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Military Review

Professional Journal of. the US Army

The DktriCt Advisor Red lXdISiISNuclear FOrWard.paUSe . . . . . . . , . . CCSPf James

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The Military Review, a publication of the UNITEO STATESARMY, provides a forum for the expression of militar~ thought with emphasis on doctrine concerning the division and higher levels of command. The VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORS and not necessarilY those of the US Army or !he Command and General Staff College.

Editor in Chief Cot Donald J. Delane# Assistant Editor s

Lt Cd Albert IV. Garland

Features Editor Maj Robert L. Burke

Layout Editor
18t Lt Robert K. Lindgren I
Acting Spanish-American Luis A. Monaerrate I
Brazilian Editor Lt Col Luiz A. Araripe Associate Editor Lt Cal Algin J. Huglies Armrt War College Production OfAcer I
Staff Artist I
Editor

Maj Norman-C. MurratI

Charles A. Moore

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The District
Captain

Advisor

James F. Ray, United States Arm&!

In late 1964 Captain James F. Ray, United States Army, ,Wbsector Advisor, Nha Be District in Gia Ditih Province, South Vietnam, prepared a report which was a distillate of his litie months experience and of his approach to solving the key problems which he had encountered in his particular area. th 12 January 1965 Major General Richard G. Stilwetl, United states Armg, then Chief of Staff, United States Militarg Assistance Command, Jietnam, circulated Captain Rays report throughout US elements in South Vietnam. In a covering letter, General Stilwell pointed out that while some of Captain Rags conclusions and meth May 1965 .

ods were transferable, others were not. General Stilwell wrote: The real value of this brief ?-eport lies in its perceptiveness-as witness the jinal paragraph. For Captain Ray was a singularly per ceptive and dedicated soldier. His successive superb records+t the Military Academy, at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar, and in initial troop assignmentswere those of one headed for the verg top of the pro. fession of arms. Just three days before, on 9 Janu ary 1965, Captain Ray had been killed in action while accompan~ing his counterpart on a night reconnaissance patroL-Edftor. 3

DISTRICT ADVISOR

NY attempt ~o discuss the position of the advisor to. a district chief in Viet nam must perforce take account of the variety of the job as among the hetero. geneous @lection of districts which com prise the nation. Perhaps no other advisory role is so conditioned by the local situation which, indeed, together with the personality of the district chief himself, determines the limits within which tbe advisor functions. Thus, in those areas where Wet Cong con. trol is extensive and government suzerainty limited, one is strictly (as the terms of ref. erence imply) a subsector advisor, a military advisor. But in others, where the military situation is more under control and the sphere of governmental involvement is ac. cordingly broader, the scope of advisory activity opens to embrace not only security in the strict sense, but also the errtire spec trum of public welfare and administration. This paper, which attempts no more than a synthesis of my own experiences, is, there fore, a reflection only of conditions in Nha Be District, and may afford slim basis for generalization.

over 400 Popular Forces. These troops es tablish ambushes each night msd conduct small (two or three-platoon) operations vir. tually every day. Thus, the errtire district is covered once every two or three weeks, and, in consequence, there are no permanent Wet Congbaseswithhr our limits. Yiet Cong activity is confined to terrorism by indigenous guerrillas and raids, typically of squad size, by units based near the di$ tricts borders. Roads are, in general, not safe at night; during daylight one can, with a small bodyguard, enjoy freedom of the district. security problem The major-security problemderives from the presence in the district ofa tank farm in which is stored petroleum, oils, and Iub. ricants stock. A critical sector, Yeu Khu Nha Be, has been created which includes parts of Nha Be and Nhan Trac (Bien Hoa) Dis tricts, and three Regional Force companies are under the operational control of the critical sector commander for the defense of the installation. The Nha Be district advisor is addition. ally charged with overseeing the tank farm defenses. I,therefore, work with twocoum terparts. since the problems of securing the tank farm can neither logically nor prag matically be separated from thosa of defend. ing the district, coordination of efforts be tween these two counterparts is a major focus of advisory effort. Perhaps the nature of the job can best be described through an investigation of how the advisors time is spent. I have everaged nearly three hours daily with the dktrict chief. In one sense, this is inade quateit would have been far better if the two of us could have spent more tima to. gether outside the office, visiting hamlets and supervising the activities of pacification Military Review

agrarian district Nha Beis one of tlsesix districts of Gia .Dhdl, and lies at the hub of the Hop Tac area, It has a population of some 55,000 in an area of roughly 100square kilometers of paddy land. Although contiguous with Saigon on its northern border, it is almost entirely agrarian. Over 90 percent of its work force is engaged in growing rice (of which, for water reasons, it gets but one crop annually). Roughly one-quarter of tha districts 34 hamlets are completely pacified, and the government is in effective military control of the remainder. One Regional Force company is under !he operational control of the subsector corn mander, who also directs the activities of 4

DISTRICT ADVISOR
cadre. as well Bu~ the fact as conducthw operations. chief Third, we have worked in some detail with the district police chiefmainly in an attempt to influence his allocation of the manpower resourcas at his disposal, espe cially in the direction of increased emphasis on a program of population and resources control measures. Finally, we have stayed in close contact with the subsector staff. Here, we have experienced some success in improving the functioning of the operations center, regu larizing logistical procedures, and, perhaps most important, infusing the notion of staff coordination (even, on occasion, coopera tion). , staff functions Indeed, I have taken as a major objec tive of this teams efforts the initiation of proper staff functioning with mission-type orders, intrastaff liaison, and the presenta tion of coordinated plansthe overambi tiousness of which goal may be only too obvious to those having experience with the Vietnamese system of personal rule. Nonetheless, the degree of inexperience of subordinate district and subsector offi cials is the greatest obstacle in the path toward a viable, properly functioning arm of government at this echelon (with, per haps, the, exception of the obstacle posed by those who have too much experience). It may well be that over the long run the greatest contribution that our advisory ef fort makes at the district level will be in terms of the training of this new genera tion of officials. Advisory work with the district chief and his staff has been accomplished almost exclusively by the teams two officers. I have not carved out special areas of inter est reserved exclusively for one or the other of usrather, we have shared par ticipation in all facets of the. work. 5

ia that this ~isfict

tied himself to his desk, in spite of strong advisory pressure to do some field super vision, and, under such circumstances, he had a limited capacity for absorbing advice. Of the many hours so spent, perhaps a fourth were concerned with matters of mili - tary security; the bulk of the remainder was addressed primarily to pacification problems and the administration of United States Operations Mission (USOM) projects. de facto agant In this regard, I have, in my dealings with the district chief, served as a de facto agent of USOM, alike in the drafting of projects, followup on the approval process, and supervision of their execution. indeed, such matters have, in terms of time, formed by far the largest part of my job. Additionally, my assistant and I have averaged two to three hours daily with subordinate district officials. Most military matters have been coordinated through the commander of the subsectors Regional Force company, who acts as the deputy for security (although this position has not been formalized). One or more members of the advisory team accompany him on military operations whenever practicable. The sub jects of advisory effort with him are assen tiahy identical with the area of interest to advisors of any tactical unit. S~cond, we have spent a great deal of time working with the aspirant who directs the Hamlet Pacification Service. In his case, advice has amounted virtually to complete training in the responsibilities and tech niques of his job. It has been through him, rather than the district chief, that the crit ical problem of translating reports, sub mitted by pacification cadre, into goods and services for the people has been directed. May 1965

DIST~lCT ADVISOR
The one specialized member of the team is the medical advisor, the extent of whose activities merits consideration in detail. Essentially, he has served as advisor to the District H#alth chief who has proved to be an exceptionally receptive counterpart. The medical advisor has averaged more than six hours a day with this man. Jointly, they have firmed hamlet sick call hours, corrected medical supply procedures, improved treat ment records, and generally raised the standard of treatment and the number of patients seen daily. Also, the medical ad visor has worked quite closely with USOM Public Health Division officials, most of whom have expressed surprise and pleasure at finding someone with his technical cre dentials permanently based in the district. Through them he has been able to obtain substantial material benefits for the dis tricts medical program. refute doubts The medical advisor would seem to have refuted the doubts which USOM is alleged to have voiced concerning his position. He has also worked as a military medicfor example, medical teams have, for the first time, begun visiting paramilitary dependent . housing. He has organized training in the elements of first aid for selected Popular Force members, and has caused to be initi. ated supply procedures to obtain basic essential first aid supplies for each separate Popular Force unit. Independently of his counterpart, the medical advisor has also performed treat ment using US medical supplies, although certainly not on a routine basis. First, he has performed rout$re first aid for persorr net living in the same compound with our team. Second, he has consistently been the first medic to arrive and administer emer. gency treatment when friendly forces have 6 been wounded. He has probably done more than any other member of our team, both to create good will among the people for the U~ited States and to enhance among the people the notion that their government is, indeed, for the people. some success The teams operations sergeant, initially, was able to do little advisory work, most of his time being involved in the adminis trative and logistical support of our team, but he is now becoming quite active. as a training advisor. Recently, we have enjoyed some success with the notion of training as a continuing requirement. Jfany of the operational Weaknesses of the Regional and Popular Forcesmost notable, the deplo~ able standard of marksmanship proficiency can be corrected by training at the unit level. However, their most serious defi ciency, the weakness of subordinate iead ers, is rather beyond our capability for formal training. We are working out a modi fied Army Training Program built largely around individual and squad proficiencies for gradual presentation to these units. The Regional Force companies defending the tank farm began training in December. The operations sergeant has bean given the mission of acting as a kind of training ser geant to oversee the implementation of plans worked out between the commander and the senior advisor and, where appro. priate, to assist in obtaining training aids or in presenting classes. Finally, he typically accompanies one of the maneuver elements on as many operations as practicable. Having considered the nature of our work as it has evolved over a period of some four months, it is appropriate to examine some of the difficulties we have encoum tered. The first of these is the language prob.

Military
Review

DISTRICT ADVISOR lens, although in this regard we have been particularly fortunate. I am able to com municate with both my counterparts in (a kind of) French; we have for some time had an interpreter which enables us to split our advisory effort; and the District Health Chief speaks a rudimentary English that suffices for routine purposes therefore, we are able simultaneously to function in three separate directions. language training This is largely fortuitou: Probably a greater percentage of people at the district level do not speak English than at any other echelon in which w; fiave advisors. The raw fact is that. there can be no more advisors than there are p&ople able to communicate. More than this, a di$rict ad visory team is constantly thrown into con tact with the common manhamlet chiefs, patients on sick call, policemen at checkpointswith whom even a basic Viet namese capability counts for a great deal. I consider it almost imperative to the suc cess of the district advisory effort that as many district team members as possible get three months of language training, and that persons having this background receive priority in assignment to district teams. All our team members are currently study. ing the language, but in terms of available time it is decidedly a second-best solution. Second, there is an inexorable urge to try to command through US advisory chan nelsa tendency noticeable at virtually all US echetons, however sincere their desire to resist it. It arises from a very proper desire to correct a myriad of deficiencies, and is nurtured by our system of inspec tions and reports. However laudable the motives which sustain it, it has to be re sisted; whatever advantages it might yield in the short run would be more than offset May 196a by the more permanent harmful effects. We must be prepared to tolerate a certain level of inefficiency in the name of a larger goal: training the new generation to run the nation. The third problem is one familiar to all advisors in whatever capacity, and follows from a tradition of centralized powers and personal rule. These have resulted in a lack of staff initiative and both introduce totally unnecessary delays and unrespon siveness into the system. They also have most unfortunate consequences whenever there isa power vacuum, I have unhappily experienced tha replacement of a district chiefregrettable, essentially, because the manner of its execution left the district without an effectively functioning leader for nearlya month, a month characterized chiefly by marking time, if not actual rv gression. logistical role

A fourth difficulty is a tendency on the part of some Vietnamese-although, for tunately, neither of thetwocommanders to consider the advisor as a combination genie and supply officer. This we have had some success in countering, largely through a stubborn insistence on making the Viet namese system work. Some officials are still wont to think that requisitions are to be submitted to the adviso~ we, therefore, have been at some pains to stress that our logistical role begins when someone in their system either delays or says No. From discussions with other district ad visors one gathers that many have experi enced cllfficulties with their own house keeping, although most of these appear to be the one-time function of initially getting organized. Since ours was, I believe, the first to be fully manned and equipped in the field, these transitional problerrk have ,, 7

DISTRICT AOVISOR ., bynow been resolved, and our propinquity

to Saigon makes it eo to solva such prob lems as arise. It would be most advanta geous to have a second jeep, and we are less -than convinced that a GRC-87 is the answer to the district teams communica tion problems, although one can appreciate why teams are currently are. We have distilled certain conclusions from our experiences thus far which I would like to posit in the form of suggestions to be considered. The first concerns specialized training to be given district advisory per sonnel. Language training seems the single most important prerequisite for succes$ the foundation in the language given in a 12-week course would be indispensable. Most of the other background material needed could be woven into the fabric of the language course, and would ideally be presented using the case study method aImost exclusively. Second, i feel that the medical advisor should be accorded greater latitude-by equipped as they

which 1 mean extending him supplies of medicine commensurate with his state of training for his own use in treating Viet namese, not as a competitor with thair own supply system. He should also be given a freer hand to participate, along with the District Health Chief, in providing proper outpatient medical care to the rural popu. Iation. This, 1 think, would have a signifi. cant impact on what district teams can do to win support for the United States among the people of Vietnam. In conclusion, I think there could be no finer job in Vietnam, in terms of the back. ground one acquires in what President Johnson has $alled the stubborn realities of the pursuit of peace. The district ad. visory team is directly involved in three of our most pressing international problems the delicacies of dealing with allies who desire our support while resenting any hint of interferenc~ the grassroots administra. tion of foreign aid (in terms of ensuring that our aid gets to the people who need ith and the military confrontation of Corn. munist revolutionary warfare.

Military Review

PROGRESS OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN

COMMUNIST CHINA , &

Cheng Chu-yuan OMMUNIST China began de veloping nuclear weapons in the development 1953.* Initially, came under the heading of making peaceful use of nuclear energy. In May 1953, however, a Committee of Atomic Energy was established within the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) ; the committees function was to accelerate research and experimen tation in this field. A year later, in 1954, China and
U dew otherwise indicated, .11 references to Chin. t. th,s .rtwle are to Communist Chki the People% Republic .f Cb,m.

$3

the Soviet Union signed an agree ment to cooperate in science and tech nology, and in April 1955 an agree ment was reached in Moscow which provided that the Soviets would aid the Chinese Peoples Republic (CPR) in building an experimental nuclear reactor and accelerators. The Soviet Union also agreed to give Communist China the technical documents which pertained to the reactor and acceler ators, When China published her First Five-Year Plan in 1955, the peacefnl 9

May1965

NUCLEAR WEAPONS use of nuclear energy was listed as the first principal task for the CAS to tackle. In 1~56 a 12-year plan for the development of science and tech nology was formulated; this again put thd peaceful use of nuclear en ergy as the foremost aim of Chinese scientists and engineers. During 1955-57 the membership of the research staff in the Institute of Physics of the CAS expanded sub stantially. By the end of 1957 the Institute was reported to have em ployed more than 200 persons, includ ing 80 scientists and 70 technicians. In 1958 the Institute changed its name to the Institute of Atomic En ergy (IAE ) and added the function of supervising the experimental reac tor. It has since become the organiza tion responsible for the buildup of nuclear weapons in China. Experimental Reactor Tbe first experimental reactor pro vided by the Soviet aid program went into operation on 1 July 1958, the 37th anniversary of the birth of the Chinese Communist Party. A cyclo tron was also completed and readied for research work. The reactor, which was of the heavy water type, produced thermal power ranging from 7,000 to 10,000 kilowatts. Since then, the re actor has gradually increased its power. The cyclotron was designed to accelerate alpha particles to an en ergy as high as 25 million electron volts. At the same time, a pressurized
Cheng Chu-yuan is a Research Economist at the Center for Chinese Studies at the flniversitfi of Michi gan. He holds a Ph. D. degree in Eco nomics from Georgetown University, Washington, D. C. Borw in China, he is the author of many books and aWi clee on the subject of Communist China.

electrostatic accelerator built by Chi nese scientists and engineers was also completed, an important step in the development of the Chinese nnclear bomb. By a secret agreement signed be tween Peking and Moscow in late 1957, the then Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, promised to provide Communist China a prototype nuclear bomb together with the technical data concerning ite manufacture. This se cret agreement stimulated the devel opment of nuclear weapons in China; during the following year, Chinas in vestment in scientific projects came to nine times the amount she had in vested in .1955. Research Work At the same time, more than 20 prominent Chinese physicist partic ipated in research work at the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JI NR ) which had been eet up in Dubno, USSR, hy 12 Communist countries. In fact, a top Chinese nuclear physi cist was elected as deputy director of that Institute. Chinese scientists made great progress in theoretical research and experimental nuclear physics between 1957 and 1959. In late 1958, in view of Chinas growing ambition to become a great military power, the Soviet Ieadcra put forward demands deeigned to bring Communist China under Soviet mili tary control. Mao Tse-tung rejected the demands. Khrushchev then backed away from his earlier pledge to pro vide China a prototype nuclear bomb, a refusal which, while it dealt China a hard blow, did not etop her en deavors. In the years following, China in creased her scientific expenditures tremendously. In 1960 the state budget for scientific purposes rose to Military Review

10

NUCLEAR WEAPON; dollars, a figure nearly three times that of 1958 and almnat 28 times the amount allocated in 1955. This reflects the regimes determina. tion to develop nuclear weapona through its own resources. In November 1960, Liu Shao-chi, Chairman of the CPR, proclaimed at the Moscow Conference of Commu nist Parties that China has four atomic reactors in operation. These reactora can be used for war ae well as for peaceful purposes. When Brit-. ish Field Marehal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery visited Peking in 1961, Chou En-lai solemnly told him that China would develop nuclear weap ons with her own scientists, These official statement clearly in dicate that, despite the eetbacl? in the economy caused by three years of natural calamities, the disasters ~f the Great Leap Forward, and the total suspension of Soviet economic and technical assistance, Chinas leaders have determined to continue a toppriority nuclear weapons program.
459 million

Equipmentand Manpower Chinese authorities have reported that the reactor and the cyclotron built in Peking with Soviet assist ance are performing well. According to Cbien San-chiang, Director of the IAE, the intensity of the neutron cur rent of the reactor and the intensity of the ion current of the cyclotron are up to advanced international stand arde. The 2.5-million electron-volt electrostatic proton accelerator, the high-teneion multiplierboth de signed and built by Chinese scientists and the induction electron accelera tor eupplied by the Soviet Union have been in operation since 1959. By the end of 1960, three other reactore had been constructed in Lanchow, Kaneu Province, in northwestern China;
May 1965

Paotow in Inner Mongolia; and at Shanghai. But their total capacity has not been disclosed. Uranium 235 is used as fuel ma terial by the Chinese reactore, indi cating a stage of development ahead Of tbe first nuclear bomb made in the United States, which used plu tonium. By 1949 the Soviets had discovered rich uranium ores in Sinkiang. Largescale exploitation began in 1960 when two SinO-Soviet joint-stock companies were set up for developing oil and nonferrous metals in that Province. Thie enterprise in its early atages es tablished 11 modern mines and one highly mechanized ore selection plant. Some 5,000 Chinese workers and tech nicians, as well ae several hundred Soviet experts, were engaged in pro duction. The enterprise was taken over by the Communist Chinese Government in 1955 and, since then, large-scale capital construction has been launched. Until 1959 the producte were shipped mostly to tbe Soviet Union. Test Site In October 1957, when Moscow pledged aid to China in developing a nuclear bomb, a small team composed of three Chinese geologists and one Soviet geologist began to search for a proper test site. The team investi gated the northern shore of Lake Lop Nor in the Takla Makan Desert of Sinkiang. Lake Lop Nor situated north of Charkhlik and south of Hami and Turfan, is in the very heart of cen tral Asia, far from traveled places. It is surrounded by uninhabited areas which stretch for hundreda of kilo meters. Local hunters rarely visit this particular region. The team found it 11

NUCLEAR WEAPONS to be the ideal site for nuclear test ing, probably ,b~sed on two considera tions: Being uninhabited and remote from populated areas, falIout elfects would be minimized. Its remote location in tbe hinter lands reduced the chances of surveil lance by Taiwan-based reconnaissance airplanes. Scientists Before the Communist takeover, China had at least 12 nuclear phyej cists who had been trained either in Western Europe or in the United States, The best trained of these phys icists now form the hard core of the top brains in charge of the current nuclear weapons program. The most eminent nuclear physicist in Communiet China is Chien San chiang. Chien received his Ph. D. in Physics in 1943 from the University of Paris where he was a collaborator of Fr6d6ric Joliot-Curie; in 1946 he won the physics prize of the French Scientific Institute for his work in nuclear physics. One year later he re turned to China and was appointed Director of the Atomic Research De partment of the Academia Sinica, the of tbe CAS. When the . predecessor IAE was set up in 1958, he became its director. His major contributions have been the discovery of the third and fourth phases of nuclear fission. Next to Chien are two other promi nent nuclear physicistsWang Kan chang and Chao Chung-yao, both Dep uty Directors of the IAE. Wang re ceived his Ph. D. in Physics from the University of Berlin in 1943. In 1948 he worked at the University of Cali fornia as a research associate and re turned to China the same year: A fortier Deputy Director of the JINR, Wang returned to China in 1961 and 12 is believed to be the top scientist who designed the bomb. In the first ses sion of the National Peoples Con gress which convened in late Decem ber 1964, he wae elected one of the executive chairmen, a pOsitiOn of honor which was not shared by Chien San-chiang. This snggests that Wangs contribution to tbe first ex plosion probably exceeded that of the other nuclear physicists. Chao Chung-yao has attended sev eral famous institutions in the West. He received hie Ph. D. degree from the California Inetitute of Technology and has also attended the University of Halle in Germany and, Cambridge University in England. He has been credited with the discovery of gamma rays, and has participated in the Sci entific Council of the JINR. Theoretical Research Two other Deputy Directors of the IAE, Peng Huang-wu and Chang Chia-hua, are also Western-trained nuclear physicists. Peng is a Pb. D. from Edinburgb University in Scot land and is presently in charge of the oretical research in atomic nuclei and fundamental particles. Cbang received his doctorate from Washington Uni versity in 1952 and is tbe youngest ~ among the deputy directors. Under these top nuclear physicists, about a hundred other scientists who currently hold positions as research fellows in the IAE in other institutes or in the universities are considered to have participated in Chinas nu clear weapon project. About 500 topranking scientific and engineering specialists have been involved in tbe Among nuclear weapons program. these people, at least 50 hold Ph. D. degrees from Western countriee. Along with the development of a nuclear weapon, Communist China MilitarfReview

NUCLEAR WEAPONS has also conducted a program to de. velop rockets. Since early 1956, when Peking mapped out the 12-year plan for the development of ecience and technology, jet propulsion hae been listed ae one of the 12 major tasks, exceeded only by the use of nuclear energy. The project is under the su pervision of the Institute of Mechan ics in the CAS. In 1959 several new institute were set up within the Academyan In stitute of Upper Atmosphere Phyeics in Wuhan; and an Inetitute of Auto mation and Remote Control and an Institute of Mechanice and Electron ics both in Peking. All of theee insti tute participate in the rocket pro gram. . Information Is Scant There ie still little information con cerning the current progrees of the rocket project. The Communist Chi nese decision for completing such a prbject, bowever, was clearly dis closed by Chen Yi, Vice Premier and Foreign Minieter, who, in an inter view with a group of Japaneee corre spondence in Peking on 28 October 1963, indicated that:
The testing of atomic bombs is the natural result of ths rising of Chinas industrial standard. Atomic bombs, missiles, and supersonic airplanes are reflections of the standard of the ad ~,anced industries of a nation; there fore, if China fails to reach the goal in several ~ears, she will remain a second or third class nation. We are approaching this goal. . . .

of theee are believed to have been used to develop r?ckete. Chien Hsueh-sen, one of the worlds noted aeronautical and jet propulsion engineers, heads the over-all project. Director of the Institute of Mechan ics eince he returned to china in 1955 from the United States, he received a Master of Science degree in Aero nautical Engineering from Maeeachu setts Institute of Technology in 1936 and a Ph. D. in Aeronautical Engi neering from the California Institute of Technology three yeare later. Chien was a Professor of Aeronautic at MIT during 1947-49. After World War II, as a consultant to the US Navy, he was sent to Europe to inves tigate German rocket development. After hie return to China in Septem ber 1955, he immediately initiated the program to develop Chinese rockets. Another top ecientist involved in the rocket project ie Kuo Yung-huai, Deputy Director of the Instit/te of Mechanics. A Ph. D. from the Cali fornia Inetitute of Technology, Kuo is also a noted aeronautical engineer. Important Centers The Science and Technology Uni versity of the CAS, the Tsinghua Uni versity in Peking, and the Peking Aeronautical Engineering College are the three important centere for train ing engineers and technicians in rock etry. During the past 10 yeare, more than 3,000 college etudents, specialist engineering, have in aeronautical been graduated. In 1963 the China Aeronautical Engineering Society wae formally established, indicating the rapid growth of technical manpower in this field. Since Communist China has eeveral capable men with long years of ex perience in the rocket field, and eince China began her rocket project al 13

Some recent data does reveal that Communiet China has been striving hard to attain this goal. During 1963 and 1964, China imported a great quantity of precieion instruments from Western Europe and from Czech oslovakia and East Germany. A part Msy1965

NUCLEAR WEAPONS most in the same period with the nuclear weapons program, the devel opment of a rocket booster might soon be anticipated. It is quite possible that China may launch her first rocket within the next two or three years. Significance Tb= successful explosion of the first nuclear bomb by China has certain definite effects not only in the Far East but in the whole world as well. The impact nf the Chinese bomb on Asian countries was prompt and pro found. Under tbe ehadow of Chinas nuclear threat, there is growing pres sure on the governments of India and Japan to follow suit. If in the coming year Communist China could make another test and successfully launch a rocket, both India and Japan might be forced to enter the race. To several underdeveloped coun tries, such as Egypt and Indonesia, where the leaders are feverishly seek ing international power position, Chi nas effort in developing nuclear weap ons has acted as a model. Egyptian President Gan,al Abdel Nasser haa re cently hinted that he will put more emphasis on developing nuclear weap ons, while reports from Indonesia dis close that China may be preparing to help President Achmed Snkarno to realize his ambition to make Indone sia a nuclear power. The spreading of nuclear weapons throughout the world seems to be inevitable. Inspired by tbe first expiosion, it is certainly true that China is now undertaking a more intensive effort to create a large nuclear stockpile and to accelerate her rocket program. Tbe development of Chinese nuclear weap on.e, though, is still limited by several factorsthe supply of equipment aid tbe general condition of the national economy.
14

While tbe supply of raw materials for producing nuclear weapons has increased during the past few years, the supply of technical equipment bas not kept pace. In the early fifties most of Chinas nuclear raw materials were shipped to the Soviet Union, only a portion was retained for domestic purposes. According to recent Chi nese statistics, during the period 1949-62, China furnished the Soviet Union more than 1,4oo million new rublee (or about 1.5 billion dolIars) worth of mineral products. Among the most important items were 100, ,000 tons of lithium ore concentrates; 34,000 tons of beryliium concentrates; 51,000 tons bf borax; 270,000 tons of wolfram concentrates; 32.9 tons of piezoelectric quartz; 7,730 tons of mercury; 39 tons of tantalum-niO bium concentrates; 37,000 tons of mo lybdenum concentrates; and 180,000 tons of tin. Many of these mineral products are raw materials for tbe manufacture of rockets and nuciear weapons. The lithium concentrates are especially important in the development of hy drogen bombs. As a result of the sharp decline of Sino Soviet trade in 1963, the mineral products are now available for domestic use. Imports Reduced Prior to 1961, Communist China imported a great quantity of technical equipment and precision instruments from the Soviet Union. The suspen sion of Soviet aid in 1960 has reduced that supply to a negligible amount. Although China still can obtain many precision instruments from other Communist countries and from West Europe, the supply of technical equip ment for Chinas major industries has become a critical problem. This shortage will hinder Chinaa capacity

f
1

Military
Review

NUCLEAR WEAPONS to develop long-range missiles and hydrogen bombs and will impede her timetable to become a world nuclear power. One crucial factor in Chinas devel opment of nuclear weapons, as well as the development of a delivery sYs tem, lies in the general condition of her national economy. Since the col lapse of the Great Leap Forward in 1960, capital investment in heavy in dustry has been greatly curtailed. The Chinese Communists have given pri ority to the nuclgar weapons program, but continuing development would be limited if the general economic con dition does not show aubstantia] im: provement. Although it poseesses many out standing nuclear physicists and has abundant raw materials, Communist Chinas economic capacity will inhibit tbe rapid development of nuclear weapons and a rocket program. To become a major nuclear power, China has a long way to go.

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May 1965

15

,.

A FORWARD-PAUSE DEFENS FOREUROP

Harald B. Malmaren

ORTH Atlantic Treaty Organi zation defense strategists have for 15 years debated European de fense strategy. Some argue that tac tical nuclear weapons must be used automatically in the event of an at tack to prevent any lose of territory. Others feel that a defense character ized bya pause is essential and that this can be achieved by making con ventional forces much stronger. It has been argued that if all NATO forces depIoyed in centrai Europe were fully combat ready and highly mobile, and there were some increase in the number of divisions, conven tional defense of Europe would be pos
16

sible. This posture requires addltiond divisions so as to maintain some de-l; fense in depth, but basically it in.! volves a fluid defense which will allow\ trading space for time during which : CL
This article was digested from the origitzal which appeared in 1

ORBIS,No. 8 Fall 196A zwb~ished

# by the Foreign Poltcg Re8earch Inetitute of the University of ~ Copyrighted @) Pennsylvania. 196.$ by the Trustees of the Uni versity of Pennsylvania. Mr. MalmgrenkJ with the Of fice of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiation, Execn tive Ofice of the President. 1

FORWARD.PAUSE DEFENSE
the forces for be organized. a counteroffensive can

However, many Europeans consider trading space for time inadmissible, because it would permit the overrun ning of NATO territory and would probably convert most of West Ger many into a battlefield. It requires in creased conventional contributions by the NATO nationsa step that is nn likely to be taken. Since such a force is also capable of large-scale offense, many argue that it would compel the Soviets to increase their combat forces deuloved . .. in East Europe with reeultant adverse ~effects On the political situation ii the bloc countries and on the stable mil itary situation. A large-scale fluid de ~ fense capability would also tend to preelude thinning out of forces in cen tral Europe in possible arms control negotiating, since it would take 25 ~to 3(I divisions to provide defense in 1 depth or coverage of the front under a i%fiddefense strategy. f

The Static Defense

On the other hand, a deployment which placee some of the total force in a static defense posture well forportion in r ward, with a substantial mobile reserve at the rear, is much $sore favorab,e in these respecte. Me #static defense posture would have to include substantial digging in, barri ades, fortification, and alternative + equipment. Thus, static defense may employ equipment and tactical con epts completely different from those f the mobile forcesfor example, F ~emphasizing antitank weapons as op osed to tanks for antitank warfare. f barricades raise enemy penetration equirements, they would be equiva ent in that een~e to the alternative i f increasing the number of divisions. I Static defense does not depend so 1

much upon trading space for time. Rather, time is bought by forcing the enemy to give etrategic warning in massing for penetration and by elov.+. ing the pace of his penetration. Static defense can reduce the number of di visions required to hold a position, and thus accords more closely to the realities of Europes defense contri butions. It ia not as capable of offense as the fluid defenee posture, but, con sequently, it may tend to be less pro vocative. Thinning out of forces un der arms control agreements would be more feasible behind a static de fense posture. If the other NATO nations do not increase their conventional contribu tions, or even further reduce their contributions, the development of complementary militia forces along Swiss lines for a static defense role may be an acceptable means to build a plausible defense posture. With regard to the trade off be tween militia and regular forces, the fluid defense concept requiree a very large, well-trained standing army, larger than that which presently ex ists; static defense does not impose such stringent requirements. The im portance of continuous experience among men and units for effective mobile combat cannot be overempha sized; again, static defense is not so demanding. The functions of each man in a static defense postnre are far more limited in number than when he is being used in mobile com bat formation. The Forward Pause A static defense concept with al ternative combinations of fixed for ward forces and mobile reeerve forces, standing forces and militia forces, and defeneive equipment and position ing may consequently be described as 17

v 1965

FORWARD-PAUSE DEFENSE a strategy of forward pause: forwird defense, conventional, with ,a built-in pause. Tactical nuclear weapons could be used to create gaps in a static defenee formation, but this would place

tions wilI be far less vulnerable to self-kilY by nuclear weapons ere. ployed in close proximity by the de.I ~ fendera. The enemy will, therefore, / tend to remain a prime nuclear target for a substantial period of time go I

Arnw New, Fed..

The author says a static defense, emphasizing antitank weapons rather than tmk$ would be less provocative ?

the onus of first use on the attacker. If the enemy does not use nuclear weapons at the outset of a military engagement, the static defense POS. ture would compel him to mass his forces for penetration. Even during the course of penetration it will be necessary for the attacking force to remain compressed in order to maintain momentum through a etatic defense area and to deal with mobile
reserve forces if the etatic areb ie broken through. Defensive forces in prepared posi18

that the opportunity to use tacticalj nuclear weapons in defense would not
be entirely lost as a consequence of 4
any pause.
In a tactical context, delay buys
several things, Additional time m.
$
ables intelligence to improve. Thef longer the pause, the greater are th? :
chances of obtaining and confirming
correct information and rejectiuf
incorrect information. With add. tional time, better sources of intelli. , gence can be employed, such as acrid photographic reconnaissance, whid Military Wiw I

FORWARO-PAUSE OEFENSE

I
4

is slower but more accurate than many other typee of information acquisition. With additional time, in ~ other words, there is a better chance ~ Oflocating an enemy, defining his pos ; ture, identifying his likely pattern of attack, acquiring targets, and identi fying them with greater precision. 1 Delaying or slowing up the attack ers penetration makes defensive tac ? tics more effective. The enemy loses the advantages of mobility and mo mentum; targeting is much easier ~with a slowly moving enemy; counter \ deplowent by mobile reserve units
~ at points of intended penetration is
of attacking
enhanced; attrition forces is likely to rise more rapidly r than that of defending forces as the ~ fighting is prolonged; and, in rela tmn to tactical nuclear weapohs, ad ditional time enables defensive forces to maneuver in order to assume a tac tical nuclear mode when necessary. 1 Tac)ical Nuclear Riposte

If the aggressive move appears to at mass penetration ~ rather than a limited (accidental or intentional ) border incnreiona fact $ that can be established only over a period of tires-then the defensive ~ forcee can redeploy for a possible tac ~ tical nuclear riposte. Slowing the
!/h e an attempt

matic reeponse and reliance on preplanning or hasty judgments nnder fire. Additional time means time to negotiate, or at leaet to make threate and demormtratione of intent to move to a higher level of conflict. Addi tional time enablee the adversaries to feel each other out and determine just how far the other is prepared to go and what the objectives are. Tt has been argued that once overt conflict begins it must be assumed that, the attacker has weighed all the risks and costs, otherwiee the con flict would not have been initiated. But that need not be true. An at tacker may have misjndged the de fenders resolve or the defenders view of his vital interests in varions parts of the globe. Once a limited conflict is underway, the probabilityy of general war rices perceptibly, and the reactions of governments when conf renting the imminent specter of general war are likely to be qnite different than when general war ap pears remote or inconceivable. Important Effects As the conflict continues, longer run effects become more important in particular, the ratio of friendly to enemy reserve and mobilizable forces which can be bronght to bear, and the risks of escalation in pro longed stalemate. The length of delay a defender ought to be willing to buy is, therefore, limited by the con straints impoeed by enemy reserves and the risk that etalemate will lead to escalation. Although a defense system should be constructed to achieve a significant delay or sig nificant pause: the duration of that pause will depend upon how Ioqg the defender estimates any limited cen tral war can laet in the modern era and what he will do with the time.

I j speed of the enemys attack ie a]so in terms of the safe and ~ J important

f successful use of nuclear weapons. If ! the aggressors rate of advance is so ~ swift that the defender cannot ac . quire a target, and then fire and hit ~~it at a range beyond the minimum , safety distance, it will not be possible e to strike at the enemy with tactical K nuclear weapons. K In the strategic or politico-military k i, context, time is critically valuable. II Additional time produces better deci ~ sions and reducee the need for auto 1 ,

May 1965

FORWARD-PAUSE DEFENSE . . There are important reasons for a serioue dis~ision of the forwardpause concepL There is, for instance, a very real question whether any de fense bther than a full forward de fense along the border between East and West Germany will be acceptable to the West Germans in the long run. The European configuration of forces is also likely to change sub stantially in the next few yeare. The French are not only reducing the size of their army by one-third; they are also shifting to a territorial deploy ment concept for a substantial per-, tion of their ground forces (the socalled Operational Defenee of the Ter ritory (DOT) forces ). The British may well find the worldforces, and this may weIl be the pat. tern of further development beyond the present 12 standing divisions. A concept of defense which fits in with this coming configuration of forces may be better than one which ig.
noree it.

With regard to questions of arms control and military stability in ten. tral Europe, th~ forward-pause con cept may turn out to have certain ad. vantages over other poeeible defense configurations. A defense concept which increases defensive capability without increasing the dangers of es. calation would make thinning out safer for the defender. * If the defense concept provides strategic warnirw and substantially

US A{, For,, Delay gives intelligence agencies more time to acquire information. Aircraft such as the F-4C can conduct a detailed photoreconnaissance.

wide demands on their fighting forces so burdensome as to compel them to reduce further, or at best not to ful fill the target strength of, the Britieh Army of the Rhine. The Germa& are now beginning to develop a Territorial Army in addition to the standing 20

raises the enemy requirements for penetration, so that the ratio of of. fense to defense needed for an attack would virtually preclude attack, then stability would have increased meas ufrably. Thus, a ehift to a forwardpause defense strategy for the forces Militsry Reti?w,

FORWARD.PAUSE DEFENSE remaining in central Europe may per mit a reopening of the question of dis engagement and supply new impetus to a consideration Of other forms of European arms control. Moreover, if domestic pressuree for some reduction in US forces hased in Enrope grow, the adminietration might find it poesible to argue that there are sOme realistic defense con cepts which do not require euch ex tensive US commitments in Germany. Finally, if there is any way in which a forward defense capability can be achieved without reliance on the automatic use of tactical nuclear defense in a provocative mobile de fense-offense mode, then substantial urozress toward avoidimz escalation ,= vill have been achieved. It should be remembered, how&er, hat simple calculations of offenee-toIefense ratio for achieving various evels of defense effectiveness can be misleading. Requirements for pene ,ratioh vary greatly with terrain, veather, morale, strategy of attack, )ace of attack, and their relation to he various elements which make up he defense system. Measures of combat effectiveneee ncombat firepower of attacking and Iefending units can only be crude es imatee for average conditions. Other :onsideratione may be of equal im )ortafice, such as an increase in the !nemys uncertainty of the possibili ties for successful attack. In the mod ern context, where the risk of escala. tion is so great, any increase in the aggreseOrs uncertainty about his ability to penetrate is a gain to be eought in iteelf. No defenee system can be consid ered adequate if there is no offensive capability whatsoever. If an enemy does penetrate and consolidate hie po sition, the defender must have the means to take the offensive and regain the lost territory, or to seize enemy territory and bargain for the loet ter ritory. A defense posture must not encourage the enemy to make a con certed push to achieve a fait accompli. If the enemy should break through the static defense system, the defend ing forces must have a rapid counter attack capability to prevent consoli dation of the enemy position. There is no getting around tbe need for fluid tactice involving space-time trades once a large-ecale penetration is achieved. This capability must exist so as not to tempt the enemy to con cert all his energies for one largescale penetration, after which he might be free to disperse and harass the static defense as well as increase the momentum and area covered in hie attack. There is, in other words, a limit to the degree to which static defenee forces may replace mobile re serve forces capable of taking the offensive.

hy 1$65

21

NATO
and
The Flexible Response

Otto Heilbrunn

w
,.

HEN United States planners discarded the conceDt of mas. sive retaliation and adopted the doctrine of flexible response, they believed that the European North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies would fall readily into line and approve the new strategya conven-

tional attack on a NATO membe would not automatically be met wit nuclear weapons but, if possible, wit conventional means. The French, however, refused to al eept the new doctrine; they still at here to the doctrine of massive retal ation. The Germans, after some initi~ Military Reiie

22

 FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

esitancy, now v~er to the view that

he flexible response concept erits. The British basically he US view. Mr. Denis W. Healey, the has its support British

efense Minister, declared in the ouse of Commons on 17 December 964 that, precisely because we know he terrifying consequences of nuclear ar, we cannot arm ourselvee to a trategy, such as that of maesive reIiation, which does not allow us an alternative in any circumstances. He went on to say that NATO must have conventional forces which can raise e threshold at which nuclear weap ns are brought to bear to a point high enough to be credible if an enY is thinking of a major attack. he present state of NATOs strat egy has been neatly described by the \ German Minister of Defense, Kai )L%e von Hassel. The old concept is still officially accepted, he says, eventhough most of the members of !NAT(Yno louger consider it binding. NATO, at the moment, is without an approved strategic concept, or, as the LX congressional study group put 1it in its report of January 1965, NATO was now possessed of two strategiesa de facto strategy of flexibleresponse and the official stra~ W of massive retaliation.
Force Gosls

trine, they agreed that a atamfing force of 30 divisions wae required, When the United States switched to the flexible response strategy, she as serted that 30 divisione were required for the new role. NATO now has 25 divisions. At the meeting of the alliances Defense hfhisters in December 1964, the chairmen of the NATO Standing Group and of the military committee recommended an increase of forces. The US Secretary uf Defense, un doubtedly referring to the total of 30 planned divisions, concluded that NATOS conventional force strength was sufficient. Mr. Healey, on the other hand, apparently thought that the present strength of 24 or 26 divi sions should not be increased. New Concept Needed In view of these differences of opin ion, there is certainly an urgent need to work out a new NATO defense con cept. It also seems pertinent to find out how the planners arrived at the 30-division-force goal, whether NATO can repel with conventional means a conventional attack by numerically superior forces, and whether NATO should increase the strength of its standing forces to 30 divisions. In NATOs early days, planners held that, in order to succeed, an at tacker would need a threefold supe riority over NATOs defense forces. The then current estimates of Soviet strength made it certain that NATO would have to have a 25 to 30-division standing force on the Central Front, and a somewhat higher number of di visions in reserve capable of mobili zation witbin 15 to 30 days. Theee forcee would fight a conventional war. When the Soviet Union quickly de veloped her nuclear capabilities in the following years, however, a review be 23

But that is not the only unresolved NATO problem. It is also dOubtful whether its force geals are still valid. When all NAT() members still sub scribed to tbe massive retaliation docOtto Heilbrunn, is the author of War in the Enemys Camp, which Wpeared in the July 1964 Gxue of the MILITARY REVIEW. He is a rni[itary historian residing in England and a

9tudent of fi!anyyears. May 1965

irregular

warfare

for

ELEXIBLE RESPONSE came necessary. In 1956 NATOs planners decided that a standing force of 30 divisions was required, but they agreed that the number of reserve forces could be reduced. While the primary role of these forces would be to fight under nuclear conditions, it was also felt that they could deal with an enemy probing attack, These calculations were based dn the assumption that the attacker needed a threefold superiority over the defense. One NATO commander, though, raised a warning voice against calculations of that type. Gen eral Hans Speidel, who then headed Land Forces Central Europe, felt that in a nuclear war it was no longer es sential for the attacker to have a 3 or 4 to 1 superiority over the de fender. He felt that firepower would make up the difference. limited Attacks While the alliea have hitherto been assessing the force strength required to deal with an all-out attack, the force goals for convectional forces which the allies are now discussing have been set with a different con tingency in mind. The 30 divisions deemed necessary by the Americans, or the 25 divisiona considered suffi cient by tbe British, are not meant to defeat a massive invasionin which case, NATO would use nuclear weaponsbut to repel a small or medium-sized attack. If, instead of the 3 to 1 ratio of forces, a 3 to 2 ratio is accepted, as one writer has suggested, 30 NATO divisions could effectively deal with an attack by 45 aggreseor divisions. Yet, the maximum strength which the So viets could put into tbe field immedi ately before D-day, without attract ing NATOs attention, is usually es timated at only 40 divisions. 24

Within one month the Soviets COUI~ build up their forward strength to O! divisions, while NATO could mobilire o 12 divisions, thereby raising its total strength to 42 divisions. The respw tive ratio of strength would then he~ almost exactly 3 to 2. Thus, presumably, the NATO forces could fight conventionally for over a month in any case, and for a longs! period if, tbe level of attack were lower.

Three Factors But is it really permissible to as.a sume that 30 NATO divisiona could successfully fight against 40 or 45 di visione, and that 42 NATO division9 could do so against 65 divisions? The answer, it appears, must be in the negative. It is generally agreed that troops j fighting a conventional war against ; a nuclear power must be deployed as if they were fighting a nuclear war, simply because they do not knm whether or when the opponent will use nuclear weapons and they must prepare against this eventuality and deploy accordingly. The troops must, therefore, fight a mobile war in dis. persed order on a vastly extended battlefield. All three factorsmobile war, dispersion, and the wide expanse of the battlefield-greatly influence the calculation of tbe number of troopa required for the defense: MobiIe war means that the ds. fense no longer enjoys the numerous built-in safety devices found in a static defense system. What is more, a mobile defense must be conducted offerreively. The purely mobile defense is, therefore, almost as exposed m the attacker who takes his protection with him in the form of tanks, ar mored personnel carriers, and self firopelled guns. The Soviets recogniss

Re~iM Military

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

hat the sharp distinction between of. ensive and defensive missions is no nger valid. They rightly stress that: in the land . . . fhe bsllige~ent. heaters will attempt to achieve thei? ims ?nairdy in offense. . . . De fenee but the ill not dieappear entirety,
istinction betureen offense amd de-, erwe will not be as clearlv expressed 8 in pact wars.

a Dispersion means.that there will e much less mutual support on the attlefield than wae possible in the ast, Neighboring units will no longer e in cloee touch; they will probably osecontact with each other. Further ! ore, while conventional firepower ie : eared to frontages of UP to 16 kilo eters, the 30 NATO divisions would ch have to cover, in the event of war, a frontage of 40 kilometers. he effectiveness of the defenders rtillery would be, therefore, eharply rednced. c T~e wide expanse of the battle fieldmeans that reservea will have to pove over considerable dietarmes. ,Sinceartillery support for the defense troops already in contact with the enemywill be weak, the power of re bstance of those troopa will be eharply Ieduced. The reserve. might not reach the battlefield in time to boleter the hont. Reduced Advantages Thu., the advantage. of the de fenderover the attacker are either re duced, or done away with completely !fthe defender conducts a mobile war indiepersed order on vastly expanded battlefield.. The defense also must be repared to wage a counteroffensive. It follows from all this that in open w,rfare the defense must be as strong m the offense. Thie means that the 10NATO divisions which the United States considers neceseary cannot be Iiy 1965 ~

expected to repel an attack by more than 30 aggressor divisions. Is it likely that tbe Soviete would wage an offensive in Europe with 30 or fewer divieione ? They would not do eo if they wanted to start a major war, becauee they would have 40 Red Army divisions and a fair number of divieions from the other Warsaw Pact members at their dispoeal right from the beginning. Contingency Well, then, which contingency would fit into the 30-divieion frame? It appears that we muet exclude hos tilities which start eomewhere outside Europe but then spread to Europe; hostilities which etart in Europe if Red China puehes the Soviet Union into war there; hostilities that seek to procure the unification of Ger many; and, in all likelihood, hostili ties over Berlin. In all these caeee, the Soviets would undoubtedly com mit more than 30 divieione to battle on D-day. There are other possible contingencies in which the Soviet starting effort would be above the 30 divieion level. The Soviet. might begin hostilities with 30 division. or lees only if. they intended to carry out a limited probe. Such a limited probe of uncertain objectives was considered by Mr. Healey as the meet likely form of an enemy attack when he spoke at the meeting of the Defenee Ministers of the Atlantic Council in December 1964. He added that NATO ehould plan for this contingency and resign itself to making the beet use of the manpower it already had. When considering only a limited probe by an aggressor, it doe. not seem, at first sight, to make much dif ference whether the NATO conven tional f rce designed to meet this \ 25

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

threat consists of 25 or 30 divisions. An attack by 25 divisions is above the limited-probe size anyway. But we must not Ioee sight of another aspect the length of the frontage to be covered by the defense. if there are only 25 NATO divi sions, each division must bold a front age of no less than 48 kilometers. The divisional frontage could be reduced to 40 kilometers if 30 divisions were available. Even in the latter case, the divisions would require a high degree of mobility to fulfill their mission. In view of the sharply reduced artillery cover mentioned before, tbe frontage must not be larger than 40 kilometers. Therefore, a standing force of at least 30 divisione is required, should the present dc%ente not be lasting. It may be said that it is not neces sary to cover the entire NATO front so intensively because an aggressors objective would soon become appar ent, and the NATO divisions could then be moved to block the meet likely routes of advance. That may be so.

But as long as the aggressors obj tive remains uncertain, 30 divisi all of themwill be necessary screen NATO territory effectively. We must be clear about one thi NATO defense forces cannot fig a conventional war against an aggre.d sor who holds a two or threefold s{ periority. Because of thie, the deter. rent value of the NATO conventional forces is smaller than has been ~ Iieved. They will deter only a convem tional attack by an equal force or by less wumerous forcee. Even so, those forces are essentii if the West wante to, maintain, w it must; its freedom of action. Yd they must become more mobile, anl their administrative support must h improved. In addition, NATO need more combat-ready reserves immedi ately available so that a conventions war, if it should come, can be fough for a longer period of time and against stronger enemy forces than is preeently envisaged by most of ths 1 allies.

26

MilitsrY Reii

D&ln!3e
of

E Qn&DJpe
General Hans Speidel,
German Arm& Retired

UR military and political situa. tion is still characterized by a O gulf bet een tbe East and the West. It would e dangerous to nourish any 1 illusions on that score. The shifts in the Soviet attitude toward the West expressed in the policy of peaceful coexistence are entirely tactical in nature. The strategic and tactical concepts of the Soviets and the organization of their forces all indicate that their war objectives in Western Europe

27

TFiE DEFENSE OF EURDPE

would be the, destruction of allied nu clear capabilities and the North At lantic Treaty Organization forces, and the capture of European territory. The Soviets believe that nuclear weapons will extend war in space and time rather than shorten it. This is why they have both strategic longand = conventional range weapons forces. By keeping a balanced mili tary posture, they can deal with both nuclear and conventional war. For tbe crucial -central European front, the Soviets have deployed 20 armored and mechanized divisions in. central Germany, two divisions in Po land, end four in Hungary. They can be reinforced with 50 additional divi sions from the western part of the USSR. Thirty of these divisions are category 1 forcesthat is, their strength exceeds 70 percent. After de ployment, a total of 70 Soviet divi sions must be reckoned with. The So viet Union can eventually muster be tween 145 and 150 divisions with modern equipment. a Dffensive Forces There are 11 Polish, nine Czecho slovakian, and six East German divi sions available for offensive employ ment with Soviet forces. A strong tactical air fleet and numerous me dium-range missiles threaten all the important targets in Western Europe. The modern Soviet Navythe second strongest, in the worIdrelies upon submarines and rocket weapons. Thf
This article was translated wtd digested from the original, pub lished in the REVUE MILITAIRE GfiNfiRALE (France) November 196.L, under the title, Die Ver teidigung Europas/ . General Speidel is a former Commander, Allied Land Forces Central Europe.

Baltic Fleet can move into the Atlanh, and, along with the Arctic, Black Sea and Pacific Fleete, strike at the grea seapowers. In the event of war Soviet strateg, might seek to annihilate tbe allk forces east of the Rhine. It may b, assumed that their main axes of at tack would be in the north German low lands along the Berlin-Hanover-Rub line and along the Leipzig-Eisenaci Frankfurt Iine. Operations in the d] rection of Schleswig and Meininger Karlsruhe or Hof-Nuremberg COUI also be expected. An encircling opere tion through Austria and Hungary t break through the southern flank o northern Italy and seize the Medite! ranean with tbe aid of the Black Se Fleet would also be a possibility. The armed forces of the West mu! protect the NATO infrastructure an tbe navigation aids of the air force The land forces must confront, sto] and break up an enemy attack at tt Iron Curtain. Any attempt of the S( viets or their satellites to achieve local breakthrough must be frustrate! This is the only way to counter tl aggressor initially and defeat hl decisively. The Communityof Fete Between the Iron Curtain and tt Seine are concentrated 125 mini people and almost the entire industri and economic potential of Weste] Europe. This 850,000-square-kilom ter area includes the Ruhr and Rki] industrial districts, the coal mines Belgium and the Saar, the iron min of Lorraine, several heavy indust centers, and many important Eur pean ports. Reinforced by this enormous indu trial and economic potential, and th of northern Italy, the Soviets wou be superior to tbe United StatesMilitary Ilcti

2a

THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE

,.

fact which links the destinies of the United States and Free Enrope. Of the 29% divisions from nine na~ ,tions required as mobilization-day ~ forces for the central fluropean sec ltor, only 24 are available. When I took cOmmand of the NATO land !forces in central Europe in April ~1957,the line of defense was still Ialong the Rhine. West Germany, in ~themeantime, has made it possible

stop an attack; therefore, the immedi-. ate employment of nuclear weapons may be required. The eituation will improve only when the Epropean na tione live up to the full extent of their obligations. The ~nited States has stored equip ment for two divisions in the central European region. The airlift rein forcement capabilitythat is, the abil it y to move mobilized ~ersonnel quickly from the United Statee to Europe by airwas successfully tested in Opera tion Long Thrust in February 1962 and in Exercise Big Lift in October 1963. It should be kept in mind, how ever, that such amofvement of tro6ps is only possible well before the operr ing of hostilities, since the airlifting of reinforcements to the sensitive cen tral European region in periods of great tension may produce an immedi ate threat to the peace. Airlift Problems There are some similarities between the eending of troops to critical areas in times of crises and the dangerous effects which military mobilization meaeures had in the past. It will re quire great political tact to determine when an airlift of combat troops to a critical area will have a deterrent effect and when it might trigger off a war. Moreover, such a movement ie difficult after the outbreak of war be cause airfields, communication lines, and the means of land transportation may be destroyed by enemy action. In this connection it should be remem bered that, in the two airlift exer cises, only personnel were trans ported. Most weapons and equipment were already stored in Europe. The difficulties of command which were obvious in coalition warsfrom the Napoleonic Wars to World War IIdemonstrate that the fast and .29

NA To

Photo

A NATO radar site in west Europe to move the line forward to the Iron curtain by contributing 11 divisions to the central sector and one to the northern sector. But the present level of troop strength is not enough to
I

I!ay 19s5

THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE smooth functioning of an alliance in war can be improved by integrated cooperation practiced in times of peaca. The force de f rappe (nuclear strike force) which places a heavy ti nancial burden on France, represents as yet no French contribution to the security of the West. On the contrary, it serves to underline Frances polit ical independence and to raise her na tional prestige.
French Ooctrine

proximity of the border along thee at tire European front. The days of cla ] ill sic mobilization are gone. Vitai ttreliminary work must, them. e

II

The French strategic doctrine of the total nuclear counterstrike, recently presented by General of the Army Charles Ailleret, Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces, does not go into particulars in several important as pects.* Since no one can predict what forms future wars will aesume, we must he prepared for all contingencies, even though this places heavy bur dens on West Germany. We must be prepared to wage a general nuclear war, limited nuclear war, or conven-, tional war. Since an aggression by the Weet ie inconceivable, the enemy holds the initiative in this area. The disadvantage of the Weet at the beginning of a war can be over come only if the political leaders re act promptly. Each minute will be pre cious. But stronger armed forces than those presently available in central Europe are required. Once those forces are muetered, the Soviets will be less tempted to fan crises or to seize a piece of Western territory ae a hoe tage. We should not cherish hopes that mobilization alone can provide enough added manpower. Forces that are not organized and available at the out break of war will come too la%e for the decisive first phase, because of the
Gene..l of the Arnw Charlee Ailkret, ,,The Flexible Rewmns+ A Fmn.b View,)) Mtiit.ru Re

Soviet

missiles

are a significant to NATO members

threat Mrt

.,.,..

T-eb,.ww 19w,.p 7&

+ore, be undertaken in all civil and roil. ng itary sectors in order to be ready for as an &mergency. Although the 15 NATO U1

Ieg

30

Military
RwitH ?!

I I

TtlE DEFENSE DF EUROPE

ates will have a tOtal of 81 divisions mobilization day, the Soviet bloc II have 208 divisions, 120 of which even nOw at 70 percent of their artime strength. Furthermore, sl ough strong conventional forces may duce the danger of nuclear war, eir activation will be only a part of e nuclear deterrent. In 1960, under the Eisenhower ad inistratiom a plan was advanced to mit a number of Polaris subma.

surface vessels armed with Pokzms missiles. This plan coste less, can be made available faster, and has the same advantage of greater freedom of action. The United States conducted extens ive studies on this subject and con cluded that such a system would be militarily effective and that it is un likely that tbe MLF could be destroyed hy a Soviet counterstrike. The MLF is designed to strengthen

THE DEFENSE, OF EUROPE smooth functioning of an alliance in war can be improved by integrated cooperation practiced in timee of peace The force de frapgre (nuclear strike force) which placea a heavy fi nancial burden on France, represents as yet no- French contribution to the eecurity of the West. On the contrary, it servea to undwline Francee polit ical independence and to raise her na tional preetige.
French Doctrine

proximity of the horder along the Q tire European front. The days of ck{ 1 sic mobilization are gone. Vital preliminary work muet, therj.

The French strategic doctrine of the total nuclear counteretrike, recently presented by General of the Army Charles Ailleret, Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces, doee not go into particulars in several important as. pects. Since no one can predict what forme future ware will aeeume, we must be prepared for all contingencies, even though this places heavy bur dens on Weet Germany. We must be prepared to wage a general nuclear war, limited nuclear war, or conven tional war. Since an aggression by the West ie inconceivable, the enekrry holds tbe initiative in this area. The disadvantage of the West at the beginning of a war can be over come only if the political leaders re act promptly. Each minute will be pre cious. But stronger armed forces than those preeently available in central Europe are required. Once those forces are mustered, the Soviets will be less tempted to fan crisee or to eeize a piece of Western territory as a hos tage. We should not cherish hopes that mobilization alone can provide enough added manpower. Forces that are not organized and available at the out break of war will come too late for the decisive first phaee, because of the
General of the Amy Chmles Ailleret, ..The Flexible R.sPo..*A French View,,, Mtiiteru %. /.,,!, .Februay 1966, D 78.

I
Ou du eil e In , irr

1
atf r ill e
arl

Soviet missilee are a significant threat Str to NATO members

fore, beundertaken inallcivilandmil. ng itary sectors in order to be ready for al arr#mergency. Although the15NAT0 u

30

MMt,y Revitw
l

l I

tes will have a total of 81 divisions b, mobilization day, the Soviet bloc [ ill have 208 divisions, <20 of which It e even now at 70 percent of their artime strength. Furthermore, sl ough strong conventional forces may duce the danger of nuclear war, eir activation will be only a part of e nuclear deterrent. In 1960, under the Eisenhower ad ministration, a plan was advanced to I remit a number of Polaris subnra

e I [

1 i

THEDEFENSE OF EUROPE surface vessels armed with Polar% miseiles. This plan coste less, can he rnad.e available faster, and has the same advantage of greater freedom of action. The United States conducted exten sive studies on this subject and con cluded that such a system would be militarily effective and that it is un likeIy that the MLF could be destroyed by a Soviet counterstrike. The MLF is designed to strengthen
I

Hiy 1965

THE QEFENSE. OF EUROPE

British to complement the MLF, is worthy of consideration, but it should mot delay the creation of the MLF. From the military and polit>:l, point of view, the MLF represe t? a, reinforcement and an additional u)r< antee for Europes securi , a though it is not the panacea w d c it is some times made out to be in public discus sions. The political significance of the MLF is that it shows a way for an improvement of the NATO alliance. Like any other defense system, the Atlantic alliance needs to keep pace with prevailing condition, Technolog: ical developments and political and economic changes within the alliance make new forms of cooperation nec essary if it is not to become stagnant. The NATO countries should explore all ways which lead to new joint forms of the alliance, not only the MLF. Stagnation in an alliance often indi cates that its collapse is imminent. History has proved many times that stagnation harbors dangers for secu rity and peace. No European will ever be able to forget how much harm was done to our continent because of un realistic, inflexible alliancee. We must guard against this danger, for the sake of the security of all, NATO must remain a modern treaty system of partners with equal rights, a system alive and developing. These measures appear to be essen tial to the maintenance of security: Reorganization and creation of a NATO military summit. Placing mobile, land-based, med ium-range missile systems and seaborne missiles at the disposal of the NATO Supreme Commander. of practical-regu Establishment lations governing the control of nu- , clear weapons. ! Placing all assigned units al / i 32

ready under NATO command on sic ple alert. Standardization of training a logistics. Reduction of mobilization tim Development of an integrated defense system. During the 15 years of its exij errce, NATO has experienced man, crises, but the unifying forces k. tween its members have always out $ & weighed those which tend to divi them. The Atlantic alliance has p served world peace and guaranteed integrity of all member etates. It with good reason that the Soviet Uni looks upon NATO as the major obs cle to the realization of her plans. The so-called acute NATO crisis, iI my opinion, evolves around two pro lems which have not been solved: t power to dispose of nuclear weapo and codetermina~ion of the NATO members in the formulation of Polk) concerning world political problems. If we want to speak of a latent crisis, w t may find its source in the fact tha: . ; the NATO partners are convinced 01 the necessity of a joint defense, hu! not of the uncompromising determim tion to overcome Soviet ideology and its expansive power. We live in a divided world; if then is further division, we will be hesded for new dangers. The joint defense of Europe requiree unity and mutual trust. Although we are living in the age of the atom, the human task re. mains the came for soldiers: In tht final analysis it ie men who fight! ,Our national destiny rests upon the joint maintenance of freedom, equal. ity, and the ethical values of the West. ern World against the expansionist thruste of co~munism. Th~ military s~curit y of the Atlantic community ist indivisible.

Military nwim

GERMAN IN THE 1942-45

DEFEAT EAST

Earl F. Ziemke

p HE most striking aspect of the 1 German-Soviet conflict in World ir II was the vastness of its dimen ns. With scarcely an interlude, the hting lasted for three years, 10 nths, and 16 days. From autumn H to autumn 1943 the length of : front was never less than 3,860 Ometers; for a time late in 1942 reached 4,900 kilometers. The cont seesawed iicross eastern and cen I1965

tral Europe between the Elbe and the Volga, the Alps and the Caucasus. The German armies thrust 1,900 kilome ters into the Soviet Union and Soviet troops countermarched 2,400 kilome ters to Berlin. The total number of troops engaged averaged between eight and nine mil lion, and the losses were appalling. The German dead from all causes ap parently numbered between three and 33

6ERMAN DEFEAT

,,
three and one-half million. The mili tary eervice ifehths on the Soviet side may have gone as high as 12 to 13 million. The much larger Soviet losses can be ~ccounted for by the extremely heavy casualties of the 1941 cam paign, less efficient medical services, and the Soviet tactics, which through out the war tended to be expensive in terms of human life. The Germans, on the other hand, although they often deliberately sacrificed masses of men, by doctrine expended manpower spar ingly. Tbrougb the war and the occupa tion, the Soviet Union lost some seven million civilians and Germany about 1.5 million. The losses+ ivilian and military-of Finland, the Baltic States, and, eastern and southeastern European countries added millions more,
Consolidation the Soviet

Union the secOnd-rankin wor[d power. The Soviet victory was a victoq g of raw manpower and industrial pr duction used by a regime that cou exploit both with complete ruthl ness. The Germans contributed in two waysafter their initial blitt :Q krieg attempts failed, by trying b te force a stalemate in the World WNto I style; and by the extreme and UD. @ compromising nature of their IYU aims.

That great struggle completely un hinged the traditional European bal ance of power,. and the line on which it ended retained all the essential characteristics of a military front. The war consolidated the Soviet re gime in Russia, and enabled it to im pose its system on the neighboring states of eastern Europe, Finland ex cepted, and on the Soviet occupation zone in Germany. The victory made
Earl F. Ziemke is Deputfi Chief, Current Branch, Ofice of the Chief of MilitarV History, Department of the Army, Washington. He receiwed his Ph. D. degree from the University of Wisconsin and is the author of

The German Northern Theater of Op erations, 1940-1945 published bv the

O/j7ce of the Chief of Military History

in IQ59. This article is based upon a chapter in the authors soon to be Wb tished volume, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, 1942 1945.

Nigh Price The one placed a price in blood an materiel on ground; bpt the pric could not be set higher than the Ss. viet Union could pay. Consequently, Soviet Ieadersbip was guaranteed virtually unbroken seriee of victoriu i without which it might not have been. able to extract the eacritices it did from its people. The other gave the Soviet people no choice except tha between an indigenous and a foreign, tyranny. But those in eum counted for fai less than the genuine, spontaneous s heroism, self-sacrifice, and industry of the Soviet people. The Soviet bureauc racy proved itself capable of mobiliP ing manpower, industry, and agricu1 ture for the war effort even under the t tremendous handicap of having Ios in the first months one-third of ih reeource;, industrial plant capacitY, and agricultural production. The pri n cipal achievements were the relocation and rebuilding of existing plants, t he opening and construction of neu mines, plants, and agricultural lands, and, far from least, the unprecedented and unequaled concentration on war production. , The absolute increase in Soviet pro< dnctive capacity was less important than the massive concentration on pra

Rwk~ Military

GERMAN DEFEAT

tiucing the implements Of land war E-fare, guns, ammunition, tanks, and
ighter and ground-eupport aircraft.
~IFI attaining that concentration, the
oviet Union posseseed advantages
one of the other major belligerents

8d

n one f rent.

to an equal degree. She fought Except to a minor ex nt in the Far East, she did not have contemplate the emergence of other

,1 She fought an exclusively land war. She fought on her own or immedi atelyadjacent territory and hence did notneed to establish lengthy ne~, supd tdv lines. Particularly over water, or

Additionally, the Soviet Union re ceived 10.2 billion dollars of lend-lease assistance-mostly from the United States. The Soviet Army fought the war with Soviet-designed and Soviet manu factu red weapons; it could do so only because of the great support it received through lend-lease. Between 22 June 1941 and 20 September 1945 the Soviet Union received, among other iteme, 409,526 jeeps and trucks, 12,161 armored vehicles, 325,784 tons of explosives, 13,041 locomotives and railroad cars, and 1,798,609 tons of foodstuffs. Against the Soviet quantitative ad

Ie

. ~gain~t the

soviet quantitative

advantage in manpower and materieL Germany had a

~ generalqualitative advantage derived principally ~rom a hkher level of military pro i ficiency dl vantage in manpower and materiel, ~ construct and stock remote bases. Her

troope and civilian population gener,. ated economic demande of a much ,t lower order than most of the other ,, belligerents.

Germany had ,a general qualitative ad vantage that derived principally from a higher level of military proficiency. The ratio of the one to the other was 35

GERMAN TIEFEAT

not corrstar$- and the shift was in the

Soviet favor. The qualitative gap nar rowed and, as the war progressed, de cline? in significance. The quantita tive gap widened. In 1941 and 1942 the Germans advantage was proved inadequate to get them the victory. the quantitative ele ment had moved to the fore, and the Germ~ns accepted the terms it im posed even though they ran directly counter to the principles under which Germany had fought the war thus far. The German Command did not af tempt again to exploit the qualitative advantage strategically. To have done so would have required at the outset a decision to fight for a draw. As the war continued, the qualita tive advantage that remained. to the Germans was in the middle and lower command echelons where its effect was mitigating but not decisive. The higher German Commands passed to the bands of generals who used it as an arithmetical substitute for quan tity. By then the Soviet Union had de veloped commanders, Georgi K. Zhu kov, AIeksandr M. Vasilevski, Ivan S. Koniev, and possibly others, and for mationsthe tank armies in particu larthat, although they lacked the ingenuity and professional expertness of the better German generals or the easy coordination of tbe German Panzer armies in their prime, had achieved full effective parity in per formance with tbe Germans. The quantitative advantage was sufficient to accomplish the rest and compensate for a slower and more uncertain rise in average capability. Every assessment of the German decline and defeat inevitably encoun ters Adolph Hitler, his leadership, and 36
Accept Terms By late 1942

his responsibility. The single natio~ leader was a distinguishing feato of World War II. The tendency ward fusion of the military and polik t ical authority in wartime was n new. What was unusual was th everywhere popular opinion stron~f inclined toward entrusting the PO! ers of military decision to the politia leadership rather than the reverse, Franklin Roosevelt generally d~ clined to intervene in military opera tions. Winston Churchill did when could and would gladly have done.\ more often had be not heen discou 1 aged by his own and, the combin i staffs and by the example of his Arn ican colleague. Joseph Stalin left mark on Soviet strategy but, a the painful lessons learned earl the war, apparently contented self with a largely counterfeit mili tary image. Hitler, however, decide d German strategy from the outbreak of tbe war to its end, and after De cember 1941 he was in direct com mand of the German ground forces,

Responsible for Defeat The responsibility for the German mistakes was chiefly Hitlers as wm a major share of the credit for th? successes. Undoubtedly, the former were both greater than the latter and more decidedly his own; therefore, at the highest command level be was re sponsible for the German defeat. Mor fundamentally, be also bore the re sponsibility for the root causes nf the defeatthe attempt to pursue unlim ited objectives with limited means and the creation of a political system that by every means made itself in. tolerable to most of the rest of the world, But Hitler was no mere incompe tent accidentally propelled into a com d manding position from which he COU

MilitaryRelie

GERMAN DEFEAT

otatre the efforts of the military ,tu ofessionals. His conduct of the war isplayed adevastating logic that even mwt destructive found at Ieast ny convinced adherents as it did nts among the leading military e inspired public confidence and nted the will of the nation to er degree than any other pergroup. He gave Germany the leadership she wanted. He not possessing the ability to the results he promised; that
me than by others, but by all tuo

. The Soviet contribution to the war at sea was small, so small that the Baltic Sea remained a German lake and the German naval training ground until 1945. The Soviet Union profited through being relieved of the second front threat in the Far East without, until very late, making any contribu tion to the war against Japan. Strategic Initiative Ends The perspective can be completed by examining how the German defeat was accomplished on the ground. Sta Iingrad and the North African cam paign put an end to the period of Ger man strategic initiative and demonstrated that both the Allies and the
Soviet Union had achieved the capa bility of bringing superior strength to bear at decisive points. In the after-

h~~ Iu terms of conventional

statistics

n ground warfare, the eastern thear dominated the war against Gerany. On the basis of those statk -

IiIi.tics, the Soviet Union has laid claim to the preponderant contribution to the victory in Europe. That claim ignores in its fundamental premise the Omenormous influence of geography in es. determining the character of the theater. The Germans were aware before ac they began the invasion in 1941 that ,a$space could eventually be their worst ~ht enemy.Once tbe battle was joined and plan had er the original Barbarossa *nd failed, and given the leadership and ~t capabilities of both sides, the war was hound to become a struggle of mass ;;; against mass on an unprecedented re sca[e. the To determine the true proportions m. of the Soviet contribution to the vic~~ tory,the theater must be looked at iu ~m its strategic perspective, In establishin. ing that perspective, three significant ;be limiting features can be identified im. mediately. The Soviet Union contributed ]e m. nnthing to the employment of stra,,~ tegic airpower against Germauy.
OW May1965

math of Operation ZitarZeUe, the Soviet Union took the strategic initia tive in the east. In the west the Allies began exercising their strategic initiative with the iuvasion of Sicily. Subsequently, in their strategic de ployment, the Germans rated the threats from east and west as about equal and were inclined to regard the Allied thrust from the west as more dangerous because of tbe shorter dis tances to Germanys vital centers. Un til the Allied landing in Normandy in June 1944, even though the Allies were actually engaged only in a sec ondary theater in Italy and the great battles were being fought on the Eastern Front, on the balance the Allied and Soviet strategic accomplishments were about equal. The German strength was split about evenly be tween east and west. Essentially, then, until the late spring of 1944 the Soviet Union and the Allies were maneuvering into Po sition to deliver the crucial blows. 37

GERMAN DEFEAT

The environments were different. For the Allies the war had a global as pect in which air, sea, and logistics operation weighed heavily. Theirs was tihs problem of staging a gigantic amphibious invasion, a one-shot, do or-die undertaking that afforded no latitude for preliminary sparring and an appallingly black ?nd wh]te pros pect of victory or defeat.
Reduce Buffer

The Soviet problem was to reduce the sti]l substantial buffer of Soviet territory the Germans held and get within striking range of the Reich, Iu June 1944 the race, if there was a race, was neck and neck. The Soviet . foimes had cleared the Ukraine and northern Russia and were deployed in the center on the axis WarsawBerlin. They had exacted and bad themselves paid heavy prices in blood and materiel. The Allies bad completed the less spectacular but technologi cally and economically more demand ing preparations on their side and had, in the mearitime, brought the air and sea operations against Germany nearly to their climax. In the summer the invasion suc ceeded and the Allied armies plunged to the German border; the Soviet ar mies reached the Vistula and the bor der of East Prussia. In December Hit ler committed his last strategic offen sive potential in the west, and the Soviets broke through to the Oder. From mid-February 1945 to mid-April the Soviet armies stood on the Oder, and the Allies crossed two-thirds of Germany to the Elbe. By then tbe war was finished in every rational sense; fear and batred and tbe will of he man were all that kept it alive. .The Soviet contribution to th~ vic tory in Europe was important but not overwhelming. Soviet postwar 38

claims notwitbstanding, the war in sio sense demonstrated the superiority rr[ Marxist theory. The German-Son conflict was euphemistically billed ~~ Germany from the stsrt as a crush against bolshevism, but the SOti ~~, Government chose not to submit i ~1 systems popularity to a direct and, instead, nominated itself to I!u an a war for national survival. Tbe h ~,h~ viet people choee an indigenous dn ~m tatorship. That was possibly the ma. en enduringly important single ~decisim~ of World War II. Margin of tlecision Even though the German failure ti ~ offer ewen superficia~ . inducement f weighed heavily in the Soviet favor, the margin of decision was narroi~ and remained so nntil the last glim mer of an alternative had vaniehed, The war was a true test of stremth \ between ideologies only in that & Soviet regime evinced superior adapt. ability in identifying itself with RUS. sian nationalism. Nevertheless, in war, the capahib. ties, objectives, and ideological out. looks of governments are likely to b!~ reflected in their strategies. Soviei strategy in World War II was cau. tious, methodical, and politically ori. ented, Its most distinguishing featur! was the heavy political overburden it carried. At some considerable addl tional cost in life and materiel, no s doubt, tbe Soviet armies alway . fought for ground as much as to de feat the enemy. The Soviet Commani planned its operations as if under a compulsion to legalize every territo. rial acquisition by actual militar y conquest. In the end, when time had run out, it went so far as to insist on staging a ,sham battle for Czechoslovakia. Sim ilarly, it had insisted on a token inMilitaryIlevbw

n ~sion of Bukaaria after that country J rrendered. Soviet strategy was r rasping rather than sweepingly ag d ressive as the German strategy had s en; it was inhibited, psychologically 11 efeneive, and morally rnthless. The German defeat was an outt kmding victory for Marxism in that 1( t broke the quarantine in Europe rhich had for a generation confined a ommunism as a system of govern04 nmt within the boundaries of the Sosi

-. 1
:.

GERMAN DEFEAT

viet Union. This situation changed the complexion of the war in its final stage and made genuine peace impos sible. In the postwar era, it has some times appe~ed that any alternative would have been preferable. Probably none ccmld have been devised that would not in some form have given Hitler his miracle. Although tbe out come might have been different, would it then have been more satisfactory?

e 3 VI r( h Ie !3
t] 1P :U lit w k !ic

COMMENTS INVITED

The Military Review welcomes your comments on any material published. An opposite viewpoint or a new line of thought of your ideas. If you will assist us and may lead to publication are an authority on a certain eubject, why not write an article for our consideration ? If you have only an idea, query us; per haps we can assist you in developing an acceptable article. EDITOR

au )11 Jr Ii dl IL iy k nc ,a tsJY .d, ng mn

:W way 1965

39

,.

The views expressed in this arti cle are the authors and are not nec essarily thoss of the Department of - the Army, Department of Defense, or the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College.Editor-.

N 2 January 1959, as Fidel C!as tros guerri]laa streamed into o Havana, Cuba, to seize control of the city, shouts of We did it ! were heard from them. They referred to the fact that after more than two years of guerrilla warfare, they had suc ceeded in defeating a superior mili tary force with only a emall band of guerrillas that numbered from 3,000 to 7,300 armed men. The barbztdos, or bearded ones,. also crowed that they had defeated the mil itary forces of the dictator, Fulgencio 40

Batieta, who had been assisted b! the United States Military Miseion in Cubaa mission which had provided military equipment and advice. Tb! advice, according to the barbudos and their leader, was ineffectual, and it was not going to be needed in the fu. ture. As one writer has stated: . . . Fidel sarcasticall~ remarked that if theg [the US mission] could teach Bat[stas armed forces no better than they had been able to, he would
gladly do without them.

Juet a few months after Castro had seized political power in Cuba, Ch6 Guevara wrote how easy it was to defeat a conventional military force. The Cuban guerrillas, he claimed, had defeated a regular, disciplined army: and that a small group of dedicated Military WieW

GUERRILLA WAR

I 1!

n who did not fear death could al. ys destroy such an army. This was ~ fundamental lesson for those Cas sympathizers in Latin America o desired to emulate the Cuban ample.
,On 10 April 1960 the Communist
esident of Cuba, Osvaldo Dortic6s fprrado, in a letter to the president Ofa student federation in Chile, enMged upon the earlier evaluations of &stro and Guevara: [The Cvban] Army of more than men, equipped with [arty thousand orth American armanaents and led oficer.s who had received combat uining from an oficial North AmerUn Militarv Mission, tzctemtty col
, psed and disintegrated before the tctorious advance of our liberating

of being led by competent and combattrained officers. Since 1959 this theme has been pushed aggressively in Lath America.
Beginnings

Thus, one theme began to emerge I the Castro propaganda machinX military assistance had been un ble to keep Batista in power; the ]ilitary competence of the US mis ionto aid the military forces of BaIsta in the elimination of guerrillas s questionable. The picture was h!further enlarged by Castros key Indhenchmen. Guevara claimed that the it CubanArmy had a regular, or pro iu. kssional, and disciplined force. Dor tioisgave the Cuban Army the image
ed ~,d Lieutenant Colonel Harold R. Aaron is Senior Aide to the Commander in er [hi~f, v~i~ed Nattons command, Ko !ld Wa,He holds a ph. D. degree frOm was gradu Georgetown University; ~d uted from the National War College; ~! wd has served with the Directorate to of Strategic Plans and PolicII, Deputy Chief of Staff for Militar~ Operations, . Department of the ArmII; and with id ihe (_)fice of the Assistant Secretarll : ofDefense for International Securitg

:d Afairs.
w

The question arises, then, as to what was the role and the effactive ness of the US military miesion of less than 50 persons in Cuba? What were the Cuban armed forces like dur ing the period of the guerrilla war which started on 2 December 1956 the date when Caetro and a small group of 81 guerrillas landed in Oriente Province after a voyage from Mexico to begih their guerrilla war against Batista ? The US military mission started to function in Cuba almost 14 years ago. In 1952 the United States and Cuba signed a mutual defense assistance agreement in accord with the United States Mutual Security Act of 1951. This permitted the shipment of US military aid to Cuba to equip those forcesground, sea, and airwhich would be utilized for the defense of tbe hemisphere, and for training per sonnel of the Cuban military estab lishment. While this agreement did not include equipping the entire mili tary force maintained by the Batista government, which numbered aboht 21,000 officers and men in 1956, Cuba was also permitted to purchase arms for these forces in excess of those re quired for hemispheric defense. By 1957, after Castro and hie guer rillas had landed in Oriente, the mem bers of the US military mission found themselves etill confronted with tre mendous odds in developing an effec tive force that could successfully en gage in either counterguerrilla war fare or hemisphere defense missions. Essentially, these were the obstacles: The leadership of the Cuban 41

t I@1365

GUERRILLA WAR ,,

armed forces at the senior or upper levels of command was ineffective and inefficient. Thk included the Presi dent, who was also commander in chief of ihe armed forces. Although re ferred to as General, Batista had had little military experience beyond the ability to marshal forces to effect a coup. His senior service chiefs were political cronies whh had been re warded for their loyalty to him and not for their military experience. They, in turn, participated in the bla tant graft and corruption of the entire group in power and awarded lucrative

officers, many of them were trtiind US schools and recognized the d comings of their profession, but! were in no position to correct politicization. The principles of authority command in the armed forces. w constantly undermined. For exam as tbe guerrilla war began in Orie Province, Eatista a.vsumed direct trol of the counterinsurgency fo from his post in Havana. He Ph little trust in his field commande~ in their military abilities. Officers and soldiers were u

cie~ e ~ clu all d] red eV at Ila ll~s etr , scl e 11

Fidel Castro leads a group of guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra Mountains assignments to their followers based upon their support rather than on their military competence. . No professional officer coips exie$ed, and Batista wanted no professional officer corps. Although junior
42

1s

for arduous field duty and had notfi engaged in large-scale military ma. neuvers and exercises. Forces operated0 N only as separate battalions or corn. panies, and no effort was expendedh by senior afficers to learn the intd. r

GUERRILLA WAR

hemispheric defense mission. As the unit began to achieve some degree of effectiveness from the training advice and assistance of the US advisors, the unit officers of the battalion were sud. derdy transferred to other units. The purpose of this action was quite sim ple-Batista could not afford to let the battalion become too well trained and officered; if it did, the unit would constitute a threat to the retention of his power in the capital. Revolt This view became more pronounced as the Batista regime remained in power, and especially after the events that took place in September 1957. At that time, Batista discovered that certain army, navy, and air force offi cers were involved in a revolt against hie regime. Although the revolt aborted in Havana, it was initially successful in Cienfuegos and was crushed only after serious fighting in the town. In contrast to the Cuban armed forces, the guerrillas were dedicated to the overthrow uf Batista and his government. The summary execution of their members by the Cuban Army in the initial etages of the war served only to make them more determined to fight until killed. Their training, while far from being effective, was relatively more suited to the accom plishment of hit-and-run raids than to the Cuban militarys lethargic train ing meaeuree to provide cohesive, mo bile, and aggressive counterguerrilla forces. As the guerrilIa war began to gain in intensity in tbe eaetern province of Oriente in 1957, US advisore were prohibited by their Ambaeeador from entering the contested area. Informal invitations were proffered by the Cu ban military to visit the area of gner 43

GUERRILLA WAR

.
rills warfare operations, but they could not be accepted. The US Govern ment was not going to become in volved in this internal struggle for powtm, add it could not afford to have any of the mission members become casualties. Thus, US military mission members were not able to judge the effective ness of the Cuban Armys intelligence, its planning, its operations, and the logistic capability of the emall coun terguerrilla forces. They were not able to aee the mistakee that were being mad+mistakes which could have been cdected in Cuban Army schools and :n unit training programs. They learned only from distorted and controlled press claims and communi ques that the Cuban Army was win ning. They could not perceive that the Cuban soldiers will to fight was being slowly eroded. Salability While tbe military mission could not operate effectively, its large and potentially dangerous capability was not lost on Castro. From the outset of the guerrilla war, Castro began bis campaign to eliminate the mission and the flow of arms to Batista. As he eaw it, the arms would eventually be used to build UP the Cuban military force to end the, guerrilla war. In his July 1957 manifesto urging the unity of all opposition groups, Castro called for a suspension of the flow of arms from the United States to the Batista government. In Novem ber 1957 oppoajtion groups in Miami endorsed this idea for they, too, rec ognized the danger of the mission. This objective was constantly sought until the end of the guerrilla war. Caatro aseigned a lobbyist, Ernesto Betancourt, to Washington. Betan courts primary mission was to stop 44 the flow of arms and to ensure withdrawal of the military misti He and other individuals moved fr office to office throughout the W ington area to obtain a curtailm of tbe arme shipments and the acti ties of tbe miesion. A letter campal
to key Government leaders inaugurated. Castro also acquired an

nitec prol ~r~ *Y ill a i~~i~

~th( was a ~~~ ation the

agent

keep his lobbyists supplied with a nite~ munition. A Cuban Army eergeant rn~ the office of tbe military qttachl It w Washington had joined Castros mor 2*Y ment of 26 July. He was able to ate vise the rebel forces of the arms bei ,Ot{ shipped to Cuba. ~::d Pressure Grows By March 1958 the pressure agai~ den

the US Government to eliminate t m arms flow had become quite severe, w useful pretext was available to term ~ga nate the flow of. combat equipment k JJ Cuba. It was concluded that the miti io: tary equipment being sent to Batistasl: for use in hemispheric defense mi$ n sions was being diverted to thos 0 forces engaged in internal securih he functions or those attempting to elim.h: inate Castro and bis guerrilla forca j lg On 14 March 1958, therefore, th
1? !,s government of Cuba was informed h the US Government that an arms emrJlh( p v bargo had been placed on aid shi ments destined for Cuba. There were d 1,950 Ml rifles, then being preparedCIli in New York City for shipment 10xel Cuba, returned to storage. Other corn.ant bat items, such as mortar ammuni.aft tion, armored cars, and hand gr~ ph nades, were not shipped. The effect of this embargo on th! Wa Cuban scene and on the limited trair of ing advice and assistance was consid.sp( erable. Valuable time was lost by B* fol tista in acquiring new sources of m wer+pons supply. By this action, th i{

~
GUERRILLA WAR

ited States had indicated her disS: proval of the Batista government. provided the fuel to spark new milm ry conspiracies. The existing good Irn ill and limited effectiveness of the tctir i~~ionmembers were reduced even m ~ther in their day-to-day opera 3 1 onswith their counterparts. The sit ation became so bad that, by the end nt the year, the military leaders of the be lifted. hi. It was too late. Batista and his mil mO1ary forces were slowly being de 0 ~ ated by Castro and his guerrillas, bei ~t ~nIYby small but important mili: @y skirmishes, but also by propa ~anda, subversion, and a lack of con :ain, dence in the ability of the Cuban et rmy tO stOp the insurgents. re,: When Castro came to power and em Wn tO cOnsOlidate his hold OVer the ,n~
Cuban peopie, the US military mis ~ii~ ion was withdrawn. It had failed to ,ti$~ ssist in stopping an insurgent mOve ~ib ent. Had a populariy b~ed political thOM ; ovement come to power rather than nrir ,hedominant military force of Castro, e missions lack of accomplishment ght have had a beneficial effect. Inr more diabolical than predecessor came into prominence. were political, economic,
sons in Cuba that fa.
lard fititated Castro>s ~i~e tO power, there
It [0\\ere other reasons external to Cuba cow md involving the United States that mni.&cted the ~i~~ion and its ~ccom. greplishment. The US Government, at the time, the ma not type air of warfare. No evaluationreal and mid.specific-was made of Castro and his B* followers. our policymakers considL of ered Castro as a ]eader With the the ideals! neceesary for Cuban progla mt nited States s embargo recommended that the

wt

ress. We did recognize that there had been some infiltration by Communists in the guerrilla force, but thie was not considered serious. No clear national intelligence evac uation was made which required a priority intelligence effort. Had it been done, and had it been discovered that Castro was a serious leftist and an opportunist, the role of the mili tary mission would have been more forcef ui. Additional arms and advisors would have been provided to gain time in the military environment, while a more palatable and rapid PO. Iiticai solution for the rule of Cuba could be achieved by democratic and patriotic Cubans.
Military Emphasis

prepared tO rne:t this

The military emphasis would have shifted from the unrealistic mission of hemisphere defense to that of pro moting counterinsurgency and inter naI security. Training in conventional warfare of a few units could have been replaced by serioue training in counterguerriila warfare using the Ieesons of Greece, the Philippines, and Malaya. The over-all effect on US national policy would have been salutary. A hard look would have been made re garding revolutionary wars in 1957 rather than in 1961. The national pol icy response through the development of military measuresan assessment of the current hemisphere mission roles, the use of counterguerrilla ad visors, and the development of serious counterguerrilla doctrine-would have taken place at least four to six years earlier. The use of the military mission in Cuba was a failure. The mission and US military competence, unfortu nately, became an easy target for Cas tros propaganda. 45

6UERilLLA

WAR

Because of circumstances largely beyond their control, the mission members were unable to perform effi ciently: . ,The Batista regime, intent upon staying in power, was unwilling to train and equip military forces in a serious manner for fear of being over thrown. Not until the spring of 1958 did a change take plate, and by then it was too late for anyone to prOfes ~ionalize the Cuban armed forces and to train an effective fighting force. . The members of the US military mission were forced to work in a poor military environment. They were un. able to assess the comparative capa bility of the fighting of tbe two op. posing sides. The seriousness of the rebels, their effectiveness, and their fanaticism were unknown quantities. Not until November and December 1958 did even an obscure pirkure of a possible Castro victory emerge in the highest levels of the US Govern ment. US policy was inflexible. De termined to adhere to the concept of training forces for hemisphere de

fense when int,ernal threats W* emerging, the United States failed recognize that one dictator of gra danger to the United States could,fi place one not so dangerous. Prews groups in the United States acted ~ effective restraints to any attem~ to adopt a flexible and realistic u policy to meet a war of Iiberatk which had Marxist overtones. Since 1961 considerable empha~ has been placed on countering so-rallti wars of liberation by the militw forces of threatened countries. tl forces have been developed to asw in meeting this threat. All of her 0[ ganizing talent, her ,military ma[ power, %nd her military doctrine wi be useless, however, unless the armt forcee of those developing countri! can attain military competence so profeeeiormlism and avoid politiu activities. The US Armed Forcee, at all tires must recognize by their actione th[ in assisting those countries, they m slow]y unsheathing a double.edg? sword which can be helpful as we as harmf u].

46

II

Joseph J. Lee

HE main goal of Red China in Latin America is to establish ideological leadership ofer the revoIitionary movements in that area. To dothis she must identify the revoIutionary struggles of the LatinAmerican people with Chinese revo-

lutionary tradition. Latin Americans must also be persuaded that Chinese revolutionary experience and strategy am applicable to their situation. Lack ing normal diplomatic channels and copious economic resources, the Chinese have chosen to use an ideological
41

CHINAS LATIN POLICY

approachperpetration contact arid exchange.

via

cultural

Major tlandicaps In developing these cultural ties, Communist China has faced two ma jor handicaps. The first, which ac counts for her rather sporadic ac tivitie~ prior to 1956, was her in. volvement in the Korean War and her subsequent preoccupation with domes tic political consolidation and eco nomic reconstruction. The second is the nonavailability of normal diplo matic channels, limiting the number of cultural delegations Peking can send to Latin America and the num ber of countries they can visit. To remedy this situation, Chinese leadera have employed the obvious expe dient of having Latin Americans visit Red China instead. There have been two stages of Chi nese ideological penetration in Latin America. The first, extendirig from 1949 to 1959, was exploratory. It placed emphasis on familiarizing the Latin-Ameriian people with Commu nist China, establishing contacts with individuals, and creating a nuclei of pro-Chinese organizations, such as
cultural institutes and friendship as sociations. Individuals and delega tions visiting Red China in these

years were mainly students, artists, journalists, trade unionists, univer sity professors, lawyers, and doctors. The chief agency supervising and
This article was digested from the original, published in ASIAN 1964. ACJAN SURVEY, November SURVEYis published monthly by the Institute of International Studies, University of Cal[fomia. The author is an Assistant Professor of American Thought and Language at M[chigan State University.

directiug this cultural exchange been the Chinese People>a Asaocia for Cultural Relationa With Fo Countries, established in 195 1956 a Chinese art ensemble 1 Chu Tu-nan, head of the assoc toured Chile, Uruguay, Brazi Argentina. It was a great succe tour enhanced the prestige of e friendship associations America and established co certain institutions of higher lean ing. At this time, Latin Am gan to visit Red China in large n hers. In March 1956 the Chi Peoples Association for Cultural Iatiuns With Foreign Countries s sored a Mexican art show and a art exhibit by three students from University of Chile. These were fd lowed by visits from other L American artists and writers. By 1959 the progress made by th Chinese in developing cultural W. tact with Latin America was substm tial. On the occasion of the 10th and. versary of the founding of the Pes pies Republic of China, Chines propagandists scored a great sucee.u in the organization of the Colombia. China Friendship Association. At tk National Day celebration in PekingJ were youth delegations from 10 Latin. American countries and cultural ani friendship association representatiw from nine countries, Over 200 schd ars, poets, writers, artists, and jour . nalists from 11 countries were preamt at a reception given by Chu Tu-nan
Opinion Makers It was also in 1959 that the Chinese

entered a second stage in their ide~ logical penetration of Latin America . In this new stage, individuals of vari d ous background were still welcome by the Chinese, but the emphaais wa
Military RwI! *

4a

CHINAS LATIN POLICY

on Latin-American opinion makers, eludingintellectuals and journalists. An indication of the new approach s
the Latin-American tour by a oup of Chinese journalists to Chile, ruguay, Brazil, and Cuba. In Uruay the group sesms to have been strumental in bringing about an ~ti reement on an exchange of journal~01 ts. After this tour, moreover, a nish edition of the periodical e~n Ma Reconstructs, printed in Monvideo and Havana, began to circute widely in Latin America. s < n This tour served to crystallize the in hinese effort to woo Latin-American ~~ urnalists who subsequently visited ~B ommunist China in increasingly *O rger numbers. In fact, the number Latin-American journalists presnt

,atl ~d ). id ~ti ~

1
b ,,,,

epared no effort to win newspapers and magazines in Latin America to their side. No matter how small and insignificant they might be, journal ists representing them were brought to see Red China. The Latin-Ameri can journalists, for their part, were curious . about this new nation, charmed by the special attention given them, and eager to visit and report on the country. The Chinese have also lavished attention on Latin-American intellectu als. Some were professors who also served as leadera of radical groups in their country. A number of university presidents were also included among those who visited Red China. While 1959 produced major gains in Chinese ideotegical penetration of

Mnl [anYViSitOrs from Latin-American nations attended the rally and parade held i tti~ ekingin October 1964 to celebrate tbe 15th anniversary of tbe founding of tbe Com munist Chinese Peoples Republic ..A

.,,.

tiws nt at the October 1959 National Day chol.debration was so large that the Chiioor. ese held a separate reception for :aenthemwi}h over 200 Latin-American nm I$itors being entertained by Chu u-nan. Believipg that the effectiveness of ese newspaper, a news agency, a broaddet mting network is decided less by its ~ ,wilities than by its position as tbe m oiceof tbe people, * the Chinese med ~~~ , KIOWT.WWW Jih.zmw, Peking, 27 AM 1968.

Latin America, 1960 was notable for organizational consolidation and de velopment. On 16 March 1960 the Sine-Latin American Friendship As sociation was inaugurated with Chu Tu-nan as president. Assisting him were seven vice presidents, a council of 116 members, and a standing com mittee of 30,. The etated purpose of the association was to coordinate ac tivities of the 15 agencies mairrtain ing contact with Latin America. Its 49

CHINAS LATIN POLICY

ultimate objective, however, was to do ,its bes~ jo support the struggle of the Latin American peoples and to promote friendship, unity, and cul tur+ and economic exchange. In Peking that same year, at a gathering of over 100 persons from 15 Latin-American countries in such fields as journalism, law, medicine, trade, and youth activities, Chinese experience was declared to be of ex traordinary significance to all Latin America. Those present pledged to return and publicize their under standing of Communist China and her experience. .
Success

ers were already taking the view their revolution indicated the roa~ all oppressed people of the worlf During the past 15 years, Pc has become increasingly convi that the Chinese revolutionary ( rience is applicable to national ocratic movements in all part the Afro-Asian-Latin-American w Their way is claimed to be the way for preindustrial, colonia], semicolonial countries, just as Russian Revolution is a classic n for industrialized imperialist ( tries.
The Chinese Way

II

d
pl It

T VI 9( ..

Thus, by 1960 the Chinese Commu nists had achieved considerable suc cess in their campaign of ideological penetration. Latin-American intellec tuals who had visited Red China had come to identify their revolutionary movements with the Chinese revolu tion, convinced of the applicability of Chinas revolutionary model for them. On their return to Latin America, these individuals gave talks, passed resolutions, and wrote articles and books expounding these views. BY 1961, according to one account, 20 such hooks had been published in Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, and Cuba. The Chinese, of course, were primar ily interested in giving tbe LatinAmerican peoples an ideology and strategy for the conduct of their na tional democratic or liberation movements. The Chinese Communists claim that pre-Communist China was, and Latin America is, semicolonial and semifeudal in nature; thus, the Chinese revolution may point the way for the Latin-American people. As early as 1949, the year the Peoples Republic of China was founded, Chinese lead
50

Many Latin-American Comm leade~s who have visited Red C express the same views, notably tor de Merchan of Colombia, Carlos %estes of Braqil, and Al{ dro Idrove of Ecuador. The view that Chinese revolu ary experience is applicable to L American countries, is not confin{ these pro-Peking Communist lea{ certain fellow travelere and unki individuals have also expressed view that the Chinese way has ] to offer Latin-American revolu aries. According to Peking, the es! of the Chinese way lies in Mao tungs integration of Marxism-L ism with the concrete situation o Chinese revolution. Since 19591 teachings have been circulated w in pamphlets and books in 1 America. No effort has heen S1 to bring attention to Maos re tionary guidance and strategy revolutions. Two elements of Maos tead are emphasized as guides for Latin-American national demot movementsarmed struggle am ~united frent. According to the
Nilitav I

\
CHINAS lATIN POLICY

r se, a broad united front consisting idf ~11 segments and forces of the so ld, ~ty, formed by an alliance between & e working class and the peasantry, Ii d led by the COmmunist Party, is e prerequisite for the successful revd ution. te The working class and its party VO! ve two taeke before them, the Chi ! ~, e assert: to consolidate and unite / bor organization, firet in a given

supposedly want land reform. The Chinese euggested in Havana in 1961 that it was imperative for the indus. trial workers and other progressive forces to aseist the peasante in form ing their own organization, take joint actions, and form an increas ingly firmer alliance. In addition to this alliance between the industrial workers and the peas ants, the Chinese have consistently

ltiol recent Chinese Communist exhibition

en ountry and then in the whole of T! atin America, and to form a close eniu Iliance with the peasantry so as to f 11 lay a leading role in the organiza 80 ion and consolidation of a national det nited front. Area solidarity and co ;8[1 peration, the Chineee argue, is cru ar id to the cause of the peoples of OIUatin America. fo Chineee analysis of Latin America naturally gives heavy emphasis upon tin he peasantry as a major force in t~ atin-American national democratic rhti ovemente, Peasants constitute about
~ 70percent of the areas population.
tCh The great majority are landless and

f!

at Santiago, Chile, was designed to enlarge Skro-Chilean cultural and ~concimic ties

emphasized the importance of all pro. gressive forcee forming a broad united front. The Chinese are natu rally pessimistic about the role of the bourgeoisie in any united front for national liberation. According to them, the bourgeoisie lack resolution and are guilty of wishful thinking in regard to the United States. Nonethe less, the Chinese urge the formation of a united front to include not only workers, peasants, and intellectuals, but also the bourgeoisie. While an important purpose of the united front is to conduct legal strug gles such as strikes and student dem
51

CfflNAS LATIN POLICY

onstrations, its even more important purpose is ,ttv serve as a base for ex tra legal actionarmed struggle. Communist parties should not engage in a Jong series of legal struggles or launch hopeless urban uprisinga; rather, they should begin armed struggles in the countryside which would later encompass the cities. This is the lesson of the Chinese revolu tion. Before 1958 the Chinese did not think the Latin-American people were ready to employ armed uprisings in their revohtionary struggle, but the success of the Cuban revolution caused them to change their minds. In the Chinese concept, the Cuban revolution ushered in a new revolu tionary era in Latin Americaan era of armed struggle. The Chinese note that, in the first part of 1959, peasants in Colombia, Bolivia, and Brazil, under Communist leadership, were using olence to take land and waging guerri la warfare to oPPose dictatorship. B 1962 guer. rills activities were a oot in 11 of Venezuelas 16 provinc 1 s, and armed conflict of varying kindb and degrees of seriousness had occurred in 10 other countries.
Cuban Experience

encircle the cities; and both fins is seized the cities to establish Politi er power. in Tbe Cuban leaders abet this anal, In sis by freely acknowledging thi ce debt to Mao Tse-tungs teachings. a The eatablishment of pnliti Vo power, however, is not the end of tf revolution+nly its beginning. Id er

tification of the Cuban with the c nti nese revolution would not be compl lit

had it used Maoiat strategy to, Sdi It{ power but failed to consolidate tk f revolution and carry out nahonal re construction. Throughout 1959, therefore, thi ~ Chinese were urging %he Cubans t! embark immediately on changing tj I ownership of the means of prodm] tion and bring about social refnrm Unless Cuba can rid itself of Amm ican monopoly capital, they said, a will be very difficult to develop ho , independent economy so as to insim her political independence. For the]r part, Cubans could not agree more. Land Reform The Chinese Communists greetd the 1959 Cuban proclamation on lad reform with acclaim. Tbe People$ Daily, in an editorial of 28 July 1959 commented that land reform was th ! basic content of Cuban national and
democratic revolution and that it! proclamation waa a fatal blow to tht plantation system and foreign kind ownership. Chinese interests in the Cuban kmd reform is understandable. Accordiu g to them, land reform has always been the urgent demand Qf the broad masses of the Latin American pee.I pie but has been withheld from them

The emergence of Castros Cuba is used by Peking as proof of the validity of Chinese analysis. Accord ing to the Chinese, tbe 26th of July movement was victorious primarily because it had followed the line of armed struggle and the united front. In terms of insurrectionary strat egy, the Cuban revolution is described by Chinese writers as very close in character to the Chinese revolution. Both were armed struggles ba~ed on the masses and with bases in the vil lages; both used the countryside to 52

primarily because of the obstrw tion of tbe United States and various dictatorships. The Cuban example showe that land reform can b Military Retikw

CHINAS LATIN POLICY

I I

hieved if they will only follow the perience first gained in Communist Iina. hr summary, Communist China now mes primary emphasis on Latin nerica as an area pregnant with ~olutionary possibilities and a key the overthrow of US world power. w early efforts were devoted es mtiallyto laying the foundations for ,Jiticalrrenetrat ion via an extensive ltural relations program attuned to Iiticai and labor leaders, intellec-

tuals, and all who might serve ae sources of communications, The Cuban revolution was a great boon to Peking since--whatever its true relation with Chinese Commu nist tacticsit could be used to ad vance the general Maoist formula for Latin America and inaugurate the revolutionary era. Peking, while lim ited in resources, intends to make Latin America, together with Africa, its next major target in world revo lution.

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DURING THE LAST NVE YEARS, THE MILITARY _; REVIEW HAS REPRINTEDARTICLESFROM 20 COUNTRIES WITH 10 DIFFERENT LANGuAGES ,,

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re di ps. y des nner d to Iung( td e C ppor d tht n V
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A HISTORICAL
SUMMARY

tu Ii< m
A

Colonel M. Drrgue MacCarthy,

French

Arm~

1
ili

HE division, a French creation,

was born of a necessity which resulted from the evolution of combat procedures.. and of weapons improve ments. The history of the division is, in fact, the history of the reciprocal influences of the organization of troops, of combat procedures, and of weapons improvements. This is equally true of the army corps, also a French creation, al though, in order to determine as ex actly as possible the date of the birth of the corps, it seems important to clear away some confueion which ex iets as to the date of the creatfon of army corps. Most of this confusion stems from

the fact that at two different perio our military vocabulary employed word corps to designate two differ. w ent entities. In speaking of the 18th. th( century armies, for example, we do, indeed, say the corps of Marshallb Soubise or the corps of the Prim h of Bevern; we also, when speakin K of the Grand Army of Napoleon, say, the corps of Davout and the corp s; of Ney. Although we are truly con .s cerned with army corps when talkingp of the last-named organizations, thi$ b is not true of the first-named. 1 Indeed, it was in the 18th century t that necessity caused armies to he [ broken down into smaller, more co~ phct organizations. And SO, armiec (
Military Retie! I

54

THE CORPS

tremendous multiplication of force imposed a need for breaking down the whole mass into manageable parts, both for maneuvering as well as com bat purposee. The solution arrived at wae the mixed, or combined arms, division of from 12,000 to 15,000 men. In an army of iOO,OOOmen, which became the rule in the principal theaters from 1795 on, there could be found 8 to 10 divisions. As a result, an in termediary echelon was logically in dicated between the army and the di visions from the moment the latter reached, or passed, the numerical strength that a single commander could efficiently employ. Accordingly, the generale in com mand of an army adopted the habit of grouping their divisions by twos or threes intoa certain number of corps a left-wing corps; a right-wing corps; a center corps; and, at times, a reserve corps.
Expedient Solution

These were not permanent group ings, but groupings decided on at the beginning of a campaign and then modified during the course of opera tions. Thus, Bonaparte, when he be gan his march to Vienna, decided to send into the Tirol a groupment of these divisione under the command of Joubert. This organization was diesolved as soon as Jouherts forces re joined tbe main body of the Army of Italy at Klagenfurt. A solution of this type was only an expedient. To maneuver the new ar mies properly, a new organization was required, not only becauae of the in; crease in the number of divisione, but also because of the epirit of independ ence manifested by some of the divi sion commanders. Even though the divieion system gave to the armiee a 55

THE CORPS

hitherto unknown flexibility, and even though it pr!vided excellent training for the generals, inherent in the sys tem was the danger of bringing about a dispersion of efforts that could be extrerhely prejudicial to the success of operation. Thie danger was more eerioue since concern for the defenee of national territory had now-in the late 18th centurybeen succeeded by ware of conquest. Bonaparte had understood perfectly the disadvantages of the division sys

quite naturally, of the word corps,f who] In January 1800 he directed Gen w 10 Louis A: Berthier,, the Minister lr9 d War, to establish a Reserve Army,OrP~ This army, Napoleon sajd, was to Onsls composed of three corps and each on d COr of these Corps will be composed of la, ixed 000 to 20,000 men, inclusive of 2 reg ing) iments of hxssards or chasseurs m he 4t hree1 16 pieces of artillery. Napoleon encountered oppositio f ~Cav thf from those division commanders wb ivi~i were jealous of their independent . Ivml

. FRENCH CORPS OFTHE GRAND

ARMYIN1806

xxx

in tt CORPS RNK+v<

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Isa @\&l&l @E3w?lEI

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Figure 1.

hit

tern and the grouping of divisions when he commanded the Army of Italy in 1796-97. After he became First Consul of
France, Napoleon gave himeelf aver to working out a new echelon of com

and prerogatives. But he wae strong tir te] enough to impose hie views. I It is interesting to compare Bona. st
partes reaue, solution with Jean V. Mom

mand. Td designate 56

it, he made use,

who, in 1800, commanded the g{ Army of the Rhine, Moreaus army o consisted of 108,000 men, 13 percent ~

MlitasyFletiew ~

THE CORPS

whom were cavalry; it was divided 010 mixed divisions and one cav division, grouped into four army S, The 1st Corps (right wing) isted of twO mixed divisions; the orps (center) consisted of three divisions; the 3d Corps (left had two mixed divisions; and Corps (reserve) consisted of hreemixed divisions and the division ry. MOreau retained command ~[)f t? 3d Corps. Each of the mixed ,C !v~ons had 10,000 men; the cavalry %Mmon had 8,000,

The system was not wholly per fected, and in practice Napoleon sev eral times had to disassemble one or the other of the CO*PSin order to com mit separately the various divisions. In spite of the imperfections in the system, bowever, the idea of the army corps had its birth in 1800, and Na poleon Btmaparte was its author. The plebiscite of 2 August 1802 made Napoleon consul for life, maeter of France, and all-powerful Chief of the Army. From that momept on, he had complete liberty in instituting his own organizational ideas. The Grand OifferentConcept Army was now to be organized into Napoleon, on the other hand, had j permanent corps, whose composition m the Reserve Army (the future was inspired by the organizational Army of Italy) a force in which he principles first introduced in 1800. couldfully exerciee his initiative. His conceptof organization was entirely General Reserve At the highest echelon stood the difierent. With 80,000 men at his disGeneral Reserve, comprising the posal, he also constituted four army Guard, or elite troops; tbe cavalry di corps.But each of the corps was uni vision; the artillery reserve; and the form~y organized with two fairly main artillery and engineer parks. !es.k infantry divisions (4,000 to Each of the corps consisted of a corps J,000men each), one brigade of cav beadquarters; from two to four in alry, and one battery of horse artil fantry divisions; a brigade, or a divi lery, Napoleon, although he did not sion of cavalry; an artillery park; }ersonally command any of the corps, one or two engineer companies; and i had under hie own control a strong rather rudimentary services compris general reserve made up of two cav ing, among other things, a field med i dry divisio ns, 54 artillery pieces, and ical service and an administrative a small infantry division. train (Figure 1). A total of eight Napoleons system permitted him to corps existed in 1805; this number overcome the independent spirit of grew to 16 by 1813. Ihie division commanders because it Although they were similar, the tookaway from the latter their cav corps were not identical; they were alryand a goodly portion of their ar not necessarily interchangeable. Tbe , .!illery. It also reduced the number of main difference existed in the number his tactical pawns but, at the same of infantry divisions assigned to each. time, it doubled their worth. The sys Some corps had two, others three; one tem permitted Napoleon to maintain or two of the corps which took part strong control over bis corps com in each of Napoleons campaigns had manders because, thanks to the etrong four infantry divisions; and for the general reserve, he had something to campaign of 1812, one corps had six offerthem and he could make bis ac such divisions. It was not until 1813 tions felt.
My19s5

57

THE CORPS

that Napoleon standardized the corps organization at three divisions. From 1805 to 1813 the inconveniences which resulted from the noninter~hangeability of the corps did

naissance, security, and, to a certal e Iart extent, shock. But they lacked a Wf ~Win ticient number of artillery unik itiou~ SU pport adequately by fire the mano ~ldme ver units. Many of the COrPSdid no ~ncya 1

FRENCH CORPS IN 1870 xxx

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not escape Napoleons attention. But differences between the corps reinforced the particular character, or personality, of each of them, and Napoleon was partial to that personality. He knew that one was tenacious, another spirited, and he much, preferred designating his corps hy the names of their command ers rather than by their numbers. The corps of the Grand Army were not large, complete unite of battle. Rather, they were large units in that they put into operation and coordi nated the actions of several infantry divisions. They possessed in their or ganic cavalry the elements of recon
he knew-that~he

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al]otrnent of two batteries,

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poleon only exceptionally accorded~rga them a reinforcement drawn from his to m artillery reserve. tlon In 1812 there was a return to a par- ~rm tial decentralization of the artiller Y$lje units. The immensity (for that era) and of the theaters of operation and the& number of forces involved in the cam- rnif . cert paigns of 1812 and 1813 made it irn possible to concentrate the artiller y, (,~ rapidly. Accordingly, the corps were ~fe units which were D given artillery drawn from the General Reserve. As for logistics, Napoleon made of g the corps, rather than the division,

58

THE CORPS

e large unit capable of conducting W ~~tained combat operations, The diIt i~ion$ had no services

~xc~pt a~~a]l

leu ~ld~edi~al service and a small emer no ~n,,yartillery park. The corPs gath - red and saw to the distribution of
mmunition, materiel, and supplies of
IIkinds which came from depots es bliehed in the areas of operation. he functioning of these services was ather mediOcre, even miserable as re arded the medical service and the reIeniehment of victuals. The exploita tionof local resources and captured ateriel, which had been badly man ged afrd rendered difficult by pillage ecanse of the absence of a properly onstituted quartermaster corps, re ulted, in turn, in enormous waste.
.Mralked Control By 1815 the corps had acquired

political atmosphere of the moment: The attitude of the Second Res toration (that of 1815, after Waterloo and Napoleons second abdication) was one of wishing to ignore every thing that had happened since tbe death of Louis XVI. The- attitude of tbe Second Em pire was, to the contrary, one that at tempted to copy the military organiza tion of the First Empire, but witbout adapting that organization either to new tactical procedures or to improve ments which had been made in mili tary armaments.
Episodical Character .

its ighteof citizenship. The division had n~d on armies a high degree of pt]tude for rapid, successive deploy nts and concentrations. The corps,
bygrouping the divisions, coordinat , :og their maneuver, and combining
- ~beirefforts in battle, had permitted @ more centralized control to he exer cisedand had prevented a dispersion : ofefforts from taking place. It was the ,d latter which had wrecked the division ;~ organization when it had been applied to mase armies. The corps organiza tion facilitated and lightened the r-!tmy commander~s task: it possessed Y8 iertain character of permanence ) md,consequently, a personality. [e Between 1815 and 1870, French ~ rnifitary organization underwent a 1- eertain regression. In other countries, Y,notably in prussia, just tbe opposite e! feet occurred. e During this period, French Army o rganization was intlnenced by two f successive but radically opposed men tal attitudes, botb resulting from the

After 1815 in France, corps, divi sions, and brigades were dissolved. Only the regiments remained. The care to eliminate everything remind ful of the Empire was so great that over the next few years, in the infan try, the term regiment was replaced by departmental legion. After that, tbe constitution of di visionsand, still more so, of corps possessed an episodical character. Thus, in 1823, France sent an army to Spain which consisted of four corps, each corps made up of four mixed divisions and one division of cavalry. In the 1830% and 1840s the French Army fought in Algeria. There it operated in cohrmns or de tachments whose. composition varied in accordance with the necessities and possibilities of the moment. With Napoleon III, the permanent divisions of infantry and cavalry re appeared. So did the term army corps. But the latter designated a purely honorary territorial command and had no reference to permanent large nnite. After the campaign in Italy in 1859, numerous reorganiza tional plans were made up, but none were put into effect. 59

4Miy
1965

THE CORPS

,.

By 1870, however, with war with Gemuwry , a. definite liketfhood, the French created eight corps, inclueive of the Imperial Guard. The quasi sup$rstitious imitation of the formsr las of the First Empire were obvious: The eight corps were directly subordinated to the main French Army Headquarter without any in termediary command echelon. The composition of the corps

zaine. But he committed the tra timral error of leaving the Marsh in command of their respective co Moreover, no army headquarters w organized. The composition of the corps w \ not uniform. These corps commani~ by the two MarehalsMacMahon id Bezaine-eonsieted of four iufrmt( divisions, while the corps command! by general officers had only three il

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Figure 3. was natterned after that of the First Ernp~re (Figure 2). With the start of hostilities, Na poleon III felt it necessary to create intermediary command echelone be tween himself and the corps command ers. He created two armies+rre un. der Marshal Maurice de MacMahon in Alsace, the other in Lorraine under the command of Marshal Achille Ba 60 fantry divisions. Even though corps were similar, they were not terchangeable like those created un the First Empire. Unlike the 1805 corps, the Fre corpe of 1s370could he considered pable of conducting sustained corn operations. It had been equipped ~ a numerous and strong corps artillf ilt~ough, admittedly, many of
Military Re

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THE CORPS

French corps commanders, not knowingenough about the capabilities and Irritations of artillery, did not know howto make full use of this powerful ,.WIU. The corps also had efficient lo gistics services to permit the conduct af sustained operations. The divisions, on the other hand, were practically devoid of cOmhat eup port cervices and could not exist if idled upon to operate independently. ,This fact proved extremely trouble some during the period of waiting which preceded the opening of actual hostilities. Spread along the frontier, the divisions were quite distant from the corps eupport services, and it was only with considerable difficulty and after long delays that they received my logistical support. French rail roads were poorly utilized, the divi sions lacked ammunition, they were forcedto live off the country, and they hadto leave their wounded where they lay. The French Army corps of 1870 was not an organ binding together divisions. And it waa not interchange able as were the oppoeing corps of the German armies. what happened in France, Prussia, after 1815, did not forget her military experiences ac quired during the Napoleonic period. I Immediately after the Treaty of Vienna, General Hermann von Boyen reorganized the army. There were nine permanent army corps created; in time of peace, these constituted the skeleton of the wartime Prussian Army. Between 1820 and 1870 the compo sition of the various corps changed a great deal, although they were, at my given time, identically organized. In addition, divisions which comprised
May1965

the corps consisted of both regular army and reserve unite, and the re servists, therefore, took their perioda of instruction in the corpe which they would join on mobilization. After the victory at Sadowa, when the German Federation was formed, a numb-er of agreements were entered into which regnlated the contribution the various states would make to the Federal Army. By 1870 that army contained 15 corpe, 11 of which wer~ Pruesian; all of the corps were on the same footing, and all of them were of the Prussian type. Under the corps headquarter were two mixed divi siong, each with one cavalry and four infantry regiments, a light infantry battalion (cluzs.seurw), one brigade of artillery, one engineer battalion, a trains battalion, and quartermaster and medical cervices (Figure 3).
Further Oivision

Wman Corps Contrary to

The German forces were divided further into three armies and one re serve army. Witbin each army, the cavaIry divisions were grouped in the army general reserve. At the beginning of hostilities in 1870, the German corps did not pos sess any organic cavalry, ae did the French corps. But after the capitula tion of Metz, a part of each armys cavalry reserve wae turned over to the corps. The German corps wae considerably smaller than the French Army corps, an undeniable advantage from the lo gistical standpoint in view of the fact that the logistical meaneall horse drawnwere at the corps echelon. In addition, the corps was a permanent unit which had existed in peacetime and, therefore, possessed great cohe sion. Each corps also had a marked personality, a factor accentuated by the use of regional recruitment.
61

THE CORPS I

The defeck of the French Army in 1870 demonstrated the imperfections in its organization. The defeat also made the French realize that changes

engineere, plus the park smd a bridl train; transport elements; one art lery park; quartermaster and me ical services; and an infantry reser

FRENCH CORPS IN1914

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had to be made. Between 1871 and 1914, then, France modified her armys organization to a considerable extent. The army corps felt the consequences of these reforms. On the eve of the war in 1914, it was similar to that of the German Army corps and consisted of a headquarters, two infantry divisions of two brigades each, and certain nondivisional elements one cavalry regiment (four squadrons) ; 12 batteries of artillery (75millimeter guns) ; nne ,battalion of 62

of two regiments, each with two b talions (Figure 4). There were 21 army corps on t French rolle in 1914, the same or which had been in existence for ye: in France and Algeria. Thus, by 19: the corps had acquired some degl of permanence and marked persona ties. They were interchangeable 1 cause they were identically composl and they still preserved their char: ters as large nnits of battle, ev though each of them had heen redut to, two infantry divisions.
Rev Militasy

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THE CORPS

mOnthe of World War I rtil. were mOnths which saw a war of led. / movement, a succession of advances !Ne?and recoils on two oppoeed, parallel, Iand almoet continuous lines. The gaps ~ which were produced between twO
I armiee were usually of a I ! neighboring character. By , ~local and temporary { 1915 the fronts had become stabilized ;nam period of the great offensives I

:dgb The first

1 , ~

The change in tactice made it nec essary to aesign to each of the corps heavy, or breakthrough, artillery. But the great offensives also @roved that it was impossible for an army corps to conduct a prolonged action because of the rapid attrition of the two in fantry divisions. Too, the corps in fantry reserv%two regiments, each with two battalions-was insufficient for remedying the attrition.

In 1916 the Battle of Verdun led to tbe concept of an army corps which wae a permanent organ of command on the field of battle binding together a variable number of infantry divi sions. Since there waa relatively little attrition in the corpe headquarters and among nondivisional elements, these could be maintained in place while the infantry divisions had to be relieved on a periodic basis, somet imes in no more than a few days time.
Noria System

Organizational Changes During the first months of 1915, therefore, the uew tactical conditions resulted in a number of changes in organization: The infantry reserve and light artillery units were taken away from the corps, with which new infantry divisione were constituted. ) Several of the corps were given additional infantry divisione. . ,The corps were supplied with ort. ganic heavy artillery units and then e reinforced, when neceesary, by bat teries drawn from the general re s serves. . The corps lost part of their lo ; gistical servicee; these were dis e tributed among the infantry divisions {1 to give the latter greater capabilities. Tbia had proved neceesary because, doring periods of crises, the high com 1 I mand created reservea by pulling divisione from the lees threatened I points along the front.

This led to the so-called Noria Division system.* Ite consequences were to withdraw from the corpe the last elements of the logietics services which they still had and to assign them to the infantry divisions. Born of the new conditions of war -defeneive war and a static front the new formula ruined the personal ity of the army corps, which now be came sector units whose composi tion was in perpetual movement. This depersonalization of the tactical large unitwhich the corpe continued to be had serious repercussions on the morale of the combatants who rapidly lost confidence in commander they did not know. Eventually, in order to slow down the Noria and to keep the same di visions in the same corps, very large attack army corps were created. At the same time, the number of sector army corps was reduced. There were, then, 16 attack corps, each with four infantry divisions; 17 gector corps, each with two infantry divisions; and 14 divisions outaide the corps as re serves. IS there any need to etate that this
~ Nwia i. a hydraulic machine m.stituted by buckets . . an endless chtin dippinz into a well and often qjerm-d by s donkey. The dmkq dnot .hmrze. hut the emptybucketi, imtmdiatdy m)laeed

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63

THE ibRPS new system aroused the indignant protests of the 16 attack corps? Iri 1918 the return of the war of movement brought about the abandon ment of the formulas born of the ne cessities to fight a war of position. The organization returned to a for mula not far removed from that of 1914, but with the addition to the corps of a third infantiy division and maintenance forcee at the general re serve echelon. The divisions, however, retained their own logistics services.

Basic Unit World War I saw the army corps take a decisive step forward. If it had lost ite character of permanence and some of its logistics functions, it had become, as regards exeeution, the basic unit of battle. It combined and conducted much more than it co ordinated. Possessing an ample head
quarters, it was able to put into op means both as to eration extensive

number of divisions and of forma tions from the general reserves. Its cadre had become flexible, and it had become hn instrument which com posed itself on demand and whose means varied on the missions aa signed to it. Thanks to its long-range, heavy artillery, and to its observation aviation, the corps had become a ma nipulator of massive fires over the en tire depth of the field of battle as well as over its own rear areas. Immediately after the victory in 191S, those responsible for the reor ganization of the French Army ap pear to have been greatly influenced by public opinion which could not ad mit to an offensive war. The French Army, therefore, waa destined to con duct a defensive war, at least initially, and the Maginot Line was truly the concrete expression of this state of mind. a4

It was admitted, though, that a fu. ! In ture war would again place mass W.~ag8i1 mies in action and it wae imagin~ 1, w that large units, even if operating un .$ der mobile conditions, would opemt e /jyr;, side by side. The turning mcmramt ~~nd which required vast space, apPearedOfa as a not too likely eventualityy. thst The formula for the organization n te~ti of the army corps adopted in 191 6 answered this concept perfectly anIt & was put into effect immediately aft er ~. ~ the signing of the peace. tion The corps wae the permanent or. ort, gan of command on the field of batt le. Possessing copiously endowed orga nic ~t corps elements which permitted it t ac. ~88i ticaily to command from two to fom . ~d$, infantry divisionsnone of which was organicthe 1939 army corps wm definitely an impersonal organ of com mand. mm Two Types Iacl The corps orgahized in 1939 were I ,.
1.
of two types: abs Normal, with a large portion of to the organic corps elements still horae did
drawn.

units

Motorized, all of whose were motorized.

organic

uq Ot ra~

In addition to a headquarters and grt services, organic corps elements in- poi eluded a cavalry reconnaissance gronp, : one regiment of heavy artillery, a regiment of pioneers, and a squadron of reconnaissance aircraft. The complete motorization of the ~( organic corps units was not finished pe in 1939. The French High Command ,n of that time, ite judgment obscured ~h by World War I experiences in static co warfare. looked uuon motorization as .} the simple repl~cement of horse- drawn vehiclee by vehicles which were motor drivenas a modernization of logistics means and not the advent of new tactical possibilities. MilitaryReview

THE CORPS

ft. ; In the logistical services, the corps W. ]again took over, in the years preced inti ing 1939, many of the prerogatives un. ;they had surrendered to the divieions mti ,during ~ld War I. The theory be. en~ hind this wae to relieve the divisione ~rd Of as many problems as poseible so that they could devote their full at :ion tention to combat. 91t Contrary to expectations, the op m( erations in May and June 1940 had tcr no resemblance whatever to tbe posi tional warfare of 1915, 1916, 1917, or. or to the slow drive, shoulder to shord. tk der,of 1918. And it soon came to pass Iric that the organization, created on the ac. basis of World War I, proved poorly lur adapted to the tempo of World War II. lag ,as logisticaland Tactical Araas rn- In the logistical area, the corps whichparticipated in theDyle-Breda maneuver in Belgium and Holland lacked the necessary transport means re to move their divisione rapidly. The abaence of logistical means adapted of to an operation of this magnitude se didnot permit the corps adequately to support the divisions. The latter could ic notsupport themselves because of the rapidity of the movement and the d great distances from the supply de 1. pots.
),
In the tactical area, it had been exa pacted that the various corps headn 1quarters maintained in the general headquarters reserve up to the moB ment of the Ardennes crisis would i permit the reestablishment of a front I in the event of an enemy breakI through. This hope proved vain. The corps thrown into the melee were not I ; ableto coordinate the actions of fresh i I units with those divisions already sub jected to shock and which had lost a large part of their strength. Fresh diI visions, too, were insufficient in num hers to, conduct a proper defensive /

battle. This failure illustrated quite clearly the degree of difficulty that is encountered in the midet of a crisis in trying to get large unite, strangers to each other, to cooperate. The great innovation of World War II in the organization of large com bat units was the armored corps, cre ated and put into action for the first time by the Germans in 1939. A number of individuals are some times tempted to see the origin of the armored corps in the cavalry corps of World War I, the latter the heirs of the famous Napoleonic cavalry re serve. May those individuals forgive me, but such is not my opinion. In fact, neither the cavalry reserve of the Grand Army nor the cavalry corps of World War I was a true, tactical, large unit. Although they possessed speed and mobility, and were able to realize surprise, they lacked power which depended at that time essentially on the number and caliber of artillery pieces. In the absence of sufficient artil lery, particularly heavy artillery which would have weighted them down, the cavalry reserve and the cav alry corps were incapable of enduring and they were never capable of ex ecuting alone-successive combat op erations. That was not, moreover, their role.
Development of Aviation

But the moment the horse yielded its place to the motor, the develop ment of aviation changed the known factors of the problem. The airplane gave the new, mobile ground weapon the protection of the firepower which it could not acquire for itself with out weighting itself down, thereby losing its speed and mobility. Supplemented by the airplane, the large armored unit became a tactical 65

THE CORPS

large unit capable of enduring on the battlefield. , . The armored corps was the logical consequence of the German doctrine of wpr, radically opposed to the French concept. Tested and perfeeted in Poland, $he system was employed with mastery in Belgium and in France. Faithfrd to their military tradi tions, the Germans considered that the armored corpsand the army corps as wellwas, above all, a head quarters with the constituent ele ments under it. The personalization of the armored. corps was thus oh-~ tained by the headquarters and by maintaining, to the greateat poseible degree, the same divisions in the same corps as long as possible.
Flexibility But there was no formalism here, no rigid principle. Quite the contrary, the armored corps were characterized by the great flexibility of their organ ization which, in turn, was based on

successive assigned missions. Because of tbe impressive results obtained by tbe Germans, we may ask why the Anglo-Americans, at the time of the Normandy landing and later during the course of the operations in Europe, did not group their ar mored divisions into armored corps ? Instead, the armored divisions were divided among the various army corps, and there never appeared, on the Allied side, an armored corps or an armored army. Why? It would seem tu me that there were a number of reasons for the AngloAmerican action: were better s Armored corps adapted to those missions requiring speed, flexibility, and power~the breakthrough battles, deep exploita tions, and wide-turning or flanking 66

movements. The armored corpe we!t two not truly interchangeable with other ~he army corps which were more suits~ ~o~ for defeneive action and for the oecu.$Bo pation and mopping up of terrain, 10 Thie noninterchangeability of tac~ct] iM pawns ie often bothersome in strategy T and in operational tactics. ha The Anglo-Americane considered we that, since the mase of their combs t W forces was entirely motorized, thert. Q~ was no need to create armored corps fO The two Allies did not conside1 di that the theater of operations in th northwestern Europe offered spaceI for the maneuver of units more richly endowed with armored unite than their ovh army corps. And, above all, their almost corn. plete superiority in the air almost au. in their opin. somatically eliminated, ion, the danger of a massive and unexpected counteroffensive from an advereary who was on the decline. It is well to recall, however, that at the time of the American break through at Avranches, General George S. Patton, Jr., in order to carry out successfully his maneuver of exploita tion, was given the 7th US Corpe which, with two armored divisions and an infantry divieion almost corn. pletely motorized, was in truth an ar mored corps.
The Future

The army corps, a French creation, as was the division, was born of ne cessit y. Breaking down the army into divisione had as its aim facilitating the exercise of command. The regroupment of the divieions became imperative at the moment their number became greater than one man could command. Such was the origin of the group of divisions, the army corps. With the appearance of the corps, MilitaryBewiW

THE CORPS

? two opposite tendencies

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1

also made their appearance:

.Centrdization, in the case of
Bonaparte.
Decentralization, in the cage of Moreau. Throughout its bietory, the corps has been the object of a struggle between these two tendencies. With World War I, a problem ap peared which had not been posed be fore: whO must ensure the life of the divisions, the corps or the divisions
themselves? If oneconsiders the corps 8Sa command organ which binds var

n II

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a 1 1 1 r

iablenumbers and quality of divisions together, it lends itself poorly to play ing the role of the large autonomous unit. During thecouree of World War 11,the Allies handled this problem by centralizing the meane for autonomous existence at the army level. W]ll this solution be applicable in the event of a nuclear war? Will not the nuclear factor also change the point of view from which we habitu ally consider the employment of the army corps? Napoleon, for example, gave stra

tegic preoccupations to certain of his corps commandersthe mission con fided in 1797 tothe three divisions of Joubert in ttie Tirol; the maneuver executed by Sordts corps in October 1805; and the maneuver by Davont two days before Jena in 1806. Like wise, iq 1939, the action of General Heinz Guderians armored corps in Poland was more strategic than tac tical. World War Ibrought about the de personalization of the army corps. Thie depersonalization facilitated the constitution of corps on demand which the new form of war imposed. The formula proved practical in the case of corps framed in in a shoul der-to-shoulder war. But during World War II the Ger mans felt the necessity of a return to a certain personalization of their armored corps whose distant and deep missions required flawless cohesion and solid combat camaraderie which cannot be obtained without long mu tual acquaintance. Is there not, here, a necessity which it will be well to take into account in nuclear warfare?

1, $. 0 ~ s t

mly 1965

61

. . ,

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I
The International Staff Officer
Lieutenant Colonel Jack E. Carter, United States Air Force

UTY on an integrated military staff can be a rewarding experience or it can be an exercise in frustration. A great deal depends on bow much the newly as signed officer knows about the problems in herent in, and peculiar to, any international staff. Basically, the international staff officers job is the same as that performed by a na tional staff officer-to assist the commander m performing his command functions. As with most staffs, however, a definite in formal organization existea eelect group of people spread throughout th&headquar ters who are contact points for getting the

T,tle Olustratim .ourtesY NATO L.ttir.

68

sTAFF OFFICER

Ob done. These unofficial channels eem tO be more pronounced in allied han in national staffs, because there s a tendency for nationals to work hrough nationals. In addition, a cer ain rigidity of organization--caused iy an inability to make periodic hange.s to an already agreed on man ]ing table-will contribute to the functioning of tbe informal, or un official,staff system. The basic philosophy of an inter national beadquartere ehordd be in tegration, a characteristic posseseed ]y most effective organizations. This :oncept is designed to bring together dl staff personnel so that they will act IS a single, cohesive, effective force. integrating only certain national ele nents ie certainly not in keeping with theepirit of unity and is not conducive to the conduct of effective staff work.
Keded Attributes

mand. In a personal letter to each of his staff members, General Eisen hower said:
As a member of SHAPE You are given the opportunity of contributing heavil~ to the preservation of a jveace ful world and to those values cher ished bg free men. The worth of your contrtbu tion will depend in large of the measure upon your recognition fact that the purpose to which f,Iour country hue 8ubscribed will be best served bg your unswerving loyaltg to or-m allied team.

The former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Field Marehal the Viscount Montgomery, put it this way:
The really necessary thing is for every oficer to understand that he is an international and not a national person. Although by accident of birth he happens to be British, for instance, he must be concerned just as much for the defense of France, Belgium, and Holland as for the defense of England. I am an international sol dier; so muet they be. It is not always eas~ to make people understand that. If I allowed natioial feeling to rule, I would never get angthing done at all. We are all one team and we sink or swim together. National Traits

The international staff officer must ievelop-if he does not already POS ~essthemthe attributes of patience, tolerance, and adaptability; he must strive to develop a loyalty and attach ment to the international command. Hemust aleo strive to understand dif fering viewe, cultural patterns, and work habite. He must be able to work objectively with people of other na tionalities, religions, and customs. When he established the Supreme ffeadquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, after World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower recognized that the first problem he had to solve was the building of loyalty among hie newly assigned personnel to the new con r
This article was digested from the original published in NATOS FIFTEEN NATIONS (The Nether lands) December 196.&January 1965. Copyrighted @ 1964-65 by

NATOs FIFTEEN NATIONS.

Ihy 1965

Loyalty, of course, goes much deeper than merely talkbrg about changing a philosophical outlook. The matter of loyalty to an international organization, it must be remembered, cuts across all aspects of etaff furrc tione. Each individual staff officer muet be continually on tbe outlook so that he does not demonstrate national traite which might prove detrimental to hie relations with other staff offi cers. He must also be fully aware of the fact that things do not necesear 69

STAFF OFFICfR

ily happen as fast or take the same form .as they do on a national staff. Most complications that do occur on the international staff level often are aggravated by the lack of ability on the part of staff officers to communi cate fluently in a language uther than their own. This problem, with all of its ramifications, can be eased and partially avoided by gbod human re lations. Most officers assigned to the vari ous international military staffs strive to get along, because they realize that a lack of good human relations is det rimental to the efficient operation of ~ the particular staff. Most of them also realize full well that the possi bility of friction and misunderstand ing taking place is greatly increased when people from different nationali ties and cultural backgrounds are re quired to work tngether. If an officer ie to contribute effec tively to an integrated allied staff, he must be able to put himself in the Po sition of his fellow staff officer. This helps to determine how a certain ac tion will be received and how the other national will react. The staff officer will be well re warded if he diligently seeks to learn

of his fellow officers, \ In turn, this will help them to know : 9 each other as individual, which is es. : for, sential to mutual understanding. Fur- ] ~es thermore, an integrated staff officer i ~ bat can often gain the confidence of other ~at national staff members simply hy r?. , ..,, .. . specting their religion, culture, heri. tage, and habits. The officer who is fortunate enough to be considered for an assignment to an international staff should, in addi. tion to the normal technical qualifica tions, develop certain other qualities. He must have tbe proper tempera ment and attitude, and, most impor tant of all, he must be ,able to adapt quickly to new and strange situations. His task will be threefold: the nor. mal staff responsibility; assisting other nationals in staff work; and maintaining good will on behalf of bie country. He will find himself in timately involved in the cultural and institutional patterns of his native country, the organization, and the country in which the staff is located. In short, he will be a new breed meet ing unique situations which, if facsd up to and prnperly prepared for, could prove to be one of the richest and most interesting tours of his career.

the background

70

Military Relit

HE year was 708 B.C. The a~my Qf Sennacherib etood be. fore the gates of Jerusalem. With a heavy heart, King David ranged the battlements and studied the formi dable Aesyrian force. Only a miracle couldsave the city and its slender gar rison in tomorrows battle. By the first light, the captains from Nineveh roused their soldiere. Within a few moments, they discovered that catastrophe had struck in the night the angel of the Lord had visited the Assyrian camp and 5,180 men-at arms lay dead. Sennacherib departed, and the holy city wae saved without an arrow fired or a spear thrown. Thus, it is written in Isaiah 37: 33-37.It is, perhaps, the first recorded instance of a battle decided by epi demic disease. Disease is woven intricately into the fabric of war. The story of one cannot be told without the other. Yet, each succeeding generation, soldier and scholar alike, seems reticent to concede to the microbe its historical role as an awesome factor in the wars of man. Perhaps plagues and pennants should not be mixed, but such present ments are contrary to the facts of history. Frederick the Great and Na poleon were openly contemptuous of medicine and the importance of dis-

cmd

Of Plagues Pennants
Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Moser,
United States Armg

MiY 1965

71

PLAGUES ANLI PENNANTS eaae in military operations; both lived to regret this :o1lY. It seems that the lesson must be rele~rned in every cen tury. Even in this era of medical enlight enment and military sophistication, we have much in common with 708 B.C. A brief scanning of the history of wars and epidemics will show that this is true.
Weakened Ferce

I
of Greece, war erupted between Ath. ~ ano
ens and Sparta. Pericles had reason ~ ho?

In 480 B.C. the seaborne army of Xerxes, estimated at between 800,000 and two million, bridged the Helles pont and cut a canal across Mount Athos to confront the Greeks. Plague . and dysentery ravaged that army un til its ranks were reducedto 400,000. The Greeks pulled back to Salamis on the Attic coast and, with only an esti mated 40,000 soldiers manning the Hellenic triremes, feigned withdrawal and fled into a narrow strait. The eager Persians pursued, andt soon 1,000 ships mingled in a wild melee. The athletic hoplites, defying prece dent, hoarded tbe Persian triremes to engage. in hand-to-hand combat; they soon carried the day. Salamis is cited as tbe fii-st deci sive sea battle in recorded history, a great victory for the Hellenic best. How many of Xerxes men were weak ened and demoralized by plague and dysentery cannot be estimated. One can only wonder. In 430 B.C., during the Golden Age
Lteutenqnf Colonel Robert H. Moser is Chief of the Department of Med icine at WiZtiarn Beaumont Genera! HospitaZ, EZ Paso, Texas. He eerved with the US Navg from 19.4$ to 1948; received his M.D. from Georgetown University; was a battaZion surgeon in Korea from 1950 to 1951; and was graduated from the 1964 Fall Asso ciate Course of the U. S. Army Com mand and General Staff College. 3, 72

to fear his enemy since it was a ecant j an< 50 years since Thermopylae, and the ; jaa power of Spartan arme was almost ~ toti legendary. The Spartans had devas. , tated the Athenian countryside, and ni< refugees poured into the city; it was summer and swarms of terrified peas. frl ants choked the streets of Athens. ck to Periclee marched his disease. wracked army from the city to attack the Spartans, but smallpox accounted & for more casualties than the enemy. Only half of his original force sur. t vived. Even the gallant Pericles SUC. 2. ~ cumbed to the plague. In the. final days, th; Spartan ad miral, Lysander, drove bis triremes into the barber of Piraeus. His war riors stormed tbe walls of that un fortunate city to the merry tunes of ;1
Spartan flutes, also tbe lamentation s~ and wails of the ,Athenians. Athens I lay in tbe dust, never to rise as a ,~ . world power again. Many factors ; contributed to the capitulation of the great city-state, but the plague of Athens cannot be discounted.
Strange Procession In tbe autumn of 218 B.C. a strange procession swarmed out of the Alpine passes onto the plains of northern Italy. Hannibal of tbe lions blood, :

bearing the Barca family vendetta of death to Rome, entered the pages of history. As one writer has said:

In its elements, the new Cartha ginian Army was as rnotZey a force I as was ever assembZed: Iberian hearw tuniee and infantry weaving white carrying buckZers of buZZs hide; taZl, haZf-naked GauZs with their huge ~u?ovds and spears; Balearlc a[ingers trained from childhood to heave lead peZlets with amazing force and aim; Libuan foot soZdierw with shaved heads I MiZitary Review 7

i L

PLA6UES AND PENNANTS and tattooed

limbs; Numidian light horse clad in the skins of wild beasts and riding without bridles; African javelin men who fought in the wicker totoers borne by the elephants.

And in the rear ranks came malaria. The city of Rome, with its inge
nious system of aqueducts bringing

fresh water into the city, and the ctoaca ma~ima draining the sewage to the marshlands, remained free of

their farms to become the idle, rebellious rabble of the city? Perhaps the political upheaval and corruption would have been delayed for centuries if bread and circuses had not been the mandate of the populace and the policy of the rulers. Still later, in the declining days of empire, the Parthian horse archere attacked Syria, a key province guarding the eastern flank of Rome. In

N.t,.nd

Arch,..,

During the Napoleonic Wars, more than 10 times as many men died from disease as were killed in battle malaria. The surrounding countryside, however, was lese fortunate. Malaria became endemic, and tbe country people crowded to the Eternal City. Soon malaria joined the multitudes. Worebip in the temple of Febris, the goddess of fever, became a popular avocation. Two additional establishments were built to accommodate the febrile faithful. Many theories have been proposed to explain the downfall of Rome. One could add the physical debility and intellectual torpor that attends chronic infection with tbe malarial parasite. What would have happened if the countryf olk had not been driven from May 1965 A.D. 164 Marcus Aurelius Antoninus dispatched the crack legions of Avid ius Cassius to Seleucia to aid the cor rupted and ineffectual local garrieon.. The Roman cohorts easily routed the primitive Parthians. But a pestilence attacked the legionnaires camped along the banks of the Tigrisit is suspected that it wae smallpox. Even as the returning soldiers marched in their victory parade, the plague exploded upon Rome with a violence reminiscent of the great plague of Athens. It hae been called the Antonine Plague, perhaps to commemorate the emperor wbo died with many of hie subjects. The in 73

PLAGUES AND PENNANTS

credible figure of 10,000 deaths a day has been recofd~d. Military operations throughout the sprawling empire were paralyzed as logistical support failed. The Goths and Vandals seized the initiative, and soon Rome joined Athens in the dust of ignominy and obscurity. True, complex factors are involved in the death of an empire, but the plague of Antoninus must enter the reckoning.
Rare Paradox

The siege of Metz provided one of the rare medical-military paradoxes of the 16th century. The forces of Charles V had swept all before them. Toul and Verdun had fallen to the Ifapsburg steel, and now the fortress at Metz was the intended prize. The army, though, had been weakened by famine since the prodigious entour. age of camp follom,erswhich out numbered the troopshad loaded. the supply wagons with useless plunder. Forage was scarce. The men were be set by great diseases, pleurisies and they con fevers. . Nevertheless, fronted tbe town with 14 regiments of L.arzdilcnecfites and an additional 120,000 Spanish and Italian foot sol diers. Within the walls a most remarkable series of events took place. The Duke of Guise had 4,600 men, 444 horses
and 920 gendarmerie. He prepared

remnant withdrew, and the siege was lifted. In May 1519 a soldier in the forces of P&nfilo de Narviiez-the successor ; to Hernando Cortes as the supreme commander of the Spanish expedition. ary forcesstepped ashore in Mexico. Although they had not lost their fear of Iherian gunpowder and horses, the Aztecs were still numerous and hos.
tile. The Spanish soldier came in in.
timate contact with many of the In.
dian villagers; unfortunately, hq had
smallpox.
This was a new disease to the Americas. and the Indians had no im. munological experience with smallpox. In the epidemics that followed, an es. timated 3.5 million Aztecs died. In the pandemic that swept northward, half ~ the population perished.

for the siege by establishing rigid protocols which called for the immedi ate isolatiori of all sick soldiers and cleansing of daily townspeople, streets, and the careful regulation of food and water. Under this program the defenders withstood 65 days of siege. Charles men, meanwhile, suf fered the simultaneous agonies .of starvation, bitter cold, dysentery, and, of course, typhus: an estimated 20, 000 to 30,000 perished. The pitiful 74

Lleath Tolls During the Thirty Years War 11620-50 ), the Palatine period was characterized by the retreat of Coun} Mansfields rogue army and the puw wit by Tinys imperial corps. The withdrawing army plundered and burned, spreading typhusknown as 8) the Hungarian Sicknessin its wake. Terrorized peasants fled to the walled cities, and the progress of the ! army could be measured by the rising death tolls of the cities in its path. In Frankfurt, 1,785 died; in Nurem lb berg, 2,487. Mansfield marched into Bavaxia with TiIly in hot pursuit. Ultimately, the imperial army caught up with the & plague, and soon villagera who did not get typhus from the retreating 9 Protestants caught it from the pur suing Catholics. Tbe surviving burgh ers bated both armies. The disease spread to Lorraine and even to Metz, where, despite rigid quarantine pre. cautiorr~, 3,000 people died. MilitaryReview

PLAGUES AND PENNANTS

The 1 Thirty Years War provides the classic example of infected armies irissc dossing a continent to spread epidemic disease to every village and hamlet. In July 1778 the aging monarch, Frederiek the Great, crossed the bor der of Bohemia with 100,000 men on a mission to chaetise Joseph II of Austria for annexing some property

In June 1812 the Grand Army of Napoleon, 450,000 strong, with battle streamers from Aueterlitz, Jena Auerstedt, and Friedland fluttering, crossed the Neman River. Finding the Russian countryside a barren waste land, French foragers returned with empty. carte; there was no food for man or horse. The only life in the villages was vermin and insects. Hun-

US Arnw ,

The American Army of the Mexican War period had advanced but little, if at all, in ita medical procedure from the days of the Napoleonic Wars

that had belonged to Maximilian Juseph, the late Elector of Bavaria. No shot was fired, and the difficulties were resolved hy the Treaty of Te achen. Nevertheless, Frederick lost 14,548 soldiers from his three armies dysentery and typhus had finally caught up with the old soldier. He suun ordered a drastic revision in the Prussian Army medical service. May1965

ger, discord, and cold gnawed at the men. Napoleon pushed ahead and took Vilnyua, leaving 8,000 soldiers behind sick with typhus. Lack of discipline was an increasing problem as the sit uation became more desperate. After the capture of Ostrov, there were 10, 000 soldiers down with typhus. Approaching Moscow, Bonaparte 75

PLA6UES AND PENNANTS

still had 95,000 men, In the terrible Battle of Borodino, 113 kilometers from Moscow, 32,000 French and 42, 000 Russian troops perished. Field Marshal /MikhaiI I. Kutuzov retreated under cover of darkness, but the French cavalry was too exhausted to pursue. Napoleon entered Moscow a week later and lingered for six fate ful weeks in the smold~ring ruins, tormented by indecision. It was al ready cold when he gave the order for withdrawal. The army had heen mortally wounded. Aside from the cold, harass ment by Coesack cavalry, violent hun ger, and wolves, there were the omni present lice. The louseborne typhus which had exacted its toll throughout the campaign was relentless; the army degenerated into a disorderly rabble, and thousands of men were killed in the panic at the Berezina River. Some. were drowned; others were crushed on the bridge. Less than 3,000 men struggled back across the Neman. Even the snrvivors carried the miasma of death with them. Typhus struck in every corner of the continent. East Prussia, Silesia, Saxony, Prussia, and France shared -. the horror of new epidemics. During the Napoleonic Wars, be tween 1792 and 1815, there were 4.5 million men under arms. It ie esti mated that 150,000 died in battle. Ap proximately 2.5 million fell victim to disease.
Punitive Excursion

entery was spread widely throughout the United States in conformity with the ancient tradition of returning armies. Parenthetically, one might add that the US Army of this period had ad. vanced but little, if at all, in its med. ical procedure from the days of the Napoleonic Wars.
Tactical Blunder

Tbe Crimean War is remembered principally for ite tragicomic general ship, the tactical bkrnder that sent the Light Brigade plunging to de struction - and immortality, and the gentle nobility of Florenfe Nightin. gale. A Iittie-known aspect of this war was the typhns epidemic which swept through both armies. One writer bas said:
Thousands of allied troops died, of disease as a consequence of improper food, clothing, and sanitation. At one time more than half the British Arrn~ was unfit for service, and two out 01 three Russian vscruits were pros. trated by Wsess or starvation on the way to the front. AU told, more thafi 100,000 men were lost in defense O] Sevastopol, the majority succurnbin~ to epidemics.

In the Mexican War1846-48 General Zachary Taylor -took a US Array on a punitive excursion south of the border, His loeses were 1,549 killed (or died of wounds), 10,951 dead from disease (mostly dysentery, yellow fever, and malaria ), and 13,825 discharged for disability? The dys 76

Within five monthe in 1855, Flor. ence Nightingale and her devoted stafl reduced the hospital mortality rat( from 42 percent to two percent, per haps the most significant event to oe cur in this nndistinguished war. II also marked the beginning of the mod ern era of nursing care. A review of the sick reports of th[ Union Army compiled in 1864 re vealed that disease accounted for eve] 60 percent of all deaths in the Civi War. Figures for the Confederat~ Army are thought to be about twice that high. An unavoidable conclusion is that infectious diseases of the gasMilitaryReview

PLAGUES AND PENNANTS

trointestinal tract killed more soldiers than shot and shell. At the Battle of Gettysburg, 5,000 sulkers and eick followed the Confederate ambulance trains, a figure which represented about 10 percent of General Robert E, Lees fighting strengtfi. Many of those remaining in the Iinee were weak and sick. Colonel W. W. Blackburn, in his book, The War Years With Jeb Stuart, recounted that on the second day of the battle, he observed General Lee quite ill with diarrhea. This hae been disputed on the grounds that none of Lees staff ever commented on the matter in their memoirs. One might

in the battle. No one, certainly, likes to mix plagues and pennants. The fact remains that the Battle of Gettysburg was characterized by epieodee of incomprehensible apathy and indecivenesz by officere and men of the Army of Northern Virginia. General George G. Meades forces, on the other hand, were virtually unaf fected, The actual role of diseaee can not be reckoned, but there is prece dence for such occurrences in war. The Spanizh-American War intro duced a new dimeneion to the problem of epidemic disease in the Armed Forces of the United Statee. For the first time, large numbers of US treopz

Dnrifig the Spsnish-American War, for tbe first time, large nnmbers af American troops were sent to tropical areas, int reducing a new dimension to the problem of
epidemic disease in tbe Armed Forces suspect that the loyal never permit hietory to their leader appeared in heroic posture at such a

statf would record that such an un critical time

were sent to tropical areas. Cuba, Puerto Rico, and tbe Philippines threatened with diseaees unfamiliar to American immunological defenses. 77

May1965

PLAGUES AND PENNANTS

A feeling for the situation can be ob tained by extra~ting a few comments from the report of the Dodge Com mission which investigated the activi ties of the Army Medical Service dur ing the war: During the Spanish-American War

puleing every Austrian thruet across the Danube and Sava Rivers. n Later, the Austriane Iauncbed a ~ more concerted drive; thh culminated ~ in five days of bitter fighting in the valley of the Yadar before the Ser. bians prevailed and rciuted the Aw. of 1898, every regimetzt constituting trians, taking 20,000 prisoners. the First, Second, Third, Fourth, In September 1914 tbe Austrians Fafth and Seventh ArmLI Corps devsl attacked once again, and this time oped typhoid fever. More than 90 YO their offensive carried to Belgrade. A of volunteer regiments developed ty Serbian counterattack 13 day later, phoid fever within eight weeks of go however, hurled the Austrians back ing into camp. across the Drina and Sava Eivera, In Cuba, typhoid fever, yellow The defenders celebrated Christmas fever, and malaria caueed 61 deaths in Belgrade; but their jubilation was out of every 1,000 patients admitted to be ehort lived. , for disease. In Puerto Rico, typhoid Disease Spreads fever alone caused 41 deaths per 1,000 The first cases of typhus had oc admissions for disease. In the Philip curred in the Serbian Army in Octo pines, 19 per 1,000 died from typhoid ber and November; the disease was fever, smallpox, malaria, and diar thought to have been introduced from The over-all ratio of rhea] disease. Albania. In the wak,e of the Austrian disease versus injuries was 2,037 to withdrawal in December, many of the 109 per 1,000 men. In other words, captured or wounded soldiers were , every man visited the hospital two found to have typhus. They were times during 1898. There were 3,949 gathered in Valjevo, which bad been total deaths during this year and the the Austrian headquarters, and the vast majority were due to dieeaee. It dieeaee quickly spread among the 60,- 1) ie an interesting commentary on this 000 prisoners and those who nursed war that more men were ruptured them. It was then that a fatal error than were injured by gunshot. was reads-the Serbians decided to
Serbia

The Turkish and Bulgarian wars of 1912 and 1913 had just been con cluded when the incident at Sarajevo plunged Serbia into World War I. The preceding conflicts, and a cholera epidemic, had depleted Serbian re sources, including medical personneI and materiel. Austria-Hungary etruck tbe Ser bian Army in July 1914. The weary army fell back and Belgrade was brought under artillery fire. The Aus trians did not follow immediately, and the Serbians rallied, eventually re
7a

separate tbe prisoners and to send them to different parts of the country for treatment and internment. Within a short time, an epidemic of enormous proportion erupted in every corner of the little country, reaching a peak in April 1915 when 9,OOOnew cases were being reported each daythe army alone was con tributing 2,600 a day. The situation was completely beyond the capability of health authorities, and the condi tions of filth and stench in the bur geoning hospitals were reminiscent of the ~esthouses of the 17th century.
Militsrs Review

1 I

PLAGUES AND PENNANTS Over 150,000 deaths occurred in six months @ a country of 2.5 million people. Relapsing fever and typhoid were also present, but were lost in

the. power of epidemic disease oc curred in 1916 in Macedonia, when British, French, and Bulgarian Ar mies were decimated to the point of

the agony of the typhus. In October 1916 Field Marshal August von Mack ensen crushed the valiant Serbian Army which retreated to the Adriatic coa~t, never again to be an effective arm of the allies. In World War I the American Ex peditionary Forces suffered no major epidemic problems. The Surgeon Gen erals report revealed only a signifi cant incidence of influenza-729,281 cases with a mortality rate of seven per 1,000 patients. This was a part of the Spanish influenza pandemic which swept around the world, a disease which accounted for some 200 million cases and 10 million deaths. One remarkable demonstration May1965 of

immobility by malaria. The stalemate persisted for three years. In the Brit ish Macedonia expeditionary forces alone, 162,512 soldiers out of 434,724 were hospitalized, a situation that was little better among the other com batants. In World War II, we were better prepared to cope with our microbial antagonists than at any previous time in history. Sanitation discipline had been improved, mass immunization became routine, and physical stand: ards were more rigid. But what hap pened ? In the South Pacific theater of op erations, malaria caused five times as many casualties as combat operations. 79

i
PLAGUES AND PENNANTS

In September 1943 the malarial at tack rate was, 700 per 1,000 men. Im provement was dramatic with quina crine (atabrine) prophylaxis, but it came top late. In New Guinea the Australian 7th Division reported that malaria was the cause of 90 percent of the casualties due to disease and 82 percent of the total casualties. Other units shared its pfight.
Impact an Morale

In the last days of the fighting on Bataan, 20,000 American and Philip pine soldiers were infected with ma laria. In the US Army alone in the first yeare of the war, 500,000 cases of malaria were reported. Only 301 of these died, but the impact on mo rale and productivity was severe. In May 1943 General Douglas MacArthur said:
This will be a long war if fov every division I have facing the enemy, I must count on a second in the hospital with malaria and a third division con valescing fTom thie debilitating dis ease.

1 In other areas, less exotic diseases j W exacted their toll, During the war, $of over four million soldiers were hos. j Js pitalized with a virus-induced, upper j 10 respiratory disease with an average ~m hoepital stay of 6.7 days. This wss St equivalent to the ioss of four divisions ,W from combat for a period of one year,s1 Dysentery and other forms of diar. rhea ran ramuant amomr the armie 9 -. t] in North Af~ca during the desert campaigns of 1943. German camps were notorious for the laxity of their sanitary discipline, and the incidence of diarrhea among German soldiers was consequently high. Vice Admiral Sir Sheldon F. Dudley, Medical Direc tor General of the British Navy from 1941 to 1945, has remarked that though Montgomerys aidthe Eighth Army WOU,Rommel claimed the vic tory for dysentery. Shades of Gettysburg!
Acute Infections

Other exotic diseases assaulted US troops. Filariasis was a vexing prob lem throughout the South and South western Pacific. In 1942 and 1943
. thousands of soldiers, and often en tire units, were evacuated from the
tropical islands to prevent the dreaded
lymphatic obstruction (elephantiasis )
which attends repeated expoeure to
the microtilaria. Many of ,the troops who waded ashore at Leyte Gulf in the reoccupa tion of the Philippine Ielands devel oped a strange itch between their toes. This was the introduction to the US infantryman of schistosomiasis, a parasitic fluke with an affinity for the liver and gastrointestinal tract. We lost 300,000 man-days ae a result of this disease.
80
,.

World War H did generate great interest in the problems of interna tional health, and research in immu. nology, preventive medicine, and anti biotic development advanced our knowledge in tbe fight against disease. But it seems that each time men gather to train for war or actually engage in combat, new and completely unprecedented situations arise. It is true that the violent pandemics that depopulated vast segments of tbe earth in past ages have gone; even the influenza pandemics arelessviru lent. and in 1958 Asian influenza was qui~e benign compared to ite deadly predecessor of 1919. Yet, strange things have happened. In 1946, for example, outbreake of acute streptococcal infections were re ported from several US training camps. The caueative organism wae resistant to sulfonamide druge. At
, Military Ifovisw

PLAGUES AND PENNANTS

~ his prwticular tilme, troop strength It

i of our occupation forces in Korea and \ Japan had declined to precariously ~low levels and some 60,000 recruits, , many from those camps where the 1 streptococcus had been prevalent, , were loaded onto troop transports and shipped to the Far East. The ships made the long trip by the cold northern route, and crowded conditions were ideal for the rapid dissemination of streptoeoccal infec. I tions. On 15 January 1947 at Inchcm, troops debarking from one transport wsre tested by taking throat cultures at dockside. Over 50 percent were found to he carriers of the hemolytic streptococcus; 15 percent required hospitalization. At this time 2,237 cases of scarlet fever were reported in a six-month period. This was followed by 1,146 cases of acute rheumatic fever. At the peak of the epidemic the attack rate ! ! was 59 per 1,000 soldiers.
had been the scene of a small epidemic of a disease which defied clinical diagnosis. Forty soldiers reported on sick call with fever, malaise, severe muscnlar ach ing, and jaundice. Perplexed medical officers suspected hepatitis, but the illness had too many unusual features. It was reported in medical literature aa Fort Bragg Fever. The percep tive staff had some tubes of serum placed in the deep freeze. Nine years later, in 1952, the situ ation was reinvestigated. Now, it was snspected that Fort Bragg Fever represented a form of leptospirosis, a spirochetal disease. The old tubes were removed from the freezer, and the serum was analyzed by techniques that had not been available in 1943 the clinical suspicion was confirmed. Fort Bragg Fever In 1943 Fort Bragg

The disease had heen acquired hy the sol~lers while swimming in a pond which had been contaminated by urine from swine, rats, or cattle; each animal is the vector for a different variety of Ieptospira, During the British counterinsur. gency operations in Malaya in 195A an increasing number of soldiers be gan coming down with an unusual fever. Between March 1954 and Sep tember 1955 a research unit from the Walter Reed Army Institute of Re search, working with the British in the latters hospital at Kinrara, studied 852 patients and discovered that leptespiroeis ~as the most com mon cause of fever. It was identified in 213 military patients and 31 civil ians, and accounted for 35 percent of all cases of fever. In 1953 two French physicians re ported the presence of Ieptospirosis in South Vietnam. Thus, it has
emerged military New Virus as a disease significance. of international

In 1957 alert medical officers at Fort Leonard Wood ohserved a some what bizarre variation in the common uPPer respiratory diseases of their recruit patiente. Their reports at tracted the attention of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Reeearch, and a team of bacteriologists, virolo gist, and immunologists was dis patched to Missouri. As a result, the first of a new family of virusee was isolated. The traditional affinity of the urmsual microbe for the usual sol dier was being preserved. At Warren Air Force Base near Cheyenne, the high incidence of strep tococcal infections was eo consistent and predictable that a special labo ratory was established to conduct long-term studies on the effects of 81

May 1965

PLAGUES AiUl PENNANTS

penicillin in the prevention of acute rheumatic fever., The investigators never. lacked for case material. Over a five-year period they collected 5,198 patients, ~ dubious distinction which could have been shared by several other recruit training centers. These are not examples of severe epidemic disease that influenced mil itary operations to any significant ex tent, but they must be taken in con text. Most of these small outbreaks were atypical, but most of them oc curred under almost optimal condi tions of sanitation in a peacetime en vironment. Under other circumstan. ces, the situation might have been different.
Unknown Disease

In June 1951, for example, a litter jeep brought a patient to a battalion aid station near Uijongbu in Korea. The patient was an otlicer in deep coma; his body was covered with oex tensive areas of subcutaneous bleed ing; his temperature was 106 de grees; and his blood pressure was not obtainable. Emergency treatment was administered and as soon as hc was reasonably stabilized he was transported to the 121st Evacuation Hospi . tal. Despite all efforts he died within several hours. No one could make a diagnosis; several educated guesses proved wrong. It was weeks later that Japanese physicians identified the disease in another patjent seen at tbe Tokyo Army Hospital. It was epidemic hem orrhagic fever, which they had re membered from Manchuria. Tbe dieease was unknown to US physicians. From April 1951 until January 1953 there were 2,070 such cases with 122 deaths among United Nations per sonnel, a mortality rate which aver aged about six percent. Among US 82

soldiers, there were 1,694 cases with t, 92 deaths. It was a small plague, u ~ plagues go. d But what would have happened if this incident had occurred months 1 earlier, when our military posture bad been ckitical ? We eventually ( learned that the disease is not trans1 mitted from man to man, and that it ( seems to be confined to an area along { the 38th Parallel. But this knowledge : was not forthcoming for several
months. The confnsion and uncer tainty during the Chinese Communist
intervention could have been inten , sified if this mysterious disease bad
appeared in our midst during that interval, and wotdd undoubted y have had an important effect upon our mili , itary operation.
Malaria

Throughout this review of war and disease, one can follow the heavy im print of malaria, a disease which has been known on this eaq~h for over 2,000 years. Over one bdlion people still live in areas where malaria flour- ( ishes. Four million dwell where no malarial eradication program exists. Jb Malaria is a disease with 300 million sufferers and takes the lives of three million people each year. It has been ) doing this for centuries. Yet we know all about malaria. The life cycle of the parasite is a familiar part of the catechism of every med ical student. The morphology and idiosyncrasies of the protozoa have been explored in depth. The beneficial effect of cinchona alkaloids (quinine) has been known for centuries. But malaria still flonrishee. 4 In World War 11 the Japanese moved rapidly into the uplands of Java and seized the few thousand , acres of land bearing the cinchona trees. This gave the Japanese a virMilitary Revinm
1

PLAGUES AND PENNANTS

tual mmrOk m the only means which man has known for three hun

dred years fOr fighting malaria.

legends of War

The heroic effort of Lieutenant Colonel Arthur F. Fischer to develop a source of quinine for the Allies ia one of the legends of the war. The urgency of the situation can be appreciated from the staggering num. ber of malaria-induced casualties suf fered hy the Allied armies. Conse quently, an enormous etfort wag di reeted into the search for effective antimalarial drugs and residual in secticides. Over 16,000 compounds were stud ied; only 160 were sufficiently safe for human investigation. Of these drugs, five have proved to be of last ing value. Then, in 1943 DDT was discovered; for the first time in his. tory, an economically feasible ap proach to interrupting the life cycle of the anopbeIes mosquito was avail able. The time had come to destroy this ancient nemesis. But we had un derestimated both parasite and mos quito. In the study of microorganisms and the means to destroy them, there is tbe curious biological phenomenon of resistance. The sulfonamide-resistant streptococcus is a prime example. Re sistance may develop by one of two meebanismsthe organiem can mod ify its metabolic proeeesee to circum vent the damaging effects of the anti biotic agent; or, in most colonies of organisms, there are a few which have intrineic resistance to one or more antibiotics. They represent an insignificant minority since they are suppressed by the drug-sensitive ma jority under normal conditions. How ever, when an antibiotic destroys the ausceptib]e organisms, the resistant May 1985

survivors thrive and multiply to re populate the mediain the test tube or patientas a completely resistant strain, The wily anopheles mosquito has developed resistance to DDT, and its deadly sohort P. Iakipmwtz, the ma. Iarial parasite, has begun to manifest increasing resistance to the newest antimalarial drug, chloroqu inc. Such strains have been reported from Co lombia, Brazil, Cambodia, Thailand, MaIaysia, and South Vietnam. Ma laria still constitutes a serious threat to the success of any military opera tion mounted in an area where ma laria is prevalent. It is only with ade. quate individual and group discipline that troops can operate in malariaI areas without being decimated by the disease. sense, this can apply to any epidemic agent. The lesson of hktory is clear. Although the great plagues are gone, the military cam paigns of tomorrow could falter or fail if our troope are weakened or de moralized by disease. How can we prevent tkds from happening to fu ture American armies ? No one can anticipate all eventuali ties. But there are steps that can be taken to protect our troops against known disease hazards. We could start by educating troop commanders. We muet convince key officer per sonnel that epidemic disease is a crit ical factor in military planning. They must never underestimate the disrup tive power of the microbe. It seems trite and fruitless to preach from Army Regulations 40-5, Prwventioe Medicirw, which state with great clar ity that officers are charged with the responsibility for the medical care of their troops. 83
Clear Lesson In a broader

PLAGUES AND PENNANTS Unfortunately, the phrase com

mand responsibility has lost much of its real meaning from overwork and broad application. An appeal to the troop cuthmander must be on an intel lectual basis, and this can only be ac complished by citing historical exam ples and by applying this knowledge to current situations. , Ofiicera should also be afforded the OPPOrtunity to become familiar with the capabilities and availability of preventive medicine trained Medical Corps and Medical Service Corps of. ficers. Basic training ifl the fundamentals of preventive medicine in the field shouId be provided. Wherever and

whenever possibIe, a new environ. ment must he tailored to conform to our standards of hygiene and sanita. tion. This is never easy, especially under combat conditions, but simple awareness of the problem, flexibility, and ingenuity may spell the differ. ence between health and disease ~~ victory and defeat. Our microbial enemy has capabili. ties which have taxed the imagination of man for centuriee. Ultimate vie. tory against epidemic disease will come, but, perhaps, not in this ten. tury. Where the battle pennant flut. ters, soon the plague will try to follow, It is up-to us to interrupt the mo. notonous cycle of war and dieease,

It is the fundamental purpose of the United States Army to fight the

nations battles on land wherever the need may arise. This the Army does

by cIosing with the enemy and defeating him wherever be may appear, in whatever guise and configuration.
General Harold K. Johnson

84

Military Revi~)

indian ocean strategy

Wing Commander Mahamj K. Chopra Indian Air Force, Retired

HE Indian Ocean covers a vast area which ie composed of an expanse of water, a network of islands, and a number of oceanic states. The strategic interests in this region have developed in a peculiar way. There was a time when practically no such interests existed. Then there came a period, which lasted for nearly four and a half centuries, when strategy was sought to be concentrated under a eingle authority, and for one-third of the period was, in fact, concentrated. This span of time has now been super seded by another, which has already lasted a qnarter century, in which strategic unity has disintegrated and multiple strategies have arisen. Of the three forces behind this evolution of strategic interestsgeography, political and economic impulse, and technology geography has been primary. The Indian Ocean, which is the most extensive part of the region, has an area of 73.5 million square kilometers and is the third largest ocean in the world after the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. The entire region falls roughly between the latitudes 300 north and 60 south and longitudes 30 east and 120 east, embracing belts of the Equator, the Tropic of Cancer, and the Tropic of Capri corn, and portions of the landmasses of three cent inentsA frica, Asia, and Austra liabut excluding parts of the Pacific. Four geographical features of the region bear on strategy: Its location on the globe. The Indian Ocean area is a bridge between the east and the west, providing lines of communi cations and contact which are comparatively free, easy, and reliable. Compare these with the arctic ronte and the cross-Eurasian routes. The former Was not even dreamed of in the past. The land routes through China, the Soviet Union, and Europe, al ways dangerous, have been closed for the last six centuries for purposes of free movement. 85

INDIAN OCEAN
Distancesnot as long aS those in the Pacitio, btit which are consid erabl& It is approximately 2,660 kilo meters from Aden to Bombay and about the same distance from Madras to Singapore. From Durban to Co lombcw it is 5,800 kilometers and to Melbourne 8,370 kilometers. Air travel has reduced tbe time between those points, but even the fs.steet steamehip today still requires several weeks to traverse the distances. Thie factor highlights the importance of islands in the ocean, serving, as they do, as indispensable halting centers. Compared to the size of the ocean, the lines of communications are by no means prolific, and in tbe south they are particularly sparse. Winde. They are related to the rotation of tbe earth and to the dis tances from the Equator. Nortli of the Equator the winds blow soqth west in summer and northeast in win ter; south of the Equator the direc tions are reversed. Not as important today, tbe movemente of the air were vital determinants of oceanic traffic for commerce or for war in the days of sailing vessels. Moreover, these winds do exert a profound influence on the adjoining lands, being con cerned with raine, with the formation of deserts and forests, with the living chores of the people, and quite often with political and military calcula tions. Most important, there is the

configuration

of

the

Indian

Ocean,

While the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans run generally north and south, from one to another, the Indian Ocean ends at a Iandmaes, thus forming a gigan. tic bay. Overlooking this bay from the north are the countriee of the Middle Eaet, Pakietan, India, and Burma which, with the exception of Burma, have given rise to some of the oldest civilizations, denseet popula tion, and richest materials worth struggling for and fighting for. Un. like the frozen north of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the northern sec. tor of the Indian Ocean is hospitable and full of !ures and incentives. Both the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Ben. gal have been theaters of human in. tercourse since timee immemorial. For purposes of intercourse, Arabi~ and Iran have been important. But Indias roIe has been even more so Her peninsula juts deep into the wa, ters; her location is central to th( east-west traffic and her coastline of fers numerous halting points. Negative Influence Africas influence has also heel profound, but in a negative wayi acts as a barrier between the AtIan tic and Indian Oceans, so that fo) century upon century the seafarini peoples of the weet were practical]! cut off from the peoples of the east It was not until 1486 that a Portu guese sailor discovered the Indial Ocean after a grueling travel of 6,44( kilometers. Five centuries have gon, by since then, and while the barrie Africa has created has been tone{ down, it hae not completely disap peared. The eastern ramparts of the India] Ocean, on the other hand, consist o splintered bits of land of which Su matfa, New Guinea, and Austrafi Military Review
.

m~ng Commander Mnharaj K. Chepra, Indian Air Force, Retired, is military cowespondent for the Eng lish-language Indian newspaper, Tbe Indian Express. Hs ie the author of Indian Defense at the Croseroadi: which appeared in the October 1964 issue of the MILITARY REVIEW.

86

INDIAN OCEAN

institute the bigger samples. In be veen, the sea has carved its alleys mough which movements have taken ace throughout the ages. Strategy, in the sense that it pro otes policy with the aid of military ]wer under organized authority, ia : comparatively modern growth. But
Istances of ancient commanders us ~g the Indian Ocean in military sit ~tions are not lacking. One such in

ance is provided by Alexander who, wing battled his way through the ay 1965 .

deserts and mountains of the Middle East, found it difficult to return over land with all his troops and booty. He sent a portion of his holdings back by sea--quite a feat at that time-using a Punjab-built flotilla which sailed from the Indus. to the Euphrates. The seafaring art progressed so much that 14 centuries after Alexan ders feat, the kings of south India mounted conquering expeditions across the Bay of Bengal to the regions of Indochina and Malaya. 87

INDIAN OCEAN

The advent of the Portuguese to ward the em-l of the 15th century ma~ked the first deliberate attempt to control the Indian Ocean. They had larger dnd better-built ships than the Arabs, who had been in the Arabian Sea for a long period of time, and their ships were fitted with more powerful guns with longer range. They captured Mauritius, established fortifications at Goa, and controlled Hormuz and Muscat at the mouth of the Persian Gulf and Aden on the Red Sea. When Malacca in the East Indies also fell to them, the Portuguese strategy took an all-oceanic character. They also prescribed that in the appli cation of seapowe~ all ships follow only certain predetermined courses.
Trade Orianted

This system, which prevailed throughout the 16th century, was trade oriented and did not aspire, after conquest of territory, beyond a few islands and coastal towns. The British, who dominated the Indian Ocean for 150 years until 1939, fOl lowed ae well as extended the Portu guese system. Instead of confining themselves to a few towns or islands, however, they conquered large terri tories in all the three continents ad joining the ocean. India was tbe bub of the British Empire, which also included terri tories on the eastern seaboard of Af rica, the Middle East, Burma, a num ber of Malaysian islands, and Aus tralia. The two vital entrances into the ocean, the Red Sea and the Strait of Malacca, also rested in British hands. So secure was this British lake that in the war of 1914-18 only one enemy cruiser entered itthe .Ewzden-hnd it was destroyed. This great and mighty security

system was breached during WOrl~ War 11 by the Japanese. Sweeping south from the Home Islands, the Japanese stormed Singapore, overran Malaya and Burma, and knocked at the gates of Australia. Their dive bombers and torpedo planes sank British battleships. From their air. craft carriers their planes bombed Ceylon and Madras. From the Anda. man Islands, which they occupied, their aircraft took off and bombed Calcutta. But the Japanese sun shone no more than three years. Meanwhile, an ers in the history of the Indian Ocean ended and another begati. Instead of the well-knit complex of colonies and autonomous states under one author. ity, there arose a medley of completely disintegrated units. Mosaicof Powers Since 1945 the Indian Ocean regior has developed a mosaic of powers, de pendent as well as independent, en gulfed in still larger power patterns and conditioned, like other regions by the revolutionary technological in novations of the post-World War 1 period. Along the 9,660 kilometers of eaat ern and southern shores of Afric: there are now seven independent states: the Republic of South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, the Sudan, and the United Arab Re public; across the Mozambique Chan nel is also the Malagasy Republic. Along the coastline of Asia, more than 18,000 kilometers long, there are the 12 independent states of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the Federation of South Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, the Federation of Malaysia, and Indone sia: In between there are territories like Mozambique in Africa, Aden in Military Review .

88

INDIAN OCEAN

Asia, and Mauritius in the ocean, seeking. a new political expression, while Australia and New Zealand have developed a new stature and outlook. The gateways of the Indian Ocean also appear in a new political setting. The Suez Canal has been taken over * .> ,.

Seychelles, Mauritius, the Chagoa

Aldabra, Rodrigues,
Archipelago, Amirante, and Chriktmas.
India has the Andamau, Nico-
bar, and Laccadive Islands France holds tbe R&union, Crozet, Comoro, and Saint Paul Islands.

US Armg

The efficiency of the mountain barrier which runs from Afghanistan become questionable

to Burma has

by the United Arab Republic, Aden is in tbe grip of convulsions, while the Strait of Malacca is in the cockpit of a power struggle which involves mtmy countries. Islands of the Indian Ocean have not been redistributed as L, astically as territories around it, but even these are still held by as many as seven countries: Britain has the largest number of the more important islands, including KWia Muria, Socotra, Maldive, May1965.

Australia has the Cocos and

Heard Islands.
South Africa holds the Prince
Edward Islands.
Indonesia, the Mentawai Islands,
among others. Burma, the Mergui Islands and

several others. Many of these islands have played important roles in the military his

tory of the Indian Ocean, and will un doubtedly play important roles in the future. 89

INDIAN OCEAN

While old powers have shed their

supremacy in. whole or in part, no
consolidated authority has emerged
to occupy a position of dominance. At
the same time, a system of power
blocs has come into being which op erates on a worldwide basis. Like
many similar seetore of the world
the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, and
the Pacific-the Indian Ocean has be.
come an integral part of the fabric of
global strategy.

Security ef Region

portant,

and that country comes into prominence every time the Suez Ca. nal is closed and chips have to enter

In a general way, all the states around the ocean are interested in the security of tbd region, for their own stability and their ability to en joy benefits from contact with the sea largely depend upon this security. Not every state, however, has the power to influence developments sig nificantly in tbe ocean area. In east Africa, while every state can claim some kind of a strategic advantage, only two-the United Arab Republic and the Republic of South Africaare particularly important. Forming a crossroads between Asia and Africa, facing Europe, and lo cated at the junction of two seas, the United Arab Republic has some unique advantages. In practically every as +essrnent of the military situation in the Indian Ocean area, the Suez Canal must figure. Tiny though it is, that canal is in dispensable for the bulk of contacts between the east and west, the econ. omy of the United Arab Republic, and the needs of tbe developing countries east of the Suez. The United Arab Republic has reasonable military strength, with her fleet of 450 bomb ers and fighters and two dozen war ships, but the limitations of her strength are obvious. South Africas location is also im
90 .

tbe Indian Ocean via Cape Town. South Africa has about the same an. nual defense budget as the United Arab Republicabout 300 million dol larsbut her armed forces are smaller, and are significant only for purposes of regional strategy. The oceanic states of south Asia present some conditions strikingly different from those of east Africa. The seat of ancient civilization, their , contacts with the outside world are deep rooted. Their economy+il, raw material, a-rid tropical prodnce-has a global character. Now and again they have served as a buffer between cen tral Asia and the Indian Ocean. In this belt lies India.
Two Grosrps

Countries in this part of the world may, perhaps, be considered in two groups. There are those which are members of a military alliance-Iran, Pakistan, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand. While these countries seek to influence strategy through al liance, their own intrinsic significance may not be ignored. Iran with her oil and location on the Persian Gulf, Pakistan facing the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, and with her considerable reeources, and Australia with more than 4,830 kilometers of coastline along tbe In dian Ocean are all individually sig nificant in the strategic balance sheet. But they, too, have their limitations. Australia is off the beaten path and is underpopulated. The other two are capable of influencing only local strat egy. The second group consists of tbe nonaligned statesBurma, Indonesia, and India. Burma bas not developed
Military Review

INDIAN OCEAN

considerable naval or airpower, but her western coastline covers almost tfie entire eastern shore of the Bay of Bengal. What is more, she is a backdoor outlet of Communist China, aud presently forms a sensitive buffer between Mainland China and the Indian Ocean. Indonesia lies at the junction of the Pacific and Indian Oceans athwart I the trade routes of Asia and Australia. With her more than 3,000 islands, which are scattered in the form of an arc in both waters, she occupies
my

influence are unmistakable, and she has been brought into conflict with Holland, Malaysia, Britain, Australia, and the United States. These ambi tions are likely to remain circum scribed for the present, but it must not be forgotten that she has a population of 100 million and that her resources, not yet fully tapped, are great. With the tongue of her peninsula jutting into the sea, India faces the ocean on three sides, has a coastline of 5,633 kilometers, and has two

3
!
! t

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Headquartersin

Bangkok, Thailand

a very important position. For over a decade she has been trying assidu ously to build military power, which presently includes anavyof some 200 vessels. Her submarine fleet, while small, is, perhaps, the best in south ern Asia. Indonesias ambitions to extend her May1965

groups of islands-one of which is far out in the Bay of Bengal andbas a southeast Asia look. BY virtue of her geography and resources, India possesses a potential for naval strat egy On. an oceanic scale. Presently, however, her navy is small, consisting of a emall aircraft carrier, two cruis 91

ers, three destroyers, a dozen frigates, and a number of other vessels, but no submarines. H6r air force is also small. The Andaman Islands have re cently b6en strengthened, but, by and large, Indias sea and air forces are essentially designed for defensive purposes and would hardly be effective beyond halfway to the Equator. India is interested in the security of the Indian Ocean area both for her own development and trade-which is now 3.2 billion dollars a yearand the safety of world communications of which she is a focus. Apart from a few shipping lines which go direct to Australia via Cape Town or tbe Suez, there are no routes between the east and the west which do not converge at or pass over India. British Interests Britains interests in the Iridian Ocean are still surprisingly varied and farflung, even though there is no British Empire. A bulk of the Com monwealth people live in this area and here, too, lies a greater part of Commonwealth territory. Britain has two military alliances hers-the Cen tral Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Treaty Organiza tion (SEATO ) and one defense ar rangement, with Malaysia, in addition to a rather nebulous defensive link with South Africa. A large number of British islands are located in the., Indian Ocean, and across it or over it pass British ship ping and air routes. These account for a high proportion of British trade and contacts m,hich go right up to Hong Kong in one of the longest sweeps of communicant on in the world. Britains fear of Soviet pene tration into this region fills many pages of history; a similar fear ie 92

now being expressed about Red China. Elements of British strategy in this. area are made up of a string of bases in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East; control of a num. ber of island posts; alliances; a pow. erful navy which includes aircraft car. riers and submarines; and a home. based strategic reserve which depends largely cm air transport for mobility. Implementation of British strategy, however, has been confronted with increasing difficulties in which costs of maintenance, distances, military in adequacy, and politics all figure prom inently. Since bases in Africa or along the Red Sea, which once ensured smooth entrance, are becotning unten able, there is a search in Britain for alternative outposts which could be developed and would be reliable. In this connection, the names of Sey chelles, Mauritius, Aldabra (257 kilo meters from Malagasy Republic), and Diego Garcia in the Chagoa Archi. pelago (2,575 kilometers from Ceylon) have been mentioned. US Interests The United States has no bases in tbe waters of the Indian Ocean and her military power so far has been based east of Singapore. But thanks to her technological superiority, the United States has the capacity to in fluence the region even while remain ing out of it. Her interests in the area are con siderable. Nearly one-fifth of US trade lies here; here also are a con siderable proportion of her aid pro grams; and ahe has military alliances with a number of Indian Ocean coun tries. The security of the Indian Ocean is an important factor in US attempts to stem communism in the west Pacific and in southeast Asia. American ability to influence InMilitary Review

INDIAN OCEAN

dim Ocean areas was demonstrated in the fall of 1962 when Red China invaded India. Great quantities of mil itary equipment were immediately flown into Assam from stockpiles held in Europe. While this waa being done, 1 a US aircraft carrier of the 7th Fleet was on its way to the Bay of Bengal when the fighting stopped.
Critical Areas

Nepal, and Burma from the massive, ruthless sweep of the conquerors of central Asia. Under the new techno logical conditions, and after the Chi nese invasion of India, the efficiency of this barrier bas become question able.
Major. Routes

&

$.

1 ~ k # ( i

~ I

Following the disintegration of the old political system, the Indian Ocean area has been in the throes of con vulsion and upsurge. There have been revolutions and civil wars, disputes over frontiers, and armed conflicts among states. Old ideas have been dy ing, sometimes causing explosions. Some particularly critical areas have emerged. One of them lies roughly around Singapore; another is around Aden. The mosaic of land and sea that is Indonesia and Malaysia is the bridge between two oceans and two worlds, as well as between Australia and the AsIan mainland, and thus is of in ternational importance. An Indonesian attempt to demolish the Malaysian state could be a signal for tbe escala tion of conflict on a large scale. The southern sector of Arabia does not pose a comparable threat, but tbe sit uation there will remain fraught with anxiety so long as the conflicts call for the use of military force again and again. In another part of the region, how ever, there are portents of a much more serious explosion. The moun tainous belt of land from Afghanistan to Burma-ever 4,830 kilometers long appears far from the Indian Ocean, and yet, but for it, the history of southern Asia would have been dif ferent. For centuries it has barricaded Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, hrdia,

In the 19th centnry this buffer zone, beyond which lie the Soviet Union and Communist China, was called the land frontier of the Indian Ocean, There were few lines of communica tions through it then, as, indeed, there are not many even today. But routes of invasion were not lacking; and strategists were wont to contemplate what routee the Soviet Union could take if she made a bid to reach the Indian Ocean. It was thought that the major routes would be: Through the Persian Azerbaijan to tbe Tabriz railhead and then via Tehran to the Persian Grdf. From Bandar Shah on the Cas pian Sea by rail via Tehran to the Persian Gulf. . From the Kushka railbead to Herat, Kandahar, Quetta, to the Indus River and the sea. From the Termez railhead by Kabul, through the Khyber Pass to Peshawar, and then to the sea. Possibilities of advance east of Af ghanistan did not come seriously into strategic equations. All thie speculation appears to have become somewhat of a piece of geo political fiction when, in the fall of 1962, the Communist Chinese broke through the mountains of Assam and overran in a month the entire Hima layan slope. They followed a route hardly, if ever, thought of before, even though it is the shortest from the crest of the Himalayaswhich forms the Chinese frontierto the shores of the 93

INDiAN OCEAN

Bay of Bengal which lie only 805 kilo meters to the . .south. Serious as it was, this aggression has had even more critical, long-range repercussions. It has shown how mod ern weapone and techniques have practically softened natural obstacles and how they can play havoc when harnessed with explosive elemente. If Assam can be overrun, so can Burma. Against the background of the declared and often repeated tech niques of Mao Tse-tungintiltration, sabotage, occupation hy force-this breach of the Indian Ocean land fron tier through Assam assumes a sinis. ter signitlcance.
Search for Strategy

The outstanding fact of the situa. tion is that, unlike what prevailed be fore 1939, there is no single author. ity in the region, and, consequently no single strategy. Instead of on{ strategy as before, there is today t bundle of strategies, some with mea ger, others with powerful resources Quite often there is a contlict betwea them, making for additional confu sion. Since militarily such a situatior may not be tenable, ie there a possi bility that a single strategy might b{ evolved for the entire region ? .
Obvious Difficulties

A etrategic outlook concerning the Indian Ocean region must, therefore, take into account numerous factors, including the large size of the area, its heterogeneous makeup, historical developments, the impacts of. tech nology, the emergence of critical areas, and possibilities of massive ag gression from certain quarters. It must also vary from conditions of a large-scale war to those of localized conflicts. All this is baffling, a tangled skein not easy to unravel. In a large-scale war, should one erupt, this area would be involved much moral closely than ever before. A concerted drive to breach its land frontier would be made. On a scale unprecedented in history, there would be a colossal confrontation between land and seapowers, aided in each case by airpowe~. Comparatively im mune in the past, the Indian Ocean region is likely to suffel destruction reminiscent of the havoc caused in the Eurasiafi Continent or in the west Pacific during World War II. . But what if tota~ war is ruled out as an instrument of national policy?
94

The difficulties of this kind of ap preach are obvious if Ye recall ho! Britain Was able to maintain her su
premacy. To begin with, she enjoye( better political stability at home tha) her rivals, Portugal, Holland, an France. In the course of centuries sh accumulated immense technical an material wealth. Between the horn base and the farflung empire her con trol of the seas was unchallenged and lines of communications were uninter. rupted. Within the Indian Ocean region, while Portugal held Mozambique, France Madagascar, and Holland the East Indies, these and other foreign possessions were negligible compared to Britains vast domain. Even at tbe dawn of the 20th century Britain had no rival in Europe. Japan and the United Statee were just building their naval power, China was in the throes of civil war, Russia was weak and only a landpower, and units of the empire were underdeveloped. From within as well as without British su premacy was unchallenged. Since most of these prerequisites of ascendancy have ceaaed to exist and cannot be recreated, a single stra tegic outlook applicable to the area
Military Review

INDIAN OCEAN

would have to be ruled out. Therefore, wise strategist would have to think in terms of multiple interests and ap proaches, and even some friction be tween tbeee now and again. Despite this multiplicity, can some over-all consensus be evolved? I think yes, but only if certain common aims for the region are accepted: The human aspect. There are over one billinn people living in this part of the world, mostly in underde veloped countries, lacking in the more modern resources, and trying to make headway through conditions of turbu lence. Their commonly held desire is to forge patterns of welfare and ad vance. It is imperative, in the inter ests of the region and of the world at large, that this great mass nf hu manity be aseisted in its progress with minimum internal disturbance and maximum external security. s All the etates of the region have developed,national pride to an unprec edented degree, with a strong belief in the sanctity of frontiers and a de sire for noninterference by outeide powers. A strategy with even a sem blance of what is called colonialism is completely unthinkable. At the same time, it must be appreciated that the area cannot be closed, *that it is im portant for the world at large, and that ultranationalistic conceptions are outdated and not acceptable. While accepting for the time be ing the idea that limited conflicts can

not be eliminated, the aim should be that these conflicts are kept localized and are not aRowed to escalate into widespread, large conflagrations. It muet be accepted that con frontation between the coastlands and heartland of Asia is mnre real today than -ever befoie, that the interven ing mountain barrier has eroded. A serious effort is necessary to avoid collisions and explosions. A strategy which accomplishes these aims will have to be broadly based, built with the cooperation of many nations, charged with a political talent of a high order, and backed by a re serve of military power. It would be idle to presume that a consensus on the above lines existe. And yet glimpses of a community of interests are not lacklng. America rushing to Indias assistance is one instance. Another is a desire recently expressed in Britain to strengthen is land bases in cooperation with others or to make a part of her V bomber nuclear force available to this region to counter Red Chinese threats. The SEATO and CENTO alliances are yet another instance. These are, however, merely point ers; hy no means are they accomplish ments. A strategist must be continu ously on watch to keep track of de velopments and to take a hand in, the shaping of things in this most crucial area of the globe.

May 1965

95

UNITED Suspension System

STATES

A test is being conducted at Aber deen Proving Ground, Maryland, on a three-point hydropneumatic suspen-

control equipment. It will be a stabk manned aerial platform equipped with a variety of weapons. It will have a vertical takeoff and landing eapabil. ity and will be designed for mninte nance in the forward area of thf combat zone. AAFSS is the follow-on ,replacemen for the Armys present armed heli copters, and will be ueed as an escor for transport helicopters.DOD re lease.
Paddy Wagon

A mu NeuJ. Faatwea

sion system mounted on a modified T95 tank chassis. The system allows the driver to vary the ground clearance of the tank while moving. This feature is de signed to prevent low silhouette tanks from catching on rocky terrain by in creasing ground clearance. Improve ments in cross-country speeds and mo bility are expected.DA release. Advanced Aerial Fire Support System Two major aircraft firms have been selected to perform six-month studies to define the development program for the Advanced Aerial Fire Support System (AAFSS ). The system was conceived as an integrated aerial fire support system to include armament, avionics, and fire

An unusual vehicle called the PaddM designed to operate in mud, marshlands, and swamps, is currently the subject of research at a defense firm. The vehicle can achieve a paddle
Wagon,

..
Lockheed Atrcrait

sew;.. Cmnww

wheel effect in water, permitting high-speed crossing of water obstacles.News release.

The MfLITAflY IfEVIEW and the U. S. Army Command and GeneralStaff Conese assumem rem...sib,lity for accuracy of information wmtr,ined in the M1f,lTARY NOTES section of this rmb fi.ation. Items m. printed as 8 service to ~he readers. N. qffi.i.l endorsement of the vtews. opinion., . . factual st.ternents IS mc.md=L-The Ed,f.r.

96

Military Review

MILITARY NOTES

..
Spacecraft Pulse Motor Teat

The Air Force is at work on a four fold spacecraft research program to develop unmanned test vehicles capable of maneuvering to a precision re covery site after reentering from or
bit.

Designated START (Spacecraft Technology and Advanced Reentry Tests), the program will include hypersonic flight rocket-launched tests of unmanned lifting body reen try vehicles and aircraft-dropped transonic-subsonic flight tests of a larger vehicle of similar design. Primary objective of the program is to provide a flexible and accurate technique for return of instruments and data from orbit. Part of START is a study effort designed to correlate and interpret data rsturned from efforts in the other areas in order to learn more about aerodynamics, materials, and struc tural characteristics of future maneu verable space vehicles.US Air Force release.
long-Range Survey System

A lightweight {pulse motor con taining 40 solid propellant wafers performed successfully in a series of firings over a 26-hour period. The demonstration, conducted un der contract to the Air Force Systems Command, reportedly indicated the feasibllit y of the solid propellant pulsed concept which the Air Force

-,.

Lo.]&wd P,ow!.<0. COmP..v

A new survey system is being de veloped by the Army Corps of Engi neers to provide rapid, accurate posi tion location for mobile weapons. The new electronic distance measuring and positioning system ie being de veloped to meet the need for fast lo cation of weapons and control points no matter what the weather. The Long-Range Survey System I (LR.SS) is comprised of a control sta tion, an airborne relay station, small base stations, and up to 50 positioning bases. Distance is measured between the master station and each of the ground stationsvia the airborne relayby phaee comparison of elec tronic signals.News item.
May1965 .,

has indicated will be used for aif lamrch applications. It may aleo be useful in space operations. The pulse wafers were fired one at a time in bursts of five, each one man ually initiated two seconds after burnout of the preceding pulse. The instrumented motor was shut down for one hour between each group of firings. After 30 pulses had been fired in six groups, the motor was allowed to remain in the horizontal thrust stand overnight before initiation of the final two 5-pulse sequencee. The prolonged period of downtime lasted for a total of 19 hours. The motor chosen for demonstra tion purposes is approximately 10 feet long and two feet in diameter. Exact proportions, weights, and thrust Iev. ek of the wafers are classified, but each wafer exceeds 1,000 pounds of thrust.News release. 97

MILITARi

NOTES Equipment Transporter

Drinking Water Emergency drinking water from engine exhauet gases is being etudled

by the US ArmY Materiel Command to eupport Army tactical units in the field. Preliminary teete have shown that a pound of gaeoline can be converted into a pound of water which normally is Ioat to the atmospher& in a gaeeous etate. Reclaimed and purified, it would provide a limited emergency water supply in arid or other water short age areae. The laboratory study has included the investigation .of the heat tranefer or gas condensing characteristics for obtaining water from engine exhaust gases, the phyeical and chemical prop erties of the water produced, and the treatment preeeseee required to ren der tbe water potable. Equipment being ueed in the study includes a three-kilowatt military en gine-generator and a condenser that is an improvised adaptation of a copper-cored radiator from a ~i-ton weapons carrier, using air from a fan for cooling.US Army release.

The Army hae awarded a contrac for initial concept and feasibility etudies for a new heavy equipmes transporter (HET) for uee by th United States and Weet Germa Armiee. The West German Government als ia conducting studiee with Germa firms for the new HET. Later thi year the United Statee and West Ge many will coneider tbe results of bot etudy efforts and merge them inte single HET concept for joint deve opment. Both countries have agreed to th military character-istice. desired. Th HET wiil be designed to carry th new United States-German main ba tle tank as well as general cargo an engineer-type equipment normal t both armies. It will have at Ieaet 40 horsepower. In addition, it will h sufficiently maneuverable to negotiat 30-foot interjecting etreets wit buildinge flueh on all four corner and its axle loads will be kept unde 25,000 pounds to avoid undue damag to road networks.DOD release.

USS America

G.!I.v.I DLIwmic. Ne

The Navys newest attack carrier, the 77,600-ton USS America (CVA-66), was recently commissioned at Portsmouth, Virginia. The carrier, which has a conventional powerplant, is 319 meters long, an 77 metere wide at the flight deck. It is armed with Terrier air defense mieeil and providee a base for the Navys meet modern aircraft.News item. 9e
Military

ReY

MILITARY NOTES Arms Agreement Protective Mask Device

The United States recently eigned I an arms. agreement with Great Brit ain and Australia for the manufac ture and sale of US armament to those

nations. Included are 150 F-4

Phantom

11

fightere

and 50 C-190 transports

for

Britain. Australia will receive 12 C-13O8, 10 P-8As, and 14 S-2ES, in

addition to 100 million dollars worth of Army equ ipment.News releaee.

HotGas Valve Scientists at a defense contractors test facilities recently announced suc ceeeful testing of a large-scale system for the directional control of large, solid propellant rocket motors. Called a hot gas valve, it is being studied irran effort to obtain efficient systems for use on large solid motors. The increased eize of the planned rocket mo F multimillion-pound-thrust ~ tors of the near future demand more efficient ways of providing directional i control without unduly increasing the ; weight of the vehicle. The method under study by the ~ company calls for the harnessing of hot exhaust gases generated within the rocket itee[f. As applied to large , solid motors, tbe hot gas would be ducted from the combustion chamher into the exhaust flow of the nozzle, creating a shock wave and deflecting I thrust in a manner similar to sec ondary liquid injection systems cur rently in use on smaller motors. The valve recently underwent a successful test firing with an 84-inch-diameter Char motor. A full-scale test of the ~ valve is scheduled for mid.1965 using a 13-foot-diameter segmented motor. The development program is con ducted in accordance with a contract with the Air Force Systems Command,News release.

Development has hegun on a device which will permit personnel wearing the field protective maek to give ar tificial respiration to eevere nerve gas casualties, using the principles of mouth-to-mouth rescue breathklg. The. rescuer will not be expoeed to the hazard of nerve gas poisoning while using the resuscitating device. It will be used for immediate first aid in the field pending arrival of medical assistance. The device will consist of a flexible tube with an adapter at one end to permit rapid attachment to field pro tective maske. The other end will be attached to an oronasal mask for use on the caeuaity receiving resuscita tion. The equipment will weigh lees than one-half pound and will be small enough to be stored, ready for use, in the protective mask carrier. De spite its small size, the resuscitator will be sufficiently rugged to with stand the rigors of field handling and use.DA release.
Walleye Missile

A contract has been awarded by the Navy to a defense contractor to pre pare proposals for production of a television-guided air-to-surface glide bomb. The Navy-developed missil=alled WaltsVs-can be launched by aircraft at a safe distance and directed at tar gets by a guidance system employing television. Walletie already has been flight tested by the Navy at the Naval Ord nance Test Station at Inyokern, Cali fornia. Three aerospace companies are competing for production of the exiet ing bomb and development of an im proved version.News releaae. 99

May1965

MILITARY NOTES Operation Sailor Hat Initial tests in the Sailor

ffat se. rit% were recently conducted by the Navy ndpr Kahoolawe Is[and, Hawaii. Purpos@ of tbe tests is to find out if

A four-speed transmission at the wheel eliminates the need for lar~! and heavy axlee, differentials, ani final drives. The multitorque whet] drive can be driven mechanically, hy. draulieally, or electrically. With mi. norch?nge, thedrive can reconverted to an eight-epeed transmission. Typical applications where themul. titorquem wheel may improve equip ment include loading scrapers when heavy drawbar loads are required bulldozing; and cross-country trave involving etream fording, ~limbin[ steep slopes, and traversing Ioosesars and soils where traction is low and all wheel d$ive man~atory.US Arm: release. Heat Control Llnits A family of compact horizontal hea removing and heat producing Erw ronmental CO%trol Units (ECUs), d( signed for general purpose usage i military mobile and air-traneportabl electronic systems, is being develope by the US Army Materiel Command Engineer Research and Developer Laboratories, Fort Belvoir, Virginia The ECUS are being developed i four sizes and will be used in mi! sile-fire control vans, communication shelters, and electronic systems she
ters.

Dewvtwwnt of D.f,.m

The fully manned cruiser USS Atlanta takes the force of a 500-ton explosive charge broadside Navy ships can survive a near mies nuclear attack. Large quantities of high explosives are used to simulate nuclear blast. -Newe item. Mrdtito;que Wheel Drive

A mukitorque wheel drive being evaluated for military potential ap pears to offer significant savings in over-all vehic[e weight and an in crease in design flexibility, according to the US Army Materiel Command. The drive is aself-contained unit that can be mounted as an integral part of the wheel, and ie designed to provide power to the wheels in vehi clee with comptex configuration. This, in many inetancee, may eliminate the use of mechanical drive trains. The drive can serve either ae the main driving system or provide auxiliary wheel drive where additional traction ie needed. It ie emall enough io he built into the rim of large rubbertired equipment.
100

Design requirements include low noise level, sm,all volume, and light weight, plus the capability of with standing extreme environmental con ditions of vibration, shock, humidity, rain, fungus, sand, and dust. The ECUS will produce heat when operating in outdoo~ temperatures down to minue 50 degreee Fahrenheit. They will also be required to provide ventilating air in outdoor tempera tures ranging from minus 50 degrees tq plus 120 degrees Fahrenheit.US Army release.
Review Miiitmy

MILITARY NOTES REPUBLIC Nuclear !tesearch OF SOUTH AFRICA

COMMUNIST CHINA
five-Year MNitary Buildup

A number of actions were taken at a recent meeting of Red Chinas Na tional Defense Council, according to press reports. Conscript service has heen extended from three to four years for most land forces. Those serving in special branches, public security forces, and naval shore units will serve five years. Naval fleet personnel will serve for six years. One estimate is that the operational strength of the armed forces, now es timated at two and a half to three million menj will be increased hy onethird, Plans were said to be made for building jet bombers, fighters, and for developing short-range, land-based nnclear missiles.News iteiu. Msy 19a5

plans to build a firing and launching range for sounding rockets and satellite launch vehicles in French Guiana. First rocket to be launched under the French civilian space program will be the Diarnant, which will be fired from the Hammaguir range near Colomb-B6char in the northern Sa hara. As soon as the first segment of the French Guiana range is ready, sometime in 1968, all similar firings will be conducted there. The French Government has em phasized that the Guiana base will not be used for tests of military devices. Tests of military rockets and instal lations will reportedly be held at Pa cific Ocean test sites (MR, Feb 64, p 103) .Ne*s release.
101

FRANCE Missile Test Range has announced France

MILITARY NOTES WEST GERMANY

,.

Buildup of Naval Power This note is based on information contaiped in a recent issue of Wehr. kunde (Federal Republic of Ger many) .Editor. Naval construction programs ap
proved by the West German Parlia ment include 222 new ivarships and more than 60 support vessels. They include four destroyers of the ffam burg elase; eix fast frigates (escort destroyers) of the Koln class; 50mo tor torpedo boate; 30 submarines; 20 coastal patrol craft; 74 minesweep er; 14 tenders; six [anding ships; and a few trial vessels. Some of the new ships have already been com pleted and have entered service. The support vessel construction program includes 12 supply ships, 13 tankers, six ammunition transports, two materiel transports, 20 tuqs and harbor tugs, and a few epecial craft ranging from inland boats to floating workshops. All units will be built

by

qualified German shipbuilders, A modernization program providej for the rearmament of 10 motor tor. pedo boats of the Jaguar class with Tartar missiles, and the construction of nine new missile-armed motor tor. corvattee of pedo bOats. Ten Tartar German design are in development. These 2,000-ton ships are intended to extend the belt of antiaircraft mis. siles to the sea and to eecure. a for ward air defense. Since West Ger many doee not have an aircraft warn. ing eyetem, the protection of the wet flank againet air attacke as sumes special significance. A recently approved followup pro gram authorize the construction of three missile destroyers. These VSS. sels of the John F. Adams claes will be built at US shipyarde. Three more destroyers of the same type will later be built by the Germane. West German naval programs are ~

I
Hamburg class

.-t

Kiiln clas~

1U2

Military Review

MILITARY NOTES JAPAN

satabliahed in coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Western European Union agen cies. NATO hae aseigned specific mie sions to the Weet German Navy, which determine the typee of veesels required. The navy can completely forego units larger than destroyers. Its miesion, together with the Danieh

Guided.Missile Destroyer Japane first guided-missile-armed deetroyer, the Arnatseduzze, has en

tered active service. It was laid down in November 1962 and launched in October 1963. The 3,050-ton vessel will .be equipped with US ?artar eurface-to-air miseiles and have a complement of 290 officers and men. Newe item.
SPAIN F-5 Tactical, Fighters

Sol&t x-d Technik Skctche,

Jaguar class Fleet, is to eafeguard vital convoys and shield the coastal flank. None of the West German warships will exceed 6,000 tons. The naval forces may be called a shallow water fleet whose units meet the latest re quirements.News item. ArmoredDivision West Germany haa placed the laet of her 12 divisione under NATO com mand with the recent contribution of an armored division. There are 438,000 West German troops now part of the NATO com mands. Army units include eeven ar mored infantry divisions, three ar mored divisions, an airborne divieion, and an Alpine division.News item.
SWEDEN Civil Defense

The Spanieh Air Force will be equipped with new F-5 supersonic tac tical fighters, according to the Spanieh Minietry of Air. Seventy of the Amer ican-designed jet fightere will be or dered initially. The program includes both singleseat and two-seat versions of the F-5 fighter, which has a epeed of approx-

Northww Cove.v.tim

The Swedieh civil defense organiza tion now has its own aviation. The new branch ie organized into 28 groupe throughout the country. More than 600 trained pilote and 225 aircraft are availab]e.Newe item.
May1965

imately 1,000 miles per hour and climbs at a rate of nearly 30,000 feet per minute. Among allied nations scheduled to receive the F-5 supersonic tactical fighter are Norway, Iran, Korea, Greece, Turkey, and the Republics of the Philippine and China. Greece is echeduled to receive two squadrone of F-5 aircraft in 1965.News release.
103

MILITARY NOTES USSR Missiles ~

Weapons observed for the first time in November 1964 in Moscow on oc casion of the 47th Anniversary of the Russian October Revolution include: Missiles believed to be of the intercontinental ballistic missile type (Figure 1). The two.st,age weapon was carried on a new three-axle trailer. Antimissile weapons in special containers (Figure 2). An improved version of the Pe laris-type missile, code-named Snar?c.

SWdut m.d T.chz4 Figure

Ph.tq

4.

The new vergion features a new war. head. Figure 3 shows the Sturrk and Figure 4 the improved version, News item. Missile-Armed Destroyer A new guided-missile code-named Kashi?t-was , destroyer recently ob.

served in the Turkish Straits. Its standard displacement is estimated at 4,500 tons and full load displacement at approximately 5,500 tons. The armament of tbe new type de stroyer consists of two twin-launchers for surface-to-air missiles mounted . fore and aft, two 76-millimeter twin antiaircraft guns, five tubes, and four 12-barrel rocket launchers for anti submarine warfare. The new Soviet destroyer of the

Figure 2.

,, ~ .

Solda$ u=d Te.k.,k Kashin class is

Sl,efdw

Fvure 3.
104

shown above, and be low is the US guided-missile frigate Leahy, which is similar. At thk time no information is available as to how many of the new Soviet destroyers are in service or projected for con stfuction.News item,
Militsry Review

MILITARY NOTES NATO Code Names

He,konm{na INethe,. Innd.s} Sketch.. New NATO code names for Soviet aircraft

Tbe name for the tactical light D is kfangrove (top). The light tactical bomber known as the Firebar A was designated the Brewer (center). The all-weather fighter known as Firebar B is now simply named Firebar (bottom) .Newh item.
IRAQ Soviet Equipment Airpower EAST BLOC

have been announced. photoreconnaissance plane known as the Fkmh

The Soviet Union will reportedly supply Iraq with additional military hardware. The new equipment includes tanks, guns, aircraft, and missiles. News item.

The 62 air divisions of the Wareaw Pact states have an average of 50 fighter bombers per division, according to a West European source. News item,

May1965

THE MANAGING OF ORGANIZATIONS. The Ad ministrative Struggle. Volumes I and N. By Bertram M. Gross. 463 Pages and 971 Pages. The Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1964. $25.00 set.

THE RED ARMY. A Short History. BY Edgar OBaNance. 237 Pages. Frederick A. Prae. ger, Inc., New York, 1964.$7.50. BY COL WILLIAMJ. GALLAGHER, USA

1 ! i

BY LT CoL CHARLESB. ABLETT, USA Professor Gross, now on the faculty of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public AtTairs it Syracuse Univer sity, hss made a major contribution to management literature. After several years of service in the Roosevelt ad ministration and as staff director of the Senate Military Affairs Subcom mittee, he served as executive secre tary of President Trumans Council of Economic Advisors from 1946 to 1951. He was later a consultant to the United Nations and an economic advisor to Israel. Profeseor Gross identifies the main streams of management thought and philosophy, tracing them from their origins through mergers and changes . of direction. As presented, however, this is a social history which concen trates on mans increasing involve ment in group activities and mans understanding of tbe nature of these groups, their influence on him, and his ability to control them. Newer approaches to management are interpreted in a way which adds meaning to the modern views and to the social order of which they are now a part. The exhaustive bibliographical report of research studies and publi cations in Volume II is e. majOr con
tribution interested 106 to the newcomer or caeually reader of management.

The author traces the history and growth of the Red Army from 1918 to the present. His central theme seems to he that, despite the political hamstringing which has bedeviled the Red Army during all of its existence, it has been effective, flexible, resilient, quick to profit from its own mistakes, and ever ready to adopt new tactics when old ones have failed. A dismal notfifrom the West ern professional officers viewr)Oint which runs through this book is the J brutal treatmeut meted out to some # of its most loyal senior officers, even I to those whom- the Red Army owes so much. Trotsky, Frunze, Tukhachevsky, Feldman, Bluykher. and Yegorovto name but a fewwere all murdered, their intense loyalty to the mother land standing them in feeble stead when they became politically unreli able. Although the author portrays to days Red Army as a military mon ster, he tempers his analysis by de with the disadvantages lineating which the Soviet political system per force has handicapped this great land force threat to the security of the Weet. On balance, he leaves little doubt that in an open conflict tbe West would prevail. Mitary Review

MIL1T4RY BOOKS ANZIO: ElSic of Bravery. BY Fred Sheehan. 239 Pages. The University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Okla., 1964.$5.95. CUBAN JOURNAL. By Mehammed A. Rauf, Jr. 231 Pages, Thomas Y. CroweN Co., New York, 1964.$4.95.

BY MiJ JACK G. CALLAWAY,USA The Anzio landing was conceived in optimism, planned in haste, exe. cuted with inadequate preparation and resources, and is one major Al lied amphibious effort that Was al. most kicked back into the sea. After the landing, Allied offensive efforts failed and for four months, under cOnStant fire of the Germans, the AI. lies in the beachhead waged a desper ate defense, slowly increased their strength, and waited for an opportu nity to break out toward Rome. It was, as German General Albert Kesselring said, an epic of bravery. The author, now a news editor for the American Broadcasting Company, was a rifleman at Anzio. Four years of research have produced a book that covers the subject thoroughly and ranges from the foxhole to the coun cil rooms of national capitals. The political hyplay among the Allies is amply described and explanations of Allied and German tactics and strat egy are clear and concise.
COOE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS. Title 3 The Presidentr 1959-1963 Compilation. 996 Pages. Swrerintendent of Documents, US Ga;ernment Printing Office, Washin~on, O. & $6.00.

BY LT COL ARTHUR A. OLSON, USA A firsthand account of life as it exists in Cuba today. The author, a member of the Scripps-Howard news paper-alliance, entered Cuba as a tour ist and closely observed the populace at the grasaroota level. His book categorize the difficulties encountered by the Cuban people in their countrye emergence as a Com munist State under Fidel Castro. It is of general interest to the military reader.
CHINA ASSIGNMENT. By Karl Lett Rankin. 343 Pages. University of Washington Press, Seattle, Wash., 1964.$6.95,

BY LT COL FIELDINGL.

GREAVES,

USA

~he full text of Presidential proc lamations, Executive orders, reorgani. zation plans, trade agreement lettera, and certain administrative orders is sued during this five-year period are contained in this book. It is the fifth volume in a series of five-year compilations covering the period from 2 June 1938 through 1963. May1965

Foreign service assignments at Canton, Hong Kong, and, finally, as Ambassador at Taipei make Karl Rankin particularly fitted to describe the not always smooth course of US relations with the Republic of China in the period 1949 to 1958. Mr. Rankins account portrays the gradual development of US policy to ward Taiwan and deecrihes the prob lems facing a diplomatic chief of mis sion at a time of national uncertainty when such policy is coming to birth. The book consists, in large meas ure, of copies or paraphrases of offi cial reports and correspondence of the author prepared during hia as signment in China, interwoven with narrative comment relating those doc uments to the kaleidoscope of chang ing events in the local and world sit uation of that time. The result ie a well-rounded account with an air of immediacy often lackhg in political memoirs of the recent past.
107

MILITARY SOOKS MILITARY HISTORY

Of particular. interest to the mili tary. reader are the foRowing hktor ical works pul.dished in 1964: THE GREAT ARAB CONQUESTS. By Lieutenant General Klr Juhn Bag ot Glubb. 384 Pages. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood, N. J. $6.95. A brisk military history of the Arabs by the renowned Glubb Pasha. THE SIEGE OF PARIS. By Robert Baldick. 248 Pages. The Macmillan Co., New York. $6.95, The story of the bloody 1870 siege and the courage of the Parisians. VERDUN. By Georges Blond. Trans latedby Frances Frenaye. 250 Pages. The Macmillan Co., New York. $5.95. A well-written, thoroughly researched book whicfr recaptures the hell that characterized a great World War I ,. battle. BLACK HAWK. Edited by Donald Jackson. 177 Pages. University of Illinois Press. $1.75 paperbound. An autobiography by the war chief, first published in 1833. This edition pub lished in 1955. INSIDE LINCOLNS ARMY. Edited by David S. Sparks. 536 Pages. Thomas Yoseloff, Inc., New York. $10.00. The diary of Mareena Rudolph Patrick, Provost Marshal General, Army of the Potomac. TARGET TOKYO. By James M. Mer rill. 208 Pages. Rand McNally & Co., Chicago, Ill. $4.95. The suspenseful tale of the 1942 Doolittle Raid. DECISION Al THE CHESA PEAKE. BY Harold A. Larrabee. 317 Pages. Clarkson N. Potter, Inc., New York. $5.00. The story of a littleknown naval engagement which con tributed decisively to the outcome of the Revolutionary War.
. 108

THE HUNDRED DAYS. Compiled} edited and translated by Antony Brett-James. 242 Pages. St. Martins Press, Inc., New York. $6.50. Nape. leone last campaign, as described in diaries, dispatches, letters, and mem. oirs of the period. THE HUNDRED DAYS. By Edith Saunders. 323 Pages. W. W. Norton & Co., New York. $6.00. Also shout Napoleons 1815 campaign. An excellent piece of military scholarship. UPTON AND THE ARMY. By Ste. pheu E. Ambrose. 190 Pages. Louisi.
ana State University Press. $5.00.

ml ...

IICI

Yol ~

nO th{ D~ Rai sin aro

pol an am
P

An {

account

of+he life of a Civil War hero.

!{

THE SEVEN DAYS. By Clifford ; Dowdey. 380 Pages. Little, Brown & 4C Cn., Boston, Mass. $7.50. The story of ~ the Seven Days Battle near Richmond o in 1862, and the emergence of Lee as a battlefield commander of the first , ~ rank. :C CERTAIN DISCOURSES MILIt TARY. By Sir John Smytbe. Edited f by J. R. Hale. 120 Pages. Cornell UniY versity Press, Ithaca, N. Y. $5.00, A n fascinating polemic by a 16th-century 8 1 British officer who argued that the , it musket would never replace the longe bow. f CLEAR FOR ACTION. By Foster ~ Hailey and Milton Lancelot. 320 , Pages. Duel], Sloan & Pearce, New , York. $12.50. A well-illustrated ac- 2 count of naval surface warfare from , 1898 to 1944. 1 GENERALS IN BLUE. By Ezra J. : Warner. 680 Pages. Louisiana State 1 University Press. $15.00. A biograph- icaI dictionary of 583 Union generals useful as a reference. This is a companion to Mr. Warners Genera/a in I Gra& (MR, Apr 1960, p 109).
Military Review I

MILITARY BOOKS THE WAR.PEACE ESTABLISHMENT. By Arthur Itwzog. 263 Pages. Harper& Row, Inc., New York, 1965$4.95.

BY CQL CHARLES

J. CANELLA,

USA

The wsr-peace establishment is not a formal institution charged with the employment of power, such as the Department of Defense or State. Rather, the author maintains that since Hiroshima, the interest centered around the numeroue groupings of politico-military postures has created an informal ordering of theorists and analysts best described as a war psace establishment. The advent of the nuclear weapon led to the development of a still ex panding literature dealing with the gamesmanship of thermonuclear chess; in reaction, unprecedented em phasis has been given to the analyeis of disarmament strategy. Thus, a most extensive bibliography has been created containing so many opposing concepts that even the moat conscien tious student of politico-military af fairs has difficulty in sorting out these various strategies. Certainly, the busy military practitioner cannot keep abreast of developments in thk area. The author has taken upon himself the task of examining these concepts, establishing a continuum ranging from those who see as the solution the maintenance by the United States of a high level of nuclear strength, to those who advocate unilateral dis armament as our most rational course. Although the author eventually com mits himself, he has been as objective snd as fair as one can be in the presentation of so many conflicting views, The book is well written, with discussions which are clear but not simple, sophisticated but not eso teric. The author hae succeeded in humanizing what could easily have ihy 1965

been an abstract review through a series of personal interviewa with leading analysts and writers. This book ie recommended for those desiring to acquire an overview of a critical subject that would be other wiee impossible without extensive reading for which few of us can find the time. AMERICA ARMEO: Essays on United States
Military Policy. Edited by Robert A. 6oldwin. 140 Pages. Rand McNally & Co., Chicago, Ill., 1963.$1.25.

BY MAJ ROBERTL. BRADLEY,tl%f The intent of this collection of six essays by separate authors is to pro vide differing anewere to some related questions. Does the destructiveness of thermonuclear weapons place such constraints upon their use that mili tary power is obsolete? Is there any safe method of limiting or eliminat ing a nuclesr arms race? If not, where will it end? The titles of come of the articlee reveal the diversity in viewpoints. The Uses of Military Power in the Cold War, by Robert Osgood; The Uselessness of Military Power, by Walter MiRis; Strategy, Foreign Policy, and Thermonuclear War, by Herman Kahn; and Unilateral Dis armament, by Mulford Sibley. There is no central theme in this collection, nor was any intended. The essaye as a group are first rate and include pointe that merit attention. Each of the six authors was chosen by the Public Affairs Conference of the University of Chicago as a prom inent spokesman for his particularpo sition. Collected in an inexpensive pa perback edition, the articles are of decided interest for those concerned with etrategy and tactics. 109

MILITARY 600KS BERLIN: Beset and Bedeviled (Tinderbox of

the World). By William H. ConIan. lntrodrrc tion by Major General Philip de Witt Cinder,
United States Army, Retired. 268 Pages.
Fountainhead Publishers, Inc., New York,
1963.$6.50.
IDEAS ANO DIPLOMACY. Edited With Cont. mentary by Norman A. Graebner. 692 Pages, Oxford University Press, New York, 1964,

der
Inc.,

$12.50. BY JOHN R. CAMERON

B;

This analysis of American foreign BY CAPT DOMENICP. MASTROPASQUA, policy, through selected readings, POr1 USA ish trays the major phases of American Mr. ConIan has written a documen foreign policy and demonstrates Mr. Bri tary of a postwar city some 190 kilo Graebners thesis that the response to wit ent a crisis is dictated only superficiall~ meters behind th= Iron Curtain: the
Berlin that was, and the Berlin that
by whatever policy is in effect at the dot time. is. It is a story of the people of Berlin,
1 their heartbreaks, and their will to
He contends that the response is mil survive.
actually dictated by one of two Ca Gil The book contains a chronology of
schools of thonght: th~ analytical Soviet policy in Berlin from Septem school, whteh views Amerman foreig n TU tri ber 1944 to 26 June 1963, including
policy as a means to serve national the results of the demands made by
interests; or the ideological, whit h, the Soviets. There is also an appen sees in American policy the opportun6R dix which includes the agreements,
ity to serve the interests of humanity. Fsl political and economic, of the Potidam
Yo It is with this thesis in mind that Conference.
Graebner, a Profeseor of History at ~ ~ the University of Illinois, has struc PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF tured the components of his bOOk.~~ lal THE UNITED STATES. Harry S. Troman. 194B Each section is prefaced by a short Volume. 1,079 Pages. $9.75.1649 Volume. historical overview which describes ~, a71 Pages. $B.75. the tempo of the period. w These volumes cover the fourth and The introduction to each selection I fifth years of the Truman adminis -culled from speeches, books, and I m tration. They contain verbatim tran of magazinesprovides continuity and scripts of the Presidents news con introduces the particular author. ferences and speeches, the full text Through the extracts and brief text, !l ln of messages to Congress, and other the reader is shown the slow-rising White House releases. challenge by the ideological school , a th which reached a peak under President This brings to 16 the number of Wilson and which has not yet been ~ at volumes in the Public Papers series. in reversed. Similar works are available for the ; years since 1945, except for the last Graebners book is an important ~ three years of Mr. Trumans admin contribution to the continuing debate istration and President Johnsons first over the purpose of foreign policy. year. Those are being prepared. The book provides a thought-provok- al it ing argument in favor of a retreat The books in this series are pub B from what the author identifies as lished by the Superintendent of Doc s the current rule by the ideological uments, US Government Printing Of s sch601. fice,.Washington, D. C.
110 Military Review

MILITARY BOOKS FROM MERCV-E$S INVADERS. An Eye-witness Mnrnt of the ,Spmaish Armada. By Alexara. der MsKee.291 Pages. W. W. Norton & Co., [m., New York, 19B4. $6.50.

BY LT COL SAMUEL L. CROOK, Src.,

USA ha thie latest account of the Span ish Armada and its defeat by the British, Mr. McKee has used eye witness accounts of each stage of the enterprise, which makes the story

In order to include accounta of all theee major battles in one volume of 300 pages, the repurts are necessar ily condensed and general in natnre but adequate to tie the illustrations together. Better art than history, it is a handsome addition to the military library.
DECISION.MAK1N6. An Annotated Bibliog raphy Supplement, 1958-1963. By Paul Waa serman and Fred S. Silander. 178 Pages. Publications Section, Graduate School of Business and Public Administration, Cornell Universiv, Ithaca, N. Y., t 964.$4.75.

doubly fascinating. Witnesses range from the Lord Ad miral of England and the Spanish Captain General of the Ocean, to Giles Napper, an escaped slave from Turkish and Spanish galleys. An in triguing, entertaining book.
GREAT MILITARY BATTLES. Edited by Cyril Falls. 304 Pages. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1664.$25.00.
BY

BY LT COL FRANK B. CASE, USA In 1958 the Cornell Graduate School of Business and Public Ad ministration published a bibliography of the literature in the then-emerg ing field of decision theory. The field has grown rapidly in the last six years. The present supplement to the orig inal volume includes abstracts of over 600 selected books and articlea pub lished from 1958 to 1963. Abstracts are arranged by author under eight general headkgs, two of which are further subgrouped. An author and a title index are provided. The ar rangement is logical and convenient. Decision theory is relevant to mili tary affairs, and much of the listed material is either drawn from opera tions research or is directly applica ble to military problem analysis.
MAN AND SPACE. By Arthur C. Clarke and the Editors of Life. 200 Pages. Time, Inc., Chicago, IN., 1964.$3.95.

COL DONALDJ. DELANEY, USA

Battles is a pictor ial presentation of 27 land battles im portant in modern history. Tbe ac counts run from Rocroi 1643 through World War II. The artwork, particularly the full color reproductions of paintings, is of very high quality and there are a number of excellent photographs dat ing b~ck to the Crimean and Ameri can Civil Wars. It is unfortunate that the maps do not measure up to thi~ standard. Frequently sketchy, they inadequately portray terrain, and it is often ditlicult to trace the course of battle on them. To write the text, Captain Falls hae assembled a well-known group of mil itary authore including Bruce Catton, Bull Run, J. F. C, FulIer, Gravelottt? saint Frioat, and S. L. A. Marshall, Suvla Bay. Gr#at Milttarv

This latest volume by the editora of Life magazine is a colorfully illus trated work covering in Iaymans terms mans efforts in space and the possibilities which euch explorations may create.
111

May 1965

MILITARY BOOIS FOREIGN AFFAIRS BIBLIOGRAPHY. By Henry 1, Roberts. 752 .Pages. R, W. Bowker Co., New York, 1964.$20.00. it may not he a, completely reliabk account of decision making, perha~s because it was written so long after the eventa. It is, nevertheless, a revealing and work by one of Americas important most gallant soldiers, and a must for every military reader.

The fourth such bibliography pre pared urfder the auspices of the Coun cil on Foreign Relations, this volume is based largely on the annotated notee appearing quarterly in Foreign Af fairs magazine. The emphasis is on the really significant works of the decade. This is one nf tbe reference books considered nearly indispensable to any serious study of the international as pects of American political, economic, and strategic problems.
REMINISCENCES. By General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. 43B Pages. McGrawHill Book Co., Inc., New York, 1964.$6.95.

A VIEW OF ALL THE RUSSIAS. By Laurens

van der Post. 374 Pages. William Morrow E Co., Inc., New York, 1964.$5.95. BY COL MITCHEL

GOLDENTHAL, USA

BY MAJ ROBERTL. BURKE, USA A great controversy inevitably re sults from a vital issue which has no obvious solution. It was General Mac Arthurs fortune to participate in a great number of affairs for which there were no easy, clear-cut answers. As his reminiscences reveal, he rel ished the opportunity to assess the situation and take his stand, unpopu Iar though it frequently was. This au tobiography isas its title suggests intensely pereonal and subjective. It is useful to the historian as an ex. pression of the MacArthur viewpoint as seen in the twilight of a life of military service that spanned more than half a century. The book appeared on best-seller lists ae soon as it was written, which is some indication of the interest peo ple have in this remarkable man. It is not particularly usefuI as a source of factual information which, in any event, is available elsewhere. As some critics have already noted,
112

An intereating, provocative book by a perceptive traveler who accom plished, perhaps, the lorsgest single journey th~ough the Soviet Union by a non-Communist. Colonel van der Post, a South African who spent years in a Japanese prison camp, set out to meet all the Soviet citizens he could, armed with a knowledge of Rus sian literature and history, fluency in French and German, and,a warm per sonality which was projected in an effortless ability to inspire friendship. A great variety of people were met on a friendly basis as individuals. One of his conclusions is that the Soviet people: . . . have an overwhelming instinct to conform, a tendencg to be incapa
ble of doing openly what others are not doing and of challenging author ity or the general decree on a specific issue.

The emotionalism and primitiveness of the Soviets greatly impressed the author, as did the apparent success of their government at indoctrination. He also notes the overpowering cen tralization of tbe entire Soviet system. This is an enjoyable, worthwhile book which gives the reader a clearer insight of tbe Soviet people in basic
hur-dan terms.

Military Revie#