Feminists, Philosophers, and Mystics

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Feminists, Philosophers, and Mystics Author(s): Grace M. Jantzen Source: Hypatia, Vol. 9, No. 4, Feminist Philosophy of Religion (Autumn, 1994), pp. 186-206 Published by: Wiley on behalf of Hypatia, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810428 . Accessed: 25/10/2013 00:13
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and Mystics Feminists, Philosophers,

GRACE M. JANTZEN
thewidelyheldviewthatmysticism Thisarticle is essentially characterchallenges I that show has izedby intense,ineffable, subjective Instead, experiences. mysticism a social which were innocent series never constructions, of undergone of gendered andpopular writers on mysticism of religion for power.Whenphilosophers struggles these as theyregularly constructions, do, theyarein turn gendered perpetuating ignore removes and women a post-Jamesian which understanding of mysticism mysticism and involvement with social justice. political from
What is mysticism?Is it an experience of direct communion with God?Or is it just a human phenomenon, at its best benign piety and at its worst muddleheadedfanaticismclaiming divine authorityfor intolerant behavior? Is mysticismsomething sharedby all world religions, which could serve as a link between differentwaysof life and belief?Or is the idea of a mysticalcore of religion misguided-perhaps yet another of the totalizing discoursesof What does mysticismhave to do with justice?Is mysticalexperimodernity? ence private and subjective,or does it have political and social implications? Is mysticismrelated to gender,perhapsespecially available to women? Or is Is mysticismessentiallypatriarchal? feminist mysticismimpossible? in all these questionsis an agendaof power.The fascinationof the Implicit of subject mysticism is not, I suggest, simply a fascination with intense psychologicalexperiencesfortheir own sake:rather,what fascinatesis that the answers to each of these questions are also ways of defining or delimiting authority.The connection of questionsof power to questions of mysticismis obvious as soon as one stops to considerthat a personwho was acknowledged to have direct access to God would be in a position to challenge any formof authority,whether doctrinalor political, which she saw as incompatiblewith the divine will. If defining mysticism is a way of defining power, then the questionof who counts as a mysticis of immediatepolitical importance.From for authoritywereprominent, the earlydaysof the Christianchurch,struggles and throughoutthe medieval period,the strugglesincreased.It was crucialto M.Jantzen vol.9, no. 4 (Fall1994) byGrace Hypatia
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the ecclesiastical establishment that those who claimed knowledge of the of the church,since mysteriesof God shouldbe containedwithin the structures the powerof the church would be severelythreatenedif it should be acknowledged that access to divine authoritywas possibleoutside its confines. In modem times, the issuesof power in relation to mysticismhave shifted less than we might think. If, for instance, mystical experience (or religious experience more generally) is to be trusted, it could be used to provide an authoritativebasis for knowledgeof the existence and nature of God (Swinbure 1979; Alston 1991); if this were to be establishedand acknowledged,it would accord enormousauthorityto those whose experience was deemed to be veridical. Or, from another perspective, if mystical experience could be delimited as privateand subjective,that wouldbe a way of ensuringthat it did not have to be taken into account by those making social and political decisions: in this respect, at least, religion could be kept well out of politics (while implicitly reinforcingthe statusquo). If mysticalexperience is seen as gender-related, especiallyavailableto women, and at the same time as private and subjective,then this can be used to reinforcestereotypesof women as the spiritualnurturersof humanity while keeping both women and spirituality firmlydomesticated. Contemporary philosophersand theologians,feminists among them, regularlyspeakof mysticismas though the term is clearlyunderstood:it standsfor a subjectivepsychologicalstate, perhapsa state of "alteredconsciousness,"in which an individual undergoesa private, intense, and ineffable experience, usuallyof a religiousnature.A studyof the historicalrecords,however,shows that such an understanding of mysticismis a relativelyrecent one which bears little resemblanceto those who are taken paradigmatically as mystics of the Christian tradition. I begin with a brief sketch of some of the ways in which mysticismhas been socially constructedin the ChristianWest. Then I discuss the bearing of this historical diversity on some of the issues preoccupying philosophersof religion who think and write about mysticism. In the final usesof mysticismfroma feminist section, I raisequestionsaboutcontemporary perspectivesharpenedby the recognition of the interconnection of issuesof power and gender.I suggestthat this interconnection is not restrictedto the much morewidelywithin the single topic of mysticism,but can be generalized philosophyof religion and beyond it.
WHO COUNTSAS A MYSTIC?
Histories of Christian mysticism often base themselves on the dubious premisethat there is something like an "essence"of mysticismwhich can be seen to have a beginning in the biblical writings,to develop in the patristic and medieval era, to make progresstowardits full floweringin the thirteenth and fourteenthcenturies,and then to send out seeds for new developmentsin
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the Protestantand Catholic reformations (Bouyeret al. 1968;McGinn 1991). Taking a cue from the work of Michel Foucault (1965, 1973), I find it worthwhileto ask instead how the mysticalhas been understoodin a variety of times and places within the ChristianWest. Even a brief look resultsin sketches towarda counterhistory, which render the traditionallinearpictureof what constitutesmysticismand its improbable historyas presentedby historianssuch as Bouyerand McGinn, and as accepted by philosophersof religion such as Swinbure and Alston. Farfromhaving a the mystical and about who counts constant meaning, the ideas surrounding as a mystic have undergonemajorchanges. In the classical context in which Christiantheology had its beginnings,mysticsweresimplythose who had been initiated into the mysteryreligions, who had undergone a rite of initiation "ineffable" about aboutwhich they kept silent. There wasnothing particularly the experience; the point was simply that the ritual was to be kept secret, it wasnot to be talkedaboutwith the uninitiated.Clearly,the assumptionbehind the injunction to silence is that without such a rule,the ritualmight have been talked about:the assumption,in other words,is diametricallyopposite to any assumptionthat the ritual is "ineffable"(Bouyer 1981). From this idea of mysticsas those who keep their mouthsshut came the furtheridea, linked with Platonic philosophy, that mystics are those whose knowledge of the divine comes by shutting all the senses: mystical knowledge is knowledge available only to the mind or spiritthat is as detached as possiblefrombodily concerns. Thus the mystical or spiritualcomes to mean, in this context, that which is beyondordinarysense perceptionand the normalmeansof humanknowledge Plato and all (Louth 1981). Except for one briefexception in Plato'sRepublic, in his train took for grantedthat women were identified with bodiliness and that knowledge,especiallyin its highest forms,was the prerogativeof men. In Christian spiritualityas influenced by Plato, this meant that if there were women whose spiritualknowledgecould not be denied, they wouldhave to be males"(Miles 1989, 53-77). reclassifiedas "honorary The concept of the mystical as having to do with special knowledge underwent a considerablechange of construction as the Christian tradition on the notion came to increase its emphasison the Bible and, in particular, that every part of the Bible at its deepest level really refersto Christ. This deepest level became known as the spiritualor mysticalmeaningof Scripture, as contrasted with the literal or historical meaning. The "mystical ones," therefore,were those who could discern the spiritualmeaning of Scripture underneaththe literalmeaning:"The letter kills, but the spiritgives life."The mystical meaning of Scripturewas not some special, intense, psychological experience imparted to the reader but rather the perception of its hidden depths, its reference to Christ even in passages that in literal terms were speaking of something quite different. Similarly, the sacraments, whether baptismor the Eucharist,were to be understoodnot merelyas literal wateror
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breador wine but as the mysticalentry into the church by the washingaway of sins or as the mysticalbody and blood of Christ. And it was not held to be the case that receiving them in their mysticalsense either requiredor effected of the people concerned. Indeed, the whole a psychological transformation point of faithin their efficacywas that no such intense subjectiveexperiences need take place, but that the sacramentsare valid, nevertheless. Such an understandingof the mystical is obviously a far cry from currentdiscussions alteredstatesof consciousnessand ineffabilityas essentialcharacterregarding istics of mysticalexperiences (Jantzen1986, Smalley 1983). Once again, however, the mystical under this descriptionwas largelythe domain of men. Women, on the whole, did not have the education necessary to studythe text and its multipleglosses;and even in exceptional cases where they did have the requisiteeducationand accessto the manuscripts, they were not consideredsuitableto teach or to have the authoritythat discernmentof the mystical meaning would confer (Newman 1987, 37-41; Flanagan 1989, 53). An alternativesourceof authorityaboutthe mysteriesof God might come of by visions, a direct communicationfromGod to the most humble creatures divine creation. Since women were those who could be seen as most like "the handmaidenof the Lord," they might, ironically,be most likely to be privileged with a vision of the mysteriesof God. Thus Hildegardof Bingen in the twelfth centurymarksan importanttransitionin the social constructionof mysticism: whereas,as she insists, it is men who shouldbe the mysticalones, expounding the knowledgeof God by their insight into the mysticalmeaning of Scripture, becauseof their laxity God has had to turnto Hildegardherself,a woman, and give her the messageto be communicated,doing so by meansof visions rather than by the "normal"method of years of prayerfulstudy of the Scriptures (Hildegard[c.1142] 1990, 67). In the high and late Middle Ages, numerous women visionaries across the Europeancontinent, including among many others the famousGertrudethe Great and Mechthild of Helfta, Mechtild of Magdeburg, Hadewijch of Antwerp, Bridgetof Sweden, Catherine of Siena, Julian of Norwich, and Teresaof Avila claimed authorityfor themselves as spiritualteachersand basedthat claim at least in parton the visions they had received. The construction of mysticism could no longer exclude women (Bynum 1987, 13-30). What is apparent in the high Middle Ages, however, is the increasing warinessof the male ecclesiastical authoritiesof visionaries,usually but not exclusively women. Strict criteriawere set down for the assessmentof their claims. Many of those who today are counted as the male mystics of the medieval period decried visions and other such putative direct communications from God altogether (Eckhart[c. 1320] 1979, 127, 117; Cloud[c. 1350] 1981, 231, 223; Ruusbroec[c. 1350] 1985, 89, 231). At the very least, strict adherence to the male-defined doctrines and practices of the church was expected of any woman who claimed spiritualauthority.Among the require-
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ments were obedience to the counsel of her (male) spiritualdirector,strict physical enclosure, and absolute chastity. Thus for instance the relatively unregulatedmovement in thirteenth-centuryRhineland of religiouswomen known as Beguinesescapedchargesof heresyonly by giving up their independent living arrangements, entering enclosure,and accepting the direction of a male ecclesiastic, usuallya Dominican friar. Even this, however, was not enough to guaranteethat women would be counted as genuine mystics, as likely as men to be recipients of divine communication.As the controlsweremoretightly drawnthroughoutwestern Europefromthe time of PopeJohn XXIIonward,many women and men were triedand condemnedas heretics,often on chargesof falsemysticism-another notable shift in the possibilitiesincludedin the term.Falsemysticismwasseen as the demonic counterpartof communication with God and was regularly in terms of sexual obscenities and murderous evil (Cohn 1976; characterized Russell 1980). Within the prevailingmisogynyof the late medieval and early modem periods,this took the horrendous formof the execution of thousands of women and some men as witches. The connection of power and gender in the social constructionof mysticismcould hardlyhave been made more clear than in the condemnationand slaughterof those who wereconsidered,as false mystics,to be a threat to churchand society sufficientto justifytheir extermination (Hester 1992). Only with the development of the secularstate, when religiousexperience was no longer perceived as a source of knowledge and power, did it become forexample,in his Speeches safeto allow women to be mystics.Schleiermacher, is happyto proclaimthe greaterreligiousconsciousnessof women, on Religion, whomhe alsosawas ideallymaintainingdomesticbliss(Schleiermacher[1799] 1958, 37; Briggs1985, 227-29). In the next centuryTennyson presentedhis ideal woman as Not learned,save in gracioushousehold ways, Not perfect,nay, but full of tender wants, No Angel, but a dearerbeing, all dipt In Angel instincts, breathingParadise, between the Gods and men. Interpreter (Tennyson [1847] 1906, 89) This idealwomanwould,of course,never ventureinto the sordidpublicworld. Both mysticismand women, then, becameconstructedasprivateandpersonal, having nothing to do with politics; hence mysticalraptureswere quite compatiblewith a woman'srole as the "angelin the house,"servicingher husband as well. The decline of gender and children not only physicallybut spiritually as an issue in the definition of who shouldcount as a mysticoccurredin direct relation to the decline in the perceptionof mysticalexperience, and religion generally,as politically powerful.At the same time, such experience came to
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be describedas "ineffable"-a notion that would have simplybaffledmany of the medieval women from Hildegardof Bingen to Teresaof Avila who are standardlyincluded in histories of mysticism and who wrote about their insightsand experienceswith greatfluency and creativity,and at greatlength (James [1902] 1960). It is plausible to suspect that the characterizationof mystical experience as ineffablehas much more to do with the construction of modem epistemologythan with what those who arecounted as mysticshave the allegedinexpressibility actuallysaidabouttheir experiences.Furthermore, of mystical experience correlatesneatly with the silencing of women in the public arena of the secularworld:women may be mystics, but mysticismis a private, intense experience not communicablein everydaylanguageand not of political relevance. Given the interconnection of power and gender in the social construction of mysticismin the past, it is hardlyfarfetchedto ask what sortsof power and gender issues are at work in this modem construction. The ineffability and privacyof mystical experience are uniformlytaken as its central featuresby philosophersincluding Stace (1961), Alston (1991), Pike (1992), and Franks Davis (1989), even though in other respectstheir understandings of mysticism differ from one another. Feminists have every reason, both historical and of mysticismwhich allows that current,to be suspiciousof an understanding women may be mystics, but which makes mysticism a private and ineffable psychologicaloccurrenceand which detaches it fromconsiderationsof social justice. Although it is clear that to a very largeextent the definition and control of who should count as a mystichave been in the hands of powerfulmales intent on retaining ecclesiastical or intellectual dominance, and that they have exercised that control to their own advantage,it is also evident that women were not simply passive victims. Even women who had stronglyinternalized male ideals of womanhoodas passiveand humble, and who fully accepted the authorityof the ecclesiasticalestablishment,often pushedbackthe boundaries of what could be counted as genuinelymysticalby the courageousintegrityof their lives and writings. Women such as Hildegardof Bingen and Julian of Norwich cannot be studied without recognizingtheir strength and insight. Furthermore,it is obvious that at least in some respects that strength and insight is directly related to their gender.Julian'stheology of God as Mother, for example, and her insistence that her recognition of God's love shall be available to all God's children, not only those in a religiouscommunity,are hardlydetachable from her experiences as a woman. Hadewijch of Antwerp speaksof spiritualgrowthusingthe metaphorof the nine months of pregnancy and urgesthat when one is gestating God, it is best not to give birth prematurely: it is hardly a metaphor that male writers would use. Although the women in the Christian tradition were in many respects bounded by male definition and authority,they still foundunconventional possibilitiesof work-
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ing within those boundariesand indeed in pushing them back in ways that feminists: remaininstructiveforcontemporary Julianof Norwich raisedradical questions about whether God could be thought of as wrathfulor punishing; Teresaof Avila refusedto toleratethe equationbetween wealth and worthiness to belong to a religious community; the visionary women already named challenged the idea that authoritywas necessarilyconjoined with education and ecclesiastical privilege. The many women and men who were willing to of authoritythat were often corrupt stand againstthe ecclesiasticalstructures Porete and MeisterEckhart,were and self-serving,and who, like Marguerite liable to be defined as heretics or witches becauseof it, showedradicalwaysof forwhat they wouldcount as genuinelyreligious,whether takingresponsibility or not it was approvedby those with the powerof the sword.It is appropriate that the dangerousmemoryof these women and men should be preservedin studiesof who counts as a mystic and that their lives shouldbe includedin the parametersof the question of power and gender in the Christian mystical tradition.
THE PHILOSOPHICAL USES OF MYSTICISM
The changes in the meaning of the idea of the mystical, and the fact that the changes were not innocent of considerationsof power and gender, are readily apparentin the historical sources.None of this, however, would be guessed by reading contemporaryphilosophical literature about mysticism. Modem philosophersof religion are seduced by a particularpicture of mysticism, inherited largelyfromWilliam James,which involves them in a stately dance of claims and counterclaimsabout experience and interpretation,languageand ineffability,credulityand doubt. The movements of this dance are by now well defined;but what is hardlyever noticed is how little resemblance they bearto the things that preoccupiedthe medievalmen and women whom they themselves would consider to be paradigmmystics:discernmentof the ministryto the needs of the destitute,the lepers, mysticalmeaningof Scripture, and the ignorant,and developmentof rich new genresand modes of language to sing of the love of God (Jantzen1989, 1990; Bynum 1987). Nor is it at all usualfor philosophersof religion discussingmysticismto pay close attention to the issuesof power,let alone gender,which feminists consider essential to adequateanalysis. I shall illustratethis by noting some issues to which contemporaryphilosophers of religion do pay close attention: the nature of mysticalexperience and its evidential value. Contemporaryphilosophersof religion have a clear presuppositionthat mystical experiences are private, subjective, intense psychological states. Whateverelse is open to question about mysticism,this, at least, continues to writerson mysticismcaution that the be assumed,even though contemporary word is notoriously difficult to define. Thus Nelson Pike in Mystic Union
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(1992) concentrateswholly on the varietyof intense psychologicalstates that he believes certain mysticshave describedas union with God. Takingseriously the need to look at primarysources,Pike spends considerabletime trying to analyzethe variousstages of mystical development as presentedby Teresaof Avila. He then usesthis analysisas a basisforhis philosophicaldiscussionabout the relationship between experience and interpretationin mystical experiences. Becausehe has alreadyassumedthat what is of fundamentalimportance are the experiential psychological states of the mystic, however, his whole account is focused on those states and their similaritiesand differences.He never asks whether this focus might seriouslydistortwhat the mystic herself considered to be essential; yet as Rowan Williams has argued,Teresa'sown concern was with the "contemplative'smissionaryvocation in a way far removedfrom the individualisticand slightly preciousambience"fosteredby concentration on her psychologicalstates (Williams 1991, ix). At one point, to be sure, Pike comes very close to seeing that his concern does not coincide with the concern of the mysticswhom he is discussing.In his preface, he asks, "What, then, do we find when we turn to the primary and in responsehe says,"Commentsabout the states of union are literature?" often embeddedin contexts in which mystics are less concerned to describe featuresof mystical phenomena than to extol the majestyof God, decry the of deception, etc." (Pike 1992, sinfulstatesof the soul, warnagainstthe dangers xii). Exactly so. But instead of taking this as a warning that the project of philosophical analysis of mysticism strictly in terms of psychological states might be in any waymisguided,Pike simplytakesit as addingto the difficulties that a philosopherwho discussesmysticismmustface. The centralquestionhe setshimselfis, "Whatis it to experienceunion with God?" And he immediately addsthe followinggloss:"Moreprecisely, what arethe experientialorphenomenological features of the various experiences traditionallyincluded in the union class?"(x). Union with God is here assumed to be a subjectivepsychostate. there is no consideration of moralissues,for examlogical Accordingly, in or of the social and which contexts certain ple, political people wereallowed to count as mysticswhile otherswerenot. Pike lifts passages out of the writings of Teresaof Avila, Jan van Ruusbroec,Eckhartand other mystics, and then treats these passagesas describing"experiencesof God" that can be known and identified as such without any referenceto the ecclesiastical and social climate in which they occurred, and that can be analyzed by a modern philosopher of religion strictly in terms of the psychological phenomena involved. The assumptionof the subjective and psychological nature of mysticism occursalso in the workof John Hick, whoseAn Interpretation (1989) of Religion discussesthe question of whether the mystical experiences of adherentsof variousworldreligions are at their core the same. Throughout,Hick relies on the basic understanding of mysticismas centrallyinvolving a subjectivestate
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of consciousness,usuallybriefin duration,which wouldbe quite differentfrom ordinaryconsciousness.Similarly,Michael Stoeber, in his interesting search fora mysticaltheodicy,characterizes an "authentic" mystic as one who "grants the experiences extraordinary status as a central premise of his or her life" because of their psychological impact on subjective consciousness (Stoeber 1992, 80). Again, most of the contributors to Steven Katz'svolume on and Language(Katz 1992) assume that mystical experience is an Mysticism intense subjectivestate. The discussionnever challenges this assumptionbut only questions the extent to which such a state is expressible in language. These recent authorsstand in a long line of writers,among them Anthony O'Hear(1984, chap. 2), J. L. Mackie(1982, chap. 10), and RichardSwinburne (1979, chap. 13), who, following William James, have interpretedmystical experience as essentially involving the four characteristicsof ineffability, noetic quality,transiency,andpassivity(James[1902] 1960, 367-8) even while fundamentallydisagreeingwith one another about the significance of such experiences. Moreover,investigation reveals that much of the modern construction of mysticismderives from an attempt to circumventKantian strictureson epistemology,strictureswhose effect would be to rendergenuine religiousexperience impossible. Kant's understanding of rationality and his theory of knowledgestand at the summitof the Enlightenmentproject. In Kant'sview, human knowledge can never extend to knowledge of things as they are in themselves;the best we can hope for is accurateknowledge of things as they appearto us. Knowledgeof ultimatereality,includingknowledgeof God, must thereforeremainforeverbeyond human capability:we can never circumvent the categoriesof ourperceptionwhich entail that any human experience will be seen strictly in terms of these categories.The price of the Enlightenment projectof makingthe human subjectthe center and foundationof all knowledge is to forecloseforeverknowledgeof any transcendentreality. Postmodernthinkershave taken the Kantianturnto the rationalsubjectas one of the most objectionableaspectsof modernity, and muchhas been written about "the death of the subject."Whether this is to be welcomed or not is have reasonto be waryof announceanotherquestion.Feministsin particular ments of the "death of autonomousman" in a world in which autonomous women have hardly had a chance to be born (Braidotti 1991; Flax 1990). ContemporaryAnglo-American philosophersof religion, however, remain largelyuntouched by postmoder concerns, and conduct their discussionof mysticism, wittingly or not, under the long shadow of Kant. This shadow stretchesthroughthe workof Schleiermacherand WilliamJames,who try to retrieve religious and mystical experience from Kantian stricturesby seeing such experiencesas unique, intense, subjectivestates of consciousnessoccurring "on the verges of the mind" (James [1902] 1960, 406), different from normalconsciousnessand thus escapingKant'scriticaltheory.Not all modem
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andJames, theirindebtedness to Schleiermacher acknowledge philosophers on the subjecalthough manydo;but it is clearthat withouttheiremphasis andmystical in particular, experience experience generally tivityof religious discussion wouldbe verydifferent. the contemporary hadnot read of the Christian tradition The classical Kant,andtheir mystics if one read from think were different what one might quite preoccupations modem of them. discussions Even when did of only philosophical they speak were on much broader and more nuanced focusing something experience, they than is captured given by Jamesand acceptedby by the characteristics even in a commontradition Furthermore, mystics philosophers. subsequent all be cannot theirexperiences and heap,asthough piledintoone monolithic werehomogenized. weremuchmoreconcerned concerns Female with mystics visionsandlocutionsandintenseexperiences thanwerethe dominant male the disparagement of intenseexperiences on thepartof these Indeed, mystics. men can be readas an attemptto discredit the womenvisionaries and the claimed. characterizations of post-Kantian authority they Ironically, mysticism aremoreaccurate to female visionaries thanto malemystics, sinceit wasonly statesthat womenof spirit by wayof visionsand otheracutepsychological couldhopeto be accorded spiritual authority. once the characterization in terms of mysticism of intenseexpeMoreover, riencesis takenas definitive, then a further itself:Is there presents question reason that the to ofpeopleofotherreligions suppose any mystical experiences fromthoseof Christian Couldthere (ornone) needbe anydifferent mystics? be a mystical coreof religion-an inward, thatpeoplein personal experience allreligions havein common, it is thenoverlaid withculture-specific although beliefsandpractices? divided.CarolineFranks Davis,followingRichard Opinionsare sharply of credulity" to argue that in the absence of Swinbure, usesthe "principle thatdefeatthe claims considerations of thosewhohavereligious experiences, theirclaimsshouldbe takenas evidencefor the truthof religious doctrines Davis and Swinbume see 4 also Alston (Franks 1989,chaps. 9; 1979,chap.13; That as we that a whoclaimsto see a 1991). is, just accept standardly person treeor a flower unlessthereis serious reason reallydoessee a treeor a flower to doubtthe person's orthe reliability trustworthiness of hersenses, so alsowe shouldacceptthat if a personclaimsto have seen or otherwise experienced is veridical God, that is in itselfgoodreasonto believethat her experience we haveserious unless reason to call it intodoubt. On the otherside,Richard M. Gale arguesthat the parallels betweenmysticalexperienceand sense are too weak to allow for suchan application of the principle of experience and that therefore cannot as serve evidence for credulity mystical experience the truth of religious the claimthatGodexists(Gale1991, claims, particularly chap.8).
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It is obvious that this is anotherpreoccupationthat those who are counted as mysticshardlyshared,living as they did underthe "sacred canopy"in which God'sexistence was taken for granted.Although they were indeed concerned that their experiencesshouldnot be self-inducedor, worse,of demonic origin, the basisfor this concern wasnot a need forevidence for the existence of God. What todayis essentiallycontestedwasto them completelyclear.Philosophers who use the accounts of mysticalwritersto argueabout the existence of God or the truth of the doctrines of Christianityare using these accounts in ways that would have been foreignand in some cases abhorrentto the people who wrote them. Of course, it is proper to recognize that when modem philosophers ask questions different from those asked by the mystics themselves, it does not follow that modem philosophersare wrong to do so. Although the mystics were convinced of the truth of God's existence, that claim has now become problematic:Why should philosophersof religion who investigate it not use the resources that the mystics provide, even if that was not the original intention behind their writings?It would be courtesy (to put it no higher) to notice that this is a differentuse of the mysticalwritingsthan that which their authors intended, but in itself there is nothing particularlydevious about finding resourcesin a text which were not part of the author'sdesigns. One can, for instance, quite legitimatelyuse the Icelandic sagasas evidence that certain species of birds mentioned in the text must have been resident in Iceland at the time of the Viking era, even though providing that evidence was only incidental to the text and not what was important to those who developedthe sagas.Similarly,if the experiencesof the mysticsin the Christian traditionas describedin the books they wrote give evidence for the existence of God, then it is legitimate for modern philosophers to recognize that evidence, even when the original writerswere not making that their main point and indeed would have been astoundedthat anyone should need such evidence. But now another problemarises,and it is this one that I am concerned to highlight. If mystical experience is indeed used as evidence for the truth of religious claims (or rejected as providing such evidence), which mystical experiences are we talking about?Contraryto what would be assumedfrom readingphilosophical discussionsof mysticism,we saw in the first section of this paperthat what counts as mysticalexperiencehas gone throughenormous variations and that these variations have been essentially connected with issues of power and gender. Accordingly, if philosophers are going to use as part of their argument,it is first necessaryfor them to decide "mysticism" mean what they by that term, and whom they will count as a mystic. At this point, philosopherstypicallydo two incompatiblethings. The firstis that they employ the understandingof mysticism largely derived from the work of that I have indicated is highly problematic, WilliamJames,an understanding
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at least in a historicalsense. And second, in doing so they supposethemselves to be discussingthe experiencesof the classicalmysticsof Christianity,all of whom, they suppose, had experiences characterizablein roughly Jamesian terms. Given these assumptions,it is not surprising that issues of power and and been feminists have to unnoticed; go gender quick point out in other areas that where such issuesare unnoticed, they arereinforced. If, however,philosophersof religion do wish to ask whether certain altered states of consciousnesscan provide evidence for the existence of God, that may be a legitimate question, although one that feminists would do well to probe. But it is necessaryto be clear that this is a very different question from asking whether "mysticalexperience" (which ones? whose?) provides such does. If my argumentis correct,then evidence, let alone whether "mysticism" one thing standsout:Jamesandhis followersnotwithstanding,there is no such thing as an "essence" of mysticism, a single type of experience which is characterizable as mystical while others are excluded. All these terms have long histories of social construction;they are not unproblematicterms with clear referents,nor are their variationsinnocent of the shifting machinations of power.Philosopherswho pick on any one construction-usually one that involves intense subjectivestates of consciousness-to providethe evidential data for their discussionhave not usuallyrecognizedthat it is a construction, ratherthan "what mysticismreally is," let alone that it is constructedout of differentialsof power and genderrelations. Thus, for example, Caroline FranksDavis tries to find a common threadin religiousexperienceswhich will enable her to use them as partof a cumulative case for the truthof religiousbeliefs.FranksDavis is well awarethat mysticism is not monolithic and recognizesthis as a problemto be resolved in her effort to use the claims of mystics as evidence for religiousdoctrines.The problem, put bluntly,is that the claims of mysticsof variousreligions, and even within religions, on the face of it contradictone another.She argues,however,that the apparentconflict can often be reconciledand that even wheredifferences remain with regardto specific doctrinal claims, what the mystics have in common is more importantthan what divides them. For example, while it is true that a Christianmystic such as Teresaof Avila might experienceJesusas the Son of God, whereas a Muslim mystic would reject this claim, and a Buddhistmystic would experience "emptiness," all three, despite these differences, would agree that "the mundaneworldof physicalbodies... is not the whole or ultimate reality"and that "whateveris the ultimate reality is holy, eternal, and of supremevalue" (FranksDavis 1989, 191). These agreements on what FranksDavis calls "relativelyunramified" doctrines are then given in her cumulative case for a broad very greatimportance theism, even though she recognizesthat the people who makesuchclaimsarenot themselves"broad theists"but ratherholdersof specific doctrines.
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There are a variety of problemswith FranksDavis'sargumenthere. In the first place, even grantingthe termsof the argument,it is far from clear that her conclusion holds. After all, the more highly ramifiedbeliefs that are in conflict with one another are often held, accordingto FranksDavis, on the basisof exactlythesamemysticalor religiousexperiencesas those that produce the less ramified,compatiblebeliefs. If she wishes to use those experiencesas evidence for the truth of the latter,how is it that they can be sidestepped(or reinterpreted)when it comes to the former? Her strategyof response involves the even more doubtful move, familiar and Philosophy since Walter Stace's book Mysticism (1961), of distinguishing between interpretation and experience. During the experience, she says, "mysticsgenerallyadmit that little interpretationis possible."When we look closely at what they say after the fact, we find, however, that "mysticsvery probablyhave the samesort of experience,viz. freedomfromall sense of time, space, personal identity, and multiplicity,which leaves them with a blissful, of perfectunity and a sense that 'this is it,' the ultimatelevel 'nakedawareness' of reality"(1989, 178). It is only upon emergingfrom their experiences that mysticsinterpretthem in accordancewith their prior"doctrinalset," and it is this, rather than the experiences themselves, which causes the apparent conflict. By this time we should be alert to how problematicsuch a line of argument Davisconcentratesexclusivelyon intense is. In the firstplace, CarolineFranks subjectiveexperiences,as though that is what is importantabout mysticism.I have alreadyshown how such a concentration is a modernselection, having more to do with a modern philosophical agenda than with accuracyto the mystical tradition of Christianity,within which the focus on intense experiences wasfor long periodsabsentaltogether.I have done nothing to show that the same would be true in the case of other worldreligions, but I suspectthat of mysticalexperience by Westernscholarshas in them, too, the "discovery" more to do with the preoccupationof post-Enlightenmentphilosophy than with the indigenousreligioustraditionsthemselves.(While not concentrating on the issue of mysticalexperience, WilfredCantwell Smith has arguedthat the concept of religion is itself a Western, post-Enlightenment monster foisted on other traditions and societies ratherthan drawnout of a genuine understandingof them [Smith 1978, 1981; Byrne 1989]). For FranksDavis and other modern philosophers to take intense experiences as central to mysticism is thus simply inaccurate, at least to the Christian tradition, and since it is this tradition which most concerns them, their conclusions must be highly suspect. even in those cases where FranksDavis could indeed appeal Furthermore, to intense experiencesin the Christianmysticaltradition,such as,forexample, the visions of Hildegard of Bingen, Hadewijch of Antwerp, or Julian of Norwich, they would tend to cast doubton her case ratherthan assistit. These
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women, and others like them, kept their wits about them duringtheir intense experiences, sometimes taking part in the visions, not as though they were watching a film, but as full participantsin a drama.Julian,for example, asked pointed questions of God about the evil and suffering in the world, and objected when she felt that the responsesshe received were inadequate.To claim, as FranksDavis does, that "mysticsgenerallyadmit that little interpreof the such an experience"simplybetraysunawareness tation is possibleduring descriptionsof the experiencesgiven by the women themselves.Of coursethey were not writingdown their "interpretations" duringthe time of the experiences, but that is not to saythat they werehaving some sortof undifferentiated ecstasy,and only later invented the narrativeof their experiences, cutting it out of whole cloth. The only alternativewould be to say that these women werenot reallymystics,or at least that these experiencesarenot paradigmatically mystical. But to make that sort of move would only repeat in modem strategiesthat we have seen philosophicalguisethe samesortsof power/gender active in ecclesiastical dress in the medieval period. It is obviously not that only certain sortsof experience shall count as legitimate both to stipulate genuinelymystical(e.g., those which areineffable[Stace 1961],or those which displaya sense of "nakedawareness"[FranksDavis 1989]), and at the same claim that all mysticshave experiences time to supposethat it is an empirical of roughlythis nature;yet this is the sort of circularreasoningthat too often characterizes projects of showing that mystical experiences have a common core that can serveas partof a cumulativecase forreligiousbelief. The modem enterpriseof fitting mystics into a procrusteanbed has many antecedents, as we have seen, and such a move still has a strong appeal for contemporary philosophersof religion. The issues of power and gender which operatedso powerfullyin medieval definitions of who should count as a mystic are still with us, albeit in modem liberalcostume.
A FEMINIST RESPONSE
In the philosophical study of mysticism,with its assumptionthat mystical experience is an essentiallyprivate,subjectivematterwhich, as such, does not connect with issues of social justice, feminism has yet to make an impact. If this amounted only to there being a small academic enclave which had not taken feminist scholarshipinto account and which insisted on defining and studying mysticism in male-dominated ways, that would be bad enough, though feminists might well decide that in a world of starving children, batteredwomen, and risingfascismwe had more importantthings to do than to spendenergytryingto change the mindsof philosophersof religion.But the situation is very much more serious.No social constructionis the propertyof only one small groupof people; rather,the nature of a social construction is that the definition imposed in the interests of a powerful group in society
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becomes constitutive of the society as a whole, as partof received knowledge. The assumption,therefore,that spiritualityand social justice are separate,or, in more colloquial terms,that religion doesn't mix with politics, is one that is acceptedand reinforcednot only by manyphilosophersof religion but also far morewidely.And if, as I have alreadysuggested,it is also deemed that women more spiritualthan men, then only a small step is necessaryto are "naturally" to a context in which they are confine both the "feminine"and the "spiritual" renderedthoroughlyineffectual. escapingfeministscrutiny,in the pastdecadethere has been a strong Largely outside academiaas well as of interest in mysticismand spirituality resurgence inside, in the churches as well as in secularsociety. Devotional and New Age books, and volumes containing selected readingsfrom the mysticswhich can be readfor a few minutes at the beginningor end of the day,sell thousandsof copies and help keep religious publisherssolvent. Retreat centers flourish; institutesof spiritualityare set up; more and more of the writingsof medieval and theology and religiousstudies mysticsare availablein modem translation; at universitiesareofferingcourses-often heavily subscribed-on departments mysticismand spirituality. Feminists have paid astonishinglylittle attention to this widespreadand culturallysignificantphenomenon. Although there has been some new femimedievalmystics,and themes arisingfromthem, nist scholarshipon particular we have yet to evaluate the social needs to which this resurgentinterest in them bearswitness. Why and how does such interest ariseand make itself felt in a male-dominated,capitalist,and increasinglyfascistsociety characterized greed,andracistandsexistviolence?Nor have we askedmany by consumerism, whether or how spirituality,either in its popular manifesabout questions tations or in its academic study,connects with efforts for social justice. Still less have we inquired whether involvement in spirituality movements might actually deflect attention from the real needs of people, offering palliatives to individuals rather than solutions to the social causes of injustice. A feminist analysis of the patriarchal social construction of mysticism has hardly begun. One place to startis to look at some of the most widely sold books on prayer and spirituality.Here, we find a huge emphasis on personal psychological well-being. Topics such as anxiety, depression,and loneliness are regularly addressed,along with such matters as suffering,bereavement, and sexual desires,all treatedas essentiallyprivateissuesforan individualto workthrough in her or his own way,guidedby the insightsofferedby the authorof the book. Prayerand spiritualexercises are advocated as bringingan increase of peace and tranquillity,and courage for the hard things in life. Thus, for example, HenriNouwen, whose bookshave soldmanythousandsof copies,concentrates on woundedness,suffering,and healing through solitude and silence, prayer and meditation (Nouwen 1979, 1981). Gerard Hughes, in his enormously
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guides readersthrough meditations on their own popular God of Surprises, self-worth and seeks to help people deal with crippling guilt and make lifeaffirmingdecisions (Hughes 1985). Even Matthew Fox, in his many popular books on creation-centeredspirituality,emphasizespersonal well-being and the blessingsof sexuality and growth, but beyond bland assurancesthat this approachwill be good for women and the earth, he has little specific to say about structuralor political injustice or the ways in which spiritualityor mysticismmight have a bearingon it (Fox 1983, 1988). Perhapsmost striking of all are the writings of M. Scott Peck, especially The Road Less Traveled TimesBookReviews in August 1993, still stood (1978), which in the New York at the top of the paperbacklist after 508 weeks. The book begins, "Life is difficult."Its theme is how to meet that difficultythroughpersonaldiscipline, healing, love, and trust, characterizedas "spiritualgrowth" in "traditional values." While it is certainlyno partof a feministagendato minimizethe importance of personal psychological well-being, healthy sexuality,or creative decision making, several featuresof the spiritualityindustryneed critique. First, the immensesuccessof such devotional and spiritualself-helpbooks, measuredin numbersof sales, shows how urgent is the felt need for psychospiritual wellfor inner to resources with the distresses life. of while at Second, being, cope least some of these booksmayindeedbe helpfulforthe empoweringof women, as the cliche goes, this by itself does not begin to address the questionof where the stressesof life originate, or whether there are unjust structuresin society which generate the oppressionand anxiety for which help is sought. Except insofaras the psychospiritual well-beingof an individualhas an impacton her society (and this should not be minimized),there is as little indication in the popular literature as there is in scholarly treatments that mysticism and spiritualityhave anything to do with politics and social justice. Instead,they provide a private religious way of coping with life, whatever the external circumstances. From a feminist perspective, this is deeply worrying.To the extent that prayerand meditationand bookson spirituality actuallyhelp people cope with the distresses of life that arise out of unjust social conditions but fail to challenge those conditions themselves, to that extent they act as a sedative that distractsattention fromthe need to dismantlethe structures that perpetuate the misery.If books and practicesof spirituality help calm janglednerves and release anxieties and renew courage to re-enter the world as it is, then despite the good intentions of the authorsand practitioners(and these are usuallynot in doubt) the actualeffect is unwittinglyto reinforcethe structures of injustice. The social and political policies that make for starvingchildren, batteredwomen, and the evils of risingfascismremainin place as people learn throughprayerto find the tranquillityto live with corruptpolitical and social
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structuresinstead of channeling their distress and anger and anxiety into energyfor constructivechange. In this connection it is instructiveto considerthe way in which the writings of medieval Christianmysticshave been domesticatedfor a privatizedspirituality. In almost any book of short readingsfrom the mystics, the selections predominantlyemphasizelove of God, trust in God, humility, submissionto God's will, dependence on providence, and cultivation of inner peace and such themes of trustand Women who are awareof how regularly tranquillity. humility and submissionhave been used to keep women "in their place" in churchand society will immediatelyfind their suspicionsraised.It is clearthat while a personwho uses these readingsas a basisfordaily meditation maywell find herself calmed and encouraged,it is unlikely that they will provoke her to think hardaboutthe social causesof her stressor to detect the waysin which of capitalist society producethe stressesshe feels, threaten the the structures survivalof our sisters and brothersin economically deprivedcountries, and underminethe life-sustainingcapacitiesof the earth. As MargaretMiles has pointed out, it wasone thing forpeople to meditatetrustinglyon exhortations to submit to divine providence in the fourteenth century when the plague mightcome at any momentand no one knewhow to avoid it; it is quite another forconsolation and inactivity in the late thing to take those texts as blueprints twentieth centurywhen the very survivalof the planet dependson informed and concerted effort (Miles 1988, 176-84). In summary,with some notable exceptions, books of popular Christian spiritualitytreat prayerand spiritualexercisesas strictlyprivate, having to do with the relationshipbetween the individualand God. Forall their differences in style and intention from philosophical explorations of mysticism and of the privacyand subjectivityof they sharethe same assumptions spirituality, religiousexperience, includingmysticalexperience. In both cases, the privatizing of spirituality obscures its relation to social justice. The net result, whatever the conscious intention of the authorsand compilers, is the reinforcementof the societal statusquo, as intellectual and religiousenergypours into an exploration of private religiosityratherthan into social and political action forchange.This in turnhas the effectnot only of divertingthe attention of those seeking deepened spiritualityaway from issues of justice but also of leaving the efforts for justice to those who have abandoned concern with seeing it as severedfromthe workfor structuralchange. spirituality, It is, however,one thing for feministsto recognizethat there is considerable need for analysisof the social constructionof mysticismas it is reflectedboth in popularspiritualityand in philosophical accounts of mysticism;it is quite another to provide such an analysis.We can quite easily come to suspectthat the agenda with which philosophershave studied the lives and writingsof medieval mystics is not an agenda that the mystics themselves would have effectsof the current shared.We can recognize,as well, that one of the primary
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social constructionof mysticismhas been a focuson its personalpsychological dimensions, deflecting attention away from its political and social dynamic. But even a feminist philosophy of religion that would retrieve the lives and writingsof the mysticsand expose theirconcernsforpolitical and socialjustice It is manifestlynot the case that the tradition wouldneed to proceedcautiously. of Christian spiritualityuniformlynurtureswholeness and justice, let alone sexual egalitarianism!There is racismand classism,sexism and homophobia, as deep in the heartsof many of the paradigm mysticsof Wester Christianity as it is deep in the heart of the Christianchurch itself. None of the mystical writerswere unambiguous: we find levels of tension within each individual,as and strength integritystruggledwith deeply internalizedmisogynyand suspicion of the body and sexuality(Newman 1987;Jantzen 1987). And yet, while oppressionruns deep, it is also true that from within the mystical tradition, especially (but not only) fromsome of the women mystics,came creative and courageousefforts at pushing back the boundariesof thought and action so that liberationcould be achieved.
CONCLUSION
As feminist/womanist of religionstruggletowardouridentities, philosophers the studyof powerand genderin the social constructionof mysticismoffersa fruitfulset of reflections. I wish to drawout three that have particularsignificance for the emergenceof feminist philosophyof religion. The firstis that feministswho studymysticismand religiousexperiencehave much to gain by being more alert than philosophersof religion have usually been to the social context, including the gendered structuresof authority, within which the lives and writingsof the classicalmysticstook form.Rather than falling into the trap of universalizingdiscourse, or measuringall the mystics according to a single procrusteanbed, we can lear to respect and celebratedifferenceby resurrecting the dangerous memoriesof individualswho resisted such homogenization. Luce Irigaray has written of women's urgent need for positing new, female, values for the divine (Irigaray1993, 67). The women mystics offer such values in their colorfullyinclusive language,their unconventional concepts of God (often spoken of as female), and the costly integrityof their lives as they claimedthe authorityof theirexperiencesagainst the grainof convention. Second, feminist philosophers of religion can use a study of the social construction of mysticismto become awareof currentareasin philosophyof religion (and beyondit) whereconcepts arebandiedaboutas though they were objective and universallyapplicablewhen in fact they are productsof particular, gendered, constellations of authority.What power relations are concealed, for example, in philosophicaldiscoursesabout religiouspluralismand interreligious dialogue,in which there mayalso be an appealto a mysticalcore
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of religion? Who benefits and who loses, not only from the contemporary constructionof mysticism,but also fromother conceptions in the philosophy of religion, most notably the conceptions of God and the divine attributes, been fashionedaftera male ideal and used to legitimate which have regularly oppression?To whom, finally, are feminists accountable in our own highly privilegedphilosophicalpursuits,and is that accountabilityto be reckonedin termsof truth only or also in termsof justice? This connects with a third implication that a study of the social constructions of mysticism,past and present, opens out for feminist/womanistphilosophy of religion.The women'smovementsof this centuryhave taken women's experienceas central,validatingwomen who spoketheir truth,perhapsforthe firsttime, in contexts such as consciousness-raising groups.Formany women, the experience of being heard in such a groupwas utterly life-changing,and sometimes felt as near to a disclosureof the divine as they had ever come. It has become obvious that "women'sexperience"is neither so uniformnor so unproblematicas it at first may have appearedand that these experiences themselves are not immune fromsocial construction.Nevertheless, feminists are, I expect, much more likely to ground our philosophies of religion in women'sexperiences as the source of religiousknowledge than in the traditional categories of revelation and reason: I cannot quite imagine what a feminist rendition of the ontological argumentmight look like. As we look to women'sexperiencesfor such grounding,however,we need to be alert to the within which such experiencesare constructed,even while being parameters the to epiphanieswhich they may disclose. It is only as we are critically open alert to the dangersof a privatizedand psychologizedconstruction of experience that we will also be able to use our experiences creatively in feminist/womanistphilosophiesof religion that preservevital connections to the urgentissuesof social justice.
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significance Bynum,CarolineWalker.1987. Holyfeastandholyfast:Thereligious offoodto women.Berkeley: medieval Universityof CaliforniaPress. and the natureof religion. New Yorkand London: Byrne, Peter. 1989. Naturalreligion Routledge. Cloudof Unknowing. [c. 1350] 1981. Editedby JamesWalsh. New York:PaulistPress; London:SPCK. innerdemons.London:Paladin. Cohn, Norman. 1976. Europe's Eckhart.[c. 1320] 1979. Sermons and treatises, 3 vols. Trans.and ed. M. O'C. Walshe. London:Watkins. A visionary Sabina. 1989. Hildegard Flanagan, of Bingen: life.New York: Routledge. and postmodemism in the Flax, Jane. 1990. Thinking Psychoanalysis, fragments: feminism West.Los Angeles:Universityof CaliforniaPress. contemporary A history in theageof reason. andcivilization: Foucault,Michel. 1965. Madness of insanity Trans.RichardHoward.New York: RandomHouse. An archaeology New York: .1973. Theorder sciences. of things: of thehuman Vintage. Santa Fe: Bearand Company. Fox, Matthew.1983. Original blessing. .1988. The coming Christ.San Francisco: of thecosmic Harperand Row. Franks Oxford: Clarendon Davis,Caroline.1989.Theevidentialforce ofreligious experience. Press. Gale, Richard M. 1991. On the natureand existenceof God. Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress. A studyof thedynamics witches: Hester,Marianne.1992. Lewdwomenandwicked of male domination. New York: Routledge. Humanresponses to thetranscendent. New Hick, John. 1989. An interpretation of religion: York: Macmillan. of Bingen. [c. 1142] 1990.Scivias. Trans.ColumbaHartandJaneBishop.New Hildegard York: PaulistPress. London:Darton,Longmanand Todd.. Hughes,GerardW. 1985. Godof surprises. Luce. 1993. Sexesandgenealogies. Trans.Gillian C. Gill. New York:Columbia Irigaray, UniversityPress. James,William. [1902] 1960. Thevarieties experience. of religious Glasgow:Collins. Medievaland moder presupJantzen,Grace. 1986. The mysticalmeaningof scripture: Review7.2. positions.King's Theological .1987. Julian andtheologian. London:SPCK;New York: Paulist of Norwich: Mystic Press. 1989. Mysticismand experience.Religious 25. Studies 1990. Could there be a mysticalcore of religion? Studies 26. Religious Trans.Edmund Julianof Norwich. [c. 1370] 1978. Showings. Colledgeand JamesWalsh. London:SPCK;New York: PaulistPress. andlanguage. Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Katz,Steven T., ed. 1992. Mysticism tradition: FromPlatoto Denys. Louth,Andrew. 1981. The origins of theChristian mystical Oxford:ClarendonPress. Mackie,J. L. 1982. The miracle of theism: Arguments for andagainsttheexistence of God. Oxford:ClarendonPress. 1991. Thefoundations to thefifthcentury. McGinn, Bernard. London: Origins of mysticism: SCM. andfeminism: andtheself.Cambridge: Power, McNay,Lois. 1992. Foucault gender Polity. A critique holiness: Miles, Margaret.1988. The imageandpractice manuals of of theclassic London:SCM Press. of devotion.
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