Philopoemen's Special Forces: Peltasts and a New Kind of Greek Light-Armed Warfare (Livy 35.

27) Author(s): Mary Frances Williams Source: Historia: Zeitschrift fr Alte Geschichte, Bd. 53, H. 3 (2004), pp. 257-277 Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436729 . Accessed: 15/08/2013 12:32
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PHILOPOEMEN'SSPECIALFORCES: PELTASTS AND A NEW KIND OF GREEK LIGHT-ARMED WARFARE(LIVY 35.27)

In 192 BC Philopoemen the generalof the AchaeanConfederaof Megalopolis,
cy, devised "a new kind of fighting" (improviso genere belli Livy 35.27.4).1 But

scholarsboth of militaryhistoryand of Philopoemen have neglectedthis remarkable achievement.2 Philopoemen usedlight-armed forcesin anamphibious landingand in mountainous raidswith unusualtactics.Philopoemen's innovation is an important use of "specialforces"in ancientGreekhistory:the first exampleof a deliberate combination of amphibious landings, a mixture of lightPhilopoemennecopinantemeum improvisogenere belli adgredi statuit. Livy 35.27.4. The translation of improvisoas "new"is that of EvanT. Sage (trans.),Livy (Cambridge, MA, 1935). Translating improvisoas "unexpected" does not makesense with genere belli and is redundant with necopinantem. his Greeksource. Plutarch Livy may be translating differs fromLivy and says thatthe Spartans "didnot expect attackandwere careless"(oit
xpoa8oicC6nv, akX' 6c?xXvgvot; Plut. Philop. 14.4-5), but he says nothing about the

type of warfare.Thucydideshas the phrase"unusedto this mannerof fighting"(adtOeat Thuc.4.34.2), which is closer to improvisogenere belli. tota1)11; taX6n; R.M.Errington, Philopoemen (Oxford1969) 103-104. Thereis nothingin F.E.Adcock,The GreekandMacedonian Artof War(Berkeley/Los Angeles 1957);J.K.Anderson, "Philopoeof theAchaean men'sReform CP 62 (1967) 104-106;J. Briscoe(ed.),A Commentary Army," onLivyBooksXXXIV-XXXVII (Oxford1981);P. Cartledge andA. Spawforth, Hellenistic and Roman Sparta(London andNY 2002);Y. Garlan, A SocialHistory Warin theAncient World. (1975, translated from the French,La guerredans l'antiquite[Paris 1972]);G.R. Griffith, Mercenaries of the HellenisticWorld (Cambridge 1935);K. Grote,Das griechische Soldnerwesen der hellenistischen Zeit (Jena 1913);M.B. Hatzopoulos, L'organisation de l'armie macedonienne sous les Antigonides (Athens2001 = MEAETHMATA 30); Maurice Holleaux, "Romeand Antiochus," in: S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, and M.P. Charlesworth (eds.), The CambridgeAncient History. Vol VIII (Cambridge1930) 199-240; H.W. Parke, Greek MercenarySoldiersfrom the Earliest Timesto the Battle of Ipsus (Oxford 1933); W.K. Pritchett,Ancient Greek MilitaryPractices. Part I (= The Greek State at War Part I) (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1971);W.K.Pritchett, TheGreekStateat War.PartII (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1974);W.K.Pritchett, TheGreekStateAt War.PartV(Berkeley/Los Angeles 1991); W.W.Tarn,HellenisticMilitaryand Naval Developments (New York 1930, rept. 1966);F. Walbank, "Hellenistic World," in F.W. Walbank, A.E. Astin, M.W. Frederiksen, and R.M. Ogilvie(eds.),Cambridge Ancient History. I (2nd ed. Cambridge Vol.VII. 1984);W. WeissenbornandH.J.Muller(eds.), TitiLiviAb urbeconditalibri (Berlin1962-1963). A. Aymard, Les premiersrapports de Romeet de la confederation achaienne(Bordeaux1938)306-308 says of Philopoemen's of Nabis:"le remarquable pursuit tacticienqu'est Philopoimen." But see GeorgeWashington in 1776at Trenton. Historia,BandLIII/3(2004) ? FranzSteinerVerlagWiesbadenGmbH,Sitz Stuttgart

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specialforces, tactics,andnon-mercenary armed troops,a nightattack,guenilla mostof an entirewar. troopsconducted andthe firsttime thatlight-armed culminated and the AchaeanConfederacy Conflictsbetweenthe Spartans andthen of Sparta, beganto besiegeGytheum in 192 BC whenNabis,the tyrant thanwaiting ravagedthe Achaeans'fields. The Achaeansvoted for warrather did not arguedthatthe situation for the Romans'assistancesince Philopoemen soldiers,many confronted Nabiswith"light-armed permitdelay.3Philopoemen He peltasts(caerrati), armedwith slings, darts,and other light ordinance."4 loaded them in small boats and landedthem on a headlandnear the enemy troopstraveledby nightover the headland light-armed camp.5Philopoemen's uponthe hutsof the camp,settingthemon to Nabis'campandhurledfirebrands to them;"with were killed since no aid could be brought fire. ManySpartans immediateAfterthis Philopoemen was destroyed."6 swordandfireeverything ly ravagedTripolis in Spartanterritory,departingbefore Nabis could send his armyat Tegeaandcalleda council Thenhe gathered guardsfromGytheum. sincethe enemywas andallies.7He decidedto attack Lacedaemon of Achaeans foughtNabiswith only terrifiedas a resultof his raidat Pleiae.8Philopoemen light infantryand cavalry,and then used his caetrati in orderto ambushthe his camp;10 and then again He frightenedNabis into abandoning Spartans.9 flee in fear. After this, to causingthe Spartans attackedhim with caetrati,11 Philopoemen's Philopoemenshut up Nabis in Spartaand brokehis power.12 to Nabis' armybut also enabledhim to raidnot only causedgreatdestruction to defeatNabisbecauseof andultimately attackSpartan territory withimpunity incorthathis new methodof fightingcaused.Spartawas ultimately the terror and its constitution and lost ancestral poratedinto the AchaeanConfederacy laws. thatas a resultof theseactions,the Achaeans andLivy report BothPlutarch and to be a greater generalin this warthanFlamininus considered Philopoemen
3 Livy 35.25-26. 4 expeditosmilites,caetratosplerosque,cumfundis et iaculis et alio levi generearmaturae Livy 35.27.5. 5 navigia parva in stationemoccultam... contraxitLivy 35.27.5-6. 6 Livy 35.27.8. 7 Livy 35.27; cf. 31.36.1. 8 quoniamsatis hostiumconterritiessent Livy 35.27.12. 9 Livy 35.28.11, 35.29.3-7; Plut. Philop. 14.6-10. Philopoemenfirst used Cretanauxiliaries and cavalry against Nabis, leaving other forces in camp, then ambushedhim with caetrati (Livy 35.28.8-35.29). 10 perculso metuLivy 35.29.11; 35.30.4. 11 Livy 35.30.4-6. Philopoemenagain used Cretanauxiliariesand cavalry against Nabis, troopsarmedonly with then ambushedhim with caetrati and then laterwith light-armed swords (Livy 35.30.1-4, 8-10). 12 Livy 35.30.12.

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Warfare SpecialForces:Peltastsanda New Kindof GreekLight-armed Philopoemen's

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This strongly he was "belovedandhonoredby the Greeksin theirtheaters."'13 argues for Philopoemen'soriginality:Philopoemen'spreviousdefeat of the combat)had (and killing of him in hand-to-hand SpartantyrantMachanidas won himgreatacclaimbuthadnotelevatedhimbeyondthe statusof the Roman and for his abilityto "readthe terrain" was admired Philopoemen Flamininus. attacks. lead his troops,andalso for his innovativetacticsandsurprise andsaysthatPhilip theGreekscall peltasts"14 Livy definescaetrati as "what in 206 BC.'5PhilipV alsousedcaetrati usedcaetrati in anambush V of Macedon in 197 wherethey were stationedin the frontof his heavy at Cynoscephalae (a heavyIt has beenarguedthatPhilipV's caetrati werehypaspists infantry.16 armedelite corps)butthey weremorelikely peltastsarmedwitha smallbronze
shield and the sarissa.17 Philopoemen's caetrati at Pleiae were peltasts with a

13 Plut. Philop. 15.1; cf. Livy 35.30.12-13; Ditt. Syll. 624.10. G. De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani (Firenze 1923), IV.1, 131 credits Philopoemen's "vigilance." But Errington, Philopoemen(as in n.2) 104-105 believes that Philopoemen"failed"since he did not relieve Gytheumand Philopoemen's"expeditionachieved little", also Holleaux, Rome (as in n.2) 204. Errington explains the honors for Philopoemenas resultingfrom Greek of Rome (ibid. 106-107; cf. Aymard,Rapports pleasureat an actionthatwas independent [as in n.21, 313 and n.26; B. Niese, Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staatenseit der Schlachtbei ChaeroneaVol.II [Gotha 1899] 684-685). But why would the Greeksbe pleased with a "failed"expedition? 14 Livy 31.36.1; also 42.51.4. The caetra was a small, light shield of hide similarto thepelta (Livy 28.5.11). Livy is translating his Greeksource since the Hellenistic peltastdid not carrya leathershield (Hatzopoulos,L'organisation[as in n.2] 71). The Romansknew the caetratusas an African,Spanish,or Greekpeltast (Caes. Civ. 1.48.7; 1.70.4; 1.39; Livy 21.21.12; 21.27.5). Philopoemendid not use a Romantype of fighting:the Romansrelied on heavy infantryand cavalry, althoughthey had velites (light infantry)(Polyb. 6.21; 6.24.3-4; 6.35.5; Livy 26.4.4). The Romans' allies supplied light-armedforces: e.g., Polyb. 3.75.7; Livy 24.34.5. But the Romansdid not regularlyuse light-armed forces (but see Polyb. 1.40.6-13). The Romanspreferred face-to-face combatratherthantreachery, deception,or ambushes(Polyb. 13.3.2-8; 36.9.9; Livy 42.47.5). Livy does not say velites; thus Philopoemen'stroopswere not light infantry.Asclepiodotus6.1 explains that light infantrywere differentfrom peltastsbut were similarlystationed. 15 Livy 31.36.1-7. Livy distinguishesPhilip V's caetratifromhis "Cretan auxiliaries" since those were "fast-movinginfantry" (velocissimipedites Livy 31.36.7-1 1). 16 Livy 33.15.16; Polyb.18.24.1, 8. 17 F.W. Walbank,Philip V of Macedon (Cambridge 1940) 291-293; F.W. Walbank,A HistoricalCommentary on PolybiusVol.1 (Oxford1957) ad 2.65.2 believes thatMacedonian peltasts were hypaspists.But Hatzopoulos,L'organisation(as in n.2) 71-72 cites inscriptionalevidence to show that the Hellenistic peltasts were not hypaspists and carrieda bronzeshield. But he says thatHellenistic peltasts were the "heirs"of Alexander's hypaspists and carried out the same tasks. (See below, n.96.) Cf. Eric Foulon, "Hypaspistes, peltastes,chrysaspides, argyraspides, chalcaspides," REA98 (1996) 53-62; Id., "LagardeApied, corps d'6lite de la phalangehelldnistique," BAGB 1 (1996) 17-31.

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hypaspists Macedonian shieldbut perhaps withoutthe pike since heavy-armed andpeltastscarrying the sarissa wouldhavehaddifficultyon smallboatsandin hills at night. hilly terrain,18 butPhilopoemen's caetrati easily movedthrough raidat Pleiae.Livy, Polybius'extanttext says nothingaboutPhilopoemen's however,apparently follows Polybius,especiallysince he mentionsthatPolybius' father,Lycortasof Megalopolis,commanded the cavalryin the subsequent action against Nabis.19Plutarchsays little about Philopoemen'slater nightraidandthe firingof battleswithNabisbuthe is awareof Philopoemen's the Spartan huts.20 Both Livy and Plutarch appearto have used Polybiusfor theiraccountsof Philopoemen's unusualnightraidagainstNabis.21

Philopoemen's Reformsof the AchaeanArmy the infantry of the WhenPhilopoemen becamestrategosin 207, he reorganized Achaean Confederacy,changing weapons to the Macedonianstyle and the phamethodof fightingfrom the Greekhoplitephalanx to the Macedonian the Achaeans lanx.22BeforePhilopoemen hadreliedon the Greek phalanx and andshorter spearthanthe Macedonicavalry;mostof themuseda lighterarmor Despite Plutarch's ans and they were limited to fighting on flat ground.23 a "stationary formof military andsteadfast" remark thatPhilopoemen preferred the Achaeansdo organization in place of "fightingat a runandof peltasts,"24
18 Polyb. 12.22.4. J.K. Anderson,Military Theoryand Practice in the Age of Xenophon peltasts; (Berkeley/LosAngeles 1970) 130-131: the long spearwould have encumbered (Diod. 15.44;cf. Nep. Macedonianpeltasts possibly used a pike developedby Iphicrates NY 1967) 119: of the Greeks(Ithaca, ArmsandArmour lphicr. 11.1.3-4). A.M. Snodgrass, probablycarrieda shorterspearthanthe sarissa. hypaspists Macedonian Alexander's 19 Livy 35.29.1-2. 20 Plut. Philop. 14.4-5; cf. Paus. 8.50.6-10; Zonaras9.19. about 21 But since Zeno of Rhodes wrote about Nabis (Polyb. 16.16-17) and Aristocrates Philopoemen(Plut.Philop. 16.4), it is possible thattherewas anothersource. 22 Plut. Philop. 9.1-2; Polyaenus6.4.3. Polybius does mentionPhilopoemen'sreformsin passing (Polyb. 11.9.4-5; Errington,Philopoemen [as in n.2] 63-64 and 64 n.i). The Sparta[as in reformswere in 207 BC (Plut.Philop.9.1-2; 10.2;CartledgeandSpawforth, n.21 66-67). Plutarchmentions javelins against Machanidas(Plut. Philop. 10.2), but Polybiusdoes not (Polyb.11.11). 23 Philopoemenchangedthe Achaeanarmorfrom a lightershield and shorterspearto the heavier Macedonianshield and the sarissa and he persuadedthe Achaeans to adopt andgreaves (Plut.Philop. 9.1-2). PolybiuscastigatesAratusat the helmets,breastplates, battle of Caphyaein 220 for sending light infantry,cavalry, and hoplites to harassthe Aetolians in hills ratherthanflat ground(Polyb. 4.11.6-4.13).
24 gi6vtjgov Kai eofKiAclavdvti bpoticJi
Kcai X?acGtiKT1 gaXi1v aaicetv Plut. Philop.

9.2; Polyaenus 6.4.3. But Plutarch'sremarkthat Philopoemenabolished fighting with peltastsis clearly not accurate.

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not seem to have used peltasts in battle before Philopoemen since they are only mentioned in the sources after Philopoemen's reforms.25 Philopoemen abandoned the shortjavelin and lighter shield of his hoplites in favor of the Macedonian sarissa, Macedonian armor, and the Macedonian phalanx.26 Philopoemen was influenced by Antigonus Doson's success against the Spartans and believed that the Macedonian phalanx and tactics were necessary to combat heavy-armed hoplites in pitched battles.27 But Philopoemen retained some light-armed forces to guard mountain passes and protect his cavalry. He also adopted the Macedonian peltast, which he, like Philip V, used with his phalanx as guards and to protect his flanks, and for ambushes.28

History of Greek Light-Armed Forces Philopoemen's light-armed innovations at Pleiae must be understood in the context of the history of ancient light-armed fighting. The standardmethod of warfare in the Classical Period was the hoplite phalanx, which was comprised of citizen soldiers in heavy armor of shield and spear.29 The regular Greek
25 E.g., Polyb.4.11.6-4.13. Aratusused fourhundred "picked" hoplitesto climb the walls of Corinth(Plut.Arat.21.1). The Achaeanslevied five thousand foot andfive hundred horse in 220 (Polyb. 4.15.3-7). In 219 the Achaeansgatheredboth infantryand cavalrymercenaries (Polyb. 4.37.6). Plutarchsays thatPhilopoemenusedjavelins againstMachanidas of Spartain 207 (Plut. Philop. 10.2), but Polybiusdoes not (Polyb. 11.11). Philopoemen used "pickedtroops"in an ambushin 201 (Polyb. 16.37.2-7). Arcadianpeltastsworked as mercenaries outsidethe AchaeanConfederacy(Xen. Anab.4.8.18). 26 Plut. Philop. 9.2; Polyaenus 6.4.3; Errington,Philopoemen (as in n.2) 63; Anderson, Reform (as in n.2) 104; Snodgrass, Arms (as in n.18) 115. The Macedonianheavy infantry,despiteits excellence, was burdened by heavy armorandthe sarissa andwas not very flexible (M. Cary, A History of the Greek Worldfrom 323 to 146 B.C. [2nd ed. London 19511239-240; Tarn,Military[as in n.2] 28). 27 The Megalopolitians hadexperiencewith Macedonian armorsince AntigonusDoson had armedthemwith bronzehopliteshields at the Battleof Sellasia in 220 BC (Polyb. 2.65.3; 4.69.4-5). 28 The Macedonianpeltast was differentfrom the hypaspistand the fourthcenturypeltast (who foughtwith thejavelin), andderivedfromIphicrates'innovations.The Macedonian peltastfoughtwith thephalanxandcarriedthe sarissa but also hada lighterbronzeshield (see Hatzopoulos,L'organisation[as in n.21, 71; Polyb. 22.9.3; Snodgrass,Arms [as in n.18] 123). Archaic and classical peltasts used a leathershield (Snodgrass,Arms [as in n.18] 78). For Philip V's peltasts, see below, n.96. Philopoemen's peltasts were like Macedonianpeltasts and carrieda bronze shield (see below, n.96). They also acted as guards(e.g., Livy 35.26.16; 35.28.10). But althoughPhilopoemen'speltastswere armed in the Macedonianstyle, he did not use his peltasts at Pleiae in the usual Macedonian manner- as partof his phalanx. 29 Tarn,Military (as in n.2) 3-4. Cavalrywere not importantin classical times outside of Thessaly (Tarn,ibid. 4-5); Victor Davis Hanson, Warfareand Agriculturein Classical

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militaryforce consistedof the heavy infantry phalanx,which was well suited for defending and ravaginglevel ground.30 Light-armed forces in classical Greece were never important in battle.31 The classical Greekhoplite was a citizen who did not have time for constantmountain thatspecialized, training for movingon roughground.32 light-armed troopsrequired As Hansonnotes: Well-organized, if not mercenary, light-armed troopsmighthave stopped hoplitesat mountain passeson theirinitialdescentintothe plains.Butthey requiredconstanttraining,special armament, and carefulleadership, and hadto be deployedfor long periodsof time on the border. To the hoplitein the ClassicalPeriodwho farmned his smallplot of groundandleft only for the brief campaigning season, such a specializedforce smelledof professionalism,meantburdening costs, andspelledan end to his mostimportant obligationas a citizenof his city.33 ClassicalGreekarmiespreferred to use heavy infantry, althoughsome mountaincommunities alwaysusedlight-armed Thelight-armed troopsforraiding.34
Greece (Bibliotecadi Studi Antichi40, Pisa 1983) 22-23, 103-107; Adcock,Art of War (as in n.2) 48-50; Anderson,Theory(as in n.18) 57-58, 125; A.W. Gomme,A Historical on Thucydides Commentary Vol.1 (Oxford 1945) 15. Hanson,Warfare(as in n.29) 3-4. Anderson,Theory(as in n. 18) 111. Tam, Military(as in n.2), 3-4. P. Cartledge,"Hoplitesand Heroes.Sparta'sContribution to the Technique of Ancient Warfare," JHS 97 (1977) 11-27. Heavy hoplite armorwas poorly suited for raids, skirmishing,and ambush(Victor Davis Hanson,"HopliteBattle as AncientGreek Warfare," in: Hans van Wees fed.], Warand Violencein AncientGreece [London2000] 201-232, 206-207, 222). PritchettI (as in n.2) 133; Adcock,Art of War(as in n.2) 15-16; Snodgrass,Arms(as in n. 18) 89; J.K. Anderson,"HopliteWeaponsandOffensive Arms,"in: V.D. Hanson(ed.), Hoplites. The Classical GreekBattle Experience(Londonand NY 1991) 15-37, 21-22. Hanson, Hoplite Battle (as in n.30) 206-207: archaeologicalfinds of Greek armor indicatethat it was overwhelminglyheavy and unsuitedfor ambushor skirmishing.Cf. VictorDavis Hanson,The Western Wayof War.Infantry Battle in Classical Greece(New York 1989) 56-57. Althoughin the Peloponnesian Wartherewere raids,surpriseattacks, andotherfights thatwere not pitchedbattles,these usuallyinvolvedhoplites,not special forces or light-armed troops;see e.g., Thuc. 3.94.1; PeterKrentz,"TheStrategicCulture of PericleanAthens,"in CharlesD. HamiltonandPeterKrentz(eds.), Polis and Polemos (Claremont,CA 1997) 55-72, 57; Peter Krentz, "Deceptionin Archaic and Classical in HansVan Wees (ed.), Warand Violencein AncientGreece (London GreekWarfare," 2000) 167-200, 171-172 for ambushes. I (as in n.29) 12-15. Adcock,Artof Hanson,Warfare(as in n.29) 4. Gomme,Thucydides War(as in n.2) 16. Hanson,Warfare(as in n.29) 4. Adcock,Art of War(as in n.2) 15-16. E.g., Thuc.3.98.1-2. Otherlight-armed peoples:Amphilochians (Thuc.3.107.4; 3.112.6); Ozolian Locrians (Thuc. 3.95.3; 3.97.2); Acarnanians(Thuc. 7.31.5; 7.60.4; 7.67.2) (J.G.P.Best, ThracianPeltasts and their Influenceon GreekWarfare[Groningen1969] 16). Hanson,Warfare(as in n.29) 5, 22-25 says thatlight-arnedforces are not the same or unarmed forces who ravagedfields and were not trained. as "lightly-armed"

30

31

32 33 34

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and ready to flee, unlike the soldier was generallydespised as unorganized force was ever light-armed hoplite,andGommedeclares,"No well-organized formedby any [classical]Greekstate."35 Whatlight-armed forces therewere in ClassicalGreececonsistedof archers, slingers,javelin-men,andpeltasts.These forces wereusuallynon-Greeks, javelins of the Hellenicworld,such as Thracian or Greeksfromthe periphery Light-armedtroops, and peltasts, Rhodian slingers, and Cretan archers.36 They wereuseful primariusuallyjavelin-men,existedbutwereuncommon.37

35 Hanson,Warfare(as in n.29), 13-18; Hanson,Western(as in n.31) 13-17; Thuc.4.94.1; Gomme, ThucydidesI (as in n.29) 15. Tarn,Military (as in n.2) 5: "priorto the fourth century it seems that the light-armedwere often only an unorganizedforce, and it was very rare for them to exert any serious influence on the course of a battle, except in Aetolia. Thatunconquerable countrywas always a law to itself."Aetolianshad only light armor(e.g., Thuc. 3.94.4; 3.98.1). 36 E.g., barbarians(Thuc. 7.42.1); Acarnania(Thuc. 2.81.8; 7.31.5; 7.67.2; Xen. Hell. 4.6.7); the Balearic Islands (Polyb. 3.33.11, 16; 3.83.3; Livy 21.21.12); Rhodes (Thuc. 6.43; Xen. Anab.3.3.16);Crete (Thuc. 6.25.2; 6.43; Xen. Anab. 3.3.15; 3.4.17); Thrace (Thuc. 7.27.1-2); Scythia (Snodgrass,Arms [as in n. 18] 82-84). Adcock, Art of War(as in n.2) 21; Anderson,Theory(as in n.18) 112; Tam, Military (as in n.2) 19-21; Parke, Soldiers (as in n.2) 16; GodfreyHutchinson, Xenophonand the Artof Command (London 2000) 28, 231; Snodgrass,ibid. 78. The Atheniansand Spartansused local peltasts with theirhoplites when they fought in Thraceand the Chalcidice(e.g., Thuc. 2.79.4; 4.123.4; 4.129.4; 5.6; 5.10), and also peltastsfrom Olynthus(Thuc. 2.79.3-4; Xen. Anab. 1.2.6), all areasnearto Thrace(Best, Peltasts [as in n.34] 13 and n.72). The javelin had a short rangeand little penetrating power (Anderson,Hoplite Weapons[as in n.31] 21; Adcock, ibid. 15); the sling did not penetrateand was primarilya nuisance.The arrowwas more dangerous, butcouldnot penetrate shieldsandwas notpopular outsideof Crete(Snodgrass, ibid. 80-81; Adcock, ibid. 15;Tarn,ibid. 6). On Cretanarchers: Plato,Laws 625D. It was consideredunmanlyto use the bow (e.g., Eur. Herc. 160-164; Snodgrass,ibid. 80-81; Garlan,War[as in n.21 128; Hanson,Western[as in n.31] 16; Hdt.9.72.2; Plut.Mor. 234 E46). Archersare not mentionedin pitched battles (Anderson,Hoplite Weapons[as in n.3 1] 22), andarcherscould not standagainstthephalanx(Adcock, ibid. 15-16). Javelins were the primaryweaponsof Homericand DarkAge warriors (P.A.L. Greenhalgh, Early Greek Warfare[Cambridge1973] 41, 73). Archaic and classical peltasts used a leather shield (Snodgrass,ibid. 78). Cf. 0. Lippelt,Die griechischenLeichtbewaffneten bis auf Alexanderden Grojien(Diss. Jena 1910). The only success of the light-armed,outside Aetolia, was at Sphacteria (Tarn,ibid. 6). 37 Tarn,Military(as in n.2) 4-6. Slingersrarelyplayeda role in classical battlesanddid not form a standard partof the classical army- except at Himerasin 31 1 (Diod. 19.109.1-2; PritchettV [as in n.2] 21). The peltastoriginatedin Thracebut was not significantuntil the PeloponnesianWarwhen the Atheniansemployedsome mercenary Thracianpeltasts (Thuc. 7.27.1-2; 4.129.2; Anderson,Theory[as in n.18] 113-114; Best, Peltasts [as in n.34]; Snodgrass,Arms [as in n.181 98). In 408 the Athenian Thrasyllus armed five thousandsailors, probablyrowers,as peltasts(Xen. Hell. 1.2.1-9; Anderson,Theory[as in n.18] 114). The Boeotians had ten thousand infantryand five hundredpeltasts at

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ly in mountain passes wherethey could shoot down at the enemy,againstand with cavalry,38 and on both sides in sieges to protectwalls or hinderdefenders.39 He was peltastbecameimportant.40 In the fourthcenturythe mercenary anda lighterspearorjavelin,andwas consequently armedwith a light shield41 frontiersbetroopswere used on the mountain more flexible.42Light-armed

38

39

40

41

42

Delium (Thuc. 4.93.3); and the Syracusanswere suppliedwith Sicilian javelins (Thuc. werejavelin-men 7.33.1). Cf. Thuc. 4.123.4; 2.79.4; 4.129.2. Most classical light-armed (Snodgrass,Arms[as in n. 18178). The AthenianDemosthenes,who "saw that the lightarmed infantrywere, in some sorts of encounter,the effective answer to the heavilyforce of javelin-menavailable(GeorgeCawkarmedhoplite,"usuallyhad a light-armed well, Thucydidesand the Peloponnesian War [London and NY 1997] 50; cf. Thuc. 7.31.5; 7.33.4-5; 7.35.1; 7.42.1; hoplites and archers [Thuc. 3.107.2]; light-infantry [Thuc.4.67.2]; Best, Peltasts [as in n.34] 19-29). Demosthenesused hoplites and lightarmedtroops to ambushthe Spartansat Olpae (Thuc. 3.107.3-108.1). But Thucydides says that the Spartansby custom did not usually use cavalry or archers(Thuc. 4.55.2; 4.40.2). Most referencesto classical light-armedforces are to non-Greeks,particularly Persians(e.g., Xen. Anab. 1.9.5; 3.3.6-8, 15; 3.4.15-18, 25-26; 4.1.16; 4.2.12, 27) and other easterntribesmen(Xen. Anab. 5.4.23. PritchettV [as in n.21 9-13). Darius used twenty thousandslingersand archerswith his cavalryon his rightwing and six thousand javelin-menand slingers in the front of his line at Issos (Curt.3.9.1-11). The sling and Libyanfighting weapons(Diod. 3.49). javelin were traditional In 415 BC Nicias was supplied with seven hundredRhodianslingers (Thuc. 6.43) and Cretan archers (Thuc. 6.25.2; 6.43) for use against enemy cavalry since the stones frightenedhorses (Thuc. 6.22; 6.25.2). For slingers against and with cavalry, see also Thuc. 6.22; 7.6.2; Arr.5.13.4. Javelinswith cavalry(Thuc.6.67; 7.11.2; 7.37.3; 7.42.6); archerswith cavalry(Thuc. 2.13.8). Mountainpasses (e.g., Xen. Anab.5.4.23-25, 30; Xen. Hell. 2.4.12-16; 3.5.19-20; 4.6.8; 7.1.19; Hutchinson,Xenophon[as in n.36] 75); in sieges (e.g., Thuc. 3.23.3-4; 4. 100.1; 5.84.1; 7.11.2; 7.43.2; Polyb. 4.61.2; Xen. Hell. 4.7.6; 7.1.15; Aen.Tact.38.4-8; Diod. 20.85.3; PritchettV [as in n.2] 7-8, 14-15, 58, 60; Anderson,Theory[as in n.18] 138139; Hutchinson,Xenophon [as in n.36] 157). Light-armedmarines fought on ships (Thuc.7.62.2; 7.70.5). A groupof these, some of themThracians,accompanied the Marchof the Ten Thousand (Xen. Anab. 1.2.3, 6; 3.3.15; 5.6.15; Anderson,Theory[as in n.18], 112, 115; Griffith, Mercenaries[as in n.2] 5). Jasonof Thessaly in 374 not only gatheredtwenty thousand hoplites but also had enough peltasts "to be set in arrayagainstthe whole world,"says Xenophon(Xen. Hell. 6.1.19). But Jasondoes not appearto have done anythingwith this in the fourthcenturyand later in generalwere increasinglyimportant force. Mercenaries Histo(e.g., E.M. Anson, "TheHypaspists:Macedonia'sProfessionalCitizen-Soldiers," ria 34 [1985] 246-248, 246). The peltastwas so called becauseof his pelta, a light shield of hide (Anderson,Theory[as in n.18] 112; Snodgrass,Arms [as in n.18] 78). But the Macedonianpeltast carrieda bronzeshield (Hatzopoulos,L'organisation[as in n.2] 71). E.g., Xen. Hell. 4.5.13-16; Nep. Iphicr. 11.1.3-4; Anderson,Theory(as in n.18), 129131; Tarn,Military(as in n.2), 6-7, 10; Adcock,Art of War(as in n.2) 22-23.

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tween Attica and Boeotia43 and in the passes between Corinth and Sicyon.44 But these examples do not involve specialized training, guerilla tactics, or night warfare.45Although most fourth-century Greek states used peltasts as a lightarmed force with the phalanx,46 there were few attempts to use peltasts in new ways: in fact, two Spartan attacks using peltasts resulted in great defeats at the hands of cavalry.47Perhaps as a result, the Spartanshad contempt for peltasts.48 Only the Athenian Iphicrates, who trained peltasts as a special unit, and later Alexander the Great and Philip V could afford the great expense of drilling special units of mercenary light-armed troops. Alexander the Great dramaticallychanged Greek fighting with the Macedonian phalanx,49 and he used several kinds of force rather than just heavy infantry. Alexander developed his cavalry into the premier method of fighting in the Hellenistic period and he used heavy-armed hypaspists in battle.50 Alexander also had two special groups of mercenary light-armed fighters with his Macedonian phalanx of heavy infantry, one armed with javelins and the other with the bow (mostly Thracianjavelin-men and Cretan archers).51 But after Alexander, the light-armed forces are rarely mentioned and did not play an importantrole in the battles of the Hellenistic states. Tam remarks:
43 44 45 46 47 Xen. Mem.3.5.25-27. Anderson,Theory(as in n.18) 132. Xen. Hell. 4.2.14-16. Hanson,Warfare(as in n.29) 79. Anderson,Theory(as in n. 18) 120. E.g., Xen. Hell. 3.2.16. The SpartanPhoebidas at Thespiae in 378 used peltasts and hoplites against Theban hoplites andcavalrybut was routed(Xen. Hell. 5.4.42-45). The Spartan Teleutiasin 382 attackedthe Olynthianswith mercenary peltastsbut was routedby the cavalry(Xen. Hell. 5.3.3-6; Anderson,Theory[as in n.18] 126-128). At Nemea in 394 the Lacedaemonians andtheirallies had 13,500 hoplites,700 cavalry,300 Cretanarchers,and400 slingers;the Athenians and their allies had 24,000 hoplites, 1550 cavalry, and many light-armed, includingAcamaniansand others(Xen. Hell. 4.2.16-17). Xen. Hell. 4.4.17. Anderson,Theory(as in n.18) 110: despite Xenophon's experiences with how hoplites were "ineffective against light-armedtroops,"he was convinced that "the infantryshould be equippedfor close combat,not for skirmishing." In the 390s the Spartanking Agesilaus did use peltasts and archersbut these were apparently dispersed after Coroneia (Best, Peltasts [as in n.34] 81-85; J.F. Lazenby, The Spartan Army [Warminster 1985] 39). Anderson, Theory (as in n.18) 129-131; Hatzopoulos,L'organisation (as in n.2) 55; Diod. 16.3.1-2. Philip II may have borrowedIphicrates'innovationswith the peltasts' shield (Diod. 15.44; Nep. Iphicr. 11.1.3-4) in his reorganizationof the Macedonian phalanx (Anderson,ibid. 128-129, 131. PritchettII [as in n.21 117-125). Cavalry: Tarn,Military(as in n.2) 11. Polybiussays thatAlexanderused peltastsin battle (Polyb. 12.17.7). But Griffith,Mercenaries(as in n.2) 17 and Tarn,ibid. 16-17 believe that Alexander's"peltasts"were really heavy-armed hypaspists. Tam, Military(above n.2) 11, 20-22; Snodgrass, Arms(as in n. 18) 115. Arr.3.25; 4.7, 25, 26, 29; 5.13.4; 5.14, 20, 23; 6.2, 6. But these were few in comparisonto Alexander's forces as a whole (cf. Adcock,Artof War[as in n.2] 24; Griffith,Mercenaries[as in n.2]

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In his use of light-armed was developinga new formof warfare. Alexander whichunderwent no further ... But it seems to have been a line of warfare afterhis death,thoughif we had Seleucidhistorywe might development conceivablybe able to add somethingas regards the employment of lightarmedin mountain warfare.52 The Antigonidsused peltastsandjavelins in battle,but they fought with the its flanks.53 In the east, Antiochusseemsto havecontinphalanxandprotected ued the Persiantradition of employinglight-armed archers,slingers,andjavelins.54Yet in the HellenisticandRomanarmies,light-armed javelins,slingers, and archerswere rare and were primarilyused in the traditional ways: they protectedand harassedcavalryand elephants,skirmished, defendedwalls in the flanksof heavy troops,and foughtin mountain sieges, protected passes.55 But they playedno majorrole in battles.56 Nevertheless,light-armedraidingforces were a mountaintradition:alreliedon theirheavy-armed thoughthe Spartans hoplites,they usedpeltastson

52 53

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I [as in n.2159-125). At Issos 12-15; Parke,Soldiers [as in n.2] 20-22, 73-132; Pritchett Alexanderused slingersand bowmen in the frontof his line (Curt.3.9.1-1 1; Arr. 3.14). Alexandertried to keep his phalanx as flexible as possible; Tarnbelieves he plannedto replace his middle rankswith archersand light-armedtroops (Tarn,ibid. 13 who cites Asclepiodotus6; cf. Arr.7.23.3). Tarn,Military(as in n.2) 22-23. E.g., levis armaturaepraesidio Livy 35.26.16. The Macedonianpeltast was different from the fourthcenturypeltast:he fought with the phalanx and carriedthe sarissa, but also had a lighterbronze shield (see Hatzopoulos,L'organisation[as in n.2] 71; Polyb. 22.9.3). AntigonusDoson had 3000 peltasts, 1000 Agrianes,300 horse, anda phalanxof 10,000 for a totalof 28,200 at Sellasia in 222 (Polyb. 2.65.2-5; cf. Hatzopoulos,ibid. 74). andPersianslingersandarchers,and500 Lydianjavelins Antiochusused 2000 Agrianian (with 62,000 foot) at Raphiain 217 (Polyb. 5.79.6-13; 5.82.11); archers,slingers, and javelins in 210 when he advanced into Parthianmountains(Polyb. 10.30.5-9); lightarmedforces, including slingers at Thermopylaein 191 (Livy 36.18.3-5); and slingers and archersin 190 at Magnesia(Livy 37.41.9-10) (PritchettV [as in n.21 60, 64-65). Ptolemyused 2000 Boeotianpeltasts(with a phalanxof 25,000) at Raphia(Polyb.5.65.2; 5.82.4; 5.84.9). elephants(Polyb. 1.40.6-13); defendingLibyanwalls (Polyb. E.g., againstCarthaginian 1.43.6); javelins protectingRoman cavalry (Polyb. 3.69.8; 3.72.2; 3.110.6); Romans' javelins skirmishing with cavalry (Polyb. 3.73.3); Antiochus' archers, slingers, and (Polyb. mountaineers expertin javelins andstones were"mostuseful on difficultground" 10.29.5); Antiochus'slingers, archers,andjavelins were able to advanceover rocks and fight on hills (Polyb. 10.30.5-9); Antiochus'archersand slingersprotectedhis elephants (Polyb. 16.18.7). AntigonusDoson's peltasts and Agrianianjavelins at Sellasia in 223 played no special role in the battle(Polyb. 2.65.2), and neitherdid AntiochusIII's ten thousandpeltastsin Bactria in 208 (Polyb. 10.49.3-4). Tam, Military (as in n.2) 27 says that Raphiawas decided by heavy infantry.

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theirplundering raidsinto ArcadiaandMessenia.57 The Aetolianswereknown for theirjavelin-menwho had defeatedDemosthenes.58 The Aetolians were also notoriousfor their ability to fight on hills,59somethingthat was very difficult for heavily armedmen.60The Acarnanians were famous for their slingers6iandthey also foughtwithjavelins.62 Xenophonnotes the bravery of his Arcadian peltasts,who were commanded by an Acarnanian.63 The Achaeand ans andAcarnanians used slingersbecauseof theirmountainous terrain,64 Elian slingers were with the Lacedaemonian army at Nemea in 394.65 The Achaeans and Arcadiansknew the light-armedfighting practicedby their enemiesandthey required light armor to move easily andquicklyin mountain passes. But there is no evidence that the Achaean Confederacyused lightarmed forces, especially peltasts, in battles or raids before Philopoemen's
reforms.66

Philopoemen's originalityandspecialforces in Greekwarfare Philopoemen'soriginalityat Pleiae consisted in his combinationof a use of light-armed forces,not only peltastsbut also slingersandjavelins;amphibious landingsfrom ships followed by an immediateraid;the use of native lightarmed anduse of light-armed troopsrather thanforeignmercenaries; forcesin a commando-style raid at night against an enemy camp and then in multiple ambushes. This is the firstmajoruse of "specialforces"(i.e., specialized,rapid,
57 And in Bithynia(Xen. Hell. 3.2.1-2). Parke,Soldiers(as in n.2) 44; Anderson,Theory(as in n.18) 120; Best, Peltasts (as in n.34) 97-101. 58 Thuc. 3.94.4; 3.97.3; 3.98.1. 59 Polyb. 4.11.6-4.12; 4.14.6. Thuc. 3.94-98; Adcock,Art of War(as in n.2) 17-18. 60 Polyb. 12.22.4;Thuc. 4.33.2. 61 Thuc. 2.81.8. 62 Thuc. 7.31.5; 7.67.2; Xen. Hell. 4.6.7-11. 63 Xen. Anab. 4.8.18. More than half of Xenophon's army consisted of Achaeans and Arcadians(Xen. Anab.6.2.10) but they were mostly hoplites. Many of the peltastswere Thracians(Xen. Anab.6.2.16). But the Acamanianswere known for their peltasts(Xen. Hell. 4.6.7; J. Roisman, The General Demosthenes and His Use of Military Surprise [Stuttgart1993] 29, 3 1-32). 64 PhilipV used 300 Achaeanslingersat the siege of Ambracus (Polyb.4.61.2) andAchaean slingers had longerrangeand greateraccuracythanthe Balearicislanders(Livy 38.29.38; PritchettV [as in n.2] 55). 65 Xen. Hell. 4.2.16. Also Cretanbowmen. 66 The Achaean army under Aratus in 217 only consisted of Achaean and mercenary infantryand horse (Polyb. 5.91.6-7). Thereis no evidence thatthe AchaeanConfederacy used peltasts in battle before Philopoemen'sreforms.Philopoemenin 201 sent "picked troops"(Polyb. 16.37.2-7) against Nabis, but it is not clear if these were peltasts. See above n.25.

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and innovative light troops that performed special missions) in ancient Greece and it is the first time that light-armed troops prosecuted nearly an entire war. Philopoemen's mixture of light-armed peltasts, archers, and javelins in a special raid is unusual. Although Xenophon reports that archers, slingers, and peltasts formed part of the army of Greek Mercenaries in the March of the Ten Thousand,67these all fought together only when the Greeks attacked a mountain fortress68and when all the Greeks tried to repel an attack by Mossynoecian slingers in the mountains.69 In 404 Thrasybulus attacked the troops of the Thirty with hoplites, peltasts, javelins, and stones when they were marching up Munichia.70 The Athenians in 403 attacked the Spartan King Pausanias with slingers, javelins, arTows,and hoplites at the Piraeus.71But these are examples of traditionaluses of light-armed troops in mountains and sieges, and they were mostly used with hoplites. Demosthenes used a combination of light-armed forces at Sphacteria, but they were initially employed in the traditional way, to protect the flanks and rear of his hoplites.72 It was the light-armed troops themselves at Sphacteria who, emboldened by their success, decided on the spur of the moment to act At Sphacteria a group of light-armedtroops together and charge the Spartans.73 encircled the Spartans by moving along the precipitous shore of the island and attacking from the rear,74but these were not a specially trainedunit and they did not operate at night or use fire or other guerilla tactics.75 Roisman, indeed, argues that the peltasts on Sphacteria were of little importance compared to the archers and slingers and were no model for Iphicrates.76The only example77of
67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 Xen. Anab.5.6.15; Xen. Oec. 8.6. Xen. Anab. 5.2.12-16. Xen. Anab.5.4.23-25. Xen. Hell. 2.4.12-19. Xen. Hell. 2.4.33. Thuc. 4.32.3-4; 33.1. Thuc. 4.34-35. Thuc. 4.36. Best, Peltasts (as in n.34) 24-25 believes that Demosthenes used guerilla tactics at andin laterraids,butthe evidence is weak. AlthoughDemosthenesintroduced Sphacteria the ambushto the battlefieldat Olpae(Thuc.3.107.3), Roismanpointsout thatOlpaewas troopswere involved, light-armed a hoplite battle"and only 300 Acarnanian "'primarily advice and tactics and was himself a and arguesthat Demosthenesfollowed Acarnanian hoplite general,"not an innovator(Roisman,Demosthenes[as in n.63], 29, "traditional "TheCampaignsin Amphilochiaduringthe Archidam31-32; contraN.G.L. Hammond, ian War,"BSA 37 [1936-19371 128-140, 138 who notes Demosthenes' skill in using troopsagainsta superiorarmy). light-armed couldhavetaught 76 Roisman, Demosthenes (as in n.63) 40 andn.76:"thebattleon Sphacteria rolein land little.Forexample,thepeltastswho in lateryearsplayedan important Iphicrates Most of the troopson Sphacteria. from otherlight-armed warfarewere not distinguished andplain was the workof archers,slingers,javelin throwers damagedone to the Spartans

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severaltypes of light-armed forces used in a special raidoccurs in 329 when Alexander the Greatwith hypaspists,archers,andAgrianian javelins- a mixtureof light-armed mercenaries andheavyforces wentthrough riverchannels to enterandcapture the city of Cyropolis.78 The fourthcenturyAthenian Iphicrates was the firstto realizethe potential of a speciallytrainedmercenary force of peltasts.BecausemoneyfromPersia madeextensivetraining possible,79 Iphicrates gathered mercenaries at Corinth and drilled them as a unit of peltasts. Iphicratesbecame famous80 after his peltasts armed with javelins attackedand destroyed a division of Spartan hoplitesat Lechaeum in 390.81Iphicrates won a secondvictorywithhis peltasts againsthoplitesin 389 whenhe usedpeltaststo ambush the enemy.82 Iphicrates with ambushes;83 in 388 the experimented moreover, Athenianslanded 800 But few peltasts and hoplites on Aegina and ambushedmany Aeginetans.84 others after Iphicratescopied either his methods or his successful use of speciallytrained peltasts.His achievement was notrepeated untilAlexander the Great85 and Philip V, who were the only ones able to afford special troops. Moreover, Iphicrates' peltastsprimarily foughtwiththephalanx,noton raids,86
stone shooters." Cf. E.C. Woodcock,"Demosthenes, Son of Alcisthenes," HSCP39 (1928) 93-108, 101;Adcock,Artof War(as in n.2) 18. But Lazenby,Spartan(as in n.48) 120. In 389 Acamanianpeltastsseeking booty attackedthe Spartan Agesilaus with stones and arrows- andaboutthreehundred fell to the Spartan hoplites(Xen. Hell. 4.6.7-1 1). These were pirates,not special forces. Arr. 4.3.2. Alexanderthe Great usually put his archers,Agrianes, and javelins on his wings in battle (Arr. 5.13.4). Although Philip V in 210/9 sent 1000 peltasts and 500 Agrianianjavelins to protect Euboea (Polyb. 10.42.2), these were defensive forces. AntigonusDoson had3000 peltastsand 1000 Agrianian javelins at Sellasia in 223, butthe battle was won by the cavalryand infantry(Polyb. 2.65.2). PritchettII (as in n.2) 117, 123. Anderson,Theory(as in n. 18) 121. Ar. Plut. 170-173; Lysias 33. Cawkwell,Thucydides (as in n.37) 50; Anderson,Theory(as in n. 18) 129. PritchettII (as in n.2) 122-124: but "[t]hecitizen-hoplite,not the mercenary peltast,won or lost the day at Leuktra,Mantineiaand Chaironeia." Xen. Hell. 4.5.1 1-17. Xen. Hell. 4.8.33-39. Little is known about Iphicrates'new type of armamentfor his peltasts (Diod. 15.44; Anderson,Theory [as in n.181 129; PritchettII [as in n.2] 125; Lippelt,Leichtbewaffneten [as in n.36] 64). Xen. Hell. 4.4.15. Demosthenesambushedthe Peloponnesianswith hoplites and lightarmedAcarnanians (Thuc.3.107-108), butthis was in a pitchedbattleanddid not involve specially trainedforces. Cf. Thuc. 3.112. Xen. Hell. 5.1.10. PritchettII (as in n.2) 117. Parke,Soldiers (as in n.2) 79-80 believes thatafterIphicrates, peltastsmerelyacted as hoplites.Cf. Diod.15.44; F. Lammert, "Peltastai," RE XIX.1.405 (1937). Xen. Hell. 4.4.9; B.B. Rogers (ed.), The Plutus of Aristophanes(London 1907), v. n.l; PritchettII (as in n.2) 121. Griffith,Mercenaries(as in n.2) 239: in the seventy yearsafter

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and at Lechaeum Athenian hoplites followed the peltasts and concluded

battle.87

Alexanderthe Great made innovativeuse of his light-armed troops in pitchedbattles.88 He also usedheavy-armed hypaspists, someas his bodyguard andothersas a special unitthatfoughtwith the infantry, in ambushes, andon But they wereheavy-armed, specialexpeditions.89 andAlexander's hypaspists were not peltasts.90 The Macedonian kings also preferred pitchedbattlesto sieges or raids.91AlthoughAlexanderdeveloped some of his hypaspistsas special forces, he rarelyused them thatway and they neverwere his primary weaponof war. Philip V continuedMacedonian experimentation with light-armed forces: he useda groupof "picked peltasts" to ambush pursuing Aetoliansin 218 BC,92 and in ambushesin battle in 21593 and 206.94Philip V's peltasts were an important model for Philopoemen, who in 201 emulatedPhilipin battlewhen he sent "pickedtroops" (butnot peltasts)to ambushNabis' Spartan mercenaries95and in 192 when he ambushed Nabis with caetrati.But Philipprimarily usedpeltastsin conjunction withhis phalanx.96 His peltastswerealso veryfew
Iphicratesand before Alexanderthere is no traceof the Thracianpeltastwho appearsto by Iphicrates'speltasts. have been "driven... from the market" A. Burckhardt, BurgerundSoldaAnderson,Hoplite Weapons(as in n.31) 22; Leonhard ten. Aspekteder politischen undmilitarischenRolle athenischerBurgerim Kriegswesen 1996)92-93 andn.76. des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.(HistoriaEinzelschriften101, Stuttgart Xen. Hell. 4.5.11-12, 17. Tarn,Military(as in n.2) 19:"[N]o one can readArrianwithoutrealizingthatthe greatest share in the conquestof Asia, after the cavalry,belonged to the light armedtroops.No importantState before Alexander,in the Greek-speakingworld, had taken the use of light-armed troopsin battlereally seriously;theirbusiness had been scoutingor pursuit, and they were essentially the armof the more backwardStates."But Alexanderdid not take many light-armed L'organisation[as in n.2] 55). troopsinto Asia (Hatzopoulos, E.g., Arr. 2.23.2; 2.24.4; 2.27.1; 4.3.2; 5.13.4. Hatzopoulos,L'organisation(as in n.2) 57-59 cites inscriptional evidence thatindicatesthatthe hypaspistswere the royal guard (FGrHist in the Antigonidperiod.Cf. Anson,Hypaspists(as in n.40) 247-8; Theopompus 115 F 348). Arms Walbank,Philip V (as in n. 17) 290. Tarn,Military(as in n.2) 16-17 andSnodgrass, (as in n. 18) 115 say that Alexander'shypaspistswere the same as the phalanx. Griffith, were probablyheavy armed Mercenaries(as in n.2) 17 says that Alexander's"peltasts" (citing Arr. 3.18.1) and were not his best troops. Griffith, ibid. 12-13 says Alexander crossed the Hellespontwith only 1000 Cretansand Agrianesout of 30,000 foot. Polyb. 18.3.4-7. Polyb. 5.13.5-6. Philip also ambushedthe Aetoliansin 219 (Polyb.4.63.9). Polyb. 8.14. Livy 31.36.1-7. Cf. Livy 33.15.16. Polyb. 16.37.2-7. Grote, Soldnerwesen(as in n.2) 94. Walbank,Philip V (as in n.17) 291-293, citing Griffith,Mercenaries(as in n.2) 319, says thatPhilip V's peltastswere really hypaspists

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in numberand did not play a majorrole in Macedonian battles.97 Moreover, Polybius'commentsaboutthe inflexibilityof the Macedonian phalanx98 indicate that the Macedonian peltastwas designedto fight with the phalanx,not fromit.99 separately Nothing in the history of Greek warfarecompareswith Philopoemen's nightraidby amphibious troopsor his use of guerillatactics,includingfire.10 Amphibious landingsfromsmallboatsimmediately followedby raidsarevery in Greekhistoryfor the obviousreasonsthatthe phalanxrequired uncommon level ground to fightandwas cumbersome to moveby ship,andbecauserowing ships and even small boats requiredextensive drill.101 Even if troops were moved by ship at night, they regroupedand attackedor ravagedfarmland duringthe day.'02Amphibiouslandingswere limited to Illyriansand other

- specially trained infantry - and probably were not light-armed.But Hatzopoulos, L'organisation(as in n.2) 71-72 arguesthatthey were peltastsarmedwith the sarissa and small bronze shields who fought with the phalanx and on missions similar to the hypaspists'(cf. Snodgrass,Arms[as in n. 181 123). Philip's peltastswere sometimesused as royal guards,like hypaspists(Polyb. 5.16.2) but they were usually used to protectthe flanks of a column, in pitched battle, or ambushes (4.64.6 [to protect river crossing]; 4.75.4 [with mercenaries and light infantrythroughmountaind6fil6];4.80.8; [with light infantry];5.4.9 [throughwall]; 5.7.11-12 [with heavy infantrythroughpass]; 5.13.5-6 [ambush];5.22.9; 5.23.3-6 [with mercenaries, cavalry, and Illyriansat the Menelaium]; 5.23.8-10 [to protectriver crossing]; 10.42.2 [sent to Euboea with Agrianianjavelins]; 8.13.5-8.14 [with light infantryin ambush]).But Polybiusalways calls thempeltasts,not hypaspists, and he would know the difference. He reports that his father Lycortas occupied Messene in 182 with peltasts(Polyb. 23.16.10). Polybius knew thatMacedonian light-armedforces fought with the phalanx: he quotes a Macedoniansaying that the firsttroopsto be exposed in battleandto sufferloss arethe "lightandmost active"butthe phalanx and the heavy-armedtroops get the credit for the result (Polyb. 10.25.1-2). Philip V's peltasts were not the same as light infantry(e?5ovot). See F.W. Walbank,A Historical Commentary on Polybius Vol.3 (Oxford 1979) 789 (Addendaand Corrigenda 18.24.8-9). 97 AntigonusDoson had threethousandpeltastsand one thousandAgrianesat Sellasia, out of 29,000 total (Polyb. 2.65.2; cf. Hatzopoulos,L'organisation [as in n.2] 74). This indicatesthat Macedonianpeltasts, however well-trained,did not play a primaryrole in Hellenistic battles, were partof the phalanx,and were of minor importance.See Hatzopoulos, ibid. 69 for the numbersof peltastsat Sellasia, Cynoscephalae,and Pydna. 98 Polyb. 18.31-32. 99 As Antigonus Doson's Macedonianpeltasts did at Sellasia in 222 B.C. (Polyb. 2.65.2) and Philip V's peltastsdid at Cynoscephalae.See also Tarn,Military(as in n.2) 16-17. 100 The deliberatefiring of a camp is almost unparalleled, but there is one example (Thuc. 1.49.5 [empty camp]). The fire on Sphacteriawas accidental(Thuc. 4.30.2). Cf. Thuc. 2.77.2-6; 3.98; 4.100.3-4; Plut. Arat. 9.1-2. 101 For naval drills, PritchettII (as in n.2) 225-229; Hdt. 6.12.3. If Philopoemen'speltasts rowed themselves,they would have requiredeven more training. 102 E.g., Xen. Hell.5.1.10.

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- a great landingon Sphacteria pirates,103 with the exceptionof the Spartans' disaster- and the dawn landingof 800 Athenianhoplites on Sphacteria,104 105 attack. which was not a surprise to lightly arm native troops since light-armed It was also extraordinary forces required extensive specializedtrainingbeyondthatof the citizen hop106 armedhis peltastswithmanytypes of ordinance lite. Whether Philopoemen or used many differentforces, he had to trainhis men extensivelysince only Antigonus Doson, Classicalarmies,Alexander, expertscould fight on hills.107 javelins'08and and Philip V used foreign mercenaries, especially Agrianian

103 Pritchett1I (as in n.2) 177-189 cites only four examples of ambushfrom the sea (Hdt. once sailed ashoreand 6.138.1; Polyaenus 1.39.1; 1.40.2; 5.22.4). But the Corcyraeans fired a Corinthiancamp (Thuc. 1.49.5). Plato speaks of marines (hoplites on ships) jumping from ships when fleeing battle (not amphibiouslandings)(P1.Laws 706c). In 233/2 one hundredboats with five thousand Illyrians invaded Aetolia at night and advancedat dawn, but the surprisedAetolians routed them (Polyb. 2.3). But even the Illyriansrarelyused amphibiouslandings(e.g., Polyb. 2.4.7-2.5; 2.9). Scerdilaidasand Demetriusof Pharosin 220 sailed from Illyriaand attackedPylos and then the Cyclades but this was not at night (Polyb. 4.16.6-8). For ancientpiracy,see PritchettV (as in n.2) 312-352. Greek states (except the Aetolians) did not practicepiracy (Aetolians:Polyb. 9.34.9-11; 4.3.9-4.4.1; Diod. 28.1). (But see Plut.Philop. 4.1.) 104 Thuc. 4.11-12; 4.31.1. The Athenians landed on Sphacteriabecause of bad weather (Thuc. 4.3.1), althoughG. Wylie, "Demosthenesthe General- Protagonistin a Greek Greece and Rome40 (1993) 20-30, 23 arguesthat the incidentwas planned Tragedy?", duringthe sea (cf. Roisman,Demosthenes[as in n.631).Gylippuslandedon Plemmyrium attack.Demosthenesattacked battleat Syracuse(Thuc.7.23.1) butthis was a spontaneous Ambraciotsat dawn with Amphilochianlight-armed(Thuc. 3.112.2-5). The Spartans attackeda fort on Salamisat night (Thuc.2.93.2-4), but the landingwas not amphibious and was not againstan enemy armyor navy. guard(Thuc.4.32.1). 105 Thuc. 4.30.4. But the Athenianhoplitesdid surprisethe Spartan 106 Diod. 15.85.5; Polyaenus3.9.32; 3.9.35; Nepos Iph. 2.1-2; Xen. Hell. 6.1.5-6; Pritchett the II (as in n.2) 225, 228-229; Hanson,Warfare (as in n.29) 4. Jasonof Pheraecontrasted (Xen. Hell. 6.1.5), and lightlack of trainingof citizens with the trainingof mercenaries armedforces were usuallymercenaries. Philopoemenspent nearlyeight monthstraining in 207 (Polyb. 11.10.8-9). Achaeantroopsto go againstMachanidas 107 Polyb. 4.14.6. Hanson,Warfare(as in n.29) 4. as peltastssince may not have usedmercenaries 108 E.g., Polyb. 10.42.2.But the Macedonians peltasts were a royal guard.Anson arguesthat Philip II's hypaspistswere Macedonian citizens (Anson, Hypaspistslas in n.40] 247-8 citing Theopompus[FGrHist 115 F 348] But this providesno that Philip II's hypaspistswere "pickedmen of the Macedonians"). for the Antigonids.N.G.L. Hammond,"Alexander'sNon-European Troops information BASP33 (1996) 99-109, 101-102 suggeststhatsome andPtolemyI's Use of SuchTroops," the courts"(Diod. 17.110.1)were fromAlexander's of Alexander's"hypaspists attending Guard ibid. 107"barbarian" (Hammond, troops,andtherewas a PtolemaicPersian regular Mercenaries wereincludedin theguard(Griffith, [as in n.2] 109).Laterin Egypt,Egyptians AgrianesandCretans); 127). Cf. Tam, Military(as in n.2) 20-22 (Alexander'smercenary mercenaries). Arms(as in n.18) 78, 82-84, 106-107 (classicallight-armed Snodgrass,

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Cretanarchers,as light-armedtroops, and Iphicratesemployed only wellin the regular trainedmercenary peltasts.109 Mercenaries were very important Hellenistic armies,110 and Philopoemenhimself used mercenarieswith his in 207.111But when describingPhilopoemen's phalanx against Machanidas battleagainstMachanidas, Polybiusdeclaresthata tyrant'smercenaries generally prevail because as much as the "civic force of a democracyis more courageousin actionthanthe subjectsof a tyrantby so much will a despot's mercenaries excel a democracy'smercenaries." A democracy no longerneeds mercenarieswhen it destroys those who conspire against it, but a tyranny of his requires even moremercenaries since the despotdependson the strength foreign soldiers.112 Machanidas' mercenaries fought with couragewhile the fled.113 Achaeans'mercenaries Philopoemen'sexperiencesagainstMachaniandhe consedas convincedhim thata democracy could not use mercenaries, not mercenaries at Pleiae.114 quentlyused Arcadians, Philopoemenwas truly innovativeat Pleiae since he was the firstto use citizen soldiersas light-armed specialforces. Raids on enemy campswere very unusual,and night warfarewas almost non-existentin the Greek world:Thucydidessays there was only one night attackin the Peloponnesian Warbetweenarmies- Demosthenesat the Epipo-

109 PritchettII (as in n.2) 118, who believes that Iphicrates'mercenarieswere a mixtureof Greeks and Asians. They were partof an allied force at Corinth(ibid. 120). Cf. Burckhardt,Burger (as in n.87) 92. The Spartansin the Hellenistic period used mercenary Cretans,possibly archers(Griffith,Mercenaries[as in n.2] 94, 97-98. 110 Tarn,Military(as in n.2) 23-26. Griffith,Mercenaries(as in n.2) 318-319 says that the tendency in the Hellenistic period was to used a "citizen or national phalanx" but as the light-armed mercenaries troops.Cretanswere particularly as mercenarprominent ies (Griffith,ibid. 245). 111 Polyb. 11.11.4; Plut.Philop. 10.1. In 217 the Achaeanskept a "pickedAchaeanforce"of 3000 foot and 300 horse, an equal numberof Argives, anda mercenary force of 8000 foot and 500 horse (Polyb. 5.91.6-7). Aratusalso used mercenariesin 217 (Polyb. 5.92.10; 5.94.1). 112 Polyb. 11.13.3-8. Arist. Eth.Nic.3, 1116b15;Adcock,Art of War(as in n.2) 24. 113 Polyb. 11.14.1. 114 Paus. 8.50.9. Five hundredCretanshelped Philopoemenagainst Nabis (Polyb. 33.16.6) but they were not archers. Philopoemen's "Cretanauxiliaries"that he used with his cavalry(Livy 35.38.8) were"fast-moving infantry" (e.g., velocissimipedites Livy 31.36.711) and don't seem to have been used at Pleiae (Cretensium levis armaturaLivy 35.29.1 probablyrefers to the auxiliariessince they fought with the cavalry). Philopoemenmay have drawnupon an Achaeantraditionof slingers (e.g., Polyb. 4.61.2; Livy 38.29.3-8. PritchettV [as in n.2] 55). But since the Arcadianswere famousfor theirbraveryand for hiring themselves out as mercenaries(Xen. Hell. 7.1.23), and for their Eparitoi (the ArcadianLeague's picked force of citizen-hoplites,Xen. Hell. 7.4.22-34), Philopoemen may have used experiencedArcadianmercenaries,who perhapsfought in Crete.

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lae. 15 Pritchettconcludesthat there is no exampleof a night assaulton an a campwas very dangerenemycampby a Greekhoplitearmy.116 Infiltrating ous anduncommon: Polybiuscites one instancein whichan Aetoliandidthis at night and remarksthat the action was both brave and ill-planned."17Demjavelinsto attackan osthenesonce usedhoplitesandlight-armed Amphilochian Ambraciotcamp at dawn.118 Alexanderthe Greatonce led heavy infantry, But in hypaspists,Agrianes,and archersagainstan enemy camp at night."19 forces consist of specially none of these few examples did the light-armed andin nonedid lighttrained citizensrather thanforeignallies or mercenaries, of a warnordid it result armedfightingformthe majorpartof the prosecution in a comprehensive victory over the enemy. Thracianpeltastsfavorednight attacks,120andthey werea raiding technique of the Aetoliansbutnot of regular the ambush: it Greekarmies,121 for the same reasonthatPolybiuscondemned

WarDemosthenes 115 Thuc. 7.43-44; Thuc. 3.112; Xen. Anab. 3.4.35. In the Peloponnesian at night,securingit the gate at Megara troopsto ambush once usedhoplitesandlight-armed for the hoplites (Thuc. 4.67); Brasidassent peltasts to storm the gate at Torone when on hoplitesand traitorsopened it (Thuc.4.1 10-113). But these incidentsreliedprimarily treacheryinside the city. In 426 Demosthenesattackedthe Ambraciotsat dawn (Thuc. 3.112.3). Other examples all involve heavy-armedtroops:Demosthenesunsuccessfully results(Thuc.7.43; the Epipolaeat Syracusewithhoplitesat night,withdisastrous attacked Sardisby sending Roisman,Demosthenes[as in n.63] 59-63). In 215 Antiochuscaptured mencouldenterthe mento seize thegate at nightandto scale the walls so thattwo thousand "pickedmen"fromhis hoplitesto climb city (Polyb. 7.16-18). Aratusused four hundred at night(Plut.Arat.21.1). Butthe Romansneverfoughtbattlesat night the walls of Corinth the Greatrejecteda nightattack(Arr.3.10). (Polyb. 36.9.9; Livy 42.47.5). Alexander ibid. 156-176 and Krentz, 116 PritchettII (as in n.2) 171. For surpriseattacks,see Pritchett, ibid. 162-171 who includesthe night Deception(as in n.31) 171; night attacks,Pritchett, attackon the Thessaliancampby the Phocians(Hdt. 8.27.3); Demosthenes'attackon the night on the Epipolae(Thuc.7.43); the Athenians' Ambraciots (Thuc.3.112);Demosthenes of landingon Aegina in 388 and theirdaylightambush(Xen. Hell. 5.1.10); and a number in 404 attacked the troopsof theThirtynearPhylaeas attacks on cities at night.Thrasybulus they were leaving theircamp at dawn (Xen. Hell. 2.4.5-7) - probablywith hoplites.Cf. Roisman,Demosthenes(as in n.63) 59. Two attackson cities: twentyAetoliansin 219 at Aegeira(Polyb. 4.57.3-58); Lagorasthe Cretantook Sardisin 216 for Antiochus(Polyb. 7.16-18). Scipio sent half his legions in a night attackon the campof SyphaxnearUtica the Carthaginians. The hutsof bothcampswereset on fire(Polyb. 14.4while halfattacked 6). But Scipio used regularforces to overwhelma campon level ground. 117 Polyb. 5.81.1-7. 118 Thuc. 3.112 (at dawnbut still dark);Krentz,Deception(as in n.31) 171;Best, Peltasts (as in n.34) 19; Wylie, Demosthenes(as in n.104) 22. 119 Arr.1.6.9-11. 120 PritchettII (as in n.2) 170-17 1; Hdt. 6.45.1; Xen. Anab. 7.2.22; Polyaenus2.2.6, 8, 10. once made a night attack(Polyaenus3.9.33). Iphicrates 121 PritchettII (as in n.2) 171. Cf. Hdt. 8.27.3; Polyb. 4.25.3. The Cretansfavored night attacks(Polyb. 4.8.1 1).

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was techniqueused by cowardly Cretansbut not by brave Achaeans and Macedonians.122 Philopoemeneffectively turneda Greek state army into a powerfulandtrained CretanandAcarnanian-style raidingforce. Polybiusexplains that the Macedonian heavy-armed phalanx was inadequate because it was inflexible: the phalanx requiredlevel groundwith no obstacles,which was almostimpossibleto find, andeven if therewas suitable terrain,if the enemy refusedto fight on level groundbut insteadsackedcities and ravagedlands, "whatis the use of such a formation?"123 Althoughthe phalanxneededto marchandcampin everykindof terrain, it was notableto do so. In most contingenciesthe phalanxwas of little use because"thephalanx or individually."124 soldier is not of service either in detachments Polybius impliesthatMacedonian to fightin separate peltastswerenotaccustomed units. No matterhow Philopoemen armedhis peltasts,his use of them at Pleiae was differentfromthatof the Macedonians. Philopoemen recognizedthe deficiencies of the phalanxandcreateda new kind of armythatwas flexible, mobile, andable to act in small groupsoutsidethephalanx. Philopoemen's ideas for his new kindof fightingmay be tracedto several influences.As an Arcadian, he would have knowntraditional mountainlightarmedfighting'25 andthe Achaeanshadexperienced raidsby their light-armed enemies.Philopoemen mountain also closely studiedthe militarymethodsand tacticsof the Macedonian kings who appreciated swiftnessandthe potentialof light-armed troops.126 Philopoemenknew the value of Philip V's peltasts in in battleandagainsta line of march: ambushes Philopoemen usedhis peltaststo ambush Nabisin the sameway PhilipV did in ambushes in 215 at Acrolissusl27

122 Polyb. 4.8.11 who doesn't take into accountthe use of the ambushby Philip, Iphicrates, andPhilopoemen.Cf. Hanson,Western II (as in n.2) 177-189 (as in n.31) 13-18. Pritchett collects examples of ambushes(includingfour by Demosthenes,two by Iphicrates,and three by Philip V) and concludes that the ambushwas primarilyused along a line of marchor sail or againstdefendersof a city. Pritchett has only fourexamplesof ambushby fromthe sea: Hdt.6.138.1; Polyaenus1.39.1; 1.40.2;5.22.4. It was very rarein marauders battlebecause thephalanx had difficulty beyond level ground(Pritchett,ibid. 184-186). 123 "Forby remainingon the groundthatsuits it, not only is it incapableof helpingits friends but cannoteven ensureits own safety. For the arrivalof supplies will be easily prevented by the enemy, when they have undisturbed commandof the open country. But if the phalanx leaves the groundproperto it and attemptsany action, it will be easily overcome by the enemy." Polyb. 18.31 (W.R. Paton [trans.],Polybius the Histories [Londonand Cambridge,MA 1926]). 124 Polyb. 18.32.7-9. 125 The Arcadianswere knownfor workingas mercenaries, sometimesas peltasts(e.g., Xen. Anab.4.8.18).
126 Plut. Philop. 4.4.

127 Polyb. 8.14. Philipalso ambushed the Aetoliansin 218 using Illyriansandpeltasts(Polyb. 5.13.5-6).

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and in 206.128Iphicratesalso influencedPhilopoemennot only throughhis famous victory over the Spartans (the greatestSpartan defeat since Sphacteria)129 andIphicrates' use of peltastsandambushes, butalso becauseIphicrates had invaded Arcadiaand his peltasts had frightenedthe Arcadians.130 But although Iphicrates' andPhilip'sfew ambushes withpeltastsinspired Philopoemen's subsequent ambushes of Nabis,they are not modelsfor his nightraidat Pleiae. Demosthenes' efforts,morethantwo centuries earlier,aremorerelevant: in 425 he effectively used arrows,javelins, and slingersagainstthe Spartans at andthe Athenians' Sphacteria,131 dawnlanding,attack,anduse of light-armed troopstherearesomewhat similarto thoseat Pleiae.Butpeltastswereunimportantat Sphacteria, andthe attackwas haphazard rather thana deliberate use of forces.Demosthenes light-armed also madetwo nightattacks, butEpipolae was a disasterandillustrates the difficultiesof a hoplitebattleat night. Philopoemen clearlyknew the Battleof Caphyaein 220 BC and how the Megalopolitans were 4"compelled to burythe dead"Achaeansbecauseof Aratus' folly in fightingon a hill withregular troopswhile the Aetoliansprevailed with only their "cavalryand light infantry."'132 This impressedupon him the potentialof light-armed fightingon ruggedgroundas well as its dangersfor regularforces. But aboveall Philopoemen was influenced by his time in Crete where he learnedabout guerilla warfarein the land where piracy, raiding, andarchery andwherehe adopted ambushes, predominated "Cretan tricksand wiles, thefts,andambushes."133 All of thesefactorsgave Philopoemen the impetusto makehis reforms, yet none can specificallybe cited as his model. An amphibious landing/surprise attackis very rare;fire and night attacksare highly unusualand togetherare unique;ambushes, especiallynot againsta line of march,are equallyuncommon;andnon-mercenary, forces areexceptional. speciallytrainedlight-armed did notjust carryout one raidagainstNabisbutrather Moreover, Philopoemen
128 Livy 31.36.1-7. II (as in n.2) 122. But Iphicrates 129 Xen. Hell. 4.5.10; Pritchett used hopliteswith his peltasts (Xen. Hell. 4.5.11-12, 17). 130 Xen. Hell. 4.4.16-17. 131 Thuc. 4.32.2-4. The Athenianlight-armedkept the Spartanhoplites from advancingby shooting missiles and were too quick for the Spartansto pursuethem (Thuc. 4.33-34). Tam, Military(as in n.2) 6 says thatthis was the only important use of light-armed troops in the classical periodbeforeIphicrates. Demosthenes'Acarnanians also usedthe ambush (Thuc. 3.112). 132 Polyb. 4.13.1-4; 4.11.6-4.12; 4.14.6. 133 Plut.Philop.13.6. Errington, Philopoemen(as in n.2) 28; Griffith,Mercenaries(as in n.2) 104; also Plut. Philop. 7.2; 13.1-2; 14.1; Paus. 8.49.7; 8.50.6; Polyb. 4.8.11. Five hundredCretanshelped PhilopoemenagainstNabis (Polyb. 33.16.6). The Cretanswere knownfor night attacks(Polyb. 4.8.1 1).

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continued to pursue and ambush him with the result that he waged an entire war primarily with light-armed forces (and later, cavalry). There is an enormous difference between casual raiding and waging a major war with light-armed forces against the Spartanarmy. Philopoemen employed a new kind of fighting in 192 that was not only based on his study of military history and his practical experience in fighting but also his ability to "study the terrain" and consider what weapons and troops would be best in each situation.134It was Philopoemen's genius that he realized that using light-armed troops in an amphibious landing with a night raid would "strike terror"135into the enemy and that additional ambushes by light-armed troops would ultimately lead to victory. Philopoemen, although he did not have the funding of Iphicratesor the Macedonian kings,'36 developed a special force that greatly damaged Sparta. San Mateo, CA Mary Frances Williams

134 E.g., Plut. Philop. 4.5; Livy 35.28.1-7. 135 quoniam conterriti essent Livy 35.27.12; perculso metu Livy 35.29.1 1; paventium Livy 35.30.5. 136 Philopoemen often lacked money to pay his forces (Plut. Philop. 2.3; Griffith, Mercenaries [as in n.2] 103).

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