Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No.

109093 November 20, 1995 LOPE MACHETE, NICASIO JUMAWID, SANTIAGO JUMAWID, JOHN JUMAWID, PEDRO GAMAYA, RENATO DELGADO, FERNANDO OMBAHIN, MATIAS ROLEDA, PASIANO BARO, IGNACIO BARO, MAMERTO PLARAS and JUSTINIANO VILLALON, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CELESTINO VILLALON, respondents. BELLOSILLO, J.: Are Regional Trial Courts' vested with jurisdiction over cases for collection of back rentals from leasehold tenants? On 21 July 1989 private respondent Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for collection of back rentals and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City against petitioners Lope Machete, Nicasio Jumawid, Santiago Jumawid, John Jumawid, Pedro Gamaya, Renato Delgado, Fernando Ombahin, Matias Roleda, Pasiano Baro, Ignacio Baro, Mamerto Plaras and Justiniano Villalon. The complaint alleged that the parties entered into a leasehold agreement with respect to private respondent's landholdings at Poblacion Norte, Carmen, Bohol, under which petitioners were to pay private respondent a certain amount or percentage of their harvests. However, despite repeated demands and with no valid reason, petitioners failed to pay their respective rentals. Private respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay him back rentals and damages. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter. They contended that the case arose out of or was connected with agrarian relations, hence, the subject matter of the complaint fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers under Sec. 1, pars. (a) and (b), Rule II of the Revised Rules of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). On 22 August 1989 the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, 1 and on 28 September 1989 denied the motion for reconsideration. 2 Private respondent sought annulment of both orders before respondent Court of Appeals which on 21 May 1992 rendered judgment reversing the trial court and directing it to assume jurisdiction over the case3 on the basis of its finding that . . . The CARL (RA 6657) and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform cannot be seen to encompass a case of simple collection of back rentals by virtue of an agreement, as the one at bar, where there is no agrarian dispute to speak of (since the allegation of failure to pay the agreed rentals was never controverted in the motion to dismiss) nor the issue raised on application, implementation, enforcement or interpretation of these laws. 4 On 18 January 1993 the appellate court rejected the motion for reconsideration. 5

Petitioners maintain that the alleged cause of action of private respondent arose from an agrarian relation and that respondent appellate court failed to consider that the agreement involved is an agricultural leasehold contract, hence, the dispute is agrarian in nature. The laws governing its execution and the rights and obligations of the parties thereto are necessarily R.A. 3844, 6 R.A. 6657 7 and other pertinent agrarian laws. Considering that the application, implementation, enforcement or interpretation of said laws are matters which have been vested in the DAR, this case is outside the jurisdiction of the trial court. The petition is impressed with merit. Section 17 of E.O. 229 8 vested the DAR with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in accordance with law. Executive Order 129-A, while in the process of reorganizing and strengthening the DAR, created the DARAB to assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases. 9Section 1, pars. (a) and (b), Rule II of the Revised Rules of the DARAB explicitly provides Sec. 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Orders Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the following: (a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other agrarian laws, (b) Cases involving the valuation of land, and determination and payment of just compensation, fixing and collection of lease rentals, disturbance compensation, amortization payments, and similar disputes concerning the functions of the Land Bank . . . In Quismundo v. Court of Appeals, 10 this Court interpreted the effect of Sec. 17 of E.O. 229 on P.D. 946, which amended R.A. 3844, the agrarian law then in force The above quoted provision (Sec. 17) should be deemed to have repealed 11 Sec. 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946 which invested the then courts of agrarian relations with original exclusive jurisdiction over cases and questions involving rights granted and obligations imposed by presidential issuances promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program. Formerly, under Presidential Decree No. 946, amending Chapter IX of Republic Act No. 3844, the courts of agrarian relations had original and exclusive jurisdiction over "cases involving the rights and obligations of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land except those cognizable by the National Labor Relations Commission" and "questions involving rights granted and obligations imposed by laws, Presidential Decrees, Orders, Instructions, Rules and Regulations issued and promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program,"

except those matters involving the administrative implementation of the transfer of land to the tenant-farmer under Presidential Decree No. 27 and amendments thereto which shall be exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. 12 In 1980, upon the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the courts of agrarian relations were integrated into the regional trial courts and the jurisdiction of the former was vested in the latter courts. 13 However, with the enactment of Executive Order No. 229, which took effect on August 29, 1987, fifteen (15) days after its release for publication in the Official Gazette, 14 the regional trial courts were divested of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters. The said jurisdiction is now vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform. On 15 June 1988 R.A. 6657 was passed containing provisions which evince and support the intention of the legislature to vest in the DAR exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters. 15 Section 50 thereof substantially reiterates Sec. 17 of E.O. 229 thus Sec. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) . . . Section 3, par. (d), thereof defines the term "agrarian dispute" as referring to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farm workers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. However it may be mentioned in passing that the Regional Trial Courts have not been completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of R.A. 6657 confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are Regional Trial Courts designated by this Court at least one (1) branch within each province to act as such. These Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts have, according to Sec. 57 of the same law, original and exclusive jurisdiction over: (a) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and (b) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Act. 16 Consequently, there exists an agrarian dispute in the case at bench which is exclusively cognizable by the DARAB. The failure of petitioners to pay back rentals pursuant to the leasehold contract with private respondent is an issue which is clearly beyond the legal competence of the trial court to resolve. Thedoctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. 17

Thus, respondent appellate court erred in directing the trial court to assume jurisdiction over this case. At any rate, the present legal battle is "not altogether lost" on the part of private respondent because as this Court was quite emphatic in Quismundo v. Court of Appeals, 18 the resolution by the DAR is to the best advantage of the parties since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the administrative agency presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. Further, the proceedings therein are summary in nature and the department is not bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and inexpensive proceeding. 19 WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals as well as its resolution denying reconsideration is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The orders of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City dated 22 August and 28 September 1989 are REINSTATED. Consequently, let the records of this case be immediately transmitted to the appropriate Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for proper adjudication in accordance with the ruling in Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals 20and reiterated in Quismundo v. Court of Appeals, 21 as well as pertinent agrarian laws. SO ORDERED. Padilla, Davide, Jr., Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 Rollo, p. 20. 2 Id., p. 24. 3 Rollo, p. 50. 4 Id., p. 49. 5 Id., p. 56. 6 Code of Agrarian Reform. 7 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. 8 This provided the mechanisms for the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program; Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals, UDK No. 9864, 3 December 1990, 191 SCRA 885. 9 Sec. 13 thereof. 10 G.R. No. 95664, 13 September 1991, 201 SCRA 609; reiterated in Tiongson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 85403-06, 23 September 1992, 214 SCRA 197. 11 Citing Sec. 30 of E.O. 229 which provides: "All laws, issuances, decrees, or any parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Order are hereby repealed or amended accordingly." 12 Citing sec. 12, pars. (a) and (b), P.D. No. 946. 13 Citing Romero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 59606, 8 January 1987, 147 SCRA 183; Sec. 19, par. 7, B.P. Blg. 129. 14 Citing 83 O.G. (Supp. No. 30) 3422-0-36, 27 July 1987. 15 Quismundo v. Court of Appeals, see Note 10. 16 Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals, see Note 8. 17 Vidad v. Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, G.R. No. 98084, 18 October 1993, 227 SCRA 271. 18 See Note 10.

19 Sec. 50, R.A. 6657. 20 See Note 8, p. 4. 21 See Note 10, p. 5.

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila FIRST DIVISION DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN G.R. No. 163285 REFORM, rep. by REGIONAL DIRECTOR NASER M. MUSALI, Petitioner, Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, - versus SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CORONA, AZCUNA, and LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. HON. HAKIM S. ABDULWAHID, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. XII of Zamboanga City, Promulgated: and YUPANGCO COTTON MILLS, INC., Respondents. February 27, 2008 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION PUNO, C.J.: The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) is vested with primary and exclusive jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, including all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program. Thus, when a case is merely an incident involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), then jurisdiction remains with the DARAB, and not with the regular courts. This is a petition for review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court of a Decision dated November 21, 2003, and the Resolution dated April 21, 2004, both of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 69699, entitled Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) vs. Hon. Hakim S. Abdulwahid, as RTC Judge & Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc., on pure question of law. Particularly, the issue concerns the jurisdiction of the trial court below over the complaint in Civil Case No. 5113 vis--vis the original, primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the DARAB over agrarian disputes and/or agrarian reform implementation as provided for under Section 50 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657. On December 28, 2000, Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc. (Yupangco) filed a complaint for Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Violations of R.A. Nos. 6657 and 3844[,] as amended, Cancellation of Title, Reconveyance and [D]amages with Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order against Buenavista Yupangco Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (BYARBAI), the DAR and

the Land Bank of the Philippines. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5113 and raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12 of Zamboanga City. [1] On January 26, 2001, the DAR filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds: (a) Yupangcos causes of action were not within the jurisdiction of the RTC, (b) forum shopping, and (c) litis pendentia.[2] On November 6, 2001, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss, ruling that Yupangcos action was within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19, Chapter II of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.[3] DAR and BYARBAI filed a motion for reconsideration,[4] which was denied for lack of merit.[5] On March 20, 2002, DAR filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court with the CA, alleging that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when DARs motion to dismiss was denied. [6] The appellate court sustained the RTC, finding that the action falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts and not the DARAB because Yupangco primarily sought the recovery and possession of the subject parcel of land. Hence the petition at bar. In its lone assignment of error, petitioner submits that the CA erred when it upheld the jurisdiction of the [RTC] purely on the ground that [Yupangco] primarily seeks the recovery of ownership and possession of subject parcel of land, jurisdiction over which is lodged with regional trial courts, not the DARAB. [7] We grant the petition. It is the rule that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial office or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all of such reliefs. [8] It is also settled that jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy. [9] Thus, if the issues between the parties are intertwined with the resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB, such dispute must be addressed and resolved by the DARAB.[10] In the case at bar, the complaint filed by Yupangco seems at first blush to be within the jurisdiction of the RTC, as it has been denominated as Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Violations of R.A. Nos. 6657 and 3844[,] as amended, Cancellation of Title, Reconveyance and [D]amages with Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. [11] But as correctly pointed out by the DAR, the allegations of the complaint actually impugn the CARP coverage of the landholding involved and its redistribution to farmer beneficiaries, and seek to effect a reversion thereof to the original owner, Yupangco. [12] Thus, the complaint filed by Yupangco alleged, inter alia, the following: (a) [Yupangco] was the registered owner of certain parcels of land[13] primarily devoted to coconut plantation, under the administration and

supervision of plaintiff corporation with several employees and other persons hired as laborers;[14] (b) Sometime in 1993, the DAR placed the subject parcels of land under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the government pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657, and four (4) Transfer Certificate Titles over the subject land were subsequently issued in favor of BYARBAI; [15] (c) [Yupangco] vehemently objected to the coverage of the subject parcels of land by the DAR and the valuation made by LBP, by filing protest and objection with DAR and LBP;[16] (d) DAR, through the DAR Regional Director, Zamboanga City, issued the four questioned Transfer Certificates of Title (or Certificates of Land Ownership Awards-- CLOAs) to BYARBAI pursuant to R.A. No. 6657, without LBP paying [Yupangco] the just compensation of the subject parcels of land which valuation was then being contested before the DAR Adjudication Board; [17] (e) Majority of the members of BYARBAI are not employees nor hired workers of [Yupangco], hence, [Yupangco] alleged that they should not have been given preference nor be entitled as allocatees in the subject parcels of land; [18] (f) Soon after the CLOAs were issued to BYARBAI, the latter took possession of the subject parcels of land to the prejudice and damage of [Yupangco];[19] (g) BYARBAIs real motive in having the land distributed to them (pending resolution of all protests with the DAR and the contested valuation made by the LBP) was to convert the land into rice production resulting in the destruction of coffee plantations and other crops, including the cutting of several hundreds of coconut trees. This conversion was illegal and in gross violation of Republic Act No. 6657 and Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, and other existing laws and Administrative Issuances.[20] Yupangco also alleged in its complaint that other acts were committed with the purpose of land speculation, for business or industrial purpose, for immediate sale thereof for business profits and not for planting, care and tending of the coconut plantation, which would defeat the purposes and policies of the Agrarian Reform Laws and [breached] the conditions of the questioned award of the land, rendering the acquisition by or distribution to [BYARBAI] as the tenanttillers of the land null and void, and thus reverting back the ownership and possession thereof to [Yupangco]. [21] These allegations clearly show that Yupangco sought the recovery of the subject property by disputing its inclusion in the CARP, and imputing errors in the enforcement of the law pertaining to the agrarian reform. The primal issues raised in the complaint, viz.: protest against the CARP coverage, alleged breach of conditions of the DAR award under the CARP by the farmer beneficiaries resulting to forfeiture of their right as such; nonpayment of rentals by the farmers to the petitioner under R.A. No. 3844 (Agricultural Land Reform Code), gravitate on the alleged manner the implementation of the CARP under R.A. No. 6657 was carried out.

Under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform are within the DARs primary, exclusive and original jurisdiction, and at the first instance, only the DARABas the DARs quasi-judicial body, can determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. No. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. No. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. [22] Ultimately, the complaint in the petition at bar seeks for the RTC to cancel Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) issued to the beneficiaries and the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) issued pursuant thereto. These are reliefs which the RTC cannot grant, since the complaint essentially prays for the annulment of the coverage of the disputed property within the CARP, which is but an incident involving the implementation of the CARP. These are matters relating to terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landlord to agrarian reform beneficiaries over which DARAB has primary and exclusive original jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 1(f), Rule II, DARAB New Rules of Procedure. The ruling in Social Security System (SSS) v. Department of Agrarian Reform[23] is apropos. In this case, the former landowner, the SSS, made a similar attempt to circumvent the jurisdiction of the DARAB by filing a complaint for recovery of possession with the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal. When the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, the SSS came to this court for recourse. We ruled: Irrefragably, the titles sought to be annulled by the SSS, namely, TCTs No. 1259 No. 1260 and No. 1261 originated from the CLOAs issued by the DAR in pursuance of, and in accordance with, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Specifically, the SSS in its Complaint implored the trial court "to restrain the DAR from implementing Rep. Act No. 6657 and the defendants, farmers-beneficiaries from occupying/tilling, cultivating/disposing the properties." Section 1, Rule II, 2002 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides that: Section 1. Primary And Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The board shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228, 229, and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but not be limited to cases involving the following: a) The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws. xxx xxx xxx Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not limited to the following: xxx xxx xxx

f) Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT), Certificate of landownership Award (CLOA) and Emancipation Patent (EP) and the administrative correction thereof; Thus, taking its bearings from the above provision, Centeno v. Centeno explicitly and compellingly validated the jurisdiction of the DARAB over cases involving issuance of CLOAs, and went on further: xxx under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), the DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program. The rule is that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute or any incident involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Section 1, Rule II of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB provides: Section 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Orders Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. In the relatively recent case of Rivera v. Del Rosario, this Court cited Section 1, Rule II, 2002 DARAB Rules of Procedure and reiterated that: The DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Again in David v. Rivera, this Court pointed out that the jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters is now expressly vested in the DAR through the DARAB. Indeed, Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 confers on the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) quasi-judicial powers to adjudicate agrarian reform matters. In the process of reorganizing the DAR, Executive Order No. 129-A created the DARAB to assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases. Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure enumerates the cases falling within the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. In an earlier ruling rendered in the case of Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals , reiterated in Morta, Sr. v. Occidental and Heirs of the late Herman Rey Santos v. Court of Appeals, this Court decreed: Section 1 of Executive Order No. 229 sets out the scope of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP); it states that the program "xxx shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produce, all public and private agricultural land as provided in Proclamation No. 131 dated July 22, 1987, including whenever applicable in accordance with law, other lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture." Section 17 thereof 1) vested the Department of Agrarian Reform with "quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters," and

2) granted it "jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of Agriculture (DA), as well as 'powers to punish for contempt and to issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum and writs to enforce its orders or decisions.'" In Nuesa v. Court of Appeals the Court, in addition to re-echoing the jurisdiction of the DARAB, puts emphasis on the extent of the coverage of the term "agrarian dispute," thus: As held by this Court in Centeno v. Centeno [343 SCRA 153], "the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program." The DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction "to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. No. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. No. 3844 as amended by R.A. No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations." Under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 (CARP Law), "agrarian dispute" is defined to include "(d) . . . any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee." (citations and underscoring omitted)[24] IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 21, 2003, and the Resolution dated April 21, 2004, in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 69699, entitled Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) vs. Hon. Hakim S. Abdulwahid, as RTC Judge & Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc., are REVERSED. Civil Case No. 5113, entitled Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Buenavista Yupangco Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (BYARBAI), et al. isDISMISSED. SO ORDERED. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice WE CONCUR: ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice Associate Justice

[1] [2] [3]

[4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

[9]

[10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24]

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice Respondents Complaint, CA rollo, pp.11-26. Petitioners Motion to Dismiss, id. at 27-32. RTC Order, id. at 33-34. Parenthetically, the RTC mistakenly referred to the complaint as a cause of action. The two are not the same. Dated November 19, 2001, id. at 35-39. Dated February 8, 2002, id. at 40-41. DARs Petition with the CA, id. at 1-10. Rollo, p. 13. Heirs of Julian dela Cruz v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz , G.R. No. 162890, Nov. 22, 2005, 475 SCRA 743. Id. citing Vesagas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142924, 5 December 2001, 371 SCRA 508. See Viray v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92481, November 9, 1990, 191 SCRA 308. Monsanto v. Zerna, G.R. No. 142501, 7 December 2001, 371 SCRA 664. Supra note 1. Rollo, p. 15. Par. 3, Respondents Complaint, CA rollo, p.12. Par. 4, id. Par. 5, id. Par. 6, id. Par. 7, id. Par. 8, id. Par. 8, id. Par. 9 & 15, id. Par. 11 & 15, id. Centeno v. Centeno, G.R. No. 140825, Oct. 13, 2000, 343 SCRA 153. G.R. No. 139254, March 18, 2005, 453 SCRA 659. Id.

THIRD DIVISION SPOUSES JESUS FAJARDO and EMER G.R. No. 167891 FAJARDO, Petitioners, Present: - versus CORONA, J., Chairperson, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, PERALTA, and MENDOZA, JJ.

ANITA R. FLORES, assisted by her husband, BIENVENIDO FLORES, Respondent. Promulgated: January 15, 2010 x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION NACHURA, J.: Before us is a petition for review of the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 28, 2004 and its Resolution dated April 19, 2005, denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The facts are as follows: Leopoldo delos Reyes owned a parcel of land, denominated as Lot No. 2351 (Cad. 320-D), with an area of 25,513 square meters (sq m), located in Barangay Sumandig in Hacienda Buenavista, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. In 1963, he allowed petitioner Jesus Fajardo to cultivate said land. The net harvests were divided equally between the two until 1975 when the relationship was converted to leasehold tenancy. Per Order[2] from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Regional Office, Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, rent was provisionally fixed at 27.42 cavans per year, which Jesus Fajardo religiously complied with. From the time petitioner cultivated the land, he was allowed by Leopoldo delos Reyes to erect a house for his family on the stony part of the land, which is the subject of controversy. On January 26, 1988, Leopoldo delos Reyes died. His daughter and sole heir, herein respondent Anita Flores, inherited the property. On June 28, 1991, Anita Flores and Jesus Fajardo executed an agreement, denominated as KASUNDUAN NG PAGHAHATI NG LUPA AT PAGTATALAGA NG DAAN UKOL SA MAGKABILANG PANIG.[3] This was followed by another agreement, KASUNDUAN SA HATIAN SA LUPA, executed on July 10, 1991, wherein the parties agreed to deduct from Lot No. 2351 an area of 10,923 sq m, allotting the same to petitioner. Apparently, there was a conflict of claims in the interpretation of the Kasunduan between Anita Flores and Jesus Fajardo, which was referred to the DAR, Provincial Agrarian Reform Office, Baliuag, Bulacan. [4] In the Report and Recommendation dated May 3, 2000, the Legal Officer advised the parties to

ventilate their claims and counterclaims with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Malolos, Bulacan.[5] On December 22, 2000, a complaint for ejectment was filed by herein respondent Anita Flores, assisted by her husband Bienvenido Flores, against petitioners with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), San Ildefonso, Bulacan. In the complaint, she alleged that, as the sole heir of the late Leopoldo delos Reyes, she inherited a parcel of land consisting of stony land, not devoted to agriculture, and land suitable and devoted to agriculture located in Barangay Sumandig, San Ildefonso, Bulacan; that, sometime in the 1960s, during the lifetime of Leopoldo delos Reyes, Jesus Fajardo requested the former to allow him to work and cultivate that portion of land devoted to agriculture; that Jesus Fajardo was then allowed to erect a house on the stony part of the land, and that the use and occupation of the stony part of the land was by mere tolerance only; and that the land, which was divided equally between the two parties, excluded the stony portion. In February 1999, respondent approached petitioners and verbally informed them of her intention to repossess the stony portion, but petitioners refused to heed the request. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that Lot No. 2351, with an area of 25,513 sq m, was agricultural land; that they had been continuously, uninterruptedly, and personally cultivating the same since 1960 up to the present; that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case, considering that the dispute between the parties, regarding the Kasunduan, was referred to the DARAB; and that the assumption by the DARAB of jurisdiction over the controversy involving the lot in question therefore precluded the MTC from exercising jurisdiction over the case. Resolving the Motion to Dismiss, the MTC ruled that, while at first glance, the court did not have jurisdiction over the case, considering that it was admitted that petitioner was allowed to cultivate the land, a closer look at the Kasunduan, however, revealed that what was divided was only the portion being tilled. By contrast, the subject matter of the complaint was the stony portion where petitioners house was erected. Thus, the court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter.[6] On April 25, 2001, the MTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent. The dispositive portion reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff (respondent), ORDERING defendants (petitioners) and all persons claiming rights under them to VACATE the subject premises where they have erected their house, which is a portion of Lot No. 2351, Cad-320D situated [in] Barangay Sumandig, San Ildefonso, Bulacan; to DEMOLISH their house on the subject premises; to PAY plaintiff the sum of P400.00 a month by way of reasonable compensation for their use and occupation of the subject premises starting [in] June 2000 and every month thereafter until they finally vacate the same; and to PAY attorneys fees of P10,000.00 and the cost of suit.[7] On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, Third Judicial Region, Malolos, Bulacan, affirmed the MTC Decisionin toto upon a finding that no

reversible error was committed by the court a quo in its Decision[8] dated August 29, 2002. On motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC issued an Order on December 10, 2002, reversing its decision dated August 29, 2002. The RTC found that the issue involved appeared to be an agrarian dispute, which fell within the contemplation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, and thus ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction. A petition for review was then filed by respondents with the CA to annul the Order of the RTC dated December 10, 2002. On October 28, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed decision, which reinstated the MTC decision. It disagreed with the findings of the RTC and ruled that the part of Lot No. 2351 where petitioners house stood was stony and residential in nature, one that may not be made to fall within the ambit of the operation of Philippine agrarian laws, owing to its non-agriculture character. The CA explained that, on the strength of the two instruments, the parties made a partition and divided the agricultural portion of Lot No. 2351 equally among themselves. By virtue of said division, the parties effectively severed and terminated the agricultural leasehold/tenancy relationship between them; thus, there was no longer any agrarian dispute to speak of. Fajardo had already acquired the benefits under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law when onehalf of the agricultural portion of Lot No. 2351 was allotted to him. Petitioners cannot, therefore, be allowed to continue possession of a part of the stony portion, which was not included in the land he was cultivating. [9] The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding that the court a quo seriously erred when it reversed itself, its Order dated December 10, 2002 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated April 25, 2001 of the MTC of San Ildefonso, Bulacan is herebyREINSTATED.[10] The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition. The issue in this case is whether it is MTC or the DARAB which has jurisdiction over the case. There is no dispute that, on June 28, 1991, the parties executed an agreement, denominated as KASUNDUAN NG PAGHAHATI NG LUPA AT PAGTATALAGA NG DAAN UKOL SA MAGKABILANG PANIG. Therein, it was admitted that Jesus Fajardo was the tiller of the land. This Kasunduan was subsequently followed by another agreement, KASUNDUAN SA HATIAN SA LUPA, whereby an area of 10,923 sq m of Lot No. 2351 was given to petitioners. The portion of the land where petitioners house is erected is the subject of the instant case for unlawful detainer. Respondent argues that this portion is not included in the deed of partition, while petitioners insist that it is. We agree with the RTC when it clearly pointed out in its Order dated December 10, 2002 that the resolution of this case hinges on the correct interpretation of the contracts executed by the parties. The issue of who has a better right of possession over the subject land cannot be determined without

resolving first the matter as to whom the subject property was allotted. Thus, this is not simply a case for unlawful detainer, but one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation, definitely beyond the competence of the MTC.[11] More importantly, the controversy involves an agricultural land, which petitioners have continuously and personally cultivated since the 1960s. In the Kasunduan, it was admitted that Jesus Fajardo was the tiller of the land. Being agricultural lessees, petitioners have a right to a home lot and a right to exclusive possession thereof by virtue of Section 24, R.A. No. 3844 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code.[12] Logically, therefore, the case involves an agrarian dispute, which falls within the contemplation of R.A. No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. An agrarian dispute [13] refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. It relates to any controversy relating to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture. [14] Undeniably, the instant case involves a controversy regarding tenurial arrangements. The contention that the Kasunduans,which allegedly terminated the tenancy relationship between the parties and, therefore, removed the case from the ambit of R.A. No. 6657, is untenable. There still exists an agrarian dispute because the controversy involves the home lot of petitioners, an incident arising from the landlord-tenant relationship. .Amurao v. Villalobos is quite instructive: The instant case undeniably involves a controversy involving tenurial arrangements because the Kasulatan will definitely modify, nay, terminate the same. Even assuming that the tenancy relationship between the parties had ceased due to the Kasulatan, there still exists an agrarian dispute because the action involves an incident arising from the landlord and tenant relationship. In Teresita S. David v. Agustin Rivera, this Court held that: [I]t is safe to conclude that the existence of prior agricultural tenancy relationship, if true, will divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction the previous juridical tie compels the characterization of the controversy as an agrarian dispute. x x x Even if the tenurial arrangement has been severed, the action still involves an incident arising from the landlord and tenant relationship. Where the case involves the dispossession by a former landlord of a former tenant of the land claimed to have been given as compensation in consideration of the renunciation of the tenurial rights, there clearly exists an agrarian dispute. On this point the Court has already ruled: Indeed, section 21 of the Republic Act No. 1199, provides that all cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landlord or by a third party and/or

the settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of landlord CERTIFICATION and tenant . . . shall be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division of Agrarian Relations. This jurisdiction does not require the continuance of the Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had relationship of landlord and tenantat the time of the dispute. The same may been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the have arisen, and often times arises, precisely from the previous termination of opinion of the Courts Division. such relationship. If the same existed immediately, or shortly, before the REYNATO S. PUNO controversy and the subject-matter thereof is whether or not said relationship has Chief Justice [1] been lawfully terminated, or if the dispute springs or originates from the Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang, with Associate relationship of landlord and tenant, the litigation is (then) cognizable by the Court Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, concurring; rollo, pp. of Agrarian Relations . . . 71-80. [2] In the case at bar, petitioners claim that the tenancy relationship has Records, pp. 54-55. [3] been terminated by the Kasulatan is of no moment. As long as the subject matter Id. at 6. [4] of the dispute is the legality of the termination of the relationship, or if the Id. at 15. [5] dispute originates from such relationship, the case is cognizable by the DAR, Id. [6] through the DARAB. The severance of the tenurial arrangement will not render Id. at 33. [7] the action beyond the ambit of an agrarian dispute. [15] Rollo, pp. 58-59. [8] Furthermore, the records disclose that the dispute between the parties, Id. at 60-63. [9] regarding the interpretation of the Kasunduan, was, in fact, raised and referred to Id. at 77-78. [10] the DAR, which in turn referred the case to the DARAB. [16] In view of the foregoing, Supra note 1, at 79. [11] we reiterate Hilario v. Prudente,[17] that: Rollo, p. 65. [12] The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a R.A. No. 3844, Sec. 24, provides that: controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an Sec. 24, Right to a Home Lot. The agricultural lessee shall have the right administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform cases, to continue in the exclusive possession and enjoyment of any home lot he may jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more have occupied upon the effectivity of this Code, which shall be considered as specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). included in the leasehold. [13] WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 28, 2004 of the Court of Appeals R.A. No. 6657, Sec. 3(d). [14] is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court dated Amurao v.Villalobos, G.R. No. 157491, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 464. [15] December 10, 2002 is REINSTATED. Id. at 474-475. [16] SO ORDERED. Rollo, p. 66. [17] ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA G.R. No. 150635, September 11, 2008, 564 SCRA 485. Associate Justice WE CONCUR: RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice Chairperson PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice Associate Justice JOSE C. MENDOZA Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division

SECOND DIVISION [G. R. No. 161090 : July 04, 2012] SPOUSES ROMEO LL. PLOPENIO AND ROSIELINDA PLOPENIO REPRESENTED BY GAVINO PLOPENIO, PETITIONERS, VS. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM AND LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. NO. 161092] EDUARDO LL. PLOPENIO REPRESENTED BY GAVINO PLOPENIO, PETITIONER, VS. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORLVI AND LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.cralaw DECISION SERENO, J.: In these consolidated Rule 45 Petitions, we rule on the propcr mode of appeal from the decision of a Regional Trial Court (RTC) designated as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC).cralaw In G.R. No. 161090, petitioner-spouses Romeo Ll. Plopenio and Rosielinda Plopenio assail the Decision[1] and Order[2] of the SAC-RTC Branch 23, Naga City, in Civil Case No. 2003-007.cralaw In G.R. No. 161092, petitioner Eduardo Ll. Plopenio (Eduardo) questions the Decision[3] and Order[4]of the same court in Civil Case No. 2003-004.cralaw THE FACTS Petitioner-spouses own 11.8643 hectares of coconut land in Caramoan, Camarines Sur, while petitioner Eduardo owns 22.8349 hectares of coconut land in the same locality. In 2000, the land of their brother Gavino Plopenio, likewise located in Caramoan, Camarines Sur, was valued by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) at P51,125.60 per hectare in DARAB Case No. V-LV-040CS-00. On this basis, petitioners offered their entire landholdings to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for acquisition and distribution pursuant to Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.[5]chanrobles virtual law library On 26 October 2001, public respondent Land Bank sent a Notice of Valuation and Adjudication valuing the land of petitioner-spouses at P23,485.00 per hectare[6] and that of petitioner Eduardo at P22,856.62 per hectare.[7] Dissatisfied with Land Banks offer, petitioners rejected the Notice of Valuation and Acquisition and referred the matter to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Camarines Sur for summary administrative proceedings.[8]chanrobles virtual law library The PARAD affirmed the valuation made by Land Bank in a Decision dated 5 September 2002, a copy of which petitioners received on 27 September 2002. [9] chanrobles virtual law library On 11 October 2002, or 14 days thereafter, petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration.[10] The PARAD denied their Motion in an Order dated 20 November 2002, which petitioners received on 21 December 2002.[11]chanrobles virtual law Petitioners then filed separate Petitions before the SAC-RTC on 6 January 2003, or 16 days after their receipt of the PARADs Order. They explained that they were allowed to file their appeal 15 days from the receipt of the Order of denial of their Motion for Reconsideration. Since the 15th day fell on a Sunday, they reasoned that they should be allowed to file their appeal until 6 January 2003.[12]chanrobles In its Answer, Land Bank alleged that the Decision of the PARAD had already attained

finality after the lapse of the 15-day period, counted from petitioners receipt of the PARADs Decision. Thus, it argued that the SAC-RTC should no longer entertain the Petitions.[13]chanrobles virtual law library In its assailed Decisions, the SAC-RTC ruled that the Decision of the PARAD had already attained finality because petitioners failed to file their Petitions on time. The lower court thus dismissed the appeal in this wise:chanrobles virtualaw library WHEREFORE, with all the foregoing this court finds merit in [respondent Land Banks] special and affirmative defense, that the filing of these petitions is now barred by prior final and executory judgment hence wanting of a valid cause of action.cralaw The petitions therefore are hereby ordered dismissed for lack of valid cause of action.cralaw SO ORDERED.[14] Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the SAC-RTCs Decision, but their motions were denied for lack of merit.[15]chanrobles virtual law library From the Decisions and Orders of the SAC-RTC, petitioners then filed the instant Petitions for Review directly before this Court. On 24 July 2006, we resolved to consolidate the cases at bar, considering that the factual milieu and legal issues involved in both cases are similar in nature.cralaw THE COURTS RULING At the outset, we rule that the consolidated Petitions are immediately dismissible because petitioners resorted to a wrongful mode of appeal by filing the instant Rule 45 Petitions directly with this Court.cralaw Section 60 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law provides:chanrobles Section 60. Appeals. An appeal may be taken from the decision of the Special Agrarian Courts by filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the decision; otherwise, the decision shall become final.cralaw An appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, or from any order, ruling or decision of the DAR, as the case may be, shall be by a petition for review with the Supreme Court within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of said decision. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, following the letter of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, petitioners should have appealed the SAC-RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals.cralaw Petitioners propose to carve out an exception to this rule by arguing that because the instant Petitions raise only pure questions of law, the proper mode of appeal is via a Rule 45 Petition to this Court.[16]chanrobles virtual law library We do not agree. While the general rule is that appeals raising pure questions of law from decisions of RTCs are taken to this Court via a Rule 45 petition, decisions of trial courts designated as SACs are only appealable to the Court of Appeals.cralaw We have repeatedly ruled that the right to appeal is a remedy of statutory origin. As such, this right must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law authorizing its exercise.[17] The special jurisdiction of the SACRTC is conferred and regulated by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and appeals therefrom are governed by Section 60 thereof. That law expressly states that appeals from SACs must be taken to the Court of Appeals without making a distinction between appeals raising questions of fact and those dealing purely with questions of law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. Consequently, we rule that the only mode of appeal

from decisions of the SAC-RTC is via a Rule 42 petition for review [18] to the Court of Appeals, without any distinction as to whether the appeal raises questions of fact, questions of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.cralaw Furthermore, even if we were to allow the appeals to prosper, we find that the Petitions before the SAC-RTC were filed out of time.cralaw Under the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure (1994 DARAB Rules), which were effective during the pendency of this case before the PARAD, the decision of the adjudicator on land valuation and on the preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall be brought directly to the SAC within 15 days from receipt of the notice thereof.[19] Parties aggrieved by the adjudicators decision are allowed to file one motion for reconsideration.[20]chanrobles virtual law library In the event of a denial of the motion for reconsideration, the 1994 DARAB Rules provide:chanrobles virtualaw library SECTION 12. x x x. The filing of a motion for reconsideration shall suspend the running of the period within which the appeal must be perfected. If a motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have the right to perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period for appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed on reconsideration, the aggrieved party shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution of reversal within which to perfect his appeal. [21] While a petition for the fixing of just compensation filed with the RTC-SAC is not an appeal from the PARADs decision, but an original action before the court a quo,[22] the rule in Section 12 of the 1994 DARAB Rules should find analogous application. A party aggrieved by the PARADs decision is given 15 days to file the original petition before the SAC-RTC. The pendency of a motion for reconsideration of the decision suspends the running of the period within which the petition may be filed before the RTC-SAC. Consequently, upon receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration, the reglementary period for filing the petition before the RTC-SAC again commences to run.cralaw In this case, petitioners received a copy of the PAIZAD Decision on 27 September 2002.[23] They filed their Motion for Reconsideration thereof on 11 October 2002, or 14 days from their receipt of a copy of the Decision. [24] On 21 December 2002, they received the Order denying their motion.[25] Hence, petitioners only had one more day within which to file their Petitions with the SAC-RTC for the determination ofjust compensation for their respective properties. Since 22 December 2002 tell on a Sunday, they had until 23 December 2002 to file their Petitions. However, they only filed their Petitions on 6 January 2001, or 16 days after they received the Order denying their Motion for Reconsideration. Clearly, the Petitions before the SAC-RTC were filed out of time.cralaw From the foregoing discussion, we therefore find that the instant Petitions should be denied.cralaw WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the consolidated Petitions for Review are hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decisions and Orders of the Special Agrarian CourtRegional Trial Court, Branch 23, Naga City in Civil Case Nos. 2003-007 and 2003-004 are hereby AFFIRMED.cralaw SO ORDERED. Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, Sereno and Reyes, JJ., concur.cralaw Endnotes:

Rollo (G.R. No. 161090), pp. 24-27, RTC Decision dated 7 October 2003, penned by Judge Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr. [2] Id. at 28, Order dated 14 November 2003, penned by Judge Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr.. [3] Rollo (G.R. No. 161092), pp. 24-27, RTC Decision dated 7 October 2003, penned by Judge Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr. [4] Id. at 28, Order dated 14 November 2003, penned by Judge Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr. [5] Rollo (G.R. No. 161090), p. 11, Petition dated 28 December 2003; Rollo (G.R. No. 161092), p. 11, Petition dated 28 December 2003. [6] Rollo (G.R. No. 161090), p. 11, Petition dated 28 December 2003. [7] Rollo (G.R. No. 161092), p. 11, Petition dated 28 December 2003.cralaw [8] Rollo (G.R. No. 161090), p. 11, Petition dated 28 December 2003; Rollo (G.R. No. 161092), p. 11, Petition dated 28 December 2003. [9] Rollo (G.R. No. 161090), p. 24, RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 2003-007; Rollo (G.R. No. 161092), p. 24, RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 2003-004.cralaw [10] Id. [11] Rollo (G.R. No. 161090), p. 11, Petition dated 28 December 2003; Rollo (G.R. No. 161092), p. 11, Petition dated 28 December 2003. [12] Rollo (G.R. No. 161090), pp. 11-12, Petition dated 28 December 2003; Rollo (G.R. No. 161092), p. 11, Petition dated 28 December 2003. [13] Rollo (G.R. No. 161090), p. 12, Petition dated 28 December 2003; Rollo (G.R. No. 161092), p. 12, Petition dated 28 December 2003.cralaw [14] Rollo (G.R. No. 161090), p. 27, RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 2003-007; Rollo (G.R. No. 161092), p. 27, RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 2003-004. [15] Rollo (G.R. No. 161090), p. 28, Order in Civil Case No. 2003-007; Rollo (G.R. No. 161092), p. 28, Order in Civil Case No. 2003-004.cralaw [16] Rollo (G.R. No. 161090), pp. 53-54, Reply dated 9 July 2004; Rollo (G.R. No. 161092), p. 98, Reply dated 9 May 2006.cralaw [17] Oro v. Diaz, 413 Phil. 416 (2001). [18] Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon, 437 Phil. 347 (2002).cralaw [19] 1994 DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE, Rule XIII, Section 11. [20] Id.cralaw [21] 1994 DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE, Rule VIII, Section 12.cralaw [22] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Martinez, G.R. No. 169008, 31 July 2008, 560 SCRA 776.cralaw [23] Rollo (G.R. No. 161090), p. 24, RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 2003-007; Rollo (G.R. No. 161092), p. 24, RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 2003-004. [24] Id. [25] Rollo (G.R. No. 161090), p. 11, Petition dated 28 December 2003; Rollo (G.R. No. 161092), p. 11, Petition dated 28 December 2003.
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