The Southern Journal of Philosophy (1989) Vol.

XXVIII, Supplement

ON THE ORDERING OF THINGS: BEING AND POWER IN HEIDEGGER AND FOUCAULT Hubert L. Dreyfus University of California,Berkeley
At the heart of Heideggers thought is the notion of being, and power is central in the works of Foucault. Yet there is a difference of emphasis from the start. The history of being gives Heidegger a perspective from which to understand the present age and especially how in our modem world things have been turned into objects. Foucault wants to switch Heideggers focus on things to a focus on human beings and how they became subjects.
For Heidegger, it was through an increasing obsession with techn6 88 the only way to arrive at an understanding of objects, that the West lost touch with being. Lets turn the question around and aek which techniques and practices form the Western concept of the subject.

Just as Heidegger offers a history of being, culminating in the technological understanding of being, in order to help us understand and overcome our current way of dealing with objects, Foucault offers what he calls a genealogy of regimes of power, culminating in modem bio-power, in order to save us from being subjects. These rough parallels, which I will soon explain, suggest that it might be illuminating to see how far the comparison of Heidegger and Foucault can be pushed. To what extent do Heideggers epochs of the history of being match Foucaults regimes in the history of power? To what extent do these two histories lead us to criticize our current cultural condition in similar ways? How does each envisage resistance? What positive response does each propose? Many readers of Heidegger think that his critique of modernity consists simply in pointing out that man has taken control of the planet and that everything is being brought under his domination. This is a banal conservative view. Happily it is not Heideggers. Heidegger did, indeed, hold for a time, like many current critics of the modern age, that man was exploiting all beings for his own satisfaction. Indeed, as late as 1940 Heidegger seems to hold that from the beginning

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of modernity up to the present man is a subject in control and that the objectification of everything is the problem:
Western history has now begun to enter into the completion of that period we call the modern, and which is defined by the fact that man becomes the measure and the center of beings. Man is what lies at the bottom of all beings; that is, in modem terms, at the bottom of all objectification and representability.2

But already in 1938 Heidegger suspected that accounts in terms of subjects and objects, and the analysis of the modern problem as one of domination were superficial:
Certainly the modem age has, as a consequence of the liberation of man, introduced subjectivism and individualism. But it remains just as certain that no age before this one has produced a comparable objectivism and that in no age before this has the non-individual, in the form of the collective, come to accept as having worth. Essential here is the necessary interplay between subjectivism and objectivism. It is precisely this reciprocal conditioning of one by the other that points back to events more profound.3

And by 1942 he clearly holds t h a t our technological understanding of being underlies the subject/object distinction: [Mlodern technology . . . accomplishes the unlimited self-assuring feasibility of everything . . . through its irrestible transformation of everything into an object for a subje~t.~ But even this is not the final story. Technology at first produces and uses subjects controlling objects, but later it no longer needs them. In his final analysis of technology, Heidegger is critical of those who, still caught in the subject/ object picture, think that technology is dangerous because it embodies instrumental reason: The current conception of technology, according to which it is a means and a human activity, can . . . be called the instrumental and anthropological definition of technology.5 Modern technology is something completely different and therefore new.6 The goal of technology Heidegger tells us, is more and more flexibility and efficiency simply for its own sake. [ Elxpediting is always itself directed from the beginning toward furthering something else, i.e., toward driving on to the maximum yield at the minimum e ~ p e n s e . ~
Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately a t hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it standing-reserve [B e ~ t a n d ] . ~

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Heidegger seems to waver on the question whether, as technology reaches its final stage, it will accentuate subjects and objects or eliminate them.
The subject-objectrelation thus reaches, for the first time, its pure relational, i.e., ordering, character in which both the subject and the object are sucked up as standing-reserves. That does not mean that the subject-object relation vanishes, but rather the opposite: it now attains to its most extreme d~minance.~

In the end, however, Heidegger seems clearly to hold that technology can treat people and things as resources to be enhanced without setting meaning-giving subjects over against objectified things. A year after the previous remark about subjects and objects reaching extreme dominance, Heidegger appears to retract his view about objects at least, in his observation that nature has become a system of information10 and that a modem airliner is not an object at all, but just a flexible and efficient cog in the transportation system.11 Heidegger concludes: Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as object.12 Foucault too, in the social realm, went through a stage, expressed in Madness and Civilization, where he thought the problem was that some men or classes dominated and excluded others, and only later saw that exclusion, calling for the liberation of those repressed, was not the problem. Power is not an instrument for exclusion which has fallen into the wrong hands; but a pressure towards ever greater optimization. Thus Foucaults engages in an auto-critique:
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it excludes, it represses, it censors, it abstracts, it masks, it conceals.13 At bottom, despite the differences in epochs and objectives, the representation of power has remained under the spell of monarchy.14 The theory of sovereignty . . . does not allow for a calculation of power in terms of the minimum expenditure for the maximum return.15

This new form of power Foucault calls bio-power. It is a power

working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them.lB

Foucault, however, does not seem to have followed Heideggers move beyond subjects and objects. He seems, rather, to have believed to the end that Christian and Freudian

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confessional practices and their product, a subject that examines itself for its deep truth and a science of desire, are the most important way bio-power proliferates in our culture. One side of Foucaults work shows that bodies can be individualized and rendered docile without interiorization by techniques such as the examination. But another side focuses on the interiorization produced by such technologies such as the Christian and Freudian confessional and their product, a science of desire and a hermeneutic subject. Moreover, Foucault seems to view these subjectifying technologies as more basic than the objectifying ones.
[Tlhe West has managed. . . to bring us almost entirely. . . under the sway of a logic o f . . . desire. Whenever it is a question of knowing who we are, it is this logic that henceforth serves as our master key.

But if Heidegger is right, subjectification may well be going the way of objectification. Indeed, there are signs that introspection is becoming passe. Bio-power operates more and more on life and on populations without the intervention of subjective meaning. Law provides an interesting case. Signs saying Speed: 15miles per hour in school and housing areas are aimed at the drivers subjectivity, i.e., his sense of moral responsibility and guilt. But now one increasingly finds speedbumps on the road which bypass the drivers subjectivity to produce conformity all the more efficiently. Likewise, no-fault insurance has been found to be a more efficient way of managing a population that is trying to develop responsibility by assigning blame. In managing sexuality, the same development seems to be taking place. In California, at least, anti-Freudian sex counselors claim that their science has shown that sex is a meaningless physiological function that can be optimized by suitable techniques. Foucault saw this development on the level of society.
[Olne had to speak of [sex] as of a thing to be not simply condemned or tolerated but managed, inserted into systems of utility, regulated for the greater good of all, made to function according to an optimum.18

But he does not follow up his insight. He may well have been alluding to his neglect of this theme when he agreed with Paul Rabinow and me in an interview that after his long obsession with the subject he must return to writing his genealogy of bio-power.lg In any case, in the last stage of their thinking both Heidegger and Foucault would agree that man as a subject/object double is being wiped out, but that this reveals an underlying long86

term process, and so is not necessarily encouraging. Indeed, Heidegger and Foucault see us as caught in especially dangerous practices which produce man only finally to eliminate him, as these practices reveal more and more nakedly a tendency toward the t o t a l ordering of all beings. Heidegger calls this final Understanding of being technological and is concerned to show how it distorts our understanding of localness and of things; Foucault calls it disciplinary bio-power and focuses primarily on how it affects the social order and the relations between human beings. Both hold it determines our understanding of ourselves and leads to a pervasive sense of distress. They agree that as the underlying direction of our current practices is becoming clear our culture is facing the greatest danger in its history, for, while previous governing clearings were static and partial, leaving a certain leeway for the way things and human beings could show up and be encountered, our current understanding is active and is progressively taking over every aspect of the natural and social world. The Greeks had a relaxed attitude toward what they called aphrodesia, and did not try to regulate it. The topdown order of the medieval understanding of being and of monarchical power, while centralized, did not extend to all details of the world. And in the next stage juridical power was restricted to specific laws. Only the modem understanding of beinglpower is bottom-up, leveling a n d totalizing. Heidegger emphasizes the totalization by calling it, following Emst Jiinger, total mobilization, while Foucault includes both totalizing a n d leveling by adapting Georges Canguilhems notion of normalization. Normalization is more than socialization into norms. Norms are necessary in any society. Normalization, however, is uniquely modem. A normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life.20 In this understanding which has emerged more and more clearly since the Classical Age, norms are progressively brought to bear on all aspects of life by new methods of power whose operation is not ensured by right but by technique, not by punishment but by control, not by law but by normalization.21 To understand how normalization works we have to bring Foucaults insight into the way the human sciences serve to extend social norms together with Heideggers account of the technological understanding of being underlying modem science. To do t h a t we need to spell out Heideggers understanding of research. Modem research is original in that

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it is totalizing. In contrast to Aristotleian or medieval natural history where one listed fabulous exceptions, monsters, etc., among the results of empirical observation, since Galileo, scientific research has been based on the idea that the scientist assumes there is one system into which all of physical reality must be made to fit.
[Elvery procedure . . . requires an open sphere in which it moves. And it is precisely the opening up of such a sphere that is the fundamental event in research. This is accomplished through the projection within some realm of what is-in nature, for example-of a fixed ground plan of natural events. The projection sketches out in advance the manner in which the knowing procedure must bind itself and adhere to the sphere opened up.22

To understand what Heidegger means by research it helps to look at Thomas Kuhns account of normal science in his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Normal science operates by setting up a total interpretation of some region of reality and then attempts to show that the anomalies that emerge can be fitted into the general account. Normal science assumes beforehand that the general plan is correct and thus that the anomalies have no truth to tell-that in the end all anomalies will be brought under the law. Normal science progresses precisely by producing and then eliminating anomalies. Foucault sees that our modern social norms, supposedly grounded in science, likewise produce anomalies (deviants) and then takes every deviant and delinquent, every attempt to evade them, as occasions for further intervention to bring the anomalies under the scientific norms. Normalization, according to Foucault, serves not only to objectify, exclude, coerce or punish, but essentially to enhance life. This is what leads us all to cooperate in extending these practices. Power creates docile bodies and self-analyzing, deep subjects as further material for the human sciences whose goal is ever greater welfare for all. It has become self evident to us that everyone should get the most out of his or her possibilities, and that the human sciences show us the way to do this. I. The Danger
Both Heidegger and Foucault are clear that what is uniquely oppressive in our current practices is not that they cause social or ecological damage. Indeed, Heidegger goes so far as to see predictions of technological disasters as part of the problem.

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All attempts to reckon existing reality . . . in terms of decline and loss. in terms of fate, catastrophe, and destruction, are merely technological behavior.23

For Foucault, our normalizing society would be even more oppressive if it became even more permissive, pleasurable and productive. Heidegger distinguishes the current problems of technology-ecological destruction, urbanization, deforestation, nuclear danger, etc.-from the devastation that would result if technology solved all our problems.
What threatens man in his very nature is the willed view that man, by the peaceful release, transformation, storage, and channeling of the energies of physical nature, could render the human condition, mans being, tolerable for everybody and happy in all

This is the greatest danger because:

[Tlhe approaching tide of technological revolution in the atomic age could so captivate, bewitch, dazzle, and beguile man that calculative thinking may someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking.25

Their common critique of technology/bio-power does not, however, lead Heidegger or Foucault to oppose the use of technological devices, nor specific welfare practices. Heidegger is clear that it is the essence of technology, i.e., the technological understanding of being, not technology, that causes the distress we may feel. And Foucault does not think we can or should leave behind the welfare society. He simply wants to weaken its grip. To understand what Heidegger and Foucault are proposing, we need an illustration of Heideggers obscure but important distinction between technology and the technological understanding of being. For such an example we can turn to Japan. In contemporary J a p a n a traditional, nontechnological understanding of being exists alongside the most advanced high-tech production and consumption. We can thus see that the technological understanding of being can be disassociated from technological devices. Heidegger uses and depends upon modem technological devices, he does not advocate a return to the pretechnological world of ancient Greece.
It would be foolish to attack technology blindly. It would be short-sighted to condemn it as the work of the devil. We depend on technical devices; they even challenge us to ever greater advances.26

Foucault, like Heidegger, is, of course, not opposed to modem welfare techniques. Paul Rabinow and I once asked him if he opposed welfare practices such as mass vaccinations. He

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answered, of course not. But he added that what he opposed was a way of thinking that took the need for the proliferation of such techniques for granted and suppressed discussion of the social and personal costs such a procedure might have. Foucault is opposed to taking for granted that welfare practices, based on the human sciences, should, in the name of efficiency and optimization, be extended without critical questioning to all aspects of our lives. Likewise, Heidegger says that we should not assume that it is a step forward to dam up the Rhine and turn it into a source of flexible electric power, but one can imagine him saying that that does not mean that we should oppose all hydro-electric stations. Heidegger says explicitly that we should neither push forward technological efficiency as the only value nor condemn it as the work of the devil. We should, presumably, in each case discuss the pros and cons. That is what Heidegger calls having a free relation to technology. It is only possible, however, if our culture succeeds in getting over our technological understanding of being.

11. What Resists and Why

Both Heidegger and Foucault see what is endangered as at the same time a source of resistance. Heidegger holds that things can never be completely understood by the sciences nor totally controlled by technology. Their resistance is not the passive resistance of prime matter, but a n active withdrawal. Heidegger calls this function earth. Earth . . . shatters every attempt to penetrate into it. It causes every merely calculating importunity upon it to turn into a destruction.27 This refusal of things to fit into some preordained total plan, reveals things not just as anomalies but as the source of other ways of seeing. Just as for Kuhn anomalies sometimes contain a resistance that forces a revolution in science in which the anomaly is no longer an anomaly but the focus of a new truth, so for Heidegger the resistance intrinsic to things holds open the possibility of a saving breakdown of the total ground plan of modern culture. In one of his interviews Foucault seems to find in people a positive resistance to bio-power parallel to that Heidegger finds in things:
[TJhere is indeed always something in the social body, in classes, groups and individuals themselves which in some sense escapes relations of power, something which is by no means a more or less docile or reactive primal matter, but rather a centrifugal movement, an inverse energy, a discharge. This . . . is not so much what stands outside relations of power as their limit,

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their underside, their counter-stroke, that which responds to every advance of power by a movement of disengagement.28

For both Heidegger and Foucault these strange notions presumably are meant to encourage us to pay attention to what remains of the different, the local, and the recalcitrant in our current practices. What needs to be resisted are not particular technologies nor particular strategies, not even the natural sciences nor the human sciences, but rather our totalizing, normalizing understanding of being. Thus the current understanding can only be resisted by first showing that it is not inevitable-that it is just one interpretation of what it is to be. Then one must strengthen practices which have escaped or successfully resisted the spread of technology/ bio-power and so might become the elements of some different understanding of being. Thus Foucault holds we must preserve the endangered marginal and local, and Heidegger says, Here and now . . . in simple things . . . we may foster the rescuing power in its inc~ease.2~ Heidegger and Foucault are, however, faced with a dilemma concerning the status of these possibly saving marginal practices. While dispersed, practices Heidegger would approve such as backpacking into the wilderness, and Foucaults practice of cosmopolitan friendship, escape totalization, but offer little resistance to its further spread. If, however, one were to focus on them and try to manage them, even in the name of a counter-tradition or resistance, they would risk being taken over and normalized. One cannot resist normalizing totalization by introducing new universal principles or political movements. Rather, thinking the history of being which led to our technological understanding of being as standing reserve, for Heidegger, and giving a genealogy of power which leads up to bio-power, for Foucault, are meant to open a space for critical questioning by showing that our understanding of reality need not be defined by technology/bio-power-that we need not be dominated by the drive to optimize everything. Both thinkers seek to show that we had a different relation to beings once which suggests that we could have other relations in the future. An understanding of our historical condition weakens the hold our current understanding has on us and makes possible disengagement from the direction our practices are taking. Heidegger in his last work distances the thinker from the philosopher who argues for new cultural norms.
[Tbe thinking in question remains unassuming because i t a task is only of a preparatory, not of a founding character. It is content with awakening

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a readiness in man for a possibility whose contour remains obscure, whose coming remains uncertain.30

Foucault, in a similar style of reflection, attempts to replace the pretentions of the universal philosopher with the modesty of the specific intellectual. When asked about his positivist proposals for a better society, Foucault always said he was not a prophet. He was only trying to open up possibilities for action where people now accepted limits supposedly based on a given, fixed reality. My job is creating doors and windows where there now are walls, he once remarked. Only when it comes to the difficult question, just why and how, then, should we resist, do Heidegger and Foucault take quite different paths-each of which has its advantages and drawbacks. Heidegger, unlike Foucault, has an account of why the technological understanding of being causes human distress, from which perspective he can criticize the present. For Heidegger human beings, in this culture at least, have been defined from the start as receivers of the gift of an understanding of being. However, the sense that each understanding of being is a gift was lost after pre-Socratic Greece and all subsequent understandings of being are attempts to replace it with a fixed account of reality grounded in some ultimate being, then in human beings, and finally, just in ordering for its own sake. Human beings who reflect on the original happening of receiving an understanding of being and on the epochs to which it gives rise, Heidegger calls thinkers. But all Western human beings, whether they realize it or not, share in the human essence formed in preSocratic Greece. This Heideggerian minimal account of our historical essence is perfectly adapted to allowing a critique of the present without being the basis for new universal moral norms. The technological understanding of being has no place in its practices for human receptivity. It covers up that there is anything outside eventual human control. Embracing this denial that all understanding of being is a gift produces a distortion of our essence which causes our distress. In the last analysis Foucault is more radical than Heidegger. Consistent with his opposition to all totalizing claims concerning how people should live their lives, he avoids any account of what human beings essentially are and are called to do, whether that be Nietzsches call to constant selfovercoming or Heideggers claim that being demands total receptivity. In the same interview in which he acknowledges his debt to Heidegger, Foucault asserts that The search for 92

a form of morality acceptable by everyone in the sense that everyone would have to submit to it, seems catastrophic to me.31 Thus, although Foucault does at one point say that he is attempting to be receptive to the problematizations in our current practices through which being offers itself as having to be thought,32he does not claim that in so doing he is fulfilling his human essence. This, however, denies him any account of why bio-power should be felt as distressing and so be resisted. He nonetheless still engages in active resistance to specific instances of normalizing bio-power. Since Foucault rejects the idea that man has any essenceeven an historical one-which he must recover, and since power practices always lead to the exclusion of some possibilities and the reinforcement of some conformity, Foucault assumes that each regime of power will have its advantages and its concomitant dangers, and that none will be ideal. At each stage it is the job of the genealogist to loosen what is taken as fixed, and to resist specific cases of domination. This view of his role, Foucault calls his hygeractive pessimism.

1 1 1 . Heideggers Super-Passive Optimism

In their sense of distress and in their diagnosis of its sources Heidegger a n d Foucault are strikingly similar. But Heideggershopes for a better epoch are quite alien to Foucault. Heideggers stance might be called super-passive optimism. Since he thinks that what has been lost is receptivity, he does not advocate active intervention. Rather, he advocates Gelassenheit. Thinking the history of being produces Gelassenheit-opting out of the current understanding of being. Of course, that alone will not bring about the sending of a new clearing. All the thinker can do is join the poets in an attempt to preserve the saving power of simple things. But just preserving non-technical practices, even if we could do it, would not give us what we need. Heidegger thinks that our culture will be in distress until we find a new sense of community. He puts this need for community in the strange language of the poet, Holderlin:
[Our] era is defined by the gods failure to arrive, by the default of God. But the default of God . . . does not deny that the Christian relationship with God lives on in individuals and in the churches; still less does it assess this relationshipnegatively.The default of God means that no god any longer gathers men and things unto himself, visibly and unequivocally, and by such gathering disposes the worlds history and mans sojourn in it.33

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This means that one cannot legislate a new understanding of being. For shared practices to give meaning to the lives of those whose practices they are, they must be focused, organized and held up to the practitioners. This function, which later Heidegger calls truth setting itself to work, can be performed by what Heidegger calls a work of art. Heidegger takes as his illustration of a work of art working, the Greek temple. But he mentions several other examples of truth setting itself to work: the nearness of the god (e.g., the Hebrew Covenant), the sacrifice of a god (e.g., the Crucifixion), the act of a great political leader (e.g., Pericles), or the words of a great thinker (e.g., Parmenides). We could call such special objects cultural paradigms. A cultural paradigm focuses and collects the scattered practices of a culture, unifies them into coherent possibilities for action, and holds them up to the people who can then act and relate to each other in terms of the exemplar. Aeschyluss Oresteia is an example. Aeschylus wanted to show the Athenians what they stood for. He did not want to state propositions or justify their beliefs. The last thing he wanted to do was to tell the Athenians their values. So he produced a drama in which they were participants-he presented his fellow citizens with a pageant, a ritual, a paradigm of their way of life. And in doing that he helped focus and preserve the practices of his age. When we see that for later Heidegger only those practices focused in a paradigm can establish what it makes sense to do and what can count as true, we can see why he was pessimistic about reviving focal practices from the past. For example, Heidegger would surely reject Robert Bellahs and Charles Taylors suggestion t h a t we revive Christian communities, and Greek republicanism. Heidegger would say that we should, indeed, try to preserve such practices, but they can only save us if they are radically transformed and integrated into a new understanding of reality. Such practices, having now become marginal, have no truth and reveal no reality unless they can be taken up, transformed, and manifested in a new shared paradigm. Such a new object or event that grounds a new understanding of reality Heidegger calls a new god, and he holds that only such a god can save us.34 Once one sees what is needed, one also sees that there is not much one can do about it. It is not something that can be made the goal of a crash program like the moon flighta paradigm of modem technological power. A new paradigm would have to take up practices which are now on the margin
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of our culture and make them central, while de-emphasizing practices now central to our cultural self-understanding. It would come as a surprise to the very people who participated in it, and if it worked it would become a n exemplar of a new understanding of what matters and how to act. There would, of course, be powerful forces tending to take it over and integrate it into our technological practices, and if it failed, it would necessarily be measured by our current understanding of reality and so look ridiculous. A hint of what such a social transformation might look like is offered by the music of the sixties. The Beatles, Bob Dylan, and other rock groups became for many the articulation of new understanding of what really mattered. This new understanding almost coalesced into a cultural paradigm in the Woodstock Music Festival where people actually lived for a few days in an understanding of being in which main-line contemporary concerns with rationality, sobriety, willful activity, and flexible, efficient control were made marginal and subservient to Greek virtues such as nudity, enjoyment of nature, and dancing, along with a neglected Christian concern with peace, passivity, ecstasy and love of ones neighbour without desire and exclusivity. Technology was not smashed or denigrated but all the power of electronic communications was put at the service of the music which alone really mattered. If enough people had recognized in Woodstock what they most cared about and recognized that all the others shared this recognition, a new understanding of being would have been focused and stabilized. Of course, in retrospect we see that the concerns of the Woodstock generation were not broad and deep enough to sustain a culture. Still we are left with a hint of how a new cultural paradigm would work, and the realization that we must preserve the endangered species of practices that remain in our culture in the hopes that one day they will be pulled together in a new paradigm rich enough and resistent enough to give new meaningful direction to our lives. This is what I have called Heideggers super-passive optimism and it is quite alien to Foucaults hyper-active pessimism. If one shares the Heidegger/Foucault diagnosis of technological bio-power, one will have to decide for oneself which of the two stances to take. But in either case the goal would be to free oneself from the current understanding of being by understanding it as a n historical interpretation, and to preserve the endangered practices that resist the current mobilization or normalization of our world.
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NOTES Michel Foucault, Truth and Subjectivity, Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, October 20, 1980. Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume Four: Nihilism, Harper & Row, 1982, p. 28. Martin Heidegger, The Age of the World Picture, in The Question Concerning Technology, Harper Colophon Books, 1977, p. 128. Martin Heidegger, Hegels Concept of Experience, Harper & Row, 1970, pp. 62-63. Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, in The Question Concerning Technology, p. 5.

Zbid. Zbid., p. 15. 8 Zbid., p. 17. 9 Martin Heidegger, Science and Reflection, The Question Concerning Technology, p. 173. Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, p. 23. Zbid., p. 17. 12 Zbid. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, Pantheon Books, 1977, p. 194. l 4 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, The Uses of Pleasure, Volume ZZ, Vintage Books, 1986, pp. 88-89. l5 Michel Foucault, Two Lectures, Power/Knowledge:Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 by Michel Foucault,ed. Colin Gordon, Pantheon Books, 1980, p. 105. l6 Michel Foucault, The History of SexuaZity, Volume Z, Vintage Books, 1980, p. 136. 17 Zbid., p. 78. Zbid., p. 24. 19 H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, The University of Chicago Press, 1983, p. 232. 2o Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume Z, p. 144. 2l Zbid., p. 89. 22 Martin Heidegger, The Age of the World Picture, p. 118. 23 Martin Heidegger, The Turning, The Question Concerning Technology, p. 48. z4 Martin Heidegger, What Are Poets For?, Poetry, Language, Thought, Harper & Row, 1971, p. 116. 25 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 56. 26 Zbid., pp. 53-54. 27 Martin Heidegger, The Origin of the Work of Art, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 47. Michel Foucault, Power and Strategies, p. 138. 29 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, p. 33. 30 Martin Heidegger, The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking, Basic Writings, Harper & Row, 1977, pp. 378-379. 3 l Michel Foucault, Le Retour de la morale, interview conducted by Gilles Barbadette, Les Nouvelles, June 28, 1984, translated as Final Interview Raritan, Summer 1985, p. 37. 3* Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume ZZ, p. 11. 33 Martin Heidegger, What are Poets For?, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 91. R4 Martin Heidegger, Only A God Can Save Us, Der Spiegel, May 31, 1976.
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