Edited by Guenther Roth

and Clus Wittich

Unersity of Califoria Press
Berkeley. Lo"Angeles London
,
-Max Wber
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CHAPTER
I I I
THE TYPES OF LEGI TI MATE
DOMI NATI ON
1
The Basis oLegitimacy
I . Domination and Legitimac
^
Dominaton was defne abve echo 1: 16) a the prbbility that
crtin spi6c commands (or-all cmmands) will bobye by a gven
group of prons. It thus do n include every m d m
g
"pe" or "infuence" or o prsons. Dominato ("autorty")l
in this snse may b ba on m:t divere mv dcc:
the way from. simple habitaton t the mot purey rt c
ton o advantage. Hence evey guine form of dominaton implie
a minimum of voluntary complianc. that is, an intet {b on
utr motves or genuine ac c) in obiec.
Mwc of dominapO mus o eonon m m
do w&ways have eonomic objve. Howeve, nl te m
ovr a csideble numht m@ rUire a stf (e. c. b,),
that is, a 'e gouP which c nol y bme the
,; geral plicy a wel a the sc cmmands. The meb of the
aministatve stf may bbobienc w teir sp(o s
prio") by custo, by , by a py mtrial cplex of
[:U2]
i
J
\
The Ba of Legitimy
\
interet, o;'by ideal (wetatoal) motives. Te quality of these mo
tve largely detennine the typ of domination. Purely material interet
and calcu1atoris of advantages as the basis of solidarity ben the chief
and his administratve staf reult, in this as in other connexons, in a
ratvely unstable situation. Nonnally other element, aetuaJ and
idel, supplement such interet. In certain exceponal case the former
alone may b desive. In everyday life thee relatonships, like others,
a govere by custm and material calculation of advantge. But cus
tom, prsonal avtg, purly afetual or idel motve of solidarity,
do not fonn a sufcienty reliable basis for a given dominaton. In addi
ton there is normally a further element, the blief in lgtm.
Expience shows that in no instance do dominaton voluntarily
limit itelf to the appl to material or afe or iel motve as a basis
for it contnuance. In additon every such system attempt to etablish
mto cultivate the blief in it legitmacy. But according to the kind of
legitmacy which is claimed, the typ of obience, the kind of adminis
trativ staf develop t guarantee it, and the moe of exerising author
ity,' wilI all difr fundamentlly. Equally fundamental is the variaton in
efet. Hence, it is usful t clasif the gof dominaton acing
t the kind of claim to legitmacy typcally made by ec. In doing this,
it is bt to start fm moem and therfore more familiar exmple.
I. The choice o this rther than w-other basis m cas fcto
m oly b justife by it reult. The fact that = oher typical
criteria o vrto are theeby negle for the U bing and c
only b intouce at a lat stage is no a deisiv di ty. The I-ge
m o a Q o cot has fr mor than a my "ie" sigi
m, only bm it h w definit relatos t emo

2. Not ever ca which is prote by c O law $houId

b @m mas involvig a eon mauthoity. m the worker,
m his ca f fulft Mthe w@ ctc, would b fsing au
thoty over his epo mmhis Om c, on oc o, b efor
b oer o a cr. Alhis m sttus H that o yto a co
brlatoship with hi eploe, in which he mcin "right"
to rive pymt At th s me the cocep o an authoity rla
tonship (H.Ihmis) n.'mally do no m the pibi
ity that it has orig i a fI y cot H u true mthe
m ~o the eplo o the worker as m in the fes
mNmWOwtg the wok prs ; ad the ath
Ma lo o a W who mfe y mw mw mrelato
o ft. 8twymhm<l pine uon y "invountty"
whi "that t mthe f is voluntar do no alt the
mthat the mu a c o subjeo t .e pto
o 8 bu N H et into by c"" a c b
-
J

.
THE TYPES OF LEGITIMATE DOMINATION

[ Ch. III
freely resigned, and even the status of "subject" can often ,be freely
entered into and (in certain circumstances) freely repudiated. Only in
the limiting case of the slave is formal subjection to authority absolutely
involuntary.
On the other hand, we shall not speak of formal domination if a
monopolistic position permits < person to exert economic power, that is,
to dictate the terms of exchange to contractual partners. Taken by itself,
this dos not constitute authority any more than any other kind of in
fuence which is derived from some kind uf superiority. as hy virtue of
erotic attractiveness, skill in sport oc m discuSSion. Even if a big bank i!
in a position to force other banks into a cartel arrangement, this will not
alone be sufcient to justify calling it an authority. But i f there is a1
immediate relation of command and obedience such that the manage
ment of the frst bank can give orders to the others with the clai'm that
they shall, and the probability that they will, be obeyed regardless of
particular content, and if their carrying out is supervised, it ,is, another
matter. Naturally, here as eve!'here the transitions are, gradual; there
are all sorts of intermediate steps between mere indebtedn and debt
slavery. Even the position of a "salon" can come very close to the border
line o authoritarian domination and yet not necessarily cGllstittlte "au
thority." Sharp diferentiation in concrete fact is often ilfpossible, but
this makes clarity in the analytical distinctions all the more important.
3- Naturally, the legitimacy of a system of dmination may be treated
soiologically only as the probability that to a relevant degree the appro
priate attitudes will exist, and the corresponding practical conduct ensue.
It is by no means true that every case of submissiveness to persons in
p
ositions mpower is pri
,

arily (

r even at all
.
)

ri

nted to
"
this helief.
Loyalty may b hyporItIcally simulated by mdlvlduals o-by whole
groups on purely opportunistic grounds, or carried out in practice for
reasons o material selfinterest. Or pople may submit from individual
weakness and helplessnes becaus there is no acceptable alternative.
But these considerations are not decisive for the classifcation of typs of
domination. What is important is the fact that in a given ; the panic
ular claim to legitimacy is to a Signifcant degree and according to its
type treated as "valid"; that this fact confrms the position of the prsons
claiming authority and that it helps to determine the choice of means of
its exercise.
Furthermore, a system of domination may-as often ocurs in practice
-b so completely protected, on the one hand by the obvious commu
nity of interests between the chief and his administrative staf (boy
guards. Pretorians, "red" or "white" guards) as opposed to the subjects, on
the other hand by the helplessness of the latter, that it can aford to drop
even the pretense o a claim to legitimacy. But even then the moe of
legitimation of the relation btween chief and his sf may vary widely '
accoding to the typ of bass o the relation o the authority between
mm, and, as will b sow. this variation is highly signifcant for the
Itructufe o domination.
i | The Basis of Legitimacy 2
,
5
4. "Obedience" will be taken to mean that the action of the person
obeying fol'lows in essentials such a course that the content of the com
mand may be taken to have become the basis of action for its own sake.
Furthermore, the fact thit it is so taken is referable only to the formal
obligation, without regard to the actor's own attitude to the value or lack
of value of the content of the ('ommand as such.
5. Subjectively. the cau.sal seuence may vary, especially as between
"intuition" and "sympathetic agreement." This distinction is not, how
evcr, signifcant for the present classifcation of types of authority.
6. The scope of determination of social relationships and cuhurai
phenomena bv virtue of domination is considerably broader than appears
at first Sight. For instance, the authority exercised in the schools has much
to do with the determination of the forms of speech and of written lan
guage which (\1" regarded as orthodox. Diale.:ts used as the "chancellery
langu;gc" of <lutocephalom political units, hence of their rulers, have often
hecoml' orthodox forms of speech and writing and have even led to the
formdtion of separate "na<iun" (for instance, the separation of Hol
land from Germany), The lUll b:' parents and the school, hovever,
extends far beyond the determination of such cultural patterns, which
are perhaps only apparently formal, to the formation of the young, and
hence of human beings generally.
7. The fact that the chief and his administratiYc staf often appear
formally as servants or agents of those they rule, naturally dos nothing
whate\er to dispro\'e the quality of dom:nance. There will be ocasion
later to speak of the substanti\'e features of so-called "democracy." But a
certain minimum of assured rower to issue commands, thm of domina
tion, must b provided for in nearly every conceivable case,
2. The Three Pure Types of Authority
There are three pure types of legitimate domination. The validity
of the claims to legitimacy may be based on:
I. Rational groundsresting on a belief in the legality of enacted
'ules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue
commands (legal authority).
2. Traditional grounds-resting on an established belief in the sanc
tity of immemorial traditions and the legiti macy of those exercising
authority under them (traditional authority); or fnally,
j. Charismatic grounds-resting on devotion to the exceptional
sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of
the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic
authority) .
In the case of legal authority, obedience is owed to the legally estab
lished impersonal order. It extends to the persons exercising the authority
TIlE TYPES OF LECmMATE DMINATION [ Ch. I|i
o Omcc uOct t by VIttuc O thc Otma c_aty O thct cOmmands d
Ony wthn thc scOQ O authOttyO thc Omcc n thc co ttadtOna
authOt\ty, Obcdcncc \sOwcd tO thcpeson O thc chc whoocugm thc
ttadtOnay sanctOncd gOstOn O authOtty and whO s Wthn U
sghctc bunu by ttadtOn. ut hc thc ob_auOn o Occ s a
mattct O gctsOna oyaty wthn thc awa O accustOmo Ob_auOns. n
thccasc OchatsmatcauthOtty, tsthcchatsmaucay guabO lee
as such whO s Obcycu by vttuc O pronl ttust n hs tcVcauOn, hs
hctOsmOthscXcmgaty guatcs so atas thcy a Wthn thc o
thcnuvduasbc n hschatsma.
1, hc uuncss othcabovc cassbcaton can on!y b ud_c by
b tmuu n _tomotn_ systcmatc anayss. hc conccgt M "chatsma
("the _t o go", s mkcn tom thc voabu!aty o mty Lhtstanty.
otthc Lhtstan hctotacy udo bohm, n hs Krcherecht,was thc
htst to caty thcsubtancc o thc conccgt, ethouh hc dd not usc
thc sam terminolog, Lthms [ot nstancc, 1o! n h un
Bussgealt) havc cathc certin mgtant cOngumcm o t. !t s
thusnothn_ncw.
2. hc act that nonc o thcsc thtw d thc cucdauo O
Whch w! ocugy Ihc oown_ u ay to b ound n hs
totca caw n "gutc onn, \s natuynoa va!d ojccon t atmt-
n_ thct conccgtua otmuadon m thc shatgt g bc otm. U ths
tmt thcgtcntcisno dhctcntfrom manyohms. on (.
n E.J thc uansonaton O gutc chatsma b thc go M tounza-
uon w b ww and thctcby thc cvancc w thc cOn to thc
undctsNndn_ o cmgtca systcms o authotty co8dmaby ncmd.
ut e s t may m sad Ocvcty hstotca ghmOmmo oauthotty
that t s not !kcy to b as an qb k. nays n vns M soo
@ca g has, atct a, ascomg wth uy wgm hstotca
nvm_auon, ccttan advanta_m whch shoud mm mm. hat
u, tnthcgattcuat ca maoRMauthmty dmnc
what conons to Ot aggtoxlmam such ga cw, "hmotaQ
chatsma," "thc chatsma o Omcc, "ptcy," 'but, thc au-
thmty ostatus @g and n dmn_ s k wow wh rtvy
w
amb_uous conccgu. ut thc dm that thc whoc M coctM mca
tcatybcxhausto n thcconOw abt to mdcVcg
s as aththcauthotstho_huasanythm_codb.
ii } Legal Authoit With a Bureaucratic Staf
2 I
11
Le
g
al Authorit
y
With a Bureaucratic
Administrative Staf
Noe: Th speifcally mo typ o administration has intetionally
be n taken as a point o deprture i order to make it posible latr to
contrast the others with it.
3. Legal Authority: The Pure Type
Lal authority rests on the acceptance of the validity of the fonow
ing mutually inter-dependen ies.
I. That any givn legal nom may b establishe by agremet or by
impsiton, o grounds of expdiency or value-rationality or bh, with
a caim to obience at least o the part of the membrs of the organi
zaton. This is, however, ul y extended to include all psons within
Uspher of pwer in queton-which in the case of territorial bie
is the territorial area-who stnd in certain soial relatonships or carry
out forms of soial action which in the oe govering the orgniztion
hav bdm to b relevant.
2. That every by of law cnsist etally in a consistent system
of abstract rule which hav normally ben intentonally etablishe.
Furthermore, administaton of law is held to consist in d applicaton
of thee rule t particular cs; the administative pres in the ratonal
pursuit of the interet which a spfe in the order governg the
.organizton within the limit laid down by legal prpt following
.
pincple which are capable o gene fonnuIaton a appr
i
in te ore govring the grp, or at lest not dispprov in it.
.
_. Tat thus the ti gin autority, the "supior," b
subj t an ipr mb orientng hi ao t it m his
own ditons and o .(his-i te not only for psons er
<g legal autority who a in the u s , but,
instnc, fr the ele prt a su`
g. t the pn wh o authority do s, a it is ul y
str, only in his cty . a " o t oa ton what
mob is only "the law." [Hmy m dconneon b t m
2 I 8 THE TYPES OF LECITIMATE DMINATION [ Ch. l|l
of an association, of a community, of a church, or a citizen of a state.)
. In conformity' with point j, it is held that the members of the
organization, insofar as they obey a person in authority. do not owe this
obedience to him as an individual, but to the impersonal order. Hence, it
follows that there is an obligation to obedience only within the sphere
of the rationally delimited jurisdiction which, in term! of the order, has
been given to him.
The fonowing may thus be said to b the fundamental categories of
rational legal authority:
(: ) A continuous rule-J.-md ,:ondu('t of ofcial business.
;] A specifed sphere of C0mpetence (jurisdiction). This involves:
(a) A sphere of obligations to perform functions which has been marked
of as part of a systematic division of labor. (b) The provision of the
incumbent with the necessary power. (c) That the necessary means of
compulsion are clearly defned and their use is subject to defnite condi
tions. A unit exerCising authority which is organized in this way will be
calbd an "administrative organ" or "agency" (Behade).
There are administrative organs m this snse in large-scale private
enterprises, in partie and annies, as well as in the state and the church.
P electe president, a cabinet of ministers, o a boy of elected "Peo
ple's Representatives" also in this sense constitute administrative organs.
This is not, however, the place to disuss these concepu Not every
administratve organ is provided with compulsory powers. But this dis
tinction is not important for present puQ.
(3) The organization of ofces foHows the principle of hierarchy;
that is, each lower ofce is under the control and supervision of a
higher one. There is a right of. appeal and of statement of grievances
from
the lower to the higher. Hierarchies difer in rept to whether and in
what cases complaints can lead to a "corret" ruling from a higher
authority itself, or whether the responsibility for such changes is left to the
lower ofce, the conduct of which was the subjet of the complaint.
(4) The rules which regulate the conduct of an ofce may be techni
cal rules or norms.2 In both cases, if their application is to b funy ra
tional, specialized training i necessary. It is thus nonnally true that only
a prson who has demonstrate an adequate technical training is qualifed
to be a member of the 'administrative staf of such an organized group,
and hence only such persons are eligible for appintment to ofcial
poitions. The administrative staf of a rational organization thus typically
consists of "ofcials," whether the organizton b devote to plitical,
hieroratic, economic-in particular, capitalistc-or other ends,
(,} In the rational git is a matter o principle that the' members
of the administratve staf should b completely separate from owner-
ii ]
Legal Authority With a Bureaucratic Staf
ship of the means of prouctioI} or administration. Ofcials, employees,
and workers attached to the administrative staf do not themselves own
the non-human means of prouction and administration. These are
rather provided for their use, in kind or in money, and the officiHI is
obligated to render an accounting of their use. There exists, furthfrmore,
in principle complete separation of the organization's property (respec
tively, capital), and the personal property (household) of the oHldal.
There is a corresponding separation of the place in which ofcial func
tions are carried outthe "ofce" in the sense of Pfcl'lises-from the living
quarters.
(6) In the rational type case, there is also a complete absence of
appropriation of his ofcial position by the incumbent. \here "rights" to
an ofce exist, as in the case of judges, <nd recently of an increasing
proportion of ofcials and even of wrkers, they do not normally serve
the purose of appropriation by the oficial, but of securing he purely
objective and independent character of the conduct of the ofce so that
it is oriented only to the relevant norms.
,
(7) Administrative acts, decisions, and rules are formulated and
recorded in writing, even in cases ',vhere oral discussion is the rule or is
even mandatory. This applies at least to preliminary di<cussions dnd
proposals, to fnal decisions, and to all sorts of orders and rules. The
combination of written douments and a continuous operation by
ofcials constitutes the "ofce" (Bureau) which is the central fOLuS
of all types of modern organized action . .
(8) Legal authority can be exercised in a wide variety of diferent
forms which will be distinguished and discussed later. The following
ideal-typical analysis will b deliberately confned for the time being to
the administrative staf that is most unambiguously a structure of domi
nation: "ofcialdom" or "bureaucracy."
In the above outline no mention has been made of the kind of head
approriate to a system o legal authority. This is a consequence of cer
tain considerations which can only be made entirely understandable at
a later stage in the analysis. There are very important types of rational
domination which, with respect to the ultimate source of authvrity, be
long to other categories+ This is true of the hereditary charismatic type,
as illustrated by hereditary monarchy, and of the pure charismatic type
of a president chosen by a plebiscite. Other cases involve rational ele
ments at important points, but are made up of a combination o bureau
cratic and charismatic components, as i true of the cabinet form of
government. Still others are subject to the authority of the chiefs of other
organizations, whether their character be charismatic or bureaucratic;
thus the formal head of a government department under a parliamentary
T TYES OF LEGITIMATE DMINATION [ Ch. III
rime may b a minist who oupie his piton bcaus of his au

thority i a pp,The o rational, legl administrative stf is cap

able o.,,li:.:~in al kinds of situatios and context. It is the mot
impt mehanism for the administato m everyday afairs. o m
that sphere, the exercise o authority consists ,--i.-l,in administration.
4. Lega AuthOrity: The Pure Type (Continued)
The puret typ of exercise of legal authority is that which employs
a bureaucratc administrative staf. Only the supreme chief of the organi
ztion ocupie his piton of dominance (Herenstelung) by virtue
of appropiaton, of elecon, or oha'ing be n designated for the suc
cession. But even mauthorit consist in a spher of legal "comptence."
The whole administratve staf under the supreme authority then con
sists, in the puret typ, of individual ofcials (consttutng a "mono
cracy" as oppose to the "coHfgiai" type, which wi b discusse low)
who are appointe and function according t the follOwing criteria:
(I ) They are personally free and subject to authority only with
res
F
t to their impersonal ofcial obligations.
(2) They are organized in a clearly defned hieraxhy of Omccs.
(
3
) Each ofce has a dearly def.ne spere o competence it: the
legal sense.
,
(4) The ofce is flle by a 'm contractual reiatiQi.1Ship. J.us, in
principle, there is free selection.
(5) Candidate are selected on the basis of technical qualifca<ions.
In the most rational case, this is testd by examinatiop or guarant&,d by
diplomas certifying technical train:ing, or bth. They are appointed, no(
elected.
(6) They are remunewt(d hy fxed salaries in Llcney, ft>r the most
part with a right to pnsions. Only under certain circumstances does the.
emplOying authority, espially in private organizations, !ave a right to
'
terminate the appointment, hut the ofcial is alwa ys free to resign. 1:v
1
salary scale is graded according to rank in the hierarchy; but in addition
I
to this criterion, the respnsibility of the position and tIc requirement
J
of the incumbent's social stat1s may b taken into a::(.Oll,it (c. ch. |V)
1
(
7
} The ofce is treate as te sale, or at least t. primary, Ou_
ton of the incumbent.
(8; It constitute a career. T!1ere is a system of "pwJ'lotiou" acconi-

ing t seniority or t achievement, or both. Promotion j dependent 0'

the judgment of supriors.
Legal Authoit With a BUTeaucatic Staf
(9) The ofcial 'works cnutc1y separat frm ownership of the
means of administration and without appropriaton of h8 psiton.
(10) He is suO|ot to stict and systematic discipline and control in
the conduct of the of c.
This tygcof organization is nprinciple applicable with equal facility
t a wide variety of diferent felds. 1t may be applied in proft-making
businesor n charitable organizations, or in any numbr of other typ -.
of private enterprises serving ideal or material ends. It s equally .lppli
cble to gOtca and
to hieroratic organizations. With the varying
degrees of approximation to a gutc g, u historical existence can b
demonstrate in all these felds.
I . For examg!c, butcauctacy s ound n gt:vau c!ncs, as wc!! as n
cndoWed hosgta!s ot thc horU!s mantancd by tc!_ous otdcs. u
tcauctat ot_anzaton s wc\ !!usttatcd by thc admnsttabvc to!c o
thc gtetho CK!nokrati) n thc mocm [Latho!c| chuth, whch
h,cxgtogtato a!most a!! o thc o!d chutch bnchce, whch wcc n
onact days to a !at_c cxtcnt subjet to gtvatc aggtogtaton. 1t s a!so
i!usttate by thc noton o a |aga!_ unvctsa! cgsogatc, whch s
thou_hto as onna!!y consttutn_ a unvctsa !c_a!,comgtcncc n tc!
_ous mattcts. bm!aty, thc dottnc o aga na!!b!ty s thou_ht o
as n at nvo!vn_ a unvctsa! comgtencc, but on!y onc whch unc
bons c cathcdta n thc sghctc m thc omcc, thus mgyn_ thc tygca
dstincbon btwn thc sghcrc momcc and that o thc gtvatc adats o
thc ncumbnt. hc samc ghcnomcna atcound n thc !at_csca!c cag
ta!st mtctgtsc; andthc!at_ct t 8, tbc _tcatm thct to!c. nd ths s
not les uuc m gtcaI gatte, whch w!! b dvud scgaratc!y, n
ay, Umocm #nay s ntay a butcauctatc ot_anzat:on admns
tmothatgu!atgmmIty)uactonaty,thcomccr.
2. utcauctatauthotty scatte out n its gutet ona whcrc t s
mot c!cat!y domnatcd by thc gtncgc o aggontmcnt. hctc s no
such thn_ as a hctarchca ot@nzaton o c!otcd omcaIs. In' thc htst
g!acc, it s mgss:bc to attin a stt:n_cny o dSgbne cvcn aggtmch
n_ tbat in thc aggOntcd tyg, sncc thc subtdnatc omca! can stand
on h8 own ceton and sncc hs gtots atc not dcgndmt oa thc
sugtorsud@cnt.(Oceo cas,seb!o,s. :,.)
. ggontmcntby tcmtract, whch maktsc!oton _sb!c,
scssenta to mocm butcauctacy. hctc thctc s a hctatchca o_an
zaton wth ma! sghctes o comgtmcc, but ocugcd by b
omca!s!xc sJave ot minie s, w hocvcr, uncton n a o
mally butcauctabc mannctthc tn gattmona! butmutacy w!! b
m
q. hc to!c o mk gua!:bcatos n butmuctatc ot_anzabons
s coatnua!!y :ntcasn_. bvcn an o a! n a gatq ot a ttadcunon
ot_anzat:on :s n n o sga!ze knowcd_c, thou_h t s usua!!y
dcvc!og by cxgtmcc tathct than by otma! ttann_. In thc moc

2 2 2 THE TYPES OF LEGITIMATE DOMINATION [ Ch. III
state, the only "ofces" for which no tenical qualifcations are re
'uired are those o ministers and presidents. This only gos to prove that
they are "ofcials" only in a fonnal snse, and not substantively, just like
the managing director or president of a larg business corpration. There
is no question but that the "position" of the capitalislic entrepreneur is
as defnitely appropriated as is that of a monarch. Th us at the top of a
bureaucratic organization, there is necessarily an element which is at
least not purely bureaucratic, The category of bureaucracy is one ap
plying only to the exercise of control by means of a particular kind of
administrative staf.
;. The bureaucratic ofcial normally reeives a fxe salary. (By
contrast, sources of income which are privately approriate will b
called "benefces" P]ndn)-u this concept, se low, s. 8.)
Bureaucratic a!arie; arc also normally paid in money. Though this is
not essential to the con<x'pt of bureaucracy, it is the arrangement which
b fts the pure type. CIayment, in kind are apt to have the character
of bencfcc, and thl' ren'ipt of a benefce normally implie the appropri
ation of oppoftuniti('s r {'arnings and of pitions.) There are, how
ever, gradwil !r,lnitioll\ in this field with many intermediate types.
Appropriation hy virtue o leaing or sale o ofces or the pledge of in
come from O/TllT are phenolllcna foreign to the pure type of bureauc
racy(H.:i:]:.{c. 7;:.111: ;
6. "Ofjccs"_whi,h do not (OllStilute the incumbent's principal ocu
pation, in partilul'l r "honorary" ofces, blong in other categories,
which will be disusxl later (scc 19[.). The typical "bureaucratic"
ofcial ocupic the ofice as his principal ocupation.
7
.
With respect to the separation of the oficial from ownership of
the means of adminbtration, the situation is exactly the same in the
feld of public administration and in privatc bureaucratic organizations,
such as thc brge-scalc capitalistic enterpris.
8. Collq.;ial boies will b discussed separately blow (stion 15).
At the presnt time they ;ue rapidly decreasing in importance in favor
of typ of organization whkh are in fact, an for the mot part formally
as well, subject to the authority of a singJe head. For instance, the col
legial "gmernmcnts" in prussia have long since given way to the mono
cratic "distri!.t president" (Regierungsprisident). The decisive factor in
this development has ben the need for rapid. clear decisions, free o the
necessit\' of compromise between diferent opinions and also free o
shifting' majorities.
9. The moem <lfmy ofcer is a typ m appinted ofcial who is
clearly marked of by certain status distinctions. This will b disussed
elsewhere Cch. IV). In this respect such ofcers difer radically from
efe,ctcd militac\' leader., from charismatic condDt/ieri (s. to),from the
type of ofce who recruit and lead mercenary armies as a capitalistic
enterrise, and, fnally, from the incumbnts of commissions which have
been purchased (sec. 7a). There may b gradual transitions between
these types. The patrimonial "retainer,"' who is separated from the means
ii ]
Legal Authority \Vith a Bureaucratic ,Staf
of cartying out his function, and the p:oprietor of a mercenary army for
capitalistic purpoes have, along with the private capitalistic entrepre
neur, been pioneers in the organjzation of the moetn Q of bureauc
:sy.This will be discussed in detail below.
5. Aonocratic Bureaucracy
Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic
type of administrative organization-that is, the monocratic variety of
bureaucracy-is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attain
ing the highest degree of efC:ency and is in this sense formally the most
ration3l known means of exercisin authority over human beings. It is
superior to any other form in ptccsion, in stability, in the stringency
of its discipline, and in its rcbbility It thus makes possible a particularly
high degree orcalculability of results for the heads of the organization
and for those acting in rdation to it. It is fnally superior both in in
tensive efciency and in the scopc of it operations, and is formally
capable of application to ali lind of administrative tasks.
The development of moer form; of organization in all felds is
nothing less than identicill with the development and continual spread
o bureaucratic administration. This is true of church and state. of armies,
political parties, economic cntc:
|
tis0. interest groups, edowments,
dubs, and many others. Its development is, to take the most striking
case, at the root of the modern \Vetern state, However manv forms
there may D vhich do not appear to fit this patter, such as ollcgial
r('pRsentativl hodies, par!iament:lr' conllllittees, sove|s, honorary ofcet>,
lay judges, :md II'h:lt not, and ovcvc: many people may complain about
[he " rd tilpe," It \\
'ould he h(er illmion 10 think for a moment that
continuou: 3dmini.,n,'li\(: v::J C.l!l he carried out in any feld except by
me.jUs of I1ttu \i)rking in htO he vhOc pJtt{rIl of everyday life
,is cut to ft th;" frar:w\\'ork. I f l,tI l'caUlT,ltic administration is, other things
bing equal. u\y. the mot r.ltion'll typl from a technical pint of
vcv, thc needs of mass ldml rlitra|in make !t todY completely indis
pcnahle The ,hUlL" only | hat ctvccn burC,lUl1 ,\cy and dilettantism
in tcfeld of ;IJmilll\tr.t;on.
The primary source of the '>Llperiority of hureaucratic administration
lies in the role of tcchniCI knowledge which_ through the development
of modern technology and |+:
'
inc methr;ds in the production of goos,
has become completely indisp(:nsablc. In this respect, i t makes no dif
ference whether the economic system is (Iganizcd on a capituJistic or a
socialistic basis. Indeed, if in the latter c.>ca compnrabJe level of technical
THE IES OF LEGITIMATE DMINATIbN [ Ch. III
efciency w t b achieve, it would mean a tremendous inc in
the imprtance of profesional buraucrat.
\hen thoe subject t bureaucratic contro seek to escap the in
Buence of the existng buraucratic apparatus, this u nonnally posible
ooIy by creating an organization of their own which is equally subjet
to breaucratzation. Similarly the exsting bureaucratic apparatUs is
driven w continue functioning by the mot pwerful interest which are
material and objective, but s mc in character. Without it, a-soiety
like our own-with its separation of ofcials, employee, and workers
frm ownership of the means of administraton, and its depndence on
discpline and on tehnical training-could no longr function. The only
exception would h those groups, such as the pasantry, who are still in
g sion of their own means of subsistence. Even in the case of revolu
tion by force mof ocupation by an enemy, the bureaucratic machinery
will normally continue t function just as it has for the previous legal
goverment.
The quetion is always who controls the existing bureaucratc ma
cinery And such control is pssible only in a very limite degre t
prsons who are not technical spcialist. Generally spaking, the highest
ranking career ofcial is more likely to get his way in the long run than
his nominal superior, the cabinet minister, who i not a sist.
Though by no means alone, the capitalistc system undeniably
played a major role in the development of bureucrcy. Inde, without
it capitlistc pruction, could not continue and .ny\ rta g o
soialism would have simply t take it over and incr it imprtance. ,
Its developmeht, largely under capitalistc auspice. has cret an urgent
nee for stble, stict, intensive, and calculable administation. It is this
ne which is s fateful t any kind of Iarg- ale administation. Only
by rverion in every feld-pitical, religious, eonomic, etc.-to small
scale organizaton wouId it b pssible t any considerable extent to
escap it inBuence. L the one hand, capitlism in its moem stages
of develoment requires the bureaucracy, thoug bth have arisen from
dint historical soure. Conversely, capitafism is the most rational
economic basis for bureucratic aministration and .enable it to develop
in the mot ratonal form, eially bcause, from a fscal pint of view,
it supplie the nesary money reources.
Along l\rth th_ere fscal conditions of efcient bureaucratic administra
ton, there are certain extremely imprtant conditions in the felds of
communication and transton. The precision of it functioning r
quirs the service of the railway, the telegraph, and the telephone, and
bome increasingly depndent on them. A soiaiistic form of organiza
ton would not alter this fact. It would b a question (cf. ch. Usec. 12)
ii] Legal
A
uthoity With a Bureaucratic Staf
whether in a soialistic system it would b possible to provide conditions
for carrying out as stingent a hareauctc organizaton as has ben
psible in a capitalistc order. For soialism would, in fact, require a stll
higher degree of formal buraucratzaton than capitalism. If this should
prove not to b pssible, it would demonstrate the existence of another
of those fundamental elements of irrationality-a con8ict between
formal and substantive rationality of the sort which soiology S often
encounters.
Bureaucratic administration means fundamentally dominaton through
knowlege. This is the feature of it which makes it spcifcally rational.
This :onsists on the one hand in technical knowledge which, by itself, is
sufcient to ensure it a poition of extmordinary power. But in addition
to this, bureaucratic organizations, or the holders of pwer who make use
of them, have the tendency to increase their pwer still further by the
knowledge growing out of experience in the service. For they acquire
through the conduct of ofce special knowlege of facts and have
available a store of doumentary material peculiar to temselve. While
not peculiar to bureaucratic organizations, the concept of "ofcial secret"
is certainly typical of them. It stands in relation to tchnicaI knowledge
in somewhat the same pition as commercial secrets do to tehnological
training. It is a prouct of the striving for power.
b.QtiOt to bureaucracy in the knowledge of techniques and facts is
only the capitalist entrepreneur, within his o sphere of interet. He is
the o,.y tye who has been able to maint:in at least relative immunity
from :ubjection to the control of rational bureaucratic knowledge. In
large-scale organizations, aU others are inevitably sl!ject to bureaucratJc
contrd, just as they have fallen under the dominance of precision
mach:nery-in the mass prouction of gos.
qeneral, bureaucratic domination has the fol'owing social conse-

quenc:..
(. Tbe tendency to "levelling" in the interest of the broadet pos
sible Lasi$ of recruitmcut in terms of technical competence.
(.; The tendency to plutoracy growing out of the interest in the
greatest possible length of technical training. Today this often lasts up
to the .ge of thirty.
Th dominan. . of a spirit of formalistic impersonality: "Si .. .
ir i studio," without ]-atred or passion. a'od hence without afection
. or enthusiasm. The dominant norms are concept.;of straightforward duty
without regard to personal considerations. Everone is subject to formal
equa;,ty of treatment; that is, everyone in the same empirical situation.
Tis is the spirit in which the ideal ofciaJ conducts his ofce.
2 2 6 THE TYPES OF LEGITIMATE DOMINATION [ Ch. 1lI
The development of bureaucracy greatly favors the levelling of status,
and this can be shown historically to be the normal tendency. Con
versely, every process of social levelling creates a favorable situation for
the development of bureaucracy by eliminating the ofce-holder who
rules by virtue of status pnvileges and the appropriation of the means
and powers O! admiilistration; in the interests of "equality," it also elimi
nates those who can hold ofce on an honorary basis or as an avocation
by virtue of their wealth. Everywhere bureaucratization foreshadows
mass democracy, which will be discussed in another connection.
The "spirit" of rational bureaucracy has normally the following
general characteristics;
(1 ) Form3lism, which is promoted by all the interests which are con
cerned with the security of their own personal situation, whatever this
may consist in. Otherwise the door would be open to arbitrariness and
hence formalism is the line of least resistance.
(2) There is another tendency, 'which is apparently, and in part
genuinely, in contradiction to the above. It is the tendency of ofcials
to treat their offcial function from what is substantively a utilitarian
point of view in the interest of the welfare of those under their authority.
But this utilitarian tendency is generally expressed in the enactment d
corresponding regulatory measures which themselves have a formal
character and tend to be treated in a formalistic spirit. (This will be
further discussed in the Sociology of Law). This tendency to substantive
rationality is supported by all those subject to authority who are not
included in the group mentioned above as interested -in the protectiQn
of advantages already secured. The problems which open up at this point
helong in the theory of "democracy."
11
Traditional Authority
o. The Pure Type
Authority will be called trlditional if legitimacy is claimed for it and
blieved in by virtue of the sanctity of age-old rules and powers. The
mastel are designated according to traditional rules and are obeyed be
cause of their traditional !tatus (Eigenwurde). This typ of organized
* * * * ~~~
iii J Traditional Authority
rule is, in the simplest case, primarily based on personal loyalty which
results from common upbringing. The person exerCising authority unot
a "superior," but a personal master, his administrative staf does not
consist mainly of ofcials but of personal retainers, and the ruled are
not "members" of an assoiation hut are either his traditional "comrades"
(sec. 7a) or his "subjects." Personal loyalty, not the ofcial's impersonal
duty, determines the relations O the administrative staf to the master.
Obedience is owed not to enacted rules hut to the person who o
cupies a position of authority by tradition or who has been chosen for it
by tbe traditional mater. The commands of such a person are legitimized
.n one of two ways:
a) partly in terms of traditions which themselves directly determine
the content of the command and are believed to be valid within certain
limits that cannot be overstepped without endangering the master's
traditional status;
b) partly in terms of the master's discretion in that sphere which
tradition leaves open to him; this traditional prerogative rests primarily
on the fact that the obligations of personal obeience tend to be essen
tially unlimited.
Thus there is a double sphere:
a) that of action which is bound to specifc traditions;
b) that of action which is free of specifc rules.
In the latter sphere, the master is free to de good turns on the basis
of his personal pleasure and likes, particularly in return for gifts-the
historical sources of dues (Gebuhren). So far as his action fonows princi
ples at all, these are governed by considerations of ethical common sense,
of equity or of utilitarian expediency. They are not formal principles, as
in the case of legal authority. The exercise of power is oriented toward the
consideraton of how far master and staf can go in view of the subjects'
traditional compliance without arousing their reistance. When resistance
ocurs, it is directed against the master or his servant prsonaIIy, the ac
cusation bing that he failed to observe the traditional limits of his power.
Oppsition is not directed against the system as such-it is a case of
"traditionalist revolution."
In the pure gof traditional authority it is impossible for law or
administratve rule to be deliberately created by legislation. Rules which
in fact are innovations can be legitimized only by the claim that they
have been "valid of yore," but have only now ben recognized by means
of "Wisdom" [the Weistum of ancient Gennanic law], Legal decisions
as "fnding of the law" (Rechtsfmdung) can refer only to douments .
of tradition, namely to precedents and earlier decisions.
THE TYPES OF LEGITIMATE DMIATION [ Ch. III
7. The Pure Type (Continued)
The master rules with or without an administrative staf. On the
latter case, see s.
7
a:1.
The typical administrative staf is recruited from one or more of the
following sources: .
(I) From persons who are already related to the chie by traitional
te of loyalty. This will be called patrimonial recruitment. Such prsons
may b
a) kinsmen,
b) slaves,
c) dependents who are ofcers of the household, especially
ministeriales,
d) clients,
e) coloni,
f) freedmen;
(II) Recruitment may be extrapatrimo
nial, including
a) prsos in a relation of purely personal loyalty such as all sort
of "favorites,"
b) persons standing in a relation of fealty to their lord (vassals),
and, fnally,.
c) free men who vluntarily enter into a relation of personal
loyalty as ofcials.
On La) Under traditio!lalist domination it is very conuno for the
mot important pots to be SUed with members othe ruling family or clan.'
b) In patrimonial administrations it is
common for slave and free
men to rise even to the highest poitions. It has not been rare for Grand
Viziers to have ben at one time slaves.
c) The typical house'hold ofcials have ben the follOWing: the sen
echal, the marshal, the chamberlain, the carver (Truhsess), the major
<omo, who was the head of the service personnel and posibly of the
vassals. These are to b found everywhere in Europe. In the Orient, in
addition, the head eunuch, who was
in charge of the harem, was partic
ularly important, and in African kingdoms, the executioner. Further
more, the ruler's. prsonal physician, the astrologer and similar prsons
have ben common.
d) In China and in Egypt, the principal source o recruitment for
patrimonial ofcials lay in the clientele o the king.
e) Armies of coli have been known throughout the Orient and
were qical o the Roman nobility. (Even in moem time, in the
Mohammean world, annie o slaves have existe.)
O II.a) The regime of favorites is characteristic of every patrimo
nial rule and has often been the ocasion for traditionalist revolutions.
b) The vassals will be treated separately.
m| Traditional Authority
c) Bureaucracy has frst developed in patrimonial states with a boy
of ofcials recruited from extra-patrimonial source; but, as will b shown
,
son, these ofcials were at frst personal followers of their master.
" In the pure type of traditional rule, the following features of a
oteaucratic administrative staf are absent:
a) a clearly defned sphere of competence subject t impersonal
rules,
b) a rationally established hierarchy,
c) a regular system of appointment on the basis of free contract, and
orderly promotion,
d) technical training as a regular requirement,
e) (frequently) fxed salaries, in the type case paid in money.
On a): In place of a well-defned functional jurisdiction, there is a
conficting series of tasks and powers which at frst are assigned at the
master's discretion. However, they tend to bcome permanent and are
often traditionally steretyped. Tese competing functions originate
particularly in the comptition for sources of income which are at the
disposal of the master himself and of his representatives. It is often in
the frst instance through these ihterests that defnite functional sphere
are frst marked of and genuine administrative organs come into being.
At rst, persons with permanent functions are household ofcials.
Their (extra-patrimonial) functions outide the administration of the
househ91d are often in elds of activity which bear a relatively superfcial
analogy to their household function. or which originated in a discretion
ary act of the master and later became traditionally stereotyped. In ad
diton to household of cials, there have existed primarily only persons
with ad hoc commissions.
Te absence of distnct spheres of competence is evident from a
prusal of the list of the titles of ofcials in any of the anciet Oriental
states. With rare exceptions, it is imposible to assoiate with these titles
a set of rationally delimited functions which have remaine stable over
a considerable pero.
The proess of delimitng pnnanent functions as a result of comp
ttion among and comprOmise bte interests seeking favors, income,
and other forms of advantage is clerly evident in the Middle Ages.
This phenomeon has had very' important conseuences. The fnancial
interests of the powerful royal court and of the poerful legal profe
sion in Engand were l
argely reponsible for vitiating o curbing the
inBuence of Roman and Canon law. In all perios the irrational division
of ofcial functions has be n stereotyped by the existence of an estb
lished set of right to f and pequisite.
On b): The question of who shan decide a matter or deal with a?
pals-whether an agent shall be in charge of this, and which one, or
THE TYPES OF LEGITIMATE DOMINATION
[ Ch. III
whether the master reserves decision for himself-is treate either tradi
tionally, at times by considering the provenience of certain legal norms
and precedets taken over from the outside COherhof-System);8a or
entirely on the basis of the master's discretion in such manner that all
agents have to yield to his personal intervention.
Next to the traditionalist system of the [preceent-setting outide]
"superior" court COberho) we fnd the principle of Germanic law, de
riving from the ruler's political prerogative, that in his preence the
jurisdiction of any court is suspended. The ius evoandi and it moem
derivatve, chambr justice CKabinettsjustiz), stem from the same source
and the ruler's discretio. Particularly in the Middle Ages the Oherho
was very often the agency whose writ declared and interpreted the law,
and accordingly the source from which the law of a given loality was
imported.

On c): The household ofcials and favorites are often recruited in

a purely patrimonial fashion: they are slaves or dependents Cminis
tiales) of the master. If recritment has ben extra-patrimonial, they
have tended to be benefce-holders whom he can freely remove. A funda
mental change in this situation is frst brought about by the rise of free
vassals and the flling of ofces by a contract of fealty. However, since
fefs are by no means determined by functional considerations, this dos
not alter the situation with respect to a) and b) [the lack of defnite
spheres of competence and dearly d.termined. hiearchical relationships].
Except under certain_ circumstances when the administrative sff is organ
ized on a prebendal basis, "promotion" is completely up to the master's
discretion (see sec. 8;
On d): Rational technical training as a basic qualifcation for ofce
is scarcely to tfound among household ofcials and favorites. However,
a fundamental change in administrative practice ocurs wherever there
is even a beginning of technical training for appointees, regardless of
its content.
For some ofces a certain amount of empirical training has been nec
essary from very early times. This is particularly true of the art of read-
. ing and writing which was originally truly a rare "art." This has often,
most strikingly in China, had a decisive inRuence on the whole develop
ment o culture throug the mde o life o te literati. It eliminate
the recruiting of ofcials from intra-patrimonial source and thus limite
the rul
,
er's power by confronting him with a status group (H.s. y: III),
On c). Household ofcials and favorites are usually supprted ard
equipped in the master's household. Generally, their dissoiation from
the lord's own table means the creation of benefces, at frst usually
benefces in kind. It is easy for these to become traditionally steretyped
in amount and kind. In :ddition, or instead of them, the ofcjals who
Traditional Authority 1 1
live outside
-
the lord's household and the lord himself count ,n various
fees, which are often collected without any regular rate or scale, being
agreed upn from case to case with those seeking favors. (On the concept
of bnefces see sec. 8.)
7a. Gerontocracy, Patriarchalism an Patrimonialism
1. Gerontocracy and primary patriarchalism are the most elementary
g of traditional domination where the master has no personal ad-
ministratve staf.
. .
The term gerontoracy is applied to a situation where so far as rule
over the group is organize at all it is in the hands of eIders-which
originaUy _understo literally as the edest in actual years, who are
the moswamiliar with the sacred traditions. This is com",mon in groups
which are not primarily of an economic or kinship character. " Patriar
chalism" is the situation where, within a group (household) which is
usnally organized on both an economic and a kinship basis, a prticular
individual governs who is designated bya defnite rule of inheritance.
Gerontoracy and patriarchalism ate freuently found side by side. The
decisive characteristic of both is the belief of the members that domina
tion, even though it is an inherent traditional right oLthe masicr, must
defnitely b exercized as a jOint right in the interest of all members and
is thus not freely appropriated by the incumbent. In order that this shall
be maintaine, it is crucial that in both cases there is a complete ahsence
of a personal (patrimonial) staf. Hence the master is still largely de
pendent upon the willingness of the members to comply with his orders
since he has no machinery to enforce them. Therefore, the members
(Genossen) are not yet really subjects (Untertanen).
Their membership exists by tradition and not by enactment. Obedi
ence is owed to the master, not to any enacted regulati?n. However, it
is, owed to the master only by virtue of his traditional status. He is thus
on his part strictly bound by tradition.
The difrent types of gerontoracy will b discussed later. Elemen
tary patriarchalism is related to it in fnat the patriarch's authority car
tic strict obligations to obedience only within his own household.
Apart from this, ,1S in the case of the Arabian Sheik, it has only an ex
emplary efect, in the manner o charismatic authority, or must reort to
advice and similar means of exerting inHuence . .
II. Patrimonialism and, in the extreme case, sultanism tend to arise
whenever traditional domination develops an administration and a mili
tary force which are purely personal instruments of the master. Only
then arc the group members treated as subject. Previously the master's
THE TYPES OF LEGITIMATE DOMINATION
[ Ch. 1lI
authority appeared as a pre-en._.lent group right, now it turs into his
personal right, which he appropriate in the same way as he would any
ordinary objet of possession. In principle, he can exploit his righ.t like
any economic asser-sell it, pledge it as security, or divide 'it by inherit
ance. The primary exteral support of patrimonial power is provided by
slaves (who are often branded), colani and conscripted subjects, but also
by mercenary boyguards and armies (patrimonial trops); the latter
practice is designed to maximize the solidarity of interest between master
and staf. By controlling these instruments the ruler can broaden the
range of his arbitrary power and put himself in a position to grant grace
and favo! at the expense of the traditional limitations of patriarchal and
gerontoratic structures. Where domination is primarily traditional, even
though it'is exercised by virtue of the ruler's personal autonomy, it will
be crlled patrimonial authority; where it indeed operates primarily on the
basis of discretion, it will be called sultanism. The transition is defnitely
continuous. Both forms of domination are distinguished from elementary
patriarchal ism by the presense of a personal staf.
Sometimes it appears that sultan ism is completely unrestrained by
tradition, but this is never in fact the case. The non-traditional element
is not, however, rationalized in imperonal terms, but consist only in an
extreme development of the rulms discretion. It is this which distin
guishes it from every form of rational authority
III. Estate-type domination (stndische Herrschaft)' is that fonn of
patrimonial authority under which the administrative staf appropriates
particular powers and the corresponding economic assets. As in all similar
cases (d
.
ch. II, sec. :p),appropriation may take the following forms:
a) Appropriation may b carried out by an organized group or by a
category of persons distinguishe by particular characteristics, or
b) it may be carrie out by individuals, for life, on a hereditary basis,
or as free property.
Domination of the estate-typ thus involves:
a) always a limitation of the lord's discretion in selecting his adminis
trative staf because positions or seigneurial powers have been appropri
.
; at by
a) an organized group,
B} a status group (see ch. IV), or
b) often-and this will be considered as typical-appropriation by
the individual staf members of
<} the psitions, including in general the economic advantage
assoiated with them,
b; the material means of administration,
;} the govering powex.
iii ]
T radit Authorit
2
3 3
Thoe holding appropriated psitons may have originated historically
I )from membr of an administrativ stf which w not prviously a
independent status group, or 2) bfore the appropriaton, they may no
have belong to the staf.
Where governing powers are appropriate, the cot of administraton
are met indiscriminately from the incumbnt's own and his apppriate
means. Holders of military pwers and seigneurial membrs of the "feu
dal" army (stndisches Heer) equip themselves and pssibly their own
patrimonial or feudal contingents. It is also possible that the provision
of administrative means and of the administrative staf itself is appropri
ated as the object of a proftmaking enterprise, on the basis of fxe
contributions from the ruler's magazine or treasury. This was tue in
particular of the mercenary armies in the sixteenth and sevententh cen
tury in Europexamples of "capitalist armies."
'here appropriation is complete, all the powers of government are
diviJt:d btween the ruler and the administrative staf membrs. each
,n the basis of his prsonal rights (Eigenrecht); or autonomous powers
are created and regulate hy special decres of the ruler or speial com
promises with the holders of appropriate rights.
On t): An example are the holder o cour of ce which have b
come appropriated as fefs. An example for 2) are siger who ap
propriated powers by virtue of their privileged poition or by usurpation,
using the former asa legalization of the latter.
Appropriation by an individual may rest on
I . leasing,
2. pledging as security,
3
. sale,
4. privileges, which may b personal, hereditary or freely appro
priated, unconditional or subject to the prformance of certain functions;
such a privilege may b
a) granted in return for services or for the sake of "buying"
compliance, or
b) it may constitute merelY' the formal recognition of actual
usurpation of powers;
5. appropriation by an organized group or a status group, usually a
consequence of a compromis between the ruler and his administratve
staf or between him and an unorganized status group; this may
. ) leave the ruler completely or relatively free in his seleton
of individuals, or
]} it may lay down rigid rules for the selecton of incumbnts;
6. fefs, a case which we must deal with separately.
THE TYPES OF LEGITIMATE DOMINATION | Ch. III
I . In the cs of gerontoracy and pure patriaohalism, so far ,15
there arc clear ideas on the subjet at aH, the means of auminitfltion
are generally appropriated by the group a a whole or by the participat
ing households. The administrative functions are performed on behalf
of the group as a whole. Appropriation- by the master personal.y is a
phenomenon of patrimonialism. It may vary enormously in degree to the
extreme cases of a claim to full proprietorship of the land ,ccnrcgul
and to the status of master over sub,ects treated as negotiable slaves.
Estate-type appropriation generally means the appropriation of at least
part of the means of adins.ration by tile memhers or
'
the :dministrative
staf. In the case of pure pa.rimoniaIism, there is l'umpJcte separation
of the functionary from the means of !aryin_ out his function. !u ex
actly the opposite is true of the estatype of <trmonialism. The per
son exercising governing powers has peronal control of the means of
administration-if not all, at least of <In im
;
otant part of them. In full
posession o these means were the feudal knight, who provided his own
equipment, the count, who hy virtue of holding his rlef took the court
fees and other perquisites for himself and met his feudal obligations
from his own means (including tht-appropriatcd 0lt"), and the Indian
jagirdar, who provided and (quipped a military unit from the p.eeds
of his tax henefice. On the o:her hand. ,I colonel who recruited a mer
cenary regiment on his own accOlmt, but rCl"ivcd certain payments
from the royal exdle(
l
ucr and (ored hj< deficit either by (
'
urtJilin.' the
service or from b.-ty or rC'
l
uisitions, was .nly parly in possession of
the means of administration <lnd was subjed to certain regulat ions. !y
contrast, the Pharaoh, who -rgani.ed armies of slaves or co n:, put his
clients in command of them, and tothed, |c <lnd c<]uippcd them from
his own stoehouses. was <cting . s a patrimonial lord in full pesonal
control of the meaDS of administration. It is not <lIw<lvS the formal mode
of organization which is deisivc. The MaJllclukes ;" cre forma!!y pur
chased laves. In fact, however, tl!cy monop.li.ed the powers of govern
ment as completely as any grouof n:nstvriul: has cver monopolized
the service fefs.
There a.e examples of senico lund app-priated by a doed g-up
without any individual appropriation. Where this {curs. land may he
freely granted to individuals by the lord as long as they arc memhers of
the group (case m:a: l) or tJ\e grant may be subject to regulatiolls
secifying {lualifc<ltion (case w: a:f). Thus, military or possihly
ritual qualifcations have been ruired of the.candidates, but once they
arc given, cloe blo rclation have had priority. The s.t.at.on IS jm.
lar in the case of manorial or gi:lild artisans or of pcas<nts whose services
have been attached for military or administrative purposc.
2. Appropriation by lease. espciaHy tax farming, by pldging as
security, or by sale, have been found in the Occident, but also in the
Orient and in India. In Atiquity, it was not un. ,)mmon |o priest
hos to b sold at auction.;;In the case of leaSing, the aim has heen
partly a practical fnancial one to meet stringencies caused especially by
the costs of war. It has pardy also been a matter of the teclmique of
iii ] Traditional Authorit
Inancing, to insure a stable money income available for budgetry uses.
Pledging a security and sale have generally arisen from the frst aim.
In the Papal States the was also the cr(.ation o rents for neph.
ews (Nepotenrenten). Appropriation by pledging playe a signifcant
role in France as late a the 'eighteenth century in flling judicial pots
in the palents. The appropriation o of cers' commissions by re
ulated purchase continued in the Britsh anny well into the ninetenth
century. Privilege, as a sanction of usurption, as a reward, or a an
incentive for political services, were common in the Middle Ages in Eu
rope as wen as elsewhere .
8. Patrimonial Maintenance: Benepces and Fiefs
The patrimonial retainer may receive his support in any of the fol
lowing ways:
a) by living from the lord's table,
, b) by allowances (usually in kind) from the lord's magazines or
treasury,
c) by rights of land use in return for services ("service-land" ),
d) by the appropriation of property income, fees or tes,
e) by fefs.
We shall speak of benefrces insofar as the forms .o maintenanc
b) hrough d) are always newly @nte in a traditieial fashion which
determin amount or loality, and insofar as they can b appropriate
hY"the individual, lth'ough not hereitarily. Vm a administratve
stf is, in print Jple, supprted in this form. we shal Sak of prebendl
ism. In such a situation there may b a system of prmot.:on a basis of
seniority or of particular objectively detwne achievOand- Hmay
also happen that a certain soial status and hence a ss mwhonor
(Standesehre) are required as a criterion o eigbiliq (O the concept
qf the status group: Stand, see ch. IV.)
Appropriated seigneurial pwers will ~ called
a
fd
they are
granted primarily to particular qualife individuals by a contrat and
if the reiproal rights and duties involve are primarily oriented to
conventional standards of status honor, prtcularly in a military sense.
If an administrative staf is primarily supprted by fefs, -we w spak
of [Wester
]
feudalism CLehensfeudalismus).
The transition between fefs and military bnefce is so gradual that
at time they are almost indistinguishable. (This w b further dis-
cusse blow in ch. IV.) .
In cs d) an4 e). sometime also mc), tviual wh has ap
proriate goveng pwer pays the cot o his adminitaton, psibly
T TYPES OP LEGMATE DOMINATION [ Ch. III
of Wltry equipment, in the manner indcte aOvc, from thc proees
o his Oncbccor fef. :s own authority may thcn OcOmc gaIt:mOna
(hcncc, hereitry, amabc, aw cgabc of dv:s:on by nhct:tancc._
J. hc mtt m ot su@tt ot toya tctanms, houschod om-
cb, gtu othct t gtt:mona ot cxamgc, manma]
tctancts has bcn thct gtcscncc at thc otd's tabc ot thct suggott by
d:ntwa: aoanc tOm hs stot. hc mcns housc, whch s
thc mdt otm o gtosona mta: ot_anzatonsto b dmt wth
atct, vcty otcn adhctcs tO thc consumgvc houschod communsm o
atun_ sttatum. bcgatatontom m tac o thc Otd ot o thc tcmgc
ot catheta} and tc substtuton o aoanc ot tvceand has by
no mmnt awas b tc@tdcd wth aggtovaI. t has, howcvct, usuay
tcsutcd to thctab mcnt o ndcgndcnt amcs. Powanccs n
k:nd _tantcd to such tcmgc tu and omcaIs consttutc thc ot:_na
fo o suggtt o omc:as thtou_hout thc cat Last and aso cstcd
n Lhna, nd:a, and otcn n thc Lcdcnt. hc usc o and n tctum
ot mtatytvcc sound mtou_hout thcLt:cnt s:ncc caty Pntquty,
and.a`n mecva Ly,a a mcans o gtovdn_ tot minisls,
manota o cas and othct unctonat. hc ncomc soutc o thc
utksh spahis, thc]aganm samurai, and vatous smatt o Ltcn
` nta:nc and kn_hu atc, n thc gtcscnt tctmnoo_y, bnchc
and nothHs, as wd b gn out atct. n somccas thcy hvc bccn
dct:vo ttom thc tcnu o ccttan ands; n othcts, tom thc t ncmc
oOdsttco. n thc attctmsc, they havc @nctayb combne
w:th aggtogt1auon o _ovcmmmta gWcts n thc samc dstt:ct. hc
conccgt o thc fe can b utthct dcvcogd ony n tcaton to that o
thc s. u ob|cct may ba manot~a otm o gattmona domnaoon
- t may b any o vatous k:nds o cams to gtogty ncomc and
H
2. hc aggtogtaton ogt ncomc and t_ho to m and thc
preot t n thc otm bnchccs and hcs o a s s wdc-
tmd. n 1nd:a, gattcuaty, t ba an ndcgndcnt and h:_hy
cvc gtactcc. hc usua attan@mcnt w thc _tantn_ o t_hu
w thm utc o ncomc n rm ot mc gtovson o mty cw-
un@Handthcgymcntoadmnsnatvccosu.
g. Ette-Type Domination an Its Division qPoes
In Uc gw tg, patrimonial domination. eally of thc mtatc
Q,t@1gving pw and thccorrespnding eonomic right
a privatly apprriat enoic advantage. This do not m that
te gar qualittively undifntate. bc impnt oe a
apat in a fn subjet t spal rgulatons. In partcUlar, th6
apto of judical and m1Q gcG tend. to b m a a
legal mfr a privile 'lt piton of those appropriatng m, a
Traditional Authority 2 3 7
compared to the appropriaton of purely eonomic advantges having to
do with the income from domains, from taxe, or perquisite. Within
the latter category, again, there tends t b a difrentaton of thoe
which are primarily patrimonial from thoe which are primarily exta
patmonial or fscal in the moe of appropriation. For our terminology
the decisive fact is that, regardless of content, govering pwers and the
related emoluments are treated as private rights.
In his Lmwm Staw Mittelts, von Below is quite right
m emphasizing that the a
p
ropriation o judicial authority was single
out and bame a source privileg status, and that it is imposible to
prove that the meieval plitical organization had ether a purely pt
monial or a purely feudal character. Nevertheles, so far as judicial
authority and other rights o a purely plitical origin are m as
private rights, it is for prent pur terminologically corret to sk
o patrimonial domination. The concept itslf, as is well xo, has
be n mot consistently develop by Haller in his RetTai m
Sta tssehf. HistOrically there has never b a purely pti
monial state.
. We shall spak of the estattype division of powers (sti che
Gewaltnteilung) when organize group of prsons privilege by ap
propriate seigneurial pwers conclude compromises wt ter rler. A
the ocasion warrant, the subject of such coprmis may b plitcl
or administrative rgulations, concrete administrative decisions or supr
visory measur. At time the membrs of such groups may participat
directly on their own authority and wt their own staf.
I. Under certin circumstance, group, such as pt, which
do not enjoy a privileged sial pition, may b include. This do
not, hoever, alter the conce
y
t. For the desive
p
oint is the fact that
the membrs o the privileged grop have indepent rights. If sially
privilege groups wee abnt, the cas would obviously blog unde
another g.
2. Te gowhas ~ fully dvelop oly i the Oc idet. We
must deal srately and in detail with it characteristic and with te
resons for its developmet.
3. A a rule, such a status goup did no have an adminisatve
wdm its own, ely no one with indepet ging p
Qu.Traitional Domination and the Ey
The primary eft of tdtona dominato on em acvite
is usually in a very gneral way to stgthen ttona atttude.
nmot conspiCOU under geronttc and prly ptaral domina
ton, which cannot u an administratv machine agnst the m
THE TYPES OF LEGITIMATE nOMINATION
[ Ch. III
of the group and hence is strongly dependent for its own legitimacy
upon the safeguarding of tradition in every respect.
I. Beyond this, the typical mode of fnancing a traditional structure
of domination afects the eonomy (cf. ch. II, sec. 38). In this respet,
patrimonial ism may use a wide variety of approaches. The following,
however, are particularly important:
A. An oikos maintained by the ruler where needs are met on a
liturgical basis wholly or primarily in kind (in the fonn of contributions
and compulsory services). In this case, economic relationships tend to
be strictly tradition-bound. Ic development of market u obstructed,
the use of money is primarily consumptive, and the development of
capitalism is impossible.
B. Provisioning the services of socially privileged groups has very
similar efects. Though not necessarily to the same extent, the develop
ment of markets is also limited in this case by the fact that the property
and the prouctive capacity of the individual economic unit are largely
pre-empted for the ruler's needs.
C. Furthermore, patrimonialism can resort to monopolistc want satis
faction, which in part may rely on proft-making enterprises, fee-taking
or taxation. In this case, the development of markets is, accoring to the
gof monopolies involved, more or less seriously limited by irrational
factors. The important opnings for proft are in the hands of the ruler
and of his administrative staf. Capitalism is thereby either directly ob
structe, if the ruler maintains his own administration, or is diverte
into plitical capitalism, if there is tax farming, leaSing or sale of ofces,
and capitalist provision for armies and administration (sech. II, sec.

I}.
Even where it is carried out in money terms, the fnancing of pa
trimonialism and even more of sultanism tends to have irrational con
sequences for the following reasons:
IJThe obligations placed on sources of diret taxation tend both in
amount and in kind to remain bound to tradition. At the same time
there is complete freedom-'and hence arbitrariness-in the detennina
tion of a) fees and b) of newly imposed obligations, and c) in the
organization of monopolies. This element of arbitrrines is at leas
claime as a right. It is historically most efective in case a), bcause the
lord and his staf must be asked for the "favor" of action, far less efec
tive in case b), and of varying efectiveness in case c).
2) Two bases of the rationalization of economic activity are entirely
lackin

; namely, a basis for the calculability of obligations and of the

extent of freedom which win be allowe to private enterprise.
D. In individual cases, however, patrimonial fscal plicy may have a
I
I
1

!
i

,
J
iii ]
T raircl Authot 2 3
9
ratonalizing efet by systematcally cultivatng its source of taxation
and by organizing monolie rationally. This, however, is "a u"
and depndent on Spefc historical circumstance, some mwhich existe
in the Oc ident.
If there is etate-type division of pwers, scal plicy tnds to a
result of compromise. This make the burdens relatively preictable and
eliminate
-
or at least sharply limit the ruler's powers to imp new
burdens and, above all, to create monoplies. \hether the reultng
hplicy tends to promote or to limit rational economic activity de
pnds largly on the typ of ruling group; primarily, it depnds on
whether it is a feudl or a patan stratum. The dominance of the
feudal stratum tends, bause the structure O feudalize pers of @~
erment is normally patrimonial, t set rigid limit to the freom o
acquisitive activity and the development of market. It may even involve
delibrate attempts to suppres them to protet the pwer of m fudal
stratum. The predominance of a patrician [urban] stratum may have the
oppite efect.
, Ii 'hat has b sid abve must suffe fo m prent. It will b
nes r to retur to te quets reptely qIerent conne
tos.
, e m IA): the ok c anciet Eg ad i h IB):
larg pr the Mccm wol me_ Roman Empire, Cha, In
dia, t sme extent Rusia t Ic W IC).rmQ
to s extent the Byzntne Empr, and i a dHferent way the regime
o te Start in England; ID): t Oc iden s m
the prio M "elighrne dn ," e.8y Ct
s
p .
.
. It
'
is not only the fnancal plley o mo, pmp
which tends to retrict the devd.t of rato em nvq, b
abve all the general charactr mteir ainttV Ti
-

tue in the following rept:

a ) Traditonalism places serios obst m w d tw
`
rtonal regulatons, which can b depnde ug t 0 stble an
hence are calcu1hle in their eonomic implictons and lotbility4
b) A stf of ofcials with formal tenical taining is typilabnt.
(The fact that it develo m te pto st o t Oc et
i, as w.11 b shown, :acounte fo myodm.Ts
develo fo te mo part ot m sr whol y dt h de
general scture mpaia1is.)
c) The,re is a wide fo act atbinednandthe w ion N
prely pnal wh'" on the pr dte mr am the mb o h
administratve staf,' The oning for mq crpto, whc i
THE TYPES OF LEGITIMATE DOMINATION [ Ch. 1II
simply a matter of the disorganization of an unregulated system of fees,
would be the least serious ef ect Hthis if it remained a constant quantty,
because then it would become calculable in practice. But it tends to b
a matter which is settled from. case to case with every individual ofcial
and thus highly variable. If ofces are leased, the incumbent is put in a
position where it is to his immediate interest to get back the capital he
has investe by any available means of extortion, however irrationaL
d) PatriarchaIism and patrimonialism have an inherent tendency to
regulate economic activity in terms of utilitarian, welfare or absolute
values. Tis tendency stems from the character of the claim to legitmacy
and the intest in the contentment of the subjects. It breaks down the
type of formal rationality which is oriented to a technical legal order.
This type of inRuence is decisive in the case of hiercratic patrimonialism.
In the case of pure sultanism, on' the other hand, it is fscal arbitrariness
which is likely to be most imprtant. ;
For all these reasons, under the dominance of a patrimonial regime
only certain types of capitalism are able to develop:
a) capitalist trading,
b) capitalist tax farming, lease and sale of ofces,
c) capitalist provision of supplies for the state and the fnancing of
wars,
d) under certain cirumstances, capitalist plantations and other colo
nial enterprises.
AU these forms are indigenous to patrimonial regimes and often reach
a very high level of development. This is not, however, true of the type ,
of proft-making enterprise with heavy investments in fxed capitl an a
rational organization of free labor which is oriente to the market pur
chases of private consumers. This type of capitalism is altogether to
sensitive to all sort of irrationalitie: in the administration of law, ad
ministration and taxation, for these upset the basis of clabilit.
The situation is fundamentally diferent only in cases where a ptri
monial ruler, in the interest of his own pwer and fnancial provision,
develops a ratonal system of administraton with technically spialize
ofcials. For this to happn, it is necessary I ) that tehnical training
should b available; z} there must be a sufciendy pwerful incentve
to embark on such a plicy-usually the sharp comptition betwen a
plurality of patimonial powers Mthin the same cultural area;
3
) a ver
spcial factor is nesr, namely, the prticiption d urban immune
as a fnancial suprt in the comptition of the patrimonial units.
I. The major forerunnes of the moem, spifcally Wetr fn
o capitlism are to be found i the organizd urban comune o Eu-

iii ] Traditionl Authority
rop with their particular tp o relatively rational administration. Its
primary development tok place from the sixteenth to the eighteenth
centuries within the framework of the class structure and political or
ganization (standischen folitishe Verbande) of Holland and England.
which were distinguished by the unusual power of the bourgeois strata
and the preponderance o their economic interests. The fscal and utili
tarian imitations. which were introuced into the purely patrimonial or
largely feudal (feud4l-standisch) states of the Continent, have in com
mon with the Stuart syste of monopolistic industry the fact that they
do not stand in the main line of continuity with the later autonomous
capitalitic development. This is true in spite of the fact that particular
measures of agricultural and industrial policy-o far and because they
were oriented to English, Dutch, and later to French, moels-played
a very important part in creating some of the essential conditions for this
later development. All this will b discussed further on.
. In certain felds the patrimonial state of the Middle Ages devel
oed a g of fonnally rational administrative staf which consisted
especially of persons with legal training both in the civil and the canon
law, and which difered fundamentally from the corresponding admin
istrative stafs in political boies of any other time or place. It will be
necessary later to inquire more fully into the sources of this develop
ment and into its signifcance. For the present it is not posible to go
beyond the very general observations introuced above.
Y
Charismatic Authorit
y
,
1 0, Charismatic Authority and Charismatic Community
The tenn "charisma" will b applied to a certain quality of an in
dividual prsonality by vi$e of which he is considere extraordinary
and treated as endowed with supratural. suprhuman, or at least sp
ci6cally exceptional pwers or qualities. These are such. as are not ac
cesible to the ordinary prson. but are regarded as of divine origin or
as exemplary, and on the basis of them d individual concere U
treated as a "leader." In primitive circumstance this peuliar kind of
quality is thought of as restng on magical powers, whether of prophet
prons with a reputation for theraputic or legal wisdom, leaders in the
hunt, or heros in war. How the quality in question would b ultimately
THE TYPES OF LECITIMATE DOMINATION | Ch. 1
judged from any ethical, aesthetic, or other such point of view is naturally
entirely indiferent for purposes of defnition. What is alone important 'is
how the individual is actually regarded by thoe subject to charismatic
authority, by his "followers" or "disciples."
For present purposes it will be necessary to treat a variety of difer
ent types as being endowed with charisma in this sense. It includes the
state of a "berserk" whose spells of maniac passion have, apparently
wrongly, sometimes been attributed to the . us m drugs. In medieval
Byzantium a group of these men endowed with the charisma of fghting
frenzy was maintained as a kind of weapon. It includes the "shaman,"
the magician who in the pure type has to be subject to epileptoid seizure
as a means of falling into trances. Another typ is represented by
Joseph Smith, the founder of Mormonism, who may have been a very
sophisticated swindler (although this cannot b defnitely established).
Finally it includes the type of litterater, such as Kurt Eisner,6 who is
overwhelmed by his own demagogic success. Value-free soiological anal
ysis will treat all these on the same level a it dos the charisma of
men who are the "greatest" heros, prophets, and saviors according to
conventional judgements.
1. It is recognition on the prt of those subject to authority which is
decisive for the validity of charisma. This reognition is freely given and
guaranteed by what is held to be a proof, originally always a miracle, and
consists in devotion to the corresponding revelation, hero worship, or ab
solute trust in the leader. But where charisma is gnuine, it is not this
which is the basis of the claim t legitimacy. This basis lies rather in the
conception that it is the duty of those subject to charismatic authority to
recognize its genuineness and to act accordingly. Psychologically this rec- '
ognition is a matter of complete personal devotion to the possessor of the
quality, arising out of enthusiasm, or of despair and hope.
No prophet has ever regarded his quality as depndent on the attitudes .,
of the masses toward him. No elective king or military leader has ever
treated those who have resisted him or tried t igore him oherwise
than as delinquent in duty. Failure to take part in a military expdition
under such leader, even though the recruitent is formally voluntary,
has universally met with disdain,
II. If proof and success elude the leader for long, if he appears de
serted by his god or his magical or heroic powers, above all, if his leader
ship fails to beneft his followers, it is likely that his charismatic authority
will disappear. This is the genuine meaning of the divine right of kings
(Gottesgnadntum ).
Even the old Germanic kings were sometime rejected with scorn.
Similar phenomena are very common among Salle primjtive poples.
iv J Charismatic Authority
In China the charismatic quality of the monarch, which was transmit"
ted unchanged by heredity, was upheld so rigidly that any misfortune
whateve, not only defeats in war, but droughtg Hoods, or astronomical
phenomena which were considered unlucky, forced him to do public
penance and might even force his abdication. If such things ocurred,
it was a sign that he did not posess the requisite charismatic virtue and
was thus not a legitimate "So of Heaven."
III. An organized group subject to charismatic authority will Se
called a charismatic community (Gemeinde). It is based- on an emo
tional form of communal relationship (Vergemeinschaftung). The ad
ministrative staf of a charismatic leader does not consist of "ofcials";
least of all are its members technically trained. It is not chosen on the
basis of soial privilege nor from the point of view of domestic or personal
dependency. It is rather chosen in terms of the charismatic qualities of
its membrs. The prophet has his disciples; the warlord his boyguard;
the leader, generally, his agents (Vertrauensminner). There is no such
thing as appointment or dismissal, no career, no promotion. There is only
a' call at the instance of the leader on the basis of the charismatic
qualifcation of those he summons. There is no hierarchy; the leader
merely intervenes in general or in individual cases when he considers
the members of his staf lacking in charismatic qualifcation for a given
rask. There is no such thing as a
bailiwick or defnite sphere of com
petence, and no appropriation of ofcial powers on the basis of social
privileges. There may, however, b territorial or functional limits to
charismatic powers and to the individual's mission. There is no such
thing as a salary or a benefce.
DiSCiples or followers tend to live primarily in a communistic re
lationship with their leader on means which have been provided by
voluntary gift. There are no established administrative organs. In their
pla..:e are agents who have been provided with charismatic authority by
. their chief or who possess charisma of their own. There is no system
of formal rules, of abstract legal principles, and hence no process of
rational judicial decision oriented to them. But equally there is no legal
wisdom oriented to judicial precedent. Formally concrete judgments are
newly created from case to case and are originally regarded as divine
judgments and revelations. From a substantive point of view, every
charismatic authority would have to subscribe to the proposition, "It is
written . . . but I say unto you . . . " The genuine prophet, like the
genuine military leader and every true leader in this sense, preaches,
creates, or demands new obligations-most typically, by virtue of revela
tion, oracle, inspiration, or of his own will, which are recognized by
2
4 4
THE TYPES OF LEGITIMATE DOMINATION [ Ch. III
the members of the religious, military, or party group because they
come from such
a source. Recognition is a duty. When such an authority
comes into conBict with the competing authority of another who also
claims ckuismatic sanction, the only recourse is to some kind of a con
test, by magical means or an actual physical battle of the leaders. In
principle, only one side can be right in such a conRict; the other must he
guilty of a wrong which has to be expiate.
Since it is "extra-ordinary," charismatic authority is sharply opposed
to rational

and particularly bureaucratic. authority, and to traditional
authority, whether in its patriarchal, patrimonial, or estate variants, all of
which are everyday fonns of domination; while the charismatic type is
the direct antithesis of this. Bureaucratic authority is speincally rational
in the sense of bing bound to intellectually analysable rules; while
charismatic authority is specincally irrational in the sense of being foreign
to .all rules. Traditional authority is bound to the precedents handed
down from the past and to this extent is also oriented to rules. Within the
sphere of its claims, charismatic authority repudiates the past, and is in
this sense a specifcally revolutionary force. It recognizes no appropriation
of positions of power by virtue of the psesion O property, either on
the part of a chief or of socially privileged groups. The only basis of
legitimacy for it is personal charisma so long as it is proved; that is, as
long as it receives recognition and as long as the followers and disciples
prove their usefulness charismatically.
The above is scarcely in need of further discussion. ,What has been
said applies to purely plebiscitary rulers (Napoleon's "rule o genius"
elevate people of humble origin to thrones and high military com'
mands) just as much as it applies t religious prophet
s or war hero.
IV. Pure charisfna is specifcally foreign to economic considerations.
\herever it appears, it constitutes a "caU" in the most emphatic sense
of the word, a "mission" or a "spiritual duty." In the pure type. it disdains
and repudiates economic exploitation of the gifts of grace as a source of
income, though, to be sure, this often remains more an ideal than a fact.
It is not that charisma always demands a renunciation of property or even
of acquisition, as under certain circumstances prophets and their disciples
do. The heroic warrior and his foJlowers actively seek booty; the elective
ruler or the charismatic party leader requires the material means of power.
The former in addition requires a brilliant display of his authority to
bolster his prestige. What is despised, so long as the genuinely charismatic
type is adhered to, is traditional or rational everyday economizing, the
attainment of a regular income by continuous economic activity devoted
to t:send. Support by gifts, either on a grand scale involving donation,
iv J Charismatic Authority
endowment, bribery and honoraria, or by begging, constitute the volun
tary type of support. On the other hand, "booty" and extortion, whether
by force or by other means, is the typical form of charismatic provision
for needs. From the point of view of rational ec .nomic activity, charis
matic want satisfactioil is a typical anti-economic forre. It repudiates any
sort of involvement in the everyday routine world. It can only tolerate,
with an attitude of complete emotional indiference, irregular, unsys
tematic acquisitive acts. In that it relieves the recipient of economic
concerns, dependence on property income can b the economic basis of
a charismatic moe of life for some groups; but that is unusual for the
normal charismatic "revolutionary_"
The fact that incumbency of church ofce has been forbidden to
the Jesuits is a rationalized application of this principle of discipleship.
The fact that all the "virtuoi" of aseticism, the mendicant orders, and
fighters for a faith belong in this category, is quite dear. Almost all
P!ophets have been supporte by voluntary gifts. The wellknown say
ing of St_ Paul, "If a man dos not work, neither shall he eat," was
,directed against the parasitic swarm of charismatic missionaries. It obvi
ously has nothing to do with a poitive valuation of economic activity
for its own sake, but only lays it down as a du(y of each individual
somehow to provide for his own support. This because he realized that
the purely charismajc parable of the lilies of the Meld was not capable
of literal application, but at bst "taking no thought for the morrow"
could be hoped for. L the other hand, in a case of a prilll3rily artistic
tyF of charismatic disciplehip it is conceivable that insulation from
economic struggle should. mean limitation o those really eligible to the
"economically independent"; that is, to persons living on income from
property. This has been true of the circle of Stefan George, at least in its
primary intentions.
V. In traditionalist perios, charisma is the great revolutionary force.
Te likewise revolutionary force of "reason" works from without: by alter
ing the situations of life and hence its problems, fnally in this way
changing men's attitudes toward them; or it intellectualizes the individ
ual. Charisma, on the other hand, may efect a subjective or internal
reorientation born out of sufering, conRicts, or enthusiasm. It may then
result in a radical alteration of the central attitudes and directions of ac
tion with a completely nw orientation of all attitudes toward the difer
ent problems of the "world."1 In prerationalistic perios, tradition and
charsma between them have almost exhausted the whole of the orienta
tion of action.
=
'E TYES OF LEGITIMATE DOMINATION [ Ch. 1Il
v
The Routinization of Charisma
I I . The Rise of the Charismatic Community and the
Problem of Succession
In its pure form charismatic authority has a character specifcally,
foreign to everyday routine structures. The soial rela.tionships dire<tly
involved are strictly personal, based on te validity and practice of
charismatic personal qualities. If this is not to remain a purely transitory
phenomenon, but t take on the character of a permanent relationship, a
"community" of disciples or followers or a paz:ty organization or any sort
of political or hierocratic organization, i t is nesary for the character of
charismatic authority to become radicalIy changed. Indeed, in its pure
fonn charismatic authority may he said t exst only in stt nascendi.
It cannot remain stable, but becomes either traditionalized or rationalized,
or a combination of bu.
The follOWing are the principal motives underlying this transforma
tor (a) The ideal and also the material inerests of the followers ln the
,
continuation and the continual reactj"atiori of the community, (b) the
still stronger ideal and also stronger material interests of the members of
the administrative staf, the disciples, the party workers, or others in
continuing their relationship. Not only this, but they have an interest
in continuing it in such a way that both from an ideal and a material
point of view, their own posi tion is put on a stable everyday basis. This
means, above a, making it possible to participate in normal family re
lationships or at least to enjoy a secure soial position in place of the kind
of discipJeship which is cut of from ordinary worldly connections, nota
bly in the family and in economic relationships.
These interests generaJiy become conspicuously evident with the dis
appearance of the personal charismatic leader and with the problem of
succession. The way in which this problem is met-if it is met at all :d
the charismatic community continues to exist or now begins to emerg
-is of crucial importance for the character of the subsequent social re
lationships. The following are the principal possible types of solution:-
(a) The search for a 'lew charismatic leader on the basis of criteria
of the qualities which will ft him for the position of authority.
v j The Routinization of Charima
This is to be found in a relatively pure type in the proess of choice
of a new Dalai Lama. It consists in the search for a child with charac
teristics which are interpreted to mean that he is a reincarnation m the
Buddha. This is very similar to the choice of the new Bull of Apis.
1n this case the legitimacy of the new charismatic leader is bound to
certain distinguishing characteristics; thus, to rules with respect to which
a tradition arises. The result is a process of traditionalization in favor of
which the purely personal character of leadership is reduced.
(b) Revelation manifested- in oracles, lot, divine judgments, or other
techniques of selection. In this case the legitimacy of the new leader is
dependent on the legitimacy of the techniqlle of his selection. This in
volves a form of legalization.
It is sai that a times the ShRfe.m Uuggesl of Israel had this charac
ter. Saul is said to have been choen by the o)d war oracle.
(c) Designation on the part of the original charismatic leader of his
own successor and his recognition on the part of the followers.
, This is a very common fonn. Originally, the Roman magistracies
were flled entirely in this way. The system survived most clearly into
later times in the appointment of the dictator and in the institution of
the interrex.'
In this case legitimacy is acqUired through the act of designation.
Cd) Designation of a '.lCcessor by the charismatically qualifed ad
ministrative staf and his recognition by the community. In its typical form
this process should quite defnitely not be interpreted as "election" or
"nomination" or anything of the sort. It is not a matter of free selection,
but of One which is strictly bound t objective duty. It is not to be
determined merely by majority vote, but is a question of arriving at the
corren designation, the designation of the right person who is truly
endowed with charisma. It is quite possible that the minority and not
te majority should be right in such a case. Unanimity > often required.
It is obligatory to acknowledge a mistake and persistence in error is a
serious oIense. Making a wrong choice is a genuine wrong requiring
expiation. Originally it was a magical ofence.
Nevertheless, in such a case it is easy for legitimacy to take on the
character of an acquired right which is justifed by standards of the
correctness of the process by which the position was acquired, for the
most pan, by its having been acquired in accordance with certain formali
ties such as coronation.
This was the original meaning of the coronation of bishops and kings
in the Wester world b the clergy or the high nobility with the "con-
THE TYPES OF LEGITIMATE DOMINATION [ Ch. l||
sent" of the community. There are numerous analogous phenomena all
over the world. The fact that this is the origin of the moem conception
9f "election" raises problems which will have to be gone into later.1
(e) The conception that charisma is a quality transmitted by heredity;
thus that it is participated in by the kinsmen of its bearer, particularly by
his dosest relatives. This is the case of heredit charisma. The oroer
of hereditary succession in such a case need not b the same as that which
is in force for appropriated right, but may difer from it. It is also some
times necessary to select the propr heir within the kinship group by
some of the methos just spoken of.
Thus in certain African states brothers have had to fght for the suc
cession. In China, succession had to take place in such a way that the
reation of to living group to the ancestral spirits was not disturbed.
The rule either of seniority or m designation by the followers has been
very common in the Orient. Hence, in the House of Osman, it usd t
be obligatory to kill of all other posible aspirants.
Only in Medieval Europe and in Japan, elsewhere sporadically, has
the principle of primogeniture, as govering the inheritance of authority,
become dearly established. This has greatly facilitated the onsolidation
of political groups in that it has eliminated struggle between a plurality
of candidates from the same charismatic family.
In the case of hereditr charisma, recognition is no longer paid to
the charismatic qualities of the individual, but to the legitimacy of the
position he has acquired by hereitary succession. This may lead in the
direction either of traditionalization or of legalization. The concept of,
divine right is fundamentally altered and now comes to mean authority
by virtue of a prsonal right which is not depndent on the reconition
of those subject to authority. Personal charisma may be totally absent.
Hereditary monarchy is a conspicuous iIlustration.- In Asia there
have beer very numerous hereditary priesthos; also, fre<uently, the
hereditary charisma of kinship groups has been treated a a criterion of
soial rank-and of eligibili;Y for fefs and benefces.
([ The concept that charisma may be transmitted by ritual means
from one bearer to another or may be created in a new person. The
concept was Orignally magical. It involves a dissoiation of charisma
from a particular individual" making it an objective, transferrable entity.
In particular. it may become the charisma of ofce. In this case the blief
in legitimacy is no longer directed to the individual. but t the acquired
qualities and to the efectiveness of the ritual acts.
The mot important example is the transmission of priestly charisma
by anointing. consecration, or the laying on of hands; and o royal au-
v J The Routiniztion of Charsma
thority, b anointing and by coronation. The chrater indlebilis thus
acquired means that the charismatic qualitie and powers of the ofce
are emancipated from the Qetsonal qualitie of the priet. FOI Qreisly
this reason, this has, from the Donatist ad the Montanist heesies down
to the Puritan revolution, been the xubject of continual conRiets. The
"hireling" of the Quakers is the preacher endowed with the charisma of
ofce.
1 2. Types of Appropriation by the Charismatic Staf
Concomitant with the routinization of charisma with a view to insur
ing adequate succession, go the interest. s in its routinization on the part
of the administrative staf. It is only in the initial stages and so long as
the charismatic leader acts in a way which is completely outside everyday
soial organization, that it is possible for his followers to live com
munisticaIIy in a community of faith and enthusiasm, on gifts, booty, or
sporadic acquisition. Only the members of the small group of enthusiastic
disciples and followers are prepared to devote their lives purely idealis
tcally to their call. The great majority of disciples and followers will in
the long run "make their living" out of their "calling" in a material sense
as well. Indeed, this must be the case if the movement is not to dis
integrate.
Hence, the routimzation of charisma also takes the fon of the ap
propriation of powers and of economic advantages by the followers or
disciples, and of regulating recruitment. This proess of traditionalization
or of legalization, according to whether rational legislation is involved or
not, may take anyone of a number of typical forms.
I. The' original basis of recruitment is personal charisma. However,
with routinization, the followers or disciples may set up norms for tc
cruitment, in particular involving training or tests of eligibility. Charisma
can only be "awakened" and "tested"; it cannot be "leared" or "taught."
.All types of magical asceticism, as practiced by magicians and heros, and
all novitiates, blong in this category. These are means of closing the
administrative staf. (On the charismatic type of education, see ch. IV
below [unfnished1.)
Only the proved novice u allowed to exercise authority. A genuine
charismatic leader is in a position to oppose this type of prerequisite for
membership; his successor is not free to do so, at least if he is chosen by
the administrative staf.
This type is illustrated by the magical and warrior asceticism of
the "men's house" with initiation ceremonies and age groups. An indi-
THE TYPES P LEGITIMATE DOMINATION C+ . III
vidual who has not successfully gone through the initiation, remains a
"woman"; that is, he is excluded from the charismatc group.
2. It is easy for charismatic norms to be transformed into those de
fning a traditional social status (on a hereditary charismatic basis). If
the leader is chosen on a hereditary basis, the same is likely to happen
in the selection and deployment of the staf and even the followers.
The term "dan state" (Geschlechterstaat) will be applied when a
political boy is organized strictly and completely in terms of this prin
ciple of hereitary charisma. In such a case, all appropriation of govern
ing powers, of fefs, benefces, and all sorts of economic advantages fO,l
low the same pattern. The result is that all powers and advantages of
aU sorts become traditionalized. The heads of families, who al' tradi
tional gerontocrats or patriarchs without personal charismaticlegitimacy,
regulate the execise of these powers which cannot be taken away from
their family. It is not the type of poition he occupies which determines
the rank of a man or of his family, but rather the hereditary charismatic
rank of his family determines the psition he will occupy.
Japan, before the development of bureaucracy, was organized in this
way. The same was undoubtedly true of China as well where, before
the rarionalization which tok place in the territorial stat{s, authority
was in the hands of the "old families," Other types of examples are fur
ished by the caste system in India, and by Russia before the mestni
chestvo was introduced. Indeed, all hereditary social classes with estab
lished privileges belong in the same category.
3. The administrative staf may seek and achieve the creation and
appropriation of individual positions and the corresponding economic
advantages for its members. In that case, according to whether the
tendency is to t:: aditionalization or legalization, there will develop (a)
benefces, (b) ofces, or (c) fefs. In the frst case a prebendal organiza
tion wiII result; in the second, patrimoniaJism or bureaucracy; in the
third, feudalism. These revenue sources become appropriated and replace
provision from gifts or booty without settled relation to the everyday
economic structure.
Case (a), benefces, may consist in rights to the proceeds of begging,
to payments in kind, or to the proceeds of money taxes, or fnally, to the
proceeds of fees. The latter may result from the former through the
regulatior of the original provision by free gifts or by "booty" in terms
of a rational organization or fnance.
Regularized begging is found in Buddhism; benefces in kind, in the
Chinese and Japanese "rice rents"; suppon by money taxation
_
has been
v
The Routiniztion of Cham
the rule in-all the rationalized conquest states. The last case is commo
everywhere, espeially on the part of priet and jUdge and, i India,
even the military authorities.
Case (b), the transformation of the charismatc mission into an
ofce, may have more of a patrimonial or more of a bureafcratic cha!
acter. The former is much the more common; the latter is found prin
cipally in Antiquity and in the moem Wester world. Elsewhere it is
exceptional.
In case (c), only land may b appropriated as a fef, whereas the
position as such retains its originally charismatic character, or powers
and authority may be fuIIy appropriated as fefs. It is difcult to dis- .
tinguish the two cases. However, orientation to the charismatic character
of the position was slow to disappear, also in the Middle Ages.
1 2a. Status Honor and the Legitimation of Authority
For charisma to be transformed into an everyday phenomenon, it is
necessary that its anti-economic character should b altered. It must b
adapted to some form of fscal organization to provide for the needs of
the group and hence to the economic conditions necessary for raising
taxes and contributions. When a charismatic movement develops in the
direction of prebendal provision, the "laity" become diferentiated from
the "clergy"--erived from qv, meaning a "share"-, that is, the
participating membrs of the charismatic administrative staf which has
now beome routinized. These are the priests of the developing "church."
Correspondingly, in a developing political boy-the "slate" in the ra
tional case--vassals, bnefce-holders, ofcials or appOinted party ofcials
(instead of voluntary party workers and functionaries) are diferentiated
fro the "tax payers."
This proess is very conspicuous in Buddhism.nd in the Hindu
secte the Soiology of Religion blow. The same u true in all con
quet States which have bome ratonalize to fonn pmanent struc
tures; also o parties and other originally charismatic structures_
It follows that, in the course of routnization, the charismatcally
ruled organization is largely transformed into one of the everyday au
thorities, the patrimonial form, espcially in its estate-type or bureaucratic
variant_ Its original pculiaritie are apt to be retained in the charismatic
status hoor acquired by hereity or ofce-holding. This aplie to all
who participate in the appropriation, the chief himself and the membrs
TE TPES OF LEGITMTE DOMNATON [ Ch. III
of his sf. It is thus a matter of the type of prestige enjoyed by ruling
groups. A hereditary monarch by "divine right" is not a simple patrimo
nial chief, patriarch
,
or sheik; a vassal is not a mere household retainer
or ofcial. Further details must b deferred to the analysis of status
groups.
A a rule, rourinization is not free of confct. In the early stage
prsonal claims on the charisma of the chief are not easily forgotten and
the confict between the charisma of the ofce or of hereditary status with
personal charisma is a typical proess in many historical situations.
I. The power of absolutionthat is, the power to absolve from mor
tal sins-was held originally only by personal charismatic martyrs or
ascetics, hut beame transfonned into a power of the ofce of bishop
or priest. This proess was much slower in the Orient than in the Occi
dent beause in the latter IS was inRuenced by the Roman conception of
ofce. Revolutions under a charismati.: leader, directed against herei
tary charismatic powers or the powers of ofce, are to be found'in all
types o organizations, from states to trade unions. (This last is particu
larly conspicuous at the preent time [1918/20J.) The more highly de
veloped the interdependence of diferent eonomic units in a monetary
economy, the greater the pressure of the everyday needs o the followers
of the charismatic movement becomes, The efect o this is to strengthen
the tendency to routinization, which is everywhere operative, and as a
rule has rapidly won out, Charisma is a phenomenon typical of pro
phetic movements ot of expansive political movements in their early
stages. But as soon as domination is well established, and above all a
soon as control over large masses o people exists, it gives way to the
forces of everyday routine.
2. One of the decisive motives underlying all cases of the routiniza
tion of charisa is naturally the striving for security. This means legiti
mization, on the one hand, of positions of authority and soial prestige,
on the other han.d, of the economic advantages enjoyed by the followers
and sympathizers of the leader. Another important motive, however, lies
in the ob;ctive necessity of adapting the order and the staf organiza
tion to the nonnal , everyday needs and conditions of carrying on admin
istration. In this connection, in particular, there are always points at
which traditions of administrative practice and of judicial decision can
take hold a the are needed by the nonnal administrative staf and
those subjet to its authority. H further necessary that there should b
some defnite order introuced into the organization of the administrative
staf itself. Finally, as will b o>ussc in detail below, it is necessary
for the administrative staf and .lll it administrative practices t b
adapted to everyday economic conditions. It i not posible for the costs
opnnanen', routine administ:ation to he met by "hooty." contributions,
gifts, and hospitality. as is t/Pical of the pure tye of military and pro
phetc charisma.
J
The Routiniztion of :harma
5 3
. The proess o routini7..tion is thus not by any means confned to
the problem of succession and dos not stop when this has been solved.
On the contrary, the mot fundamental problem is that o making a
.
transition from a charismatic administrative " tf, and the corresponding .
.' .principles of administration, to one 1Nhich is adapted to everydav condi
' tons. The problem osuccession, hOWen!f, is crucial beause through it
ocurs the routinization o the charismatic fous of the structure. In it,
the character of the leader himself and of his claim;'o legitimacy is al
tered. This proess involves peculiar and characteristic conceptions'which
are understandable only in this context and do not apply to the problem
of transitiQl to traditional or legal patters of order >nd types or admin
isrative organization. The most important of the moe of meeting the
pblem of succession are the charismatic deSignation of a successor and
hereitary charisma.
.
4. As has already been noted, the most irriportant historical example
o designation by the charismatic leader of his own succesor is Rom.
Fo the Te, this arrangent is atteted by tradition; while for the ap
pointment of the dictor and of the co-emperor and succesor in the
-lrincipate, it has existed in historical times. The way m which all the
higher magistrates were invested with the impeium shows deaily that
they also were designated as successors by the military commander, sub
ject to recognitio: by the citizen army. The fact that candidates were
examined by the magistrate in ofce and that originally they could be
excluded on \"hat were obviously arbitrary grounds shows clearly what
was the nature o the development.
5
. The most important eamples of deSignation of a successor by the
charilmatic followers of the leader arc to be found in the election of
bishop, and prticularly o the Pope, by the original system o designa
tion by the clergy and recognition by the lay community. The investiga
tions of U. Stut have made it probable that the -eletion m the Gennan
king was modelled on that of the bishops.l" He was deSignated by a
group of gualifed prince and reognized by the "people," that is, those
baring arms
.
Similar arrangements are very common.
. The classical case of the development of hereditary charisma is
'that of caste in India. All ocupational qualifcations, and in particuJar
all the gualifications for positions of aUlhor:ty and power, have there
come to be regarded as strictly bound to the inheritance of charisma.
Eligibility for fefs, involving governing powers, was limited to mem
bers of the royal kinship group, the fefs being granted by the eldest of
the group, All type of religiOUS ofce, including the extraordinarily
important "nd infuential position of uru, the diretr d l'd, were
treated as bound to hereditary charismatic- qualities. The same is true of
all sorts of relations to traditional cusomcrs and of all pitions in the
village organization, such as priest, barber, laundryman, watchman, etc.
The foundation of a sect always meant the development of a hereditary
hierarchy, as was true also o Taoism in China. Also in the Japanese
:.
THE TYPES OF LEGITIMATE DOMINATION
[ Ch. 1II
"feudal" state, beore the introuction of a patrimonial ofcialdom on the
Chine moel. which then led to prbends and a new feudalization,
soial organization was based purely on hereditry charisma.
This

kind o hereditary charismatc right to poitions of authority
has ben develope in similar ways all over the world. Qualifcation
by
virtue of individual achievement has been replace by qualifcation bv
birth. This is
everywhere the basis of the develogment of hereditary
aristoracies, in the Roman nobility, in the concept of the stirps regia.
which Tacitus desribes among the Gnans, in the rule o eligibility
to tourament and monasteries in the late Middle Age, and even in
the genealoical reearch conducted on bhalf o the paenu aristoracy
of the United Sttes. Indeed, this is to b found everywhere where
hereitary status groups have bome establishe.
Relationship t the economy: The process of routinization of charisma
is in very important respcts identical with adaptation to the conditions
of the economy, since this is the pincipl continually operating force in
everyday life. Economic conditions in this connetion play a leading role
and do not constitute merely I depndent variable. To a very large ex
tent the transition to hereditar charisma or the charisma of ofce serves
as a means of legitimizing existing or recently acquired powers of con
trol over economic go s. Along with the ideology of loyalty, which is
certainly by no means unimportant, allegiance to hereditary monarchy in
particular is ver strongly infuenced by the consideration that an in
herited and legitimately acquired property would be endangered if
people stopped believing in the sanctity of hereditary succession to th,e
throne. It is hence by no means fortuitous that hereditary monarchy is
more adequate to the proprtied strata than to the proletariat.
Beyond this, it is not possible to say anything in general terms, which
would at the same time be substantial and valuable, on the relations of
the various possible moes of adaptation to the economic orer. This
must be reserved to the more detailed treatment. The development of
l prebendal structure, of feudalism, and the appropriation of all sorts of
Advantages on a heritary charismatic basis may in all cases have the
same stereotyping efect on the economic order jf they develop from
charismatic starting points as if they developed from early patrimonial
or bureaucratic stage. In economic respect, to, the revolutonary impact
of charisma is usually tremendous; at frst, it is often destructive, because
it means new moes of orientation. But routinizaton leads to the exact
reverse.
The eonomics or charismatic revolutions will have to b discussed
separately; tsa diferent matter altogether.