Pham, 1

Name: Truong Pham Professor: Michael Baxter War, Peace and Conscience Paper #2 In the progress of history, Christians have always struggled to live in harmony with the society. After Jesus left, Christians found themselves tangled in a nexus of political, societal and familial responsibilities. They tried to practice non-violence and promote peace, but the worlds governments, not yet transformed by the love of God, constantly came into conflicts with each other and call for their service. Christians strived to become like Jesus and follow his example of tolerance in the face of injustice, yet they found it extremely difficult to do so: Jesus tolerated injustice and gave up his life so that humanity can come closer to God while the immortal Christians effort to tolerate in most cases only breeds more injustice and worsens the state of their human fellows. Christians are not only asked to give back to Caesar what is Caesars but also to give God what is his (Matthew 12:21, NIV Bible), for Jesus said, Unless your righteousness surpasses that of the Pharisees and the teachers of the law, you will certainly not enter the kingdom of heaven (Matthew 5:20, NIV Bible). The letter The Challenge of Peace by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops reflects this struggle to balance between civil duties to Caesar and holy duties to God. In a time when the never-ending arms race between America and the Soviet Union constantly put the world on the verge of destruction, American Catholics faced a moral challenge in the new concepts of obliteration bombing, mutual destruction and deterrence. The letter, by drawing on the Catholic traditions of just war and pacifism, provides a well-thought answer to this challenge. By employing biblical substance as well as rationalization, the letter was able to appeal to a larger audience including the secular

Pham, 2

community and the civil authority. In order to give this letter a careful evaluation, it must first be examined in the light of the historical context that gave rise to it. After that, the assumptions and scholarly works used to write this letter are compared and contrasted. Finally, the letters position is evaluated in its role to provide moral guidance for American Catholics and the larger civil community. On August 6th, 1945, humanity had its first taste of the terror of nuclear weapons. From an altitude of 31,600 feet, an atomic bomb was dropped onto the city of Hiroshima. With a power equivalent to that of 12,500 tons of TNT, the bomb totally destroyed 70,000 buildings out of Hiroshimas 76,000 and killed 80,000 people. A year later, the death toll reached 140,000 due to nuclear radiation and burning (Kort, 4). The bomb instantly placed America on top of the worlds military powers. Americans now had in their hands a weapon that could swiftly put out all wars. This atomic bomb set the tone for Americas foreign policies for the next fifty years. The conflict between the Soviet Union and America was fundamentally an ideological one. It was a conflict between tyranny and freedom, expansionism and containment, and communism and capitalism. The conflict could be traced back to as early as 1918, when American troops helped the White Army in Russia fight the Bolsheviks (Kaufman, 77). During World War II, the two nations joined forces together to defeat Nazi Germany. After the war ended, countries in Eastern Europe fell into the control of Communist governments, and, as a result, a Soviet block was formed in Eastern Europe by the end of 1946 (Ibid., 80). The nature of Soviets ambition was foreshadowed by George Kennan in his famous Long Telegram from

Pham, 3

Moscow, which concludes: Relentless battle must be waged against socialist and socialdemocratic leaders abroad (Ibid., 79). This shift in Americas policies in dealing with the Soviet Union was reiterated in President Trumans address to Congress when he requested aid for war-stricken Greece: I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way (Ibid., 84).This statement laid out the foundation for what was late r known as the containment policy, a policy aiming to contain the Soviet expansion by providing s upport for countries resisting communism instead of having to really enter a war with the Soviet Union (Smoke, 49). In his book National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma, Richard Smoke points out the containment policy, together with Americas possession of the atomic bomb, gave the American government a confidence in reducing the number of troops in Europe after World War II (Ibid., 52). This strategy worked well for Americas goals: The US could maintain some kind of peace in Europe without having to spend too much resource on a traditional army. As a result, the Americas Strategic Air Command invested in equipping its B-47s with atomic bombs in case the USSR took the first step to threaten Europe. Therefore, at first, deterrence was a situational response to the pressure put on the Government to bring back home the soldiers. The policy was based on the assumption that America was the only nation that possessed the atomic bomb, and the Soviet Union, given its current state of technology, would take at least ten more years to successfully create an atomic bomb (Isaacs and Downing, 146). Unexpectedly, the Soviet Union successfully tested its atomic bomb in 1949, which broke the Americas nuclear monopoly and opened an era of arms race. Alarmed, President Truman approved of the testing of an even more destructive weapon, the H-bomb in 1952 (Smoke, 58).

Pham, 4

A study submitted to the National Security Council in 1950 concluded that America had to build up its power to contain the Soviet threat (Ibid., 59). The full-scale nuclear race between the two super powers had run since then, with its climax occurring in 1962, when the USSR decided to place its missiles in Cuba. During the seventies, the tension between America and the Soviet Union was slightly reduced thanks to astute dtentes and compromises, exemplified by the Americas normalization of relation with China and the SALT talk series. The nuclear arms race was renewed in the late seventies and early eighties with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the election of President Reagan. Reagans approach to the nuclear arms race was bold: he wanted to outrace the USSR. Reagan wanted to lead the West in a crusade for freedom and regarded the Soviet leaders as the focus of evil in the modern world (Isaacs and Downing, 334). His administration proposed an ambitious project called the Strategic Defense Initiative, which would implement an anti-missile defense system based in space (Ibid., 342). It was during this time that the pastoral letter was written. Labeled The Challenge of Peace, the letter was adopted at the National Conference of Catholic Bishops in 1983 (USCCB, 1). In this letter, the authors seek to firstly provide moral guidance for American Catholics and secondly contribute to the wider public debate on this issue, for the bishops believed that there is no satisfactory answer to the human problems of the nuclear age which fails to consider the moral and religious dimensions of the questions we face (USCCB, 1). The bishops make it clear that not all advices in their letter have the same moral authority, and that they were writing as moral teachers, not technical experts to once again remind policy makers to read the letter with discernment. The positive meaning of peace,

Pham, 5

which is not just the absence of war but also requires unconditional and effective respect for each one's unprescriptable and inalienable rights, is the driving force of this let ter (USCCB, 15). This meaning of peace provides a basis on which the authors can use the just-war theory to evaluate the use of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. In the first two parts of the letter, the bishops use the interconnection between the pacifist and just-war traditions in the Church to come to the conclusion that both nuclear war and the deterrence policy are morally wrong, but deterrence can still be in place as a step to progressive disarmament (U SCCB, 2). In parts III and IV, the bishops propose plans and actions that are conducive to peace to eventually remove deterrence as Americas policy. The letter reflects and combines a variety of contemporary Catholic writers opinions on the subject. The first section of the letter focuses on the Biblical basis of peace and the Churchs traditional positions on war. The bishops point out that throughout the Bible, there is a longing for peace. In the Old Testament, the longing for peace is expressed by the Israelite nations submission to the only God to lead them from battle to battle. The peace in the Old Testament time was a covenantal peace, a peace remained as long as the people of God adhere to his covenant. Therefore, there was a longing for a higher peace, or if we use the correct theological term, an eschatological peace. This is a peace that embraces righteousness, a time when [the] Spirit is poured on us from on high (USCCB, 10). In the New Testament time, the hand of God was extended further through Jesus. Gods people, instead of finding peace through obeying the old laws, could now find peace within themselves through accepting Jesus. Jesuss example of love and non-violence reminds Christians that they were crucified with Christ, and that they no longer live, but Christ lives in *them+ (Galatians 2:20, NIV Bible). If the Jewish

Pham, 6

people had to use external forces such as the law to maintain peace, then transformed Christians could find that force inside them, a force bringing peace that the world cannot give (John 14:27, NIV). The remaining duty for Christians, then, is to make the forgiveness, justice and mercy and love of God visible in a world where violence and enmity are too often the norm (USCCB, 13). The authors of the letter, however, point out that the Bible, even though providing the principles of peace and justice does not have guidance for reality Christians have to face (USCCB, 8). They argue that the ideal peace should have justice as its foundation, but the history of mankind has often witnessed the tension between justice and peace (USCCB, 13). The letter goes on to explain that because Christians live in an already but not yet world, they cannot delude themselves into disregarding the existing sinful pattern and conflicts of interests that mark the worlds history (USCCB, 13). Therefore, the bishops borrow the words of Pope John Paul II to remind Christian idealists to regard peace initiatives with realism and humility (USCCB, 13). This argument echoes St. Augustines work on The Two Cities: the earthly city and the kingdom of God. Regarding the Christians duty to the earthly city, Augustine says, As long as the two cities are commingled, we also enjoy the peace of Babylon (Augustine, 83). With this recognition of the imperfect world, the letter presents the necessity of the just-war theory. Regarding the right to self-defense of nations, the bishops cite Pope Pius XII consenting words on self-defense: A people threatened with an unjust aggression, or already its victim, may not remain passively indifferent, if it would think and act as befits a Christian (USCCB, 16). The letter says that the Christian duty to defend peace is non-disputable; however, moral options are available when it comes to the questions of how to defend peace. The

Pham, 7

bishops express approval for both the pacifist tradition and the just-war tradition, for these two reactions have a complimentary relationship, in the sense that they both seek to serve the common good (USCCB, 16). David Hollenbach, a well-known theologian in the area of international justice, indicates that people have focused on the difference between pacifism and just war for so long that they have forgotten the origin of the just-war theory as a reluctance to justify violent warfare. Hollenbach, like the Catholic bishops, believes that both the just-war and pacifist traditions take non-violence as a presumption and violent acts are only allowed in some exceptions, if at all (Hollenbach 582). Within this framework, the authors of the letter examine the use of nuclear weapons and the deterrent using the just-war theory. They first list the two categories of conditions that define a just war, as formulated by Thomas Aquinas (USCCB, 19). The first category is called Jus ad Bellum, or the questions regarding whether one nation should go to war. This category includes the conditions such as right intention, last resort, and competent authority to declare war. The second category is called Jus in Bello, which is about the conduct of war. This category includes discrimination and proportionality (USCCB 20). The bishops conclude that because of the horrendous destructive potential of nuclear weapons, the use of them violates the justwar condition, for it creates disproportionate destruction and kills people indiscriminately (USCCB, 21). The bishops maintain that the lives of innocent persons may never be taken directly, regardless of the purpose alleged for doing so (USCCB, 21). The right end never justifies the immoral means. The reason often used to defend the concept of total war is that

Pham, 8

civilians have become a part of modern warfare. This reason is not convincing for me. John Ford, in his assessment of obliteration bombing, gives us an interesting insight: Is it not evident that the most radical and significant change of all in modern warfare is not the increased co-operation of civilians behind the lines with the armed forces, but the enormously increased power of the armed forces to reach behind the lines and attack civilians indiscriminately (Ford, 150). There are two points in this statement worth our consideration. The first point is that, to some extent, the contribution of civilians in war effort has always existed in history. A nations army could never fight effectively if they also had to provide food and clothing for themselves. The army have always supported by the people. Therefore, saying that the cooperation between civilians and the military justifies obliteration bombing is more like an excuse than a reason. The second point that the improvement in the the destructiveness of weapons is the real change in modern warfare is a true insight. This is a fact that can be quantitatively proven. No one can deny the difference in destruction power between a sword and a canon ball, or, even better, an atomic bomb. This insight implies that it has been some peoples desire to kill more and more so that they can win wars. While traditional just-war theory places restrains on this desire, modern war theorists look for excuses to allow the just use of powerful weapons that can swiftly win the wars for them. Now that we are approaching the denial of the use of nuclear weapons, should we accept the concept of limited nuclear warfare? To this question the bishops use the conclusion of the Pontifical Academy of Science: it argues that because even attacks aiming military facilities would create widespread damages, for military targets are not really isolated from

Pham, 9

civilian areas, and nuclear radiation may also spread (USCCN, 21). This consideration leaves our bishops no option but to prevent this calamitous war from happening. After concluding that the use of nuclear weapons is morally unacceptable under any circumstances, the bishops discuss the deterrence policy as a preventive measure for nuclear war. They use the definition of deterrence as a "dissuasion of a potential adversary from initiating an attack or conflict, often by the threat of unacceptable reta liatory damage (USCCB, 29). In this definition, we can see the paradox of the deterrence policy: we deter the use of nuclear weapons by building up our nuclear capacity, which only increases the possibility of a nuclear war. By implementing deterrence, the US government threatened to take an action that it wished it never had to take. Pope John Paul II condemned the policy of deterrence as one that maintains the balance of terror instead of the balance of forces. The bishops also express doubt for the counter-force deterrence policy, for an attack on military targets or militarily significant industrial targets could involve "indirect" (i.e., unintended) but massive civilian casualties (USCCB, 32). However, the bishops, as well as the Pope, decide to accept deterrence only on the ground that it must be a step toward disarmament, even though it is not an adequate long-term basis for peace. The bishops adopt deterrence as a defensive measure that is sufficient to deter the initiation of a nuclear attack (USCCB 34). This view is also reflected in Hollenbachs writing. Hollenbach states that in order to make a moral judgment about deterrence, one must distinguish the intent to use nuclear weapons and the intent to deter their use. He argues that deterrence cannot be evaluated as a general concept, but each deterrent policy should be judged based on its capability to a make nuclear war less likely and the reduction of nuclear weapons more likely (Hollenbach, 602). For example, the deployment

Pham, 10

of Pershing IIs in Europe, even though aiming toward the reduction of weapons, put Moscow on alarm and made a nuclear war more likely. Based on Hollenbachs criteria, this action is unacceptable. On the other hand, the SALT talks, by aiming to reduce both defensive and offensive capacities of both the US and the USSR, passed the test by lifting up the threshold for war as well as reducing nuclear weapons at the same time (Smoke, 153). There are several Catholic moralists who opposed Hollenbach and the bishops view. One of them is Germain Grisez, an influential Catholic moralist. Grisez argues that the general deterrent policy of the United States is inherently wrong because it includes the intent to kill the innocent (Grisez, 10). He expresses doubt over the possibility of a deterrent policy without a murderous intent (Grisez, 15). I agree with Grisez at this point. Hollenbachs idea of separating the intent to use nuclear weapons from the intent to prevent a nuclear war is merely a play of words that offers no use for a rational argument. One should rationally accept that these two intents are interconnected, and the US government had a real intention to destroy a large civilian area of the Soviet Union to prevent the Soviet from starting a nuclear war. However, I disagree with Grisez regarding his position that the US should unilaterally reduce its nuclear weapons because better anything than mortal sin (Grisez, 9, 16). Within the Augustinian frame, one must accept that the world Christians live in is plagued with sins, and that to some extent, every Christian knowingly or unknowingly contributes to the sinful reality of the world every day. Even the peaceful toleration of sins is a sin in itself. The real question for Christians is: How do they disconnect themselves from this world and live strictly under Gods rules only? History has shown no viable answer to this question considering the failure of utopian societies. Even the just-war theory is a lesser evil in itself because Jesus tolerated injustices until his death.

Pham, 11

Therefore, Grisez cannot take the absolutist position and reject the lesser evil in the current state of deterrent policy because an Americas unilateral decision to reduce its nuclear weapons will lead to the imbalance of power and the world will be susceptible to the terror of communism. In short, to reconcile Hollenbach and Grisez, we should, unlike Hollenbach, admit that the current deterrent policies America was pursuing during this period are in no way morally justifiable because they include the intention to kill the innocent. However, we must also disagree with Grisezs proposal for unilateral disarmament on Americas side because it was not a viable moral option either, given the consequences it would lead to in state of the world during the Cold War. The pastoral letter expresses exactly this sentiment. The bishops express dissatisfaction with the current state of the deterrence, but also do not advocate a policy of unilateral disarmament (USCCB, 36). However, they all believe that each side should take some first steps to express good will. The pastoral letter lists some useful principles for the direction of the deterrent, but also leaves a lot for discussion of the realization of such direction. The discussion of moral deterrence is rich and multi-dimensional. Malcolm McCall, for example, proposed a justdeterrence theory that was analogous to the just-war theory. Even though one should be skeptical toward new just-theories considering the misuses of the just-war theory throughout our history, I think that there are some merits to Mr. McCalls proposal. Like the just -war theory, his just-deterrence proposal also involves the question of whether to practice deterrence (Jus ad Dissuasionem) and the question of how we should conduct deterrence (Jus in Dissuasione). For example, McCall borrows the just-wars condition of a competent authority to suggest that the government should strive for the competency in controlling nuclear

Pham, 12

weapons (McCall, 12). This criterion also prevents small nations without enough measures to control the use nuclear weapons from participating in the arms race. Another borrowed justwar criteria is the probability for success. This criterion allows the active role in deterrence when the probability for success is high. President Reagans win over Communism is a historical evidence for this criterion. In the last part of their letter, the bishops propose plans to move the world toward the common good. They recognize the efforts made in the SALT talks and the Baruchs plan, but also worry about the reality that nations are not adhering to the nuclear non-proliferation plan (USCCB, 37). They encourage both the US and the Soviet Union to take some first steps so that nuclear disarmament can be a possibility. The Bishops envision a world where nations are bonded by the moral fabric, a place that nurtures a more perfect form of justice among men and women" (USCCB, 41). The Challenge of Peace letter extended the long tradition of the Church in advancing the state of peace and justice in the fallen world. The bishops extensive analysis of nuclear war and the deterrence reminds Christians that the moral picture of humanity is becoming more opaque every day. Technologies have allowed people to fulfill the most evil desires of their heart. However, the bishops still believe in the natural law God instilled in every person and express hope for a possible future when man finally come to peace with his fellow people and his Creator.

Pham, 13

Works Cited (USCCB), US National Conference of Catholic Bishops. "The Challenge of Peace." 8 May 1983. USCCB. 25th July 2011 <http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/international/TheChallengeofPeace.pdf>. Augustine. "To Count Boniface; Act, Agent, and Authority; The Human Dilemma; Peace and Natural Law." War and Christina Ethics. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005. 60-83. Ford, John. "The Morality of Obliteration Bombing." Ford, John. The Morality of Obliteration Bombing. Westminster: John Knox Press, 1992. 139-177. Isaacs, Jeremy and Taylor Downing. Cold War. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1998. kaufman, Joyce P. "A Concise History of U.S. Foreign Policy." kaufman, Joyce P. A Concise History of U.S. Foreign Policy. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006. 75-115. Kort, Michael. "The Columbia Guide to Hiroshima and the Bomb." Kort, Michael. The Columbia Guide to Hiroshima and the Bomb. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. 1-10. McCall, Malcolm. "Just War and Just Deterrence: When and Why Nuclear Deterrence is Just." McCall, Malcolm and Oliver Ramsbotham. Just Deterrence: Morality and Deterrence into The Twenty-first Century. London: Brassey's Ltd., 1990. 8-25. Smoke, Richard. "National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma." Smoke, Richard. National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma. Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1984. 45-62, 151-156.