from a great number since certain brevity was necessary. These principles, therefore, will not' so much give complete instruction to Your Royal Highness, as they will stimulate and serve as a guide for your own reflections. It could well be subtitled: "How to overcome difficulties and win wars in four easy lessons." Besides these reflections on strategy and politics, Clausewitz also wrote much on the campaigns of Napoleon, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, 'Frederick the Great, and many others. Are the teachings of Clausewitz valid in this technical and ideological
Military Review

age? The thermonuclear bomb which threatens unimaginable destruction has undoubtedly changed the nature of war. No statesman, who is sane, can tolerate the idea of nuclear war as a progression of policy. In these conditions war can no longer be a continuation of policy but rather a negation of policy. In spite of Clausewitz' teaching, the true relationship between political and military aims are apparently still confused. What else can explain the marathon disarmament talks taking place side by side with the mammoth arms race? Are times so different today from what they were in Clausewitz' day? In the early 1800's the governing mil-

itary and political experience was Napoleon's urge for world domination. He audaciously employed powerful and revolutionary means to attain that objective. Clausewitz' teaching rejected Napoleon and his oppressive system. In the final analysis he cherished the concept of freedom, right, and humanity, a premise which led to his analysis of war which he ultimately put into competition with power and chaos. Can we say less of communism? However, the real worth of Clausewitz lies in the fact that he has created a profound and unexcelled philosophy of war and has developed its elements into a universally valid and timeless conception.

The job of military forces is to establish a climate of order in which normal government procedures can be followed. This climate of order is created by establishing control. Control is achieved by closing with and destroying the armed forces of the enemy. Closing is accomplished through a process of fire and maneuver. Closing is the role of armies. Once order has been established, the army has the capability to renew, to restore, to rebuild, or just to build, a nation.

Major General Harold K. Johnson

May 1963

79

TURKEY AND HER ARMED FORCES

Dr. Jiirgen Weise

TURKEY has a long military tradition and is now the strongest military power in the Near East. At the height of its power, the Turkish Empire stretched from southern Russia to the North African desert and from the Indian border to Hungary and Austria. It was a multinational empire held together by a highly: developed military power. The Empire collapsed during World War I, and, under the terms of the treaty which followed, Turkey was reduced to an occupied nation of greatly diminished proportions. However, under the leadership of Kemal Atatiirk, the Turkish people won their freedom and sovereignty.
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Atatiirk transformed Turkey into a modern, independent state by a determined and energetic program of reform. The state was separated from the church, the veil and the fez were abolished, and the Roman alphabet was introduced. The Turkish Government managed to remain neutral during most of World War II. Since 1945 the United

This article was translated and digested from the original, published in TRUPPENPRAXIS (Federal Republic of Germany) November ~962, under the title, "Die Tiirkei und ihre Streitkrafte." All Rights Reserved.
Military Review

States has given Turkey political, military, and economic support in the face of mounting Soviet pressure for territorial claims and demands to share in the control of the straits. In 1952 Turkey became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and in 1955 she joined the Central T rea t y Organization (CENTO).

Manners and Customs

Islam, the religion of almost the entire population, plays an important role despite separation of the church and the state. In general, the Turks tolerate other religious beliefs. The Turks educated in the West and those in the large cities no longer closely follow the rules' of the Koran with reference to abstinence and fasting. These' customs and r i t e s are still strictly observed in the rural areas. The Turks generally are earnest, proud, and sensitive people and, .therefore, reserved. They take their hospitality very seriously. Measured by west European standards, most of them are poor but very honest,especially the rural population. Although the reforms legally gave women equal rights, they do not move about in public as freely as in western Europe. Even in the cities they rarely are seen in restaurants without a male escort. In the smaller towns, cafes are reserved for men.

Population
Since the deportations of the Armenians during World War I and the repatriation of Greeks from Turkey in 1922 and 1923, the population is essentially Turkish. The October 1960 census counted 28 million people. The present annual increase is nearly one million per year. The strongest r a cia I minority, amounting to at least one and onehalf million, are the Kurds living primarily in the east and southeast of Anatolia. Turkey officially considers them "mountain Turks" despite the fact that they speak Kurd and not Turkish. About 250,000 Arabs live along the Syrian border. Most of the Armenians that remained-approximately 60,000 -and roughly 90,000 Greeks dwell in urban areas. The other small minority groups are insignificant in number but important in the economic life. About 80 percent of Turkey's population live in rural settlements. The rest are concentrated in a few large cities. Most important are Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana. About 15 percent of the population are seminomads. The western part of the country is better developed, more densely populated, and has better transportation facilities than the east which is relatively untapped.
May 1963

Economics
Turkey is essentially an agricultural country. Almost 80 percent of the population derive their modest income from agriculture, forestry, and fishing. G r a z i n g is still an extensive branch of agriculture. The production of meat and fat meets the domestic demand and provides some for export. Cereal production is adequate for domestic needs only when the crops are good. In bad years Turkey must import bread grain and feed. Turkey's mineral resources-which include coal, chromium, manganese, copper, and crude oil-are relatively undeveloped. Iron-producing industries have been established in the northeast pa.rt of the country. Recent drillings in the southeast portion of
81

TURKEY
Turkey have developed a producing oilfield. Turkey is currently building up a consumer goods industry, opening the land by building roads, and developing the tourist industry.

Political Status Asia Minor is a bridge between Europe and Asia. At the same time, it is also a safety zone between the Black and the Mediterranean Seas. It has been a target for Russian expansion for centuries and, therefore, its people have become almost immune to political influence from this direction. Since Turkey is not strong enough to hold her own against the USSR, she must rely on the support of her NATO partners, particularly the U nit e d States. However, a glance at a map also reveals how valuable Turkey is to NATO and CENTO, for she serves as the link between the two. Turkey is also the "keeper of the straits"-the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles-and is in a position to deny passage to enemy naval forces. Turkey is separated only by the Black Sea from the USSR's sensitive southern flank. In the northeast she shares a 610-kilometer border with the Soviet Union and blocks direct access to the Arab States. After a nearly bloodless coup by a group of military officers on 27 May 1960, against a regime well on the way to a dictatorship, Turkey is in the process of establishing a parliamentary democracy. In her internal affairs, the armed forces carry a much greater weight than in west European countries. The Armed Forces Prussian officers Were assigned to Turkey as ear,ly as 1789 where they were "to shape the Turkish Army
82

United Nation8

Eighty percent of the population derive their living from agriculture, forestry, and fishing

after the Prussian pattern." In the middle of the 19th century, German artillery and engineer officers were in Turkish service as advisors and instructors. After Turkey went bankrupt in 1875 and later in 1912 in the face of the Balkan Wars, German military aid assumed special proportions. A special "German Military Mission" was sent to Turkey, and German General Staff officers in Turkish service held high command posts and key positions in the general staff. The chief of the general staff was a German officer. Distinguished officers such as Field Marshal von der Goltz and Generals von Sanders, von Falkenhayn, and von Seeckt were some of the qualified officers who served in Turkey during World War 1. After the collapse of the Central Powers, the Turkish General Mustafa Kema! fought for self-determination for the Turks and insisted on Turkish territorial integrity. He succeeded and, under the name of Atatiirk, later Military Review

 became the first President o.f the new Republic.

The Military System

Turkey's armed fo.rces, with a peacetime strength o.f nearly o.ne-half millio.n, are co.mprised o.f a stro.ng army and a numerically smaller but welltrained navy and air fo.rce. Active military training is co.mpulso.ry fo.r every Turk between 20 and 46 years o.f age. Basic training in the army and the air fo.rce is two. years and in the navy three. Therefo.re, the active fo.rces can draw o.n well-trained reserves if needed. The Turk is a to.ugh, frugal, and brave so.ldier. He Io.o.ks back with pride UPo.n a Io.ng, unbro.ken military traditio.n. Fo.r her armament, particularly fo.r heavy weapo.ns and fo.r the training o.f specialists, Turkey depends largely o.n the aid o.f friendly natio.ns, especially the United States. Effo.rts to. use the latest weapo.ns, equipment, and o.rganizatio.n are hampered by illiteracy, the lack o.f specialists, and the mo.dest financial and industrial base o.f the / co.untry. Despite these limitatio.ns, the disciplined and well-trained Turkish armed fo.rces co.nstitute a stro.ng and reliable co.rner Po.st within the NATO alliance. There has never been the slightest reaso.n to. do.ubt Turkey's Io.yalty to. the alliance and her determinatio.n to. pro.tect herself against threats fro.m the East. Twenty-eight percent o.f the to.tal budget is allo.tted to. the Ministry o.f Natio.nal Defense fo.r the armed fo.rces. This figure do.es no.t include the military, financial, and material aid granted by the United States. Until 1960 the military pay, particularly that o.f the co.nscripts, was extremely Io.w. Pay has been raised, but
May 1963

the inco.me o.f the Turkish so.ldier is still Io.w. The abrupt dismissal o.f abo.ut 7,000 o.fficers follo.wing the revo.lutio.n o.f 27 May 1960 naturally had its effect UPo.n the armed fo.rces. Many military units were stripped o.f their leaders, and staffs were depleted. This situatio.n has no.w no.ticeably impro.ved. Yo.unger o.fficers who. grew into. their new duties have been advanced. Yet it will take so.me time befo.re the military will reco.ver fro.m this drain.

The Branches of Service

The gro.und fo.rces co.nstitute the majo.r Po.rtio.n o.f the armed fo.rces. They are divided into. three armies. One is 'statio.ned alo.ng the Euro.pean side o.f the straits, and o.ne alo.ng the Asiatic side. The third is alo.ng the bo.rder with the So.viet Unio.n and o.n the so.utheast fro.ntier. The majo.rity o.f units are infantry divisio.ns, o.rganized, arm ed, and trained alo.ng the lines o.f the US pento.mic divisio.n. These divisio.ns are partly mo.to.rized in that the heavy weapo.ns are mo.to.rized and transPo.rtatio.n is available fo.r part o.f the infantry. Other units include armo.red divisio.ns, armo.red brigades, and armo.red cavalry regiments. Effo.rts are being made to. increase mo.to.rizatio.n and mechanizatio.n. The pro.cess is slo.W as it is co.ntingent UPo.n the availability o.f qualified perso.nnel and financial and material reso.urces. Recruits are trained in three training divisio.ns. "This relieves the co.mbat divisio.ns o.f recruit training and permits a higher degree o.f readiness. The units are ho.used in barracks o.r tents near their area o.f pro.bable emplo.yment. Adaptatio.n fro.m peace to. war fo.o.ting can be acco.mplished quickly. The training is intensive and realis83

 Allied L and Fo-rce8 Southea8t Europe

Cadets from the military academy provide competently trained young officers for the Turkish Army

tic. Turkish soldiers are rugged and frugal and their wants are few. Coupled with absolute obedience and defiance of death these qualities are indicative of the combat effectiveness of units. The Turkish soldiers will fulfill their duties under even the most difficult conditions, as they proved in the Korean War. In an effort to reduce illiteracy, instructions in reading and writing are part of army training. The army is, in the true sense of the word, "the school of the nation." In Turkey, only those who have honorably completed their military service are considered to have reached maturity.

The Navy
From the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish Republic established by Atatiirk retained an area closed in on three sides by the straits and ~ong
84

coastline. There are 4,374 kilometers of coastline and only 2,687 kilometers of land border. This situation has stimulated the reconstruction of the navy. Turkey's geographical and geopolitical position imposes a multiple of missions upon her navy. These include safeguarding of the straits-keeping them open for her own traffic and closing them to the enemy in case of emergency; coastal defense; protection of overseas supply lines; and disruption of the enemy's lines of communications. It has always been impossible for Turkey, even for the much larger Ottoman Empire, to assume these responsibilities with a fleet of her own. Traditionally, Turkish policy has sought security through close alignment with a strong naval power. This tendency
Military Review

became particularly obvious in the Crimean War when Turkey fought against the superior Russian enemy. The transfer of a German naval squadron to Constantinople influenced Turkey to some degree to take part in World War I. Today, the situation is similar. Turkey has neither the manpower nor the financial resources to confront the Soviet naval forces with equal seapower. Nevertheless, Turkey's aim is to have a naval force which must be taken into account by an enemy and which would be welcome support for an ally. At the present time, the Turkish Navy has eight destroyers, 10 escort ships (Corvettes), 10 submarines, five minelayers, five oceangoing mine-

sweepers, 16 coastal minesweepers, a number of small patrol boats, a unit of tenders, and repair ships. This small naval force, with a personnel strength of about 1,800 officers and approximately 24,000 men, is backed up by the 6th US fleet in the Mediterranean. The fleet is ready to protect the Turkish Straits at any time. Naval forces of the other NATO states are also available. The Turkish Navy also suffered from the effect of the revolution. The loss of a number of officers was keenly felt, but young, active officers soon took over the vacant positions. Plans have been made to modernize the fleet and to improve the training system. However, replacement of ob-

Mounted units are trained and equipped to defend regions inaccessible to motor columns
Allied Land Forces Southeast Europe

TURKEY
solete materiel is complicated by the financial problems of the country. Aid from NATO is needed. The Turkish Navy is particularly interested in building up a small-craft navy which is well suited for operations in the Black Sea. the third independent component of the armed forces. The missions of Turkey's Air Force today include air defense, the protection of the armed forces and installations, and the support of other services in action. With the exception of the Soviet Air Force, Turkey's Air Force is at least equal in number and equipment to those of her immediate neighbors. The air force is well trained and combat ready. In the event of war against the powerful neighbor in the north, it can count on strong support from the NATO allies. The Turkish Air Force now numbers about 400 combat craft and is organized into two tactical air fleets and six wings assigned to the NATO command at Izmir. A wen-balanced supply organization, patterned after the US model, has been bu ilt up. Turkey, a relatively poor country of a predominantly agricultural economy, is not yet in a position to bear the cost of modern weapon systems without assistance. She currently receives substantial grants from the United States to support her military effort and to assist her economic growth.

The Air Force

In Worid War I the German Reich sent First Lieutenant Serno with a total of 190 aircraft pilots, 1,400 technical personnel, and abo u t 155 aircraft to Turkey to activate "integrated" German-Turkish air companies. A few squadrons consisted exclusively of German personnel. The German officers entered the Turkish service and wore Turkish uniforms. These units effectively supported the Turkish armies under extremely adverse conditions, including a lack of supplies, and in most cases against a far superior enemy. Turkish aviation also supported their army in the fight for freedom after the war. During the years between the two World Wars, Turkey built up a small, but well-equipped and superbly trained air force. In 1933 this force became

We Americans know that the Turks are brave and valiant. But we do not usually think of their nation in terms of democracy. Modern Turkey is, however, a noble democratic society, expressing the faith that government should be of the people, by the people, and for the people. Atatiirk took this nation by the neck at the end of W Qrld War I and shook it, demanding that it become modern. After a bitter struggle, equality of women and separation of church and state were realized. Industrialization got under way. A universal franchise was granted and a multiparty system gradually developed.

William O. Douglas Associate Justice of the Supreme Court

86

Military Review

~ ' SERGEANT

~THE

Captain William J. Le Clair, United States Army

LESS than a decade ago a solid fuel, inertially guided missile, which could be easily maintained and automatically tested and fired, represented the artilleryman's dream. The Sergeant missile has made this dream a reality. Sergeant is a quick reacting, relatively simple weapon system which capitalizes on recent advances in solid propellants and inertial guidance to give the US Army a mobile, nuclearcapable missile suitable for employment at the corps level. The Sergeant system, which will replace the Corporal in the relatively near future, has the specific advanMay 1963

tages of quick and. automatic test and countdown procedures. It requires a minimum of vulnerable and easily recognized equipment at the launch site, and its inertial guidance is virtually immune to all known electronic countermeasures.

Mobility Battlefield mobility is, of course, a relative term. The Sergeant system, by comparison with earlier weapons with equivalent capabilities, can be quickly moved to the launch site, emplaced, fired, and displaced. It is as mobile as a heavy conventional tube artillery piece and its nuclear war87

The Sergeant system is as mobile as a heavy artillery piece

head provides the field commander with a punch greater than that of a thousand howitzers using high-explosive ammunition. The missile and other equipment required for test, maintenance, and firing are carried on four semitrailers and one standard 2Y2-ton truck. The semitrailers, nor m a II y towed by wheeled prime movers, can also be towed by tracked vehicles when rough terrain mobility is required. All elements are air transportable in C-130 aircraft.
Component units of the Sergeant can be moved in strategic aircraft

The Sergeant can be assembled and fired by a crew no larger than a 155millimeter howitzer section. It merely requires a launch site 20 meters in diameter. No pioneer work is required if the slope of the launch site is not more than'10 percent. Survey control must be available to provide direction and position data to the firing platoon. During launching station emplacement and missile assembly, the missile transporters must remain at the firing position. After the missile is assembled, only the launching station and a radio vehicle are required.

Preparation and 'Countdown Missile sections are transported and stored in specially designed sealed containers. The rocket motor, the guidance section, and the four control surCaptain William J. Le Clair is Ballistic Missile Project Officer with the Office of Artillery Policy and Literature at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He has attended the Sergeant New Equipment Training Course and has served as a Sergeant system instructor. Captain Le Clair has been associated with Sergeant training at the U. S. Army Artillery and Missile School at Fort Sill since 1961.

88

Military Review

faces are carried on the semitrailer transporter, and the warhead section is carried on a 2Y2-ton truck. The launching station vehicle consists of the assembly and firing platform, the firing set (actually a fire-direction center), a self-contained power supply, and the associated equipment necessary for assembly and erection of the missile. After the launching station is emplaced, the missile sections are hoisted from their containers and assembled on the underside of the launching station boom. Fire mission data furnished by higher headquarters and locally generated data, including position location and rocket motor temperature, are programed into the firing set by the operator through a simple keyboard. Based on this input data, the firing set determines a trajectory that the missile must follow for the specific fire mission. Necessary preflight information is then automatically programed into the missile. During the very brief countdown, the firing set automatically monitors the electronic components of the missile. A failure is visually indicated on the operator's control panel. As the countdown proceeds, all personnel except the firing set operator evacuate the launch site. At a specified time, the operator moves to a remote firing pit where he continues to monitor the countdown on a portable firing box. At a predetermined point in the sequence, the missile is automatically elevated and traversed to the proper firing position. As the countdown is completed, the missile fires. Missile assembly and countdown can be accomplished in a matter of minutes. The site can be cleared of personnel and equipment a few minutes later. The countdown can be halted at any
May 1963

Missile sections are moved to the launch site on a semitrailer

Missile sections are mated together on the launcher boom in preparation for launch

S erg e ant's reliability on the launcher is assured by a series of electronic checks. Missile sections are tested at or near the launch site prior to removal from their sealed containers. Each battery has an organizational maintenance test s tat ion mounted in a van which checks out the electronic components and provides a "go" or "no go" indication for each. The battery is supplied with a stock of extra assemblies for on-the-spot replacement of defective components just prior to the assembly of the missile on the launcher. Complete testing of the missile sections can be accomplished in less than 30 minutes.
As the countdown nears completion the missile is automatically elevated and traversed to firing position

point. Mission changes in the early stages of the countdown merely require a halt, insertion of new data, and reinitiation of the countdown.

Tactical Employment Current planning is based on three Sergeant battalions per field army. Actual assignment will be dependent upon requirements and availability at the time. These battalions may be retained under control of the army commander but a more appropriate use

Missile components are tested at the organizational maintenance test station prior to removal from sealed containers

would be attachment of a Sergeant battalion to a corps. Each of the two missile batteries in a Sergeant battalion is a complete fire unit, thus one battery can be available for fire missions while the other is displacing. In normal employment, each battery will be used in a separate position area and will have a varying number of alternate firing sites to which it can move. These sites may be separated by as much as five to 10 kilometers. Usually there will be adequate dispersion to preclude loss of more than one battery to a single enemy nuclear round. The range and firepower of the Sergeant missile system provide the supported force commander with a capability unknown in World War II. The fire unit will be in a state of readiness which will permit response in a matter of minutes to the commander's. requ irements. During the early phases of a nuclear war, our nuclear delivery means will concentrate on the attainment of nuclear superiority. Appropriate targets for Sergeant u n d e r these circumstances are the enemy's nuclear delivery means and his supporting installations. In a nonnuclear situation, nuclear delivery means will be held ready for employment should nuclear war develop. Sergeant has a greater range than the Honest John and Lacrosse systems and a shorter range than Redstone and Pershing. Its fires must be coordinated with the fires of other artillery units and integrated into the fire plan for a specific operation.

to the third-echelon ordnance platoon, which is organic to the Sergeant battalion. The ordnance platoort, using the field maintenance test station, can determine the defective electronic subassembly within the faulty assembly. Repairs that exceed this are a fourthechelon responsibility and are performed outside the battalion. Test equipment organic to the battalion is automatic; thus the high degree of technical training normally associated with sophisticated missile systems is not a training prerequisite. Battalion maintenance personnel utilize "cookbook" troubleshooting techniques and are more concerned with automatic readout indications than with a detailed circuit analysis. Sergeant training is facilitated by a rugged missile trainer. The training missile, identical in weight and appearance to the "tactical Sergeant," provides training at both the firing site and the battery test area. Thus factory-engineered reliability in the tactical missile is preserved for actual fire missions. The trainer round provides the same countdown indications as its tactical
Automatic testing gives the crew a visual "go" or "no go:' indication

us

Army Photos

Maintenance and Training

Simplicity of maintenance is a key feature of the Ser/leant system. When a faulty assembly is detected, it is sent
May 1963

THE SERGEANT
counterpart. The battery commander can insert simulated malfunctions into the trainer, which will automatically create , countdown holds. The trainer also provides proper test indications when cabled to the test van, and malfunction indications can be deliberately introduced by supervisory personnel. "Looking ahead" has bee n the watchword in the Sergeant program. The electronic components represent advanced and proved designs. The modular design of the missile and ground support electronic assemblies, combined with a plug-in replacement capabmty, permit constant updating and ward off obsolescence. The Sergeant has proved itself during research and development phases and extensive environmental testing; it was successfully troop fired in October 1962 at the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, by a tactical unit. As a replacement for the Corporal, the Sergeant not only adds a chevron to the field artillery weapons family, it provides the corps and army commander with a flexible, rugged, and reliable weapon system.

ilk
~

USA CGSC Extension Preparatory Course

The U. S. Army Command and General Staff College presents again this year the College Extension Preparatory Course. This special course, revised annually, is mailed to all officers designated by the Department of the Army for attendance at the Regular or Associate Courses. Its purpose is to introduce the prospective student to basic terms, procedures, concepts, and organizations used in resident instruction and to bring him up to date on doctrine and organization. Participation is purely voluntary. The subjects are designed to provide background information in military speaking and writing, basic general staff procedures, special weapons employment, divisional organization, combat and combat service support, troop movements, signal communications, and larger unit operations. Over 80 percent of last year's students prepared themselves by means of the Extension Preparatory Course. According to a survey of these students, a majority found it helpful and recommended it for future students.

92

Military Review

THE GERMAN NESELWERfERS

Lieutenant Colonel Joachim Emde, West German Army

SOME months ago there appeared in the pages of this magazine an article which discussed the Soviet Katyusha, a multiple-rocket gun/ In this article, the author intimated that the Soviet development of a multiple-rocket gun (which he dates back to 1920) proceeded at a faster pace than the German development of a similar type weapon; that the Soviets solved the problems of multiple-rocket launchers before the Germans; and that the German use of t.he multiplerocket launchers in organized units only slightly antedated their use by the Soviets. The author then went on to state emphatically: But after that first notable expenditure of effort, German use of such weapons dwindled considerably. On the Russian front, through most of
1 Albert Parry, "The Soviets' First Rocket Gun," Military Review, October 1961, pp 56-64.

the war, the Nazis used rockets chiefly for signaling and also to illuminate the landscape in front of their positions. I feel that I must correct some of the misconceptions that may have grown up in military circles as the result of these statements. By the Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I, the German Reichswehr was not permitted to have artillery pieces which had long-range or large caliber capabilities. The responsible German military leaders of this period did notice, though, that the terms of the treaty did not prohibit the Reichswehr from developing rocket-driven weapons. This, then, was the area in which German scientists, technologists, and military people put their main efforts in developing supporting weapons.
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May 1963

NEBELWERFERS
To correct this deficiency, rotation nozzles were developed and eventually adopted as standard, permitting the coverage of area targets under an acceptable dispersion factor. These rotation nozzles were one of the most important features of the German rockets; the Soviet rockets were still stabilized by fins. Over the next few years the range of the German rockets was increased particularly after the development of smokeless powder as a rocket propellant. Unfortunately, it was not until 1942 that smokeless powder propellants became available in sufficient quantity; until then, the black powder rocket propellants had to be used.

Loading

the

I50-millimeter launcher

roc k e t

Development
By 1930, black powder propulsive charges flared frequently on the test stands of the Kummersdorf firing range, and soon increasing efficiency and capacity for field use were developed. Among the test officials was General Walter Dornberger, the creator of the V -2 rocket and pioneer in the field of rocket-driven space aircraft. In 1934 the first test firings with a 110-millimeter, black powder driven rocket took place from single launching racks. At this early stage in the test firing, it was found that the stabilization of the rockets by wings during the flight resulted in a large dispersion of the rockets in the target area. At high and changing wind speeds were these errors important; here, the projectile showed a tendency to turn its head into the direction of the wind.

Dispersion Factor
Even with these developments, it was clear that the rocket launchers could not be used against pinpoint targets . There was still a relatively large dispersion factor in the target area which could not be overcome. However, it was learned that several projectiles could be placed on multiplelaunching racks. So, multiple-rocket launchers-equipped with five, six, or even 10 tubes--came into being. Inside these tubes the rockets were placed on sliding rails; special types could fire the rockets directly from the packing boxes. Since the use of multiple-rocket launchers gave a capability of literally blanketing a target-a factor important when using smoke or chemical agents-the Germans decided not to attach the rocket launcher units to the artillery. Rather, they created special units in the Chemical Corps (the socalled Nebeltruppe) to handle the new weapon. In a sense, then, this development followed the same pattern as established in the United States Army of pre-World War II days when the
Military Review

Lieutenant Colonel Joachim Emde West German Army, is with the ABC Defense School at Son tho fen, Bavaria. After graduation from the Officers' School at Potsdam in 1938, he served with various rocket launcher units throughout World War II. He studied civil engineering after the war and in 1956 reentered the G e r ~ a n Bundeswehr.
94

4.2-inch mortar was developed. The mortar was assigned initially to the Chemical Corps, with a primary mission of firing smoke-filled or chemicalfilled rounds. During World War II, as we all know, chemical agents were not employed. Therefore, in the early stages of the war, the German rocket projectiles (nebelwerfers) were filled not only with smoke, but also with high explosives. For the latter purpose a projectile was invented which contained the propulsive charge in the front part and the explosive charge equipped with a high-sensitive tail fuze behind the circular rotation nozzles of the propulsive charge. A t the moment of impact the explosive charge detonated abo v e the ground at a height equal to the length of the propulsive charge (50 to 60 centimeters), thus glvmg greater fragmentation effect against targets, and providing the weapon with another and unanticipated effect: The blast of successive detonations during mass firing on a target could damage the lungs of human targets, resulting in a large number of casualties with no apparent injury to the exterior surfaces of the body.

Weapons
The main weapon of the N ebeltruppe was the 150-millimeter rocket launcher 41. It had a launching rack with six tubes; in each tube three sliding rails were mounted to give the rocket proper guidance and direction. The rockets were electrically ignited by means of a blasting machine, the opposite tubes being ignited at onesecond intervals. This weapon was fired only in the lower elevation angles, with a rate of fire of six rounds every 10 seconds. Thus one battery with six rocket
May 1963

launchers could cover a target area with 36 rounds in 10 seconds. The launcher could be reloaded and reignited every 50 to 60 seconds, with well-trained crews accomplishing this process in somewhat lesser time. It could throw a high-explosive round some 6,700 meters; a smoke-filled round some 300 meters less. Its main effect was caused by fragmentation. On the other hand, the 210-millimeter rocket launcher 42, which had five tubes, was m a i n I y employed against entrenched targets or field fortifications. Construction and firing rates were about equal to the rocket launcher 41, although a somewhat longer time for reloading was required. It did have a longer range, however, somewhere in the neighborhood of 8,000 meters. The 210-millimeter rockets had their propulsive charges located behind the explosive charges, and the impact fuze could be set for a delayed explosion. Thus with this weapon a deeper penetration into the ground could be effected and an enormous cratering effect could be obtained. The heavy weapons of the N ebeltruppe were the rocket launchers of a 280j320-millimeter projectile (the Schweres Wurfgerat 41), with a propulsive charge equal to that of the 150-millimeter but with a correspondingly reduced range of some 2,000 meters. Later on these were replaced by a 300-millimeter rocket launcher which had six tubes and a split-trail carriage. The propulsive charge was equal to that employed in the 210millimeter rocket, but the range was slightly more than 4,000 meters. A special type of rocket launcher was the 150-millimeter mounted on a semitracked vehicle which had thin armor. This weapon could be loaded
95

NEBELWERFERS
area targets. Only by a concentration of fire on limited areas during a limited period of time could the maximum efficiency of this weapon be exploited. There were, of course, exceptional cases. Often, single, highly mobile batteries were employed as a "fire brigade" at a threatened sector of the front. In late 1942 at Stalingrad, for example, the German 6th Army beginning at 2000 on the night of 22 November was to make a break to the west through the Soviets' encircling ring. The spearhead of the breakout attempt was to consist of the 24th Panzer Division, the 14th Panzer Di-

The 280/320-millimeter rocket launcher with unfuzed 280-millimeter rockets in foreground

with 10 rounds, and each battery had eight launchers. It had high mobility, could be loaded while the vehicle was moving, and after firing from a stationary position, it could be moved quickly to a new firing area.

The

280/320-millimeter rockets firIng from heavy launcher frame

Employment
The rocket launchers were generally employed in mass and against

Rocket

launchers mounted tracked vehicles

on

half-

vision, and a few motorized infantry divisions. Behind the spearhead, the wounded and the transport echelons were to be taken out, covered by nonmotorized infantry divisions. The rear guard was made up of motorized infantry divisions, reinforced by tanks and the 3d Battalion, 2d Heavy Launcher Regiment. Thirty minutes prior to the breakout attempt, a Soviet division command post, a Soviet regimental command post, and a Soviet artillery command post were to be blanketed by rocket launcher fire. On schedule, at 1930, the first rocket salvo went off and fell into the target
Military Review

96

areas. But then, by an order from Hitler, the breakthrough attempt was canceled. Although there was some evidence that the Soviet command posts had been put out of action, there remained only 72 rounds of launcher ammunition. Thus it was no longer possible to employ the launchers for area fire,

effort by firing three rounds, as single shots, and getting three direct hits about 100 meters in front of the German infantry position.

Organization
The smallest firing launcher unit was the battery, with each battery generally having six launchers. Three batteries formed a battalion, with some of the battalions having an additional launcher battery mounted on armored vehicles. The battalions were formed into launcher regiments, depending on the caliber of the rockets. By 1943 the regiments were being brought together to form launcher brigades. This enabled the Germans to concentrate a huge volume of fire against one target area with minimum personnel and equipment. The first launcher regiment-N ebelwerfer Regiment 51-was organized in 1940. It had three battalions, each battalion having three batteries. Initially, each battery had eight 150millimeter rocket launchers, a number reduced by two before the campaign in the USSR. When originally organized, the launchers of this regiment were scheduled to participate in Operation Seeloewe, the invasion of England. They received their baptism of fire, instead, during the invasion of the Soviet Union when the fortifications in the Brest Litovsk area were blasted with about 10,000 rocket projectiles.2 During the course of the war, the German Army established 31 launcher regiments; 15 heavy launcher regiments; three entrenched launcher regiments; four regiments for training and replacement purposes; and 25 in2 A statement (attributed to General Dornberger) in the article mentioned earlier that the Germans during the first 20 minutes of the war with the Soviet Union expended approximately a million and a half rockets is an e xaggeration.

Gunner with magnetos firing a launcher

at least in battalion-sized units. Too, the Soviets did not offer a target which appeared to make such employment worthwhile. The launchers, to a great extent, had to take over on the east side of the German pocket the mission of the arti1lery, most of which had been moved to the west to assist in the breakout. Firing had to be executed by individual launchers on point targets, and, surprisingly enough, the fire proved to be extremely accurate. Against one Soviet attack, one single launcher managed to blunt the Soviet
May 1963

97

NEBElWERFERS Conclusion
Rockets and rocket-driven weapons are today often included in the headlines of newspapers and periodicals. In actuality, the authors of these items usually refer only to satellites and space ships. Seldom, if at all, does anyone call attention to the predecessors of today's giants of the space age. Little is said of the smaller rockets and rocket launchers. Certainly, since the end of World War II, weapons of war have changed. The nuclear weapon now dominates the scene and influences our military concepts and our military training. But efforts are still being exerted to strengthen our conventional war capabilities. Certainly, the Soviets have made extensive use of the knowledge they gained with their rocket launchers (and with captured German equipment) during the last war; they have repeatedly demonstrated new and more advanced versions during their May Day military reviews in Moscow. To me, we are forgetting the lessons we learned from our more advanced, more sophisticated rockets of World War II days. We forget the capabilities possessed by powderdriven rockets. It seems to me that we should continually recall the words of General Dornberger who, at a reunion in 1954 of former Germa.n rocket launcher personnel, said: "The powder-driven rocket will be an important weapon for decades." I agree.
t

All photos courte81/ of author

Night firing of I50-millimeter battery

dependent battalions. All of these units eventually saw frontline duty, and some of the regiments were established several times. Launcher Regiment 51, annihilated at Stalingrad, was reestablished in 1942 and again in 1944. In one six-month period between July and December 1943, while engaged on the Eastern Front near Orel and Smolensk, this one regiment fired a total of 68,344 highexplosive 150-millimeter and 8,325 high-explosive 210-millimeter rounds against 43 tank concentrations, 342 infantry assembly areas, 145 Soviet attacks, and 42 Soviet artillery positions. All told, the Germans employed on the Eastern Front from 60 to 80 rocket launcher battalions. Rocket launcher units, but not in the same numbers, were employed in the northern areas, in Africa, and against the Allied forces in Italy and France.

98

Military Review

MILITARY

N.OTES
UNITED STATES
counterguerrilla Equipment
US forces engaged in counterguerrilla operations are receiving new equipment specifically designed to meet the needs of troops operating in remote areas or under unusual conditions. A new lightweight nylon hat, similar in shape to the old campaign hat, has been approved for procurement. The hat is water repellent, can be easily reshaped when crushed, and its has produced a shorter, lightweight version of that weapon for Special Forces use. The new model is six inches shorter and two pounds lighter than the standard weapon. Except for the gas cylinder, gas piston, and flash suppressor, all parts used in the lightweight version are identical to those used in the standard M14. A jungle boot with a steel mesh sole has been designed to counteJ' the sharp spike traps planted along jungle trails by Viet Cong guerrillas.-News item.

Hand-Held Weapon
The Army has awarded development contracts to three industrial firms and to Springfield Armory, a Government facility, for construction of prototypes of a new special purpose, hand-held weapon for use in Special Forces and infantry units. Individuals armed with this weapon, called the Special Purpose Individual Weapon (SPIW), would be able to engage area and point targets more effectively. The weapon could be used as both a shoulder-fired grenade launcher and a rifle. Fully loaded, it is expected to weigh no more than the current M14 rifle. Prototypes will be delivered to the Army by February 1964 for test and evaluation. Following this, one of the designs will be selected for completion of development and subsequent engineering and service tests.-DOD release.
99

Army News Service

New tropical hat

wide brim provides protection against tropical sun and rain. A sleeve-type mosquito head net, carried in the crown of the hat when not in use, provides protection for the head and neck from parasites. One manufacturer of the M14 rifle
May 1963

MILITARY NOTES TOW' Missile Development A 2.1 million-dollar contract has been awarded for continued research on the TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile) system (MR, Apr 1962, p 97). No details, other than those implied by its name, have been released on the new weapon system. A press report, said to be based on a statement by the Army's Chief of Research and Development before the House Armed Services Committee, indicates that TOW is an antitank system capable of firing a conventional round as well as a rocket.-News item. Collapsible Fuel Tanks A collapsible aluminum tank is now being evaluated by the Army for use as a fuel container. The unit consists of an aluminum shell with a synthetic rubber liner. When empty the container can be folded to a height of 11 inches. When in use it measures 52 by 42 inches and is 46 inches high. It has a capacity of 350 gallons. It can be used for transporting liquids in vehicles or aircraft or is suitable for static storage. Extreme weather tests indicate that the container will function properly at temperatures as high as plus 135 degrees or as low as minus 45 degrees Fahrenheit.-News item. Silent Engine The Army is developing a silent sixhorsepower engine which requires only a source of hydrocarbon fuel to provide useful power. The engine will have the capability of operating for an hour on approximately one and onethird gallons of fuel. It is intended to drive high-speed alternators for use in forward areas, and is expected to be inaudible to the human ear at a distance of 100 feet under the quietest ambient conditions. The model to be developed under a recently awarded $360;000 contract will be chemically fueled and hermetically sealed. Engine components will include a mercury preheater, a radiant-heated boiler, a turbine suitable for driving a 24,000-revolutions per minute alternator, a mercury pump, an air-cooled mercury condenser, a cooling fan, and necessary controls. It will weigh approximately 110 pounds and can be broken down into two easily transportable units. An experimental unit is scheduled for delivery in December 1963.-DA release.

More OH-13S' Helicopters The Army has ordered 150 additional OH-13S light observation helicopters. The OH-13 (formerly H-13)

Army New8 Service

OH-13 Sioux light helicopter

is a three-place aircraft which has been in service with the Army for a number of years. The S model is powered by a 260-horsepower turbosupercharged engine.-DOD release.

The MILITARY REVIEW and the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College assume no responsibility for accuracy of information contained in the MILITARY NOTES section of this publication. Items are printed as a service to the readers. No official endorsement of the views, opinions, or factual statements is to be implied.-The Editor.

100

Military Review

Multifuel Trucks Being Issued A new 2Y2-ton truck with a multifuel engine is now being issued to troops. The truck, the M35Al, is a modified version of the M35. Its LDS427 engine is capable of burning any of six different fuels ranging from low-grade diesel to gasoline. The M35Al has a five-speed synchromesh transmission. During troop tests, the vehicle traveled 5.1 miles per gallon on JP4 jet engine fuel, 6.3 miles per gallon on gasoline, and 7.3 on diesel. The Department of Defense recently announced the purchase of 8,339 multifuel engines for 2Y2-ton trucks. A five-ton truck with a multifuel engine also has been troop tested and may be issued to field units in the near future.-News item. Lightweight Vehicular Radio The Army has completed development and testing of an ultrarugged, lightweight vehicular r a d i 0 that greatly improves long-range combat communications between US ground forces. The two-way transistorized set, called the Angry-l06 from its official designation AN/ GRC-l 06, provides dependable 50-mile voice communications, even over severe terrain obstructions. Under favorable conditions, its signal can rea c h much greater distances. The 100-pound set is half the size an'd weight of the one it replaces, yet through use of advanced, single sideband circuitry, it provides 10 times the effective signal power and twice the range. A high-priority test and development program on the A ngry-l 06 was compleied in two years, half the time usually required for such projects. The new radio enables a commander to
May 1963

maintain radio contact with widely dispersed forces in a fluid combat area, even while his vehicle is in motion. The radio has been put through rigorous tests in simulated combat. It operated perfectly after two airdrops, more than 3,000 miles of road tests, . and standard laboratory shock and vibration tests. In heat, dust, and rain, it also proved superior to other sets of comparable size and weight. Composed of two units mounted one

US Army

New AN/GRC-I06 vehicular radio

atop the other, the set operates on any one of 28,000 high frequency channels spaced one kilocycle apart. It nets with the Army's other high frequency sets and features a simple system of digital tuning in which a channel is selected by setting a series of knobs to prescribed numbers. The radio is planned as the first of a family of lightweight, long-range sets for Army tactical use to be manpacked or mounted on ground vehicles and combat aircraft.-DOD release.
101

MILITARY N 'OTES
International IHawks'
The Army's Hawk missile has been adopted by at least 15 nations as an air defense weapon. The US, Canada, and 10 European nations of the NATO alliance now use the missile. Sweden,

US Air Force

Turboprop YAT-28E aircraft

winder missiles and .50-caliber machinegun pods. It will be powered by a T55 turboprop engine.-DOD release.

IRedeye' Development Continued

The Army plans to continue research and development work on the Redeye shoulder-fired, surface-to-air missile system. A Department of Defense spokesman has been quoted as stating that no funds for procurement
Army New8 Service

Hawk surface-to-air missile

a neutral nation, has also purchased the Hawk from the US. Personnel from Korea and Free China are now being trained to operate the missile system.-News item.

Counterinsurgency Aircraft
The Air Force has awarded a contract for the development of an evaluation prototype fighter bomber for counterinsurgency operations. The new aircraft, to be designated the YAT-28E, will be a turboprop conversion of the T -28 piston engine airplane, originally built for the Air Force as a trainer. The model will have a high weapons load capability which will include wingtip-mounted Side102

Foxhole air defense weapon

of Redeye are included in the Fiscal Year 1964 budget "because of development problems." However, a recently awarded contract provides 1.6 million dollars for continued developmental work on the missile system.News item.
Military Review

Second 'OH' Model Flies

Department of Defense

First OH-5A in flight

The Army's OH-5A, the second of three competing models of the light observation helicopter, has undergone initial flight tests at the manufacturer's plant. Three major manufacturers will each build five prototypes of their proposed design. One of the three will be selected for large-scale procurement to meet the Army's expanding requirements for a light helicopter with improved performance capabilities.-News item.

Irradiated Foods
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved irradiated fresh bacon for US public consumption. The approval follows a research program conducted o~er the past 10 years by
May 1963

the Army to develop a new form of food preservation. Bacon is the first item to receive general approval. It is anticipated that irradiated potatoes, wheat flour, chicken, pork, and fresh oranges will be submitted to the FDA for approval during the next two years. Meanwhile, the irradiated bacon win be given extensive field trials to establish its acceptability as a standard menu item under arctic, tropic, and other conditions. Procurement for mass military feeding and availability for public use will depend upon the adoption of irradiation as a food processing method by private industry. This could occur during the next five years.-DOD release.
103

MILITARY NOTES
Mauler' Funds
The Army has asked Congress for 75.6 million dollars to purchase the Mauler missile system in Fiscal Year 1964. Mauler is a self-contained, battlefield air defense system capable of knocking down low-flying supersonic aircraft or short-range missiles.News item. Under the reorganization, over-all general staff responsibility for the development of the Reserve forces of the Army will be centralized under the Office, Chief of Reserve Components. Previously, responsibility for specific elements of the program were dispersed through the Army staff. The Chief, Office of Reserve Components (CORC) has now been authorized to exercise staff supervision of all plans, policies, and programs affecting the Reserve components within the Army staff. CORC continues to exercise general staff supervision over the Army's Reserve component activities of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, and the Chief, Army Reserve Affairs. The CORC position will be filled by a lieutenant general. The reorganization will not affect the statutory authority of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, to advise the Chief of Staff directly on matters pertaining to the Army National Guard, or his statutory function as the channel of communications between the Department of the Army and the states.-DOD release.

DA Staff Changes
The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations has been reorganized into two separate staff agencies. The purpose of the reorganization is to simplify and strengthen Army planning and programing. Under the reorganization, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (ODCSOPS) will remain as a general staff agency with certain of its functions transferred to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (OACSFOR), a new staff agency. The DCSOPS win be principal advisor to the Chief of Staff on all joint affairs and on the establishment of requirements for and use of major combat-ready forces. He will serve as Army Operations Deputy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ODCSOPS will also provide staff advice on special warfare and civil affairs matters. The new ACSFOR will be the principal advisor to the Chief of Staff on the coordinated development of Army forces to include combat doctrine, training, organization, and equipment. OACSFOR also will provide staff advice on chemical, biological, and radiological warfare and Army aviation. The Secretary of the Army has also announced a reorganization of Army staff responsibilities for the Reserve Components Program.
104

MMRBM Develo: pment

Initial engineering and planning efforts will get underway on the propulsion system for the new mobile midrange ballistic missile (MMRBM) system, under terms of a recently awarded contract. The award is for Phase I efforts to establish the design of the propulsion system and to define the Phase II research and development program. The MMRBM (MR, Jun 1962, p 95) is to be a highly mobile, surface-to-surface weapon capable of being fired from naval vessels or ground vehicles. It is being developed under Air Force direction.-News release.
Military Review

Aircraft Depot Maintenance

The Army now has its own depot maintenance facility to support the growing fleet of aircraft devotecL -exclusively to the support of ground combat operations. The US Army Transportation Aeronautical Depot Maintenance C e n t e r (ARADMAC) was activated at Corpus Christi, Texas, in 1961. Since that time it has grown into an industrial-type opera. tion capable of disassembly, repair, reassembly, and flight-testing Army aircraft in preparation for their reissue to field units. In its first 18 months of operation, ARADMAC has rebuilt 1,114 aircraft engines and 66 complete aircraft of various types. By the end of the current fiscal year, it is anticipated that the installation will have the capacity to meet a considerable portion of the Army's requirements for aircraft depot maintenance. -N ews release.

US Army

ARADMAC Headquarters ...

US Army

controls an industrial-type operation ...

occupying approximately 66 acres of the Corpus Christi Naval Air Station

us

Navy

MILITARY NOTES

WEST GERMANY
'Sergeant' Battalion Fires
West Germany's 150th Artillery Battalion h~s successfully passed its live-firing tests with the Sergeant solid-fueled missile at the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. The 150th is the first non-US unit to fire the tactical Sergeant. The unit has completed four months of individual and unit training at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Its attached ordnance detachment was trained at Redstone Arsenal in Alabama.-News item.

USSR
Antita, nk Rocket Transporter
The Soviet Army's new antitank rocket transporter (MR, Feb 1963, p 105) is reported by Soldat und Technik (West Germany) to be mounted on a BTR40A armored personnel carrier. The rockets are of about the same size and have approximately the same range as the SS-11, and are wire guided. The launching device can be

AUSTRALIA
Aid To Vietnam
Australia will provide over one-half million dollars in defense aid to South Vietnam during this fiscal year. The money will provide urgently needed supplies of barbed wire and other material required in the South Vietnam Government's program of fortifying villages against Communist guerrilla attacks and infiltration.-News release.

Equipment Standardization
The Australian Army will join with the US, British, and Canadian Armies in the standardization of military equipment and procedures. A basic standardization agreement has existed between the latter three countries since World War II. Known as the ABC (American, British, and Canadian) Standardization Program, the coordinated planning effort has led to the pooling of research talent for the solution of mutual problems and the adoption of uniform or compatible equipment and materiel in the three armies. This compatibility improves effectiveness of combined operations and simplifies the functioning of multinational forces.-News item.
106

Soldat und Technik

Soviet antitank vehicle

placed in position by opening two top hatches. Otherwise, there are only minor changes on the personnel carrier. Experts estimate the range of the rockets at from 500 to 3,000 meters. The vehicle has a 4 by 8-wheel drive. The two center axles can be raised and lowered. The vehicle is amphibious and is operated in the water by a water-jet propulsion. A central jet propels the vehicle; jets at the side under the stern steer it.-News item. Military Review

CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Forces Reqrganize
Since 1959 the Czechoslovakian armed forces have been reorganized and, to a large extent, reequipped. During this period, according to an Austrian source, the number of divisions has been reduced from 16 to 12. The new divisions, however, have been given 'a greater combat potential and, with the possible exception of two infantry units, have been motorized. The Czech division is organized on the Soviet pattern. Each motorized rifle division has a headquarters, three mechanized infantry regiments, and one tank regiment. The artillery units of the division inc 1 u d e a rocketlauncher battalion with 18 launchers for 140-millimeter rockets, and one artillery regiment consisting of one battalion each of 100-millimeter antitank guns, 122-millimeter howitzers, 152-millimeter howitzers. and 160meter howitzers and one battalion of 152-millimeter howitzers. Each battalion consists of three batteries of six guns each~ The 12 divisions are grouped under three army headquarters. One is located in Prague, one in Brno, and the

Soldat und TechniTt

vie t BTR50P amphibious personnel carrier

Truppendienst

ISU152 heavy assault vehicle

millimeter mortars. Each battalion consists of three 6-gun batteries. A Czechoslovakian tank division has a headquarters, three tank regiments, one mechanized regiment, and one assault tank battalion consisting of 30 JSU152 heavy assault tanks. The artillery component of the armored division consists of a rocket-launcher battalion with eighteen 240-millimeter rocket launchers, and an artillery regiment with two battalions of 122-milliMay 1963

third is believed to be in Olomouc. Each army has four divisions subordinate to it. Three of these are infantry divisions and one is armored. A current report indicates that one army may be reorganized into a tank army with three tank divisions and one mechanized infantry division. Armor in the Czechoslovakian forces is estimated to consist of approximately 2,700 medium and 500 heavy tanks. In addition to the tanks, there is believed to be some 300 antitank guns and assault tanks and approximately 2,000 armored personnel carriers. The current program of modernization provides for the replacement of T34 and JS3 tanks with T54 and T10's. T54's and possibly T10's are being built in PlzeX. The new armored personnel carriers are believed to be BTR50P's which are to be built in Czechoslovakia under license from the Soviet Union. The BTR50P is a full-tracked personnel carrier with an open top.-News item.
107

MILITARY NOTES

FRANCE
'SS-11' Missile The French manufacturer is reported to be working on a transistorized version of the SS-ll antitank missile. The new version will be designated the SS-llB1.-News item.

I I aircraft, is an inertially guided

GREAT BRITAIN
Defense Plans Great Britain has prepared a defense budget for the 1963-64 period that is greater than any of her military budgets since World War II. The new budget calls for an expenditure of $5,146,400,000, a 327.6 million-dollar increase over last year. Under the new program, the British Army will grow to 180,000 men, all volunteers, during the next year. With the Royal Marines and Gurkha regiments, this will give the country a ground force of 200,000 men The Army of the Rhine in Germany will be immediately increased by 1,000 men and an additional 1,000 will be added during 1964. All of the increased expenditures in the next year will go for conventional weapon systems pending the start of construction of Polaris submarines. Great Britain will purchase Polaris missiles from the US to arm a nuclear underseas fleet now planned to augment the strategic deterrent of her V-bomber force.-News item. First 'Blue Steel' Squadron The first Royal Air Force squadron to be completely equipped with the British Blue Steel air-to-surface missile is now operational. The squadron has flown 140 training sorties from its base in Lincolnshire with Blue Steelloaded Vulcan Mark II bombers. Blue Steel, which can be carried by either the Vulcan or the Victor Mark

standoff weapon. Firing tests conducted at W oomera, Australia, showed that the weapon exceeds design specifications in range, accuracy, and reliability of components. Nine of the last 10 shots were termed "completely successful." Design specifications have not been announced, but the weapon is unofficially reported to be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead at supersonic speeds when released from an aircraft some 200 to 400 miles from the target. British sources indicate that there is no

Blue Steel standoff bomb

evidence it can be shot down, once airborne, and its range is "completely adequate" to enable the carrier aircraft to remain outside the main antiaircraft defenses of any potential enemy target.-News item.

Nuclear Missile Development The British Government is reported to be developing a secret nuclear weapon to be carried by jet bomber aircraft. The new weapon will supplement the Blue Steel standoff bomb and will help fill the gap left by cancellation of the US Skybolt program. No details have been released on the new weapon; however, it is reported to be a refinement of a system originally intended for use by Britain's newest tactical strike reconnaissance plane, the TSR-2.-News item.
Military Review

MILITARY
BOOKS
DARE CALL IT TREASON. By Richard M. Watt. Introduction by Colonel John Elting. 344 Pages. Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York, 1963. $5.95. By LT COL ALBERT N. GARLAND, In! On 29 April 1917, thirteen days after the beginning of the bloody, frustrating, poorly planned Nivelle offensive, units of the French Army rose against their leaders and began to mutiny. The mutinies (officially called cases of collective indiscipline) began in the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment, a unit that had lost 400 of its 600 men in the first days of the French assault and was under orders to move back to the front. The mutinies spread rapidly throughout the army. By the end of May, only a "tough crust" of French Army troops manned the trenches-"behind this crust the Army was soggy with revolt." In this, a well-written, highly spirited, thoroughly researched volume, the author attempts to explain the causes and effects of the French Army mutinies of World War I---eertainly one of the least publicized and still highly secret aspect of that great blood bath. Much of what is said about the number of mutinous units, the suppression of the mutinies, and the fate of the mutineers is largely conjecture. For this, the author cannot be blamed; with the exception of one s h 0 r t chapter in the multivolume French official history of World War I, the French Army has released no details. The only official figure admits
May 1963

that "there were 110 cases of 'grave collective indiscipline' and that these occurred within 54 different divisions." To the author, the underlying causes of the mutinies stretch back years before 1917-to 1866 and the rise of Prussia as a major military power; to the Franco-Prussian War, "a devastating military fiasco for the French Army"; to the creation of the Third Republic, which lacked both direction and purpose; to the Boulanger affair; the Panama scandals; and the Dreyfus case, which took from the French Army its former, almost sacred, status. And if these were not enough to weaken the French will to fight, there were the prewar French military and political leaders too arrogant, inept, or traitorous to see where their paths were leading France; the very nature of the kaleidoscopic French political structure; and the French people to whom in 1914 the prospect of a war of revenge with Germany had lost much of its attractiveness. Among the recent spate of books -on World War I, this one stands out as a contribution to military history.

NEITHER WAR NOR PEACE. The Struggle for Power in the Postwar World. Revised Edition. By Hugh Seton-Watson. 510 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1962. $2.95 paperbound.
A reissue, in paperbound form, of a volume first published in 1960 (MR, Dec 1960, p 112). An epilogue has been added to update the work.
109

MILITARY BOOKS THE EASTCENTRAL FRONT. U. S. Marine Operations in Korea 19501953. Volume IV. By Lynn Montross, Major Hubard D. Kuokka, United States Marine Corps, and Major Norman W. Hicks, United States Marine Corps. 342 Pages. Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. $2.25 clothbound.
The story of the longest, continuous stretch of land warfare ever experienced by a major Marine unit is now unfolded in The East-Central Front, a book just published. It covers the activities of the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing from late December 1950 to March 1952, and is the fourth in the projected five-volume series, U. S.
MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA.

pointers on football, baseball, basketball, and track and field competition. The author writes primarily for the younger reader. His list of published works includes 15 books comprising military history, historical westerns, biographies, and the well-known Clint Lane West Point series.

FACING THE DICTATORS. 19231938. The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon. By Anthony Eden. 746 Pages. Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, Mass., 1962. $7.50. By CAPT ROBERT M. WORCESTER,
USAR

This volume begins with the 1st Marine Division recuperating at Masan after the bitterly fought Chosin Reservoir campaign, and follows through the next 15 months of operations to the cessation of offensive operations on 20 September 1951.

POINTERS ON ATHLETICS. By Colonel Red Reeder. 173 Pages. Duell, Sloan & Pearce, New York, 1962. $3.95.
The will to win is often the determining factor in the outcome of any conflict between well-matched adversaries. Colonel Red Reeder, Army brat, combat leader, military writer, and athlete, has drawn from a lifetime of experience in competition on the athletic field and on the field of battle in writing this volume. It provides useful guideposts to those engaged in instilling the will to win in the youth of our Nation. Colonel Reeder, now assistant director of athletics at West Point, draws on four head coaches at the Military Academy to provide specific
110

An important period of England's history coincided with the political life of an articulate statesman, Anthony Eden, now Earl of A von. In the first pu blished book of his memoirs, Full Circle, Lord Avon described his part during World War II and after. In Facing the Dictators he writes about his entry into England's and the world's affairs and of the years preceding that great conflict. Eden won honors in oriental languages from Oxford in 1922, and probably rightly determined that to enter the foreign service would mean years stamping passports in some eastern consulate. He decided that the way to make a significant contribution would be to stand for Parliament. He did so, and was elected in 1923. His rise in Britain's parliamentary system was rapid; by the time he was 38 he was in the Cabinet as Foreign Secretary, and at the very forefront of world events. He relates from the inside the problems of the League of Nations, the rise of Hitler and Mussolini, the rape of Abyssinia, and civil war in Spain. Finally, in 1938, he could stand Chamberlain's appeasement policy no longer and resigned. It is a wellwritten contemporary history.
Military Review

AFRICA'S RED HARVEST. By Pieter Lessing. 207 Pages. The John Day Co., New York, 1962. $3.95. By LT COL FIELDING L. GREAVES, Arty
Until 1958: Soviet policy-makers were so ignorant about Africa that they were incapable of shaping a coherent policy. ... During 1960 decided progress was made [and] in 1961 a definite, all-embracing African policy finally emerged. ... Russia began to operate with confidence ... [and] the scales were definitely tipped against the West. From this opening, author Pieter Lessing, sometime correspondent for the British Broadcasting Corporation and the Christian Science Monitor, who traveled extensively in Africa in 1959 and 1960, paints a compelling picture of the mushrooming Soviet efforts to penetrate, manipulate, and control the infant labor movement in Africa south of the Sahara, to capture the women's and youth movements, and to plant large numbers of technical "experts" throughout Africa under the guise of assisting in the economic development of the new African states. The growth of Radio Moscow's propaganda coverage of Africa and Soviet efforts to educate the next generation of African leaders are also discussed. East Germany-as the only Soviet bloc state with former colonialist experience in Africa-played a significant role in the recent shaping of Soviet policy for Africa, according to the author. With regard to Red Chinese and Soviet competition for predominance in Africa, the author points up Red China's advantages: she was recently underdeveloped, like the African states; she has suffered from colonial oppression; and her people are
May 1963

nonwhite, non-European. Red China can, therefore, claim close kinship and understanding with the Africans-in contrast to the white, European, industrialized Soviet Union. Mr. Lessing disclaims any alarmist intentions, but his timely and restrained work succeeds in leaving the reader with a sense of urgency: that, to date, the West has not acted with sufficient vigor to counter the Soviet drive to capture Africa, and that time is running out.

ABERT'S NEW MEXICO REPORT 1846'47. Report of Lieutenant J. W. Abert of His Examination of New Mexico. Foreword by William A. Keleher. 182 Pages. Horn &Wal lace, A , lbuquerque, N. M., 1962. $7.50.
On 27 June 1846 Lieutenant James William Abert left Fort Leavenworth with a particularly choice assignment: to accompany General Stephen Watts Kearny on his conquest of New Mexico and to write a detailed scientific report on that territory. The report made in response to those orders was first published 115 years ago as Senate Executive Document No. 23. The present volume is a limited edition facsimile reprint of that original report. Lieutenant Abert was an acute observer, a fluent writer, and his highly readable report covered a wide range of subjects. In addition to reporting on the topography and the inhabitants of the area through which he traveled, he covered the day-to-day activities of his party, his encounters with famous settlers and traders, and the hardships and perils of travel through the New Mexico of that era. Abert's Report will be particularly welcomed by the reader who is interested in original source material on the early history of the American West.
111

MILITARY BOOKS VERTICAL TAKEOFF AND LANDING AIRCRAFT. By John Paul Campbell. 202 Pages. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1962. $7.50.
V e r tic a I takeoff and landing (VTOL) air vehicles open new vistas fQr both civil and military applications. This small, but comprehensive, volume presents an up-to-date status report on the development of VTOL aircraft. Rotor, propeller, ducted fan, turbojet, and ground effects air vehicles are each discussed in separate chapters. One chapter covers military applications currently under consideration. The author predicts large-scale military conversion to VTOL aircraft in the 1970's with the changeover in commercial aviation probably taking place in the 1980's. Numerous photographs and line drawings add to the effectiveness of this work. loyal to Major Fremont, played a key role in the command dispute between Fremont and Kearny during the annexation of California. Liberal quotations from Fremont's writings and other contemporary memoirs and journals contribute materially to a broader insight to Kit Carson's life and accomplishments.

THE FIRST WORLD WAR. A Photographic History. Edited 'by Laurence Stallings. 306 Pages. Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York, 1960. $7.50. By 1ST LT RUSSELL W. MUNSON, JR.,
SigC

KIT CARSON. A Portrait in Courage. By M: Morgan Estergreen. 320 Pages. The University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Okla., 1962. $5.95. By COL JAMES G. KALERGIS, Arty
This book carries the reader from Kit Carson's birth on Christmas Eve, 1809, to his death on 23 May 1868. Interwoven into the chronological record of his life is the story of the Western . frontier. This is more than just another biography of an almost legendary romantic figure from the early history of the West. It is, in essence, as the introduction states, "the story of the West . . . over the first three quarters of the nineteenth century." Of particular interest to the military reader is Carson's experiences as a guide with Major John C. Fremont, "the pathfinder," and with General Stephen Watts Kearny. Kit Carson,
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This picture book of World War I was first published in 1933. The 1962 edition is the same except for a new introduction by Mr. Stallings. Over 500 photographs collected from the US Army Signal Corps and various commercial agencies are arranged chronologically from Archduke Ferdinand's assassination to the end of the war. The pictures are excellent, considering the circumstances under which they we retaken, but the crowded layout ca-uses some of them to lose their individual impact. Despite these minor distractions, The First World War is interesting, worthwhile, and truthful in content.

GUIDE TO FEDERAL ARCHIVES RELATING TO THE CIVlt WAR. By Kenneth W. Munden and Henry Putney , Bee, rs. 721 Pages. Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. $3.00.
A comprehensive bibliographic listing of US Government records pertaining to the Civil War. The postwar years as well as the records accumulated by Federal agencies during the actual years of struggle have been researched and recorded. This work is primarily a research tool.
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