JOINT OPERATIONS AT THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

MICHAEL A. FOX, LCDR, USN B.S., University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1994

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Thesis Title:

LCDR Michael A. Fox

Joint Operations at the Campaign of Santiago

Approved by:

,
C &

Thesis Committee Chairman

William C. ~ockAood, M.M.A.S.

,
CDR Richard P. ~ e r ~ d o n B.S. ,
...

Member

Lawrence A.

at$,

, Member
Ph.D.

Accepted this 3rd day of June 1994 by:

,
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT AT THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO by LCDR Michael JOINT OPERATIONS A. Fox, USN, 93 pages. This study is a historical analysis of the joint operations between the United States Army and Navy during the Santiago Campaign of the Spanish-American War. The study examines the U.S. military's preparations for the campaign, including mobilization and development of campaign plans at both the strategic and operational levels; details the actions of the U.S. military during the campaign, from the landing phase 'through the siege of Santiago to the eventual Spanish surrender; and analyzes the campaign lessons learned as well as the changes and reforms that took place in both services in the ten-year period following the Spanish-American War. The study concludes that, lacking doctrine or a unified command, cooperation between services is imperative to conducting a successful campaign. This cooperation was not evident between the Army and Navy during the Santiago Campaign. As a direct result, the U.S. military instituted several important changes and reforms to help ensure better cooperation in future joint actions. This study also shows that doctrine can be developed by examining the lessons learned of a military operation, as was the case for the landing operations and naval gunfire support performance at Santiago.

iii

A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S
I would l i k e t o e x p r e s s m y appreciation t o m y research

committee f o r t h e i r s u p p o r t and a s s i s t a n c e i n t h e development of t h i s t h e s i s .

LTC William C . Lockwood, CDR Richard P .

Ferguson, and D r . Lawrence A . Yates p r o v i d e d v a l u a b l e guidance and encouragement i n s e e i n g t h i s t h e s i s t o f r u i t i o n .

I am g r e a t l y i n d e b t t o t h e s t a f f of t h e Combined A r m s

Research L i b r a r y (CARL) f o r t h e i r e f f o r t s i n p r o v i d i n g r e s e a r c h m a t e r i a l and c o n t i n u a l l y s t e e r i n g me i n t h e r i g h t direction.

I a l s o want t o e x p r e s s m y sincerest gratitude t o m y

wife, Wendy, and o u r c h i l d r e n , Ryan, Tory, and Abby, without whose s u p p o r t , encouragement and u n d e r s t a n d i n g I would n e v e r have completed t h i s t h e s i s .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPROVAL PAGE

............. ..., ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTERS
1.

ii

iii

INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS PREPARATIONS THE SANTIAGO

2.
3.
4.

. FOR SANTIAGO . . . CAMPAIGN . . . . .

. . . . . ....... . . ... . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CAMPAIGN LESSONS LEARNED AND SUBSEQUENT REFORMS ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

.. . . ENDNOTES.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST . . . . . . .

5.

74
82
86

LIST O F FIGURES

Fiaure
1. 2.
Map o f T r a n s i t t o Cuba Map o f S a n t i a g o T h e a t e r

l2s.C

.... ........ . . . . . . . . . . . .

15
17

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander of the U.S. Fleet, had just completed a successful blockade of Cuban waters during the initial stages of the Spanish-American War. The U.S. naval forces now contained several Spanish ships, under the command of Admiral Pasqual Cervera, inside the waters of Santiago Harbor. However, the U.S. fleet was unable

to exploit its successes further due to the defensive fortresses that overlooked the bay and the possibility of mines in the waters. Sampson promptly wired the War

Department, requesting the Secretary of War, Russell A. Alger, to send U.S. Army assets to the Cuban theater to conduct a siege on the town of Santiago, facilitating his fleet's destruction of the Spanish ships. In response to Sampson's

request the Major-General Commanding the Army, Nelson A. Miles, sent the following instructions (on May 31, 1898) to Brigadier-General William R. Shafter, Commander of the Army's
V Corps, which was being mobilized at Tampa, Florida:

With the approval of the Secretary of War, you are directed to take your command on transports, proceed under convoy of the Navy to the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, land your force at such place east or west of that point as your judgment may dictate, under the protection of the Navy, and move it onto the high grounds and bluffs overlooking the harbor or into the interior, as shall best

e n a b l e you t o c a p t u r e o r d e s t r o y t h e g a r r i s o n t h e r e , and c o v e r t h e Navy a s it s e n d s i t s men i n s m a l l b o a t s t o remove t o r p e d o e s ; o r , w i t h t h e a i d o f t h e Navy, c a p t u r e o r d e s t r o y t h e Spanish f l e e t now r e p o r t e d t o b e i n S a n t i a g o Harbor. 1 These r a t h e r ambiguous o r d e r s proved t o be t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r what would l a t e r be a n example o f ineffectual joint operations. Although t h e Campaign of

S a n t i a g o h a s t o be c o n s i d e r e d a n o p e r a t i o n a l s u c c e s s due t o t h e subsequent d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e Spanish f l e e t and t h e f o r t s under S p a n i s h c o n t r o l i n t h e c i t y , it w a s p e r h a p s due more t h r o u g h l u c k and enemy incompetency t h a n by any U.S. t a c t i c a l expertise. The l e s s o n s l e a r n e d from t h e i n e p t conduct of j o i n t o p e r a t i o n s a t S a n t i a g o , however, r e s u l t e d i n s i g n i f i c a n t changes i n t h e s t r u c t u r e of b o t h t h e U.S. Army and Navy; t h e y a l s o i n f l u e n c e d f u t u r e j o i n t d o c t r i n e and p r o c e d u r e s . The

purpose o f t h i s t h e s i s i s t o examine t h e conduct of j o i n t o p e r a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e B a t t l e o f S a n t i a g o and t o d e t e r m i n e what went wrong. The i n t e n t i s t o show how t h i s campaign had a

d i r e c t b e a r i n g on f u t u r e j o i n t o p e r a t i o n s , n o t t o a s s i g n blame f o r t h e f a i l u r e s t o any one p e r s o n o r s e r v i c e . One cannot assume t h a t t h e commanders of t h e S a n t i a g o campaign c o m p l e t e l y i g n o r e d t h e s t a n d i n g p r a c t i c e s o r p r o c e d u r e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e conduct o f j o i n t o p e r a t i o n s . S e v e r a l f a c t o r s combined t o handicap m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s a s t h e y t r i e d t o conduct o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e Spanish i n Cuba. For one, it had been o v e r t h i r t y y e a r s s i n c e t h e l a s t j o i n t

o p e r a t i o n i n v o l v i n g t h e Army and Navy had been conducted.

For

a n o t h e r , d e c r e a s e d l e v e l s o f manning i n b o t h t h e Army and t h e Navy had g r e a t l y h i n d e r e d t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n e f f o r t s , which had

a d i r e c t e f f e c t on t h e t r a i n i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s p r i o r t o t h e
campaign. Additionally, t h e lack of a s t r u c t u r e d chain of

command from t h e p r e s i d e n t i a l l e v e l down t o t h e f i e l d commanders p r o v i d e d l i t t l e s t r a t e g i c d i r e c t i o n f o r t h e conduct o f t h e campaign.

I t i s e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t , however, t o keep i n

mind t h a t poor e x e c u t i o n a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l a s w e l l a s a l a c k of c o o r d i n a t i o n between Sampson and S h a f t e r g r e a t l y c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e o v e r a l l performance of t h e U.S. m i l i t a r y a t Santiago. The j o i n t a s p e c t of t h e Campaign o f S a n t i a g o began w i t h t h e p r e p a r a t i o n s phase. While t e n s i o n s between t h e

Americans and t h e Spanish had been on t h e rise f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s p r i o r t o t h e o u t b r e a k of war, t h e U.S. m i l i t a r y was caught o f f g u a r d when h o s t i l i t i e s began. The Navy, through i t s

Naval War College, had begun i n i t i a l work on f o r m u l a t i n g p o s s i b l e n a v a l a c t i o n s i n response t o a w a r w i t h Spain whereas t h e Army had y e t t o a d d r e s s t h e i s s u e . Thus, no one c o h e s i v e

war p l a n u t i l i z i n g j o i n t f o r c e s had been developed t o oppose a s e a power w i t h d i v e r s e l a n d h o l d i n g s , s p e c i f i c a l l y Cuba and the Philippines.
A s i g n i f i c a n t m o b i l i z a t i o n o f Army t r o o p s

was r e q u i r e d b e f o r e even t h e most b a s i c of war p l a n s c o u l d be executed. Time s p e n t m o b i l i z i n g t r o o p s d e t r a c t e d from t h e

j o i n t t r a i n i n g e f f o r t , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e a r e a of amphibious

operations.

T h i s f i r s t became a p p a r e n t d u r i n g t h e embarkation

o p e r a t i o n s a t Tampa and was l a t e r b o r n e o u t when t h e Army a r r i v e d o f f t h e c o a s t o f Cuba i l l - p r e p a r e d t o t r a n s p o r t p e r s o n n e l , m a t e r i e l , and s u p p l i e s from s h i p t o s h o r e . Furthermore, a s a r e s u l t o f n o t h a v i n g a u n i f i e d commander f o r t h e conduct o f j o i n t o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e a t e r , t h e r e w e r e i n e f f i c i e n t communications p r o c e d u r e s and a s e r i o u s l a c k of c o o r d i n a t i o n . T h i s would prove t o b e a d e t r i m e n t

d u r i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g s i e g e o f t h e town o f S a n t i a g o and i t s surrounding w a t e r s . J o i n t o p e r a t i o n s a l s o s u f f e r e d from i l l - d e f i n e d o b j e c t i v e s r e g a r d i n g t h e end s t a t e o f t h e S a n t i a g o campaign. Beginning w i t h M i l e s ' s o r d e r t o S h a f t e r and t h e l a c k o f p r e s i d e n t i a l guidance t h a t p e r s i s t e d t h r o u g h o u t , Sampson and S h a f t e r conducted o p e r a t i o n s a s t h e y s a w f i t i n o r d e r t o accomplish t h e i r own p e r c e i v e d g o a l s . Only t h e l a c k of a

l e g i t i m a t e t h r e a t from t h e Spanish i n Cuba p r e v e n t e d a U.S. military disaster.

A s t u d y o f t h e Campaign o f S a n t i a g o p r o v i d e s a n

o p p o r t u n i t y t o examine t h e changes t h a t were made i n t h e m i l i t a r y f o r c e s i n t h e y e a r s immediately a f t e r t h e SpanishAmerican War. The m i l i t a r y r e c o g n i z e d t h e need t o i n s t i t u t e

reforms i n o r d e r t o p r e c l u d e f u t u r e i n e f f e c t u a l j o i n t operations. Some o f t h e s e reforms i n c l u d e d t h e development o f

t h e G e n e r a l S t a f f i n t h e Army, t h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n of t h e General Board i n t h e Navy, and t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e J o i n t Army

and Navy Board.

Although many of these changes most likely

would have been made eventually, the conduct of joint operations at Santiago proved to be the catalyst that accelerated these reforms and other changes throughout the military structure. This thesis will focus on the conduct of joint operations at Santiago through the examination of both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include official correspondence between the participants at the strategic, operational, and tactical level; official reports from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy; and the report of the Senate committee that investigated the conduct of the Spanish-American War. First-hand accounts of the Santiago

campaign, such as those by French E. Chadwick and John D. Miley, and newspaper reports from the battlefield are also valuable primary sources. Other sources, such as personal

papers, letters, and correspondence, provide excellent insights into the conduct of joint operations at Santiago. Secondary sources, including comprehensive histories by Graham Cosmas and David Trask, provide excellent background material for this study. This thesis will be limited in its review to those reforms that were instituted in the military in the ten-year period after the War. This thesis will not address the causes

of the Spanish-American War or the conduct of combined operations with the Cuban insurgents.
5

The following definitions will be used throughout the study. Amphibious Operation:
An operation launched from the

sea by naval and landing forces against a hostile or potentially hostile shore.2 Campaign Plan: A plan for a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space.3 Command: The authority that a commander in the

military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority

and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions.4 Command and Control: The exercise of authority and

direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and

control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.5 Communications: A method or means of conveying information of any kind from one person or place to an~ther..~

Doctrine:

Fundamental principles by which the

military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authorative but

requires judgment in application.7 Joint: Activities, operations, organizations, etc.,

in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate.8 Joint Amphibious Operation: An amphibious operation conducted by significant elements of two or more Services.9 Landing Area: That part of the objective area within

which are conducted the landing operations of an amphibious force. It includes the beach, the approaches to the beach,

the transport areas, the fire support areas, and the land included in the advance inland to the initial objective.10 Operation: A military action or the carrying out of a

strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.11 Unified Command: A command with a broad continuing

mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Services, and which is established and so designated by the President.12 Unified Operation: A broad generic term that

describes the wide scope of actions taking place within unified commands under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands.13

CHAPTER 2 PREPARATIONS FOR SANTIAGO

As the nineteenth century was coming to a close, the United States, spurred on by imperialistic rhetoric from prominent political, academic, and literary figures, as well as from the press, began to look abroad to enlarge its role in world affairs of the day. Tensions had already begun to

escalate between the United States and Spain concerning the latter's treatment of the indigenous people of Cuba. By early

1898, it was apparent that military conflict between the two

nations was becoming more and more likely. Since 1895, Cuban insurgents had been waging a guerrilla campaign in order to gain their independence from the Spanish government. Most of the guerrilla actions consisted of light skirmishes with Spanish regular forces and "scorched-earth" destruction of'sugar'crops. In response, the

Spanish enforced a policy of reconcentration, moving Cuban citizens into camps. Cubans perished. It was in these camps that over 400,000

The United States, horrified at the Spanish

actions as well as having significant economic interests on the island, found itself forced to respond to the instability in Cuba. 1
8

As early as 1894, the Naval War College had begun to develop war plans to deal with the possibility of military action against the Spanish. Versions of these initial plans called for a blockade of Cuba while mounting an expeditionary force to seize major Cuban ports. In addition to the

blockade, the U.S. Navy would be tasked to defeat any Spanish naval forces sent to protect the island. Consideration was also given to conducting an operation simultaneously in the Philippines in order to prevent the Spanish navy there from sailing for the Caribbean. Other versions called for a.much

greater reliance on the naval blockade in conjunction with naval bombardment, as the invasion force envisioned for Cuba was estimated to require 90,000 men, almost four times the available military manpower at the time. All of these plans,

however, contained variations that had yet to be coordinated between the services when war was declared in April of 1898.2 The structure of the military leadership was illprepared to plan joint operations. Secretary of War Russell

A. Alger and Secretary of the Navy John D. Long, both chiefly responsible for the manning and training of their respective services, were also the principal cabinet-level military advisors to the President. Both the Army and the Navy lacked any semblance of a General Staff, which could have greatly assisted in the planning, preparation, and waging of a military campaign. Guidance for military actions during the

war was often worked out between President William McKinley

and members of his Cabinet and then disseminated down through the secretaries directly to the commanders in the field. Under these procedures, the President frequently had to act as the mediator between Alger and Long.3 The Army, in particular, was hampered by its own muddled chain of command. Major-General Miles held the title

of Commanding General of the Army, which was primarily an honorary role given to the senior officer in the Army. While

the position of Commanding General had no legal authority, it had evolved to where the occupant served as an invaluable military advisor. The problem was that there was no

centralized control of the Army and that frequently the Secretary of War and the Commanding General feuded over their respective roles. This situation was further exacerbated

later during the Santiago campaign when General Miles left for the field to command troops in the invasion of Puerto Rico, thus leaving the civilian Secretary of War without his chief Army advisor.4 This was the situation when war was declared with Spain. It was quickly realized by the strategic leaders in

Washington that an advisory board of some sort was necessary to help devise campaign plans. The Navy, which lacked a

senior naval advisor comparable to the Army's Commanding General, had already created its own Naval War Board in response to the growing crisis. This board was charged with

advising Secretary Long on matters of naval strategy and with

a s s i s t i n g i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f s t r a t e g i c war p l a n s . Membership on t h i s board i n c l u d e d A l f r e d Thayer Mahan, t h e n o t e d seapower t h e o r i s t , and A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Navy Theodore Roosevelt, b e f o r e he r e s i g n e d t o j o i n t h e Army.5 P r e s i d e n t McKinley and h i s a d v i s o r s had determined t h a t any w a r a g a i n s t t h e Spanish i n Cuba would r e q u i r e t h e i n t e r a c t i o n of t h e Army and Navy. This l e d t o t h e formation

o f t h e J o i n t Board, a n i n f o r m a l group o r g a n i z e d w i t h t h e mutual c o n s e n t of Alger and Long. T h i s board was e s s e n t i a l l y

t h e Naval W a r Board w i t h t h e a d d i t i o n o f a s i n g l e Army officer. The J o i n t Board p r i m a r i l y performed an a d v i s o r y r o l e

f o r t h e P r e s i d e n t , Alger and Long, and t h e remaining c a b i n e t members. The campaign p l a n t h a t was s u b m i t t e d by t h e J o i n t

Board and u l t i m a t e l y a g r e e d upon by McKinley w a s drawn l a r g e l y from t h e p l a n s p r e v i o u s l y developed by t h e Naval War C o l l e g e .

I t c a l l e d f o r a n a v a l blockade of Cuba t o b e conducted by t h e

North A t l a n t i c squadron under t h e command of Admiral William

T.

Sampson.

The f l e e t would a l s o be p o i s e d t o engage t h e

S p a n i s h f l e e t i f Spain chose t o send i t s s h i p s t o d e f e n d Cuba. I n a d d i t i o n , a s m a l l e x p e d i t i o n a r y f o r c e would b e

m o b i l i z e d and s e n t i n t o Cuba t o s e i z e a major p o r t . 6 The s i t u a t i o n remained complicated, however, because t h e p r i m a r y o b j e c t i v e and t h e s i z e o f t h e e x p e d i t i o n a r y f o r c e k e p t changing. S a n t i a g o w a s s e l e c t e d a s t h e primary o b j e c t i v e
As for the

o n l y weeks b e f o r e t h e campaign o f S a n t i a g o began.

s i z e o f t h e f o r c e , i t s r e a s o n s f o r v a r y i n g w e r e due t o t h e

changing e s t i m a t e s of t h e s i z e o f t h e Spanish f o r c e s i n Cuba and t h e s t a t e of r e a d i n e s s o f t h e American t r o o p s . Additionally, t h e President f a i l e d t o i d e n t i f y an o v e r a l l campaign commander, who c o u l d have used t h e a v a i l a b l e t i m e t o conduct t e r r a i n a n a l y s i s and develop o p e r a t i o n a l p l a n s . 7

10n
I n t h e two-month i n t e r v a l between t h e d e c l a r a t i o n of

war w i t h Spain and t h e f i r s t Army s o l d i e r t o a r r i v e i n Cuba, a tremendous m o b i l i z a t i o n e f f o r t had t o be conducted. which i n A p r i l of 1898 numbered 28,000, The Army,

had d i s p e r s e d many of

i t s r e g u l a r s a s w e l l a s newly i n d u c t e d v o l u n t e e r s a t s e v e r a l
camps t h r o u g h o u t t h e South, b u s i l y p r e p a r i n g them t o go t o war. S i n c e t h e r e a d i n e s s of t h e Army had been allowed t o

s i g n i f i c a n t l y d e t e r i o r a t e o v e r t h e decades s i n c e t h e C i v i l War, almost e v e r y minute was s p e n t on o u t f i t t i n g t h e t r o o p s

and c o n d u c t i n g rudimentary m i l i t a r y d r i l l . 8 On A p r i l 29th, B r i g a d i e r - G e n e r a l William R . S h a f t e r was o r d e r e d t o proceed t o Tampa, F l o r i d a , t o assume command o f t h e V Corps c u r r e n t l y undergoing t r a i n i n g t h e r e .
H e was

charged t o p r e p a r e h i s t r o o p s t o conduct a n e x p e d i t i o n i n s u p p o r t o f t h e n a v a l blockade c u r r e n t l y underway. Ten days

l a t e r , S h a f t e r r e c e i v e d t h e o r d e r t o move h i s command, v i a t r a n s p o r t s , t o " s e i z e and h o l d Marie1 o r most i m p o r t a n t p o i n t on n o r t h p o i n t o f Cuba."g

It would be o v e r a month, however, b e f o r e S h a f t e r and

h i s t r o o p s would d e p a r t f o r Cuba. 12

Again, c o n f u s i o n among t h e

p l a n n e r s a t t h e s t r a t e g i c l e v e l had d e l a y e d a d e c i s i o n a b o u t t h e p r i m a r y o b j e c t i v e i n Cuba a l o n g w i t h t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g number of r e q u i r e d Army t r o o p s . The Spanish f l e e t , under t h e

command o f Admiral Cevera, a s s i s t e d i n c l e a r i n g up t h i s c o n f u s i o n by s a i l i n g i t s s h i p s i n t o t h e p o r t o f S a n t i a g o i n mid-May. This forced t h e m i l i t a r y planners t o s h i f t t h e focus

o f t h e campaign from Havana on t h e n o r t h e r n c o a s t o f Cuba t o t h e s o u t h e r n c o a s t , t h e o b j e c t i v e now b e i n g t h e p o r t of S a n t i a g o and t h e Spanish s h i p s anchored t h e r e . The d e p a r t u r e

o f t h e Army e x p e d i t i o n a r y f o r c e was p u t on h o l d , which allowed S h a f t e r much needed t i m e t o assemble and e q u i p h i s f o r c e s . 1 0 However, t h e c o n f u s i o n and i n d e c i s i o n a t t h e s t r a t e g i c l e v e l r e g a r d i n g t h e o b j e c t i v e s o f t h e Cuban campaign had forced Shafter i n t o a reactive role. He now had t o p r e p a r e

f o r an invasion i n t o p o t e n t i a l l y h o s t i l e t e r r a i n with a f o r c e t h a t v a r i e d anywhere from 5,000 t o 25,000 men. I n addition,

t h e c u r r e n t s t a t e o f r e a d i n e s s o f the Army r e q u i r e d t h a t a l m o s t a l l of t h e t i m e i n Tampa be s p e n t on j u s t moving s u p p l i e s from an i n a d e q u a t e r a i l r o a d l i n e t o t h e p i e r and t h e n p l a c i n g them onboard t h e t r a n s p o r t s . . S h a f t e r was n o t a f f o r d e d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o u s e t h e t i m e a v a i l a b l e t o conduct j o i n t t r a i n i n g , which would l a t e r prove t o b e c r i t i c a l d u r i n g t h e amphibious o p e r a t i o n s phase.11 While t h e Army w a s c o n t i n u i n g t o b u i l d up i t s f o r c e s , t h e Navy w a s p r o c e e d i n g w i t h i t s blockade o f Cuba. Admiral

Sampson, wanting t o b e g i n t h e s i e g e of S a n t i a g o , was growing

more impatient each passing day with the delayed arrival of the Army troops. On June 7, Sampson sent the following message to Secretary Long, which was relayed to Shafter: If 10,000 men were here the city and fleet would be ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration demands immediate army movement. If delayed, city will be defended more strongly by guns taken from fleet.12 Thus, the mobilization phase came to an end with MajorGeneral Miles's order for Shafter to proceed to Santiago. 1 Cam~aianPlans Shafter's force, numbering almost 17,000 men along with materiel, supplies, and 2,300 animals, left on 14 June for Santiago. The twenty-nine transports and six support

vessels, procured by the Army and captained by civilian masters, were accompanied by thirteen naval escort ships. All

the ships arrived off the coast of Santiago six days later. On June 20, Admiral Sampson and General Shafter, along with General Calixto Garcia, the leader of the Cuban insurgents, met ashore at Aserrado. The purpose of this meeting was to

discuss the operational objectives of the Santiago campaign as well as to determine the landing site for Shafter's forces.13 The area surrounding the city of Santiago provided a formidable haven for the Spanish fleet anchored in the harbor. The entrance to the harbor was, at best, only 350-feet wide, with bluffs on both sides that towered as high as 200 feet. Moreover, on both sides of the entrance sat forts containing gun batteries

Socapa to the west and the Morro Castle to the

east

and t h e waters a t t h e e n t r a n c e were s t r e w n w i t h c o n t a c t Although t h e range and e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f naval vessels stationed

and e l e c t r i c a l mines.

t h e Spanish guns a g a i n s t t h e U . S .

o u t s i d e t h e h a r b o r e n t r a n c e were minimal, t h e i r l o c a t i o n p r e c l u d e d p o s s i b l e countermine o p e r a t i o n s , . There was a l s o t h e

r e a s o n a b l e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t any s h i p a t t e m p t i n g t o f o r c e i t s way i n t o t h e h a r b o r would be damaged and p o s s i b l y sunk, b l o c k i n g t h e narrow channel f o r b o t h f l e e t s . For t h e U.S.

Navy t o c l e a r t h e mines from t h e channel and engage t h e Spanish f l e e t from i n s i d e t h e h a r b o r e n t r a n c e , t h e f o r t s had t o be c a p t u r e d o r destroyed.14 Complicating t h e i s s u e were t h e g a r r i s o n s l o c a t e d i n s i d e t h e c i t y of S a n t i a g o , approximately t h r e e miles i n l a n d . While t h e s e g a r r i s o n s were of l i t t l e s t r a t e g i c importance, t h e i r p r o x i m i t y t o t h e Spanish s h i p s i n t h e a d j o i n i n g h a r b o r and t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of mutual g u n f i r e s u p p o r t would be s i g n i f i c a n t t o t h e development o f U.S. campaign p l a n s .

General S h a f t e r had a r r i v e d i n Cuba w i t h v e r y l i t t l e guidance on what h i s a c t u a l o b j e c t i v e s were i n r e g a r d s t o t h e l a n d campaign. The o n l y d i r e c t i v e t h a t had been g i v e n was t h e

vague and ambiguous o r d e r o f May 31 from General Miles, which i n e f f e c t allowed S h a f t e r t o choose a s h i s o b j e c t i v e t h e f o r t s a t t h e entrance, t h e g a r r i s o n s i n Santiago, o r both. w i t h no u n i f i e d commander o v e r l o o k i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n a t S a n t i a g o , S h a f t e r c o u l d chose any of t h e o p t i o n s w i t h l i t t l e chance o f b e i n g o v e r r u l e d . Thus,

OCAPA

HORRO CASTLE

O n t h e t r i p from Tampa t o S a n t i a g o p r i o r t o t h e campaign, S h a f t e r had r e a d an account o f t h e B r i t i s h campaign a t S a n t i a g o i n 1741. The B r i t i s h had landed a t Guantanamo,

l o c a t e d o n l y 40 m i l e s t o t h e east of S a n t i a g o , b u t t h e n proceeded t o l o s e o v e r 3,000 men t o d i s e a s e and had t o s t o p t h e campaign s i x t e e n m i l e s o u t s i d e t h e c i t y , never h a v i n g fired a shot. To S h a f t e r , t h i s f a c t s t r e s s e d t h e importance

o f conducting a q u i c k campaign u s i n g t h e b e s t a v a i l a b l e roads and a t t a c k i n g a t t h e p o i n t s o f l e a s t r e s i s t a n c e . 1 5 Shafter a l s o believed t h a t t h e f o r t s a t t h e entrance t o t h e h a r b o r were more h e a v i l y guarded t h a n t h e S a n t i a g o garrisons. I n r e a l i t y , t h e r e were 400 t r o o p s a t Socapa, 400

a t t h e Morro C a s t l e , and j u s t o v e r 10,000 men s p r e a d t h r o u g h o u t t h e v i c i n i t y of S a n t i a g o . Additionally, Shafter,

p o s s i b l y a f t e r s e e i n g t h e h i g h rocky b l u f f s a l o n g t h e c o a s t , reasoned t h a t t h e b e s t avenue of approach l a y f u r t h e r i n l a n d . The g e n e r a l , a l t h o u g h never having observed it p e r s o n a l l y , l a t e r d e s c r i b e d t h e r o u t e a l o n g t h e c o a s t towards t h e Morro C a s t l e a s "rugged, devoid of water, and d e n s e l y covered w i t h a

poisonous undergrowth. " 1 6 With t h e s e f a c t o r s i n mind, S h a f t e r f e l t h i s ' b e s t c o u r s e o f a c t i o n l a y i n p r o c e e d i n g i n l a n d from D a i q u i r i and Siboney, t h e Army's secondary l a n d i n g s i t e . The' Army would

then a s s a u l t t h e garrisons located i n Santiago, with t h e . p o s s i b i l i t y of using naval gunfire support t o cover h i s s i e g e of t h e c i t y . T h i s p l a n s t r e s s e d r a p i d i t y o f a c t i o n , denying

t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f massing Spanish t r o o p s a t S a n t i a g o w h i l e moving q u i c k l y b e f o r e d i s e a s e c o u l d s e r i o u s l y impede t h e American advance. S h a f t e r f e l t t h a t t h i s c o u r s e would r e s u l t

i n less l o s s o f l i f e f o r h i s own t r o o p s w h i l e e n c i r c l i n g t h e c i t y and would a l s o n e g a t e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f p l a c i n g t h e Army i n a s u b o r d i n a t e r o l e t o t h e Navy.17

A s f o r A d m i r a l Sampson, he was q u i t e s u r e what h i s

primary o b j e c t i v e was:

t o destroy t h e f l e e t bottled inside I n o r d e r t o accomplish t h i s

t h e waters o f S a n t i a g o Harbor.

mission, t h e e n t r a n c e had t o be completely c l e a r e d of mines s o t h a t U.S. s h i p s c o u l d engage t h e Spanish f l e e t from a more One o p t i o n would have been t o send

e f f e c t i v e f i r i n g range.

one o r more o f t h e Navy s h i p s i n t o t h e c h a n n e l t o c l e a r t h e mines. T h i s p l a n , however, would most l i k e l y have r e s u l t e d i n

a s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l o f damage from e i t h e r mines o r s h o r e gunfire. T h i s would have s t r a t e g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s i f t h e U.S.

Navy were l a t e r t a s k e d t o s a i l and i n t e r c e p t t h e remaining Spanish f l e e t . Loss o f any c a p i t a l s h i p f o r t h e American

f l e e t c o u l d have g r e a t l y t i p p e d t h e b a l a n c e towards t h e Spanish. 18 To t h i s end, Sampson chose what he f e l t was h i s o n l y available option

t o have t h e Army s t o r m and s e i z e t h e f o r t s

s o t h a t countermine f o r c e s c o u l d b e s e n t i n t o c l e a r t h e channel.
I t was w i t h t h i s i n mind t h a t he had s e n t h i s

o r i g i n a l r e q u e s t f o r Army a s s i s t a n c e , and when t h e Army

responded by s e n d i n g S h a f t e r and h i s t r o o p s , Sampson most l i k e l y i n t e r p r e t e d t h i s as a s s e n t f o r h i s campaign p l a n s .

A t t h e i r i n i t i a l c o n f e r e n c e on June 20,

S h a f t e r and

Sampson d i s c u s s e d t h e p o s s i b l e avenues o f approach f o r t h e Army t r o o p s . Although no formal agreement was reached between

t h e two, b o t h most l i k e l y f e l t t h a t t h e o t h e r had a g r e e d w i t h h i s r e s p e c t i v e plan of a t t a c k . I n h i s r e p o r t of J u l y 15,

Sampson s t a t e d t h a t " t h e p o s i t i o n s occupied by t h e e a s t e r n and western b a t t e r i e s s h o u l d b e c a r r i e d , " t o which General S h a f t e r "gave most c o r d i a l a s s e n t . " S h a f t e r , however, stated in his

o f f i c i a l r e p o r t t h a t "approaching S a n t i a g o from t h e e a s t ...and making a t t a c k from t h a t q u a r t e r ' ' was " t h e o n l y f e a s i b l e p l a n . " I n f a c t , t h e n o t e s o f t h i s conference, which was concerned mostly w i t h t h e impending l a n d i n g o f Army t r o o p s , one r e f e r e n c e t o t h e follow-on p l a n s : D a i q u i r i and march on S a n t i a g o . " contain only

"land expedition a t

S i n c e D a i q u i r i l a y due e a s t

of b o t h t h e c i t y and t h e h a r b o r e n t r a n c e , it i s u n d e r s t a n d a b l e t h a t t h e r e would be misconceptions about .the campaign p l a n s . 1 9 Whether by d e s i g n o r by s i m p l e miscommunication,

it

would be s e v e r a l days b e f o r e Sampson would r e a l i z e t h a t t h e Army would n o t s u p p o r t h i s p l a n . S h a f t e r d i d send t h e

f o l l o w i n g message t o Sampson on June 22:

It i s m y i n t e n t i o n t o proceed from D a i q u i r i t o S a n t i a g o a s r a p i d l y a s I c a n . . . I r e q u e s t t h a t you keep i n t o u c h d u r i n g t h e advance and b e p r e p a r e d t o r e c e i v e any message I may wish t o t r a n s m i t from a l o n g t h e b l u f f s , o r any o f t h e small towns, and t o r e n d e r any a s s i s t a n c e necessary.20

Sampson, believing that the reference to the bluffs corresponded to the route towards the harbor entrance, did not seek further clarification regarding Shafter's actual intentions. It was only after Shafter had begun his advance

towards the city of Santiago several days later that Sampson became aware of the difference in plans. By this time,

Shafter was already committed to carry out his plan and his plan only .21 The conduct of joint operations during the remainder of the campaign went steadily downhill. Each commander,

believing that his course of action would result in the least loss of life and material, could not see his way to compromise. Their lack of cooperation would never be fully resolved.

CHAPTER 3 T H E SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN a+ S m L u g ~ With t h e a r r i v a l of Army t r o o p s i n t h e Cuban t h e a t e r ,

it was now a m a t t e r o f d e c i d i n g where t o l a n d them.

The

i n i t i a l c o n f e r e n c e of June 20 between Sampson and S h a f t - e r , i n a d d i t i o n t o d i s c u s s i n g o p e r a t i o n a l campaign p l a n s , a l s o was t o determine possible landing s i t e s . Regarding t h e l a n d i n g a r e a , M i l e s ' s ambiguous o r d e r of May 31 t o S h a f t e r p r o v i d e d l i t t l e d i r e c t i o n concerning t h e c h o i c e of a s i t e , whether e a s t o r w e s t of S a n t i a g o , implying t h a t t h e commander i n t h e f i e l d should make t h e s e l e c t i o n . Admiral Sampson f e l t t h a t S h a f t e r s h o u l d l a n d h i s c o r c e s west of S a n t i a g o , l e a v i n g t h e Army i n a more advantageous p o s i t i o n t o a t t a c k t h e f o r t s l o c a t e d a t t h e e n t r a n c e of S a n t a i g o Harbor. General S h a f t e r , however, f e l t t h a t t h e b e t t e r

t e r r a i n l a y t o t h e e a s t and was a l s o s u b j e c t t o l e s s s h o r e opposition. A f t e r much d i s c u s s i o n , and i n accordance w i t h t h e

a d v i c e of General G a r c i a , it was d e c i d e d t h a t t h e l a n d i n g would be done a t D a i q u i r i , a p o i n t approximately 15 m i l e s e a s t of S a n t i a g o 1 S h a f t e r had come t o Cuba w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e Army would conduct t h e a c t u a l o f f l o a d i n g of t r o o p s from t h e
22

transports.

S e c r e t a r y Long, w h i l e i n q u i r i n g t h e p r e v i o u s

month a b o u t t h e Army's c a p a b i l i t y t o conduct l a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n s , n o t i f i e d t h e Army t h a t : While t h e Navy w i l l be p r e p a r e d t o f u r n i s h a l l t h e a s s i s t a n c e t h a t may be i n i t s power, it i s obvious t h a t t h e crews o f t h e armored s h i p s and o f such o t h e r s a s w i l l b e c a l l e d upon t o remove t h e Spanish mines and t o meet t h e S p a n i s h f l e e t i n a c t i o n can n o t b e s p a r e d f o r o t h e r p u r p o s e s , and ought n o t t o b e f a t i g u e d by t h e work i n c i d e n t t o l a n d i n g o f t h e t r o o p s , s t o r e s , etc.2 S e c r e t a r y of War Alger responded t o Long t h a t t h e Army -was n o t i n need o f any s p e c i a l a s s i s t a n c e from t h e Navy. cannot be determined whether General S h a f t e r e v e r r e c e i v e d t h i s n o t i f i c a t i o n of t h e Navy's p l a n n e d involvement i n t h e landing operation. However, it was most l i k e l y S h a f t e r ' s
It

i n t e n t i o n a l l a l o n g t o l i m i t t h e Army's dependence on t h e Navy t o conduct t h e l a n d i n g .

I t was w i t h t h i s i n mind t h a t t h e

Navy w a s t a s k e d t o p r o v i d e g u n f i r e s u p p o r t t o s u p p r e s s any armed o p p o s i t i o n a s h o r e w h i l e l e a v i n g t h e o f f l o a d t o t h e Army t r a n s p o r t s themselves.3 T h i s q u i c k l y changed when it was d i s c o v e r e d t h a t t h e Army had f a i l e d t o b r i n g a l o n g t h e n e c e s s a r y l a u n c h e s t o t r a n s p o r t a l l o f i t s t r o o p s i n a t i m e l y manner. The Navy, i n

r e s p o n s e s e n t o v e r a l l t h e steam launches, whale b o a t s , and l i f e b o a t s t h a t it c o u l d s p a r e from i t s f l e e t . The t r a n s p o r t

St. Louis, under command of C a p t a i n C . F . Goodrich, was

d i s p a t c h e d from i t s s t a t i o n o u t s i d e of S a n t i a g o Harbor t o h e l p l e a d t h e t r a n s p o r t s toward D a i q u i r i . The Navy a l s o

p r o v i d e d a beachmaster, a s t h e Army d i d n o t have a n i n d i v i d u a l

23

q u a l i f i e d t o perform t h i s f u n c t i o n .

A f t e r t h e St. L o u i s went

t o w i t h i n one and a h a l f miles from t h e s h o r e t o d e m o n s t r a t e t o t h e o t h e r b o a t s t h e d e p t h o f t h e water, t h e l a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n commenced.4 I n conducting n a v a l g u n f i r e s u p p o r t o f t h e l a n d i n g , t h e Navy bombarded s e v e r a l p o i n t s a l o n g t h e c o a s t s u r r o u n d i n g Santiago. T h i s was done a s a d e c e p t i o n maneuver t o h i d e t h e I n a n o t h e r move, Navy c o l l i e r s , made up These

r e a l p o i n t of a t t a c k .

t o look l i k e t r a n s p o r t s , moved westward from D a i q u i r i .

c o l l i e r s even went through t h e d r i l l o f lowering l i f e b o a t s i n o r d e r t o d e c e i v e Spanish o b s e r v e r s a l o n g t h e s h o r e l i n e . f e i n t movements were s u p p o r t e d by l a n d a t t a c k s from Cuban insurgents. One d e a t h o c c u r r e d aboard t h e Texas when it was These

s h e l l e d by t h e Socapa b a t t e r y a t t h e mouth o f t h e S a n t i a g o Harbor. 5 After t h e preliminary naval gunfire cleared t h e l a n d i n g a r e a a t D a i q u i r i , launches were l o a d e d and s e n t towards t h e s h o r e . Many o f t h e s e l a u n c h e s had t o be l o a d e d

s e v e r a l m i l e s o u t t o s e a , a s t h e c i v i l i a n c a p t a i n s of t h e t r a n s p o r t s d i d not want t o expose t h e i r s h i p s t o enemy f i r e . T h i s f o r c e d t h e Navy l a u n c h e s t o make l o n g t r i p s back and f o r t h , slowing down t h e o f f l o a d procedure; B y t h e end of t h e

day, a t o t a l of 6 , 0 0 0 p e r s o n n e l had been o f f l o a d e d i n t o t h e landing area a t Daiquiri.

A l l o f t h e p e r s o n n e l and s u p p l i e s

were n o t c o m p l e t e l y o f f l o a d e d u n t i l t h r e e days l a t e r . 6
24

The o f f l o a d i t s e l f d i d n o t p r o c e e d smoothly.

With t h e

few a v a i l a b l e l i g h t e r s f o r o f f l o a d , p r i o r i t y was g i v e n t o p e r s o n n e l and t h e n m a t e r i e l and s u p p l i e s . Combined w i t h t h i s

f a c t o r was t h a t many o f t h e s m a l l b o a t s were n o t c a p a b l e o f f e r r y i n g t h e animals t o t h e shore.

As a result,

a n i m a l s were

thrown overboard under t h e assumption t h a t t h e y would s w i m ashore. S i n c e t h e r e was no b o a t a v a i l a b l e t o watch t h e Over 30 a n i m a l s Also, two s o l d i e r s

animals, some o f them swam o u t t o s e a . drowned d u r i n g t h e l a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n .

drowned when t h e i r b o a t w q s smashed a g a i n s t t h e rocks.' During t h e onload o p e r a t i o n back a t Tampa, much of t h e m a t e r i e l and s u p p l i e s had been l o a d e d i n t h e o r d e r i n which it had been r e c e i v e d . While t h i s was n e c e s s a r y due t o t h e s h o r t

amount o f t i m e i n which s u p p l i e s had t o be onloaded, t h i s proved t o be a d e t r i m e n t upon a r r i v a l a t D a i q u i r i . Most o f

t h e heavy equipment, i n c l u d i n g s i e g e guns, w e r e u n a b l e t o be offloaded f o r s e v e r a l days. S h a f t e r was f o r c e d t o w a i t a s h o r e

w h i l e t h e o f f l o a d c o n t i n u e d b e f o r e h e had t h e n e c e s s a r y armament t o p r o c e e d i n l a n d . On 2 6 June S h a f t e r was f i n a l l y

a b l e t o b e g i n t h e ground campaign, h a v i n g two i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s , a dismounted c a v a l r y d i v i s i o n , and an independent i n f a n t r y brigade at h i s disposal.8 That t h e l a n d i n g a t D a i q u i r i was done w i t h s o l i t t l e l o s s o f l i f e i s due mostly t o l u c k and t h e l a c k o f armed r e s i s t a n c e from t h e S p a n i a r d s a s h o r e . The S p a n i s h commander,

u n s u r e where t h e Americans would s e l e c t t h e i r l a n d i n g s i t e ,

had d i s p e r s e d h i s t r o o p s a l o n g a 50-kilometer f r o n t s u r r o u n d i n g S a n t i a g o Harbor. T h i s r e s u l t e d i n a piecemeal

r e s p o n s e by t h e S p a n i a r d s t h a t t h e Americans had no t r o u b l e i n surmounting. Once t h e n a v a l g u n f i r e began, t h e Spanish f o r c e s

a t D a i q u i r i , e s t i m a t e d a t 300, q u i c k l y f l e d from t h e s h o r e .
Had t h e Spanish massed t h e i r f o r c e s a t D a i q u i r i o r emplaced barbed w i r e a l o n g p o s s i b l e l a n d i n g a r e a s , t h e amphibious o p e r a t i o n c o u l d have had a d i f f e r e n t ending.9 S h a f t e r , from t h e f i r s t days o f m o b i l i z a t i o n back a t Tampa, had u n d e r e s t i m a t e d t h e amount o f c o o r d i n a t i o n and equipment it would r e q u i r e t o o f f l o a d h i s e n t i r e f o r c e . Since

t h e r e was l i t t l e t i m e t o p r e p a r e h i s t r o o p s b e f o r e t h e t r i p t o Cuba, he d i d n o t conduct any t r a i n i n g i n l a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n s before i t s a r r i v a l a t Daiquiri. Inadequate t r a n s p o r t

equipment and poor p i e r f a c i l i t i e s would have a g r e a t impact on S h a f t e r ' s l o g i s t i c s l i n e s and p l a g u e t h e A r m y t h r o u g h o u t t h e campaign. German Rear-Admiral M. Pluddemann, o b s e r v i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n s a t S a n t i a g o , made t h e f o l l o w i n g comments r e g a r d i n g t h e landing a t Daiquiri: o one i n There w a s l a c k o f management g e n e r a l l y . N a u t h o r i t y had been a p p o i n t e d commander o f t h e l a n d i n g p l a c e . 'The commander-in-chief, General S h a f t e r , d i d n o t t r o u b l e himself about t h e l a n d i n g . Admiral Sampson had o n l y made arrangements a s f a r a s t h e warships and t h e i r b o a t s were concerned. 10 Not a l l t h e blame can be p l a c e d on t h e Army o r t h e Navy f o r t h e c h a o t i c l a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n s . There were no

e x i s t i n g r e g u l a t i o n s t h a t would d i c t a t e t h e conduct o f j o i n t landing operations. Having no p r e c e d e n t , n e i t h e r s e r v i c e was

If

even s u r e o f i t s own r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n such m a t t e r s .

t h i s had been t h e e x t e n t o f t h e d i s j o i n t e d o p e r a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e S a n t i a g o campaign, t h e n t h e l a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n would j u s t b e a n i n t e r e s t i n g s i d e b a r t o t h e Spanish-American W a r . What

was u n f o r e s e e n a t t h e t i m e w a s t h a t t h e l a n d i n g phase was a p r e c u r s o r f o r t h e j o i n t o p e r a t i o n s t h a t were t o happen d u r i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g campaign. e towards S By 2 6 June, General S h a f t e r had g a t h e r e d enough t r o o p s , m a t e r i e l , and s u p p l i e s t o b e g i n h i s advance towards Santiago. The o n l y e x i s t i n g r o u t e between D a i q u i r i and

S a n t i a g o was more o f a t r a i l t h a n a road, and movement o f s u p p l i e s and heavy equipment q u i c k l y became a problem. There

were i n s u f f i c i e n t p i e r and s t o r a g e f a c i l i t i e s a t b o t h D a i q u i r i and Siboney, f o r c i n g t h e Army t o m a i n t a i n a l o g i s t i c s t r a i l t h a t r a n from t h e o f f s h o r e t r a n s p o r t s t o t h e t r o o p s i n t h e field. T h i s would l a t e r prove t o be c r i t i c a l a s t h e d i s t a n c e

between t h e two, combined w i t h r a i n y weather d u r i n g t h e campaign, c o n s p i r e d a g a i n s t S h a f t e r ' s a b i l i t y t o r e s u p p l y h i s t r o o p s . 11 While S h a f t e r w a s advancing towards S a n t i a g o , Admiral Sampson's f l e e t c o n t i n u e d t o m a i n t a i n i t s s t a t i o n o u t s i d e t h e entrance t o t h e harbor. From t h e i r p o s i t i o n s , t h e Navy s h i p s

were c a p a b l e o f p r o v i d i n g g u n f i r e s u p p o r t t h a t c o u l d c o v e r t h e
27

e n t i r e advance of t h e Army f o r c e s .

The s h e l l s a b o a r d t h e

s h i p s were c a p a b l e o f ranges o u t t o s i x o r seven m i l e s , b u t s u f f e r e d from a reduced impact e f f e c t a t t h e s e g r e a t e r r a n g e s . T h i s w a s compounded by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d i r e c t f i r e would be

most e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t t h e gun b a t t e r i e s emplaced i n s i d e , w i t h

l i t t l e o r no impact a g a i n s t t h e f o r t s themselves.
Despite t h e

meager amount o f s u p p o r t t h e n a v a l g u n f i r e was a b l e t o provide, t h e i r possible contributions i n t h e a r e a s of p r e p a r a t o r y f i r e and as a morale b u i l d e r s h o u l d n o t have been overlooked. 12
I t i s d i f f i c u l t , t h e n , t o comprehend why S h a f t e r d i d

n o t choose t o employ n a v a l g u n f i r e s u p p o r t u n t i l h i s t r o o p s were on t h e o u t s k i r t s o f S a n t i a g o . Even h i s f i r s t r e q u e s t f o r Perhaps he

such s u p p o r t was f o r d e c e p t i o n purposes o n l y .

simply d i d n o t u n d e r s t a n d t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s of t h e n a v a l s h i p s o r w a s u n w i l l i n g t o a s k t h e Navy f o r any s u p p o r t a t a l l , b e i n g p r e p a r e d t o conduct h i s a t t a c k on S a n t i a g o u s i n g Army a s s e t s exclusively. Most l i k e l y , it was p r o b a b l y due t o a l a c k o f

j o i n t t r a i n i n g i n t h e s e t a c t i c s t h a t l a y a t t h e r o o t of S h a f t e r ' s f a i l u r e t o c o n s i d e r u s i n g n a v a l g u n f i r e u n t i l much l a t e r i n t h e campaign.

A s S h a f t e r c l o s e d i n on S a n t i a g o , he deemed it

n e c e s s a r y t o conduct c o o r d i n a t e d a t t a c k s on E l Caney and San Juan H e i g h t s , l o c a t e d t o t h e e a s t o f S a n t i a g o a l o n g v i t a l roads. Though he p r i v a t e l y d i d n o t h o l d t h e Spanish t r o o p s i n

much r e g a r d S h a f t e r f e l t it was p r u d e n t t o conduct a f e i n t

towards Aguadores, l o c a t e d two m i l e s e a s t o f t h e Morro C a s t l e , t o d e c e i v e t h e enemy a s t o t h e primary o b j e c t i v e s . In

conjunction with t h i s f e i n t , Shafter f i n a l l y requested t h e a s s i s t a n c e of naval gunfire.13 The a s s a u l t s on E l Caney and San Juan H e i g h t s were s c h e d u l e d f o r J u l y 1. On June 30, S h a f t e r c a b l e d Sampson

a b o u t h i s i n t e n t i o n s , a s k i n g Sampson t o "bombard t h e works a t Aguadores

... and

a l s o make such d e m o n s t r a t i o n a s you t h i n k

p r o p e r a t t h e mouth o f t h e h a r b o r , s o as t o keep a s many of t h e enemy t h e r e a s p o s s i b l e . " Sampson w i l l i n g l y acceded t o

t h i s r e q u e s t , though t h e a c t i o n appeared t o have l i t t l e e f f e c t on t h e s m a l l number of t r o o p s l o c a t e d a l o n g t h e c o a s t l i n e . A d d i t i o n a l l y , Sampson a l s o had h i s f o r c e s s h e l l d i r e c t l y i n t o t h e c i t y t o keep t h e S p a n i a r d s occupied. f o l l o w i n g message from S h a f t e r t o Sampson:
A f e w s h e l l s of l a r g e s i z e f e l l some d i s t a n c e b e h i n d o u r

T h i s produced t h e

I t i s h a r d l y p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e y came from l i n e s to-day. your s h i p s , b u t I can n o t account f o r them u n l e s s t h e y came from t h e enemy's navy.

T h i s s u r e l y c o d d n o t have h e l p e d t h e a l r e a d y d e t e r i o r a t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p between Sampson and S h a f t e r . 1 4 While Sampson was bombarding Aguadores, S h a f t e r and h i s t r o o p s were f a c i n g much g r e a t e r problems. The g e n e r a l had

e x p e c t e d l i t t l e r e s i s t a n c e from t h e S p a n i a r d s , who he c l e a r l y f e l t were i n c a p a b l e o f h o l d i n g o f f t h e s u p e r i o r American forces. Thus, S h a f t e r was g r e a t l y s u r p r i s e d when h i s t r o o p s

r a n i n t o s t i f f r e s i s t a n c e d u r i n g t h e i r a s s a u l t s e a s t of Santiago. Though t h e Americans e v e n t u a l l y p r e v a i l e d a f t e r two

29

days o f i n t e n s e f i g h t i n g , it i s a p p a r e n t t h a t S h a f t e r was c l e a r l y unprepared f o r any prolonged d e l a y i n r e a c h i n g Santiago. There were o t h e r f a c t o r s t h a t a l s o had a n impact on S h a f t e r ' s p l a n of a c t i o n . D i s e a s e s such a s yellow f e v e r and

m a l a r i a had begun t o reduce t h e r e a d i n e s s o f t h e American troops.

Also,

t h e tenuous l o g i s t i c s t r a i n was i n danger o f

l e a v i n g S h a f t e r ' s f o r c e s i l l - e q u i p p e d f o r t h e follow-on investment o f t h e c i t y p r o p e r . S h a f t e r , who h i m s e l f was

f e e l i n g t h e e f f e c t s o f d i s e a s e , and perhaps w i t h t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e 1 7 4 1 B r i t i s h campaign on h i s mind, s t a r t e d t o look f o r ways t o f i n i s h t h e campaign a s q u i c k l y a s p o s s i b l e . 15 The g e n e r a l made h i s f e a r s known t o Alger, c a b l i n g him on J u l y 3 t h a t h i s d e f e n s e s were t h i n , t h a t l o s s e s (due b o t h t o b a t t l e and t o d i s e a s e ) were b e g i n n i n g t o mount, and t h a t r a i n was having an impact on h i s a b i l i t y t o keep h i s f o r c e s supplied. S h a f t e r even c o n s i d e r e d h a v i n g h i s f o r c e s f a l l back

f i v e m i l e s from S a n t i a g o , a l l o w i n g him t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o b u i l d up h i s t r o o p s . T h i s s u g g e s t i o n caused g r e a t

c o n s t e r n a t i o n among t h e l e a d e r s i n Washington, b u t Alger, w i t h McKinley's a c q u i e s c e n c e , l e f t t h e m a t t e r t o S h a f t e r ' s discretion.16

I t was a t t h i s p o i n t , on J u l y 2 ,

t h a t S h a f t e r began t o

r e q u e s t o f Sampson t h a t h i s s h i p s f o r c e t h e e n t r a n c e t o t h e harbor. The g e n e r a l f e l t t h a t t h i s would f a c i l i t a t e t h e

d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e Spanish f l e e t as w e l l as p r o v i d e more e f f e c t i v e g u n f i r e s u p p o r t t o assist t h e Army's advance. r e s p o n s e , Sampson s t a t e d t h a t it was " i m p o s s i b l e t o f o r c e e n t r a n c e u n t i l w e can clear c h a n n e l o f mines, a work o f some t i m e a f t e r f o r t s a r e t a k e n p o s s e s s i o n o f by your t r o o p s . " l 7 L a t e r t h a t same day, S h a f t e r c a b l e d t h e f o l l o w i n g message t o Sampson:
I t i s i m p o s s i b l e f o r m e t o s a y when I can t a k e b a t t e r i e s a t entrance t o harbor. I f t h e y are a s d i f f i c u l t t o t a k e a s t h o s e which we have been p i t t e d a g a i n s t it w i l l b e some t i m e and a g r e a t loss o f l i f e . I a m a t a loss t o see why t h e Navy can n o t work under a d e s t r u c t i v e f i r e a s w e l l a s t h e Army.

In

T h i s was f o l l o w e d a l i t t l e t i m e l a t e r w i t h a n o t h e r message, a g a i n from S h a f t e r t o Sampson:

I u r g e t h a t you make e f f o r t immediately t o f o r c e t h e e n t r a n c e t o a v o i d f u t u r e l o s s e s among m y men, which a r e a l r e a d y v e r y heavy. You can now o p e r a t e w i t h l e s s l o s s o f l i f e t h a t I can.18

Sampson, c l e a r l y f e e l i n g t h a t S h a f t e r had no knowledge o f t h e Navy's s i t u a t i o n , f i r e d o f f t h i s r e s p o n s e : Our t r o u b l e from t h e f i r s t h a s been t h a t t h e c h a n n e l t o t h e h a r b o r i s w e l l s t r e w n w i t h o b s e r v a t i o n mines, which would c e r t a i n l y r e s u l t i n t h e s i n k i n g of one o r more of o u r s h i p s i f w e a t t e m p t e d t o e n t e r t h e h a r b o r , and by t h e sinking of a s h i p t h e object of t h e attempt t o e n t e r t h e h a r b o r would b e d e f e a t e d by t h e p r e v e n t i n g o f f u r t h e r p r o g r e s s on o u r p a r t . I t was m y hope t h a t an a t t a c k , on your p a r t , of t h e s e s h o r e b a t t e r i e s from t h e rear would l e a v e u s a t l i b e r t y t o drag t h e channel f o r torpedoes. I f it i s your e a r n e s t d e s i r e t h a t we s h o u l d f o r c e o u r e n t r a n c e , I w i l l a t once p r e p a r e t o u n d e r t a k e i t . I t h i n k , however, t h a t o u r p o s i t i o n and y o u r s would b e made more d i f f i c u l t i f , as i s p o s s i b l e , w e f a i l i n o u r attempt. 19

As a result of these exchanges, both commanders, finally recognizing the need to meet face to face to resolve their differences and possibly to formulate a coherent plan of attack, arranged to meet ashore on July 3. Sampson was

prepared to submit a plan in which his fleet would countermine the harbor entrance, followed by an immediate entrance of his ships. He wanted the Marines encamped at Guantanamo to storm

the Socapa battery in conjunction with an Army assault on the Morro Castle. Though this plan would surely have resulted in

a significant loss of life, Sampson most likely felt it was time to force the issue. As for Shafter, he was prepared to

discuss no plan other than his own.20 However, whatever prospects existed for some semblance of jointness were dashed when the Spanish fleet, under the command of Admiral Cervera, picked the exact moment of the proposed conference to sortie his fleet out of Santiago Harbor. Destruction of the S~anishFleet As the morning dawned on July 3, the joint forces of the United States could best be described as disorganized. There existed no coherent plan of attack that would best utilize the joint capabilities of the U.S. Navy's ships and the land forces of the Army's V Corps. Additionally, the

tenuous relationship between the two commanders in the field had begun to degenerate into a clash of personalities, as each

maneuvered h i s forces as he saw f i t , w i t h l i t t l e r e g a r d f o r the other service. Admiral Sampson's f l e e t , o v e r s e v e r a l days, had conducted a v i g o r o u s s h e l l i n g o f t h e e n t i r e r e g i o n s u r r o u n d i n g S a n t i a g o and i t s h a r b o r w a t e r s . . The problem w a s t h a t ,

a l t h o u g h t h e guns on t h e s h i p s were w e l l w i t h i n r a n g e o f t h e l a n d t a r g e t s , t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e i r s t a t i o n i n g p o i n t s o u t s i d e t h e h a r b o r e n t r a n c e s e v e r e l y reduced t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e shot. The t r u e v a l u e o f t h e Navy's armada would o n l y b e

r e a l i z e d i f t h e s h i p s c o u l d draw c l o s e r t o t h e i r i n t e n d e d targets. Sampson f e l t t h a t t h i s was i m p o s s i b l e u n t i l t h e

e n t r a n c e c o u l d be c o m p l e t e l y c l e a r e d o f mines.
A s f o r S h a f t e r , h i s f o r c e s had reached t h e end o f

t h e i r advance, encamping on t h e o u t s k i r t s o f S a n t i a g o .

While

t h e e n t r e n c h e d Army f i r m l y h e l d t h e S p a n i s h t r o o p s i n s i d e t h e i r garrisons,

it w a s f e a r e d t h a t a n a s s a u l t upon t h e

f o r t i f i c a t i o n s would s u r e l y r e s u l t i n t h e l o s s o f many l i v e s . S h a f t e r , f a c i n g t h i s c h o i c e , was u n w i l l i n g t o commit h i s t r o o p s any f u r t h e r w i t h o u t t h e d i r e c t s u p p o r t o f Sampson's fleet.

I t w a s a l s o S h a f t e r ' s f o r c e s who w e r e b e g i n n i n g t o

f e e l t h e e f f e c t s o f t h e c o n t i n u i n g campaign, i n f i n i t e l y more
t h a n t h e Navy. While t h e Navy's s h i p s c o u l d p e r i o d i c a l l y

steam o v e r t o Guantanamo t o conduct r e s u p p l y o f c o a l and o t h e r i t e m s , t h e Army c o n t i n u e d t o be t i e d t o a r a t h e r s h o r t

logistics train. S h a f t e r r e f l e c t e d h i s concerns l a t e r i n h i s

o f f i c i a l r e p o r t of t h e campaign: Our s u p p l i e s had t o b e brought forward by a narrow wagon road, which t h e r a i n s might a t any t i m e r e n d e r impassable; f e a r w a s e n t e r t a i n e d t h a t a storm might d r i v e t h e v e s s e l s c o n t a i n i n g o u r s t o r e s t o s e a , t h u s s e p a r a t i n g u s from o u r b a s e o f s u p p l i e s ; and l a s t l y , it w a s r e p o r t e d t h a t General Pando, w i t h 8,000 reenforcements f o r t h e enemy, was e n r o u t e from Manzanillo and might be e x p e c t e d i n a few d a y s . These f a c t o r s , combined w i t h t h e growing number o f s o l d i e r s a f f l i c t e d with disease, g r e a t l y influenced S h a f t e r ' s decisionmaking p r o c e s s . 2 1 E a r l y on J u l y 3, b e f o r e S h a f t e r and Sampson were a b l e t o c o n f e r and a g r e e on a mutual p l a n o f a t t a c k , S h a f t e r s e n t a r e q u e s t f o r s u r r e n d e r t o t h e Spanish commander i n S a n t i a g o , General T o r a l . While q u i t e p o s s i b l y a b l u f f , S h a f t e r reasoned

t h a t it might j u s t be p o s s i b l e t o a v o i d any more l o s s o f l i f e i f t h e Spanish s u r r e n d e r e d , o b v i a t i n g f u r t h e r a c t i o n on t h e p a r t of t h e American f o r c e s . The Spanish promptly r e f u s e d t o

s u r r e n d e r , r e a s s u r i n g themselves t h a t t h e s i t u a t i o n d i d not y e t c a l l f o r such d i r e a c t i o n . 2 2 I n r e a l i t y , however, f o r t h e Spanish f o r c e s i n and around S a n t i a g o t h e s i t u a t i o n was r e a c h i n g j u s t t h a t p o i n t . The Spanish f l e e t , b o t t l e d up i n s i d e t h e h a r b o r w a t e r s f o r o v e r a month, had been t o l d t o p r e p a r e f o r movement i n c a s e t h e c i t y was a b o u t t o f a l l . Approximately 1,000 s a i l o r s had

even been redeployed from t h e i r v e s s e l s t o a s s i s t w i t h t h e d e f e n s e of t h e c i t y ' s g a r r i s o n s . But when S h a f t e r ' s f o r c e s

r e a c h e d t h e o u t e r l i m i t s o f S a n t i a g o , t h e Spanish government d e c i d e d t h a t it was b e t t e r t o r i s k a n escape of t h e f l e e t ,

despite having to run past the American fleet stationed just outside the harbor, than to blow up their own ships. Thus, over Admiral Cervera's objections, who felt it was best to keep the fleet in support of the town's defense, his ships were ordered to attempt an escape from Santiago Harbor.23 At 10 o'clock in the morning on 3 July, the Spanish fleet, under the command of Admiral Cervera, filed through the narrow harbor entrance and proceeded westward in a vain attempt to outrun the superior American fleet. The following battle at sea resulted in the complete annihilation of Cervera's fleet of six ships. The Spanish losses in manpower

totaled over several hundred killed due to gunfire and drowning, and about 1,300 prisoners. one killed and two wounded.24 While the action of Sampson's fleet in defeating Cervera's ships was strictly a naval operation, the impact of joint operations, however disorganized, cannot be overlooked. Continuous shelling from the naval vessels and the Army's light artillery, despite causing little physical damage, was most likely beginning to take its toll on the morale of Santiago's defenders. Though they were stocked to wait out a American losses totaled

siege of up to two months, they quickly realized that, with no reinforcements coming from Spain, it was only a matter of time before capitulation. The Spanish commanders evidently had no idea of the conflicts and problems that the Americans were facing. From

t h e i r perspective, overpowering.

t h e e f f e c t s o f t h e j o i n t o p e r a t i o n s were

For a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, t h e f a l l o f

S a n t i a g o appeared t o be imminent. s i e a e of

Santiaao
Any f u r t h e r

The d e s t r u c t i o n o f C e r v e r a ' s f l e e t accomplished t h e primary o b j e c t i v e of t h e S a n t i a g o campaign.

a c t i o n on t h e p a r t o f t h e Americans would o n l y s e r v e t o accomplish secondary o b j e c t i v e s , none o f which were of s t r a t e g i c importance. P r e s i d e n t McKinley and h i s a d v i s o r s

back i n Washington, however, were determined t o c o n t i n u e t h e campaign u n t i l t h e remaining Spanish f o r c e s i n Cuba had surrendered. Nothing s h o r t o f a t o t a l s u r r e n d e r i n t h e Cuban

t h e a t e r would b e s u f f i c i e n t b e f o r e c o n t i n u i n g w i t h t h e n e x t phase of t h e war w i t h Spain.25 Though t h e Spanish f l e e t had been d e s t r o y e d , t h e s i t u a t i o n around S a n t i a g o remained t e n s e . While it was most

l i k e l y t h a t t h e c o n t a c t mines had been removed p r i o r t o t h e s o r t i e o f t h e Spanish f l e e t , t h e r e remained t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t e l e c t r i c a l mines, c o n t r o l l e d from t h e s h o r e b a t t e r i e s on b o t h s i d e s o f t h e h a r b o r , were s t i l l emplaced. I n essence,

U.S. Navy s h i p s c o n t i n u e d t o f a c e t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f b e i n g s e v e r e l y damaged i f t h e y a t t e m p t e d t o n a v i g a t e t h r o u g h t h e channel. General S h a f t e r , f i r m l y e n t r e n c h e d around t h e c i t y and n o t wanting t o l o s e any more l i v e s t h a n he a l r e a d y had, was loath t o force the issue. Faced w i t h t h e Spanish r e f u s a l t o

36

s u r r e n d e r and t h e r e i n f o r c e m e n t o f Spanish t r o o p s i n S a n t i a g o , o r i g i n a l l y e s t i m a t e d a t 8,000 men b u t a c t u a l l y much c l o s e r t o 3,500, S h a f t e r began t o look f o r a l t e r n a t e ways t o end t h e Having missed t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o meet w i t h Sampson

standoff.

due t o t h e s e a b a t t l e , what f o l l o w e d w a s a l o n g series o f exchanges between t h e t w o commanders i n t h e hopes o f p e r s u a d i n g t h e o t h e r t o come around t o h i s p l a n o f a t t a c k . 2 6 Beginning on J u l y 4 , S h a f t e r began t o i m p l o r e Sampson t o f o r c e h i s way i n t o t h e e n t r a n c e o f t h e h a r b o r . end, he s e n t t h e f o l l o w i n g message t o Sampson: Now, i f you w i l l f o r c e your way i n t o t h a t h a r b o r t h e town w i l l s u r r e n d e r w i t h o u t any f u r t h e r s a c r i f i c e o f l i f e . M y p r e s e n t p o s i t i o n has c o s t m e 1,000 men, and I do n o t wish t o l o s e any more. With m y f o r c e s on one s i d e and y o u r s on t h e o t h e r - and t h e y have a g r e a t t e r r o r o f t h e Navy, f o r t h e y know t h e y cannot h u r t you - we s h a l l have them.27 To Sampson, t h i s was j u s t a r e p e a t o f t h e p l a n t h a t S h a f t e r had proposed e a r l i e r i n t h e campaign. With t h e To t h i s

Spanish f l e e t no l o n g e r anchored i n s i d e S a n t i a g o Harbor, t h e a d m i r a l was even l e s s w i l l i n g t o s a c r i f i c e men and, e s p e c i a l l y , Navy s h i p s t o a s s i s t i n t h e s i e g e o f S a n t i a g o . What a l t e r e d t h e s i t u a t i o n was t h a t S h a f t e r had begun t o inform S e c r e t a r y of War Alger about h i s r e q u e s t s f o r Navy assistance. Almost e v e r y message between S h a f t e r and A l g e r

o v e r t h e n e x t week c o n t a i n e d r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e p o s s i b l e r o l e o f t h e Navy i n f o r c i n g an e n t r a n c e i n t o t h e h a r b o r . A d d i t i o n a l l y , p r e s s c o r r e s p o n d e n t s t h a t had been t r a v e l i n g w i t h t h e Army began t o send back S h a f t e r ' s messages f o r

r e p r o d u c t i o n i n t h e i r d a i l y newspapers. r e s p o n s e from Sampson's q u a r t e r ,

With no o p p o s i t e

it s t e a d i l y began t o a p p e a r

t o t h e l e a d e r s i n Washington and t o t h e p u b l i c i n g e n e r a l t h a t t h e Navy was n o t c a r r y i n g i t s end o f t h e o p e r a t i o n . 2 8 Consider t h e f o l l o w i n g messages from S h a f t e r t o Alger, b o t h s e n t . e a r l y on J u l y 5 and w i t h i n twenty minutes o f each other:
I r e g a r d it a s n e c e s s a r y t h a t t h e navy f o r c e an e n t r a n c e i n t o t h e harbor of Santiago not l a t e r than t h e 6th i n s t a n t and a s s i s t i n t h e c a p t u r e o f t h a t p l a c e . I f t h e y do, I b e l i e v e t h e p l a c e w i l l s u r r e n d e r without f u r t h e r s a c r i f i c e of l i f e .

and
I f Sampson w i l l f o r c e a n e n t r a n c e w i t h a l l h i s f l e e t t o t h e upper bay of S a n t i a g o , w e can t a k e t h e c i t y w i t h i n a few h o u r s . Under t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s I b e l i e v e t h e town w i l l surrender. I f t h e army i s t o t a k e t h e p l a c e , I want 1 5 , 0 0 0 t r o o p s s p e e d i l y , and it i s n o t c e r t a i n t h a t t h e y can b e landed, a s it i s g e t t i n g stormy. Sure and speedy way i s through t h e bay.29

T h i s exchange q u i c k l y g a i n e d t h e a t t e n t i o n of P r e s i d e n t McKinley.
A s t h e Commander i n Chief and t h e o n l y

p e r s o n who was i n b o t h t h e Army and Navy c h a i n o f command, he had t h e a u t h o r i t y t o d e c i d e t h e i s s u e o u t r i g h t by choosing a course of a c t i o n . Though t h e r e was no e q u i v a l e n t t o o u r

p r e s e n t day S e c r e t a r y o f Defense, McKinley d i d have a t h i s d i s p o s a l s e v e r a l m i l i t a r y a d v i s o r s , i n c l u d i n g S e c r e t a r y o f War Alger, S e c r e t a r y of Navy Long, and t h e Naval War Board. However, i n s t e a d o f o p t i n g f o r a s p e c i f i c p l a n , McKinley,

b e l i e v i n g i t ' b e s t not t o i n t e r f e r e with t h e decisions of t h e on-scene commanders, i n s t r u c t e d Sampson and S h a f t e r t o

38

"confer...at

once f o r c o o p e r a t i o n i n t a k i n g S a n t i a g o .

After

t h e f u l l e s t exchange o f views you w i l l a g r e e upon t h e t i m e and manner o f a t t a c k . " 3 0 I n r e s p o n s e t o t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s , Admiral Sampson s e n t word t o General S h a f t e r on J u l y 5 t h a t he would l i k e t o

meet w i t h him i n o r d e r t o r e a c h a n agreement on a p l a n o f

attack. S h a f t e r concurred w i t h t h i s r e q u e s t b u t a s k e d t h a t

Sampson come a s h o r e f o r t h e meeting, as he was t o o ill t o make t h e t r i p o u t t o Sampson's command s h i p . made f o r t h e two t o meet on J u l y 6.31 Meanwhile, Alger, s e e i n g t h a t t h e Navy was u n w i l l i n g t o f o r c e i t s way i n t o S a n t i a g o Harbor, f o r m u l a t e d h i s own p l a n
He

Arrangements were

i n which t h e Army would clear t h e c h a n n e l t h e m s e l v e s . o u t l i n e d h i s p l a n i n a message t o S h a f t e r :

t a k e a t r a n s p o r t , c o v e r t h e p i l o t house i n most exposed p o i n t s w i t h b a l e d hay, a t t a c h an anchor t o a t o w l i n e , and, i f p o s s i b l e , g r a p p l e t h e t o r p e d o c a b l e s , and c a l l f o r v o l u n t e e r s from t h e Army - n o t a l a r g e number - t o run One i n t o t h e h a r b o r , t h u s making a way f o r t h e Navy t h i n g i s c e r t a i n ; t h a t is, t h e navy must g e t i n t o t h e h a r b o r , and must s a v e t h e l i v e s o f o u r b r a v e men t h a t w i l l b e s a c r i f i c e d i f w e a s s a u l t t h e enemy i n h i s entrenchments without a i d .

...

...

While n o t e n t i r e l y i m p l a u s i b l e , t h i s scheme does r e f l e c t on t h e misapprehension by t h e S e c r e t a r y o f War, and t h e Army i n g e n e r a l , o f t h e p r o p e r a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e U.S. Navy.32 On J u l y 6, Sampson s e n t word t h a t he w a s ill and would n o t b e a b l e t o a t t e n d t h e meeting w i t h S h a f t e r . In h i s place,

Sampson s e n t C a p t a i n F . E . Chadwick, h i s c h i e f o f s t a f f Sampson's p l a n , a s r e l a y e d by Chadwick, was, a g a i n , t o employ

t h e Marines on t h e western b a t t e r y a t Socapa w h i l e t h e Army a s s a u l t e d t h e e a s t e r n b a t t e r y a t t h e Morro C a s t l e . Once done,

Sampson would send i n h i s countermine a s s e t s t o c l e a r t h e channel. S h a f t e r , q u i t e n a t u r a l l y , opposed t h i s p l a n , fearing

t h a t h i s t r o o p s would s u f f e r t h e b r u n t o f t h e c a s u a l t i e s w h i l e t h e Navy would e x p e r i e n c e v e r y l i t t l e , i f any, l o s s of l i f e . 3 3 F i n a l l y , a compromise agreement was worked o u t between Chadwick and S h a f t e r . Under t h i s p l a n , a l e t t e r of t r u c e

would b e s e n t t o General T o r a l , r e q u e s t i n g t h e immediate s u r r e n d e r o f a l l Spanish f o r c e s i n t h e S a n t i a g o v i c i n i t y . If

t h e Spanish f a i l e d t o comply, t h e n a v a l f l e e t would commence f i r i n g 8- t o 13-inch s h e l l s on t h e c i t y f o r a 24-hour p e r i o d , a t a r a t e of one s h e l l e v e r y f i v e minutes, e x c e p t f o r one hour when t h e r a t e would be one e v e r y two m i n u t e s . I f , a t t h e end

of t h i s p e r i o d and a f t e r s u b m i t t i n g a second demand f o r s u r r e n d e r , t h e Spanish s t i l l d i d n o t comply, Sampson and h i s f l e e t would t h e n f o r c e i t s way i n t o t h e c h a n n e l e n t r a n c e . The

commencement f o r t h e n a v a l g u n f i r e was set f o r noon on J u l y 9 . Chadwick d r a f t e d t h e s u r r e n d e r n o t i c e , t o which S h a f t e r a f f i x e d h i s s i g n a t u r e , and it was t h e n s e n t t o General T o r a l .

An i n f o r m a l t r u c e ,

f o r a l l i n t e n t s , would be i n p l a c e u n t i l

t h e commencement of t h e n a v a l g u n f i r e . 3 4 S h a f t e r was less t h a n e n t h u s i a s t i c a b o u t t h i s p l a n . For one, he was n o t convinced t h a t , when t h e t i m e came, t h e Navy would a c t u a l l y c a r r y through w i t h i t s f o r c e d e n t r y . For

a n o t h e r , any f u r t h e r d e l a y i n ending t h e s i e g e o n l y added t o

t h e l o g i s t i c woes t h a t c o n t i n u e d t o p l a g u e S h a f t e r and h i s .troops. A d d i t i o n a l l y , w h i l e t h e r a t e o f d i s e a s e had n o t

r e a c h e d epidemic p r o p o r t i o n s , t h e r e were j u s t t o o many c a s u a l t i e s t o c o n t i n u e a n extended investment of S a n t i a g o .

H i s c o n c e r n s were v o i c e d i n t h i s message, d a t e d J u l y 7, t o

Alger : The f a i l u r e t o have t u g s and l i g h t e r s f o r u s e i n h a n d l i n g t h e f l e e t i s o f s o s e r i o u s a n a t u r e t h a t I must a g a i n r e f e r t o i t . T r a n s p o r t s go o f f m i l e s from s h o r e and t h e r e i s no way o f r e a c h i n g them o r compelling them t o come i n . I t i s a c o n s t a n t s t r u g g l e t o keep them i n h a n d . . . I t i s w i t h t h e t h e g r e a t e s t d i f f i c u l t y t h a t one d a y ' s food can b e i s s u e d a t a t i m e . 35 These l o g i s t i c a l and communications problems were l a t e r compounded when t h e t r u c e was extended a day t o a l l o w General T o r a l t o communicate w i t h t h e S p a n i s h government o v e r t h e l a t e s t surrender offer.36 The Spanish, hoping t o make t h e b e s t of a bad s i t u a t i o n , agreed t o t h e surrender o f f e r , with c e r t a i n stipulations. Most n o t a b l y , t h e s e i n c l u d e d a l l o w i n g t h e

S p a n i s h f o r c e s t o march o u t o f S a n t i a g o w i t h t h e i r guns and baggage. When S h a f t e r forwarded t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n back t o

Washington, he i n i t i a l l y s t a t e d t h a t he " d i d n o t t h i n k h i s ( T o r a l ' s ) t e r m s would be a c c e p t e d . " Several hours l a t e r ,

though, S h a f t e r wired t h a t he was now i n c l i n e d t o a c c e p t t h e offer.

H i s r e a s o n f o r t h e change o f h e a r t w a s t h a t a c c e p t a n c e

of t h e t e r m s would open t h e h a r b o r w h i l e p r e v e n t i n g t h e g r e a t d e s t r u c t i o n t h a t a bombardment would e n t a i l . C l e a r l y hoping

t o f o r e s t a l l a n extended s i e g e , S h a f t e r ' s wavering b r o u g h t

41

down on him a s h a r p rebuke from t h e P r e s i d e n t .

S h a f t e r would

t h e r e a f t e r seek only t h e unconditional surrender of t h e Spanish f o r c e s . 3 7 O n J u l y 10, a t approximately 4 o ' c l o c k i n t h e a f t e r n o o n , Navy s h i p s , i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h Army l i g h t a r t i l l e r y , commenced t h e bombardment o f S a n t i a g o . Army

p e r s o n n e l o u t s i d e o f S a n t i a g o s p o t t e d t h e impact o f t h e Navy's s h e l l s i n r e l a t i o n t o a l o c a l c a t h e d r a l , which were t h e n relayed t o t h e f i r i n g ships. The f i r i n g s t o p p e d a f t e r one The

hour, b u t was s t a r t e d a g a i n t h e n e x t day a t 9:27 a.m. g u n f i r e c o n t i n u e d u n t i l j u s t about 1 : 0 0 p.m.,

when t h e o r d e r

t o c e a s e f i r i n g was g i v e n by General S h a f t e r . 3 8 Surrender a t Santiauo General Miles, who had s p e n t t h e p r e v i o u s c o u p l e of weeks w i t h h i s t r o o p s i n Tampa, a r r i v e d i n t h e Cuban t h e a t e r on 1 1 July. Though he was t h e r e p r i m a r i l y i n a r e i n f o r c i n g

r o l e f o r S h a f t e r , Miles immediately sought a n audience w i t h Sampson. The i n t e n t o f t h i s meeting was t o work o u t t h e

d e t a i l s f o r s t o r m i n g t h e westernmost b a t t e r i e s a t t h e h a r b o r e n t r a n c e , u s i n g newly a r r i v e d Army t r o o p s . These p l a n s ,

however, would be f o r naught a s t h e f i g h t i n g a t S a n t i a g o was a l l b u t over.39 L a t e r t h a t same day, J u l y 11, S h a f t e r s e n t a n o t h e r l e t t e r o f s u r r e n d e r f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n by General T o r a l . This

t i m e , h a v i n g begun t o s e e t h e h o p e l e s s n e s s o f h o l d i n g o u t

a g a i n s t t h e American f o r c e s , t h e S p a n i a r d s had no c h o i c e b u t t o consider t h e o f f e r seriously.

As they deliberated, a

c o n d i t i o n a l t r u c e was i n p l a c e f o r b o t h s i d e s . 4 0 S h a f t e r , however, w a s s t i l l n o t s a t i s f i e d a t t h e t u r n of events while conducting t h e s i e g e of Santiago. After only

two days o f s h e l l i n g t h e town, h e was s t i l l l o o k i n g f o r any way t o end t h e c o n f l i c t as q u i c k l y a s p o s s i b l e . He a l s o f e l t

t h a t , a s l o n g as t h e Navy r e f u s e d t o f o r c e i t s way i n t o t h e h a r b o r , h i s t r o o p s would o n l y be s u b j e c t t o more p a i n and h a r d s h i p i n a s i t u a t i o n t h a t may t a k e weeks t o r e s o l v e . I n d i c a t i v e o f h i s growing e x a s p e r a t i o n w i t h Sampson w a s t h i s message t o Alger, s e n t e a r l y J u l y 11: A f t e r twenty-four h o u r s ' bombardment navy promised t o t r y and g e t i n c l o s e t h e h a r b o r w i t h some o f h e r l a r g e d r a f t boats. I f to-morrow bombardment i s n o t s a t i s f a c t o r y I s h a l l a s k them t o make t h e a t t e m p t . I w i l l not s a c r i f i c e any l i v e s . . . T h e o b t a i n i n g o f l a u n c h e s from t h e navy w a s n o t s a t i s f a c t o r y , and I p r e f e r c a l l i n g on them a s l i t t l e as p o s s i b l e . 4 1 Meanwhile, A d m i r a l Sampson, who w a s s t i l l underway a t s e a a b o a r d t h e New York;had no i d e a t h a t s u r r e n d e r Sampson c a b l e d

n e g o t i a t i o n s had begun t o t a k e p l a c e a s h o r e .

S h a f t e r , i n q u i r i n g i f f u r t h e r g u n f i r e s u p p o r t would b e r e q u i r e d f o r t h e n e x t day. In response, S h a f t e r n o t i f i e d

Sampson t h a t a t r u c e was i n e f f e c t and t h a t he f e l t f a i r l y c o n f i d e n t t h a t a s u r r e n d e r would soon be reached.42 The t r u c e c o n t i n u e d t o remain i n e f f e c t a s t h e S p a n i s h commanders i n S a n t i a g o c o n f e r r e d w i t h t h e i r governmental l e a d e r s back i n S p a i n . Over t h e n e x t s e v e r a l days, each

s u r r e n d e r o f f e r w a s met w i t h a c o u n t e r o f f e r . .

As the

n e g o t i a t i o n s c o n t i n u e d t h e American f o r c e s , b o t h a s h o r e and a t s e a , e s s e n t i a l l y p l a y e d a w a i t i n g game. General S h a f t e r , s t i l l f e e l i n g t h e e f f e c t s o f h i s t e n u o u s s u p p l y l i n e , maintained h i s p o s t u r i n g about t h e l a c k o f Navy s u p p o r t t o S e c r e t a r y Alger back i n Washington. J u l y 1 2 , S h a f t e r c a b l e d Alger t h a t , e n t e r t h e h a r b o r by t h e Navy. a determined e f f o r t a t once." On

"So f a r no a t t e m p t t o

They should be r e q u i r e d t o make T h i s prompted a h e a t e d

d i s c u s s i o n between S e c r e t a r y Alger and A l f r e d Thayer Mahan, who had been a d v i s i n g b o t h t h e P r e s i d e n t and t h e S e c r e t a r y of Navy a s a member of t h e Naval War Board. The o n l y outcome of

t h i s f u r t h e r example o f d i s j o i n t e d o p e r a t i o n s was t h e u r g e n t message from S e c r e t a r y Long t o Sampson: The commanding g e n e r a l of t h e Army u r g e s , and S e c r e t a r y o f War u r g e n t l y r e q u e s t s , t h a t Navy f o r c e h a r b o r . Confer w i t h commander of Army. Wishing t o do a l l t h a t i s r e a s o n a b l y p o s s i b l e t o i n s u r e t h e s u r r e n d e r o f t h e enemy, I l e a v e t h e m a t t e r t o your d i s c r e t i o n , e x c e p t t h a t t h e United S t a t e s armored v e s s e l s a r e n o t t o be r i s k e d . 4 3 Sampson w a s q u i e t l y o u t r a g e d upon r e c e i v i n g t h i s l a t e s t message. For one, h e t r u l y f e l t t h a t he and h i s men

had f u l l y c o o p e r a t e d w i t h t h e Army t h r o u g h o u t t h e campaign. For a n o t h e r , Sampson, though p r e p a r e d t o c o n t i n u e t h e s h e l l i n g and q u i t e p o s s i b l y t h e f o r c i n g o f t h e e n t r a n c e , had n o t done s o because he understood t h a t S h a f t e r had c a l l e d f o r t h e truce. The arrangement reached e a r l i e r between Chadwick and

S h a f t e r had c a l l e d f o r a 24-hour p e r i o d of s h e l l i n g , which

S h a f t e r had postponed a f t e r o n l y seven h o u r s .

Sampson was

determined not t o f o r c e t h e entrance u n t i l t h e g u n f i r e support had been f u l l y e x h a u s t e d and t h e Spanish g i v e n a n o t h e r chance t o surrender i n response. n o t been done. 4 4
It i s a l s o i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t b o t h t h e S e c r e t a r y
H e f e l t t h a t , a s o f y e t , t h i s had

o f War and Commanding General o f t h e Army i n t h e f i e l d were c a l l i n g f o r a major n a v a l o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e Spanish d e f e n s e s w h i l e a t r u c e was i n effect. Though t h e American

f o r c e s w e r e c o r r e c t i n c o n t i n u i n g t h e s i e g e o f S a n t i a g o , any a c t i o n s t h a t c o u l d have been c o n s t r u e d a s o f f e n s i v e i n n a t u r e would have d e l a y e d t h e s u r r e n d e r n e g o t i a t i o n s w h i l e p o s s i b l y s e r v i n g t o p r o l o n g t h e campaign, w i t h a c o r r e s p o n d i n g l o s s of life.

I t i s d o u b t f u l t h a t t h e Spanish f o r c e s would have

a l l o w e d t h e Navy t o c l e a r o u t t h e mines a t t h e h a r b o r e n t r a n c e , t r u c e o r no t r u c e .
A s S h a f t e r and Miles, who w a s b e g i n n i n g t o e x e r t h i s

influence i n t h e t h e a t e r , continued t o n e g o t i a t e with t h e Spanish, Sampson f e l t t h a t it w a s i m p o r t a n t t h a t he a l s o be represented i n t h e t a l k s . On J u l y 13, t h e a d m i r a l c a b l e d t h i s

r e q u e s t t o S h a f t e r , who responded t h a t he would b e g l a d f o r Sampson t o do s o , b u t t h a t it would b e d i f f i c u l t t o coordinate. S h a f t e r a d v i s e d Sampson t o send a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e Before Sampson c o u l d respond,

t o s i t i n on t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s .

M i l e s s e n t word t o him l a t e r t h a t day t h a t "The enemy h a s

surrendered.

I w i l l be down t o s e e you soon."45.

The enemy, however, had n o t y e t a g r e e d t o a l l o f t h e s u r r e n d e r t e r m s , and o v e r t h e n e x t t h r e e days it was s t i l l u n s u r e i f t h e f i g h t f o r t h e S a n t i a g o g a r r i s o n s would have t o b e conducted. Sampson, having f a i l e d t o send someone t o

r e p r e s e n t t h e Navy i n t h e matter, had t o r e l y on t h e c a b l e s t h a t c o n t i n u e d t o come i n p e r i o d i c a l l y from t h e s h o r e . Sampson d i d n o t send anyone a s h o r e sooner i s open t o speculation. Perhaps he d i d n o t want t o r i s k h a v i n g a s e n i o r W h y

o f f i c e r away i f t h e Navy was suddenly o r d e r e d t o f o r c e t h e entrance. This i s q u i t e possible a f t e r h i s e a r l i e r

e x p e r i e n c e , when t h e scheduled c o n f e r e n c e of J u l y 3 p r o h i b i t e d Sampson from p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e o n l y n a v a l a c t i o n of t h e campaign. F i n a l l y , on J u l y 1 6 , t h e terms of t h e s u r r e n d e r were a g r e e d t o by a l l p a r t i e s and t h e formal s u r r e n d e r t o o k p l a c e t h e n e x t morning. I n n o t i f y i n g Sampson of t h e f o r m a l

agreement, Miles t o l d him t h a t he was " g l a d t h a t t h e Navy h a s been a b l e t o c o n t r i b u t e such an important p a r t . " 4 6 Sampson, however, was s t i l l n o t p l e a s e d w i t h t h e outcome of t h e s u r r e n d e r . He c l e a r l y f e l t t h a t , i n a j o i n t

o p e r a t i o n of t h i s t y p e , a l l commanders, o r t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , be s i g n a t o r i e s t o any n o t i c e o f s u r r e n d e r . T h i s o v e r s i g h t by S h a f t e r and Miles, i n t e n t i o n a l o r n o t , was compounded by t h e f a c t t h a t no mention f o r t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of s h i p p i n g was i n c l u d e d i n t h e s u r r e n d e r a r t i c l e s . Even a f t e r

C a p t a i n Chadwick a r r i v e d a t t h e f r o n t t o s i g n t h e a r t i c l e s

S h a f t e r r e f u s e d t o a l l o w him t o do s o .

Chadwick s t a t e d t h a t

S h a f t e r d i d s o o n l y because Sampson had f a i l e d t o mention t h e Army and i t s r o l e i n h i s r e p o r t o f t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e Spanish f l e e t . S h a f t e r l a t e r s t a t e d h i s only reason f o r

r e f u s i n g Chadwick's s i g n a t u r e was t h a t t h e a r t i c l e s had a l r e a d y been a g r e e d t o , and no f u r t h e r s i g n a t u r e w a s r e q u i r e d . 47 While amusing a t b e s t , t h e s e a c t i o n s were soon t o l e a d t o a n o t h e r c o n f l i c t between t h e two s e r v i c e s . There s t i l l

remained a few merchant s h i p s and c o l l i e r s i n s i d e t h e h a r b o r waters. S i n c e t h e m a t t e r o f s h i p p i n g had been o m i t t e d from

t h e s u r r e n d e r n e g o t i a t i o n s , each s e r v i c e a t t e m p t e d t o c l a i m t h e s e v e s s e l s a s t h e i r own.
A s Sampson s t a t e d :

Our o p e r a t i o n s l e a d i n g t o t h e f a l l of S a n t i a g o have been j o i n t a s d i r e c t e d by t h e P r e s i d e n t and s o confirmed by t h e i r c h a r a c t e r . A l l p r o p r i e t y and usage s u r r e n d e r s t h e f l o a t i n g m a t e r i a l i n such c a s e s t o t h e n a v a l f o r c e , and I have t a k e n p o s s e s s i o n o f i t . . . I do n o t t h i n k t h e commanding g e n e r a l q u i t e a p p r e c i a t e s how n e c e s s a r y a p a r t o u r force's were t o t h e r e d u c t i o n o f S a n t i a g o and t h e surrender of i t s garrison.48 S h a f t e r , however, w a s n o t p r e p a r e d j u s t t o hand o v e r t h e v e s s e l s t o Sampson and t h e Navy. He s e n t n o t i c e t o

Sampson t h a t he would n o t r e c o g n i z e t h e a u t h o r i t y o f S e c r e t a r y o f Navy Long i n t h i s m a t t e r . S h a f t e r a l s o t o l d Sampson t h a t :

I r e s p e c t i v e l y i n v i t e your a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t no c l a i m f o r any c r e d i t f o r t h e c a p t u r e o f Cervera and h i s f l e e t h a s been made by t h e Army, a l t h o u g h it i s a f a c t t h e Spanish f l e e t d i d not leave t h e harbor u n t i l t h e investment of t h e c i t y was p r a c t i c a l l y completed.49

E v e n t u a l l y , t h e P r e s i d e n t had t o s t e p i n and d e c i d e t h a t t h e s h i p s were t h e r i g h t f u l p r o p e r t y o f t h e Navy. The

f i n a l i r o n y t o t h i s e n t i r e campaign was t h a t t h e Navy had t o r e t u r n t h e s e c a p t u r e d s h i p s t o t h e Army, o n l y days l a t e r , f o r s e r v i c e as t r a n s p o r t s . The.Navy, i n t h i s case, p r e v a i l e d i n

what had been a l o n g s e r i e s o f unnecessary s k i r m i s h e s between t h e two s e r v i c e s . Sadly, t h i s was a l s o a n o t h e r example of t h e

d i s j o i n t e d o p e r a t i o n s t h a t had e x i s t e d throughout t h e campaign.50

CHAPTER 4 CAMPAIGN LESSONS LEARNED AND SUBSEQUENT REFORMS It would be only a month following the campaign at Santiago before the war with Spain would be concluded with the Treaty of Paris. During the interim, military action between

the United States and Spain would continue both in the Philippines and in Puerto Rico. While both of these theaters

had Army and Navy forces, the operations of each service were mostly unilateral in nature. Thus, the matter of joint

operations between the two services during the SpanishAmerican War ended at Santiago in July of 1898. While the

U.S. military was able to accomplish its objective of defeating the Spanish forces at Santiago, the victory was more the result of Spanish incompetence than any joint expertise on the part of the Army or Navy. Indeed, a more formidable foe

might have handed the United States a military disaster. As circumstances usually dictate, the immediate months following the military operation at Santiago were spent getting U.S. forces redeployed out of Cuba and back home. This was especially true for the V Corps, which was now seriously debilitated with numerous cases of yellow fever and malaria. Much of the Navy had been redeployed to the Puerto The military leadership, both at the strategic
49

Rico campaign.

and operational level, were rightly more concerned with the health and safety of their men and less interested in discerning any lessons learned from their performance at Santiago.1 Given this situation, it should be no surprise that the after-action reports from the principals in the Santiago campaign highlighted the U.S. accomplishments while barely mentioning any of the deficiencies. Shafter's report to

Secretary Alger, dated September 13, 1898, was especially glowing in his evaluation of the Army's performance. Shafter did outline his problems with disease and logistical support, but only to demonstrate the obstacles the Army had to overcome in their victorious action. praise to the Navy, saying: My thanks are due to Admiral Sampson and Captain Goodrich, U.S. Navy, for their efficient aid in disembarking my Army. Without their assistance it would have been impossible to have landed in the time I did.2 As for Sampson, his report to Secretary Long, submitted immediately following the Spanish surrender at Santiago, was more critical of the joint operations between the two services. This was because his report used the communications between himself and Shafter to speak for themselves, messages that Long had not been privy to during the campaign. Sampson's intent was to show the correctness of Shafter went on to give faint

his actions in relation to Shafter's requests, in order to set the record straight concerning the Navy's performance.

Sampson had become acutely aware of the press reports of the Santiago campaign and the perceived inaction on the part,of the Navy. His report, which was later published in the Army

and Navy Journal, was written "in order that a more complete history of the actions of the fleet in combination with the Army

...may

be at the disposal of the Department."3

For both Sampson and Shafter, the after-action reports essentially ended any further contribution on their part to the campaign lessons learned effort. Sampson, for his part,

went on to contend with the Schley affair, in which questions arose over the proper credit due Commodore Winfield Scott Schley for the Santiago naval battle of July 3. Schley had

been the senior naval officer present during the naval action, as Sampson was on his way to confer with Shafter. Sampson,

who felt that Schley had been less than aggressive during the naval blockade and was to some extent responsible for allowing Cervera's fleet to slip into Santiago Harbor, was now loathe to credit Schley for the destruction,ofthe Spanish fleet. This flap ultimately led to a Court of Inquiry, requested by Schley, to determine who exactly was responsible for the Santiago naval victory. The matter was eventually settled

some years later, in Sampson's favor, but the controversy only served to diminish Sampson's accomplishments at Santiago.4 As for the Army, barely had the troops arrived back in the states before charges of mismanagement were made, leveled especially at Secretary of War Alger. Cries for an

investigation forced President McKinley to form a commission, headed by railroad executive and former Army general, Grenville M. Dodge. The Dodge Commission conducted extensive

hearings in late 1898, inquiring into all aspects of the Army's participation in the war with Spain. The Commission

concluded, while there had been no intentional mismanagement or negligence: In the judgment of the commission there was lacking in the general administration of the War Department during the continuance of the war with Spain that complete grasp of the situation which was essential to the highest efficiency.and discipline of the Army.5 This conclusion would have profound effects on the near and later future for the Army. The Dodge Commission also investigated the Army's performance at Santiago, but concluded that the Army had done an exemplary job at meeting the objectives of the campaign. The members of the Commission went on to point out: All this was accomplished without the loss of a prisoner, a gun, or a color, and with a list of casualties aggregating in killed less than 250 and in wounded less than 1,400 losses which, in comparison with results, are less than have ever heretofore occurred in modern warfare.

In fact, the Commission went on to state that, "The cooperation of officers and men in this campaign is to be noted. " 6 It would not be long, however, before both the Army and the Navy would begin to reflect on their respective Service's performance at Santiago. Their analysis of the campaign would ultimately lead to calls for changes in a

multitude of m i l i t a r y procedures.

Combined w i t h t h e growing

s t a t e o f reform t h a t was p r e v a l e n t i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e s e changes soon had a tremendous impact t h r o u g h o u t t h e m i l i t a r y .

1 Staff

Based upon t h e f i n d i n g s o f t h e Dodge Commission, P r e s i d e n t McKinley sought t o s o l v e t h e Army's mismanagement problems by r e p l a c i n g S e c r e t a r y Alger. Root, a c o r p o r a t e lawyer from N e w York.
H e d e c i d e d on E l i h u

Root, who had no

p r i o r m i l i t a r y e x p e r i e n c e , brought a l e a d e r s h i p and management s t y l e t o t h e War Department t h a t would r i v a l t h a t i n any s u c c e s s f u l c o r p o r a t i o n of t h e day.7 Root, a f t e r c a r e f u l l y examining t h e Dodge Commission r e p o r t , concluded t h a t i t was paramount t o reform t h e Army's s e n i o r - l e v e l l e a d e r s h i p s t r u c t u r e by i n s t i t u t i n g a General Staff. Root, however, r e c o g n i z e d t h e i n h e r e n t d i s t r u s t i n

such a s t a f f s t r u c t u r e t h a t was widespread t h r o u g h o u t t h e Army and i n Congress, which would have t o approve any change t o a General S t a f f f o r m a t .
As a result,

it would t a k e Root almost

t h r e e years t o bring h i s e f f o r t s t o fruition.8 To advance h i s argument, Root used t h e Army's performance d u r i n g t h e S a n t i a g o campaign t o show e x a c t l y why an o r g a n i z a t i o n such a s t h e General S t a f f was n e c e s s a r y . In

h i s a n n u a l r e p o r t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t f o r 1902, Root o u t l i n e d t h e need f o r such a s t a f f , a r g u i n g t h a t : The most i m p o r t a n t t h i n g t o be done now f o r t h e Regular Army i s t h e c r e a t i o n o f a g e n e r a l s t a f f ....

It i s e a s y f o r a P r e s i d e n t , o r a g e n e r a l a c t i n g under h i s d i r e c t i o n , t o o r d e r t h a t 50,000 o r 100,000 men proceed t o Cuba and c a p t u r e Havana. To make a n o r d e r which h a s any r e a s o n a b l e chance of b e i n g e x e c u t e d h e must do a g r e a t d e a l more t h a n t h a t . He must determine how many men s h a l l be s e n t and how t h e y s h a l l b e d i v i d e d among t h e d i f f e r e n t arms o f t h e s e r v i c e , and how t h e y s h a l l b e armed, and equipped, and t o d o t h a t he must g e t a l l t h e i n f o r m a t i o n p o s s i b l e about t h e defenses of t h e place t o be captured and t h e s t r e n g t h and c h a r a c t e r and armament o f t h e f o r c e s t o b e met. H e must determine a t what p o i n t s and by what r o u t e s t h e p l a c e s h a l l be approached, and a t what p o i n t s h i s t r o o p s s h a l l l a n d i n Cuba; and f o r t h i s purpose he must b e informed a b o u t t h e v a r i o u s h a r b o r s o f t h e i s l a n d and t h e d e p t h o f t h e i r c h a n n e l s ; what c l a s s e s o f v e s s e l s can e n t e r them; what t h e f a c i l i t i e s f o r l a n d i n g a r e ; how t h e y a r e t o b e a t t a c k e d ; t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e i n t e r v e n i n g c o u n t r y ; how f a r i t i s h e a l t h f u l o r u n h e a l t h f u l ; what t h e c l i m a t e i s l i a b l e t o be a t t h e s e a s o n o f t h e proposed movement; t h e temper and sympathies of t h e i n h a b i t a n t s ; t h e q u a n t i t y and k i n d o f s u p p l i e s t h a t can be o b t a i n e d , and a g r e a t v a r i e t y o f o t h e r t h i n g s which w i l l go t o d e t e r m i n e whether it i s b e t t e r t o make t h e approach from one p o i n t o r from a n o t h e r , and t o d e t e r m i n e what it w i l l be n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e Army t o c a r r y w i t h it i n o r d e r t o s u c c e e d i n moving and l i v i n g and f i g h t i n g . . A l l t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n it i s t h e b u s i n e s s o f a g e n e r a l s t a f f t o p r o c u r e and p r e s e n t . I t was t h e l a c k o f such a body of men d o i n g t h a t k i n d of work which l e d t o t h e c o n f u s i o n a t t e n d i n g t h e S a n t i a g o e x p e d i t i o n i n t h e summer o f 1898. The c o n f u s i o n a t Tampa and e l s e w h e r e was t h e n e c e s s a r y r e s u l t of h a v i n g a l a r g e number o f men, e a c h of them doing h i s own s p e c i a l work t h e b e s t he c o u l d , b u t w i t h o u t any a d e q u a t e f o r c e o f o f f i c e r s engaged i n s e e i n g t h a t t h e y p u l l e d t o g e t h e r a c c o r d i n g t o d e t a i l e d p l a n s made beforehand. Such a body o f men d o i n g g e n e r a l s t a f f d u t y i s j u s t as n e c e s s a r y t o p r e p a r e a n Army p r o p e r l y f o r w a r i n t i m e o f peace a s it i s i n t i m e o f war. 9

...

I n h i s d r i v e t o i n s t i t u t e a General S t a f f S e c r e t a r y Root a l s o e n j o y e d t h e e n t h u s i a s t i c s u p p o r t of P r e s i d e n t Roosevelt.

A s a volunteer regimental o f f i c e r during t h e

S a n t i a g o campaign, Roosevelt had w i t n e s s e d f i r s t h a n d much of t h e mismanagement and c o n f u s i o n . After l i s t e n i n g t o Root's

arguments, Roosevelt was convinced t h a t t h e General S t a f f

s t r u c t u r e w a s s o r e l y . needed by t h e Army.

A f t e r . a hard-fought

b a t t l e w i t h Congress, R o o t ' s arguments e v e n t u a l l y won o u t w i t h t h e General S t a f f becoming law i n February o f 1903.10 The d u t i e s of t h e s t a f f under t h e law i n c l u d e d " t o p r e p a r e p l a n s f o r t h e n a t i o n a l d e f e n s e and f o r t h e mobilization of t h e m i l i t a r y f o r c e s i n t i m e of w a r . " A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e s t a f f would " i n v e s t i g a t e and r e p o r t upon a l l q u e s t i o n s a f f e c t i n g t h e e f f i c i e n c y of t h e Army and i t s s t a t e of preparation f o r m i l i t a r y operations."ll Development of t h e Navv General Board The U.S. Navy, based upon i t s n a v a l a c t i o n s a t

S a n t i a g o and a t Manila Bay, was r e g a r d e d by t h e p u b l i c t o have been q u i t e s u c c e s s f u l d u r i n g t h e Spanish-American War.

As f a r

a s t h e Navy was concerned, much of i t s s u c c e s s w a s due t o t h e i n v a l u a b l e r o l e o f t h e Naval War Board, which performed admirably a s S e c r e t a r y Long's c h i e f a d v i s o r .
I t was e v i d e n t

t h a t Long was q u i t e a p p r e c i a t i v e o f t h e b o a r d ' s e f f o r t s , a s he s t a t e d i n h i s a n n u a l r e p o r t o f 1898:

I t ( t h e Naval War Board) was e q u a l t o e v e r y demand and t h r o u g h it p r o p e r c o n t r o l was e x e r c i s e d by t h e Department o v e r a l l movements i n t h e f i e l d ; a t t h e same t i m e a l l o f f i c e r s t h e r e were l e f t ample d i s c r e t i o n and were never hampered i n t h e i r work. The board was charged w i t h d e l i c a t e and most important d u t i e s , and y e t t h e Department i s n o t aware o f a n e r r o r i n i t s performance o f them.12

The Naval War Board was d i s e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h e f a l l o f 1898, s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e w a r ended, when i t s s e r v i c e s were no longer necessary. i n c l u d i n g Long, However, many p e o p l e t h r o u g h o u t t h e Navy,

f e l t t h a t it was t i m e t o implement a permanent

advisory board to eliminate the need to form a temporary one in time of war. Thus, the Secretary established the Navy

General Board, under executive order, in March of 1900.13 The purpose as envisioned by Long was "to insure efficient preparation of the fleet in case of war and for the naval defense of the coast". Their duties in practice were to devise plans for deployment of the fleet, advise on training and acquisition matters, and recommend possibilities for naval bases overseas. The board, keeping in mind the performance of joint forces at Santiago, was also tasked to develop an "effective cooperation with the Army."l4 Pevelo~ ment of the Joint Armv and Navv Board While internal changes were being made to each service, officers from both the Army and the Navy also recognized the need to foster greater joint interservice cohesiveness. A few years of reflecting on the joint

operations during the Santiago campaign had made it obvious that there was a great requirement for improved liaison between the two services. To meet this end, the service secretaries created the Joint Army and Navy Board in 1903. It would be this board

that would function as the precursor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which was later developed in World War 11. The initial

board was designed to consider mutual matters of interest that the secretaries chose to present before it. As with the

Navy's General Board, t h e J o i n t Board l a c k e d e x e c u t i v e a u t h o r i t y and was p u r e l y a d v i s o r y i n n a t u r e . Approval o f i t s

recommendations would r e q u i r e t h e a p p r o v a l o f b o t h s e c r e t a r i e s and, i n some c a s e s , t h e P r e s i d e n t . 15 The J o i n t Board was composed o f o f f i c e r s from b o t h t h e Army's General S t a f f and t h e Navy's General Board. While t h e

board was l i m i t e d t o o n l y t h o s e m a t t e r s p l a c e d b e f o r e it by the secretaries,

it w a s t o p l a y a c o n s i d e r a b l e r o l e i n t h e

development of war p l a n s , a n o t e d d e f i c i e n c y i n t h e S a n t i a g o campaign p r e p a r a t i o n . The board a l s o had a tremendous

i n f l u e n c e on t h e s e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s f o r U.S. b a s e s overseas.16 The J o i n t Board f i r s t f l e x e d i t s a v a i l a b l e muscle i n 1904, when, a t t h e s u g g e s t i o n o f t h e Army Chief o f S t a f f , L i e u t e n a n t General A . R . Chaffee, it was t a s k e d t o develop a The

s e r i e s o f war p l a n s a g a i n s t p o s s i b l e enemy t h r e a t s .

i n i t i a l work was a c o l l a b o r a t i o n b e t w e e n s t u d e n t s from t h e Naval War C o l l e g e and t h e Army War College, who t h e n forwarded t h e i r i d e a s t o t h e J o i n t Board. The f i r s t w a r p l a n developed

by t h e J o i n t Board was f o r a p o s s i b l e m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n and t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f b a s e s on t h e i s l a n d o f S a n t o Domingo. T h i s p l a n , known a s t h e H a i t i - S a n t o Domingo P l a n , c a l l e d f o r a n a v a l l a n d i n g f o r c e which would t h e n be r e l i e v e d by a n Army e x p e d i t i o n a r y f o r c e t h i r t y days a f t e r t h e i n i t i a l s e i z u r e . 1 7 Over t h e n e x t s e v e r a l y e a r s , t h e J o i n t Board developed a s e r i e s o f color-coded p l a n s t h a t were aimed a t p o s s i b l e U.S. adversaries. These p l a n s i n c l u d e d P l a n BLACK f o r Germany,

Plan ORANGE for Japan, and Plan RED for Great Britian.

Most

of these plans would essentially remain the same until they were modified at the beginning of World War 11.18 The board, however, was also subject to disagreement between the two services. Specifically, in 1907 the members

of the board split along service lines over the choice of Subic Bay, Philippines as a Pacific base of operations. While

the matter was eventually settled in the Army's favor with Subic Bay being dropped as a base, the heated dispute between the two services only inhibited the board's potential in future years.19 One important matter that the board failed to resolve was the concept of unity of command in joint operations. It

was precisely this aspect that had resulted in the disjointed operations throughout the Santiago campaign. Each time the

board was asked to consider this concept, it chose to recommend that, instead of designating a unified commander, the services would best accomplish their objectives through mutual cooperation. The board felt it was better to avoid possible service dissatisfaction, by subordinating one service to another, at the expense of having a unified command. This was indeed one instance in which the military failed to heed the lessons learned from the conduct of joint operations during the Santiago campaign.20

S i n c e t h e s e r v i c e s had had no e x i s t i n g r e g u l a t i o n s o r d o c t r i n e f o r t h e conduct o f l a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n s p r i o r t o t h e embarkation a t Tampa, t h e s u c c e s s o f t h i s phase o f t h e o p e r a t i o n i n S a n t i a g o had t r u l y depended on t h e mutual c o o p e r a t i o n between t h e Army and t h e Navy. The b a s i s o f t h i s

c o o p e r a t i o n , however, was f o r t h e s i m p l e r e a s o n t h a t b o t h s e r v i c e s would b e n e f i t from g e t t i n g t h e V Corps a s h o r e a s soon

as p o s s i b l e .

R e a l i z i n g t h a t f u t u r e l a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n s might

n o t b e a b l e t o , r e l y on t h i s f o r c e d c o o p e r a t i o n , b o t h s e r v i c e s began t o e x p l o r e t h e a d o p t i o n of r u l e s governing t h i s t y p e of operation.

It would be almost seven y e a r s a f t e r t h e end of t h e

w a r w i t h Spain, however, b e f o r e t h e f i r s t r e a l e f f o r t a t
c o d i f y i n g r u l e s f o r l a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n s would be a t t e m p t e d . Some of t h i s d e l a y was due t o t h e reforms ( i . e . , General S t a f f , General Board) t h a t occupied much o f t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e services during t h i s period. A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e reduced

chance f o r any near-term m i l i t a r y a c t i o n p r o v i d e d a n excuse t o delay studying landing rules.21 I n 1905, it was a n o t h e r c o l l a b o r a t i v e e f f o r t between

w a r c o l l e g e students t h a t l e d t o a f i r s t d r a f t of landing
rules. These o f f i c e r s r e c o g n i z e d t h a t f u t u r e l a n d i n g

o p e r a t i o n s had t o be conducted i n a more p r o f e s s i o n a l manner, w i t h c l e a r l y d e f i n e d a r e a s o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a s s i g n e d t o each

service.

T h i s d r a f t w a s forwarded t o t h e J o i n t Board f o r i t s

c o n s i d e r a. t i o n and recommendations.22 A f t e r t h e J o i n t Board reviewed t h e r u l e s t h e y were s e n t , i n February o f 1906, b e f o r e t h e S e c r e t a r i e s and t h e President, who promptly a c c e p t e d them. These r u l e s were 174.
I t was n o t

promulgated by t h e Army as General Order N o .

u n t i l 1910 t h a t t h e s e r u l e s would a p p e a r i n t h e Army's. F i e l d Service Regulations. Order N o . 25.23 The Navy p u b l i s h e d t h e r u l e s a s General

Under t h e s e r u l e s , t h e Army was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e procurement and e q u i p p i n g o f t h e n a v a l t r a n s p o r t s , a s w e l l a s t h e l o a d i n g o f t r o o p s , animals, and s t o r e s .

Great emphasis

was p l a c e d on t h e u s e o f a n embarkation s c h e d u l e t o p r i o r i t i z e t h e o n l o a d i n g , something t h a t was n o t done a t Tampa. The

t r a n s p o r t s themselves had t o meet minimum s t a n d a r d s f o r t h e h e a l t h and morale o f t h e t r o o p s , water. such a s r e q u i r e d amounts of

The Army would c o n t r o l t h e o f f l o a d i n g from t h e

t r a n s p o r t s o n t o t h e b o a t s , where t h e Navy would t h e n assume c o n t r o l o f t h e movement t o t h e shore.24 Under a s i t u a t i o n s i m i l a r t o t h e one a t S a n t i a g o , t h e Army commanding o f f i c e r would d e c i d e t h e d e s t i n a t i o n and t i m e o f s a i l i n g o f t h e convoy.
If c i r c u m s t a n c e s were t o change

a f t e r t h e convoy had s a i l e d , t h e Army and Navy commanders would t h e n c o n f e r t o d e c i d e on a l t e r n a t i v e s . 2 5 Once t h e convoy began t o s a i l , t h e Navy commanding o f f i c e r assumed c o n t r o l o v e r t h e movement and p r o t e c t i o n o f

the convoy formation. The senior naval officer aboard each ship was to maintain command of his vessel

at no time would

the captain of the ship become subordinate to the senior Army officer aboard. This was important in case a ship would

become detached from the main formation. The Navy would keep control of the convoy until it reached the pier or anchorage. The Army commanding officer would decide the plans for landing, to include the site and time. This point, however,

hinged on the stipulation that the Navy commanding officer be consulted. Once the landing site was determined, the Navy was

responsible for placing the transports at the point of debarkation.26 Throughout the landing operation, there would be a continued emphasis on establishing and maintaining communications channels between the two commanding officers. It was highly recommended that the Army commanding officer be embarked on the flagship of the naval convoy commander. Again, this was an effort to counter the confusion of the disjointed operations that had taken place at Santiago between Sampson and Shafter .27 As for naval gunfire support, there was some concern over the performance of naval gunfire, especially in support of the siege of Santiago. It had been determined that there

were only forty-six major-caliber hits on fifty-seven houses in Santiago, out of over 1300 rounds fired. This performance,

however, was, in part,.explained by the restrictions placed on

t h e n a v a l g u n f i r e by General S h a f t e r .

H e had s p e c i f i c a l l y

a s k e d Admiral Sampson t o have h i s guns f i r e i n t o t h e w e s t e r n p o r t i o n o f t h e c i t y , t h u s a v o i d i n g any p o s s i b i l i t y o f Navy s h e l l s f a l l i n g on Army t r o o p s . This r e s t r i c t i o n s e v e r e l y

l i m i t e d t h e amount of damage t h e n a v a l bombardment was a b l e t o inflict. The Navy was o f t h e o p i n i o n t h a t g r e a t e r damage

would have o c c u r r e d i f t h e i r guns had been t r a i n e d on t h e c e n t e r o f t h e town. They a l s o b e l i e v e d t h a t , a l t h o u g h t h i s

would have caused t h e s h e l l s t o f a l l c l o s e r t o V Corps t r o o p s , t h e Navy w a s more t h a n c a p a b l e o f d e c o n f l i c t i n g t h e n a v a l g u n f i r e . 28 Thus, t h e performance of n a v a l g u n f i r e s u p p o r t was due more t o m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of j o i n t c a p a b i l i t i e s t h a n t o a d i s r e g a r d f o r t a c t i c s , t e c h n i q u e s and p r o c e d u r e s . T h i s was

e s p e c i a l l y t r u e s i n c e t h e r e had been no j o i n t t r a i n i n g i n t h i s a r e a p r i o r t o t h e S a n t i a g o campaign.

A f t e r t h e war,

i n an

e f f o r t t o combat t h i s d e f i c i e n c y , t h e Army and Navy proposed e x e r c i s e s t h a t would conduct j o i n t g u n f i r e t r a i n i n g . accomplished by t h e development o f t h e Army and Navy Maneuvers, a j o i n t e x e r c i s e t h a t f i r s t t o o k p l a c e i n 1 9 0 2 . Although p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h g u n f i r e s u p p o r t i n a c o a s t a l d e f e n s e s c e n a r i o , t h e maneuvers used p e r s o n n e l from b o t h s e r v i c e s t o observe t h e o t h e r s e r v i c e ' s g u n f i r e o r a r t i l l e r y techniques. This e a r l y attempt a t conducting j o i n t e x e r c i s e s T h i s was

g r e a t l y h e l p e d t o f o s t e r t h e growing r e l i a n c e on s e r v i c e c o o p e r a t i o n . 29.

The U.S. military prior to the Spanish-American War, suffering from inadequate readiness and an ineffective command structure, was in great need of reform. The decade after the

war provided the opportunity to bring about these changes. Although all of these changes and reforms were not a panacea, it was apparent that both services were willing to put aside many of their interservice differences in order to achieve better joint cohesiveness. It had been the disjointed

performance of the Army and Navy during the campaign of Santiago that had provided the impetus to do so.

CHAPTER 5 ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS The p r e c e d i n g c h a p t e r s have p r o v i d e d a background of t h e conduct of j o i n t o p e r a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e S a n t i a g o campaign d u r i n g t h e Spanish-American War of 1898. While n o t t h e f i r s t

o r l a s t t i m e t h a t j o i n t o p e r a t i o n s have been conducted by t h e U.S. Army and Navy,

it i s important t o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h e r e

was much t o l e a r n from j u s t how t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s were executed.

I t i s n o t merely enough, however, t o r e s t a t e t h e

a c t i o n s o f t h e American m i l i t a r y d u r i n g a war t h a t o c c u r r e d almost a c e n t u r y ago.

It i s a l s o important t o understand t h a t

t h e i r a c t i o n s i n a remote area o f Cuba would have a f a r r e a c h i n g impact on t h e f u t u r e of t h e two s e r v i c e s . . To t h a t end, it i s n e c e s s a r y t o r e a l i z e t h a t t h e a c t i o n s a t S a n t i a g o and t h e m i l i t a r y reforms t h a t t o o k p l a c e i n t h e y e a r s a f t e r t h e war were l i n k e d , t h a t one caused t h e o t h e r . primary o b j e c t i v e of t h i s t h e s i s - - t o That i s t h e

show t h a t t h e conduct of

j o i n t o p e r a t i o n s a t S a n t i a g o d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d t h e U.S. m i l i t a r y i n t h e f o l l o w i n g decade. There i s l i t t l e argument t h a t t h e United S t a t e s m i l i t a r y was f a c e d w i t h a d i f f i c u l t t a s k i n d e f e a t i n g t h e Spanish f o r c e s i n Cuba d u r i n g t h e summer months o f 1898.

64

Prior to the war, the military had been reduced to its lowest level of readiness and manning since the end of the Civil War. The build-up of forces required to meet the strategic war objectives was not initiated until war was declared in April. These objectives were simply to defeat the Spanish troops in the Cuban and the Philippine theaters, using a joint effort between the Army and the Navy. The joint operation at Santiago began as a hastily prepared Army expeditionary force thrown together with a fleet of thinly stretched Navy ships conducting a naval blockade. The state of pre-war readiness and the need for mobilization had negated any opportunity to conduct valuable joint training before the campaign began. There also existed a dearth of

doctrine,.tactics, techniques and procedures on which the services could have drawn as a starting point for joint operations. AS a result, the Santiago campaign was characterized by the inability of the two services to operate in a cohesive manner. Despite the disjointed means, the Santiago campaign, in the end, had to be considered a success because the operational objectives, though ill-defined, were met. The

constant pressure applied by the U.S. Army on the garrisons of Santiago had forced the Spanish fleet to attempt an escape of harbor waters. In turn, the Spanish ships under Admiral

Cervera's command had been destroyed by the U.S. Navy's guns. The siege of Santiago that followed forced the Spanish troops

to eventually capitulate, leading to the surrender of the entire province of Santiago de Cuba. The U.S. military

actions in Cuba set the stage for the highly successful followon campaign in Puerto Rico. Combined with the actions in the

Philippines, the Spanish-American War lasted a short four months, with a small number of casualties. The overarching lesson that can be drawn from the conduct of joint operations at Santiago is that as much, if not more, can be learned from an ineffective campaign as well as from a totally successful one. This was certainly the case for the Santiago campaign. The performance of the Army and Navy forces at Santiago, and the lessons to be drawn from this campaign, were directly responsible for many of the initiatives and reforms that were instituted in the services in the decade following the Spanish-American War. Secretary Root successfully argued for a General Staff, stating that such a command organization would have avoided the Army's mismanagement of the Santiago campaign. Secretary Long established the General Board because he had been tremendously impressed by the Naval War Board's advice concerning the Navy's role in Cuba. These intraservice

reforms led to the establishment of the Joint Army and Navy Board, which later resolved the issue of joint landing operations, among others. ~lthough many of these changes most

likely would have been made at some point in history, it is

evident that the events at Santiago clearly precipitated these events. The major deficiency of this campaign was the lack of command guidance and structure, especially in the failure to dictate unity of command. Although there have been successful operations that have lacked a unified commander, in this case joint operations between the Army and Navy was greatly hampered by having two commanders in the field who were, in effect, working against each other. It is apparent that both

General Shafter and Admiral Sampson were conducting their operations, rightly or wrongly, with their own service interests at heart.
A

joint operation under a theater

commander from the start quite probably would have resulted in a shorter campaign and with possibly fewer casualties. Cooperation between services and their commanders, while clearly a good thing, is not always a matter of common application. This was true in the relations between Sampson and ~hafter. Even when the degree of their conflict became known back in Washington, the only correction to the s.ituation was a dictum from President McKinley to cooperate better. ~houghthe two commanders did not consciously ignore McKinley's advice, the lack of doctrine or guiding principles, either formal or informal, concerning service responsibilities in a joint arena was a decisive factor for the high degree of disjointed operations.

Given a situation where military operations are called for, the most common response is to refer to doctrine to develop a basis for future operations. This doctrine may be written down or may simply be a philosophy that pervades throughout a military service. Whatever the form, this doctrine provides the commanders the same "sheet of music' from which to perform. As long as there is this common

thread, the operation will be able to adjust to any deviations that are necessary in order to adapt to the situation. The

Santiago campaign, however, suffered considerably from a lack of doctrine, especially in the areas of landing operations and naval gunfire support. If there is no doctrine (or common tactics, techniques, and procedures) from which to draw upon, the next step is to look for, lacking a better term, "institutional memory.' This refers to the corporate knowledge that exists in the military from previous occurrences of similar operations. Despite this lack of doctrine, the existence of this institutional memory can be just as valuable, if not more, in conducting military operations. For the Santiago campaign, there was none of this knowledge that either service could utilize. It had been over

thirty years since the Civil War, when the last instance of joint operations had occurred. If the commanders at both the

strategic and the operational level had gone looking for

someone to offer his expertise, they would have quickly discovered that no such person existed. Finally, if there are no apparent answers, written or otherwise, then the next step is one of innovation, heavily influenced by the exigency of the situation. Military leaders for generations have been valued for their ability to solve problems in a timely fashion. At Santiago, there were signs of this talent during the landing operations phase, when the services put aside their differences in order to get the V Corps ashore as quickly and as safely as possible. Although later on there was a considerable amount of fingerpointing from both sides concerning service responsibilities, the landing itself greatly benefitted from a unified effort. The deception plan in support of the landing was especially remarkable given the lack of pre-war planning and training. This effort to cooperate, however, was quickly forgotten as soon as the advance on Santiago began. Whether through the application of doctrine, institutional memory or innovative ideas, the overriding influence in conducting successful operations comes down to the personalities of the commanders involved. Examples of this include General Ulysses Grant, whose leadership ensured success at Vicksburg, and General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, whose guidance prevented failure in Operation DESERT STOFWDESERT SHIELD. The power of their personalties, in conjunction with

command guidance, played a significant part in their operations while resolving the matter of unity of command. For the Santiago campaign, it is apparent that both Sampson and Shafter, with no strategic guidance and lacking any doctrine or institutional memory concerning joint operations, were left overly dependent on their own ability to identify the problem and reach a unified solution. Their failure to do so at Santiago, then, was because the personalities of the commanders involved essentially nullified any willingness to cooperate. One can only speculate as to their reasons why they acted as they did. For one, both men probably viewed defeating the Spanish at Santiago as, in the end, a consequence of their own service's actions. For this to occur, both Sampson and Shafter had to have recognized that success of their own service was greatly dependent on the other service setting the stage. Given this, it is likely that neither man wanted his service to play a subordinate role in the eventual outcome. They may have been overly concerned that the recognition for the major role in the Santiago campaign would go to the service who had ended the fighting, while ignoring the contributions of the service that had set the conditions. For another, it is evident that both commanders were misinformed as to the capabilitites and limitations of the other's service. This would explain why Sampson could not comprehend why the Army could not just storm the garrisons at

the entrance to the harbor.

Shafter correctly saw that this

action would probably result in a larger loss of life on the Army's part than in conducting a siege of Santiago. Conversely, Shafter was mistaken in his belief that opening the entrance to the harbor was simply a matter of U.S. naval ships forcing their way in. This type of action would also

have led to a large loss of life, this time at the expense of Navy seamen. This lack of understanding also explains the ineffective naval gunfire support that existed throughout the campaign. In hindsight, perhaps there was not an acceptable joint course of action that the two commanders could have agreed upon that would have achieved the same results. Regardless of whether there was one or not, the main point is that Sampson and Shafter should have at least gotten together more frequently to discuss the conduct of the operation and, at least, explore other possible solutions. The two commanders met face to face only once during the entire campaign and that was upon Shafter's arrival in the theater. Instead, they chose to conduct the Santiago campaign via message, hoping against hope that one of them would eventually come around in his way of thinking. This was not to be. Fortunately for the Americans, the Spanish forces were not equipped to counter the U.S. offensive, no matter how disorganized. As stated earlier, the entire campaign was over in a matter of months, long before any long-term effects of

the disjointedness between Sampson and Shafter could be realized. To some extent, credit must be given to both services for their actions in the years following the war. After

reflecting upon the conduct of the campaign, the Army and Navy recognized that there could not be a repeat of the joint operations at Santiago. In the decade following the Spanish-

American War, the services, singularly and jointly, underwent the greatest amount of reform in their histories. Though

these reforms did not solve every problem that had arisen during the Santiago campaign, it did show that it is possible to discern valuable lessons learned from the conduct of military operations. Ultimately, the Santiago lessons learned

were translated into doctrine, as in the case of landing operations, or into the establishment of vital command and advisory structures. This study focused solely on the changes and reforms that occurred in the decade following the Santiago campaign. Many of these reforms, however, had an impact on the way the military operated for several decades. In the case of the

landing rules developed by the Joint Army and Navy Board in 1906, they bear a striking resemblance to current amphibious doctrine. For example, the division of service

responsibilities afloat and ashore arrived at by the Joint Board remains essentially unchanged almost ninety years later. Therefore, further study is recommended to determine if there

is a link between the initial landing rules and.the development of current amphibious doctrine. It is quite

possible, then, that the Santiago campaign had an influence on joint military operations that continues to this day.

ENDNOTES

1U.S. War Department Adjutant General's Office, Corres~ondenceRelatina to the War with Suain and Conditions Prowina Out of the Same includina the Insurrection in the Philiu~ineIslands and the China Relief Ex~editionBetween the Adjutant-General of the Armv and Militarv Commanders in Ehe United States. Cuba. Porto Rico. China, and PhiliDDine &lands (From ADril 15. 1898 to Julv 30. 1902) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), 18-19. 2Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02. DOD Dictionarv of Militarv and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 19891, S.V.

l~avid F . T r a s k , The W a r w i t h S ~ a i n i n 1 8 9 8 ( N e w York: Macmillan, 1 9 8 1 ) ; 2-8. 2~ichard W. Greenwood P r e s s , Turk,

e R o o s e v e l t -red
1 9 8 7 ) , 30-31;

Thaver Mdun ( N e w York: T r a s k , 76-78.

3George J . Tanham, " S e r v i c e R e l a t i o n s S i x t y Years Ago," U i t a r v A f f a i r s 23 ( F a l l 1 9 5 9 ) : 139-140. 4 J a m e s H e w e s , "The U n i t e d S t a t e s Army G e n e r a l S t a f f , l9OO-l9l7, " M i l i t a r v 38 ( A p r i l 1974) : 68. S C h a r l e s 0. P a u l l i n , "A H a l f C e n t u r y of Naval A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n A m e r i c a , 1861-1911," m t e d S t a t e s Naval I n s t i t u t e P r o c e e d i n u s 40 ( J a n u a r y - F e b r u a r y 1914) : 116. 6 p e t e r S . K i n d s v a t t e r , " S a n t i a g o Campaign of 1898: J o i n t a n d Combined O p e r a t i o n s , " M i l i t a r v Review 7 3 ( J a n u a r y 1993) : 3 . 7U.S. W a r Department A d j u t a n t G e n e r a l ' s O f f i c e , Growina Out o f t h e Sam e i n c l u d i n u t h e I n s u r r e c t i o n i n the P h i l i D D i n e I s l a n d s a n d t h e China R e l i e f E x ~ e d i t i o nBetween t h e A d i u t a n t -G e n e r a l o f t h e Armv and M i l i t a r v Commanders i n t h e

C o r r e s ~n od e n c e R e l a t i n a t o t h e War w i t h S ~ a i n and Conditions

. .

(From A w r i l 15. 1898 t o J u l v 30. 1902) (Washington, D . C . : Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 0 2 ) , 14-16. 8Stockbridge H. Barker, 9U.S. "Cuban C r i s i s , " 9-11.

Beview 34 (December 1954) : 15-16.

War Department, Correswondence,

loGraham A. Cosmas,

(Columbia, ( 1 9 7 1 ) . 129-130.

A n : The LbiLe.&

1 2 u . s . War Department,

, -

29-30.

14John Davis Long, pawers of John Davis Lona. 1897Massachusetts Historical Society, 1939), 134; French.E. Chadwick, The Relations of the united States and Sgain: The swanish-American Way 2 Vol. (New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons, 1 9 1 1 1 26-29.

u,(Boston:

15Trask. 206-207; Barker:

14.

IsRichard H. Titherington, A Historv of the Swanishw r i c a n War of 1898, (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1900). 302; Trask. 230. 17Kindsvatter: 8; Trask, 207.

1su.S. Navy Department, A~wendixto che Rewort of the vlaatlon for 1898: The S~anishw i c a n War, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, l899), 609. 19Ibid.; U.S. War Department, Rewort of the Secretary ~f War. 1898, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1898), 150; Russell A. Alger, The Swanish-American War, (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1901), 86-91.
2Ou.s.. Navy Department, Awwendix, 498

zlwilliam A. M. Goode, yith Sam~son Throuah the War, (New York : Doubleday and McClure, 1899 , 179. chawter Three lPeter S. Kindsvatter, "Santiago Campaign of 1989: Joint and Combined Operations," Militam Review 73 (January 1993): 6. 2U.S. War Department Adjutant General's Office, ~orres~ondence Relatina to the War with S ~ a i n and Conditions in the Growina . . Out of the Same includina the Insurrection ition Between the 11xwwine Islands and the China Relief E m e d . . hdiutant-General of the Armv and Mxlxtarv Commanders in the united States. Cuba. Porto Rico. China. and Phili~wineIslands 30. 1902) (Washington, D.C.: (From Awril 15, 1898 to ~ u l v Government Printing Office, 1902). 19. York: 3Russell A. Alger, The S~anish-American War, (New Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1901), 80-81.

4Jean Legrand, "The Landing at ~aiquiri."United States Naval Institute Proceedina~26 (March 1900): 123. 5Armv and N a w Journa3, 25 June 1898: 860.

7Graham A. Cosmas, fin Armv for Emuire: The United States A r m and the Suanish-American War (columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1971), 207.

lounited States Navy, "Comments of l ear-Admiral Pluddemann, German Navy on the Main Features of the War with Spain," united States Naval Institute Proceedinas 24 (December 1898): 784.

lzFrench E. Chadwick, Zhe Relations of the United States and Soain: The Suanish-American War 2 Vol. (New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons, 1911), 1: 58 and 67; David F. Trask, The War with Suain in 1898 (New York: Macmillan, l98l), 252. 13U.S. Navy Department, Auuendix to the Reuort of the chief of the Bureau of Naviaation for 1898: The Suanishmerican War, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1899), 503; Trask, 252. 14u.s. Navy Department, Auuendix, 503. IsTrask, 249. 16U.S. War Department, Corresuondence, 74-75. 17U.S . Navy Department, Auuendix, 504. IsIbid., 608. 19Ibid. zo~bid., 618; U.S. War Department, ReDort, 157.

;L898,

21U.S. War Department, Bewort of the Secretarv of War. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1898),

151. 22u.S. War Department, Correswondence, 78-79; Trask. 254-255; Walter Millis, The Martial soirit: A Studv of our Mar with Swain, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1931), 298299. 23Trask, 257-261; U.S War Department, p I 3 L 157. 24u.S. War Department, Correswondence, 81.

26Ibid., 289; Kindsvatter:

10.

27u.s. Navy Department, m e n d i x , 609. 28Ibid., 625; U.S. War Department, Correswondence, 8789. 29u.s. War Department, Correswondence, 88-89. 30Margaret Leech, In the Davs of McKinlev, (New York: Harper Publishing Company, 1959), 263-266; U.S. War Department, ~orreswondencg,89. 3lu.S. Navy Department, Fwwendiy, 619. 32~lger,188-189; U.S. War Department, Correswondence,
91.

33U.S. Navy Department, Aw~endix,610.

35U.S. War Department, Correswondence, 104

37U.S. War Department, Corr-suondence, 117-120. 38U.S. Navy Department, Auwendix, 621. 39~elsonA. Miles, Servina the R e ~ u b,u (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1911), 285-286. 78

41Ibid., 304-305; U.S. War Department, Corresoondence, 125. 42U.S. Navy Department, pxmendix, 624-625. 431bid., 625; U.S. War Department, Corresoondence, 132; John Davis Long, The New American N a w , (New York: he Outlook Company, 19031, 152.

45U.S. Navy Department, Aooendix, 624; Trask, 308. 46U.S. Navy Department, ~ m e n d i x , 627 47Ibid.; Trask. 316. 48u.S. Navy Department, Aooendix, 628; Trask, 320-321. 49U.S. Navy Department, Aooendix, 630 SOTrask, 320-321.

l~avidF. Trask, The War with SQain in 1898 (New York: Macmillan, 1981), 324-328 and 352.

m, (Washington, D.C.:

2U.S. War Department, Reoort of the Secretarv of War, Government Printing Office, 1898), 160-161.

3u.S. Navy Department, Aooendix to the Reoort of the Chief of the Bureau of Naviaation for 1898: The SpanishAmerican War, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1899), 615; Armv and N a w Reaister, 3 December 1898: 372 and 380-381.

5U.S. Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War with 8 Vol. (Washington, D.C.: Spain, Peuort to the PresiGovernment Printing Office, 18991, 1: 113-116; Trask, 484485. 6U.S. Commission, 124-125. 7~rask, 485; James Hewes, United States Army . . *The General Staff, 1900-1917," -tam Affa i 38 ~ (April ~ 1974): 68. 8Philip L. Semsch, "Elihu Root and the General Staff." plilitarv ~ f f a i r 27 ~ (Spring 19631 : 18-19

. . Staff: Its Historv and 9James D. Hittle, The Mllltaru_ Develoument, (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 19611, 201-202.

12U.S. Navy Department, Annual Reuort of the N a w Deuartment for the Year 1898, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 18991, 958.
. Paullin, "A Half Century of Naval 13Charles 0 Administration in America, 1861-1911," United States Naval ;Institute Proceedings 40 (January-February 1914): 116-117.

14Jarvis Butler, "The General Board of the Navy," Ynited States Naval Proceedin- 56 (August 1930): 702; John B. Hattendorf, "Technology and Strategy: A Study in the Professional Thought of the U.S. Navy, 1900-1916,"Naval War Colleae Review 24 (November 1971): 28. lsWilliam F. Atwater, United States Armv and ~ a + y Develournent of Joint Landina Ouerations. 1898-1942, (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms International, 19861, 17.

17Hattendorf: 31; Richard D. Challener, Admirals. and American Foreian Policv. 1898-1914, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 19731, 35, 43-44.
s.

2oC. Kenneth Allard, Command. Control. and the Common Defense, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1990), 95; Atwater, 30.

23Ibid.; U.S. War Department, General Orders of the Armv. 1906, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 19071, G.O. No. 174. 24u.s. War Department, S;eneral Orders, G.O. No.174.

2aE. B. Potter, Sea Power: A Naval Historv, (~nnapolis, ~aryland: Naval Institute Press, 1981), 376; Trask, 302-303.

2gGeorge Harrison, Rules for Armv and N a w Maneuvers, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1903), 1-3.

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Allard, C. Kenneth. command. Control. and the Common Defense. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1990. Atwater, william F. United States Armv and N a W Develo~ment of Joint Landina Operations, 1898-1942. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1986. Chadwick, French E. The Relations of the United States and S~ain: The Swanish-American War 2 Vol. New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons, 1911. Challener, Richard D. Admirals. Generals, and American Foreian Policv. 1898-1914. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973. Cosrnas. Graham A. fin Armv for Emire: The United States Am~and the SDanish- Amer ican War. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1971. Goode, William A. M. With SamQson Throuah the War. Doubleday and McClure, 1899. New York:

Harrison, George Rules for Armv and N a w Maneuvers. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1903. Hittle, James D. The Militarv Staff: Its Historv and D e v e l o n m . Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1961. Leech, Margaret. In the Davs of McKinlev. New York: Publishing Company, 1959. Long, John Davis. The New American Navy. Outlook Company, 1903. New York: Harper The

Long, John Davis. PaDers of John Davis Lona. 1897-1904. Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1939. 82

Mahan, Alfred T. Lessons of the War with S~ain. and Other Articles. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1899. ~iles, Nelson A. Servina the Rewublic. Brothers, 1911. Miley, John D. Jn Cuba with Shaftnr. Scribner's and Sons, 1899. New York: Harper and

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